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Furthermore, the plaintiffs cannot connect any of their losses to E & Y on a materialization of the risk theory, whether those losses purportedly arose out of the 6/30/99 AOL Opinion or out of any other allegedly false audit opinions. In each of the cases in which the Second Circuit has employed a materialization of the risk analysis, it has considered a particular risk that was allegedly concealed by the defendant's actions and which then materialized to cause a market loss. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09",
"parenthetical": "risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs' losses",
"sentence": "See Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 157-58 (risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 (risk of stock volatility was not concealed by “buy” and “accumulate” recommendations); Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir.2003) (risk of defendants’ “dumping” their own shares of company stock was concealed by failure to reveal previous “pump and dump” schemes by the defendants); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 97-98 (2d Cir.2001) (risk of liquidity crisis was concealed by edited background report omitting important negative events in executive’s financial and business history); see also In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig. (“In re IPO II”), 399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs’ losses)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "396 F.3d 177, 177",
"parenthetical": "risk of stock volatility was not concealed by \"buy\" and \"accumulate\" recommendations",
"sentence": "See Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 157-58 (risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 (risk of stock volatility was not concealed by “buy” and “accumulate” recommendations); Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir.2003) (risk of defendants’ “dumping” their own shares of company stock was concealed by failure to reveal previous “pump and dump” schemes by the defendants); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 97-98 (2d Cir.2001) (risk of liquidity crisis was concealed by edited background report omitting important negative events in executive’s financial and business history); see also In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig. (“In re IPO II”), 399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs’ losses)."
} | 5,702,798 | b |
Furthermore, the plaintiffs cannot connect any of their losses to E & Y on a materialization of the risk theory, whether those losses purportedly arose out of the 6/30/99 AOL Opinion or out of any other allegedly false audit opinions. In each of the cases in which the Second Circuit has employed a materialization of the risk analysis, it has considered a particular risk that was allegedly concealed by the defendant's actions and which then materialized to cause a market loss. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09",
"parenthetical": "risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs' losses",
"sentence": "See Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 157-58 (risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 (risk of stock volatility was not concealed by “buy” and “accumulate” recommendations); Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir.2003) (risk of defendants’ “dumping” their own shares of company stock was concealed by failure to reveal previous “pump and dump” schemes by the defendants); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 97-98 (2d Cir.2001) (risk of liquidity crisis was concealed by edited background report omitting important negative events in executive’s financial and business history); see also In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig. (“In re IPO II”), 399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs’ losses)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "343 F.3d 189, 197-98",
"parenthetical": "risk of defendants' \"dumping\" their own shares of company stock was concealed by failure to reveal previous \"pump and dump\" schemes by the defendants",
"sentence": "See Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 157-58 (risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 (risk of stock volatility was not concealed by “buy” and “accumulate” recommendations); Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir.2003) (risk of defendants’ “dumping” their own shares of company stock was concealed by failure to reveal previous “pump and dump” schemes by the defendants); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 97-98 (2d Cir.2001) (risk of liquidity crisis was concealed by edited background report omitting important negative events in executive’s financial and business history); see also In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig. (“In re IPO II”), 399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs’ losses)."
} | 5,702,798 | b |
Furthermore, the plaintiffs cannot connect any of their losses to E & Y on a materialization of the risk theory, whether those losses purportedly arose out of the 6/30/99 AOL Opinion or out of any other allegedly false audit opinions. In each of the cases in which the Second Circuit has employed a materialization of the risk analysis, it has considered a particular risk that was allegedly concealed by the defendant's actions and which then materialized to cause a market loss. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "250 F.3d 87, 97-98",
"parenthetical": "risk of liquidity crisis was concealed by edited background report omitting important negative events in executive's financial and business history",
"sentence": "See Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 157-58 (risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 (risk of stock volatility was not concealed by “buy” and “accumulate” recommendations); Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir.2003) (risk of defendants’ “dumping” their own shares of company stock was concealed by failure to reveal previous “pump and dump” schemes by the defendants); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 97-98 (2d Cir.2001) (risk of liquidity crisis was concealed by edited background report omitting important negative events in executive’s financial and business history); see also In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig. (“In re IPO II”), 399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs’ losses)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09",
"parenthetical": "risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs' losses",
"sentence": "See Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 157-58 (risk of impending bankruptcy was not concealed by audit opinion); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 (risk of stock volatility was not concealed by “buy” and “accumulate” recommendations); Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir.2003) (risk of defendants’ “dumping” their own shares of company stock was concealed by failure to reveal previous “pump and dump” schemes by the defendants); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 97-98 (2d Cir.2001) (risk of liquidity crisis was concealed by edited background report omitting important negative events in executive’s financial and business history); see also In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig. (“In re IPO II”), 399 F.Supp.2d 298, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (risk that a complicated scheme misled the public as to the true value of securities failed to materialize to cause the plaintiffs’ losses)."
} | 5,702,798 | a |
However, on the present record, it is not clear from Shaw's and Gimbel's attested contentions that the information in Documents Nos. 16 and 32 exclusively contain deliberative communications. Although an evidentiary inference to this effect could arguably be made on the existing record, given the facts that the Department identified Document No. 16 as a "briefing memorandum" of summarized information; Gimbel's relatively lengthy affidavit states that Document No. 32 includes an attachment and concerns a "draft public notice" and "draft report;" and the Department conducted environmental analysis of Perki-omen Creek's water quality, it is equally plausible that Documents Nos. 16 and 32 contain qualitative or statistical data that can be severed from the deliberative portions of those documents. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "12 A.3d 466, 475",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the evidence of record equally supports two inconsistent inferences, it proves neither.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466, 475 (Pa.Super.2011) (en banc), aff'd 622 Pa. 422, 80 A.3d 1219 (2013) (“Where the evidence of record equally supports two inconsistent inferences, it proves neither.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "61 A.3d 379, 379-80",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the predecisional deliberation exception was not established where the agency failed to \"submit sufficient proof to show that all communications with any other government officials are 'deliberative' than factual in nature.\"",
"sentence": "See also Carey, 61 A.3d at 379-80 (concluding that the predecisional deliberation exception was not established where the agency failed to “submit sufficient proof to show that all communications with any other government officials are ‘deliberative’ than factual in nature.”). Therefore, we vacate the OOR’s determination, in part, and, in light of the ambiguous nature of the current record and Requester’s previous request for in camera review, we remand to the OOR for in camera review to determine whether Documents Nos. 16 and 32 contain severable information that is purely factual."
} | 6,904,188 | a |
However, on the present record, it is not clear from Shaw's and Gimbel's attested contentions that the information in Documents Nos. 16 and 32 exclusively contain deliberative communications. Although an evidentiary inference to this effect could arguably be made on the existing record, given the facts that the Department identified Document No. 16 as a "briefing memorandum" of summarized information; Gimbel's relatively lengthy affidavit states that Document No. 32 includes an attachment and concerns a "draft public notice" and "draft report;" and the Department conducted environmental analysis of Perki-omen Creek's water quality, it is equally plausible that Documents Nos. 16 and 32 contain qualitative or statistical data that can be severed from the deliberative portions of those documents. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "61 A.3d 379, 379-80",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the predecisional deliberation exception was not established where the agency failed to \"submit sufficient proof to show that all communications with any other government officials are 'deliberative' than factual in nature.\"",
"sentence": "See also Carey, 61 A.3d at 379-80 (concluding that the predecisional deliberation exception was not established where the agency failed to “submit sufficient proof to show that all communications with any other government officials are ‘deliberative’ than factual in nature.”). Therefore, we vacate the OOR’s determination, in part, and, in light of the ambiguous nature of the current record and Requester’s previous request for in camera review, we remand to the OOR for in camera review to determine whether Documents Nos. 16 and 32 contain severable information that is purely factual."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where the evidence of record equally supports two inconsistent inferences, it proves neither.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466, 475 (Pa.Super.2011) (en banc), aff'd 622 Pa. 422, 80 A.3d 1219 (2013) (“Where the evidence of record equally supports two inconsistent inferences, it proves neither.”)."
} | 6,904,188 | b |
However, on the present record, it is not clear from Shaw's and Gimbel's attested contentions that the information in Documents Nos. 16 and 32 exclusively contain deliberative communications. Although an evidentiary inference to this effect could arguably be made on the existing record, given the facts that the Department identified Document No. 16 as a "briefing memorandum" of summarized information; Gimbel's relatively lengthy affidavit states that Document No. 32 includes an attachment and concerns a "draft public notice" and "draft report;" and the Department conducted environmental analysis of Perki-omen Creek's water quality, it is equally plausible that Documents Nos. 16 and 32 contain qualitative or statistical data that can be severed from the deliberative portions of those documents. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "61 A.3d 379, 379-80",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the predecisional deliberation exception was not established where the agency failed to \"submit sufficient proof to show that all communications with any other government officials are 'deliberative' than factual in nature.\"",
"sentence": "See also Carey, 61 A.3d at 379-80 (concluding that the predecisional deliberation exception was not established where the agency failed to “submit sufficient proof to show that all communications with any other government officials are ‘deliberative’ than factual in nature.”). Therefore, we vacate the OOR’s determination, in part, and, in light of the ambiguous nature of the current record and Requester’s previous request for in camera review, we remand to the OOR for in camera review to determine whether Documents Nos. 16 and 32 contain severable information that is purely factual."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where the evidence of record equally supports two inconsistent inferences, it proves neither.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466, 475 (Pa.Super.2011) (en banc), aff'd 622 Pa. 422, 80 A.3d 1219 (2013) (“Where the evidence of record equally supports two inconsistent inferences, it proves neither.”)."
} | 6,904,188 | b |
Some courts use the term "deficit spending" to describe debtors who are living beyond their means and suggest that substantial abuse is indicated anytime a debtor exhibits "deficit spending." These courts reason that substantial abuse exists anytime a debtor's expenses exceed income on the statement of income and expenses, for two reasons: (1) a debtor should live within means by spending only that earned each month and (2) because one cannot spend more than earnings, "deficit spending" indicates that the debtor is misrepresenting the financial picture to the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "substantial abuse indicated where the debtors, in their statement of income and expenses, described monthly expenses which exceeded their net monthly income by $1,364",
"sentence": "See In re Wray, 136 B.R. 122 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992) (substantial abuse indicated where the debtors, in their statement of income and expenses, described monthly expenses which exceeded their net monthly income by $1,364); In re Cook, 110 B.R. 544 (Bankr.N.D.Okl.1990) (substantial abuse indicated where the debtors’ statement of income and expenses showed more monthly expenses than monthly income); In re Roth, 108 B.R. 78 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1989) (substantial abuse indicted where the debtors had spent substantially more than they earned during the two years preceding bankruptcy); In re Hudson, 64 B.R. 73 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1986) (substantial abuse indicated where the expense figures on the debtor’s statement of income and expenses exceeded the income figures, indicating \"deficit spending”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "substantial abuse not indicated where the debtors monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income",
"sentence": "But see In re Tefertiller, 104 B.R. 513 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1989) (substantial abuse not indicated where the debtors monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income)."
} | 11,849,408 | a |
Some courts use the term "deficit spending" to describe debtors who are living beyond their means and suggest that substantial abuse is indicated anytime a debtor exhibits "deficit spending." These courts reason that substantial abuse exists anytime a debtor's expenses exceed income on the statement of income and expenses, for two reasons: (1) a debtor should live within means by spending only that earned each month and (2) because one cannot spend more than earnings, "deficit spending" indicates that the debtor is misrepresenting the financial picture to the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "substantial abuse indicated where the debtors' statement of income and expenses showed more monthly expenses than monthly income",
"sentence": "See In re Wray, 136 B.R. 122 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992) (substantial abuse indicated where the debtors, in their statement of income and expenses, described monthly expenses which exceeded their net monthly income by $1,364); In re Cook, 110 B.R. 544 (Bankr.N.D.Okl.1990) (substantial abuse indicated where the debtors’ statement of income and expenses showed more monthly expenses than monthly income); In re Roth, 108 B.R. 78 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1989) (substantial abuse indicted where the debtors had spent substantially more than they earned during the two years preceding bankruptcy); In re Hudson, 64 B.R. 73 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1986) (substantial abuse indicated where the expense figures on the debtor’s statement of income and expenses exceeded the income figures, indicating \"deficit spending”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "substantial abuse not indicated where the debtors monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income",
"sentence": "But see In re Tefertiller, 104 B.R. 513 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1989) (substantial abuse not indicated where the debtors monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income)."
} | 11,849,408 | a |
Some courts use the term "deficit spending" to describe debtors who are living beyond their means and suggest that substantial abuse is indicated anytime a debtor exhibits "deficit spending." These courts reason that substantial abuse exists anytime a debtor's expenses exceed income on the statement of income and expenses, for two reasons: (1) a debtor should live within means by spending only that earned each month and (2) because one cannot spend more than earnings, "deficit spending" indicates that the debtor is misrepresenting the financial picture to the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "substantial abuse indicted where the debtors had spent substantially more than they earned during the two years preceding bankruptcy",
"sentence": "See In re Wray, 136 B.R. 122 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992) (substantial abuse indicated where the debtors, in their statement of income and expenses, described monthly expenses which exceeded their net monthly income by $1,364); In re Cook, 110 B.R. 544 (Bankr.N.D.Okl.1990) (substantial abuse indicated where the debtors’ statement of income and expenses showed more monthly expenses than monthly income); In re Roth, 108 B.R. 78 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1989) (substantial abuse indicted where the debtors had spent substantially more than they earned during the two years preceding bankruptcy); In re Hudson, 64 B.R. 73 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1986) (substantial abuse indicated where the expense figures on the debtor’s statement of income and expenses exceeded the income figures, indicating \"deficit spending”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "substantial abuse not indicated where the debtors monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income",
"sentence": "But see In re Tefertiller, 104 B.R. 513 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1989) (substantial abuse not indicated where the debtors monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income)."
} | 11,849,408 | a |
Some courts use the term "deficit spending" to describe debtors who are living beyond their means and suggest that substantial abuse is indicated anytime a debtor exhibits "deficit spending." These courts reason that substantial abuse exists anytime a debtor's expenses exceed income on the statement of income and expenses, for two reasons: (1) a debtor should live within means by spending only that earned each month and (2) because one cannot spend more than earnings, "deficit spending" indicates that the debtor is misrepresenting the financial picture to the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "substantial abuse indicated where the expense figures on the debtor's statement of income and expenses exceeded the income figures, indicating \"deficit spending\"",
"sentence": "See In re Wray, 136 B.R. 122 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992) (substantial abuse indicated where the debtors, in their statement of income and expenses, described monthly expenses which exceeded their net monthly income by $1,364); In re Cook, 110 B.R. 544 (Bankr.N.D.Okl.1990) (substantial abuse indicated where the debtors’ statement of income and expenses showed more monthly expenses than monthly income); In re Roth, 108 B.R. 78 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1989) (substantial abuse indicted where the debtors had spent substantially more than they earned during the two years preceding bankruptcy); In re Hudson, 64 B.R. 73 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1986) (substantial abuse indicated where the expense figures on the debtor’s statement of income and expenses exceeded the income figures, indicating \"deficit spending”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "substantial abuse not indicated where the debtors monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income",
"sentence": "But see In re Tefertiller, 104 B.R. 513 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1989) (substantial abuse not indicated where the debtors monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income)."
} | 11,849,408 | a |
Because disbarment is the most severe sanction, however, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence that the misappropriation of client funds was knowing, and not merely negligent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to disbar lawyer for misappropriation of client funds, supreme court must be able to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that misappropriation was knowing",
"sentence": "See People v. Galindo, 884 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Colo.1994) (lawyer suspended rather than disbarred where it was not established that respondent’s conversion of funds was knowing or intentional); see also In re Barlow, 140 N.J. 191, 657 A.2d 1197, 1200 (1995) (to disbar lawyer for misappropriation of client funds, supreme court must be able to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that misappropriation was knowing)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "884 P.2d 1109, 1112",
"parenthetical": "lawyer suspended rather than disbarred where it was not established that respondent's conversion of funds was knowing or intentional",
"sentence": "See People v. Galindo, 884 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Colo.1994) (lawyer suspended rather than disbarred where it was not established that respondent’s conversion of funds was knowing or intentional); see also In re Barlow, 140 N.J. 191, 657 A.2d 1197, 1200 (1995) (to disbar lawyer for misappropriation of client funds, supreme court must be able to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that misappropriation was knowing)."
} | 10,344,245 | b |
Because disbarment is the most severe sanction, however, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence that the misappropriation of client funds was knowing, and not merely negligent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "657 A.2d 1197, 1200",
"parenthetical": "to disbar lawyer for misappropriation of client funds, supreme court must be able to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that misappropriation was knowing",
"sentence": "See People v. Galindo, 884 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Colo.1994) (lawyer suspended rather than disbarred where it was not established that respondent’s conversion of funds was knowing or intentional); see also In re Barlow, 140 N.J. 191, 657 A.2d 1197, 1200 (1995) (to disbar lawyer for misappropriation of client funds, supreme court must be able to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that misappropriation was knowing)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "884 P.2d 1109, 1112",
"parenthetical": "lawyer suspended rather than disbarred where it was not established that respondent's conversion of funds was knowing or intentional",
"sentence": "See People v. Galindo, 884 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Colo.1994) (lawyer suspended rather than disbarred where it was not established that respondent’s conversion of funds was knowing or intentional); see also In re Barlow, 140 N.J. 191, 657 A.2d 1197, 1200 (1995) (to disbar lawyer for misappropriation of client funds, supreme court must be able to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that misappropriation was knowing)."
} | 10,344,245 | b |
Under the first prong of the Teli-gent test, a movant seeking to modify a protective order must establish "improvidence in the grant of the order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "165 Fed.Appx. 878, 880",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of motion to modify protective order on the\" basis that movant \"had not shown a compelling need or extraordinary circumstances necessary to modify the protective order\"",
"sentence": "Teligent, 640 F.3d at 59 (quoting SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir.2001)); see Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 165 Fed.Appx. 878, 880 (2d Cir.2005) (affirming denial of motion to modify protective order on the” basis that movant “had not shown a compelling need or extraordinary circumstances necessary to modify the protective order”); Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir.1979) (holding that a protective order granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) should not be modified “absent a showing of improvidence” in the grant of the order “or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need”); see also Dandong, 2012 WL 4793870, at *5 (“When courts in [the Second Circuit] determine that a party has relied on a protective order, it is very difficult for movants to modify that order.”); TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d at 229 (noting the “strong presumption against the modification of a protective order”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "273 F.3d 229, 229",
"parenthetical": "noting the \"strong presumption against the modification of a protective order\"",
"sentence": "Teligent, 640 F.3d at 59 (quoting SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir.2001)); see Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 165 Fed.Appx. 878, 880 (2d Cir.2005) (affirming denial of motion to modify protective order on the” basis that movant “had not shown a compelling need or extraordinary circumstances necessary to modify the protective order”); Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir.1979) (holding that a protective order granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) should not be modified “absent a showing of improvidence” in the grant of the order “or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need”); see also Dandong, 2012 WL 4793870, at *5 (“When courts in [the Second Circuit] determine that a party has relied on a protective order, it is very difficult for movants to modify that order.”); TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d at 229 (noting the “strong presumption against the modification of a protective order”)."
} | 4,317,302 | a |
Under the first prong of the Teli-gent test, a movant seeking to modify a protective order must establish "improvidence in the grant of the order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "594 F.2d 291, 296",
"parenthetical": "holding that a protective order granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c",
"sentence": "Teligent, 640 F.3d at 59 (quoting SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir.2001)); see Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 165 Fed.Appx. 878, 880 (2d Cir.2005) (affirming denial of motion to modify protective order on the” basis that movant “had not shown a compelling need or extraordinary circumstances necessary to modify the protective order”); Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir.1979) (holding that a protective order granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) should not be modified “absent a showing of improvidence” in the grant of the order “or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need”); see also Dandong, 2012 WL 4793870, at *5 (“When courts in [the Second Circuit] determine that a party has relied on a protective order, it is very difficult for movants to modify that order.”); TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d at 229 (noting the “strong presumption against the modification of a protective order”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "273 F.3d 229, 229",
"parenthetical": "noting the \"strong presumption against the modification of a protective order\"",
"sentence": "Teligent, 640 F.3d at 59 (quoting SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir.2001)); see Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 165 Fed.Appx. 878, 880 (2d Cir.2005) (affirming denial of motion to modify protective order on the” basis that movant “had not shown a compelling need or extraordinary circumstances necessary to modify the protective order”); Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir.1979) (holding that a protective order granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) should not be modified “absent a showing of improvidence” in the grant of the order “or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need”); see also Dandong, 2012 WL 4793870, at *5 (“When courts in [the Second Circuit] determine that a party has relied on a protective order, it is very difficult for movants to modify that order.”); TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d at 229 (noting the “strong presumption against the modification of a protective order”)."
} | 4,317,302 | a |
Based on this statement, one might assume that plaintiff was a citizen of California prior to his incarceration, in which ease complete diversity still exists. However, in light of the fact that there is a presumption against diversity jurisdiction and the burden is upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it, the Court is not satisfied that diversity jurisdiction exists based solely on the inference that plaintiffs citizenship for diversity purposes prior to incarceration was California. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "310 F.2d 73, 74",
"parenthetical": "\"We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.\"",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547",
"parenthetical": "stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | 7,824,021 | a |
Based on this statement, one might assume that plaintiff was a citizen of California prior to his incarceration, in which ease complete diversity still exists. However, in light of the fact that there is a presumption against diversity jurisdiction and the burden is upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it, the Court is not satisfied that diversity jurisdiction exists based solely on the inference that plaintiffs citizenship for diversity purposes prior to incarceration was California. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "460 F.2d 507, 514",
"parenthetical": "stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "310 F.2d 73, 74",
"parenthetical": "\"We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.\"",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | 7,824,021 | b |
Based on this statement, one might assume that plaintiff was a citizen of California prior to his incarceration, in which ease complete diversity still exists. However, in light of the fact that there is a presumption against diversity jurisdiction and the burden is upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it, the Court is not satisfied that diversity jurisdiction exists based solely on the inference that plaintiffs citizenship for diversity purposes prior to incarceration was California. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547",
"parenthetical": "stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.\"",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | 7,824,021 | b |
Based on this statement, one might assume that plaintiff was a citizen of California prior to his incarceration, in which ease complete diversity still exists. However, in light of the fact that there is a presumption against diversity jurisdiction and the burden is upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it, the Court is not satisfied that diversity jurisdiction exists based solely on the inference that plaintiffs citizenship for diversity purposes prior to incarceration was California. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.\"",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "460 F.2d 507, 514",
"parenthetical": "stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | 7,824,021 | a |
Based on this statement, one might assume that plaintiff was a citizen of California prior to his incarceration, in which ease complete diversity still exists. However, in light of the fact that there is a presumption against diversity jurisdiction and the burden is upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it, the Court is not satisfied that diversity jurisdiction exists based solely on the inference that plaintiffs citizenship for diversity purposes prior to incarceration was California. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.\"",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547",
"parenthetical": "stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | 7,824,021 | a |
Based on this statement, one might assume that plaintiff was a citizen of California prior to his incarceration, in which ease complete diversity still exists. However, in light of the fact that there is a presumption against diversity jurisdiction and the burden is upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it, the Court is not satisfied that diversity jurisdiction exists based solely on the inference that plaintiffs citizenship for diversity purposes prior to incarceration was California. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "460 F.2d 507, 514",
"parenthetical": "stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.\"",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | 7,824,021 | b |
Based on this statement, one might assume that plaintiff was a citizen of California prior to his incarceration, in which ease complete diversity still exists. However, in light of the fact that there is a presumption against diversity jurisdiction and the burden is upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it, the Court is not satisfied that diversity jurisdiction exists based solely on the inference that plaintiffs citizenship for diversity purposes prior to incarceration was California. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547",
"parenthetical": "stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.\"",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | 7,824,021 | b |
Based on this statement, one might assume that plaintiff was a citizen of California prior to his incarceration, in which ease complete diversity still exists. However, in light of the fact that there is a presumption against diversity jurisdiction and the burden is upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it, the Court is not satisfied that diversity jurisdiction exists based solely on the inference that plaintiffs citizenship for diversity purposes prior to incarceration was California. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "460 F.2d 507, 514",
"parenthetical": "stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.\"",
"sentence": "Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir.1962) (“We start with the presumption against diversity jurisdiction, and the burden is and always has been upon the one asserting it to affirmatively sustain it.”), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 874, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963); see also Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F.Supp. 1540, 1547 (D.Colo.1990) (J. Babcock) (stating that since federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against existence of diversity jurisdiction); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the basis for federal court jurisdiction must be clearly evident on the face of the complaint)."
} | 7,824,021 | b |
Despite the fact that the Moransais court explicitly limited its holding to the claim of professional negligence, courts interpreting Florida's economic loss doctrine since Moransais appear to disagree over whether the economic loss doctrine bars breach of fiduciary duty claims after Mor-ansais. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "208 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1316",
"parenthetical": "economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "190 F.R.D. 699, 701",
"parenthetical": "reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | 9,117,700 | a |
Despite the fact that the Moransais court explicitly limited its holding to the claim of professional negligence, courts interpreting Florida's economic loss doctrine since Moransais appear to disagree over whether the economic loss doctrine bars breach of fiduciary duty claims after Mor-ansais. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "208 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1316",
"parenthetical": "economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68",
"parenthetical": "eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | 9,117,700 | a |
Despite the fact that the Moransais court explicitly limited its holding to the claim of professional negligence, courts interpreting Florida's economic loss doctrine since Moransais appear to disagree over whether the economic loss doctrine bars breach of fiduciary duty claims after Mor-ansais. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "190 F.R.D. 699, 701",
"parenthetical": "reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | 9,117,700 | b |
Despite the fact that the Moransais court explicitly limited its holding to the claim of professional negligence, courts interpreting Florida's economic loss doctrine since Moransais appear to disagree over whether the economic loss doctrine bars breach of fiduciary duty claims after Mor-ansais. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68",
"parenthetical": "eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | 9,117,700 | b |
Despite the fact that the Moransais court explicitly limited its holding to the claim of professional negligence, courts interpreting Florida's economic loss doctrine since Moransais appear to disagree over whether the economic loss doctrine bars breach of fiduciary duty claims after Mor-ansais. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "190 F.R.D. 699, 701",
"parenthetical": "reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | 9,117,700 | b |
Despite the fact that the Moransais court explicitly limited its holding to the claim of professional negligence, courts interpreting Florida's economic loss doctrine since Moransais appear to disagree over whether the economic loss doctrine bars breach of fiduciary duty claims after Mor-ansais. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68",
"parenthetical": "eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim",
"sentence": "See Excess Risk, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1316 (economic loss rule barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because party had not alleged facts independent from the contract); Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule barred plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims); Hilliard v. Black, 125 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Fla.2000)(economic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty where breach of fiduciary duty claim was independent of breach of contract claim); but see Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, 190 F.R.D. 699, 701 (S.D.Fla.1999)(reject-ing argument that economic loss doctrine barred breach of fiduciary duty claim even though breach of fiduciary duty claim may be dependent on breach of contract claim); Invo Fla. Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(eeonomic loss rule does not bar claim of breach of fiduciary duty because breach of fiduciary duty is a well-established tort claim); First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639, *1 (Fla. 3d DCA, July 28,1999)(“We think the Moran-sais opinion makes it quite clear that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even [if] there is an underlying oral or written contract,”)(quoted in Crowell, 87 F.Supp.2d 1287)."
} | 9,117,700 | b |
The asserted collusive agreement or relationship between Koch's counsel and the sheriff, if it existed, would surely entitle Koch to relief. However, Koch has at best set forth conclusory allegations of such a collusive agreement or relationship. Aside from Koch's deduction from the asserted instances of errors by his counsel at trial, the totality of which we concluded above failed to establish a valid ineffective assistance claim, Koch does not suggest any basis whatever to support his allegations of counsel conflict. Although pro se habeas petitions must be construed liberally, "mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "892 F.2d 1213, 1213-14",
"parenthetical": "concluding that petitioner failed to allege facts of actual conflict of interest warranting habeas relief and, therefore, refusing to remand for evidentiary hearing on that claim",
"sentence": "Woods, 870 F.2d at 288 n. 3; see Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011—12 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1983) (refusing to hold evidentiary hearing based on petitioner’s bare assertions of ineffective assistance); cf. Russell, 892 F.2d at 1213-14 (concluding that petitioner failed to allege facts of actual conflict of interest warranting habeas relief and, therefore, refusing to remand for evidentiary hearing on that claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to hold evidentiary hearing based on petitioner's bare assertions of ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "Woods, 870 F.2d at 288 n. 3; see Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011—12 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1983) (refusing to hold evidentiary hearing based on petitioner’s bare assertions of ineffective assistance); cf. Russell, 892 F.2d at 1213-14 (concluding that petitioner failed to allege facts of actual conflict of interest warranting habeas relief and, therefore, refusing to remand for evidentiary hearing on that claim)."
} | 10,538,528 | b |
When the legislature has stated the purpose of a state law and specified the criteria for evaluating compliance with it, then a local ordinance imposing different requirements is inconsistent with the state statute. But if the state and local provisions serve different purposes, then different methods of determining compliance do not render the two provisions inconsistent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 S.W.2d 790, 796",
"parenthetical": "\"[L]ocal regulation, ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state enactment, is acceptable.\"",
"sentence": "See Robinson v. City of Longview, 936 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, no writ) (holding that ordinance prohibiting topless dancing at locations where alcoholic beverages are served was not inconsistent with state law prohibiting municipalities from imposing stricter standards on premises where a liquor license is required). Thus, to determine if the ordinance is inconsistent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade A raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 796 (Tex.1982) (“[L]ocal regulation, ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state enactment, is acceptable.”). In ascertaining these purposes, we rely on the statements of the body that enacted the provision."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "158 Tex. 61, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade A raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes",
"sentence": "See Robinson v. City of Longview, 936 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, no writ) (holding that ordinance prohibiting topless dancing at locations where alcoholic beverages are served was not inconsistent with state law prohibiting municipalities from imposing stricter standards on premises where a liquor license is required). Thus, to determine if the ordinance is inconsistent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade A raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 796 (Tex.1982) (“[L]ocal regulation, ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state enactment, is acceptable.”). In ascertaining these purposes, we rely on the statements of the body that enacted the provision."
} | 7,091,543 | b |
When the legislature has stated the purpose of a state law and specified the criteria for evaluating compliance with it, then a local ordinance imposing different requirements is inconsistent with the state statute. But if the state and local provisions serve different purposes, then different methods of determining compliance do not render the two provisions inconsistent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20",
"parenthetical": "holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade A raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes",
"sentence": "See Robinson v. City of Longview, 936 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, no writ) (holding that ordinance prohibiting topless dancing at locations where alcoholic beverages are served was not inconsistent with state law prohibiting municipalities from imposing stricter standards on premises where a liquor license is required). Thus, to determine if the ordinance is inconsistent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade A raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 796 (Tex.1982) (“[L]ocal regulation, ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state enactment, is acceptable.”). In ascertaining these purposes, we rely on the statements of the body that enacted the provision."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 S.W.2d 790, 796",
"parenthetical": "\"[L]ocal regulation, ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state enactment, is acceptable.\"",
"sentence": "See Robinson v. City of Longview, 936 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, no writ) (holding that ordinance prohibiting topless dancing at locations where alcoholic beverages are served was not inconsistent with state law prohibiting municipalities from imposing stricter standards on premises where a liquor license is required). Thus, to determine if the ordinance is inconsistent with state legislation, we begin by comparing the purpose of each. See City of Weslaco v. Melton, 158 Tex. 61, 63-64, 308 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1958) (holding that an ordinance banning the sale of grade A raw milk was not inconsistent with a state statute for grading and labeling milk because the two provisions served different purposes); see also City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 796 (Tex.1982) (“[L]ocal regulation, ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state enactment, is acceptable.”). In ascertaining these purposes, we rely on the statements of the body that enacted the provision."
} | 7,091,543 | a |
Moreover, upon being seized, plaintiffs promptly identified themselves and answered all of the agents' questions; Farag indicated that he was a federal employee and, according to his deposition, he provided his federal tax-identification number. The record does not suggest why the agents could not verify this information before over four hours had passed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "462 U.S. 709, 709",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he ... agents knew the time of Place's scheduled arrival ..., had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent's Fourth Amendment interests.\"",
"sentence": "See Place, 462 U.S. at 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (“[T]he ... agents knew the time of Place’s scheduled arrival ..., had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent’s Fourth Amendment interests.”); cf. United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 496-97 (2d Cir.1991) (upholding 30-minute detention under Terry where, under the circumstances, the officers “could not have been expected to ... arrange for any [more expeditious] investigative technique”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "935 F.2d 484, 496-97",
"parenthetical": "upholding 30-minute detention under Terry where, under the circumstances, the officers \"could not have been expected to ... arrange for any [more expeditious] investigative technique\"",
"sentence": "See Place, 462 U.S. at 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (“[T]he ... agents knew the time of Place’s scheduled arrival ..., had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent’s Fourth Amendment interests.”); cf. United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 496-97 (2d Cir.1991) (upholding 30-minute detention under Terry where, under the circumstances, the officers “could not have been expected to ... arrange for any [more expeditious] investigative technique”)."
} | 3,221,147 | a |
Moreover, upon being seized, plaintiffs promptly identified themselves and answered all of the agents' questions; Farag indicated that he was a federal employee and, according to his deposition, he provided his federal tax-identification number. The record does not suggest why the agents could not verify this information before over four hours had passed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he ... agents knew the time of Place's scheduled arrival ..., had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent's Fourth Amendment interests.\"",
"sentence": "See Place, 462 U.S. at 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (“[T]he ... agents knew the time of Place’s scheduled arrival ..., had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent’s Fourth Amendment interests.”); cf. United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 496-97 (2d Cir.1991) (upholding 30-minute detention under Terry where, under the circumstances, the officers “could not have been expected to ... arrange for any [more expeditious] investigative technique”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "935 F.2d 484, 496-97",
"parenthetical": "upholding 30-minute detention under Terry where, under the circumstances, the officers \"could not have been expected to ... arrange for any [more expeditious] investigative technique\"",
"sentence": "See Place, 462 U.S. at 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (“[T]he ... agents knew the time of Place’s scheduled arrival ..., had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent’s Fourth Amendment interests.”); cf. United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 496-97 (2d Cir.1991) (upholding 30-minute detention under Terry where, under the circumstances, the officers “could not have been expected to ... arrange for any [more expeditious] investigative technique”)."
} | 3,221,147 | a |
A contractor's claim where a termination for convenience has occurred may be further reduced by "[a]ny claim which the [government has against the [contractor under this contract." However, the government may not prevail on a claim against a contractor where the government wrongfully prevented performance by the contractor. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "402 F.Supp.2d 198, 202",
"parenthetical": "hindrance or prevention of performance is a breach of contract",
"sentence": "See Short Bros., PLC v. United States, 65 Fed.Cl. 695, 799 (2005) (the “implied duty not to hinder performance prohibits the [government, as with any other party to a contract, from do[ing] anything to prevent performance thereof by the [contractor] or that will hinder or delay him in its performance”) (quoting Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 213 Ct.Cl. 192, 550 F.2d 26, 32 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. United States, 60 Fed.Cl. 665, 672 (2004) (“occurrence of a necessary condition [in a contract] ‘may be excused by prevention or hindrance of its occurrence through a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing’ ”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 225 cmt. b (1981)); see also Petrofsky v. United States, 616 F.2d 494, 497 (Ct.Cl.1980); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Quik Serve Foods, Inc., 402 F.Supp.2d 198, 202 (D.D.C.2005) (hindrance or prevention of performance is a breach of contract); A.I.C."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "65 Fed.Cl. 695, 799",
"parenthetical": "the \"implied duty not to hinder performance prohibits the [government, as with any other party to a contract, from do[ing] anything to prevent performance thereof by the [contractor] or that will hinder or delay him in its performance\"",
"sentence": "See Short Bros., PLC v. United States, 65 Fed.Cl. 695, 799 (2005) (the “implied duty not to hinder performance prohibits the [government, as with any other party to a contract, from do[ing] anything to prevent performance thereof by the [contractor] or that will hinder or delay him in its performance”) (quoting Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 213 Ct.Cl. 192, 550 F.2d 26, 32 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. United States, 60 Fed.Cl. 665, 672 (2004) (“occurrence of a necessary condition [in a contract] ‘may be excused by prevention or hindrance of its occurrence through a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing’ ”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 225 cmt. b (1981)); see also Petrofsky v. United States, 616 F.2d 494, 497 (Ct.Cl.1980); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Quik Serve Foods, Inc., 402 F.Supp.2d 198, 202 (D.D.C.2005) (hindrance or prevention of performance is a breach of contract); A.I.C."
} | 5,914,891 | b |
A contractor's claim where a termination for convenience has occurred may be further reduced by "[a]ny claim which the [government has against the [contractor under this contract." However, the government may not prevail on a claim against a contractor where the government wrongfully prevented performance by the contractor. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "60 Fed.Cl. 665, 672",
"parenthetical": "\"occurrence of a necessary condition [in a contract] 'may be excused by prevention or hindrance of its occurrence through a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing' \"",
"sentence": "See Short Bros., PLC v. United States, 65 Fed.Cl. 695, 799 (2005) (the “implied duty not to hinder performance prohibits the [government, as with any other party to a contract, from do[ing] anything to prevent performance thereof by the [contractor] or that will hinder or delay him in its performance”) (quoting Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 213 Ct.Cl. 192, 550 F.2d 26, 32 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. United States, 60 Fed.Cl. 665, 672 (2004) (“occurrence of a necessary condition [in a contract] ‘may be excused by prevention or hindrance of its occurrence through a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing’ ”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 225 cmt. b (1981)); see also Petrofsky v. United States, 616 F.2d 494, 497 (Ct.Cl.1980); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Quik Serve Foods, Inc., 402 F.Supp.2d 198, 202 (D.D.C.2005) (hindrance or prevention of performance is a breach of contract); A.I.C."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "402 F.Supp.2d 198, 202",
"parenthetical": "hindrance or prevention of performance is a breach of contract",
"sentence": "See Short Bros., PLC v. United States, 65 Fed.Cl. 695, 799 (2005) (the “implied duty not to hinder performance prohibits the [government, as with any other party to a contract, from do[ing] anything to prevent performance thereof by the [contractor] or that will hinder or delay him in its performance”) (quoting Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 213 Ct.Cl. 192, 550 F.2d 26, 32 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. United States, 60 Fed.Cl. 665, 672 (2004) (“occurrence of a necessary condition [in a contract] ‘may be excused by prevention or hindrance of its occurrence through a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing’ ”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 225 cmt. b (1981)); see also Petrofsky v. United States, 616 F.2d 494, 497 (Ct.Cl.1980); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Quik Serve Foods, Inc., 402 F.Supp.2d 198, 202 (D.D.C.2005) (hindrance or prevention of performance is a breach of contract); A.I.C."
} | 5,914,891 | a |
Our conclusion that these obstructions must be removed is reinforced by the fact that maintenance of such obstructions in a right of way for twenty years is enough to extinguish an easement over nonregistered land. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "76 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 204-205",
"parenthetical": "placement of boulders on way for twenty years extinguished easement as to that part of the way",
"sentence": "See Post v. McHugh, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 204-205 (2010) (placement of boulders on way for twenty years extinguished easement as to that part of the way)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "337 Mass. 552, 557",
"parenthetical": "extension of outhouse and plantings extinguished easement as to the area obstructed",
"sentence": "See also Pappas v. Maxwell, 337 Mass. 552, 557 (1958) (extension of outhouse and plantings extinguished easement as to the area obstructed)."
} | 3,848,106 | a |
Additionally, this Court has previously imposed disbarment for violations of the ethical rules similar to those found in this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disbarring respondent who misappropriated $20,000 in client funds held in trust, a portion of the total amount entrusted to the respondent by the client for the purpose of paying a bankruptcy settlement",
"sentence": "See Fla. Bar v. Brownstein, 953 So.2d 502 (Fla.2007) (disbarring respondent who misappropriated $20,000 in client funds held in trust, a portion of the total amount entrusted to the respondent by the client for the purpose of paying a bankruptcy settlement); see also Fla. Bar v. Barley, 831 So.2d 163 (Fla.2002) (disbarring respondent who misappropriated $76,760.68 in client funds held in trust, making a series of withdrawals from the funds over a period of three months, and ultimately depleting the entire amount)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disbarring respondent who misappropriated $76,760.68 in client funds held in trust, making a series of withdrawals from the funds over a period of three months, and ultimately depleting the entire amount",
"sentence": "See Fla. Bar v. Brownstein, 953 So.2d 502 (Fla.2007) (disbarring respondent who misappropriated $20,000 in client funds held in trust, a portion of the total amount entrusted to the respondent by the client for the purpose of paying a bankruptcy settlement); see also Fla. Bar v. Barley, 831 So.2d 163 (Fla.2002) (disbarring respondent who misappropriated $76,760.68 in client funds held in trust, making a series of withdrawals from the funds over a period of three months, and ultimately depleting the entire amount)."
} | 7,036,726 | a |
Significantly, the trial judge also had the ability to observe the prosecutor's demeanor to determine whether she appeared to be telling the truth, evidence which would not be evident in the record. Both the majority opinion and the record are devoid of any basis for concluding that the prosecutor's statements and demeanor left the trial judge with no permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor's race-neutral justifications. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 369, 369",
"parenthetical": "\"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"",
"sentence": "See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "537 U.S. 19, 24",
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 2254 \"demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt\"",
"sentence": "See also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (stating that Section 2254 “demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”)."
} | 9,071,398 | a |
Significantly, the trial judge also had the ability to observe the prosecutor's demeanor to determine whether she appeared to be telling the truth, evidence which would not be evident in the record. Both the majority opinion and the record are devoid of any basis for concluding that the prosecutor's statements and demeanor left the trial judge with no permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor's race-neutral justifications. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 369, 369",
"parenthetical": "\"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"",
"sentence": "See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 2254 \"demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt\"",
"sentence": "See also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (stating that Section 2254 “demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”)."
} | 9,071,398 | a |
Significantly, the trial judge also had the ability to observe the prosecutor's demeanor to determine whether she appeared to be telling the truth, evidence which would not be evident in the record. Both the majority opinion and the record are devoid of any basis for concluding that the prosecutor's statements and demeanor left the trial judge with no permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor's race-neutral justifications. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 U.S. 369, 369",
"parenthetical": "\"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"",
"sentence": "See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 2254 \"demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt\"",
"sentence": "See also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (stating that Section 2254 “demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”)."
} | 9,071,398 | a |
Significantly, the trial judge also had the ability to observe the prosecutor's demeanor to determine whether she appeared to be telling the truth, evidence which would not be evident in the record. Both the majority opinion and the record are devoid of any basis for concluding that the prosecutor's statements and demeanor left the trial judge with no permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor's race-neutral justifications. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "537 U.S. 19, 24",
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 2254 \"demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt\"",
"sentence": "See also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (stating that Section 2254 “demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"",
"sentence": "See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)."
} | 9,071,398 | b |
Significantly, the trial judge also had the ability to observe the prosecutor's demeanor to determine whether she appeared to be telling the truth, evidence which would not be evident in the record. Both the majority opinion and the record are devoid of any basis for concluding that the prosecutor's statements and demeanor left the trial judge with no permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor's race-neutral justifications. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"",
"sentence": "See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 2254 \"demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt\"",
"sentence": "See also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (stating that Section 2254 “demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”)."
} | 9,071,398 | a |
Significantly, the trial judge also had the ability to observe the prosecutor's demeanor to determine whether she appeared to be telling the truth, evidence which would not be evident in the record. Both the majority opinion and the record are devoid of any basis for concluding that the prosecutor's statements and demeanor left the trial judge with no permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor's race-neutral justifications. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"",
"sentence": "See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 2254 \"demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt\"",
"sentence": "See also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (stating that Section 2254 “demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”)."
} | 9,071,398 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "34 F.3d 769, 774",
"parenthetical": "holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments' claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "224 U.S. 413, 445-46",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | b |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "224 U.S. 413, 445-46",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "811 F.2d 1119, 1125",
"parenthetical": "discussing doctrine of \"virtual representation\" which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when \"the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests\" of party to second suit",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "224 U.S. 413, 445-46",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal of EEOC's action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "224 U.S. 413, 445-46",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal of EEOC's action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "224 U.S. 413, 445-46",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 F.2d 1115, 1119",
"parenthetical": "ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "224 U.S. 413, 445-46",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "615 F.Supp. 111, 115",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "34 F.3d 769, 774",
"parenthetical": "holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments' claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "811 F.2d 1119, 1125",
"parenthetical": "discussing doctrine of \"virtual representation\" which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when \"the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests\" of party to second suit",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal of EEOC's action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal of EEOC's action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 F.2d 1115, 1119",
"parenthetical": "ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | b |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "615 F.Supp. 111, 115",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "34 F.3d 769, 774",
"parenthetical": "holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments' claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "811 F.2d 1119, 1125",
"parenthetical": "discussing doctrine of \"virtual representation\" which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when \"the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests\" of party to second suit",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal of EEOC's action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | b |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal of EEOC's action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | b |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 F.2d 1115, 1119",
"parenthetical": "ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "615 F.Supp. 111, 115",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "34 F.3d 769, 774",
"parenthetical": "holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments' claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "615 F.Supp. 111, 115",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "811 F.2d 1119, 1125",
"parenthetical": "discussing doctrine of \"virtual representation\" which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when \"the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests\" of party to second suit",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "615 F.Supp. 111, 115",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal of EEOC's action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "615 F.Supp. 111, 115",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "615 F.Supp. 111, 115",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that dismissal of EEOC's action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | b |
This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 F.2d 1115, 1119",
"parenthetical": "ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "615 F.Supp. 111, 115",
"parenthetical": "holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing “if the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation”)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that consent decree in action by United States and State of Alaska against Exxon which resolved governments’ claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded non-party sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against Exxon); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing doctrine of “virtual representation” which permits privity element of res judicata to be satisfied when “the party to the first suit was an adequate representative of the ... interests” of party to second suit); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that dismissal of EEOC’s action for failure to comply with Administrative Procedures Act barred subsequent private action based on same claim under res judicata principles), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.1987); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.1977) (ruling that EEOC consent decree with employer barred subsequent private action by employee against employer on same alleged acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 919, 923 (N.D.Ill.1991) (applying res judicata principles to bar EEOC from pursuing ADEA claim for employee whose individual ADEA claim had previously been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds and discussing trend to loosen “ ‘the traditional and sometimes artificial limitations on the application of res judica-ta’ ” with regard to privity requirement) (citing Maguire v. Selcke, 1990 WL 70451 at *4, (N.D.Ill.1990) and quoting Diaz v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1984)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir.1993); but cf. EEOC v. Bap tist Mem’l Hosp., 615 F.Supp. 111, 115 (W.D.Mo.1984) (holding that employee was not precluded from bringing separate employment discrimination action against employer where employee was not a party to consent decree entered into between EEOC and employer, employee had rejected consent decree and had received no relief under decree)."
} | 11,506,762 | a |
However, Daker ignores the fact that he already argued in his first appeal that the trial court erroneously unsealed the documents that were used in the presentence investigation. Since Daker already waived this issue by failing to identify the location of the relevant signed releases in the record of his first appeal, we cannot reconsider this issue now. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "error waived in prior appeal could not be addressed again in subsequent appeal",
"sentence": "See Willingham v. State, 241 Ga. App. 509 (1) (527 SE2d 232) (1999) (error waived in prior appeal could not be addressed again in subsequent appeal); see also Parker v. State, 229 Ga. App. 217, 218 (2) (493 SE2d 558) (1997) (when issue decided adversely to appellant in prior appeal, relitigation is precluded by res judicata)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "229 Ga. App. 217, 218",
"parenthetical": "when issue decided adversely to appellant in prior appeal, relitigation is precluded by res judicata",
"sentence": "See Willingham v. State, 241 Ga. App. 509 (1) (527 SE2d 232) (1999) (error waived in prior appeal could not be addressed again in subsequent appeal); see also Parker v. State, 229 Ga. App. 217, 218 (2) (493 SE2d 558) (1997) (when issue decided adversely to appellant in prior appeal, relitigation is precluded by res judicata)."
} | 675,526 | a |
P 17 For example, although Article 6, Section 5 of the Arizona Constitution vests power to make procedural rules with the Arizona Supreme Court, and rules of evidence generally are regarded as procedural, statutory evidentiary rules that can be viewed as supplemental to court rules have been upheld. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "196 Ariz. 396, 404, ¶ 28",
"parenthetical": "finding that A.R.S. SS 13-1421, Arizona's Rape Shield Law, \"neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 404, ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 1069, 1077 (App.2000) (finding that A.R.S. § 13-1421, Arizona’s Rape Shield Law, “neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers”); see also State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel, 142 Ariz. 587, 591, 691 P.2d 678, 682 (1984) (statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "142 Ariz. 587, 591",
"parenthetical": "statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5",
"sentence": "See State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 404, ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 1069, 1077 (App.2000) (finding that A.R.S. § 13-1421, Arizona’s Rape Shield Law, “neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers”); see also State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel, 142 Ariz. 587, 591, 691 P.2d 678, 682 (1984) (statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5)."
} | 5,271,618 | a |
P 17 For example, although Article 6, Section 5 of the Arizona Constitution vests power to make procedural rules with the Arizona Supreme Court, and rules of evidence generally are regarded as procedural, statutory evidentiary rules that can be viewed as supplemental to court rules have been upheld. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "691 P.2d 678, 682",
"parenthetical": "statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5",
"sentence": "See State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 404, ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 1069, 1077 (App.2000) (finding that A.R.S. § 13-1421, Arizona’s Rape Shield Law, “neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers”); see also State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel, 142 Ariz. 587, 591, 691 P.2d 678, 682 (1984) (statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "196 Ariz. 396, 404, ¶ 28",
"parenthetical": "finding that A.R.S. SS 13-1421, Arizona's Rape Shield Law, \"neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 404, ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 1069, 1077 (App.2000) (finding that A.R.S. § 13-1421, Arizona’s Rape Shield Law, “neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers”); see also State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel, 142 Ariz. 587, 591, 691 P.2d 678, 682 (1984) (statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5)."
} | 5,271,618 | b |
P 17 For example, although Article 6, Section 5 of the Arizona Constitution vests power to make procedural rules with the Arizona Supreme Court, and rules of evidence generally are regarded as procedural, statutory evidentiary rules that can be viewed as supplemental to court rules have been upheld. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "142 Ariz. 587, 591",
"parenthetical": "statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5",
"sentence": "See State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 404, ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 1069, 1077 (App.2000) (finding that A.R.S. § 13-1421, Arizona’s Rape Shield Law, “neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers”); see also State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel, 142 Ariz. 587, 591, 691 P.2d 678, 682 (1984) (statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "998 P.2d 1069, 1077",
"parenthetical": "finding that A.R.S. SS 13-1421, Arizona's Rape Shield Law, \"neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 404, ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 1069, 1077 (App.2000) (finding that A.R.S. § 13-1421, Arizona’s Rape Shield Law, “neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers”); see also State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel, 142 Ariz. 587, 591, 691 P.2d 678, 682 (1984) (statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5)."
} | 5,271,618 | b |
P 17 For example, although Article 6, Section 5 of the Arizona Constitution vests power to make procedural rules with the Arizona Supreme Court, and rules of evidence generally are regarded as procedural, statutory evidentiary rules that can be viewed as supplemental to court rules have been upheld. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "998 P.2d 1069, 1077",
"parenthetical": "finding that A.R.S. SS 13-1421, Arizona's Rape Shield Law, \"neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 404, ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 1069, 1077 (App.2000) (finding that A.R.S. § 13-1421, Arizona’s Rape Shield Law, “neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers”); see also State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel, 142 Ariz. 587, 591, 691 P.2d 678, 682 (1984) (statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "691 P.2d 678, 682",
"parenthetical": "statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5",
"sentence": "See State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 404, ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 1069, 1077 (App.2000) (finding that A.R.S. § 13-1421, Arizona’s Rape Shield Law, “neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers”); see also State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel, 142 Ariz. 587, 591, 691 P.2d 678, 682 (1984) (statutory rule establishing procedure for evidentiary admission of results of blood alcohol tests does not violate Article 6, Section 5)."
} | 5,271,618 | a |
Just as a layperson may testify as to the physical manifestations of a disease or injury, so appellant here is testifying as to an incident or event that resulted in a physically observable injury, i.e., the craniocerebral trauma. Therefore, appellant is not necessarily opining as to a matter involving medical causation, and her statements render the instant claim well grounded. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "5 Vet.App. 91, 93",
"parenthetical": "Court held that lay assertion of medical causation did not render claim well grounded and vacated BVA decision that had found claim to be well grounded",
"sentence": "See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 492, 494 (1992); Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 78, 81 (1990) (person submitting claim has “burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is well grounded”) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a)); but see Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 91, 93 (1993) (Court held that lay assertion of medical causation did not render claim well grounded and vacated BVA decision that had found claim to be well grounded)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 Vet.App. 78, 81",
"parenthetical": "person submitting claim has \"burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is well grounded\"",
"sentence": "See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 492, 494 (1992); Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 78, 81 (1990) (person submitting claim has “burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is well grounded”) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a)); but see Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 91, 93 (1993) (Court held that lay assertion of medical causation did not render claim well grounded and vacated BVA decision that had found claim to be well grounded)."
} | 6,448,417 | b |
Indeed, they were not even looking for such services when they removed Katie from public school. Several courts, relying on the parents' failure to challenge the IEP's adequacy, have found insufficient notice to the school district even when the parents requested an evaluation and received an IEP before removing their child. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "348 F.3d 523, 523-24",
"parenthetical": "affirming a denial of reimbursement when the child's parents agreed to the IEP proposed by the school and only informed the school district of their concerns after they arranged for the child's enrollment in private school",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Berger, 348 F.3d at 523-24 (affirming a denial of reimbursement when the child’s parents agreed to the IEP proposed by the school and only informed the school district of their concerns after they arranged for the child’s enrollment in private school); see also M.C., 226 F.3d at 68 (denying reimbursement for psychological counseling that the court assumed necessary for the child to benefit from special education because the parents had failed to raise the issue in the child’s IEP before the counseling started)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "226 F.3d 68, 68",
"parenthetical": "denying reimbursement for psychological counseling that the court assumed necessary for the child to benefit from special education because the parents had failed to raise the issue in the child's IEP before the counseling started",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Berger, 348 F.3d at 523-24 (affirming a denial of reimbursement when the child’s parents agreed to the IEP proposed by the school and only informed the school district of their concerns after they arranged for the child’s enrollment in private school); see also M.C., 226 F.3d at 68 (denying reimbursement for psychological counseling that the court assumed necessary for the child to benefit from special education because the parents had failed to raise the issue in the child’s IEP before the counseling started)."
} | 9,292,506 | a |
When a consumer brings an action for violation of the disclosure provisions of the FCRA, the Act's purpose of protecting consumer confidentiality is implicated. In that respect, such cases are akin to invasion of privacy cases under state law-cases where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant unlawfully invaded the plaintiffs privacy by obtaining information deemed confidential. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "582 F.2d 1214, 1217",
"parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiffs' complaint, which alleged willful and negligent failure to comply with the FCRA and thus unlawfully violated the plaintiffs' right to privacy, stated a valid claim",
"sentence": "We implied so in Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir.1978) (finding that the plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged willful and negligent failure to comply with the FCRA and thus unlawfully violated the plaintiffs’ right to privacy, stated a valid claim), and at least three of our sister circuits have agreed with that characterization."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 1007, 1013",
"parenthetical": "upholding a damage award in an action brought under the FCRA based on the emotional distress caused by the defendant's invasion of privacy into the plaintiffs credit report",
"sentence": "See Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir.1998) (upholding a damage award in an action brought under the FCRA based on the emotional distress caused by the defendant’s invasion of privacy into the plaintiffs credit report); Yang v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 146 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir.1998) (recognizing FCRA’s dual purpose of facilitating accurate reporting and of protecting privacy); Zamora v. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1368, 1370 (10th Cir.1987) (“By enacting the FCRA, Congress intended to prevent invasions of consumers’ privacy.”)."
} | 11,146,938 | a |
When a consumer brings an action for violation of the disclosure provisions of the FCRA, the Act's purpose of protecting consumer confidentiality is implicated. In that respect, such cases are akin to invasion of privacy cases under state law-cases where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant unlawfully invaded the plaintiffs privacy by obtaining information deemed confidential. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "146 F.3d 1320, 1322",
"parenthetical": "recognizing FCRA's dual purpose of facilitating accurate reporting and of protecting privacy",
"sentence": "See Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir.1998) (upholding a damage award in an action brought under the FCRA based on the emotional distress caused by the defendant’s invasion of privacy into the plaintiffs credit report); Yang v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 146 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir.1998) (recognizing FCRA’s dual purpose of facilitating accurate reporting and of protecting privacy); Zamora v. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1368, 1370 (10th Cir.1987) (“By enacting the FCRA, Congress intended to prevent invasions of consumers’ privacy.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "582 F.2d 1214, 1217",
"parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiffs' complaint, which alleged willful and negligent failure to comply with the FCRA and thus unlawfully violated the plaintiffs' right to privacy, stated a valid claim",
"sentence": "We implied so in Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir.1978) (finding that the plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged willful and negligent failure to comply with the FCRA and thus unlawfully violated the plaintiffs’ right to privacy, stated a valid claim), and at least three of our sister circuits have agreed with that characterization."
} | 11,146,938 | b |
When a consumer brings an action for violation of the disclosure provisions of the FCRA, the Act's purpose of protecting consumer confidentiality is implicated. In that respect, such cases are akin to invasion of privacy cases under state law-cases where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant unlawfully invaded the plaintiffs privacy by obtaining information deemed confidential. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "582 F.2d 1214, 1217",
"parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiffs' complaint, which alleged willful and negligent failure to comply with the FCRA and thus unlawfully violated the plaintiffs' right to privacy, stated a valid claim",
"sentence": "We implied so in Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir.1978) (finding that the plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged willful and negligent failure to comply with the FCRA and thus unlawfully violated the plaintiffs’ right to privacy, stated a valid claim), and at least three of our sister circuits have agreed with that characterization."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "811 F.2d 1368, 1370",
"parenthetical": "\"By enacting the FCRA, Congress intended to prevent invasions of consumers' privacy.\"",
"sentence": "See Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir.1998) (upholding a damage award in an action brought under the FCRA based on the emotional distress caused by the defendant’s invasion of privacy into the plaintiffs credit report); Yang v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 146 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir.1998) (recognizing FCRA’s dual purpose of facilitating accurate reporting and of protecting privacy); Zamora v. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1368, 1370 (10th Cir.1987) (“By enacting the FCRA, Congress intended to prevent invasions of consumers’ privacy.”)."
} | 11,146,938 | a |
While the D.C. Circuit has been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and records. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 F.3d 110, 124-27",
"parenthetical": "holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | 5,909,880 | a |
While the D.C. Circuit has been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and records. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70",
"parenthetical": "\"the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | 5,909,880 | b |
While the D.C. Circuit has been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and records. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "846 F.2d 249, 253",
"parenthetical": "\"We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | 5,909,880 | a |
While the D.C. Circuit has been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and records. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | 5,909,880 | b |
While the D.C. Circuit has been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and records. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "732 F.2d 1302, 1308",
"parenthetical": "\"the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | 5,909,880 | a |
While the D.C. Circuit has been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and records. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 F.3d 110, 124-27",
"parenthetical": "holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | 5,871,374 | a |
While the D.C. Circuit has been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and records. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70",
"parenthetical": "\"the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | 5,871,374 | a |
While the D.C. Circuit has been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and records. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "846 F.2d 249, 253",
"parenthetical": "\"We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | 5,871,374 | b |
While the D.C. Circuit has been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and records. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | 5,871,374 | a |
While the D.C. Circuit has been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and records. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "732 F.2d 1302, 1308",
"parenthetical": "\"the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.\"",
"sentence": "See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 124-27 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the First Amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir.1984) (“the public and press possess a First Amendment ... right of access to civil proceedings”); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (“We believe that the more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir.1983) (“[t]he historical support for access to criminal trials applies in equal measure to civil trials”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984) (“the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well”); see also Nat'l Assoc. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F.Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.D.C.2008) (Collyer, J.) (“Courts have found a legitimate public interest in access to civil trials as well.”). According to these Circuits, “[t]he public’s right of access to civil trials and records is as well established as that of criminal proceedings and records.”"
} | 5,871,374 | a |
Finally, we reject Pisabaj-Mejia's contention that the BIA committed legal error in assessing his argument for a continuance for prosecutorial discretion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "525 U.S. 471, 483-85",
"parenthetical": "prosecutorial discretion by the agency can be granted at any stage of the administrative process",
"sentence": "See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining that a petitioner must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 483-85, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (prosecutorial discretion by the agency can be granted at any stage of the administrative process)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "204 F.3d 1241, 1246",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a petitioner must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim",
"sentence": "See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining that a petitioner must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 483-85, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (prosecutorial discretion by the agency can be granted at any stage of the administrative process)."
} | 4,270,476 | b |
Finally, we reject Pisabaj-Mejia's contention that the BIA committed legal error in assessing his argument for a continuance for prosecutorial discretion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "204 F.3d 1241, 1246",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a petitioner must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim",
"sentence": "See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining that a petitioner must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 483-85, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (prosecutorial discretion by the agency can be granted at any stage of the administrative process)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutorial discretion by the agency can be granted at any stage of the administrative process",
"sentence": "See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining that a petitioner must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 483-85, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (prosecutorial discretion by the agency can be granted at any stage of the administrative process)."
} | 4,270,476 | a |
Finally, we reject Pisabaj-Mejia's contention that the BIA committed legal error in assessing his argument for a continuance for prosecutorial discretion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutorial discretion by the agency can be granted at any stage of the administrative process",
"sentence": "See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining that a petitioner must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 483-85, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (prosecutorial discretion by the agency can be granted at any stage of the administrative process)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "204 F.3d 1241, 1246",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a petitioner must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim",
"sentence": "See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining that a petitioner must show error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 483-85, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (prosecutorial discretion by the agency can be granted at any stage of the administrative process)."
} | 4,270,476 | b |
Nevertheless, Judge Marx's authority was void only "because there was a want of power in the ... appointing body," see id. at 854 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, he may qualify as a de facto judge, thereby ratifying his acts prior to his official appointment, if there was "public acquiescence in the authority." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that for an individual to be a de facto official the community must acquiesce accordingly",
"sentence": "State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah 1992) (holding that a court reporter was a de facto official where she \"assumed authority ... under col- or of a valid appointment, and the public acquiesced in her authority\"); see also Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 & n. 5 (holding that for an individual to be a de facto official the community must acquiesce accordingly); State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (\"[The acts of one who assumes official authority and exercises duties under color of a valid appointment or election are valid where the community acquiesces to his authority.\")."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "845 P.2d 220, 226",
"parenthetical": "holding that a court reporter was a de facto official where she \"assumed authority ... under col- or of a valid appointment, and the public acquiesced in her authority\"",
"sentence": "State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah 1992) (holding that a court reporter was a de facto official where she \"assumed authority ... under col- or of a valid appointment, and the public acquiesced in her authority\"); see also Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 & n. 5 (holding that for an individual to be a de facto official the community must acquiesce accordingly); State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (\"[The acts of one who assumes official authority and exercises duties under color of a valid appointment or election are valid where the community acquiesces to his authority.\")."
} | 6,990,385 | b |
Nevertheless, Judge Marx's authority was void only "because there was a want of power in the ... appointing body," see id. at 854 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, he may qualify as a de facto judge, thereby ratifying his acts prior to his official appointment, if there was "public acquiescence in the authority." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "845 P.2d 220, 226",
"parenthetical": "holding that a court reporter was a de facto official where she \"assumed authority ... under col- or of a valid appointment, and the public acquiesced in her authority\"",
"sentence": "State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah 1992) (holding that a court reporter was a de facto official where she \"assumed authority ... under col- or of a valid appointment, and the public acquiesced in her authority\"); see also Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 & n. 5 (holding that for an individual to be a de facto official the community must acquiesce accordingly); State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (\"[The acts of one who assumes official authority and exercises duties under color of a valid appointment or election are valid where the community acquiesces to his authority.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "814 P.2d 1136, 1139",
"parenthetical": "\"[The acts of one who assumes official authority and exercises duties under color of a valid appointment or election are valid where the community acquiesces to his authority.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah 1992) (holding that a court reporter was a de facto official where she \"assumed authority ... under col- or of a valid appointment, and the public acquiesced in her authority\"); see also Vance, 671 P.2d at 131 & n. 5 (holding that for an individual to be a de facto official the community must acquiesce accordingly); State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (\"[The acts of one who assumes official authority and exercises duties under color of a valid appointment or election are valid where the community acquiesces to his authority.\")."
} | 6,990,385 | a |
The holding that appellant urges this Court to adopt in this appeal would require us to add language to Code SS 19.2-307 that the General Assembly did not actually include when it enacted that statute and would also be patently absurd. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "180 Va. 36, 41",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 181, 639 S.E.2d 227, 230 (2007) (explaining that an appellate court “must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute”); see also Miller v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 36, 41, 21 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1942) (“[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.”). In this case, the factfinder at appellant’s felony trial was required to decide whether appellant had actually been convicted of the requisite number of misdemeanor predicate offenses."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Va. 177, 181",
"parenthetical": "explaining that an appellate court \"must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute\"",
"sentence": "See Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 181, 639 S.E.2d 227, 230 (2007) (explaining that an appellate court “must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute”); see also Miller v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 36, 41, 21 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1942) (“[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.”). In this case, the factfinder at appellant’s felony trial was required to decide whether appellant had actually been convicted of the requisite number of misdemeanor predicate offenses."
} | 3,857,396 | b |
The holding that appellant urges this Court to adopt in this appeal would require us to add language to Code SS 19.2-307 that the General Assembly did not actually include when it enacted that statute and would also be patently absurd. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "21 S.E.2d 721, 723",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 181, 639 S.E.2d 227, 230 (2007) (explaining that an appellate court “must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute”); see also Miller v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 36, 41, 21 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1942) (“[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.”). In this case, the factfinder at appellant’s felony trial was required to decide whether appellant had actually been convicted of the requisite number of misdemeanor predicate offenses."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "273 Va. 177, 181",
"parenthetical": "explaining that an appellate court \"must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute\"",
"sentence": "See Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 181, 639 S.E.2d 227, 230 (2007) (explaining that an appellate court “must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute”); see also Miller v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 36, 41, 21 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1942) (“[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.”). In this case, the factfinder at appellant’s felony trial was required to decide whether appellant had actually been convicted of the requisite number of misdemeanor predicate offenses."
} | 3,857,396 | b |
The holding that appellant urges this Court to adopt in this appeal would require us to add language to Code SS 19.2-307 that the General Assembly did not actually include when it enacted that statute and would also be patently absurd. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "180 Va. 36, 41",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 181, 639 S.E.2d 227, 230 (2007) (explaining that an appellate court “must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute”); see also Miller v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 36, 41, 21 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1942) (“[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.”). In this case, the factfinder at appellant’s felony trial was required to decide whether appellant had actually been convicted of the requisite number of misdemeanor predicate offenses."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "639 S.E.2d 227, 230",
"parenthetical": "explaining that an appellate court \"must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute\"",
"sentence": "See Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 181, 639 S.E.2d 227, 230 (2007) (explaining that an appellate court “must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute”); see also Miller v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 36, 41, 21 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1942) (“[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.”). In this case, the factfinder at appellant’s felony trial was required to decide whether appellant had actually been convicted of the requisite number of misdemeanor predicate offenses."
} | 3,857,396 | b |
The holding that appellant urges this Court to adopt in this appeal would require us to add language to Code SS 19.2-307 that the General Assembly did not actually include when it enacted that statute and would also be patently absurd. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "639 S.E.2d 227, 230",
"parenthetical": "explaining that an appellate court \"must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute\"",
"sentence": "See Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 181, 639 S.E.2d 227, 230 (2007) (explaining that an appellate court “must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute”); see also Miller v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 36, 41, 21 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1942) (“[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.”). In this case, the factfinder at appellant’s felony trial was required to decide whether appellant had actually been convicted of the requisite number of misdemeanor predicate offenses."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "21 S.E.2d 721, 723",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 181, 639 S.E.2d 227, 230 (2007) (explaining that an appellate court “must not add to the words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute”); see also Miller v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 36, 41, 21 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1942) (“[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction which will not produce the absurdity will be found.”). In this case, the factfinder at appellant’s felony trial was required to decide whether appellant had actually been convicted of the requisite number of misdemeanor predicate offenses."
} | 3,857,396 | a |
The Declaration specifically provided that the covenants and restrictions inured to the benefit of all lot owners. As a clearly intended beneficiary of the Declaration, Kirschner had the right to enforce the subdivision's restrictions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "188 So.2d 9, 11",
"parenthetical": "well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive covenants",
"sentence": "Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862, 868 (1933) (restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants); see also Gercas v. Davis, 188 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive covenants); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in subdivision). The fact that the Declaration granted the POA power to enforce the restrictions did not eliminate Kirschner’s enforcement rights."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants",
"sentence": "Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862, 868 (1933) (restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants); see also Gercas v. Davis, 188 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive covenants); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in subdivision). The fact that the Declaration granted the POA power to enforce the restrictions did not eliminate Kirschner’s enforcement rights."
} | 8,184,892 | b |
The Declaration specifically provided that the covenants and restrictions inured to the benefit of all lot owners. As a clearly intended beneficiary of the Declaration, Kirschner had the right to enforce the subdivision's restrictions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants",
"sentence": "Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862, 868 (1933) (restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants); see also Gercas v. Davis, 188 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive covenants); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in subdivision). The fact that the Declaration granted the POA power to enforce the restrictions did not eliminate Kirschner’s enforcement rights."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "101 So.2d 587, 590",
"parenthetical": "benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in subdivision",
"sentence": "Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862, 868 (1933) (restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants); see also Gercas v. Davis, 188 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive covenants); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in subdivision). The fact that the Declaration granted the POA power to enforce the restrictions did not eliminate Kirschner’s enforcement rights."
} | 8,184,892 | a |
The Declaration specifically provided that the covenants and restrictions inured to the benefit of all lot owners. As a clearly intended beneficiary of the Declaration, Kirschner had the right to enforce the subdivision's restrictions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "188 So.2d 9, 11",
"parenthetical": "well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive covenants",
"sentence": "Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862, 868 (1933) (restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants); see also Gercas v. Davis, 188 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive covenants); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in subdivision). The fact that the Declaration granted the POA power to enforce the restrictions did not eliminate Kirschner’s enforcement rights."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "147 So. 862, 868",
"parenthetical": "restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants",
"sentence": "Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862, 868 (1933) (restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants); see also Gercas v. Davis, 188 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive covenants); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in subdivision). The fact that the Declaration granted the POA power to enforce the restrictions did not eliminate Kirschner’s enforcement rights."
} | 8,184,892 | b |
The Declaration specifically provided that the covenants and restrictions inured to the benefit of all lot owners. As a clearly intended beneficiary of the Declaration, Kirschner had the right to enforce the subdivision's restrictions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "101 So.2d 587, 590",
"parenthetical": "benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in subdivision",
"sentence": "Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862, 868 (1933) (restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants); see also Gercas v. Davis, 188 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive covenants); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in subdivision). The fact that the Declaration granted the POA power to enforce the restrictions did not eliminate Kirschner’s enforcement rights."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "147 So. 862, 868",
"parenthetical": "restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants",
"sentence": "Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862, 868 (1933) (restrictive covenants may be enforced by those who may be considered beneficiaries of covenants); see also Gercas v. Davis, 188 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (well settled that residential lot owners are beneficiaries of restrictive covenants); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (benefit of restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser in subdivision). The fact that the Declaration granted the POA power to enforce the restrictions did not eliminate Kirschner’s enforcement rights."
} | 8,184,892 | b |
Our holding in Data Access counsels that judicially identified limitations periods for federal securities law violations are to be selected by reference to analogous areas of federal securities law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. SS 185",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | 1,820,850 | b |
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