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But this argument presumes the very conclusion that is at issue in this case--namely, that the NYPD can prohibit unrecognized groups, including the LOA, from marching in parades in uniform and behind their organization banners. The danger of a prior restraint, as opposed to ex post disciplinary action, is precisely that making predictions ex ante as to what restrictions on speech will ultimately be found permissible is hazardous and may chill protected speech. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[U]nlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, [an ex ante restriction] chills potential speech before it happens.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., NTEU, 513 U.S. at 481, 115 S.Ct. 1003 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[E]x ante rules, in contrast to ex post punishments, carry risks of overinclu-siveness and underinclusiveness.”); id. at 468, 115 S.Ct. 1003 (majority opinion) (“[U]nlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, [an ex ante restriction] chills potential speech before it happens.”); see also New York Magazine, 136 F.3d at 131 (“We consider prior restraints to be particularly abhorrent to the First Amendment in part because they vest in government agencies the power to determine important constitutional questions properly vested in the judiciary.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "136 F.3d 131, 131",
"parenthetical": "\"We consider prior restraints to be particularly abhorrent to the First Amendment in part because they vest in government agencies the power to determine important constitutional questions properly vested in the judiciary.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., NTEU, 513 U.S. at 481, 115 S.Ct. 1003 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[E]x ante rules, in contrast to ex post punishments, carry risks of overinclu-siveness and underinclusiveness.”); id. at 468, 115 S.Ct. 1003 (majority opinion) (“[U]nlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, [an ex ante restriction] chills potential speech before it happens.”); see also New York Magazine, 136 F.3d at 131 (“We consider prior restraints to be particularly abhorrent to the First Amendment in part because they vest in government agencies the power to determine important constitutional questions properly vested in the judiciary.”)."
} | 11,555,327 | a |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "470 U.S. 856, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | 5,651,253 | a |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | 5,651,253 | b |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | 5,651,253 | b |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 1, 12",
"parenthetical": "presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | 5,651,253 | a |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | 5,651,253 | b |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a post-conviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | 5,651,253 | a |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "470 U.S. 856, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | 4,102,127 | a |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | 4,102,127 | a |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | 4,102,127 | a |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 1, 12",
"parenthetical": "presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | 4,102,127 | a |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | 4,102,127 | b |
It is probable that vacating Alaimalo's convictions for importation of methamphetamine will not reduce the length of his confinement; vacating these convictions, however, removes the possibility that he will be subject to their adverse collateral consequences. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions",
"sentence": "See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“[A] separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”) (emphasis in original); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (presuming significant collateral consequences in the context of criminal convictions); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir.1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "393 F.2d 731, 732",
"parenthetical": "\"Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent 'manifest injustice' even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir.1968) (“Coram nobis must be kept available as a postconviction remedy to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ even where the removal of a prior conviction will have little present effect on the petitioner.”)."
} | 4,102,127 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 F.2d 922, 923",
"parenthetical": "affirming lawfulness of officers' entry into front room of defendant's home where \"the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking\" and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "327 F.2d 301, 303-304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search",
"sentence": "Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303-304 (9th Cir. 1964) (defendant’s eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search)."
} | 3,832,426 | b |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "327 F.2d 301, 303-304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search",
"sentence": "Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303-304 (9th Cir. 1964) (defendant’s eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming lawfulness of officers' entry into front room of defendant's home where \"the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking\" and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382",
"parenthetical": "third party may consent to entry but not to search",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "327 F.2d 301, 303-304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search",
"sentence": "Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303-304 (9th Cir. 1964) (defendant’s eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search)."
} | 3,832,426 | b |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690",
"parenthetical": "\"that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house\"",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "327 F.2d 301, 303-304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search",
"sentence": "Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303-304 (9th Cir. 1964) (defendant’s eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search)."
} | 3,832,426 | b |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241",
"parenthetical": "evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants' well-being, and search was conducted with defendant's consent",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "327 F.2d 301, 303-304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search",
"sentence": "Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303-304 (9th Cir. 1964) (defendant’s eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search)."
} | 3,832,426 | b |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "327 F.2d 301, 303-304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search",
"sentence": "Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303-304 (9th Cir. 1964) (defendant’s eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "327 F.2d 301, 303-304",
"parenthetical": "defendant's eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search",
"sentence": "Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303-304 (9th Cir. 1964) (defendant’s eight year old daughter could consent to police entry, though not search)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 684, 689-693",
"parenthetical": "officer's continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 F.2d 922, 923",
"parenthetical": "affirming lawfulness of officers' entry into front room of defendant's home where \"the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking\" and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 684, 689-693",
"parenthetical": "officer's continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 F.2d 922, 923",
"parenthetical": "affirming lawfulness of officers' entry into front room of defendant's home where \"the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking\" and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | 3,832,426 | b |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming lawfulness of officers' entry into front room of defendant's home where \"the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking\" and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming lawfulness of officers' entry into front room of defendant's home where \"the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking\" and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 684, 689-693",
"parenthetical": "officer's continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382",
"parenthetical": "third party may consent to entry but not to search",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382",
"parenthetical": "third party may consent to entry but not to search",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 684, 689-693",
"parenthetical": "officer's continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690",
"parenthetical": "\"that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house\"",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | 3,832,426 | b |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690",
"parenthetical": "\"that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house\"",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 684, 689-693",
"parenthetical": "officer's continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241",
"parenthetical": "evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants' well-being, and search was conducted with defendant's consent",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
"Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof -- whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241",
"parenthetical": "evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants' well-being, and search was conducted with defendant's consent",
"sentence": "See Manni v. United States, 391 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968) (affirming lawfulness of officers’ entry into front room of defendant’s home where “the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking” and defendant knew of such purpose and consented to entry); Akron v. Harris, 93 Ohio App. 3d 378, 382 (1994) (third party may consent to entry but not to search); State v. Chapman, 97 Ohio App. 3d 687, 690 (1994) (“that where the intent of the officers was not to conduct a search, but only to question a resident, the consent of a third party to enter the house should not be held to the same standard as the consent of a third party to a warrant-less search of the house”); Commonwealth v. Netting, 315 Pa. Super. 236, 240-241 (1983) (evidence not suppressed where guest admitted police to apartment, police were not attempting to secure permission to search apartment but rather were responding to complaint to determine occupants’ well-being, and search was conducted with defendant’s consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 684, 689-693",
"parenthetical": "officer's continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 949-950, 954 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995) (no search or seizure when police questioned defendant at door of sleeping compartment in train). Contrast United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689-693 (7th Cir. 1997) (officer’s continuous knocking on hotel room door around 11:00 p.m. for over three minutes and asking defendant to open door to talk constituted an unconstitutional seizure)."
} | 3,832,426 | a |
Coastal manufactured and supplied the GFRC panels that comprised the "skin" of the St. George. Suppliers of building components have been determined to be protected ac tors entitled to protection by the repose provision of SS 2B only where the role of supplier was incidental and the actor's primary function was to provide individual expertise and particularized services relating to design and construction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 Mass. 636, 642",
"parenthetical": "defendant protected by SS 2B where its role of supplying bleachers was incidental to primary function of performing particularized construction services in assembling and installing bleachers",
"sentence": "See McDonough v. Marr Scaffolding Co., 412 Mass. 636, 642 (1992) (defendant protected by § 2B where its role of supplying bleachers was incidental to primary function of performing particularized construction services in assembling and installing bleachers)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "SS 2B protection extended to supplier of lift who provided individual expertise and particularized services, collaborated in design of lift, supervised installation, and specified and supervised building modifications",
"sentence": "See also Rosario v. M.D. Knowlton Co., 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 802 (§ 2B protection extended to supplier of lift who provided individual expertise and particularized services, collaborated in design of lift, supervised installation, and specified and supervised building modifications)."
} | 1,250,653 | a |
That exclusion sufficed in this case to vindicate the purpose of the rule. In so ruling, we leave open the question whether suppression would be necessary and proper at the sentencing phase where it is shown that the police acted egregiously, e.g., by undertaking a warrantless search for the very purpose of obtaining evidence to increase a defendant's sentence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "402 F.2d 599, 611-13",
"parenthetical": "evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was \"blatantly illegal,\" and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved",
"sentence": "See Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 931, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968) (evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was “blatantly illegal,” and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved); but see United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence “would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25",
"parenthetical": "limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence \"would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures \"",
"sentence": "See Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 931, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968) (evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was “blatantly illegal,” and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved); but see United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence “would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 3,491,307 | a |
That exclusion sufficed in this case to vindicate the purpose of the rule. In so ruling, we leave open the question whether suppression would be necessary and proper at the sentencing phase where it is shown that the police acted egregiously, e.g., by undertaking a warrantless search for the very purpose of obtaining evidence to increase a defendant's sentence. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25",
"parenthetical": "limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence \"would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures \"",
"sentence": "See Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 931, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968) (evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was “blatantly illegal,” and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved); but see United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence “would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was \"blatantly illegal,\" and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved",
"sentence": "See Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 931, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968) (evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was “blatantly illegal,” and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved); but see United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence “would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 3,491,307 | b |
That exclusion sufficed in this case to vindicate the purpose of the rule. In so ruling, we leave open the question whether suppression would be necessary and proper at the sentencing phase where it is shown that the police acted egregiously, e.g., by undertaking a warrantless search for the very purpose of obtaining evidence to increase a defendant's sentence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was \"blatantly illegal,\" and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved",
"sentence": "See Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 931, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968) (evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was “blatantly illegal,” and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved); but see United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence “would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25",
"parenthetical": "limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence \"would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures \"",
"sentence": "See Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 931, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968) (evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was “blatantly illegal,” and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved); but see United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence “would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 3,491,307 | a |
That exclusion sufficed in this case to vindicate the purpose of the rule. In so ruling, we leave open the question whether suppression would be necessary and proper at the sentencing phase where it is shown that the police acted egregiously, e.g., by undertaking a warrantless search for the very purpose of obtaining evidence to increase a defendant's sentence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was \"blatantly illegal,\" and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved",
"sentence": "See Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 931, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968) (evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was “blatantly illegal,” and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved); but see United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence “would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25",
"parenthetical": "limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence \"would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures \"",
"sentence": "See Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 611-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 931, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1968) (evidence excluded from sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was “blatantly illegal,” and court found that police needed to be deterred from making illegal searches under circumstances involved); but see United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (limiting holding of Verdugo to cases in which use at sentencing of illegally seized evidence “would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 3,491,307 | a |
Moreover, because an injured employee has been legislatively granted, in mandatory language, the unmitigated right to select and change his or her primary care provider during the course of treatment for an injury, we conclude that this right is not dependent upon a showing of medical necessity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "7 So.3d 556, 560-61",
"parenthetical": "stating \"[u]nder the managed care statute, the managed care plan must include a provision for the employee's selection of a primary care provider,\" and declaring that such right is \"similar and parallel\" to right to change in physician contained in section 440.13(2)(f",
"sentence": "See Nunez v. Pulte Homes, Inc., 985 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (concluding that statute providing injured employee mandatory right to change of physician during “the course of treatment” does not require employee to demonstrate medical necessity of change); see also Sunbelt Health Care v. Galva, 7 So.3d 556, 560-61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (stating “[u]nder the managed care statute, the managed care plan must include a provision for the employee’s selection of a primary care provider,” and declaring that such right is “similar and parallel” to right to change in physician contained in section 440.13(2)(f) — a right not dependent on showing of medical necessity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that statute providing injured employee mandatory right to change of physician during \"the course of treatment\" does not require employee to demonstrate medical necessity of change",
"sentence": "See Nunez v. Pulte Homes, Inc., 985 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (concluding that statute providing injured employee mandatory right to change of physician during “the course of treatment” does not require employee to demonstrate medical necessity of change); see also Sunbelt Health Care v. Galva, 7 So.3d 556, 560-61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (stating “[u]nder the managed care statute, the managed care plan must include a provision for the employee’s selection of a primary care provider,” and declaring that such right is “similar and parallel” to right to change in physician contained in section 440.13(2)(f) — a right not dependent on showing of medical necessity)."
} | 7,025,893 | b |
P 14. In addition to the language of the statute, "scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2008 WI 52, ¶ 22",
"parenthetical": "\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WI 27, ¶ 22",
"parenthetical": "\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | 4,021,955 | a |
P 14. In addition to the language of the statute, "scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2008 WI 52, ¶ 22",
"parenthetical": "\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | 4,021,955 | b |
P 14. In addition to the language of the statute, "scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2008 WI 52, ¶ 22",
"parenthetical": "\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | 4,021,955 | a |
P 14. In addition to the language of the statute, "scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WI 27, ¶ 22",
"parenthetical": "\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | 4,021,955 | a |
P 14. In addition to the language of the statute, "scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | 4,021,955 | a |
P 14. In addition to the language of the statute, "scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | 4,021,955 | b |
P 14. In addition to the language of the statute, "scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WI 27, ¶ 22",
"parenthetical": "\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | 4,021,955 | a |
P 14. In addition to the language of the statute, "scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | 4,021,955 | b |
P 14. In addition to the language of the statute, "scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\"",
"sentence": "Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (\"A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis.\"); see also Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶ 22, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652 (\"By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.\") (citation omitted)."
} | 4,021,955 | a |
In reaching its conclusions on "fair valuation," the court may adopt the asset values of one party or the other, or the court may choose its own fair valuation figure after weighing all the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 F.3d 30, 35",
"parenthetical": "stating that if possible, insolvency determinations should be based on seasonable appraisals or expert testimony, but that \"[b]ecause the value of property varies with time and circumstances, the finder of fact must be free to arrive at the 'fair valuation' defined in SS 101 [ (32",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Roblin Indus. Inc., 78 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir.1996) (stating that if possible, insolvency determinations should be based on seasonable appraisals or expert testimony, but that “[b]ecause the value of property varies with time and circumstances, the finder of fact must be free to arrive at the ‘fair valuation’ defined in § 101 [ (32) ] by the most appropriate means.”); See also Syracuse Eng’g Co. v. Haight, 110 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir.1940) (upholding “middle course” that court took with respect to value of assets and liabilities)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 F.2d 468, 470",
"parenthetical": "upholding \"middle course\" that court took with respect to value of assets and liabilities",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Roblin Indus. Inc., 78 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir.1996) (stating that if possible, insolvency determinations should be based on seasonable appraisals or expert testimony, but that “[b]ecause the value of property varies with time and circumstances, the finder of fact must be free to arrive at the ‘fair valuation’ defined in § 101 [ (32) ] by the most appropriate means.”); See also Syracuse Eng’g Co. v. Haight, 110 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir.1940) (upholding “middle course” that court took with respect to value of assets and liabilities)."
} | 6,052,160 | a |
We agree with the government and do not reach the merits of Reinke's claim because the state court applied an independent and adequate state procedural ground in ruling that the claim was procedurally defaulted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "796 F.2d 1103, 1106",
"parenthetical": "stating that failure to comply with Arizona's contemporaneous objection rule bars litigation of the claim in federal courts absent a showing of cause and prejudice",
"sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice); accord Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir.2003); see also Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that failure to comply with Arizona’s contemporaneous objection rule bars litigation of the claim in federal courts absent a showing of cause and prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 722, 750",
"parenthetical": "holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice",
"sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice); accord Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir.2003); see also Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that failure to comply with Arizona’s contemporaneous objection rule bars litigation of the claim in federal courts absent a showing of cause and prejudice)."
} | 142,084 | b |
We agree with the government and do not reach the merits of Reinke's claim because the state court applied an independent and adequate state procedural ground in ruling that the claim was procedurally defaulted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice",
"sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice); accord Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir.2003); see also Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that failure to comply with Arizona’s contemporaneous objection rule bars litigation of the claim in federal courts absent a showing of cause and prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "796 F.2d 1103, 1106",
"parenthetical": "stating that failure to comply with Arizona's contemporaneous objection rule bars litigation of the claim in federal courts absent a showing of cause and prejudice",
"sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice); accord Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir.2003); see also Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that failure to comply with Arizona’s contemporaneous objection rule bars litigation of the claim in federal courts absent a showing of cause and prejudice)."
} | 142,084 | a |
We agree with the government and do not reach the merits of Reinke's claim because the state court applied an independent and adequate state procedural ground in ruling that the claim was procedurally defaulted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "796 F.2d 1103, 1106",
"parenthetical": "stating that failure to comply with Arizona's contemporaneous objection rule bars litigation of the claim in federal courts absent a showing of cause and prejudice",
"sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice); accord Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir.2003); see also Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that failure to comply with Arizona’s contemporaneous objection rule bars litigation of the claim in federal courts absent a showing of cause and prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice",
"sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice); accord Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir.2003); see also Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that failure to comply with Arizona’s contemporaneous objection rule bars litigation of the claim in federal courts absent a showing of cause and prejudice)."
} | 142,084 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 381, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 N.C. 254, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 N.C. 254, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 N.C. 254, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 N.C. 254, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 S.W.2d 503, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 N.C. 254, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 Pa. 188, 212-13",
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 N.C. 254, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 N.C. 254, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 N.C. 254, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 N.C. 254, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 N.C. 254, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 381, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 S.W.2d 503, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 Pa. 188, 212-13",
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 381, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 S.W.2d 503, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 Pa. 188, 212-13",
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 381, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 S.W.2d 503, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 Pa. 188, 212-13",
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 381, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "837 S.W.2d 503, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 Pa. 188, 212-13",
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding \"no reason in law or logic\" why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
Our review of those authorities reveals that several courts have concluded that there is no statutory or common-law right of allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "919 P.2d 7, 22",
"parenthetical": "in capital case, court concluded that \"there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel\"",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 381, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence",
"sentence": "State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289, 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (in capital case, court concluded that “there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 991, 136 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1997); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 552 (Tenn. 1994) (“there is no statutory . . . [or] common-law . . . right to allocution in a capital case”); see United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that trial court did not violate former rule 32 [c] [3] [C] of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required court, before imposing sentence, to address defendant personally and to determine whether defendant wished to make statement or to present information in mitigation of sentence, when trial court denied defendant opportunity to make unsworn statement of remorse to capital sentencing jury but permitted defendant to make statement to court before it announced his sentence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1117, 119 S. Ct. 1767, 143 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo. 1992) (“the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 212-13, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) (concluding that legislature had abrogated common-law rules governing capital cases by replacing them with statutory scheme and finding “no reason in law or logic” why defendants should be permitted to make unsworn statements to juries in capital sentencing hearings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 215, 112 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1990)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
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