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The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | a |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | b |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "745 F.2d 1500, 1537",
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | a |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | b |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | b |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | b |
It is also true that the Vermont Supreme Court has recently evidenced upon several occasions its readiness to reexamine in the light of modern conditions and new legal developments some of the legal maxims and shibboleths of the past. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | 3,171,392 | b |
It is also true that the Vermont Supreme Court has recently evidenced upon several occasions its readiness to reexamine in the light of modern conditions and new legal developments some of the legal maxims and shibboleths of the past. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | 3,171,392 | b |
It is also true that the Vermont Supreme Court has recently evidenced upon several occasions its readiness to reexamine in the light of modern conditions and new legal developments some of the legal maxims and shibboleths of the past. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | 3,171,392 | b |
It is also true that the Vermont Supreme Court has recently evidenced upon several occasions its readiness to reexamine in the light of modern conditions and new legal developments some of the legal maxims and shibboleths of the past. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | 3,171,392 | b |
It is also true that the Vermont Supreme Court has recently evidenced upon several occasions its readiness to reexamine in the light of modern conditions and new legal developments some of the legal maxims and shibboleths of the past. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | 3,171,392 | a |
It is also true that the Vermont Supreme Court has recently evidenced upon several occasions its readiness to reexamine in the light of modern conditions and new legal developments some of the legal maxims and shibboleths of the past. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | 3,171,392 | a |
It is also true that the Vermont Supreme Court has recently evidenced upon several occasions its readiness to reexamine in the light of modern conditions and new legal developments some of the legal maxims and shibboleths of the past. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | 3,171,392 | b |
It is also true that the Vermont Supreme Court has recently evidenced upon several occasions its readiness to reexamine in the light of modern conditions and new legal developments some of the legal maxims and shibboleths of the past. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible",
"sentence": "O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965) (privity of contract not essential for action of negligence against food processor) ; Forcier v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 264 A.2d 796 (Vt.1970) (duty of business invitor to discover foreseeable debris); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt.1970) (builder responsible for breach of warranty to ultimate buyer); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958) (in hen blasting case damage without physical impact actionable, i. e., recovery for shock permissible); but see Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965) (married woman does not have independent cause of action for loss of consortium)."
} | 3,171,392 | b |
Several courts have declined to treat different firms as a single entity, holding them jointly and severally liable for one another's acts, simply because they shared an associational name and/or collaborated on certain aspects of the relevant transaction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "606 F.Supp. 600, 607",
"parenthetical": "dismissing complaint against Price Water-house entities outside the United States after rejecting argument that all Price Wa-terhouse affiliates worldwide were \"in fact one entity, and acted as agents of one another\"",
"sentence": "See In re AM Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 606 F.Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (dismissing complaint against Price Water-house entities outside the United States after rejecting argument that all Price Wa-terhouse affiliates worldwide were “in fact one entity, and acted as agents of one another”); Reingold v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 599 F.Supp. 1241, 1249, 1254 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (holding that existence of DH & S International, “an organization composed of a large number of affiliated accounting firms,” did not prove DH & S was “a single worldwide entity” even though some brochures described DH & S (U.S.) as “a single cohesive worldwide organization”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that defendant was not a legal entity, but \"an associational name used by a group of affiliated advertising agencies which are incorporated in different countries\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Noonan v. Winston Co., 902 F.Supp. 298, 300 n. 6 (D.Mass.1995) (noting in dicta that defendant was not a legal entity, but “an associational name used by a group of affiliated advertising agencies which are incorporated in different countries”); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F.Supp. 654, 660, 662 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (finding, in evaluation of personal jurisdiction, that “public relations materials suggesting] that Klynveld is a global firm or an international network of member firms” do not justify a finding of a partnership or agency between Klyn-veld and Peat Marwick US)."
} | 9,319,943 | a |
Several courts have declined to treat different firms as a single entity, holding them jointly and severally liable for one another's acts, simply because they shared an associational name and/or collaborated on certain aspects of the relevant transaction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "977 F.Supp. 654, 660, 662",
"parenthetical": "finding, in evaluation of personal jurisdiction, that \"public relations materials suggesting] that Klynveld is a global firm or an international network of member firms\" do not justify a finding of a partnership or agency between Klyn-veld and Peat Marwick US",
"sentence": "Cf. Noonan v. Winston Co., 902 F.Supp. 298, 300 n. 6 (D.Mass.1995) (noting in dicta that defendant was not a legal entity, but “an associational name used by a group of affiliated advertising agencies which are incorporated in different countries”); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F.Supp. 654, 660, 662 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (finding, in evaluation of personal jurisdiction, that “public relations materials suggesting] that Klynveld is a global firm or an international network of member firms” do not justify a finding of a partnership or agency between Klyn-veld and Peat Marwick US)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "606 F.Supp. 600, 607",
"parenthetical": "dismissing complaint against Price Water-house entities outside the United States after rejecting argument that all Price Wa-terhouse affiliates worldwide were \"in fact one entity, and acted as agents of one another\"",
"sentence": "See In re AM Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 606 F.Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (dismissing complaint against Price Water-house entities outside the United States after rejecting argument that all Price Wa-terhouse affiliates worldwide were “in fact one entity, and acted as agents of one another”); Reingold v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 599 F.Supp. 1241, 1249, 1254 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (holding that existence of DH & S International, “an organization composed of a large number of affiliated accounting firms,” did not prove DH & S was “a single worldwide entity” even though some brochures described DH & S (U.S.) as “a single cohesive worldwide organization”)."
} | 9,319,943 | b |
Several courts have declined to treat different firms as a single entity, holding them jointly and severally liable for one another's acts, simply because they shared an associational name and/or collaborated on certain aspects of the relevant transaction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "599 F.Supp. 1241, 1249",
"parenthetical": "holding that existence of DH & S International, \"an organization composed of a large number of affiliated accounting firms,\" did not prove DH & S was \"a single worldwide entity\" even though some brochures described DH & S (U.S.",
"sentence": "See In re AM Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 606 F.Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (dismissing complaint against Price Water-house entities outside the United States after rejecting argument that all Price Wa-terhouse affiliates worldwide were “in fact one entity, and acted as agents of one another”); Reingold v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 599 F.Supp. 1241, 1249, 1254 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (holding that existence of DH & S International, “an organization composed of a large number of affiliated accounting firms,” did not prove DH & S was “a single worldwide entity” even though some brochures described DH & S (U.S.) as “a single cohesive worldwide organization”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in dicta that defendant was not a legal entity, but \"an associational name used by a group of affiliated advertising agencies which are incorporated in different countries\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Noonan v. Winston Co., 902 F.Supp. 298, 300 n. 6 (D.Mass.1995) (noting in dicta that defendant was not a legal entity, but “an associational name used by a group of affiliated advertising agencies which are incorporated in different countries”); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F.Supp. 654, 660, 662 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (finding, in evaluation of personal jurisdiction, that “public relations materials suggesting] that Klynveld is a global firm or an international network of member firms” do not justify a finding of a partnership or agency between Klyn-veld and Peat Marwick US)."
} | 9,319,943 | a |
Several courts have declined to treat different firms as a single entity, holding them jointly and severally liable for one another's acts, simply because they shared an associational name and/or collaborated on certain aspects of the relevant transaction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "977 F.Supp. 654, 660, 662",
"parenthetical": "finding, in evaluation of personal jurisdiction, that \"public relations materials suggesting] that Klynveld is a global firm or an international network of member firms\" do not justify a finding of a partnership or agency between Klyn-veld and Peat Marwick US",
"sentence": "Cf. Noonan v. Winston Co., 902 F.Supp. 298, 300 n. 6 (D.Mass.1995) (noting in dicta that defendant was not a legal entity, but “an associational name used by a group of affiliated advertising agencies which are incorporated in different countries”); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F.Supp. 654, 660, 662 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (finding, in evaluation of personal jurisdiction, that “public relations materials suggesting] that Klynveld is a global firm or an international network of member firms” do not justify a finding of a partnership or agency between Klyn-veld and Peat Marwick US)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "599 F.Supp. 1241, 1249",
"parenthetical": "holding that existence of DH & S International, \"an organization composed of a large number of affiliated accounting firms,\" did not prove DH & S was \"a single worldwide entity\" even though some brochures described DH & S (U.S.",
"sentence": "See In re AM Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 606 F.Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (dismissing complaint against Price Water-house entities outside the United States after rejecting argument that all Price Wa-terhouse affiliates worldwide were “in fact one entity, and acted as agents of one another”); Reingold v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 599 F.Supp. 1241, 1249, 1254 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (holding that existence of DH & S International, “an organization composed of a large number of affiliated accounting firms,” did not prove DH & S was “a single worldwide entity” even though some brochures described DH & S (U.S.) as “a single cohesive worldwide organization”)."
} | 9,319,943 | b |
P12 Contrary to defendant's contention, subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c) punish different conduct. As relevant here, to be found guilty based on threats or intimidation under subsection (1)(b), the defendant (or the principal, if the defendant is guilty as a complicitor) must knowingly threaten or intimidate the victim with a deadly weapon. SS 18-4-302(1)(b). As relevant here, to be found guilty under subsection (1)(c), the defendant (or the principal, if the defendant is guilty as a com-plicitor) need not use a deadly weapon to threaten or intimidate the victim. SS 18-4-302(1)(c). Because the two subsections pro-seribe different means by which a victim may be robbed through the use of threats or intimidation, they do not contain identical statutory elements, and therefore do not punish identical conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "73 P.3d 11, 14",
"parenthetical": "comparing statutory elements to determine whether two statutes proseribe identical conduct",
"sentence": "See Campbell v. People, 73 P.3d 11, 14 (Colo.2003) (comparing statutory elements to determine whether two statutes proseribe identical conduct); see also People v. Loomis, 857 P.2d 478, 480 (Colo.App.1992) (discussing similar distinetion between elements of first degree and second degree burglary)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "857 P.2d 478, 480",
"parenthetical": "discussing similar distinetion between elements of first degree and second degree burglary",
"sentence": "See Campbell v. People, 73 P.3d 11, 14 (Colo.2003) (comparing statutory elements to determine whether two statutes proseribe identical conduct); see also People v. Loomis, 857 P.2d 478, 480 (Colo.App.1992) (discussing similar distinetion between elements of first degree and second degree burglary)."
} | 6,891,672 | a |
Furthermore, the Court notes that, even if the Yahoo Search Warrants were defective under these provisions of the SCA, the SCA is a statute, not a constitutional rule requiring heightened protection. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "748 F.3d 967, 973",
"parenthetical": "\"some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (“The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Guzman, 879 F.Supp.2d 312, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s (JDA) statutory parental notification requirement did not require a per se suppression remedy); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir.2011) (“[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text”); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.2006) (“Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.”); but see United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir.2014) (“some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (“The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Guzman, 879 F.Supp.2d 312, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s (JDA) statutory parental notification requirement did not require a per se suppression remedy); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir.2011) (“[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text”); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.2006) (“Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.”); but see United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir.2014) (“some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)."
} | 4,365,584 | b |
Furthermore, the Court notes that, even if the Yahoo Search Warrants were defective under these provisions of the SCA, the SCA is a statute, not a constitutional rule requiring heightened protection. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (“The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Guzman, 879 F.Supp.2d 312, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s (JDA) statutory parental notification requirement did not require a per se suppression remedy); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir.2011) (“[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text”); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.2006) (“Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.”); but see United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir.2014) (“some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "748 F.3d 967, 973",
"parenthetical": "\"some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (“The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Guzman, 879 F.Supp.2d 312, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s (JDA) statutory parental notification requirement did not require a per se suppression remedy); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir.2011) (“[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text”); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.2006) (“Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.”); but see United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir.2014) (“some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)."
} | 4,365,584 | a |
Furthermore, the Court notes that, even if the Yahoo Search Warrants were defective under these provisions of the SCA, the SCA is a statute, not a constitutional rule requiring heightened protection. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "748 F.3d 967, 973",
"parenthetical": "\"some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (“The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Guzman, 879 F.Supp.2d 312, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s (JDA) statutory parental notification requirement did not require a per se suppression remedy); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir.2011) (“[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text”); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.2006) (“Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.”); but see United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir.2014) (“some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (“The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Guzman, 879 F.Supp.2d 312, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s (JDA) statutory parental notification requirement did not require a per se suppression remedy); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir.2011) (“[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text”); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.2006) (“Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.”); but see United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir.2014) (“some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)."
} | 4,365,584 | b |
Furthermore, the Court notes that, even if the Yahoo Search Warrants were defective under these provisions of the SCA, the SCA is a statute, not a constitutional rule requiring heightened protection. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "631 F.3d 658, 667",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (“The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Guzman, 879 F.Supp.2d 312, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s (JDA) statutory parental notification requirement did not require a per se suppression remedy); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir.2011) (“[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text”); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.2006) (“Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.”); but see United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir.2014) (“some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "748 F.3d 967, 973",
"parenthetical": "\"some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (“The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Guzman, 879 F.Supp.2d 312, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s (JDA) statutory parental notification requirement did not require a per se suppression remedy); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir.2011) (“[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text”); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.2006) (“Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.”); but see United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir.2014) (“some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)."
} | 4,365,584 | a |
Furthermore, the Court notes that, even if the Yahoo Search Warrants were defective under these provisions of the SCA, the SCA is a statute, not a constitutional rule requiring heightened protection. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "748 F.3d 967, 973",
"parenthetical": "\"some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (“The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Guzman, 879 F.Supp.2d 312, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s (JDA) statutory parental notification requirement did not require a per se suppression remedy); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir.2011) (“[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text”); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.2006) (“Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.”); but see United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir.2014) (“some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "463 F.3d 547, 556",
"parenthetical": "\"Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (“The availability of a suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.”); United States v. Guzman, 879 F.Supp.2d 312, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (finding that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s (JDA) statutory parental notification requirement did not require a per se suppression remedy); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir.2011) (“[i]n the statutory context, suppression is a creature of the statute, and its availability depends on the statutory text”); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir.2006) (“Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations.”); but see United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir.2014) (“some violations of Rule 41 can lead to the suppression of evidence regardless of whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)."
} | 4,365,584 | b |
Remand to the Commissioner is the appropriate disposition where, as here, the ALJ incorrectly applied the law and failed to adequately develop the medical record. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 34, 39",
"parenthetical": "\"When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard, we have, on numerous occasions, remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996) (“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard, we have, on numerous occasions, remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of the evidence.”) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Rosa, 168 F.3d at 83 (remanding to the Commissioner for further development of the evidence where the ALJ “failed to fulfill her duty in [claimant’s] case in several respects.”) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original); Devora, 205 F.Supp.2d at 173 (“Where the ALJ has failed to develop the administrative record, remand for a new hearing is appropriate.”); Welch v. Chater, 923 F.Supp. 17, 20 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (remanding to the Commissioner for further evidentia-ry proceedings where ALJ failed to sufficiently develop the record regarding claimant’s ability to handle the mental demands of past work)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "168 F.3d 83, 83",
"parenthetical": "remanding to the Commissioner for further development of the evidence where the ALJ \"failed to fulfill her duty in [claimant's] case in several respects.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996) (“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard, we have, on numerous occasions, remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of the evidence.”) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Rosa, 168 F.3d at 83 (remanding to the Commissioner for further development of the evidence where the ALJ “failed to fulfill her duty in [claimant’s] case in several respects.”) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original); Devora, 205 F.Supp.2d at 173 (“Where the ALJ has failed to develop the administrative record, remand for a new hearing is appropriate.”); Welch v. Chater, 923 F.Supp. 17, 20 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (remanding to the Commissioner for further evidentia-ry proceedings where ALJ failed to sufficiently develop the record regarding claimant’s ability to handle the mental demands of past work)."
} | 9,096,880 | a |
Remand to the Commissioner is the appropriate disposition where, as here, the ALJ incorrectly applied the law and failed to adequately develop the medical record. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 34, 39",
"parenthetical": "\"When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard, we have, on numerous occasions, remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996) (“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard, we have, on numerous occasions, remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of the evidence.”) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Rosa, 168 F.3d at 83 (remanding to the Commissioner for further development of the evidence where the ALJ “failed to fulfill her duty in [claimant’s] case in several respects.”) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original); Devora, 205 F.Supp.2d at 173 (“Where the ALJ has failed to develop the administrative record, remand for a new hearing is appropriate.”); Welch v. Chater, 923 F.Supp. 17, 20 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (remanding to the Commissioner for further evidentia-ry proceedings where ALJ failed to sufficiently develop the record regarding claimant’s ability to handle the mental demands of past work)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "205 F.Supp.2d 173, 173",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the ALJ has failed to develop the administrative record, remand for a new hearing is appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996) (“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard, we have, on numerous occasions, remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of the evidence.”) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Rosa, 168 F.3d at 83 (remanding to the Commissioner for further development of the evidence where the ALJ “failed to fulfill her duty in [claimant’s] case in several respects.”) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original); Devora, 205 F.Supp.2d at 173 (“Where the ALJ has failed to develop the administrative record, remand for a new hearing is appropriate.”); Welch v. Chater, 923 F.Supp. 17, 20 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (remanding to the Commissioner for further evidentia-ry proceedings where ALJ failed to sufficiently develop the record regarding claimant’s ability to handle the mental demands of past work)."
} | 9,096,880 | a |
Remand to the Commissioner is the appropriate disposition where, as here, the ALJ incorrectly applied the law and failed to adequately develop the medical record. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 34, 39",
"parenthetical": "\"When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard, we have, on numerous occasions, remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996) (“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard, we have, on numerous occasions, remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of the evidence.”) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Rosa, 168 F.3d at 83 (remanding to the Commissioner for further development of the evidence where the ALJ “failed to fulfill her duty in [claimant’s] case in several respects.”) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original); Devora, 205 F.Supp.2d at 173 (“Where the ALJ has failed to develop the administrative record, remand for a new hearing is appropriate.”); Welch v. Chater, 923 F.Supp. 17, 20 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (remanding to the Commissioner for further evidentia-ry proceedings where ALJ failed to sufficiently develop the record regarding claimant’s ability to handle the mental demands of past work)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 F.Supp. 17, 20",
"parenthetical": "remanding to the Commissioner for further evidentia-ry proceedings where ALJ failed to sufficiently develop the record regarding claimant's ability to handle the mental demands of past work",
"sentence": "See Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996) (“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard, we have, on numerous occasions, remanded to the [Commissioner] for further development of the evidence.”) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Rosa, 168 F.3d at 83 (remanding to the Commissioner for further development of the evidence where the ALJ “failed to fulfill her duty in [claimant’s] case in several respects.”) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original); Devora, 205 F.Supp.2d at 173 (“Where the ALJ has failed to develop the administrative record, remand for a new hearing is appropriate.”); Welch v. Chater, 923 F.Supp. 17, 20 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (remanding to the Commissioner for further evidentia-ry proceedings where ALJ failed to sufficiently develop the record regarding claimant’s ability to handle the mental demands of past work)."
} | 9,096,880 | a |
Reply Brief of Appellant at 3. Miles' testimony was introduced on the fifth day of a six-day trial. The trial judge was in the best position to evaluate its probative value in the context of all the evidence presented. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "427 F.2d 987, 990-91",
"parenthetical": "\"It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir.1981) (admission not an abuse of discretion where “[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative”); see also Havelock v. United States, 427 F.2d 987, 990-91 (10th Cir.) (“It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 251 (1970)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "648 F.2d 473, 479",
"parenthetical": "admission not an abuse of discretion where \"[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir.1981) (admission not an abuse of discretion where “[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative”); see also Havelock v. United States, 427 F.2d 987, 990-91 (10th Cir.) (“It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 251 (1970)."
} | 1,854,747 | b |
Reply Brief of Appellant at 3. Miles' testimony was introduced on the fifth day of a six-day trial. The trial judge was in the best position to evaluate its probative value in the context of all the evidence presented. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir.1981) (admission not an abuse of discretion where “[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative”); see also Havelock v. United States, 427 F.2d 987, 990-91 (10th Cir.) (“It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 251 (1970)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "648 F.2d 473, 479",
"parenthetical": "admission not an abuse of discretion where \"[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir.1981) (admission not an abuse of discretion where “[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative”); see also Havelock v. United States, 427 F.2d 987, 990-91 (10th Cir.) (“It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 251 (1970)."
} | 1,854,747 | b |
Reply Brief of Appellant at 3. Miles' testimony was introduced on the fifth day of a six-day trial. The trial judge was in the best position to evaluate its probative value in the context of all the evidence presented. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "648 F.2d 473, 479",
"parenthetical": "admission not an abuse of discretion where \"[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir.1981) (admission not an abuse of discretion where “[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative”); see also Havelock v. United States, 427 F.2d 987, 990-91 (10th Cir.) (“It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 251 (1970)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir.1981) (admission not an abuse of discretion where “[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative”); see also Havelock v. United States, 427 F.2d 987, 990-91 (10th Cir.) (“It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 251 (1970)."
} | 1,854,747 | a |
Reply Brief of Appellant at 3. Miles' testimony was introduced on the fifth day of a six-day trial. The trial judge was in the best position to evaluate its probative value in the context of all the evidence presented. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "648 F.2d 473, 479",
"parenthetical": "admission not an abuse of discretion where \"[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir.1981) (admission not an abuse of discretion where “[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative”); see also Havelock v. United States, 427 F.2d 987, 990-91 (10th Cir.) (“It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 251 (1970)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir.1981) (admission not an abuse of discretion where “[t]he evidence concerning intent and motive was not so great as to make the evidence of similar crimes cumulative”); see also Havelock v. United States, 427 F.2d 987, 990-91 (10th Cir.) (“It would be awkward to refuse evidence bearing on an. element of the crime because, through hindsight, we are able to say that it proved unnecessary in the end.”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 251 (1970)."
} | 1,854,747 | a |
However, the burden is upon the appellant to furnish sufficient evidence to the trial court and to designate a record sufficient to present her points to the appellate court to establish the claimed error. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "126 Wis. 383, 383",
"parenthetical": "trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value",
"sentence": "See Beaty v. Beaty, 167 Mich. App. 553, 557, 423 N.W.2d 262 (1988) (a husband’s non-contributory pension does not have to be divided in the absence of any showing by the wife as to its present value); Miller v. Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672, 675, 269 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1978) (party seeking to include pension interest in marital estate for purposes of distribution in divorce proceedings bears burden of proving reasonably ascertainable value, and if burden is not met, interest should not be considered as asset subject to distribution); but see, In re Marriage of Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. at 383 (trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "167 Mich. App. 553, 557",
"parenthetical": "a husband's non-contributory pension does not have to be divided in the absence of any showing by the wife as to its present value",
"sentence": "See Beaty v. Beaty, 167 Mich. App. 553, 557, 423 N.W.2d 262 (1988) (a husband’s non-contributory pension does not have to be divided in the absence of any showing by the wife as to its present value); Miller v. Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672, 675, 269 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1978) (party seeking to include pension interest in marital estate for purposes of distribution in divorce proceedings bears burden of proving reasonably ascertainable value, and if burden is not met, interest should not be considered as asset subject to distribution); but see, In re Marriage of Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. at 383 (trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value)."
} | 1,491,046 | b |
However, the burden is upon the appellant to furnish sufficient evidence to the trial court and to designate a record sufficient to present her points to the appellate court to establish the claimed error. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "126 Wis. 383, 383",
"parenthetical": "trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value",
"sentence": "See Beaty v. Beaty, 167 Mich. App. 553, 557, 423 N.W.2d 262 (1988) (a husband’s non-contributory pension does not have to be divided in the absence of any showing by the wife as to its present value); Miller v. Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672, 675, 269 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1978) (party seeking to include pension interest in marital estate for purposes of distribution in divorce proceedings bears burden of proving reasonably ascertainable value, and if burden is not met, interest should not be considered as asset subject to distribution); but see, In re Marriage of Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. at 383 (trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a husband's non-contributory pension does not have to be divided in the absence of any showing by the wife as to its present value",
"sentence": "See Beaty v. Beaty, 167 Mich. App. 553, 557, 423 N.W.2d 262 (1988) (a husband’s non-contributory pension does not have to be divided in the absence of any showing by the wife as to its present value); Miller v. Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672, 675, 269 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1978) (party seeking to include pension interest in marital estate for purposes of distribution in divorce proceedings bears burden of proving reasonably ascertainable value, and if burden is not met, interest should not be considered as asset subject to distribution); but see, In re Marriage of Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. at 383 (trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value)."
} | 1,491,046 | b |
However, the burden is upon the appellant to furnish sufficient evidence to the trial court and to designate a record sufficient to present her points to the appellate court to establish the claimed error. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "126 Wis. 383, 383",
"parenthetical": "trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value",
"sentence": "See Beaty v. Beaty, 167 Mich. App. 553, 557, 423 N.W.2d 262 (1988) (a husband’s non-contributory pension does not have to be divided in the absence of any showing by the wife as to its present value); Miller v. Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672, 675, 269 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1978) (party seeking to include pension interest in marital estate for purposes of distribution in divorce proceedings bears burden of proving reasonably ascertainable value, and if burden is not met, interest should not be considered as asset subject to distribution); but see, In re Marriage of Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. at 383 (trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "83 Mich. App. 672, 675",
"parenthetical": "party seeking to include pension interest in marital estate for purposes of distribution in divorce proceedings bears burden of proving reasonably ascertainable value, and if burden is not met, interest should not be considered as asset subject to distribution",
"sentence": "See Beaty v. Beaty, 167 Mich. App. 553, 557, 423 N.W.2d 262 (1988) (a husband’s non-contributory pension does not have to be divided in the absence of any showing by the wife as to its present value); Miller v. Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672, 675, 269 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1978) (party seeking to include pension interest in marital estate for purposes of distribution in divorce proceedings bears burden of proving reasonably ascertainable value, and if burden is not met, interest should not be considered as asset subject to distribution); but see, In re Marriage of Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. at 383 (trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value)."
} | 1,491,046 | b |
However, the burden is upon the appellant to furnish sufficient evidence to the trial court and to designate a record sufficient to present her points to the appellate court to establish the claimed error. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "126 Wis. 383, 383",
"parenthetical": "trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value",
"sentence": "See Beaty v. Beaty, 167 Mich. App. 553, 557, 423 N.W.2d 262 (1988) (a husband’s non-contributory pension does not have to be divided in the absence of any showing by the wife as to its present value); Miller v. Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672, 675, 269 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1978) (party seeking to include pension interest in marital estate for purposes of distribution in divorce proceedings bears burden of proving reasonably ascertainable value, and if burden is not met, interest should not be considered as asset subject to distribution); but see, In re Marriage of Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. at 383 (trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "269 N.W.2d 264, 266",
"parenthetical": "party seeking to include pension interest in marital estate for purposes of distribution in divorce proceedings bears burden of proving reasonably ascertainable value, and if burden is not met, interest should not be considered as asset subject to distribution",
"sentence": "See Beaty v. Beaty, 167 Mich. App. 553, 557, 423 N.W.2d 262 (1988) (a husband’s non-contributory pension does not have to be divided in the absence of any showing by the wife as to its present value); Miller v. Miller, 83 Mich. App. 672, 675, 269 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1978) (party seeking to include pension interest in marital estate for purposes of distribution in divorce proceedings bears burden of proving reasonably ascertainable value, and if burden is not met, interest should not be considered as asset subject to distribution); but see, In re Marriage of Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. at 383 (trial court must evaluate and include the pension interest in the property division whether or not the parties present evidence on its value)."
} | 1,491,046 | b |
In addressing the Court's ability to enter a final judgment on Count III of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Plaintiff takes the position that her fraud/intentional misrepresentation claim must be resolved in the claims allowance process because these misrepresentations induced her to enter into the 2004 and 2005 Forbearance Agreements, upon which the Defendants' rely as a defense to the Plaintiffs allegations. A forbearance agreement is unenforceable if it is induced by fraud or bad faith. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "299 S.W.2d 261, 264",
"parenthetical": "holding \"forbearance to sue is a good consideration for a promise founded thereon\" and \"[i]t is only essential that the claim be asserted in good faith.\"",
"sentence": "See Cook v. Cook, 299 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Ky.1957) (holding “forbearance to sue is a good consideration for a promise founded thereon” and “[i]t is only essential that the claim be asserted in good faith.”); see also Ruckel v. Baston, 252 S.W.2d 432 (Ky.1952) (holding forbearance to prosecute a doubtful claim asserted in good faith will constitute adequate consideration)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding forbearance to prosecute a doubtful claim asserted in good faith will constitute adequate consideration",
"sentence": "See Cook v. Cook, 299 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Ky.1957) (holding “forbearance to sue is a good consideration for a promise founded thereon” and “[i]t is only essential that the claim be asserted in good faith.”); see also Ruckel v. Baston, 252 S.W.2d 432 (Ky.1952) (holding forbearance to prosecute a doubtful claim asserted in good faith will constitute adequate consideration)."
} | 3,673,969 | a |
The Chambers Court explicitly recognized courts' inherent power to "assess attorney's fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." The Chambers Court also held that the presence of statutes specifically authorizing certain sanctions in certain cases does not eliminate a court's power to impose sanctions under its inherent authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney's fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.\"",
"sentence": "See 111 S.Ct. at 2134 (“We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.”); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (“An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney’s fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir.1990) (court’s inherent authority authorizes sanction on attorney in criminal case); In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037 (2d Cir.1976) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2134, 2134",
"parenthetical": "\"We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.\"",
"sentence": "See 111 S.Ct. at 2134 (“We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.”); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (“An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney’s fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir.1990) (court’s inherent authority authorizes sanction on attorney in criminal case); In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037 (2d Cir.1976) (same)."
} | 3,499,495 | b |
The Chambers Court explicitly recognized courts' inherent power to "assess attorney's fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." The Chambers Court also held that the presence of statutes specifically authorizing certain sanctions in certain cases does not eliminate a court's power to impose sanctions under its inherent authority. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2134, 2134",
"parenthetical": "\"We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.\"",
"sentence": "See 111 S.Ct. at 2134 (“We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.”); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (“An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney’s fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir.1990) (court’s inherent authority authorizes sanction on attorney in criminal case); In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037 (2d Cir.1976) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney's fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.\"",
"sentence": "See 111 S.Ct. at 2134 (“We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.”); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (“An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney’s fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir.1990) (court’s inherent authority authorizes sanction on attorney in criminal case); In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037 (2d Cir.1976) (same)."
} | 3,499,495 | a |
The Chambers Court explicitly recognized courts' inherent power to "assess attorney's fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." The Chambers Court also held that the presence of statutes specifically authorizing certain sanctions in certain cases does not eliminate a court's power to impose sanctions under its inherent authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney's fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.\"",
"sentence": "See 111 S.Ct. at 2134 (“We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.”); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (“An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney’s fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir.1990) (court’s inherent authority authorizes sanction on attorney in criminal case); In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037 (2d Cir.1976) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2134, 2134",
"parenthetical": "\"We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.\"",
"sentence": "See 111 S.Ct. at 2134 (“We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.”); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (“An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney’s fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir.1990) (court’s inherent authority authorizes sanction on attorney in criminal case); In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037 (2d Cir.1976) (same)."
} | 3,499,495 | b |
The Chambers Court explicitly recognized courts' inherent power to "assess attorney's fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." The Chambers Court also held that the presence of statutes specifically authorizing certain sanctions in certain cases does not eliminate a court's power to impose sanctions under its inherent authority. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2134, 2134",
"parenthetical": "\"We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.\"",
"sentence": "See 111 S.Ct. at 2134 (“We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.”); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (“An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney’s fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir.1990) (court’s inherent authority authorizes sanction on attorney in criminal case); In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037 (2d Cir.1976) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "894 F.2d 215, 217",
"parenthetical": "court's inherent authority authorizes sanction on attorney in criminal case",
"sentence": "See 111 S.Ct. at 2134 (“We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.”); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (“An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney’s fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”); United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir.1990) (court’s inherent authority authorizes sanction on attorney in criminal case); In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037 (2d Cir.1976) (same)."
} | 3,499,495 | a |
In order to obtain credit for MBT from Virginia corporations, Aboud submitted false information to Dun & Bradstreet, and she faxed credit applications to ePlus and Intelligent Decisions, Inc. in Virginia. Because ePlus's claims involve credit fraud, these acts alone are sufficient to justify the court's exercise of jurisdiction over Aboud. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "126 F.3d 625, 625",
"parenthetical": "\"[Contacts related to the cause of action must create a 'substantial connection' to the forum state.\"",
"sentence": "See English & Smith v. Metzger, 901 F.2d 36, 38 (4th Cir.1990) (“[A] single act by a nonresident which amounts to transacting business in Virginia and gives rise to a cause of action may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon [Virginia] courts.”) (internal quotes omitted) (second alteration in original); see also ESAB Group, Inc., 126 F.3d at 625 (“[Contacts related to the cause of action must create a ‘substantial connection’ to the forum state.”) (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "901 F.2d 36, 38",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] single act by a nonresident which amounts to transacting business in Virginia and gives rise to a cause of action may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon [Virginia] courts.\"",
"sentence": "See English & Smith v. Metzger, 901 F.2d 36, 38 (4th Cir.1990) (“[A] single act by a nonresident which amounts to transacting business in Virginia and gives rise to a cause of action may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon [Virginia] courts.”) (internal quotes omitted) (second alteration in original); see also ESAB Group, Inc., 126 F.3d at 625 (“[Contacts related to the cause of action must create a ‘substantial connection’ to the forum state.”) (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957))."
} | 9,313,621 | b |
Thus, the issue of initial removal by a defendant other than the first-served defendant was simply not before the court in McKinney. Therefore, the McKinney court's expression in Footnote 3 regarding the application of SS 1446 in the circumstance where the first-served defendant had not timely filed a notice of removal was gratuitous and unrelated to the issue then before the court. Footnote 3 is classic judicial dictum: "an opinion by a court ... that is not essential to the decision," Black's Law Dictionary 485 (8th ed.2004) and therefore not binding on later panels in this circuit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 439, 463, n. 11",
"parenthetical": "commenting on \"the need to distinguish an opinion's holding from its dicta\"",
"sentence": "Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 329 (“dicta ... cannot serve as a source of binding authority in American jurisprudence”); see also U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463, n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (commenting on “the need to distinguish an opinion’s holding from its dicta”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "336 F.3d 329, 329",
"parenthetical": "\"dicta ... cannot serve as a source of binding authority in American jurisprudence\"",
"sentence": "Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 329 (“dicta ... cannot serve as a source of binding authority in American jurisprudence”); see also U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463, n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (commenting on “the need to distinguish an opinion’s holding from its dicta”)."
} | 3,521,687 | b |
Thus, the issue of initial removal by a defendant other than the first-served defendant was simply not before the court in McKinney. Therefore, the McKinney court's expression in Footnote 3 regarding the application of SS 1446 in the circumstance where the first-served defendant had not timely filed a notice of removal was gratuitous and unrelated to the issue then before the court. Footnote 3 is classic judicial dictum: "an opinion by a court ... that is not essential to the decision," Black's Law Dictionary 485 (8th ed.2004) and therefore not binding on later panels in this circuit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "commenting on \"the need to distinguish an opinion's holding from its dicta\"",
"sentence": "Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 329 (“dicta ... cannot serve as a source of binding authority in American jurisprudence”); see also U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463, n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (commenting on “the need to distinguish an opinion’s holding from its dicta”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "336 F.3d 329, 329",
"parenthetical": "\"dicta ... cannot serve as a source of binding authority in American jurisprudence\"",
"sentence": "Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 329 (“dicta ... cannot serve as a source of binding authority in American jurisprudence”); see also U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463, n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (commenting on “the need to distinguish an opinion’s holding from its dicta”)."
} | 3,521,687 | b |
Thus, the issue of initial removal by a defendant other than the first-served defendant was simply not before the court in McKinney. Therefore, the McKinney court's expression in Footnote 3 regarding the application of SS 1446 in the circumstance where the first-served defendant had not timely filed a notice of removal was gratuitous and unrelated to the issue then before the court. Footnote 3 is classic judicial dictum: "an opinion by a court ... that is not essential to the decision," Black's Law Dictionary 485 (8th ed.2004) and therefore not binding on later panels in this circuit. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "336 F.3d 329, 329",
"parenthetical": "\"dicta ... cannot serve as a source of binding authority in American jurisprudence\"",
"sentence": "Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 329 (“dicta ... cannot serve as a source of binding authority in American jurisprudence”); see also U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463, n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (commenting on “the need to distinguish an opinion’s holding from its dicta”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "commenting on \"the need to distinguish an opinion's holding from its dicta\"",
"sentence": "Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 329 (“dicta ... cannot serve as a source of binding authority in American jurisprudence”); see also U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463, n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (commenting on “the need to distinguish an opinion’s holding from its dicta”)."
} | 3,521,687 | a |
See The Trademark Act of 1946 (LanhamAct), 15 U.S.C. SS1127 (2000). As a consequence, the majority of courts look to whether the franchisor exercised control over the day-to-day operations of the franchisee or controlled through the franchise agreement the instrumentality which caused the harm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40",
"parenthetical": "restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee's negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee's employees",
"sentence": "See Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40 (Wis. 2004) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee’s employees); see also Evans v. McDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (franchisor not liable as an employer under Title VII even though it provided the manner of the franchise’s operations, frequent inspections, and training for employees, it did not have control over employment relations); Wendy Hong Wu v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 105 F.Sup.2d 83, 87-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s security deficiencies because the franchise agreement did not give the franchisor “considerable control . . . over the specific instrumentality at issue”); Viches v. MLT, Inc., 127 F.Sup.2d 828, 832 (E.D.Mich. 2000) (hotel franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent use of pesticides where the franchise agreement only ensured “uniformity and standardization ... of services”); Jones v. Filer, Inc., 43 F.Sup.2d 1052, 1056-58 (W.D.Ark. 1999) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee or its employees even though franchise agreement addressed training programs, advertising, hours of the franchisee’s operation, and decor; franchisor did not exercise control over hiring, firing, and supervising of employees); Hatcher v. 7-Eleven and Southland Corp., 956 F.Sup. 387, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (franchisor not franchisee’s employer under Title VII even though it provided an administrative payroll service, checks, unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation insurance, payroll insurance, and social security contribution, because franchisor did not hire, fire, or supervise the franchisee’s employees); Perry v. Burger King, Corp., 924 F.Sup. 548, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (restaurant franchisor could not be held vicariously liable for race discrimination by franchisee because the franchise agreement did not allow the franchisor control over employment issues); Vandemark v. McDonald’s Corp., 904 A.2d 627, 636 (N.H. 2006) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for attack on franchisee’s employee because the franchisor established uniformity and standardization of products and services and did not exercise control over security operations); Pizza K., Inc. v. Santagata, 547 S.E.2d 405, 406-07 (Ga.Ct.App. 2001) (pizza franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee delivery driver’s accident because franchisor did not supervise the day-to-day activities of the franchisee’s employees); Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Mich.Ct.App. 1990) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for injuries of franchisee patron who slipped on ice because franchise agreement provided for “uniformity and standardization of products,” and did not give the franchisor control over daily operations)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 1087, 1090",
"parenthetical": "franchisor not liable as an employer under Title VII even though it provided the manner of the franchise's operations, frequent inspections, and training for employees, it did not have control over employment relations",
"sentence": "See Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40 (Wis. 2004) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee’s employees); see also Evans v. McDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (franchisor not liable as an employer under Title VII even though it provided the manner of the franchise’s operations, frequent inspections, and training for employees, it did not have control over employment relations); Wendy Hong Wu v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 105 F.Sup.2d 83, 87-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s security deficiencies because the franchise agreement did not give the franchisor “considerable control . . . over the specific instrumentality at issue”); Viches v. MLT, Inc., 127 F.Sup.2d 828, 832 (E.D.Mich. 2000) (hotel franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent use of pesticides where the franchise agreement only ensured “uniformity and standardization ... of services”); Jones v. Filer, Inc., 43 F.Sup.2d 1052, 1056-58 (W.D.Ark. 1999) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee or its employees even though franchise agreement addressed training programs, advertising, hours of the franchisee’s operation, and decor; franchisor did not exercise control over hiring, firing, and supervising of employees); Hatcher v. 7-Eleven and Southland Corp., 956 F.Sup. 387, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (franchisor not franchisee’s employer under Title VII even though it provided an administrative payroll service, checks, unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation insurance, payroll insurance, and social security contribution, because franchisor did not hire, fire, or supervise the franchisee’s employees); Perry v. Burger King, Corp., 924 F.Sup. 548, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (restaurant franchisor could not be held vicariously liable for race discrimination by franchisee because the franchise agreement did not allow the franchisor control over employment issues); Vandemark v. McDonald’s Corp., 904 A.2d 627, 636 (N.H. 2006) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for attack on franchisee’s employee because the franchisor established uniformity and standardization of products and services and did not exercise control over security operations); Pizza K., Inc. v. Santagata, 547 S.E.2d 405, 406-07 (Ga.Ct.App. 2001) (pizza franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee delivery driver’s accident because franchisor did not supervise the day-to-day activities of the franchisee’s employees); Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Mich.Ct.App. 1990) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for injuries of franchisee patron who slipped on ice because franchise agreement provided for “uniformity and standardization of products,” and did not give the franchisor control over daily operations)."
} | 11,075,002 | a |
See The Trademark Act of 1946 (LanhamAct), 15 U.S.C. SS1127 (2000). As a consequence, the majority of courts look to whether the franchisor exercised control over the day-to-day operations of the franchisee or controlled through the franchise agreement the instrumentality which caused the harm. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "904 A.2d 627, 636",
"parenthetical": "restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for attack on franchisee's employee because the franchisor established uniformity and standardization of products and services and did not exercise control over security operations",
"sentence": "See Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40 (Wis. 2004) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee’s employees); see also Evans v. McDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (franchisor not liable as an employer under Title VII even though it provided the manner of the franchise’s operations, frequent inspections, and training for employees, it did not have control over employment relations); Wendy Hong Wu v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 105 F.Sup.2d 83, 87-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s security deficiencies because the franchise agreement did not give the franchisor “considerable control . . . over the specific instrumentality at issue”); Viches v. MLT, Inc., 127 F.Sup.2d 828, 832 (E.D.Mich. 2000) (hotel franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent use of pesticides where the franchise agreement only ensured “uniformity and standardization ... of services”); Jones v. Filer, Inc., 43 F.Sup.2d 1052, 1056-58 (W.D.Ark. 1999) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee or its employees even though franchise agreement addressed training programs, advertising, hours of the franchisee’s operation, and decor; franchisor did not exercise control over hiring, firing, and supervising of employees); Hatcher v. 7-Eleven and Southland Corp., 956 F.Sup. 387, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (franchisor not franchisee’s employer under Title VII even though it provided an administrative payroll service, checks, unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation insurance, payroll insurance, and social security contribution, because franchisor did not hire, fire, or supervise the franchisee’s employees); Perry v. Burger King, Corp., 924 F.Sup. 548, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (restaurant franchisor could not be held vicariously liable for race discrimination by franchisee because the franchise agreement did not allow the franchisor control over employment issues); Vandemark v. McDonald’s Corp., 904 A.2d 627, 636 (N.H. 2006) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for attack on franchisee’s employee because the franchisor established uniformity and standardization of products and services and did not exercise control over security operations); Pizza K., Inc. v. Santagata, 547 S.E.2d 405, 406-07 (Ga.Ct.App. 2001) (pizza franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee delivery driver’s accident because franchisor did not supervise the day-to-day activities of the franchisee’s employees); Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Mich.Ct.App. 1990) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for injuries of franchisee patron who slipped on ice because franchise agreement provided for “uniformity and standardization of products,” and did not give the franchisor control over daily operations)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40",
"parenthetical": "restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee's negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee's employees",
"sentence": "See Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40 (Wis. 2004) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee’s employees); see also Evans v. McDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (franchisor not liable as an employer under Title VII even though it provided the manner of the franchise’s operations, frequent inspections, and training for employees, it did not have control over employment relations); Wendy Hong Wu v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 105 F.Sup.2d 83, 87-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s security deficiencies because the franchise agreement did not give the franchisor “considerable control . . . over the specific instrumentality at issue”); Viches v. MLT, Inc., 127 F.Sup.2d 828, 832 (E.D.Mich. 2000) (hotel franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent use of pesticides where the franchise agreement only ensured “uniformity and standardization ... of services”); Jones v. Filer, Inc., 43 F.Sup.2d 1052, 1056-58 (W.D.Ark. 1999) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee or its employees even though franchise agreement addressed training programs, advertising, hours of the franchisee’s operation, and decor; franchisor did not exercise control over hiring, firing, and supervising of employees); Hatcher v. 7-Eleven and Southland Corp., 956 F.Sup. 387, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (franchisor not franchisee’s employer under Title VII even though it provided an administrative payroll service, checks, unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation insurance, payroll insurance, and social security contribution, because franchisor did not hire, fire, or supervise the franchisee’s employees); Perry v. Burger King, Corp., 924 F.Sup. 548, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (restaurant franchisor could not be held vicariously liable for race discrimination by franchisee because the franchise agreement did not allow the franchisor control over employment issues); Vandemark v. McDonald’s Corp., 904 A.2d 627, 636 (N.H. 2006) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for attack on franchisee’s employee because the franchisor established uniformity and standardization of products and services and did not exercise control over security operations); Pizza K., Inc. v. Santagata, 547 S.E.2d 405, 406-07 (Ga.Ct.App. 2001) (pizza franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee delivery driver’s accident because franchisor did not supervise the day-to-day activities of the franchisee’s employees); Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Mich.Ct.App. 1990) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for injuries of franchisee patron who slipped on ice because franchise agreement provided for “uniformity and standardization of products,” and did not give the franchisor control over daily operations)."
} | 11,075,002 | b |
See The Trademark Act of 1946 (LanhamAct), 15 U.S.C. SS1127 (2000). As a consequence, the majority of courts look to whether the franchisor exercised control over the day-to-day operations of the franchisee or controlled through the franchise agreement the instrumentality which caused the harm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40",
"parenthetical": "restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee's negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee's employees",
"sentence": "See Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40 (Wis. 2004) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee’s employees); see also Evans v. McDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (franchisor not liable as an employer under Title VII even though it provided the manner of the franchise’s operations, frequent inspections, and training for employees, it did not have control over employment relations); Wendy Hong Wu v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 105 F.Sup.2d 83, 87-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s security deficiencies because the franchise agreement did not give the franchisor “considerable control . . . over the specific instrumentality at issue”); Viches v. MLT, Inc., 127 F.Sup.2d 828, 832 (E.D.Mich. 2000) (hotel franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent use of pesticides where the franchise agreement only ensured “uniformity and standardization ... of services”); Jones v. Filer, Inc., 43 F.Sup.2d 1052, 1056-58 (W.D.Ark. 1999) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee or its employees even though franchise agreement addressed training programs, advertising, hours of the franchisee’s operation, and decor; franchisor did not exercise control over hiring, firing, and supervising of employees); Hatcher v. 7-Eleven and Southland Corp., 956 F.Sup. 387, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (franchisor not franchisee’s employer under Title VII even though it provided an administrative payroll service, checks, unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation insurance, payroll insurance, and social security contribution, because franchisor did not hire, fire, or supervise the franchisee’s employees); Perry v. Burger King, Corp., 924 F.Sup. 548, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (restaurant franchisor could not be held vicariously liable for race discrimination by franchisee because the franchise agreement did not allow the franchisor control over employment issues); Vandemark v. McDonald’s Corp., 904 A.2d 627, 636 (N.H. 2006) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for attack on franchisee’s employee because the franchisor established uniformity and standardization of products and services and did not exercise control over security operations); Pizza K., Inc. v. Santagata, 547 S.E.2d 405, 406-07 (Ga.Ct.App. 2001) (pizza franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee delivery driver’s accident because franchisor did not supervise the day-to-day activities of the franchisee’s employees); Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Mich.Ct.App. 1990) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for injuries of franchisee patron who slipped on ice because franchise agreement provided for “uniformity and standardization of products,” and did not give the franchisor control over daily operations)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "547 S.E.2d 405, 406-07",
"parenthetical": "pizza franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee delivery driver's accident because franchisor did not supervise the day-to-day activities of the franchisee's employees",
"sentence": "See Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40 (Wis. 2004) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee’s employees); see also Evans v. McDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (franchisor not liable as an employer under Title VII even though it provided the manner of the franchise’s operations, frequent inspections, and training for employees, it did not have control over employment relations); Wendy Hong Wu v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 105 F.Sup.2d 83, 87-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s security deficiencies because the franchise agreement did not give the franchisor “considerable control . . . over the specific instrumentality at issue”); Viches v. MLT, Inc., 127 F.Sup.2d 828, 832 (E.D.Mich. 2000) (hotel franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent use of pesticides where the franchise agreement only ensured “uniformity and standardization ... of services”); Jones v. Filer, Inc., 43 F.Sup.2d 1052, 1056-58 (W.D.Ark. 1999) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee or its employees even though franchise agreement addressed training programs, advertising, hours of the franchisee’s operation, and decor; franchisor did not exercise control over hiring, firing, and supervising of employees); Hatcher v. 7-Eleven and Southland Corp., 956 F.Sup. 387, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (franchisor not franchisee’s employer under Title VII even though it provided an administrative payroll service, checks, unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation insurance, payroll insurance, and social security contribution, because franchisor did not hire, fire, or supervise the franchisee’s employees); Perry v. Burger King, Corp., 924 F.Sup. 548, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (restaurant franchisor could not be held vicariously liable for race discrimination by franchisee because the franchise agreement did not allow the franchisor control over employment issues); Vandemark v. McDonald’s Corp., 904 A.2d 627, 636 (N.H. 2006) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for attack on franchisee’s employee because the franchisor established uniformity and standardization of products and services and did not exercise control over security operations); Pizza K., Inc. v. Santagata, 547 S.E.2d 405, 406-07 (Ga.Ct.App. 2001) (pizza franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee delivery driver’s accident because franchisor did not supervise the day-to-day activities of the franchisee’s employees); Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Mich.Ct.App. 1990) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for injuries of franchisee patron who slipped on ice because franchise agreement provided for “uniformity and standardization of products,” and did not give the franchisor control over daily operations)."
} | 11,075,002 | a |
See The Trademark Act of 1946 (LanhamAct), 15 U.S.C. SS1127 (2000). As a consequence, the majority of courts look to whether the franchisor exercised control over the day-to-day operations of the franchisee or controlled through the franchise agreement the instrumentality which caused the harm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40",
"parenthetical": "restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee's negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee's employees",
"sentence": "See Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40 (Wis. 2004) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee’s employees); see also Evans v. McDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (franchisor not liable as an employer under Title VII even though it provided the manner of the franchise’s operations, frequent inspections, and training for employees, it did not have control over employment relations); Wendy Hong Wu v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 105 F.Sup.2d 83, 87-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s security deficiencies because the franchise agreement did not give the franchisor “considerable control . . . over the specific instrumentality at issue”); Viches v. MLT, Inc., 127 F.Sup.2d 828, 832 (E.D.Mich. 2000) (hotel franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent use of pesticides where the franchise agreement only ensured “uniformity and standardization ... of services”); Jones v. Filer, Inc., 43 F.Sup.2d 1052, 1056-58 (W.D.Ark. 1999) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee or its employees even though franchise agreement addressed training programs, advertising, hours of the franchisee’s operation, and decor; franchisor did not exercise control over hiring, firing, and supervising of employees); Hatcher v. 7-Eleven and Southland Corp., 956 F.Sup. 387, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (franchisor not franchisee’s employer under Title VII even though it provided an administrative payroll service, checks, unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation insurance, payroll insurance, and social security contribution, because franchisor did not hire, fire, or supervise the franchisee’s employees); Perry v. Burger King, Corp., 924 F.Sup. 548, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (restaurant franchisor could not be held vicariously liable for race discrimination by franchisee because the franchise agreement did not allow the franchisor control over employment issues); Vandemark v. McDonald’s Corp., 904 A.2d 627, 636 (N.H. 2006) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for attack on franchisee’s employee because the franchisor established uniformity and standardization of products and services and did not exercise control over security operations); Pizza K., Inc. v. Santagata, 547 S.E.2d 405, 406-07 (Ga.Ct.App. 2001) (pizza franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee delivery driver’s accident because franchisor did not supervise the day-to-day activities of the franchisee’s employees); Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Mich.Ct.App. 1990) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for injuries of franchisee patron who slipped on ice because franchise agreement provided for “uniformity and standardization of products,” and did not give the franchisor control over daily operations)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "455 N.W.2d 390, 393-94",
"parenthetical": "restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for injuries of franchisee patron who slipped on ice because franchise agreement provided for \"uniformity and standardization of products,\" and did not give the franchisor control over daily operations",
"sentence": "See Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 338-40 (Wis. 2004) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent supervision of employees where the franchisor had no control or right of control over the daily hiring and supervision of the franchisee’s employees); see also Evans v. McDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (franchisor not liable as an employer under Title VII even though it provided the manner of the franchise’s operations, frequent inspections, and training for employees, it did not have control over employment relations); Wendy Hong Wu v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 105 F.Sup.2d 83, 87-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s security deficiencies because the franchise agreement did not give the franchisor “considerable control . . . over the specific instrumentality at issue”); Viches v. MLT, Inc., 127 F.Sup.2d 828, 832 (E.D.Mich. 2000) (hotel franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee’s negligent use of pesticides where the franchise agreement only ensured “uniformity and standardization ... of services”); Jones v. Filer, Inc., 43 F.Sup.2d 1052, 1056-58 (W.D.Ark. 1999) (franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee or its employees even though franchise agreement addressed training programs, advertising, hours of the franchisee’s operation, and decor; franchisor did not exercise control over hiring, firing, and supervising of employees); Hatcher v. 7-Eleven and Southland Corp., 956 F.Sup. 387, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (franchisor not franchisee’s employer under Title VII even though it provided an administrative payroll service, checks, unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation insurance, payroll insurance, and social security contribution, because franchisor did not hire, fire, or supervise the franchisee’s employees); Perry v. Burger King, Corp., 924 F.Sup. 548, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (restaurant franchisor could not be held vicariously liable for race discrimination by franchisee because the franchise agreement did not allow the franchisor control over employment issues); Vandemark v. McDonald’s Corp., 904 A.2d 627, 636 (N.H. 2006) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for attack on franchisee’s employee because the franchisor established uniformity and standardization of products and services and did not exercise control over security operations); Pizza K., Inc. v. Santagata, 547 S.E.2d 405, 406-07 (Ga.Ct.App. 2001) (pizza franchisor not vicariously liable for franchisee delivery driver’s accident because franchisor did not supervise the day-to-day activities of the franchisee’s employees); Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Mich.Ct.App. 1990) (restaurant franchisor not vicariously liable for injuries of franchisee patron who slipped on ice because franchise agreement provided for “uniformity and standardization of products,” and did not give the franchisor control over daily operations)."
} | 11,075,002 | a |
We think that the nuanced, case-specific approach of Williams is consistent with the strictures of Rufo and with the equitable nature of relief from a decree under Rule 60(b)(5). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 760, 760",
"parenthetical": "noting that Rule 60(b)(5) permits relief from a court order when '\"it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application' \"",
"sentence": "See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 760 (noting that Rule 60(b)(5) permits relief from a court order when ‘“it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "969 F.2d 1278, 1278",
"parenthetical": "\"the decision as to whether to modify or dissolve [a structural decree] is at bottom an exercise of equitable power\" that calls for a \"deferential standard of review\"",
"sentence": "See also Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1278 (“the decision as to whether to modify or dissolve [a structural decree] is at bottom an exercise of equitable power” that calls for a “deferential standard of review”)."
} | 7,410,332 | a |
In the contempt order itself, for example, the bankruptcy court found that Hicks had intentionally violated the December 7, 1983 order. Such a finding is not required for a civil contempt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "659 F.2d 1173, 1183",
"parenthetical": "\"In civil contempt proceedings ... the failure to comply with the court decree need not be itnentional.\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1981) (\"In civil contempt proceedings ... the failure to comply with the court decree need not be itnentional.”). Additionally, while the contempt proceedings in this case were instituted by the court, civil contempt proceedings normally \"should be instituted by the parties aggrieved.\" 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2960, at 587 (1973); see also WMATA v. Amalgamated Transit Union, National Capital Local Division 689, 531 F.2d 617, 622 (D.C.Cir.1976) (\"In the civil contempt setting, the court has no independent interest in vindicating its authority should its order be violated.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "531 F.2d 617, 622",
"parenthetical": "\"In the civil contempt setting, the court has no independent interest in vindicating its authority should its order be violated.\"",
"sentence": "NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1981) (\"In civil contempt proceedings ... the failure to comply with the court decree need not be itnentional.”). Additionally, while the contempt proceedings in this case were instituted by the court, civil contempt proceedings normally \"should be instituted by the parties aggrieved.\" 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2960, at 587 (1973); see also WMATA v. Amalgamated Transit Union, National Capital Local Division 689, 531 F.2d 617, 622 (D.C.Cir.1976) (\"In the civil contempt setting, the court has no independent interest in vindicating its authority should its order be violated.”)."
} | 6,127,188 | a |
By its own terms, Rule 615(2) "does not authorize" the sequestration of a corporate representative. Therefore, the exclusion of a corporate representative from a deposition is governed by Rule 26(c)(5), and the party seeking to exclude a corporate representative at a deposition must show good cause for his exclusion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "487 F.2d 986, 997",
"parenthetical": "\"The extent of the court's authority to determine those present was enlarged by the 1970 revision of the Rules of Discovery____ In view of the revision, it is clear that the court has the power to exclude even a party, although such an exclusion should be ordered rarely indeed\"",
"sentence": "See also Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2nd Cir.1973) (“The extent of the court’s authority to determine those present was enlarged by the 1970 revision of the Rules of Discovery____ In view of the revision, it is clear that the court has the power to exclude even a party, although such an exclusion should be ordered rarely indeed”); 10 Fed.Proc., L.Ed., § 26:166 at 407 (1985) (Under Rule 26(c)(5), the court has the power to exclude even a party). If a deponent does not fall within one of Rule 615’s three exceptions to sequestration, then Rule 615’s mandatory rule of sequestration applies."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "90 F.R.D. 75, 76",
"parenthetical": "Sequestration of an expert witness or a \"person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause\" is not authorized by Rule -615(3",
"sentence": "See Skid-more v. Northwest Eng’g Co., 90 F.R.D. 75, 76 (S.D.Fla.1981) (Sequestration of an expert witness or a “person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause” is not authorized by Rule -615(3), but such a person may be excluded from a deposition pursuant to Rule 26(c)(5) for good cause shown)."
} | 7,850,924 | b |
. Relators argue, however, that because the restraining orders targeted only persons identified with the "pro-life" movement, the orders were, in context, aimed at the "pro-life" message, and are thus not "content-neutral." This argument has been explicitly rejected in a number of the cases cited above. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 63, 63",
"parenthetical": "court order applying only to pro-life protesters not \"content-based\" because \"only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation\"",
"sentence": "See McMonagle, 939 F.2d at 63 (court order applying only to pro-life protesters not \"content-based” because “only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation\"); Terry, 886 F.2d at 1363-64; Hirsh, 401 S.E.2d at 533; Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d at 162; Bering, 111 P.2d at 926; cf. Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1989) (ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators’ speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech); but cf. Thomason v. Jemigan, 770 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1203 (E.D.Mich.1991) (city’s vacation of cul de sac to abortion clinic in order to permit clinic to invoke trespass laws over areas not \"content neutral\" where pro-life protesters were sole source of traffic problems that precipitated city’s action)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 1085, 1090",
"parenthetical": "ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators' speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech",
"sentence": "See McMonagle, 939 F.2d at 63 (court order applying only to pro-life protesters not \"content-based” because “only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation\"); Terry, 886 F.2d at 1363-64; Hirsh, 401 S.E.2d at 533; Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d at 162; Bering, 111 P.2d at 926; cf. Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1989) (ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators’ speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech); but cf. Thomason v. Jemigan, 770 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1203 (E.D.Mich.1991) (city’s vacation of cul de sac to abortion clinic in order to permit clinic to invoke trespass laws over areas not \"content neutral\" where pro-life protesters were sole source of traffic problems that precipitated city’s action)."
} | 9,993,248 | a |
. Relators argue, however, that because the restraining orders targeted only persons identified with the "pro-life" movement, the orders were, in context, aimed at the "pro-life" message, and are thus not "content-neutral." This argument has been explicitly rejected in a number of the cases cited above. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "770 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1203",
"parenthetical": "city's vacation of cul de sac to abortion clinic in order to permit clinic to invoke trespass laws over areas not \"content neutral\" where pro-life protesters were sole source of traffic problems that precipitated city's action",
"sentence": "See McMonagle, 939 F.2d at 63 (court order applying only to pro-life protesters not \"content-based” because “only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation\"); Terry, 886 F.2d at 1363-64; Hirsh, 401 S.E.2d at 533; Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d at 162; Bering, 111 P.2d at 926; cf. Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1989) (ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators’ speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech); but cf. Thomason v. Jemigan, 770 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1203 (E.D.Mich.1991) (city’s vacation of cul de sac to abortion clinic in order to permit clinic to invoke trespass laws over areas not \"content neutral\" where pro-life protesters were sole source of traffic problems that precipitated city’s action)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 63, 63",
"parenthetical": "court order applying only to pro-life protesters not \"content-based\" because \"only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation\"",
"sentence": "See McMonagle, 939 F.2d at 63 (court order applying only to pro-life protesters not \"content-based” because “only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation\"); Terry, 886 F.2d at 1363-64; Hirsh, 401 S.E.2d at 533; Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d at 162; Bering, 111 P.2d at 926; cf. Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1989) (ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators’ speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech); but cf. Thomason v. Jemigan, 770 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1203 (E.D.Mich.1991) (city’s vacation of cul de sac to abortion clinic in order to permit clinic to invoke trespass laws over areas not \"content neutral\" where pro-life protesters were sole source of traffic problems that precipitated city’s action)."
} | 9,993,248 | b |
. Relators argue, however, that because the restraining orders targeted only persons identified with the "pro-life" movement, the orders were, in context, aimed at the "pro-life" message, and are thus not "content-neutral." This argument has been explicitly rejected in a number of the cases cited above. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 1085, 1090",
"parenthetical": "ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators' speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech",
"sentence": "See McMonagle, 939 F.2d at 63 (court order applying only to pro-life protesters not \"content-based” because “only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation\"); Terry, 886 F.2d at 1363-64; Hirsh, 401 S.E.2d at 533; Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d at 162; Bering, 111 P.2d at 926; cf. Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1989) (ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators’ speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech); but cf. Thomason v. Jemigan, 770 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1203 (E.D.Mich.1991) (city’s vacation of cul de sac to abortion clinic in order to permit clinic to invoke trespass laws over areas not \"content neutral\" where pro-life protesters were sole source of traffic problems that precipitated city’s action)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "770 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1203",
"parenthetical": "city's vacation of cul de sac to abortion clinic in order to permit clinic to invoke trespass laws over areas not \"content neutral\" where pro-life protesters were sole source of traffic problems that precipitated city's action",
"sentence": "See McMonagle, 939 F.2d at 63 (court order applying only to pro-life protesters not \"content-based” because “only those persons [were] proven [to] have created ... a threat of violence and intimidation\"); Terry, 886 F.2d at 1363-64; Hirsh, 401 S.E.2d at 533; Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d at 162; Bering, 111 P.2d at 926; cf. Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1989) (ordinance prohibiting use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of medical facilities was not content-based restriction of pro-life demonstrators’ speech where language of ordinance said nothing about content of amplified speech); but cf. Thomason v. Jemigan, 770 F.Supp. 1195, 1199-1203 (E.D.Mich.1991) (city’s vacation of cul de sac to abortion clinic in order to permit clinic to invoke trespass laws over areas not \"content neutral\" where pro-life protesters were sole source of traffic problems that precipitated city’s action)."
} | 9,993,248 | a |
Taylor's significant threat to others was clearly exhibited by his willingness to engage in noncompliant behavior, such as consuming alcohol, and mailing threatening letters to various individuals and law enforcement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "299 F.3d 673, 677-78",
"parenthetical": "finding of substantial risk supported by evidence of delusions and refusal to participate in mental health assessment",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir.1990) (“[A] finding of ‘substantial risk’ under section 4246 may be based on any activity that evinces a genuine possibility of future harm to persons or property.”); see also United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 673, 677-78 (8th Cir.2002) (finding of substantial risk supported by evidence of delusions and refusal to participate in mental health assessment); United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir.1994) (finding actual violent conduct, threatening letters, history of drug abuse, weapons possession, and failure to take prescribed medication supported finding of probable dangerousness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "917 F.2d 1197, 1207",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of 'substantial risk' under section 4246 may be based on any activity that evinces a genuine possibility of future harm to persons or property.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir.1990) (“[A] finding of ‘substantial risk’ under section 4246 may be based on any activity that evinces a genuine possibility of future harm to persons or property.”); see also United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 673, 677-78 (8th Cir.2002) (finding of substantial risk supported by evidence of delusions and refusal to participate in mental health assessment); United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir.1994) (finding actual violent conduct, threatening letters, history of drug abuse, weapons possession, and failure to take prescribed medication supported finding of probable dangerousness)."
} | 4,318,393 | b |
Taylor's significant threat to others was clearly exhibited by his willingness to engage in noncompliant behavior, such as consuming alcohol, and mailing threatening letters to various individuals and law enforcement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "30 F.3d 966, 970",
"parenthetical": "finding actual violent conduct, threatening letters, history of drug abuse, weapons possession, and failure to take prescribed medication supported finding of probable dangerousness",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir.1990) (“[A] finding of ‘substantial risk’ under section 4246 may be based on any activity that evinces a genuine possibility of future harm to persons or property.”); see also United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 673, 677-78 (8th Cir.2002) (finding of substantial risk supported by evidence of delusions and refusal to participate in mental health assessment); United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir.1994) (finding actual violent conduct, threatening letters, history of drug abuse, weapons possession, and failure to take prescribed medication supported finding of probable dangerousness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "917 F.2d 1197, 1207",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of 'substantial risk' under section 4246 may be based on any activity that evinces a genuine possibility of future harm to persons or property.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir.1990) (“[A] finding of ‘substantial risk’ under section 4246 may be based on any activity that evinces a genuine possibility of future harm to persons or property.”); see also United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 673, 677-78 (8th Cir.2002) (finding of substantial risk supported by evidence of delusions and refusal to participate in mental health assessment); United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir.1994) (finding actual violent conduct, threatening letters, history of drug abuse, weapons possession, and failure to take prescribed medication supported finding of probable dangerousness)."
} | 4,318,393 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 889, 895",
"parenthetical": "applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "825 F.2d 667, 671",
"parenthetical": "defendant must \"show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "825 F.2d 667, 671",
"parenthetical": "defendant must \"show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 900, 905",
"parenthetical": "noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ \"more lenient\" standard",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | 11,452,398 | a |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 1180, 1187",
"parenthetical": "first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution's reasons for it, offends \"fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions\"",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "825 F.2d 667, 671",
"parenthetical": "defendant must \"show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 889, 895",
"parenthetical": "applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "828 F.2d 153, 167",
"parenthetical": "defendant bears burden of proving that \"the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage\" over defendant",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 900, 905",
"parenthetical": "noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ \"more lenient\" standard",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "828 F.2d 153, 167",
"parenthetical": "defendant bears burden of proving that \"the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage\" over defendant",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "828 F.2d 153, 167",
"parenthetical": "defendant bears burden of proving that \"the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage\" over defendant",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 1180, 1187",
"parenthetical": "first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution's reasons for it, offends \"fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions\"",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | 11,452,398 | a |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1497, 1515",
"parenthetical": "delay \"intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 889, 895",
"parenthetical": "applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | 11,452,398 | a |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 900, 905",
"parenthetical": "noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ \"more lenient\" standard",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1497, 1515",
"parenthetical": "delay \"intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 1180, 1187",
"parenthetical": "first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution's reasons for it, offends \"fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions\"",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1497, 1515",
"parenthetical": "delay \"intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 466, 476",
"parenthetical": "defendant must prove delay was \"device by the government to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 889, 895",
"parenthetical": "applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | 11,452,398 | a |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 900, 905",
"parenthetical": "noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ \"more lenient\" standard",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 466, 476",
"parenthetical": "defendant must prove delay was \"device by the government to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 1180, 1187",
"parenthetical": "first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution's reasons for it, offends \"fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions\"",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 466, 476",
"parenthetical": "defendant must prove delay was \"device by the government to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 889, 895",
"parenthetical": "applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 900, 905",
"parenthetical": "noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ \"more lenient\" standard",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 1180, 1187",
"parenthetical": "first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution's reasons for it, offends \"fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions\"",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 889, 895",
"parenthetical": "applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 1107, 1110",
"parenthetical": "defendant must prove that \"government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 1107, 1110",
"parenthetical": "defendant must prove that \"government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 900, 905",
"parenthetical": "noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ \"more lenient\" standard",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | 11,452,398 | a |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 1180, 1187",
"parenthetical": "first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution's reasons for it, offends \"fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions\"",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 1107, 1110",
"parenthetical": "defendant must prove that \"government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 889, 895",
"parenthetical": "applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 F.3d 1220, 1223",
"parenthetical": "delay must be \"product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | 11,452,398 | b |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 F.3d 1220, 1223",
"parenthetical": "delay must be \"product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 900, 905",
"parenthetical": "noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ \"more lenient\" standard",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | 11,452,398 | a |
Given the specific language in the controlling opinions, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of federal Circuit Courts, including our Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that Marion/Lovasco requires proof that the government acted intentionally or in bad faith to cause delay. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 F.3d 1220, 1223",
"parenthetical": "delay must be \"product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir.1987) (“intent by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir.1987) (defendant must “show that the government had improperly delayed his prosecution in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir.1987) (defendant bears burden of proving that “the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain some advantage” over defendant); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1515 (5th Cir.1996) (delay “intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage ... or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose”); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove delay was “device by the government to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir.1994) (due process “only implicated if the government purposely delayed the indictment to take advantage, tactically, of the prejudice or otherwise acted in bad faith”; government bears burden to provide reasons for delay); United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (8th Cir.1998) (“Absent a showing that the government acted intentionally to harass or to gain a tactical advantage, no due process violation may be found”); United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1997) (defendant must prove that “government delayed purposefully in order to gain a tactical advantage”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996) (delay must be “product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 1180, 1187",
"parenthetical": "first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution's reasons for it, offends \"fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions\"",
"sentence": "But see Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (applying general due process test, rather than more specific test promulgated in Marion and Lovasco); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that Fourth and Ninth Circuits employ “more lenient” standard); United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (first prong of test requires actual prejudice and second prong requires showing that delay, when balanced against prosecution’s reasons for it, offends “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions”); United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.1998) (same)."
} | 11,452,398 | a |
Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501",
"parenthetical": "holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 324, 334",
"parenthetical": "\"This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity\"",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | 4,250,966 | b |
Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 324, 334",
"parenthetical": "\"This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity\"",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer's] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | 4,250,966 | a |
Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 324, 334",
"parenthetical": "\"This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity\"",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 408, 421-22",
"parenthetical": "holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | 4,250,966 | a |
Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 324, 334",
"parenthetical": "\"This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity\"",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490",
"parenthetical": "holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | 4,250,966 | a |
Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490",
"parenthetical": "holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501",
"parenthetical": "holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | 4,250,966 | b |
Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer's] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490",
"parenthetical": "holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | 4,250,966 | a |
Here, the Plaintiff was terminated by the Defendants three weeks after the filing of the Complaint in this case. This close temporal proximity between the Plaintiffs protected activity and the adverse employment action is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for his engagement in pro tected activity. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490",
"parenthetical": "holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 408, 421-22",
"parenthetical": "holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation",
"sentence": "See Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir.2007) (“This Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity”); see also Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir.2013) (holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he passage of less than three weeks between [the employer’s] receipt of the charges and the adverse actions gives rise to an inference of discrimination”); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the passage of only twenty-one days between the plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge and his termination gave rise to an inference of a causal connection between the two events sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); but see Philbrick v. Holder, 583 Fed.Appx. 478, 490 (6th Cir.2014) (holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection)."
} | 4,250,966 | b |
. Although this case was brought and granted as a petition for prohibition, upon review we believe that the more appropriate mechanism for addressing the issues raised in the writ is through mandamus. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "179 W.Va. 277, 278, n. 1",
"parenthetical": "viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Lambert, 179 W.Va. 277, 278, n. 1, 367 S.E.2d 225, 226 n. 1 (1988) (viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus); see also State ex rel. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Lilly, 165 W.Va. 98, 100, 267 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1980) (transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition); accord State ex rel. Conley v. Hill, 199 W.Va. 686, 687, n. 1, 487 S.E.2d 344, 345 n. 1 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 W.Va. 98, 100",
"parenthetical": "transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Lambert, 179 W.Va. 277, 278, n. 1, 367 S.E.2d 225, 226 n. 1 (1988) (viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus); see also State ex rel. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Lilly, 165 W.Va. 98, 100, 267 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1980) (transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition); accord State ex rel. Conley v. Hill, 199 W.Va. 686, 687, n. 1, 487 S.E.2d 344, 345 n. 1 (1997)."
} | 9,499,722 | a |
. Although this case was brought and granted as a petition for prohibition, upon review we believe that the more appropriate mechanism for addressing the issues raised in the writ is through mandamus. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "267 S.E.2d 435, 436",
"parenthetical": "transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Lambert, 179 W.Va. 277, 278, n. 1, 367 S.E.2d 225, 226 n. 1 (1988) (viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus); see also State ex rel. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Lilly, 165 W.Va. 98, 100, 267 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1980) (transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition); accord State ex rel. Conley v. Hill, 199 W.Va. 686, 687, n. 1, 487 S.E.2d 344, 345 n. 1 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "179 W.Va. 277, 278, n. 1",
"parenthetical": "viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Lambert, 179 W.Va. 277, 278, n. 1, 367 S.E.2d 225, 226 n. 1 (1988) (viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus); see also State ex rel. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Lilly, 165 W.Va. 98, 100, 267 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1980) (transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition); accord State ex rel. Conley v. Hill, 199 W.Va. 686, 687, n. 1, 487 S.E.2d 344, 345 n. 1 (1997)."
} | 9,499,722 | b |
. Although this case was brought and granted as a petition for prohibition, upon review we believe that the more appropriate mechanism for addressing the issues raised in the writ is through mandamus. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Lambert, 179 W.Va. 277, 278, n. 1, 367 S.E.2d 225, 226 n. 1 (1988) (viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus); see also State ex rel. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Lilly, 165 W.Va. 98, 100, 267 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1980) (transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition); accord State ex rel. Conley v. Hill, 199 W.Va. 686, 687, n. 1, 487 S.E.2d 344, 345 n. 1 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "165 W.Va. 98, 100",
"parenthetical": "transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Lambert, 179 W.Va. 277, 278, n. 1, 367 S.E.2d 225, 226 n. 1 (1988) (viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus); see also State ex rel. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Lilly, 165 W.Va. 98, 100, 267 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1980) (transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition); accord State ex rel. Conley v. Hill, 199 W.Va. 686, 687, n. 1, 487 S.E.2d 344, 345 n. 1 (1997)."
} | 9,499,722 | a |
. Although this case was brought and granted as a petition for prohibition, upon review we believe that the more appropriate mechanism for addressing the issues raised in the writ is through mandamus. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Lambert, 179 W.Va. 277, 278, n. 1, 367 S.E.2d 225, 226 n. 1 (1988) (viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus); see also State ex rel. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Lilly, 165 W.Va. 98, 100, 267 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1980) (transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition); accord State ex rel. Conley v. Hill, 199 W.Va. 686, 687, n. 1, 487 S.E.2d 344, 345 n. 1 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "267 S.E.2d 435, 436",
"parenthetical": "transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition",
"sentence": "See Carr v. Lambert, 179 W.Va. 277, 278, n. 1, 367 S.E.2d 225, 226 n. 1 (1988) (viewing case brought as a writ of prohibition as one in mandamus); see also State ex rel. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Lilly, 165 W.Va. 98, 100, 267 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1980) (transforming petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus into a writ of prohibition); accord State ex rel. Conley v. Hill, 199 W.Va. 686, 687, n. 1, 487 S.E.2d 344, 345 n. 1 (1997)."
} | 9,499,722 | a |
. The briefs filed by the parties also discuss whether CREW has "prudential'' standing to challenge the FEC's action. The Court need not address this issue because Akins suggests that Congress intended to authorize standing to the full limits of Article III when it enacted FECA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 19, 19-21",
"parenthetical": "using identical analyses for the \"zone of interests\" component of prudential standing and the \"injury in fact\" component of Article III standing, and stating that \"[hjistory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly -- beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which 'prudential' standing traditionally rested.\"",
"sentence": "See 524 U.S. at 19-21, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (using identical analyses for the \"zone of interests\" component of prudential standing and the “injury in fact\" component of Article III standing, and stating that \"[hjistory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly — beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.”) (citations omitted); cf. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C.Cir.1990) (finding that the court need not address \"prudential” standing because Congress intended to authorize standing to the full extent of Article III when it passed the Fair Housing Act)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "899 F.2d 24, 27",
"parenthetical": "finding that the court need not address \"prudential\" standing because Congress intended to authorize standing to the full extent of Article III when it passed the Fair Housing Act",
"sentence": "See 524 U.S. at 19-21, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (using identical analyses for the \"zone of interests\" component of prudential standing and the “injury in fact\" component of Article III standing, and stating that \"[hjistory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly — beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.”) (citations omitted); cf. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C.Cir.1990) (finding that the court need not address \"prudential” standing because Congress intended to authorize standing to the full extent of Article III when it passed the Fair Housing Act)."
} | 1,611,131 | a |
. The briefs filed by the parties also discuss whether CREW has "prudential'' standing to challenge the FEC's action. The Court need not address this issue because Akins suggests that Congress intended to authorize standing to the full limits of Article III when it enacted FECA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "using identical analyses for the \"zone of interests\" component of prudential standing and the \"injury in fact\" component of Article III standing, and stating that \"[hjistory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly -- beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which 'prudential' standing traditionally rested.\"",
"sentence": "See 524 U.S. at 19-21, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (using identical analyses for the \"zone of interests\" component of prudential standing and the “injury in fact\" component of Article III standing, and stating that \"[hjistory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly — beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.”) (citations omitted); cf. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C.Cir.1990) (finding that the court need not address \"prudential” standing because Congress intended to authorize standing to the full extent of Article III when it passed the Fair Housing Act)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "899 F.2d 24, 27",
"parenthetical": "finding that the court need not address \"prudential\" standing because Congress intended to authorize standing to the full extent of Article III when it passed the Fair Housing Act",
"sentence": "See 524 U.S. at 19-21, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (using identical analyses for the \"zone of interests\" component of prudential standing and the “injury in fact\" component of Article III standing, and stating that \"[hjistory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly — beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.”) (citations omitted); cf. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C.Cir.1990) (finding that the court need not address \"prudential” standing because Congress intended to authorize standing to the full extent of Article III when it passed the Fair Housing Act)."
} | 1,611,131 | a |
Both as a matter of law and by examining the relevant facts here, it is clear that there was a potential conflict of interest at the outset of the City Attorney's Office and Christensen, Miller's representation of the City and Bugar and Hotard. Under the California Rule, a potential conflict of interest giving rise to the obligation to obtain informed written consent exists whenever an attorney represents more than one client in the same lawsuit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "31 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1295",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ijnformed consent is required before an attorney can jointly represent clients in the same matter.\"",
"sentence": "See Jaeger, 213 B.R. at 584 (“California rules always require the informed written consent of each client before an attorney may jointly represent two or more clients in the same lawsuit.”); see also Zador, 31 Cal.App.4th at 1295, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d at 759 (“[Ijnformed consent is required before an attorney can jointly represent clients in the same matter.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "213 B.R. 584, 584",
"parenthetical": "\"California rules always require the informed written consent of each client before an attorney may jointly represent two or more clients in the same lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Jaeger, 213 B.R. at 584 (“California rules always require the informed written consent of each client before an attorney may jointly represent two or more clients in the same lawsuit.”); see also Zador, 31 Cal.App.4th at 1295, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d at 759 (“[Ijnformed consent is required before an attorney can jointly represent clients in the same matter.”)"
} | 11,107,978 | b |
Both as a matter of law and by examining the relevant facts here, it is clear that there was a potential conflict of interest at the outset of the City Attorney's Office and Christensen, Miller's representation of the City and Bugar and Hotard. Under the California Rule, a potential conflict of interest giving rise to the obligation to obtain informed written consent exists whenever an attorney represents more than one client in the same lawsuit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "213 B.R. 584, 584",
"parenthetical": "\"California rules always require the informed written consent of each client before an attorney may jointly represent two or more clients in the same lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Jaeger, 213 B.R. at 584 (“California rules always require the informed written consent of each client before an attorney may jointly represent two or more clients in the same lawsuit.”); see also Zador, 31 Cal.App.4th at 1295, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d at 759 (“[Ijnformed consent is required before an attorney can jointly represent clients in the same matter.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "37 Cal.Rptr.2d 759, 759",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ijnformed consent is required before an attorney can jointly represent clients in the same matter.\"",
"sentence": "See Jaeger, 213 B.R. at 584 (“California rules always require the informed written consent of each client before an attorney may jointly represent two or more clients in the same lawsuit.”); see also Zador, 31 Cal.App.4th at 1295, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d at 759 (“[Ijnformed consent is required before an attorney can jointly represent clients in the same matter.”)"
} | 11,107,978 | a |
Because the judge ruled on Austin's claim for recovery under the Dealer's Act, the majority believed it was unnecessary for him to file a Rule 59(e) motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An aggrieved party who is confident his issues and arguments were sufficiently raised to and ruled on by the trial court may wish to simply file and serve a timely notice of appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 25 n. 5, 602 S.E.2d 772, 781 n. 5 (2004) (\"An aggrieved party who is confident his issues and arguments were sufficiently raised to and ruled on by the trial court may wish to simply file and serve a timely notice of appeal.”); cf. id. at 24 n. 4, 602 S.E.2d at 780 n. 4 (\"If the losing party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it, the party must file a motion to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If the losing party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it, the party must file a motion to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.\"",
"sentence": "See Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 25 n. 5, 602 S.E.2d 772, 781 n. 5 (2004) (\"An aggrieved party who is confident his issues and arguments were sufficiently raised to and ruled on by the trial court may wish to simply file and serve a timely notice of appeal.”); cf. id. at 24 n. 4, 602 S.E.2d at 780 n. 4 (\"If the losing party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it, the party must file a motion to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.”)."
} | 4,037,469 | a |
Because the judge ruled on Austin's claim for recovery under the Dealer's Act, the majority believed it was unnecessary for him to file a Rule 59(e) motion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If the losing party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it, the party must file a motion to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.\"",
"sentence": "See Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 25 n. 5, 602 S.E.2d 772, 781 n. 5 (2004) (\"An aggrieved party who is confident his issues and arguments were sufficiently raised to and ruled on by the trial court may wish to simply file and serve a timely notice of appeal.”); cf. id. at 24 n. 4, 602 S.E.2d at 780 n. 4 (\"If the losing party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it, the party must file a motion to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An aggrieved party who is confident his issues and arguments were sufficiently raised to and ruled on by the trial court may wish to simply file and serve a timely notice of appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 25 n. 5, 602 S.E.2d 772, 781 n. 5 (2004) (\"An aggrieved party who is confident his issues and arguments were sufficiently raised to and ruled on by the trial court may wish to simply file and serve a timely notice of appeal.”); cf. id. at 24 n. 4, 602 S.E.2d at 780 n. 4 (\"If the losing party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it, the party must file a motion to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.”)."
} | 4,037,469 | b |
We agree with the State that the mere theoretical availability of partial verdicts does not necessitate a further inquiry by the trial court where, for example, no party has requested a partial verdict be taken or the jury does not indicate that it has reached one. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant's consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict",
"sentence": "But see State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1146, 1151-52 (1977), overruled on other grounds, State v. Wardlow, 95 N.M. 585, 624 P.2d 527 (1981) (determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant’s consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "651 F.2d 140, 147",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the absence of such an explanation [by the trial court regarding the jury's right to return a partial verdict] did not deny the appellants any protected right in a case such as this where the jury neither attempted to return a partial verdict nor even asked if it could do so\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 147 (2d Cir.1981) (noting that “the absence of such an explanation [by the trial court regarding the jury’s right to return a partial verdict] did not deny the appellants any protected right in a case such as this where the jury neither attempted to return a partial verdict nor even asked if it could do so”); United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir.1979) (declining to adopt “a per se rule that a mistrial is improperly declared whenever the trial judge fails to specifically inquire as to the possibility of a partial verdict”); Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska Ct.App.1991) (declining “to place a burden on the trial judge to sua sponte inquire further or perform a special poll of jurors who deliberate on cases involving lesser included offenses”); Speaks v. United States, 617 A.2d 942, 952 (D.C.1992) (noting that imposing a sua sponte obligation on a trial judge to inquire regarding partial verdicts where not requested by defense counsel or indicated by the jury “threatens to disrupt the fine line which a trial judge must tread with respect to partial verdicts”)."
} | 3,717,707 | b |
We agree with the State that the mere theoretical availability of partial verdicts does not necessitate a further inquiry by the trial court where, for example, no party has requested a partial verdict be taken or the jury does not indicate that it has reached one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "651 F.2d 140, 147",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the absence of such an explanation [by the trial court regarding the jury's right to return a partial verdict] did not deny the appellants any protected right in a case such as this where the jury neither attempted to return a partial verdict nor even asked if it could do so\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 147 (2d Cir.1981) (noting that “the absence of such an explanation [by the trial court regarding the jury’s right to return a partial verdict] did not deny the appellants any protected right in a case such as this where the jury neither attempted to return a partial verdict nor even asked if it could do so”); United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir.1979) (declining to adopt “a per se rule that a mistrial is improperly declared whenever the trial judge fails to specifically inquire as to the possibility of a partial verdict”); Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska Ct.App.1991) (declining “to place a burden on the trial judge to sua sponte inquire further or perform a special poll of jurors who deliberate on cases involving lesser included offenses”); Speaks v. United States, 617 A.2d 942, 952 (D.C.1992) (noting that imposing a sua sponte obligation on a trial judge to inquire regarding partial verdicts where not requested by defense counsel or indicated by the jury “threatens to disrupt the fine line which a trial judge must tread with respect to partial verdicts”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "566 P.2d 1146, 1151-52",
"parenthetical": "determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant's consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict",
"sentence": "But see State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1146, 1151-52 (1977), overruled on other grounds, State v. Wardlow, 95 N.M. 585, 624 P.2d 527 (1981) (determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant’s consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict)."
} | 3,717,707 | a |
We agree with the State that the mere theoretical availability of partial verdicts does not necessitate a further inquiry by the trial court where, for example, no party has requested a partial verdict be taken or the jury does not indicate that it has reached one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "651 F.2d 140, 147",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the absence of such an explanation [by the trial court regarding the jury's right to return a partial verdict] did not deny the appellants any protected right in a case such as this where the jury neither attempted to return a partial verdict nor even asked if it could do so\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 147 (2d Cir.1981) (noting that “the absence of such an explanation [by the trial court regarding the jury’s right to return a partial verdict] did not deny the appellants any protected right in a case such as this where the jury neither attempted to return a partial verdict nor even asked if it could do so”); United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir.1979) (declining to adopt “a per se rule that a mistrial is improperly declared whenever the trial judge fails to specifically inquire as to the possibility of a partial verdict”); Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska Ct.App.1991) (declining “to place a burden on the trial judge to sua sponte inquire further or perform a special poll of jurors who deliberate on cases involving lesser included offenses”); Speaks v. United States, 617 A.2d 942, 952 (D.C.1992) (noting that imposing a sua sponte obligation on a trial judge to inquire regarding partial verdicts where not requested by defense counsel or indicated by the jury “threatens to disrupt the fine line which a trial judge must tread with respect to partial verdicts”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant's consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict",
"sentence": "But see State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1146, 1151-52 (1977), overruled on other grounds, State v. Wardlow, 95 N.M. 585, 624 P.2d 527 (1981) (determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant’s consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict)."
} | 3,717,707 | a |
We agree with the State that the mere theoretical availability of partial verdicts does not necessitate a further inquiry by the trial court where, for example, no party has requested a partial verdict be taken or the jury does not indicate that it has reached one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "651 F.2d 140, 147",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the absence of such an explanation [by the trial court regarding the jury's right to return a partial verdict] did not deny the appellants any protected right in a case such as this where the jury neither attempted to return a partial verdict nor even asked if it could do so\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 147 (2d Cir.1981) (noting that “the absence of such an explanation [by the trial court regarding the jury’s right to return a partial verdict] did not deny the appellants any protected right in a case such as this where the jury neither attempted to return a partial verdict nor even asked if it could do so”); United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir.1979) (declining to adopt “a per se rule that a mistrial is improperly declared whenever the trial judge fails to specifically inquire as to the possibility of a partial verdict”); Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska Ct.App.1991) (declining “to place a burden on the trial judge to sua sponte inquire further or perform a special poll of jurors who deliberate on cases involving lesser included offenses”); Speaks v. United States, 617 A.2d 942, 952 (D.C.1992) (noting that imposing a sua sponte obligation on a trial judge to inquire regarding partial verdicts where not requested by defense counsel or indicated by the jury “threatens to disrupt the fine line which a trial judge must tread with respect to partial verdicts”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant's consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict",
"sentence": "But see State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1146, 1151-52 (1977), overruled on other grounds, State v. Wardlow, 95 N.M. 585, 624 P.2d 527 (1981) (determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant’s consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict)."
} | 3,717,707 | a |
We agree with the State that the mere theoretical availability of partial verdicts does not necessitate a further inquiry by the trial court where, for example, no party has requested a partial verdict be taken or the jury does not indicate that it has reached one. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant's consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict",
"sentence": "But see State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1146, 1151-52 (1977), overruled on other grounds, State v. Wardlow, 95 N.M. 585, 624 P.2d 527 (1981) (determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant’s consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "596 F.2d 76, 82",
"parenthetical": "declining to adopt \"a per se rule that a mistrial is improperly declared whenever the trial judge fails to specifically inquire as to the possibility of a partial verdict\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 147 (2d Cir.1981) (noting that “the absence of such an explanation [by the trial court regarding the jury’s right to return a partial verdict] did not deny the appellants any protected right in a case such as this where the jury neither attempted to return a partial verdict nor even asked if it could do so”); United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir.1979) (declining to adopt “a per se rule that a mistrial is improperly declared whenever the trial judge fails to specifically inquire as to the possibility of a partial verdict”); Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska Ct.App.1991) (declining “to place a burden on the trial judge to sua sponte inquire further or perform a special poll of jurors who deliberate on cases involving lesser included offenses”); Speaks v. United States, 617 A.2d 942, 952 (D.C.1992) (noting that imposing a sua sponte obligation on a trial judge to inquire regarding partial verdicts where not requested by defense counsel or indicated by the jury “threatens to disrupt the fine line which a trial judge must tread with respect to partial verdicts”)."
} | 3,717,707 | b |
We agree with the State that the mere theoretical availability of partial verdicts does not necessitate a further inquiry by the trial court where, for example, no party has requested a partial verdict be taken or the jury does not indicate that it has reached one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "596 F.2d 76, 82",
"parenthetical": "declining to adopt \"a per se rule that a mistrial is improperly declared whenever the trial judge fails to specifically inquire as to the possibility of a partial verdict\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 147 (2d Cir.1981) (noting that “the absence of such an explanation [by the trial court regarding the jury’s right to return a partial verdict] did not deny the appellants any protected right in a case such as this where the jury neither attempted to return a partial verdict nor even asked if it could do so”); United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir.1979) (declining to adopt “a per se rule that a mistrial is improperly declared whenever the trial judge fails to specifically inquire as to the possibility of a partial verdict”); Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska Ct.App.1991) (declining “to place a burden on the trial judge to sua sponte inquire further or perform a special poll of jurors who deliberate on cases involving lesser included offenses”); Speaks v. United States, 617 A.2d 942, 952 (D.C.1992) (noting that imposing a sua sponte obligation on a trial judge to inquire regarding partial verdicts where not requested by defense counsel or indicated by the jury “threatens to disrupt the fine line which a trial judge must tread with respect to partial verdicts”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "566 P.2d 1146, 1151-52",
"parenthetical": "determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant's consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict",
"sentence": "But see State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1146, 1151-52 (1977), overruled on other grounds, State v. Wardlow, 95 N.M. 585, 624 P.2d 527 (1981) (determining that no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without a defendant’s consent exists without the trial judge inquiring whether the jury reached a partial verdict)."
} | 3,717,707 | a |
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