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. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 Pa. 167, 170",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 A.2d 661, 662",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | 7,862,136 | a |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "311 A.2d 896, 898",
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 Pa. 167, 170",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 A.2d 661, 662",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "311 A.2d 896, 898",
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | 7,862,136 | a |
Analyzing specific tort duties in these 52 jurisdictions and then comparing them to federal labeling requirements would be onerous, and it is unnecessary. Tort law in particular jurisdictions may or may not require Defendant to change statements regarding efficacy in Lipitor's label, based on the ASCOT data. It is sufficient here to hold that, to the extent any state law does so require, Defendant cannot comply with that state law and federal labeling requirements simultaneously. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "727 F.3d 1273, 1286",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]tate tort law is preempted if it imposes a duty upon manufacturers to take some action that is prohibited under federal law.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1286 (10th Cir.2013) (“[S]tate tort law is preempted if it imposes a duty upon manufacturers to take some action that is prohibited under federal law.”); see also Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 478 (4th Cir.2014) (holding that \"even if such claims are cognizable [under state law], they are preempted in the case of generic drug mánufacturers.”),"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "741 F.3d 470, 478",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"even if such claims are cognizable [under state law], they are preempted in the case of generic drug manufacturers.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1286 (10th Cir.2013) (“[S]tate tort law is preempted if it imposes a duty upon manufacturers to take some action that is prohibited under federal law.”); see also Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 478 (4th Cir.2014) (holding that \"even if such claims are cognizable [under state law], they are preempted in the case of generic drug mánufacturers.”),"
} | 12,133,527 | a |
Further, they admit that they did not raise their dedication claim until after trial, and simply labeled it an implied-easement claim. Although they suggest a new theory of Idaho law, they cite nothing but contrary public-dedication eases without articulating why those decisions would allow a private dedication in this dispute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "142 Idaho 635, 639",
"parenthetical": "reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law); cf. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006) (reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Idaho 683, 689",
"parenthetical": "affirming a fee award where a party's position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law); cf. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006) (reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous)."
} | 4,078,409 | b |
Further, they admit that they did not raise their dedication claim until after trial, and simply labeled it an implied-easement claim. Although they suggest a new theory of Idaho law, they cite nothing but contrary public-dedication eases without articulating why those decisions would allow a private dedication in this dispute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 Idaho 683, 689",
"parenthetical": "affirming a fee award where a party's position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law); cf. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006) (reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "132 P.3d 392, 396",
"parenthetical": "reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law); cf. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006) (reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous)."
} | 4,078,409 | a |
Further, they admit that they did not raise their dedication claim until after trial, and simply labeled it an implied-easement claim. Although they suggest a new theory of Idaho law, they cite nothing but contrary public-dedication eases without articulating why those decisions would allow a private dedication in this dispute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "142 Idaho 635, 639",
"parenthetical": "reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law); cf. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006) (reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "183 P.3d 771, 777",
"parenthetical": "affirming a fee award where a party's position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law); cf. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006) (reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous)."
} | 4,078,409 | b |
Further, they admit that they did not raise their dedication claim until after trial, and simply labeled it an implied-easement claim. Although they suggest a new theory of Idaho law, they cite nothing but contrary public-dedication eases without articulating why those decisions would allow a private dedication in this dispute. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "183 P.3d 771, 777",
"parenthetical": "affirming a fee award where a party's position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law); cf. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006) (reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "132 P.3d 392, 396",
"parenthetical": "reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous",
"sentence": "See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 689, 183 P.3d 771, 777 (2008) (affirming a fee award where a party’s position on a purportedly unsettled legal issue was against the clear weight of Idaho law); cf. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006) (reversing a fee award where some novel legal defenses were not frivolous)."
} | 4,078,409 | a |
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nevertheless, companies may be held liable for discrimination even where the decision-making official did not intentionally discriminate if the information used by that official in deciding to terminate a worker's employment was filtered through another employee who had a discriminatory motive. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 409, 413-14",
"parenthetical": "discriminatory intent of employer's agents sufficient proof to hold employer responsible for discriminatory termination without intentional discrimination by final decision maker",
"sentence": "See Jiles v. Ingram, 944 F.2d 409, 413-14 (8th Cir. 1991) (discriminatory intent of employer’s agents sufficient proof to hold employer responsible for discriminatory termination without intentional discrimination by final decision maker); see also Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir. 1993) (“when a committee has ‘acted as the conduit of [a supervisor’s] prejudice — his cat’s paw — the innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "990 F.2d 1051, 1057",
"parenthetical": "\"when a committee has 'acted as the conduit of [a supervisor's] prejudice -- his cat's paw -- the innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability' \"",
"sentence": "See Jiles v. Ingram, 944 F.2d 409, 413-14 (8th Cir. 1991) (discriminatory intent of employer’s agents sufficient proof to hold employer responsible for discriminatory termination without intentional discrimination by final decision maker); see also Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir. 1993) (“when a committee has ‘acted as the conduit of [a supervisor’s] prejudice — his cat’s paw — the innocence of its members would not spare the company from liability’ ”)."
} | 2,219,071 | a |
The facts to be considered are derived from the complaint, as well as documents properly before the court of which both parties have notice. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "282 F.3d 147, 153",
"parenthetical": "on motion to dismiss court may consider pleadings as well as all documents incorporated therein by reference",
"sentence": "Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002) (on motion to dismiss court may consider pleadings as well as all documents incorporated therein by reference). Such documents include those attached to the pleadings, incorporated in it by reference and/or subject to judicial notice."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 150, 156",
"parenthetical": "court considers documents if they \"are integral to the pleading or subject to judicial notice\"",
"sentence": "Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir.2007); see Global Network Commc’ns Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (court considers documents if they “are integral to the pleading or subject to judicial notice”)."
} | 4,225,024 | a |
At trial, Harris was a forty-three-year-old high school graduate. The district court found the former CSHC CEO to be "a very bright man" who had been responsible for his company's SEC filings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "291 F.3d 726, 731",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver from a defendant with an eleventh-grade education to be valid when he was a \"sophisticated businessman\"",
"sentence": "See Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1066 (“Especially relevant to [Defendant’s] understanding of the risks of self-representation with respect to the securities charges is the fact that he is an experienced stockbroker.”); see also United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir.2002) (finding waiver from a defendant with an eleventh-grade education to be valid when he was a “sophisticated businessman”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "800 F.2d 1066, 1066",
"parenthetical": "\"Especially relevant to [Defendant's] understanding of the risks of self-representation with respect to the securities charges is the fact that he is an experienced stockbroker.\"",
"sentence": "See Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1066 (“Especially relevant to [Defendant’s] understanding of the risks of self-representation with respect to the securities charges is the fact that he is an experienced stockbroker.”); see also United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir.2002) (finding waiver from a defendant with an eleventh-grade education to be valid when he was a “sophisticated businessman”)."
} | 4,084,648 | b |
In arguing that those words did not clearly convey any intent to invoke the right against compelled self-incrimination, the state accurately describes contrasting wording from other cases in which this court concluded that unequivocal invocations had occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "356 Or 451, 451-52,456",
"parenthetical": "defendant's first two invocations--\"I don't want to talk anymore\" and \"I don't want to talk no more\"--unambiguously communicated her desire to no longer speak with detectives",
"sentence": "See id. at 603, 617 (defendant who stated, “I won’t answer any questions,” unequivocally invoked, when record suggested no language barrier or confusion on defendant’s part, or that reasonable officer would have understood defendant instead to be asking a question); McAnulty, 356 Or at 451-52,456 (defendant’s first two invocations—“I don’t want to talk anymore” and “I don’t want to talk no more”—unambiguously communicated her desire to no longer speak with detectives); see also State v. Acremant, 338 Or 302, 322, 108 P3d 1139, cert den, 546 US 864 (2005) (defendant’s statement—“I think that I do need a lawyer!,] I do”—unambiguously expressed his desire to consult with counsel before speaking with detectives); State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 97, 734 P2d 334 (1987) (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 US 91, 100, 105 S Ct 490, 83 L Ed 2d 488 (1984), wherein the defendant, upon being advised of right to counsel and asked if he understood, answered “Uh, yeah[,] I’d like to do that”; Supreme Court concluded that he unambiguously invoked his derivative right to counsel). The unequivocal invocations in those cases all share a commonality that this case does not: In each case, the defendant expressed his or her intent by first self-identifying as the actor (“I”) and then by clearly stating the desired action or view relating to the right in question (won’t answer questions, don’t want to talk, need a lawyer). Simply stated, each of those cases involved classic and easily understood words of invocation."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "338 Or 302, 322",
"parenthetical": "defendant's statement--\"I think that I do need a lawyer!,] I do\"--unambiguously expressed his desire to consult with counsel before speaking with detectives",
"sentence": "See id. at 603, 617 (defendant who stated, “I won’t answer any questions,” unequivocally invoked, when record suggested no language barrier or confusion on defendant’s part, or that reasonable officer would have understood defendant instead to be asking a question); McAnulty, 356 Or at 451-52,456 (defendant’s first two invocations—“I don’t want to talk anymore” and “I don’t want to talk no more”—unambiguously communicated her desire to no longer speak with detectives); see also State v. Acremant, 338 Or 302, 322, 108 P3d 1139, cert den, 546 US 864 (2005) (defendant’s statement—“I think that I do need a lawyer!,] I do”—unambiguously expressed his desire to consult with counsel before speaking with detectives); State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 97, 734 P2d 334 (1987) (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 US 91, 100, 105 S Ct 490, 83 L Ed 2d 488 (1984), wherein the defendant, upon being advised of right to counsel and asked if he understood, answered “Uh, yeah[,] I’d like to do that”; Supreme Court concluded that he unambiguously invoked his derivative right to counsel). The unequivocal invocations in those cases all share a commonality that this case does not: In each case, the defendant expressed his or her intent by first self-identifying as the actor (“I”) and then by clearly stating the desired action or view relating to the right in question (won’t answer questions, don’t want to talk, need a lawyer). Simply stated, each of those cases involved classic and easily understood words of invocation."
} | 12,414,805 | a |
In arguing that those words did not clearly convey any intent to invoke the right against compelled self-incrimination, the state accurately describes contrasting wording from other cases in which this court concluded that unequivocal invocations had occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's statement--\"I think that I do need a lawyer!,] I do\"--unambiguously expressed his desire to consult with counsel before speaking with detectives",
"sentence": "See id. at 603, 617 (defendant who stated, “I won’t answer any questions,” unequivocally invoked, when record suggested no language barrier or confusion on defendant’s part, or that reasonable officer would have understood defendant instead to be asking a question); McAnulty, 356 Or at 451-52,456 (defendant’s first two invocations—“I don’t want to talk anymore” and “I don’t want to talk no more”—unambiguously communicated her desire to no longer speak with detectives); see also State v. Acremant, 338 Or 302, 322, 108 P3d 1139, cert den, 546 US 864 (2005) (defendant’s statement—“I think that I do need a lawyer!,] I do”—unambiguously expressed his desire to consult with counsel before speaking with detectives); State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 97, 734 P2d 334 (1987) (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 US 91, 100, 105 S Ct 490, 83 L Ed 2d 488 (1984), wherein the defendant, upon being advised of right to counsel and asked if he understood, answered “Uh, yeah[,] I’d like to do that”; Supreme Court concluded that he unambiguously invoked his derivative right to counsel). The unequivocal invocations in those cases all share a commonality that this case does not: In each case, the defendant expressed his or her intent by first self-identifying as the actor (“I”) and then by clearly stating the desired action or view relating to the right in question (won’t answer questions, don’t want to talk, need a lawyer). Simply stated, each of those cases involved classic and easily understood words of invocation."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "356 Or 451, 451-52,456",
"parenthetical": "defendant's first two invocations--\"I don't want to talk anymore\" and \"I don't want to talk no more\"--unambiguously communicated her desire to no longer speak with detectives",
"sentence": "See id. at 603, 617 (defendant who stated, “I won’t answer any questions,” unequivocally invoked, when record suggested no language barrier or confusion on defendant’s part, or that reasonable officer would have understood defendant instead to be asking a question); McAnulty, 356 Or at 451-52,456 (defendant’s first two invocations—“I don’t want to talk anymore” and “I don’t want to talk no more”—unambiguously communicated her desire to no longer speak with detectives); see also State v. Acremant, 338 Or 302, 322, 108 P3d 1139, cert den, 546 US 864 (2005) (defendant’s statement—“I think that I do need a lawyer!,] I do”—unambiguously expressed his desire to consult with counsel before speaking with detectives); State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 97, 734 P2d 334 (1987) (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 US 91, 100, 105 S Ct 490, 83 L Ed 2d 488 (1984), wherein the defendant, upon being advised of right to counsel and asked if he understood, answered “Uh, yeah[,] I’d like to do that”; Supreme Court concluded that he unambiguously invoked his derivative right to counsel). The unequivocal invocations in those cases all share a commonality that this case does not: In each case, the defendant expressed his or her intent by first self-identifying as the actor (“I”) and then by clearly stating the desired action or view relating to the right in question (won’t answer questions, don’t want to talk, need a lawyer). Simply stated, each of those cases involved classic and easily understood words of invocation."
} | 12,414,805 | b |
The district court also found that Olsen had instructed a co-conspirator not to provide information to law enforcement and told a co-defendant to "keep his mouth shut" while that codefendant was in prison. Each of these actions, as well as Olsen's decision to order a coconspirator to prevent a cooperating witness from testifying, would alone warrant the application of the obstruction of justice enhancement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "414 F.3d 845, 351-52",
"parenthetical": "upholding application of the obstruction of justice enhancement where defendant threatened to frame a co-conspirator for kidnapping if he testified",
"sentence": "See United States v. Agudelo, 414 F.3d 845, 351-52 (2d Cir.2005) (upholding application of the obstruction of justice enhancement where defendant threatened to frame a co-conspirator for kidnapping if he testified); see also United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 465-66 (2d Cir.2004) (sustaining application of the obstruction of justice enhancement where defendant told a potential witness that he planned to kill another potential witness, and the district court determined that this statement was intended to ensure the listener’s silence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "364 F.3d 438, 465-66",
"parenthetical": "sustaining application of the obstruction of justice enhancement where defendant told a potential witness that he planned to kill another potential witness, and the district court determined that this statement was intended to ensure the listener's silence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Agudelo, 414 F.3d 845, 351-52 (2d Cir.2005) (upholding application of the obstruction of justice enhancement where defendant threatened to frame a co-conspirator for kidnapping if he testified); see also United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 465-66 (2d Cir.2004) (sustaining application of the obstruction of justice enhancement where defendant told a potential witness that he planned to kill another potential witness, and the district court determined that this statement was intended to ensure the listener’s silence)."
} | 3,772,649 | a |
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the absence of any policy regarding whether the use of pepper spray is appropriate on an individual who is fully restrained created an "obvious" constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 738, 738",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Eighth Amendment violation is obvious\" when prisoner was subdued then handcuffed to hitching post for seven hours.",
"sentence": "See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment violation is obvious” when prisoner was subdued then handcuffed to hitching post for seven hours.); see also Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir.2005) (“[O]ne could draw a reasonable inference” that continued use of force after detainee was subdued or restrained “was for the very purpose of causing harm: excessive force.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 F.3d 1265, 1272",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]ne could draw a reasonable inference\" that continued use of force after detainee was subdued or restrained \"was for the very purpose of causing harm: excessive force.\"",
"sentence": "See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment violation is obvious” when prisoner was subdued then handcuffed to hitching post for seven hours.); see also Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir.2005) (“[O]ne could draw a reasonable inference” that continued use of force after detainee was subdued or restrained “was for the very purpose of causing harm: excessive force.”)."
} | 4,326,497 | a |
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the absence of any policy regarding whether the use of pepper spray is appropriate on an individual who is fully restrained created an "obvious" constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Eighth Amendment violation is obvious\" when prisoner was subdued then handcuffed to hitching post for seven hours.",
"sentence": "See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment violation is obvious” when prisoner was subdued then handcuffed to hitching post for seven hours.); see also Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir.2005) (“[O]ne could draw a reasonable inference” that continued use of force after detainee was subdued or restrained “was for the very purpose of causing harm: excessive force.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "422 F.3d 1265, 1272",
"parenthetical": "\"[O]ne could draw a reasonable inference\" that continued use of force after detainee was subdued or restrained \"was for the very purpose of causing harm: excessive force.\"",
"sentence": "See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment violation is obvious” when prisoner was subdued then handcuffed to hitching post for seven hours.); see also Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir.2005) (“[O]ne could draw a reasonable inference” that continued use of force after detainee was subdued or restrained “was for the very purpose of causing harm: excessive force.”)."
} | 4,326,497 | a |
Because the record amply supports the determination that Coleman was unavailable, we are hard-pressed to find that the outcome of Reed's trial would have been different had Luka investigated Coleman. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "823 F.2d 1439, 1446",
"parenthetical": "holding that for a habeas petitioner \"[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,\" he- \"must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced\"",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that for a habeas petitioner “[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,” he- “must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced”), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den., 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the state court’s determination that the petitioner “could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case”); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004) (concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "875 So.2d 579, 583",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that for a habeas petitioner “[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,” he- “must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced”), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den., 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the state court’s determination that the petitioner “could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case”); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004) (concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland)."
} | 4,203,547 | a |
Because the record amply supports the determination that Coleman was unavailable, we are hard-pressed to find that the outcome of Reed's trial would have been different had Luka investigated Coleman. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that for a habeas petitioner \"[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,\" he- \"must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced\"",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that for a habeas petitioner “[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,” he- “must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced”), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den., 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the state court’s determination that the petitioner “could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case”); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004) (concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "875 So.2d 579, 583",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that for a habeas petitioner “[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,” he- “must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced”), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den., 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the state court’s determination that the petitioner “could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case”); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004) (concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland)."
} | 4,203,547 | a |
Because the record amply supports the determination that Coleman was unavailable, we are hard-pressed to find that the outcome of Reed's trial would have been different had Luka investigated Coleman. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868",
"parenthetical": "concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court's finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that for a habeas petitioner “[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,” he- “must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced”), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den., 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the state court’s determination that the petitioner “could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case”); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004) (concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "875 So.2d 579, 583",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that for a habeas petitioner “[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,” he- “must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced”), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den., 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the state court’s determination that the petitioner “could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case”); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004) (concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland)."
} | 4,203,547 | a |
Because the record amply supports the determination that Coleman was unavailable, we are hard-pressed to find that the outcome of Reed's trial would have been different had Luka investigated Coleman. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "875 So.2d 579, 583",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that for a habeas petitioner “[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,” he- “must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced”), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den., 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the state court’s determination that the petitioner “could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case”); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004) (concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990",
"parenthetical": "holding that the state court's determination that the petitioner \"could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case\"",
"sentence": "See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1446 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that for a habeas petitioner “[t]o prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and to produce a certain type of expert witness,” he- “must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily competent attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would have found an expert similar to the one eventually produced”), mod. on other grounds and reh. en banc den., 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987); Monfiston v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 559 Fed.Appx. 863, 868 (11th Cir.2014) (concluding that for the petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiency to investigate the witness, he had to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the state postconviction court’s finding that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial); Gideon v. Dep’t of Corr., 295 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that the state court’s determination that the petitioner “could not show prejudice because he did not allege that [the witness] was available to testify, was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case”); see also Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla.2004) (concluding that a defendant must identify the testimony that would have been provided and allege that the witness was available to testify to establish prejudice under Strickland)."
} | 4,203,547 | b |
. A finding of willful infringement, by itself, is not sufficient to be res judicata on the issue of fraudulent intent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "350 F.3d 1327, 1343",
"parenthetical": "ruling that willful infringement \"does not equate to fraud\" and is therefore not subject to the more stringent 9(b",
"sentence": "See In re SeaChange, 2004 WL 240317, at *8 (\"Willfulness in the context of patent infringement is not equivalent to actual knowledge.”); see also Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., Inc., 350 F.3d 1327, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2003) (ruling that willful infringement \"does not equate to fraud” and is therefore not subject to the more stringent 9(b) pleading requirements)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2004 WL 240317, at *8",
"parenthetical": "\"Willfulness in the context of patent infringement is not equivalent to actual knowledge.\"",
"sentence": "See In re SeaChange, 2004 WL 240317, at *8 (\"Willfulness in the context of patent infringement is not equivalent to actual knowledge.”); see also Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., Inc., 350 F.3d 1327, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2003) (ruling that willful infringement \"does not equate to fraud” and is therefore not subject to the more stringent 9(b) pleading requirements)."
} | 3,702,028 | b |
Here, the evidence supporting the officers' reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs (i.e. his coming and going from the apartment named in the search warrant and the hand-to-hand contact observed outside the apartment) also indicated that he might be armed and dangerous. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 F.3d 1491, 1502",
"parenthetical": "holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo); see also United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that “when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle, the officer may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officer’s safety and the safety of others”); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir.1995) (noting that “it is certainly reasonable for an officer to believe that a person engaged in the selling of crack cocaine may be carrying a weapon for protection”); Unit ed States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir.1988) (concluding that an officer’s pat-down search of the occupants of a car was reasonable after the officer observed large amounts of money on the front seat, became suspicious that it might' be drug money, and was concerned for his safety “because persons involved with drugs often carry weapons”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "160 F.3d 164, 169",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle, the officer may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officer's safety and the safety of others\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo); see also United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that “when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle, the officer may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officer’s safety and the safety of others”); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir.1995) (noting that “it is certainly reasonable for an officer to believe that a person engaged in the selling of crack cocaine may be carrying a weapon for protection”); Unit ed States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir.1988) (concluding that an officer’s pat-down search of the occupants of a car was reasonable after the officer observed large amounts of money on the front seat, became suspicious that it might' be drug money, and was concerned for his safety “because persons involved with drugs often carry weapons”)."
} | 11,170,977 | a |
Here, the evidence supporting the officers' reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs (i.e. his coming and going from the apartment named in the search warrant and the hand-to-hand contact observed outside the apartment) also indicated that he might be armed and dangerous. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 869, 873",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"it is certainly reasonable for an officer to believe that a person engaged in the selling of crack cocaine may be carrying a weapon for protection\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo); see also United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that “when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle, the officer may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officer’s safety and the safety of others”); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir.1995) (noting that “it is certainly reasonable for an officer to believe that a person engaged in the selling of crack cocaine may be carrying a weapon for protection”); Unit ed States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir.1988) (concluding that an officer’s pat-down search of the occupants of a car was reasonable after the officer observed large amounts of money on the front seat, became suspicious that it might' be drug money, and was concerned for his safety “because persons involved with drugs often carry weapons”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 F.3d 1491, 1502",
"parenthetical": "holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo); see also United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that “when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle, the officer may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officer’s safety and the safety of others”); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir.1995) (noting that “it is certainly reasonable for an officer to believe that a person engaged in the selling of crack cocaine may be carrying a weapon for protection”); Unit ed States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir.1988) (concluding that an officer’s pat-down search of the occupants of a car was reasonable after the officer observed large amounts of money on the front seat, became suspicious that it might' be drug money, and was concerned for his safety “because persons involved with drugs often carry weapons”)."
} | 11,170,977 | b |
Here, the evidence supporting the officers' reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs (i.e. his coming and going from the apartment named in the search warrant and the hand-to-hand contact observed outside the apartment) also indicated that he might be armed and dangerous. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "100 F.3d 1491, 1502",
"parenthetical": "holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo); see also United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that “when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle, the officer may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officer’s safety and the safety of others”); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir.1995) (noting that “it is certainly reasonable for an officer to believe that a person engaged in the selling of crack cocaine may be carrying a weapon for protection”); Unit ed States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir.1988) (concluding that an officer’s pat-down search of the occupants of a car was reasonable after the officer observed large amounts of money on the front seat, became suspicious that it might' be drug money, and was concerned for his safety “because persons involved with drugs often carry weapons”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "859 F.2d 1171, 1177",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an officer's pat-down search of the occupants of a car was reasonable after the officer observed large amounts of money on the front seat, became suspicious that it might' be drug money, and was concerned for his safety \"because persons involved with drugs often carry weapons\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that, during an investigatory detention, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo); see also United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that “when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle, the officer may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officer’s safety and the safety of others”); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir.1995) (noting that “it is certainly reasonable for an officer to believe that a person engaged in the selling of crack cocaine may be carrying a weapon for protection”); Unit ed States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir.1988) (concluding that an officer’s pat-down search of the occupants of a car was reasonable after the officer observed large amounts of money on the front seat, became suspicious that it might' be drug money, and was concerned for his safety “because persons involved with drugs often carry weapons”)."
} | 11,170,977 | a |
After the OHA issued its decision in 1996, a group of private parties, who stood to recover additional funds as individual claimants under the FSA, directly challenged the ruling in the District of Columbia District Court. That claim, however, was rejected by the Federal Circuit. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims for lack of a private right of action and because the OHA's decision was not justiciable",
"sentence": "See Consolidated Edison v. O’Leary, 131 F.3d 1475 (Fed.Cir.1997) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim because the OHA’s decision was not reviewable); cf. Consolidated Edison v. O’Leary, 117 F.3d 538 (Fed.Cir.1997) (dismissing claims for lack of a private right of action and because the OHA’s decision was not justiciable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dismissing plaintiffs' claim because the OHA's decision was not reviewable",
"sentence": "See Consolidated Edison v. O’Leary, 131 F.3d 1475 (Fed.Cir.1997) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim because the OHA’s decision was not reviewable); cf. Consolidated Edison v. O’Leary, 117 F.3d 538 (Fed.Cir.1997) (dismissing claims for lack of a private right of action and because the OHA’s decision was not justiciable)."
} | 11,458,930 | b |
We cannot say of any future case what emphasis will be placed on the State Department's advisory opinion or what emphasis would be proper. For that reason, the injury or threatened injury is too speculative to confer standing. We think it impossible to conclude there is a real and immediate threat that any particular applicant would be denied asylum on grounds of which appellants complain. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 190, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm \"would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised\" a power related to the alleged illegality",
"sentence": "See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.1977) (denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm “would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised” a power related to the alleged illegality); see also International Longshoremen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 74 S.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954) (rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union’s attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union's attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit",
"sentence": "See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.1977) (denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm “would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised” a power related to the alleged illegality); see also International Longshoremen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 74 S.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954) (rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union’s attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit)."
} | 5,657,323 | a |
We cannot say of any future case what emphasis will be placed on the State Department's advisory opinion or what emphasis would be proper. For that reason, the injury or threatened injury is too speculative to confer standing. We think it impossible to conclude there is a real and immediate threat that any particular applicant would be denied asylum on grounds of which appellants complain. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 190, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm \"would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised\" a power related to the alleged illegality",
"sentence": "See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.1977) (denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm “would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised” a power related to the alleged illegality); see also International Longshoremen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 74 S.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954) (rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union’s attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union's attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit",
"sentence": "See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.1977) (denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm “would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised” a power related to the alleged illegality); see also International Longshoremen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 74 S.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954) (rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union’s attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit)."
} | 5,657,323 | a |
We cannot say of any future case what emphasis will be placed on the State Department's advisory opinion or what emphasis would be proper. For that reason, the injury or threatened injury is too speculative to confer standing. We think it impossible to conclude there is a real and immediate threat that any particular applicant would be denied asylum on grounds of which appellants complain. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union's attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit",
"sentence": "See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.1977) (denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm “would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised” a power related to the alleged illegality); see also International Longshoremen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 74 S.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954) (rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union’s attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "553 F.2d 190, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm \"would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised\" a power related to the alleged illegality",
"sentence": "See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.1977) (denying standing to appellant Congressman to challenge alleged illegal use of funds by the CIA in part because the alleged harm “would take place, if at all, at some undetermined time in the future when Congress exercised” a power related to the alleged illegality); see also International Longshoremen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 74 S.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954) (rejecting for failure to present a case or controversy a union’s attempt to obtain an injunction prohibiting the INS from applying a statute in a situation that had not arisen at the time of suit)."
} | 5,657,323 | b |
A court is permitted to use general points of reference as a starting point for calculating the losses or gains from fraudulent transactions and may make reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing proceeding." In other words, as a general principle, extrapolation is an appropriate method by which to calculate a forfeiture money judgment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 74, 76",
"parenthetical": "\"it is permissible for the sentencing court, in calculating a defendant's offense level, to estimate the loss resulting from his offenses by extrapolating the average amount of loss from known data and applying that average to transactions where the exact amount of loss is unknown\"",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Bryant, 128 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir.1997) (“it is permissible for the sentencing court, in calculating a defendant’s offense level, to estimate the loss resulting from his offenses by extrapolating the average amount of loss from known data and applying that average to transactions where the exact amount of loss is unknown”); United States v. Williams, 553 Fed.Appx. 73, 76-77 (2d Cir.2014) (affirming district court’s loss calculation of $4.17 million in bank fraud case even though it was “far above the loss amount documented at trial” where it was based upon extrapolating from the trial testimony the assumption that the scheme involved three days of work per week over a three year period, that the average theft was $200 per bank, and that the defendants visited five banks per day); United States v. Akpan, 361 Fed.Appx. 252, 254 (2d Cir.2010) (affirming loss calculation for sentencing purposes in excess of $200,000, in health care fraud conviction, where government proved at trial false claims reflecting $107,000 loss and court calculated loss in excess of $200,000 based upon inferences with known data)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 176, 180",
"parenthetical": "forfeiture order in food stamp fraud case properly entered in amount equal to loss amount that was calculated based upon extrapolation",
"sentence": "United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir.2009) (forfeiture order in food stamp fraud case properly entered in amount equal to loss amount that was calculated based upon extrapolation)."
} | 4,293,528 | b |
A court is permitted to use general points of reference as a starting point for calculating the losses or gains from fraudulent transactions and may make reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing proceeding." In other words, as a general principle, extrapolation is an appropriate method by which to calculate a forfeiture money judgment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "553 Fed.Appx. 73, 76-77",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's loss calculation of $4.17 million in bank fraud case even though it was \"far above the loss amount documented at trial\" where it was based upon extrapolating from the trial testimony the assumption that the scheme involved three days of work per week over a three year period, that the average theft was $200 per bank, and that the defendants visited five banks per day",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Bryant, 128 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir.1997) (“it is permissible for the sentencing court, in calculating a defendant’s offense level, to estimate the loss resulting from his offenses by extrapolating the average amount of loss from known data and applying that average to transactions where the exact amount of loss is unknown”); United States v. Williams, 553 Fed.Appx. 73, 76-77 (2d Cir.2014) (affirming district court’s loss calculation of $4.17 million in bank fraud case even though it was “far above the loss amount documented at trial” where it was based upon extrapolating from the trial testimony the assumption that the scheme involved three days of work per week over a three year period, that the average theft was $200 per bank, and that the defendants visited five banks per day); United States v. Akpan, 361 Fed.Appx. 252, 254 (2d Cir.2010) (affirming loss calculation for sentencing purposes in excess of $200,000, in health care fraud conviction, where government proved at trial false claims reflecting $107,000 loss and court calculated loss in excess of $200,000 based upon inferences with known data)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 176, 180",
"parenthetical": "forfeiture order in food stamp fraud case properly entered in amount equal to loss amount that was calculated based upon extrapolation",
"sentence": "United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir.2009) (forfeiture order in food stamp fraud case properly entered in amount equal to loss amount that was calculated based upon extrapolation)."
} | 4,293,528 | b |
A court is permitted to use general points of reference as a starting point for calculating the losses or gains from fraudulent transactions and may make reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing proceeding." In other words, as a general principle, extrapolation is an appropriate method by which to calculate a forfeiture money judgment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "361 Fed.Appx. 252, 254",
"parenthetical": "affirming loss calculation for sentencing purposes in excess of $200,000, in health care fraud conviction, where government proved at trial false claims reflecting $107,000 loss and court calculated loss in excess of $200,000 based upon inferences with known data",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Bryant, 128 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir.1997) (“it is permissible for the sentencing court, in calculating a defendant’s offense level, to estimate the loss resulting from his offenses by extrapolating the average amount of loss from known data and applying that average to transactions where the exact amount of loss is unknown”); United States v. Williams, 553 Fed.Appx. 73, 76-77 (2d Cir.2014) (affirming district court’s loss calculation of $4.17 million in bank fraud case even though it was “far above the loss amount documented at trial” where it was based upon extrapolating from the trial testimony the assumption that the scheme involved three days of work per week over a three year period, that the average theft was $200 per bank, and that the defendants visited five banks per day); United States v. Akpan, 361 Fed.Appx. 252, 254 (2d Cir.2010) (affirming loss calculation for sentencing purposes in excess of $200,000, in health care fraud conviction, where government proved at trial false claims reflecting $107,000 loss and court calculated loss in excess of $200,000 based upon inferences with known data)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 176, 180",
"parenthetical": "forfeiture order in food stamp fraud case properly entered in amount equal to loss amount that was calculated based upon extrapolation",
"sentence": "United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir.2009) (forfeiture order in food stamp fraud case properly entered in amount equal to loss amount that was calculated based upon extrapolation)."
} | 4,293,528 | b |
This Circuit has similarly interpreted the Doehr majority to have rested its due process holding on the application of Connecticut's statute to an intentional tortfeasor, as opposed to a creditor with an existing interest in the property. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 122, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor's claim for payment of \"an outstanding sum certain\" for completed repairs to attached property",
"sentence": "See Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 987 F.2d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.1993) (upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor’s claim for payment of “an outstanding sum certain” for completed repairs to attached property); cf. British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A, 212 F.3d 138, 144 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum “appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as ‘lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits’ ” (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum \"appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as 'lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits' \" (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105",
"sentence": "See Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 987 F.2d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.1993) (upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor’s claim for payment of “an outstanding sum certain” for completed repairs to attached property); cf. British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A, 212 F.3d 138, 144 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum “appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as ‘lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits’ ” (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105))."
} | 6,050,837 | a |
This Circuit has similarly interpreted the Doehr majority to have rested its due process holding on the application of Connecticut's statute to an intentional tortfeasor, as opposed to a creditor with an existing interest in the property. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 122, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor's claim for payment of \"an outstanding sum certain\" for completed repairs to attached property",
"sentence": "See Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 987 F.2d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.1993) (upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor’s claim for payment of “an outstanding sum certain” for completed repairs to attached property); cf. British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A, 212 F.3d 138, 144 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum “appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as ‘lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits’ ” (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 17, 17",
"parenthetical": "stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum \"appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as 'lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits' \" (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105",
"sentence": "See Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 987 F.2d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.1993) (upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor’s claim for payment of “an outstanding sum certain” for completed repairs to attached property); cf. British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A, 212 F.3d 138, 144 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum “appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as ‘lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits’ ” (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105))."
} | 6,050,837 | a |
This Circuit has similarly interpreted the Doehr majority to have rested its due process holding on the application of Connecticut's statute to an intentional tortfeasor, as opposed to a creditor with an existing interest in the property. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum \"appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as 'lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits' \" (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105",
"sentence": "See Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 987 F.2d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.1993) (upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor’s claim for payment of “an outstanding sum certain” for completed repairs to attached property); cf. British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A, 212 F.3d 138, 144 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum “appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as ‘lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits’ ” (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 122, 126-27",
"parenthetical": "upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor's claim for payment of \"an outstanding sum certain\" for completed repairs to attached property",
"sentence": "See Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 987 F.2d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.1993) (upholding the same Connecticut statute as applied to contractor’s claim for payment of “an outstanding sum certain” for completed repairs to attached property); cf. British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A, 212 F.3d 138, 144 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (stating in dicta that a claim for a contractually-defined sum “appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as ‘lending] themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits’ ” (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17, 111 S.Ct. 2105))."
} | 6,050,837 | b |
A district court typically has broad discretion to refer evidentiary hearings to a magistrate judge. However, as the magistrate judge explicitly recognized in this case, his authority during the bond revocation hearing was limited to a determination of whether probable cause supported a finding that Schlosser violated the terms of his bond. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "453 F.3d 1024, 1026",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the magistrate judge’s findings of fact as proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Schlosser engaged in the conduct underlying the bond violations, that would be error. See United States v. Brown, 453 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir.2006) (explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence); see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (explaining that a basic fair trial right “is a defendant’s right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 858, 876",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a basic fair trial right \"is a defendant's right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside\"",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the magistrate judge’s findings of fact as proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Schlosser engaged in the conduct underlying the bond violations, that would be error. See United States v. Brown, 453 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir.2006) (explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence); see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (explaining that a basic fair trial right “is a defendant’s right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside”)."
} | 3,362,229 | a |
A district court typically has broad discretion to refer evidentiary hearings to a magistrate judge. However, as the magistrate judge explicitly recognized in this case, his authority during the bond revocation hearing was limited to a determination of whether probable cause supported a finding that Schlosser violated the terms of his bond. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a basic fair trial right \"is a defendant's right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside\"",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the magistrate judge’s findings of fact as proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Schlosser engaged in the conduct underlying the bond violations, that would be error. See United States v. Brown, 453 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir.2006) (explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence); see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (explaining that a basic fair trial right “is a defendant’s right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "453 F.3d 1024, 1026",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the magistrate judge’s findings of fact as proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Schlosser engaged in the conduct underlying the bond violations, that would be error. See United States v. Brown, 453 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir.2006) (explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence); see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (explaining that a basic fair trial right “is a defendant’s right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside”)."
} | 3,362,229 | b |
A district court typically has broad discretion to refer evidentiary hearings to a magistrate judge. However, as the magistrate judge explicitly recognized in this case, his authority during the bond revocation hearing was limited to a determination of whether probable cause supported a finding that Schlosser violated the terms of his bond. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "453 F.3d 1024, 1026",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the magistrate judge’s findings of fact as proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Schlosser engaged in the conduct underlying the bond violations, that would be error. See United States v. Brown, 453 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir.2006) (explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence); see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (explaining that a basic fair trial right “is a defendant’s right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that a basic fair trial right \"is a defendant's right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside\"",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). Thus, had the district court relied on the magistrate judge’s findings of fact as proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Schlosser engaged in the conduct underlying the bond violations, that would be error. See United States v. Brown, 453 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir.2006) (explaining that the standard of proof at sentencing is preponderance of the evidence); see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (explaining that a basic fair trial right “is a defendant’s right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside”)."
} | 3,362,229 | a |
In accordance with these precedents, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has. recognized the proposition that an official's single act can serve as a policy and thus establish a basis for municipal liability. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "288 F.3d 1, 9",
"parenthetical": "holding that a \"policy\" for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an official's single decision",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an official’s single decision) (citation omitted); Dickinson v. Chitwood, No. 98-1446, 181 F.3d 79, 1998 WL 1085684, *1 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292 for the proposition that a single decision by a final decision-maker may give rise to municipal liability) (unpublished opinion); Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 576 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an official’s single decision or act) (citation omitted); Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292 to hold that a single decision can be a policy for purposes of municipal liability); Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir.1992) (same); Small v. City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 553 (1st Cir.1986) (holding that city manager’s single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability); but see Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156-57 (holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 1156, 1156-57",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an official’s single decision) (citation omitted); Dickinson v. Chitwood, No. 98-1446, 181 F.3d 79, 1998 WL 1085684, *1 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292 for the proposition that a single decision by a final decision-maker may give rise to municipal liability) (unpublished opinion); Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 576 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an official’s single decision or act) (citation omitted); Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292 to hold that a single decision can be a policy for purposes of municipal liability); Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir.1992) (same); Small v. City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 553 (1st Cir.1986) (holding that city manager’s single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability); but see Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156-57 (holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy) (citations omitted)."
} | 9,008,492 | a |
In accordance with these precedents, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has. recognized the proposition that an official's single act can serve as a policy and thus establish a basis for municipal liability. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "96 F.3d 566, 576",
"parenthetical": "holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an official's single decision or act",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an official’s single decision) (citation omitted); Dickinson v. Chitwood, No. 98-1446, 181 F.3d 79, 1998 WL 1085684, *1 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292 for the proposition that a single decision by a final decision-maker may give rise to municipal liability) (unpublished opinion); Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 576 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an official’s single decision or act) (citation omitted); Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292 to hold that a single decision can be a policy for purposes of municipal liability); Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir.1992) (same); Small v. City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 553 (1st Cir.1986) (holding that city manager’s single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability); but see Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156-57 (holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 1156, 1156-57",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an official’s single decision) (citation omitted); Dickinson v. Chitwood, No. 98-1446, 181 F.3d 79, 1998 WL 1085684, *1 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292 for the proposition that a single decision by a final decision-maker may give rise to municipal liability) (unpublished opinion); Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 576 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an official’s single decision or act) (citation omitted); Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292 to hold that a single decision can be a policy for purposes of municipal liability); Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir.1992) (same); Small v. City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 553 (1st Cir.1986) (holding that city manager’s single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability); but see Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156-57 (holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy) (citations omitted)."
} | 9,008,492 | a |
In accordance with these precedents, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has. recognized the proposition that an official's single act can serve as a policy and thus establish a basis for municipal liability. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 1156, 1156-57",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an official’s single decision) (citation omitted); Dickinson v. Chitwood, No. 98-1446, 181 F.3d 79, 1998 WL 1085684, *1 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292 for the proposition that a single decision by a final decision-maker may give rise to municipal liability) (unpublished opinion); Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 576 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an official’s single decision or act) (citation omitted); Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292 to hold that a single decision can be a policy for purposes of municipal liability); Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir.1992) (same); Small v. City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 553 (1st Cir.1986) (holding that city manager’s single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability); but see Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156-57 (holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "796 F.2d 544, 553",
"parenthetical": "holding that city manager's single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability",
"sentence": "Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an official’s single decision) (citation omitted); Dickinson v. Chitwood, No. 98-1446, 181 F.3d 79, 1998 WL 1085684, *1 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292 for the proposition that a single decision by a final decision-maker may give rise to municipal liability) (unpublished opinion); Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 576 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that an unconstitutional policy may be inferred from an official’s single decision or act) (citation omitted); Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292 to hold that a single decision can be a policy for purposes of municipal liability); Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir.1992) (same); Small v. City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 553 (1st Cir.1986) (holding that city manager’s single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability); but see Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156-57 (holding that evidence of a single event alone cannot establish a municipal policy) (citations omitted)."
} | 9,008,492 | b |
We have also considered the various bases for Chernov's claim that the immigration judge's conduct at the merits hearing violated his due process rights. On this record, we, like the Board, are not persuaded that there was a defect that rendered the hearing fundamentally unfair or that, if there was, any prejudice resulted therefrom. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "granting petition for review and holding the immigration judge violated due process in his conduct at the merits hearing, which included, among other things, \"continually abus[ing] an increasingly distraught petitioner, rendering him unable to coherently respond to [the judge's] questions\"",
"sentence": "See Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir.2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012) (directing immigration judges to “interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses”); Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir.1997) (explaining that the immigration judge “has broad discretion to control the manner of interrogation in order to ascertain the truth”); cf. Cham v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 445 F.3d 683 (3d Cir.2006) (granting petition for review and holding the immigration judge violated due process in his conduct at the merits hearing, which included, among other things, “continually abus[ing] an increasingly distraught petitioner, rendering him unable to coherently respond to [the judge’s] questions”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "127 F.3d 638, 643",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the immigration judge \"has broad discretion to control the manner of interrogation in order to ascertain the truth\"",
"sentence": "See Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir.2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012) (directing immigration judges to “interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses”); Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir.1997) (explaining that the immigration judge “has broad discretion to control the manner of interrogation in order to ascertain the truth”); cf. Cham v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 445 F.3d 683 (3d Cir.2006) (granting petition for review and holding the immigration judge violated due process in his conduct at the merits hearing, which included, among other things, “continually abus[ing] an increasingly distraught petitioner, rendering him unable to coherently respond to [the judge’s] questions”)."
} | 4,252,444 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Cornellier's access to courts claims because he did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit, and failed to demonstrate that he was obstructed from doing so. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 U.S. 81, 93-95",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "311 F.3d 1198, 1199",
"parenthetical": "requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court)."
} | 3,971,044 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Cornellier's access to courts claims because he did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit, and failed to demonstrate that he was obstructed from doing so. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "311 F.3d 1198, 1199",
"parenthetical": "requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court)."
} | 3,971,044 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Cornellier's access to courts claims because he did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit, and failed to demonstrate that he was obstructed from doing so. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "311 F.3d 1198, 1199",
"parenthetical": "requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court)."
} | 3,971,044 | a |
Strictly speaking, the Town's restitution claim may not be moot, unlike its claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. It is settled law that a claim for monetary relief, including restitution, may survive events that moot injunctive or declaratory relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "732 F.2d 689, 691",
"parenthetical": "holding that claim for cost reimbursement and making employees whole is not moot, despite the defendant having ceased the challenged practice",
"sentence": "See N.L.R.B. v. Me. Caterers, Inc., 732 F.2d 689, 691 (1st Cir.1984) (holding that claim for cost reimbursement and making employees whole is not moot, despite the defendant having ceased the challenged practice); see also Demelo v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 727 F.3d 117, 124-25 (1st Cir.2013) (claim for money damages survives despite mootness of other relief)Here, notwithstanding the statute repealing toll collection, the Town seemingly retains a cognizable interest in a refund of the tolls that it alleges were illegally collected."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "727 F.3d 117, 124-25",
"parenthetical": "claim for money damages survives despite mootness of other relief",
"sentence": "See N.L.R.B. v. Me. Caterers, Inc., 732 F.2d 689, 691 (1st Cir.1984) (holding that claim for cost reimbursement and making employees whole is not moot, despite the defendant having ceased the challenged practice); see also Demelo v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 727 F.3d 117, 124-25 (1st Cir.2013) (claim for money damages survives despite mootness of other relief)Here, notwithstanding the statute repealing toll collection, the Town seemingly retains a cognizable interest in a refund of the tolls that it alleges were illegally collected."
} | 4,088,911 | a |
"The qualification prong must not ... be interpreted in such a way as to shift onto the plaintiff an obligation to anticipate and disprove, in his prima facie ease, the employer's proffer of a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its decision." A plaintiffs successful performance of a job for years can satisfy the second element of the prima facie case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff satisfied second element because he was employed by the company for 28 years",
"sentence": "See Riley, 518 F.3d at 1000 (Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff satisfied second element because “he had been performing [his] job successfully for years[.]”); see also McGinnis, 496 F.3d at 875-76 n. 3 (Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff satisfied second element because he was employed by the company for 28 years). “The fact that an employee meets some expectations, however, does not mean that [he or] she meets the standard if she does not meet other significant ex pectations.” Calder, 298 F.3d at 729 (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "518 F.3d 1000, 1000",
"parenthetical": "Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff satisfied second element because \"he had been performing [his] job successfully for years[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Riley, 518 F.3d at 1000 (Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff satisfied second element because “he had been performing [his] job successfully for years[.]”); see also McGinnis, 496 F.3d at 875-76 n. 3 (Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff satisfied second element because he was employed by the company for 28 years). “The fact that an employee meets some expectations, however, does not mean that [he or] she meets the standard if she does not meet other significant ex pectations.” Calder, 298 F.3d at 729 (citation omitted)."
} | 4,174,564 | b |
. Under this factor, courts also look to state law for # statutes- that expressly require the State to pay the judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "807 F.3d 768, 776",
"parenthetical": "relying on state statute that required \"any judgment against [Wayne State University] to be paid out of the state's tax revenues''",
"sentence": "See Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 807 F.3d 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2015) (relying on state statute that required “any judgment against [Wayne State University] to be paid out of the state’s tax revenues''); see also Ernst, 427 F.3d at 360 (discussing state statute that required legislature to \"annually appropriate to the retirement system the amount of money needed”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "427 F.3d 360, 360",
"parenthetical": "discussing state statute that required legislature to \"annually appropriate to the retirement system the amount of money needed\"",
"sentence": "See Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 807 F.3d 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2015) (relying on state statute that required “any judgment against [Wayne State University] to be paid out of the state’s tax revenues''); see also Ernst, 427 F.3d at 360 (discussing state statute that required legislature to \"annually appropriate to the retirement system the amount of money needed”)."
} | 12,266,302 | a |
Our conclusion that courts cannot provide a remedy when the Legislature has failed to do so is also entirely consistent with the position of Florida courts in other contexts. See, e.g., Jolley v. Seamco Labs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 So.2d 3, 6",
"parenthetical": "finding that if Legislature had intended penalty for a violation of a time limit to be dismissal of the administrative complaint, it would have expressly included that sanction within section 455.225, Florida Statutes (Supp.1986",
"sentence": "Inc., 828 So.2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (declining to provide a remedy for a violation of Florida’s Wrongful Death Act); see also Carter v. Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation, 633 So.2d 3, 6 (Fla.1994) (finding that if Legislature had intended penalty for a violation of a time limit to be dismissal of the administrative complaint, it would have expressly included that sanction within section 455.225, Florida Statutes (Supp.1986))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "828 So.2d 1050, 1051",
"parenthetical": "declining to provide a remedy for a violation of Florida's Wrongful Death Act",
"sentence": "Inc., 828 So.2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (declining to provide a remedy for a violation of Florida’s Wrongful Death Act); see also Carter v. Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation, 633 So.2d 3, 6 (Fla.1994) (finding that if Legislature had intended penalty for a violation of a time limit to be dismissal of the administrative complaint, it would have expressly included that sanction within section 455.225, Florida Statutes (Supp.1986))."
} | 7,007,901 | b |
Merely because he earned $70,000 the year prior to the dissolution hearing does not mean the husband was voluntarily underemployed when he was forced by circumstances to open his own agency. The absence of specific findings or record evidence to support the imputation of income mandates reversal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "634 So.2d 782, 783",
"parenthetical": "\"If the court is going to impute income not apparent from the record, it must indicate the amount and source.\"",
"sentence": "See Woodard v. Woodard, 634 So.2d 782, 783 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“If the court is going to impute income not apparent from the record, it must indicate the amount and source.”) (citing Hogle v. Hogle, 535 So.2d 704 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)); see also Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 677 So.2d 918, 923 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (where financial documents in record support trial court’s decision to impute income to husband, court’s failure to make written findings on the record does not require reversal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "677 So.2d 918, 923",
"parenthetical": "where financial documents in record support trial court's decision to impute income to husband, court's failure to make written findings on the record does not require reversal",
"sentence": "See Woodard v. Woodard, 634 So.2d 782, 783 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“If the court is going to impute income not apparent from the record, it must indicate the amount and source.”) (citing Hogle v. Hogle, 535 So.2d 704 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)); see also Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 677 So.2d 918, 923 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (where financial documents in record support trial court’s decision to impute income to husband, court’s failure to make written findings on the record does not require reversal)."
} | 11,995,107 | a |
The law is "settled that affirmative defenses should be considered in making class certification decisions." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 734, 744",
"parenthetical": "\"Going beyond the pleadings is necessary, as a court must understand [inter alia] defenses ... in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.\"",
"sentence": "Waste Mgmt. Holdings v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir.2000); see also Majority Op. at 138, 139 (a court must examine “defenses in determining whether a putative class meets the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)”) (emphasis added); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir.1996) (“Going beyond the pleadings is necessary, as a court must understand [inter alia] defenses ... in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.”); cf. Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, 155 F.3d 331, 342 (4th Cir.1998) (certification is “erroneous” when affirmative defenses “may depend on facts peculiar to each plaintiffs case”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "155 F.3d 331, 342",
"parenthetical": "certification is \"erroneous\" when affirmative defenses \"may depend on facts peculiar to each plaintiffs case\"",
"sentence": "Waste Mgmt. Holdings v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir.2000); see also Majority Op. at 138, 139 (a court must examine “defenses in determining whether a putative class meets the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)”) (emphasis added); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir.1996) (“Going beyond the pleadings is necessary, as a court must understand [inter alia] defenses ... in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.”); cf. Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, 155 F.3d 331, 342 (4th Cir.1998) (certification is “erroneous” when affirmative defenses “may depend on facts peculiar to each plaintiffs case”) (citation omitted)."
} | 9,392,655 | a |
Kinder cites no case in support of this argument. To the contrary, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that expert testimony is not required to justify an enhancement under 2G2.2(b)(3). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 80, 83",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"it was within the court's discretion to conclude that the subjection of a young chdd to a sexual act that would have to be painful is excessively cruel and hence is sadistic within the meaning of 2G2.2(b",
"sentence": "United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 239 n. 22 (5th Cir.2000) (“One hardly requires a medical degree to ascertain that vaginal intercourse with an adult male would involve pain, both physical and emotional, for a young girl.”); United States v. Caro, 309 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir.2002) (“[W]e hold that the district court erred in its interpretation that, in order to support a sadistic conduct enhancement, the government is required to present expert medical testimony.”); see also United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 83 (2nd Cir.1996) (holding that “it was within the court’s discretion to conclude that the subjection of a young chdd to a sexual act that would have to be painful is excessively cruel and hence is sadistic within the meaning of 2G2.2(b)(3)”). We agree with those authorities, and conclude that expert testimony was not required."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"One hardly requires a medical degree to ascertain that vaginal intercourse with an adult male would involve pain, both physical and emotional, for a young girl.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 239 n. 22 (5th Cir.2000) (“One hardly requires a medical degree to ascertain that vaginal intercourse with an adult male would involve pain, both physical and emotional, for a young girl.”); United States v. Caro, 309 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir.2002) (“[W]e hold that the district court erred in its interpretation that, in order to support a sadistic conduct enhancement, the government is required to present expert medical testimony.”); see also United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 83 (2nd Cir.1996) (holding that “it was within the court’s discretion to conclude that the subjection of a young chdd to a sexual act that would have to be painful is excessively cruel and hence is sadistic within the meaning of 2G2.2(b)(3)”). We agree with those authorities, and conclude that expert testimony was not required."
} | 1,533,933 | b |
Kinder cites no case in support of this argument. To the contrary, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that expert testimony is not required to justify an enhancement under 2G2.2(b)(3). | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "309 F.3d 1348, 1352",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e hold that the district court erred in its interpretation that, in order to support a sadistic conduct enhancement, the government is required to present expert medical testimony.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 239 n. 22 (5th Cir.2000) (“One hardly requires a medical degree to ascertain that vaginal intercourse with an adult male would involve pain, both physical and emotional, for a young girl.”); United States v. Caro, 309 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir.2002) (“[W]e hold that the district court erred in its interpretation that, in order to support a sadistic conduct enhancement, the government is required to present expert medical testimony.”); see also United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 83 (2nd Cir.1996) (holding that “it was within the court’s discretion to conclude that the subjection of a young chdd to a sexual act that would have to be painful is excessively cruel and hence is sadistic within the meaning of 2G2.2(b)(3)”). We agree with those authorities, and conclude that expert testimony was not required."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 80, 83",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"it was within the court's discretion to conclude that the subjection of a young chdd to a sexual act that would have to be painful is excessively cruel and hence is sadistic within the meaning of 2G2.2(b",
"sentence": "United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 239 n. 22 (5th Cir.2000) (“One hardly requires a medical degree to ascertain that vaginal intercourse with an adult male would involve pain, both physical and emotional, for a young girl.”); United States v. Caro, 309 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir.2002) (“[W]e hold that the district court erred in its interpretation that, in order to support a sadistic conduct enhancement, the government is required to present expert medical testimony.”); see also United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 83 (2nd Cir.1996) (holding that “it was within the court’s discretion to conclude that the subjection of a young chdd to a sexual act that would have to be painful is excessively cruel and hence is sadistic within the meaning of 2G2.2(b)(3)”). We agree with those authorities, and conclude that expert testimony was not required."
} | 1,533,933 | a |
Additionally, Defendant cites, inter alia, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Weiss; however, that Court decided the mootness issue in the context of a class action complaint. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating, \"[bjecause defendants' Rule 68 offer included no relief for the putative class, ... we address the mootness question in that context\"",
"sentence": "(Doc. 12, p. 3), citing Weiss, 385 F.3d 337 (stating, “[bjecause defendants’ Rule 68 offer included no relief for the putative class, ... we address the mootness question in that context”); see also Zeigenfuse v. Apex Asset Mgmt., L.L.C., 239 F.R.D. 400, 403 (E.D.Pa.2006) (concluding “that the offer of judgment must now be stricken to prevent it from undermining the use of the class action device”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "239 F.R.D. 400, 403",
"parenthetical": "concluding \"that the offer of judgment must now be stricken to prevent it from undermining the use of the class action device\"",
"sentence": "(Doc. 12, p. 3), citing Weiss, 385 F.3d 337 (stating, “[bjecause defendants’ Rule 68 offer included no relief for the putative class, ... we address the mootness question in that context”); see also Zeigenfuse v. Apex Asset Mgmt., L.L.C., 239 F.R.D. 400, 403 (E.D.Pa.2006) (concluding “that the offer of judgment must now be stricken to prevent it from undermining the use of the class action device”)."
} | 4,273,776 | a |
An expert could do this by having his reanalysis published in a peer-reviewed journal or by pointing to methodological flaws in the published study and explaining how she corrected them. However, an expert cannot simply, without any explanation for rejecting a published, peer-reviewed analysis, conduct his own "reanalysis" solely for the purposes of litigation and testify that the data support a conclusion opposite that of the studies' authors in a peer-reviewed publication. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579",
"parenthetical": "\"A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.\"",
"sentence": "Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 856, 865 (D.Mass.1986) (“Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan’s re-analysis credible, this Court still could not accept result-oriented reanalysis of epidemiological studies ..., such as that performed here by Dr. Swan, as reliable data upon which to base an opinion on causation.”), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir.1987); see also Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579 (N.D.Ga.1991) (“A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "897 F.2d 1159, 1162-63",
"parenthetical": "rejecting testimony of \"the plaintiffs epidemiology expert ... [who] tried to refute the validity of the published epidemiological data through her own unpublished reanalysis\"",
"sentence": "See Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (D.C.Cir.1990) (rejecting testimony of “the plaintiffs epidemiology expert ... [who] tried to refute the validity of the published epidemiological data through her own unpublished reanalysis”); Lynch v. Merrell-Nat’l Labs."
} | 4,264,428 | b |
An expert could do this by having his reanalysis published in a peer-reviewed journal or by pointing to methodological flaws in the published study and explaining how she corrected them. However, an expert cannot simply, without any explanation for rejecting a published, peer-reviewed analysis, conduct his own "reanalysis" solely for the purposes of litigation and testify that the data support a conclusion opposite that of the studies' authors in a peer-reviewed publication. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "646 F.Supp. 856, 865",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan's re-analysis credible, this Court still could not accept result-oriented reanalysis of epidemiological studies ..., such as that performed here by Dr. Swan, as reliable data upon which to base an opinion on causation.\"",
"sentence": "Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 856, 865 (D.Mass.1986) (“Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan’s re-analysis credible, this Court still could not accept result-oriented reanalysis of epidemiological studies ..., such as that performed here by Dr. Swan, as reliable data upon which to base an opinion on causation.”), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir.1987); see also Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579 (N.D.Ga.1991) (“A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579",
"parenthetical": "\"A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.\"",
"sentence": "Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 856, 865 (D.Mass.1986) (“Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan’s re-analysis credible, this Court still could not accept result-oriented reanalysis of epidemiological studies ..., such as that performed here by Dr. Swan, as reliable data upon which to base an opinion on causation.”), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir.1987); see also Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579 (N.D.Ga.1991) (“A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.”)."
} | 4,264,428 | a |
An expert could do this by having his reanalysis published in a peer-reviewed journal or by pointing to methodological flaws in the published study and explaining how she corrected them. However, an expert cannot simply, without any explanation for rejecting a published, peer-reviewed analysis, conduct his own "reanalysis" solely for the purposes of litigation and testify that the data support a conclusion opposite that of the studies' authors in a peer-reviewed publication. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579",
"parenthetical": "\"A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.\"",
"sentence": "Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 856, 865 (D.Mass.1986) (“Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan’s re-analysis credible, this Court still could not accept result-oriented reanalysis of epidemiological studies ..., such as that performed here by Dr. Swan, as reliable data upon which to base an opinion on causation.”), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir.1987); see also Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579 (N.D.Ga.1991) (“A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan's re-analysis credible, this Court still could not accept result-oriented reanalysis of epidemiological studies ..., such as that performed here by Dr. Swan, as reliable data upon which to base an opinion on causation.\"",
"sentence": "Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 856, 865 (D.Mass.1986) (“Even if this Court were to find the methodology of Dr. Swan’s re-analysis credible, this Court still could not accept result-oriented reanalysis of epidemiological studies ..., such as that performed here by Dr. Swan, as reliable data upon which to base an opinion on causation.”), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir.1987); see also Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F.Supp. 1561, 1579 (N.D.Ga.1991) (“A scientific study not subject to peer review has little probative value.”)."
} | 4,264,428 | b |
We reverse and remand the final judgment in this case for reconsideration of the parties' equitable distribution of assets. We decline to address the issues raised by appellee (specifically the propriety of the trial court's orders on alimony and attorney's fees) because correcting the valuation of the assets and liabilities and their allocation between the parties will also require the trial court to re-examine those issues to avoid an inequitable diminution of each party's share of the equitable distribution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 So.3d 931, 933-34",
"parenthetical": "stating that attorney's fees in a dissolution of marriage action should be awarded based on .need and ability to pay, and noting that \"[i]t is appropriate for a court to award attorney's fees to avoid an inequitable diminution of the spouse's share of the equitable distribution\"",
"sentence": "See Roth v. Cortina, 59 So.3d 163, 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“As this court and Florida Statute section 61.075(9) make clear, a ‘trial court is first to do the equitable distribution of assets, and once the assets have been equitably distributed, make a determination whether alimony should be awarded.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Acker v. Acker, 821 So.2d 1088, 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002))); see also Conlan v. Conlan, 43 So.3d 931, 933-34 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (stating that attorney’s fees in a dissolution of marriage action should be awarded based on .need and ability to pay, and noting that “[i]t is appropriate for a court to award attorney’s fees to avoid an inequitable diminution of the spouse’s share of the equitable distribution”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "59 So.3d 163, 165",
"parenthetical": "\"As this court and Florida Statute section 61.075(9) make clear, a 'trial court is first to do the equitable distribution of assets, and once the assets have been equitably distributed, make a determination whether alimony should be awarded.'\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Roth v. Cortina, 59 So.3d 163, 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“As this court and Florida Statute section 61.075(9) make clear, a ‘trial court is first to do the equitable distribution of assets, and once the assets have been equitably distributed, make a determination whether alimony should be awarded.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Acker v. Acker, 821 So.2d 1088, 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002))); see also Conlan v. Conlan, 43 So.3d 931, 933-34 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (stating that attorney’s fees in a dissolution of marriage action should be awarded based on .need and ability to pay, and noting that “[i]t is appropriate for a court to award attorney’s fees to avoid an inequitable diminution of the spouse’s share of the equitable distribution”)."
} | 6,778,954 | b |
Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence at the bottom of Reynard's applicable advisory Guidelines range, as there is no indication that the district court overlooked or misapplied a relevant section 3553(a) factor, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing appropriate factors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "598 F.3d 444, 448",
"parenthetical": "appellate role is limited to determining substantive reasonableness of specific sentence where advisory Guidelines range was determined in accordance with SS 2G2.2",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (absent reversible procedural error, appellate court reviews reasonableness of district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion); United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8th Cir.2005) (defining ways in which abuse of discretion may occur); see also United States v. Shuler, 598 F.3d 444, 448 (8th Cir.2010) (appellate role is limited to determining substantive reasonableness of specific sentence where advisory Guidelines range was determined in accordance with § 2G2.2); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (appellate presumption of reasonableness may be applied to within-Guidelines-range sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 F.3d 834, 849",
"parenthetical": "absent reversible procedural error, appellate court reviews reasonableness of district court's sentence for abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (absent reversible procedural error, appellate court reviews reasonableness of district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion); United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8th Cir.2005) (defining ways in which abuse of discretion may occur); see also United States v. Shuler, 598 F.3d 444, 448 (8th Cir.2010) (appellate role is limited to determining substantive reasonableness of specific sentence where advisory Guidelines range was determined in accordance with § 2G2.2); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (appellate presumption of reasonableness may be applied to within-Guidelines-range sentence)."
} | 5,887,867 | b |
Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence at the bottom of Reynard's applicable advisory Guidelines range, as there is no indication that the district court overlooked or misapplied a relevant section 3553(a) factor, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing appropriate factors. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 F.3d 834, 849",
"parenthetical": "absent reversible procedural error, appellate court reviews reasonableness of district court's sentence for abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (absent reversible procedural error, appellate court reviews reasonableness of district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion); United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8th Cir.2005) (defining ways in which abuse of discretion may occur); see also United States v. Shuler, 598 F.3d 444, 448 (8th Cir.2010) (appellate role is limited to determining substantive reasonableness of specific sentence where advisory Guidelines range was determined in accordance with § 2G2.2); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (appellate presumption of reasonableness may be applied to within-Guidelines-range sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "572 F.3d 455, 461",
"parenthetical": "appellate presumption of reasonableness may be applied to within-Guidelines-range sentence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (absent reversible procedural error, appellate court reviews reasonableness of district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion); United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8th Cir.2005) (defining ways in which abuse of discretion may occur); see also United States v. Shuler, 598 F.3d 444, 448 (8th Cir.2010) (appellate role is limited to determining substantive reasonableness of specific sentence where advisory Guidelines range was determined in accordance with § 2G2.2); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (appellate presumption of reasonableness may be applied to within-Guidelines-range sentence)."
} | 5,887,867 | a |
See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City Police Dep't, Inc. 'v. When the employment position involves public safety, we accord greater latitude to the employer's showing of job-relatedness and business necessity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "645 F.2d 1262, 1262-63",
"parenthetical": "finding sufficient support for an employer's truck-driving experience requirements, noting that \"[a]n industry with the primary function of managing the safety of large numbers of passengers must be allowed more latitude in structuring the requirements which could [a]ffect the performance of a primary business objective\"",
"sentence": "Chrisner, 645 F.2d at 1262-63 (finding sufficient support for an employer’s truck-driving experience requirements, noting that “[a]n industry with the primary function of managing the safety of large numbers of passengers must be allowed more latitude in structuring the requirements which could [a]ffect the performance of a primary business objective”); see also Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir.1972) (“[W]hen the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show that his employment criteria are job-related.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "475 F.2d 216, 219",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show that his employment criteria are job-related.\"",
"sentence": "Chrisner, 645 F.2d at 1262-63 (finding sufficient support for an employer’s truck-driving experience requirements, noting that “[a]n industry with the primary function of managing the safety of large numbers of passengers must be allowed more latitude in structuring the requirements which could [a]ffect the performance of a primary business objective”); see also Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir.1972) (“[W]hen the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show that his employment criteria are job-related.”)."
} | 4,265,938 | a |
The trial court concluded that Safety's failure to respond to Cinergy's letters that it sent prior to the filing of the lawsuit equated to a denial of Cinergy's claims, and thus, a waiver of Safety's right to arbitrate. However, "[mJere silence or inaction on the part of an insurer is not sufficient to constitute an express waiver." While we do not approve of Safety's failure to acknowledge Cinergy's letters, given the facts of this case, including the fact that Safety had issued excess umbrella policies that would not be implicated until after the primary and umbrella policies, we cannot conclude that Safety's silence equated to an express denial of coverage. Therefore, we must conclude that the trial court erred by concluding that Safety waived its right to arbitrate by failing to respond to Cinergy's letters. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "802 N.E.2d 910, 910",
"parenthetical": "holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case",
"sentence": "See, eg., Protective Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 661 (noting that \"the failure of [the insurance company] to respond to the demand to defend letter is not evidence that [the insurance company] intended to waive its right to deny coverage\"); see also MPACT, 802 N.E.2d at 910 (holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 N.E.2d 661, 661",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the failure of [the insurance company] to respond to the demand to defend letter is not evidence that [the insurance company] intended to waive its right to deny coverage\"",
"sentence": "See, eg., Protective Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 661 (noting that \"the failure of [the insurance company] to respond to the demand to defend letter is not evidence that [the insurance company] intended to waive its right to deny coverage\"); see also MPACT, 802 N.E.2d at 910 (holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case)."
} | 8,948,200 | b |
Although McWatters does not support the view that the prior kidnapping was relevant, I recognize that the prior kidnapping may be relevant under the case law relied upon by the trial court below in allowing the evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 So.2d 741, 761",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence that the defendant had \"stalked, threatened, and assaulted\" the victim, his ex-girlfriend, was evidence as to the nature of the defendant's relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motive",
"sentence": "See Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377 (Fla.1994) (holding that evidence of two prior incidents of violence by the defendant toward his wife in the months before the murder were relevant to premeditation where defendant claimed that it was a “heat of passion” killing); King v. State, 436 So.2d 50 (Fla.1983) (holding that evidence that twenty-three days before the murder, defendant had beaten the victim, with whom he was living, to the point that she became unconscious was “proper as evidence of premeditation”); see also Dennis v. State, 817 So.2d 741, 761 (Fla.2002) (holding that evidence that the defendant had “stalked, threatened, and assaulted” the victim, his ex-girlfriend, was evidence as to the nature of the defendant’s relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence of two prior incidents of violence by the defendant toward his wife in the months before the murder were relevant to premeditation where defendant claimed that it was a \"heat of passion\" killing",
"sentence": "See Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377 (Fla.1994) (holding that evidence of two prior incidents of violence by the defendant toward his wife in the months before the murder were relevant to premeditation where defendant claimed that it was a “heat of passion” killing); King v. State, 436 So.2d 50 (Fla.1983) (holding that evidence that twenty-three days before the murder, defendant had beaten the victim, with whom he was living, to the point that she became unconscious was “proper as evidence of premeditation”); see also Dennis v. State, 817 So.2d 741, 761 (Fla.2002) (holding that evidence that the defendant had “stalked, threatened, and assaulted” the victim, his ex-girlfriend, was evidence as to the nature of the defendant’s relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motive)."
} | 7,012,513 | b |
Although McWatters does not support the view that the prior kidnapping was relevant, I recognize that the prior kidnapping may be relevant under the case law relied upon by the trial court below in allowing the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence that twenty-three days before the murder, defendant had beaten the victim, with whom he was living, to the point that she became unconscious was \"proper as evidence of premeditation\"",
"sentence": "See Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377 (Fla.1994) (holding that evidence of two prior incidents of violence by the defendant toward his wife in the months before the murder were relevant to premeditation where defendant claimed that it was a “heat of passion” killing); King v. State, 436 So.2d 50 (Fla.1983) (holding that evidence that twenty-three days before the murder, defendant had beaten the victim, with whom he was living, to the point that she became unconscious was “proper as evidence of premeditation”); see also Dennis v. State, 817 So.2d 741, 761 (Fla.2002) (holding that evidence that the defendant had “stalked, threatened, and assaulted” the victim, his ex-girlfriend, was evidence as to the nature of the defendant’s relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "817 So.2d 741, 761",
"parenthetical": "holding that evidence that the defendant had \"stalked, threatened, and assaulted\" the victim, his ex-girlfriend, was evidence as to the nature of the defendant's relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motive",
"sentence": "See Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377 (Fla.1994) (holding that evidence of two prior incidents of violence by the defendant toward his wife in the months before the murder were relevant to premeditation where defendant claimed that it was a “heat of passion” killing); King v. State, 436 So.2d 50 (Fla.1983) (holding that evidence that twenty-three days before the murder, defendant had beaten the victim, with whom he was living, to the point that she became unconscious was “proper as evidence of premeditation”); see also Dennis v. State, 817 So.2d 741, 761 (Fla.2002) (holding that evidence that the defendant had “stalked, threatened, and assaulted” the victim, his ex-girlfriend, was evidence as to the nature of the defendant’s relationship with the victim and that it was relevant to establish motive)."
} | 7,012,513 | a |
To constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance under Strickland, the defendant must show his counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudiced the defense. Watson's argument fails the first prong of Strickland because counsel does not perform deficiently by declining to pursue a losing argument. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "373 F.3d 1350, 1354",
"parenthetical": "\"[F]ailure to renew a non-meritorious motion renders a lawyer's performance efficient, not deficient.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 552 F.3d 824, 831 (D.C.Cir.2009) (ineffective assistance claim “plainly fails inasmuch as his counsel was not obliged to raise a meritless defense”); see also United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D.C.Cir.2004) (“[F]ailure to renew a non-meritorious motion renders a lawyer’s performance efficient, not deficient.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 824, 831",
"parenthetical": "ineffective assistance claim \"plainly fails inasmuch as his counsel was not obliged to raise a meritless defense\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 552 F.3d 824, 831 (D.C.Cir.2009) (ineffective assistance claim “plainly fails inasmuch as his counsel was not obliged to raise a meritless defense”); see also United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D.C.Cir.2004) (“[F]ailure to renew a non-meritorious motion renders a lawyer’s performance efficient, not deficient.”)."
} | 3,664,234 | b |
Absent a challenge by an adversary party, on the present record and the facts found here, we discern no basis for concluding that the testator did not make the bequest with full knowledge and intent. See G. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "326 Mass. 621, 623",
"parenthetical": "improper to appoint guardian ad litem to represent interests of deceased person",
"sentence": "See also Lynde v. Vose, 326 Mass. 621, 623 (1951) (improper to appoint guardian ad litem to represent interests of deceased person)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing judge's statutory authority to order notice and appoint a guardian ad litem in certain circumstances",
"sentence": "L. c. 206, § 24; Matter of the Trusts Under the Will of Crabtree, 440 Mass. at 190-194 & n.30 (discussing judge’s statutory authority to order notice and appoint a guardian ad litem in certain circumstances)."
} | 3,769,767 | b |
"If action is taken for a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent scheme, the action is void and of no force or effect." Richard A. Lord, Williston On Contracts Sec. 69.4 (4th Ed.2003). A release may be set aside if it was obtained fraudulently. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud); Riggs et al. v. Gillespie, 241 F. 311 (4th Cir.1917) (finding a release invalid as it was obtained by a “fraud in equity”); see also Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc. v. Imaging Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 176 F.Supp.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release). If a release is obtained by fraud, it is unenforceable under Montana law."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud); Riggs et al. v. Gillespie, 241 F. 311 (4th Cir.1917) (finding a release invalid as it was obtained by a “fraud in equity”); see also Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc. v. Imaging Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 176 F.Supp.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release). If a release is obtained by fraud, it is unenforceable under Montana law."
} | 9,215,969 | a |
"If action is taken for a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent scheme, the action is void and of no force or effect." Richard A. Lord, Williston On Contracts Sec. 69.4 (4th Ed.2003). A release may be set aside if it was obtained fraudulently. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud); Riggs et al. v. Gillespie, 241 F. 311 (4th Cir.1917) (finding a release invalid as it was obtained by a “fraud in equity”); see also Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc. v. Imaging Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 176 F.Supp.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release). If a release is obtained by fraud, it is unenforceable under Montana law."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud); Riggs et al. v. Gillespie, 241 F. 311 (4th Cir.1917) (finding a release invalid as it was obtained by a “fraud in equity”); see also Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc. v. Imaging Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 176 F.Supp.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release). If a release is obtained by fraud, it is unenforceable under Montana law."
} | 9,215,969 | b |
"If action is taken for a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent purpose or to carry out a fraudulent scheme, the action is void and of no force or effect." Richard A. Lord, Williston On Contracts Sec. 69.4 (4th Ed.2003). A release may be set aside if it was obtained fraudulently. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud); Riggs et al. v. Gillespie, 241 F. 311 (4th Cir.1917) (finding a release invalid as it was obtained by a “fraud in equity”); see also Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc. v. Imaging Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 176 F.Supp.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release). If a release is obtained by fraud, it is unenforceable under Montana law."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding a release invalid as it was obtained by a \"fraud in equity\"",
"sentence": "Stanley v. Holms, 293 Mont. 343, 975 P.2d 1242 (1999) (recognizing the invalidity of releases under fraudulent conditions but granting a motion for summary judgment because party had not set forth sufficient indicia of fraud); Riggs et al. v. Gillespie, 241 F. 311 (4th Cir.1917) (finding a release invalid as it was obtained by a “fraud in equity”); see also Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc. v. Imaging Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 176 F.Supp.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (acknowledging that a release is a voidable contract when a party is fraudulently induced to execute a release). If a release is obtained by fraud, it is unenforceable under Montana law."
} | 9,215,969 | b |
The district court did not consider whether defendants would be prejudiced if plaintiffs were granted leave to amend, and we see no basis for a finding of prejudice. Plaintiffs simply seek to add specificity to scienter allegations in a situation where defendants are aware of the circumstances giving rise to the action. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "178 F.3d 231, 243",
"parenthetical": "noting that merely adding specificity to allegations generally does not cause prejudice to the opposing party",
"sentence": "Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999) (noting that merely adding specificity to allegations generally does not cause prejudice to the opposing party); Laber, 438 F.3d at 427; see also Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir.1980) (“Because defendant was from the outset made fully aware of the events giving rise to the action, an allowance of the amendment could not in any way prejudice the preparation of defendant’s case.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "615 F.2d 606, 613",
"parenthetical": "\"Because defendant was from the outset made fully aware of the events giving rise to the action, an allowance of the amendment could not in any way prejudice the preparation of defendant's case.\"",
"sentence": "Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999) (noting that merely adding specificity to allegations generally does not cause prejudice to the opposing party); Laber, 438 F.3d at 427; see also Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir.1980) (“Because defendant was from the outset made fully aware of the events giving rise to the action, an allowance of the amendment could not in any way prejudice the preparation of defendant’s case.”)."
} | 4,037,444 | a |
The IJ correctly determined that RosasLeon's 2004 conviction for violating Cal.Penal Code SS 273.5 is an aggravated felony crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. SS 1101(a)(43)(F), where he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "611 F.3d 1080, 1083",
"parenthetical": "a conviction under Cal.Penal Code SS 273.5 is categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. SS 16(a",
"sentence": "See Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir.2010) (a conviction under Cal.Penal Code § 273.5 is categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)); see also Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e do not use the categorical and modified categorical approach to determine whether a petitioner has met any sentencing requirement specified in § 1101(a)(43).”). The IJ therefore did not err in concluding that Rosas-Leon was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 1076, 1083",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not use the categorical and modified categorical approach to determine whether a petitioner has met any sentencing requirement specified in SS 1101(a)(43).\"",
"sentence": "See Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir.2010) (a conviction under Cal.Penal Code § 273.5 is categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)); see also Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e do not use the categorical and modified categorical approach to determine whether a petitioner has met any sentencing requirement specified in § 1101(a)(43).”). The IJ therefore did not err in concluding that Rosas-Leon was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)."
} | 4,100,646 | a |
As defendant points out, the IAD recognizes the detrimental effects of pending charges. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "712 P.2d 993, 997",
"parenthetical": "the primary purpose of the IAD is \"to provide a mechanism for prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried charges that are the subjects of detainers so that prison rehabilitation programs initiated for the prisoners' benefit will not be disrupted or precluded by the existence of these untried charges\"",
"sentence": "See § 24-60-501, art. I, C.R.S.2001 (untried charges and detainers \"produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation\"); People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo.1986)(the primary purpose of the IAD is \"to provide a mechanism for prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried charges that are the subjects of detainers so that prison rehabilitation programs initiated for the prisoners' benefit will not be disrupted or precluded by the existence of these untried charges\"); see also United States v. Kurt, 945 F.2d 248 (9th Cir.1991)(IAD procedures prevent prosecutorial abuses of the power of detainer that potentially allow a defendant to languish in the separate jurisdiction under the constant, but uncertain threat of further prosecution)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "IAD procedures prevent prosecutorial abuses of the power of detainer that potentially allow a defendant to languish in the separate jurisdiction under the constant, but uncertain threat of further prosecution",
"sentence": "See § 24-60-501, art. I, C.R.S.2001 (untried charges and detainers \"produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation\"); People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo.1986)(the primary purpose of the IAD is \"to provide a mechanism for prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried charges that are the subjects of detainers so that prison rehabilitation programs initiated for the prisoners' benefit will not be disrupted or precluded by the existence of these untried charges\"); see also United States v. Kurt, 945 F.2d 248 (9th Cir.1991)(IAD procedures prevent prosecutorial abuses of the power of detainer that potentially allow a defendant to languish in the separate jurisdiction under the constant, but uncertain threat of further prosecution)."
} | 11,423,390 | a |
Additionally, we conclude that Bratcher's probation conditions 21 and 23 are neither overbroad or vague and that they are reasonably related to attaining the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public Indeed, our Court has explained that because "child molesters molest children to whom they have access[,]" conditions of probation that "reduce the potential for access to children are reasonable." Condition 21 simply requires him to acquire the approval of his probation officer, and condition 23 specifically applies to websites "frequented by children." Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing probation conditions 21 and 28. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "990 N.E.2d 515, 515-16",
"parenthetical": "upholding sex offender's probation condition that prohibited him from accessing websites frequented by children",
"sentence": "See, eg., Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 (upholding sex offender's probation condition that prohibited him from accessing websites frequented by children); McVey, 863 N.E.2d at 450 (holding that the defendant/child molester's probation condition-which restricted his internet access unless he had prior approval of his probation officer-was reasonably related to his reintegration into the community and to protecting the public); Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 118 (holding that the trial court did not err by restricting the defendant/child molester's gaccess to computers and online computer services)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "836 N.E.2d 267, 275",
"parenthetical": "holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolee's First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See also Harris v. State, 836 N.E.2d 267, 275 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolee's First Amendment rights)."
} | 7,271,475 | a |
Additionally, we conclude that Bratcher's probation conditions 21 and 23 are neither overbroad or vague and that they are reasonably related to attaining the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public Indeed, our Court has explained that because "child molesters molest children to whom they have access[,]" conditions of probation that "reduce the potential for access to children are reasonable." Condition 21 simply requires him to acquire the approval of his probation officer, and condition 23 specifically applies to websites "frequented by children." Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing probation conditions 21 and 28. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "836 N.E.2d 267, 275",
"parenthetical": "holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolee's First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See also Harris v. State, 836 N.E.2d 267, 275 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolee's First Amendment rights)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "863 N.E.2d 450, 450",
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant/child molester's probation condition-which restricted his internet access unless he had prior approval of his probation officer-was reasonably related to his reintegration into the community and to protecting the public",
"sentence": "See, eg., Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 (upholding sex offender's probation condition that prohibited him from accessing websites frequented by children); McVey, 863 N.E.2d at 450 (holding that the defendant/child molester's probation condition-which restricted his internet access unless he had prior approval of his probation officer-was reasonably related to his reintegration into the community and to protecting the public); Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 118 (holding that the trial court did not err by restricting the defendant/child molester's gaccess to computers and online computer services)."
} | 7,271,475 | b |
Additionally, we conclude that Bratcher's probation conditions 21 and 23 are neither overbroad or vague and that they are reasonably related to attaining the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public Indeed, our Court has explained that because "child molesters molest children to whom they have access[,]" conditions of probation that "reduce the potential for access to children are reasonable." Condition 21 simply requires him to acquire the approval of his probation officer, and condition 23 specifically applies to websites "frequented by children." Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing probation conditions 21 and 28. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "836 N.E.2d 267, 275",
"parenthetical": "holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolee's First Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See also Harris v. State, 836 N.E.2d 267, 275 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that a parole condition, which restricted a parolee's access to the internet unless he had prior approval of his parole officer, was reasonably related to reintegrating the parolee into his community and protecting the general public and did not violate parolee's First Amendment rights)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "779 N.E.2d 118, 118",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court did not err by restricting the defendant/child molester's gaccess to computers and online computer services",
"sentence": "See, eg., Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515-16 (upholding sex offender's probation condition that prohibited him from accessing websites frequented by children); McVey, 863 N.E.2d at 450 (holding that the defendant/child molester's probation condition-which restricted his internet access unless he had prior approval of his probation officer-was reasonably related to his reintegration into the community and to protecting the public); Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 118 (holding that the trial court did not err by restricting the defendant/child molester's gaccess to computers and online computer services)."
} | 7,271,475 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks through" the state supreme court's silent denial to the last reasoned decision, the court of appeal decision on direct review, as the basis for the state court's judgment as to ground one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "560 U.S. 370, 380",
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 797, 803-04",
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | 5,739,947 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks through" the state supreme court's silent denial to the last reasoned decision, the court of appeal decision on direct review, as the basis for the state court's judgment as to ground one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 797, 803-04",
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | 5,739,947 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks through" the state supreme court's silent denial to the last reasoned decision, the court of appeal decision on direct review, as the basis for the state court's judgment as to ground one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 797, 803-04",
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | 5,739,947 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks through" the state supreme court's silent denial to the last reasoned decision, the court of appeal decision on direct review, as the basis for the state court's judgment as to ground one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "560 U.S. 370, 380",
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | 5,739,947 | a |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks through" the state supreme court's silent denial to the last reasoned decision, the court of appeal decision on direct review, as the basis for the state court's judgment as to ground one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | 5,739,947 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks through" the state supreme court's silent denial to the last reasoned decision, the court of appeal decision on direct review, as the basis for the state court's judgment as to ground one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | 5,739,947 | a |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks through" the state supreme court's silent denial to the last reasoned decision, the court of appeal decision on direct review, as the basis for the state court's judgment as to ground one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "560 U.S. 370, 380",
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | 5,739,947 | b |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks through" the state supreme court's silent denial to the last reasoned decision, the court of appeal decision on direct review, as the basis for the state court's judgment as to ground one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | 5,739,947 | a |
Petitioner raised grounds one and two of the Petition on direct appeal, and the court of appeal rejected them on the merits. (Lodged Docs. K, B.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment or citation to authority. (Lodged Doc. D.) The Court therefore "looks through" the state supreme court's silent denial to the last reasoned decision, the court of appeal decision on direct review, as the basis for the state court's judgment as to ground one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA's standard of review",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal's analysis",
"sentence": "See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (holding that California Supreme Court, by silently denying petition for review, presumably did not intend to change court of appeal’s analysis); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (when state supreme court denies discretionary review of decision on direct appeal, that decision is relevant state-court decision for pui'poses of AEDPA’s standard of review)."
} | 5,739,947 | b |
See Mathews' Dep. at 78, 83-84, 87-88, 96, 123-127. Mathews' violation of Giant's policy indicates that his performance was not satisfactory. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee's performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered ‘very important,’ he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.”); see also Farasat v. Pauli-kas, 32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255 (D.Md.1998), aff'd mem., 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that employee’s performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694",
"parenthetical": "\"Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered 'very important,' he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered ‘very important,’ he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.”); see also Farasat v. Pauli-kas, 32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255 (D.Md.1998), aff'd mem., 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that employee’s performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis)."
} | 9,509,791 | b |
See Mathews' Dep. at 78, 83-84, 87-88, 96, 123-127. Mathews' violation of Giant's policy indicates that his performance was not satisfactory. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that employee's performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered ‘very important,’ he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.”); see also Farasat v. Pauli-kas, 32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255 (D.Md.1998), aff'd mem., 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that employee’s performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694",
"parenthetical": "\"Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered 'very important,' he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered ‘very important,’ he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.”); see also Farasat v. Pauli-kas, 32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255 (D.Md.1998), aff'd mem., 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that employee’s performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis)."
} | 9,509,791 | b |
See Mathews' Dep. at 78, 83-84, 87-88, 96, 123-127. Mathews' violation of Giant's policy indicates that his performance was not satisfactory. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered 'very important,' he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered ‘very important,’ he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.”); see also Farasat v. Pauli-kas, 32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255 (D.Md.1998), aff'd mem., 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that employee’s performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee's performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered ‘very important,’ he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.”); see also Farasat v. Pauli-kas, 32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255 (D.Md.1998), aff'd mem., 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that employee’s performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis)."
} | 9,509,791 | a |
See Mathews' Dep. at 78, 83-84, 87-88, 96, 123-127. Mathews' violation of Giant's policy indicates that his performance was not satisfactory. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered 'very important,' he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered ‘very important,’ he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.”); see also Farasat v. Pauli-kas, 32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255 (D.Md.1998), aff'd mem., 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that employee’s performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that employee's performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis",
"sentence": "See Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 687, 694 (E.D.Va.1999), aff'd mem., 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.2000) (“Accordingly, since [employee] violated policies that the [employer] considered ‘very important,’ he did not perform his job satisfactorily and cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.”); see also Farasat v. Pauli-kas, 32 F.Supp.2d 249, 255 (D.Md.1998), aff'd mem., 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that employee’s performance was unsatisfactory in part because he was tardy on a regular basis)."
} | 9,509,791 | a |
According ly, further discovery is not necessary for the Court to construe the Agreement. Mfrs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1999 WL 301688, at *5",
"parenthetical": "discovery granted when extrinsic evidence was necessary to interpret contract language",
"sentence": "Hanover Trust Co. v. Jayhawk Assocs., 766 F.Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (application for further discovery denied when the contract is unambiguous); Kashfi v. Phibro-Salomon, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 727, 736 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (further discovery is “pointless” where the contract is unambiguous); see, e.g., Young v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. No. 96 Civ. 1189, 1999 WL 301688 at *5 (D.Conn. Feb. 16, 1999) (discovery granted when extrinsic evidence was necessary to interpret contract language); Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc. v. N.Y. State Energy Research & Dev. Auth., No 87 Civ. 1160, 1989 WL 132027 at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1989) (no discovery warranted when the contractual language is clear and unambiguous)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "766 F.Supp. 124, 127",
"parenthetical": "application for further discovery denied when the contract is unambiguous",
"sentence": "Hanover Trust Co. v. Jayhawk Assocs., 766 F.Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (application for further discovery denied when the contract is unambiguous); Kashfi v. Phibro-Salomon, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 727, 736 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (further discovery is “pointless” where the contract is unambiguous); see, e.g., Young v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. No. 96 Civ. 1189, 1999 WL 301688 at *5 (D.Conn. Feb. 16, 1999) (discovery granted when extrinsic evidence was necessary to interpret contract language); Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc. v. N.Y. State Energy Research & Dev. Auth., No 87 Civ. 1160, 1989 WL 132027 at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1989) (no discovery warranted when the contractual language is clear and unambiguous)."
} | 9,491,150 | b |
According ly, further discovery is not necessary for the Court to construe the Agreement. Mfrs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "766 F.Supp. 124, 127",
"parenthetical": "application for further discovery denied when the contract is unambiguous",
"sentence": "Hanover Trust Co. v. Jayhawk Assocs., 766 F.Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (application for further discovery denied when the contract is unambiguous); Kashfi v. Phibro-Salomon, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 727, 736 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (further discovery is “pointless” where the contract is unambiguous); see, e.g., Young v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. No. 96 Civ. 1189, 1999 WL 301688 at *5 (D.Conn. Feb. 16, 1999) (discovery granted when extrinsic evidence was necessary to interpret contract language); Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc. v. N.Y. State Energy Research & Dev. Auth., No 87 Civ. 1160, 1989 WL 132027 at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1989) (no discovery warranted when the contractual language is clear and unambiguous)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1989 WL 132027, at *4",
"parenthetical": "no discovery warranted when the contractual language is clear and unambiguous",
"sentence": "Hanover Trust Co. v. Jayhawk Assocs., 766 F.Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (application for further discovery denied when the contract is unambiguous); Kashfi v. Phibro-Salomon, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 727, 736 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (further discovery is “pointless” where the contract is unambiguous); see, e.g., Young v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. No. 96 Civ. 1189, 1999 WL 301688 at *5 (D.Conn. Feb. 16, 1999) (discovery granted when extrinsic evidence was necessary to interpret contract language); Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc. v. N.Y. State Energy Research & Dev. Auth., No 87 Civ. 1160, 1989 WL 132027 at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1989) (no discovery warranted when the contractual language is clear and unambiguous)."
} | 9,491,150 | a |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 U.S. 106, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "745 F.2d 1500, 1537",
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | a |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 U.S. 106, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | a |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 U.S. 106, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | a |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "428 U.S. 106, 121",
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | b |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "745 F.2d 1500, 1537",
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | b |
The Secretary argues Woodruff does not have a disability in the technical sense of 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2). But as noted above, this argument appeared first in the Secretary's Reply to Woodruffs Opposition, at which point Woodruff had no opportunity to develop the record in response. Therefore, we shall not consider the argument here. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be \"clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment\" unless the issue \"was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications\"",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the dis cretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of Am., 645 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Typically when summary judgments are upheld on grounds different from those relied on by the district court, the other grounds were urged at trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 457 U.S. 102, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to order summary judgment prior to discovery, as it would be “clearly unjust for the appellate court to direct the issuance of summary judgment” unless the issue “was clearly framed by the proceedings below so that the parties had a legitimate chance to submit all relevant materials and argue their implications”), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985)."
} | 3,865,187 | a |
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