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Our holding in Data Access counsels that judicially identified limitations periods for federal securities law violations are to be selected by reference to analogous areas of federal securities law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. SS 185",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | 1,820,850 | a |
Our holding in Data Access counsels that judicially identified limitations periods for federal securities law violations are to be selected by reference to analogous areas of federal securities law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. SS 185",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | 1,820,850 | b |
Our holding in Data Access counsels that judicially identified limitations periods for federal securities law violations are to be selected by reference to analogous areas of federal securities law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. SS 185",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | 1,820,850 | a |
Our holding in Data Access counsels that judicially identified limitations periods for federal securities law violations are to be selected by reference to analogous areas of federal securities law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. SS 185",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | 1,820,850 | a |
Our holding in Data Access counsels that judicially identified limitations periods for federal securities law violations are to be selected by reference to analogous areas of federal securities law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. SS 185",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | 1,820,850 | b |
Our holding in Data Access counsels that judicially identified limitations periods for federal securities law violations are to be selected by reference to analogous areas of federal securities law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. SS 185",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | 1,820,850 | a |
Our holding in Data Access counsels that judicially identified limitations periods for federal securities law violations are to be selected by reference to analogous areas of federal securities law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. SS 185",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | 1,820,850 | b |
Our holding in Data Access counsels that judicially identified limitations periods for federal securities law violations are to be selected by reference to analogous areas of federal securities law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. SS 185",
"sentence": "See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49. We relied on three Supreme Court cases opting for a uniform limitation period under other statutes, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (civil RICO); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (suits for violation of collective bargaining agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 185); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (applying uniform state statute for civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), to support application of a uniform federal statute of limitations in cases involving securities claims."
} | 1,820,850 | b |
Indeed, under analogous circumstances, we have affirmed the existence of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "526 F.3d 385, 387",
"parenthetical": "\"We have little hesitancy in concluding a reasonable magistrate would conclude the materials found in the trash -- two plastic bags with cocaine residue, two corners torn from plastic bags, Brillo pads, a film canister with white residue -- were sufficient to establish probable cause that cocaine was being possessed and consumed in Alle-bach's residence.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Laurrence, 308 F.3d 623, 627 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that the district court acted within its discretion in not allowing a confidential informant to testify in support of the defendant’s suppression motion because, even if the informant’s statements regarding drug activity were excised from the search warrant affidavit, the remaining information obtained through a trash pull, which revealed plastic bags containing wrappers with cocaine residue, supplied sufficient probable cause for the search warrant); Hill, 142 F.3d at 310-11 (affirming decision finding probable cause to issue a search warrant where the affidavit established that the affiant was an experienced narcotics investigator; the defendant had prior drug trafficking convictions; information from a confidential informant indicated that the defendant engaged in drug trafficking on a regular basis and maintained drugs and weapons at the location to be searched; periodic surveillance corroborated the informant’s information; and marijuana and cocaine residue, and packaging materials, were found inside trash bags left on the defendant’s lawn within twenty-four hours before preparation of the affidavit); United States v. Wingate, 191 F.3d 454, 1999 WL 775917, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Sept.24, 1999) (table decision) (holding that traffic around the searched residence, the presence of a known drug dealer, and trash pulls that revealed cut straws, torn plastic baggies, marijuana stems, and one baggie with cocaine residue, constituted substantial basis for magistrate’s probable cause determination); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 (8th Cir.2008) (“We have little hesitancy in concluding a reasonable magistrate would conclude the materials found in the trash — two plastic bags with cocaine residue, two corners torn from plastic bags, Brillo pads, a film canister with white residue — were sufficient to establish probable cause that cocaine was being possessed and consumed in Alle-bach’s residence.”) (internal footnotes omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "308 F.3d 623, 627",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court acted within its discretion in not allowing a confidential informant to testify in support of the defendant's suppression motion because, even if the informant's statements regarding drug activity were excised from the search warrant affidavit, the remaining information obtained through a trash pull, which revealed plastic bags containing wrappers with cocaine residue, supplied sufficient probable cause for the search warrant",
"sentence": "See United States v. Laurrence, 308 F.3d 623, 627 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that the district court acted within its discretion in not allowing a confidential informant to testify in support of the defendant’s suppression motion because, even if the informant’s statements regarding drug activity were excised from the search warrant affidavit, the remaining information obtained through a trash pull, which revealed plastic bags containing wrappers with cocaine residue, supplied sufficient probable cause for the search warrant); Hill, 142 F.3d at 310-11 (affirming decision finding probable cause to issue a search warrant where the affidavit established that the affiant was an experienced narcotics investigator; the defendant had prior drug trafficking convictions; information from a confidential informant indicated that the defendant engaged in drug trafficking on a regular basis and maintained drugs and weapons at the location to be searched; periodic surveillance corroborated the informant’s information; and marijuana and cocaine residue, and packaging materials, were found inside trash bags left on the defendant’s lawn within twenty-four hours before preparation of the affidavit); United States v. Wingate, 191 F.3d 454, 1999 WL 775917, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Sept.24, 1999) (table decision) (holding that traffic around the searched residence, the presence of a known drug dealer, and trash pulls that revealed cut straws, torn plastic baggies, marijuana stems, and one baggie with cocaine residue, constituted substantial basis for magistrate’s probable cause determination); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 (8th Cir.2008) (“We have little hesitancy in concluding a reasonable magistrate would conclude the materials found in the trash — two plastic bags with cocaine residue, two corners torn from plastic bags, Brillo pads, a film canister with white residue — were sufficient to establish probable cause that cocaine was being possessed and consumed in Alle-bach’s residence.”) (internal footnotes omitted)."
} | 4,260,282 | b |
The question to be answered for the purposes of qualified immunity is "whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the use of force alleged was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 178, 184",
"parenthetical": "affirming grant of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity where \"a reasonable police officer certainly could have believed that the limited force applied was proper and was not unconstitutionally excessive in light of clearly established law\"",
"sentence": "Lennon, 66 F.3d at 425; see Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d 155, 157 (8th Cir.1995) (reversing district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, where force used was “objectively reasonable in the circumstances”); see also Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178, 184 (7th Cir.1995) (affirming grant of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity where “a reasonable police officer certainly could have believed that the limited force applied was proper and was not unconstitutionally excessive in light of clearly established law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "51 F.3d 155, 157",
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, where force used was \"objectively reasonable in the circumstances\"",
"sentence": "Lennon, 66 F.3d at 425; see Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d 155, 157 (8th Cir.1995) (reversing district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, where force used was “objectively reasonable in the circumstances”); see also Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178, 184 (7th Cir.1995) (affirming grant of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity where “a reasonable police officer certainly could have believed that the limited force applied was proper and was not unconstitutionally excessive in light of clearly established law”)."
} | 11,462,834 | b |
Because this case as tried addressed only actual damages, the district court, on remand, need not address any issue as to the "additional amount" authorized by the second half of the first sentence of section 407.913, but may address any other issue as to the applicability of sections 407.911-M07.915. One factor may be the proportion of Dickey's damages within the scope of the Missouri commissions statute, because damages not within the statute do not entitle Dickey to attorney's fees. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "768 S.W.2d 64, 71",
"parenthetical": "requiring segregation of attorney's fees where some counts do not authorize attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Kraft, 946 S.W.2d at 776; O’Brien v. B.L.C. Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 64, 71 (Mo. banc 1989) (requiring segregation of attorney’s fees where some counts do not authorize attorney’s fees); cf. Gary Brown & Assocs., Inc. v. Ashdon, Inc., 268 Fed.Appx. 837, 845 (11th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (analyzing award of attorney’s fees for claims under the Illinois Sales Representative Act, in case also including non-ISRA claims)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "268 Fed.Appx. 837, 845",
"parenthetical": "analyzing award of attorney's fees for claims under the Illinois Sales Representative Act, in case also including non-ISRA claims",
"sentence": "See Kraft, 946 S.W.2d at 776; O’Brien v. B.L.C. Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 64, 71 (Mo. banc 1989) (requiring segregation of attorney’s fees where some counts do not authorize attorney’s fees); cf. Gary Brown & Assocs., Inc. v. Ashdon, Inc., 268 Fed.Appx. 837, 845 (11th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (analyzing award of attorney’s fees for claims under the Illinois Sales Representative Act, in case also including non-ISRA claims)."
} | 3,682,726 | a |
. I am troubled by the trial court's preempto-ry effort to avoid having to call counsel and the defendant into open court to consider questions from the jury. This is a significant deviation from the rules of criminal procedure and this court should not acquiesce in this practice. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "296 N.W.2d 870, 878",
"parenthetical": "reversing and remanding for a new trial where the trial court refused to exercise its discretion by determining at the outset of deliberations that it would deny any jury requests to review trial transcript",
"sentence": "See State v. Rean, 421 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn.1988) (indicating that district courts cannot follow a blanket rule in denying requests to review testimony by a jury); see also State v. Spaulding, 296 N.W.2d 870, 878 (Minn.1980) (reversing and remanding for a new trial where the trial court refused to exercise its discretion by determining at the outset of deliberations that it would deny any jury requests to review trial transcript)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "421 N.W.2d 303, 306",
"parenthetical": "indicating that district courts cannot follow a blanket rule in denying requests to review testimony by a jury",
"sentence": "See State v. Rean, 421 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn.1988) (indicating that district courts cannot follow a blanket rule in denying requests to review testimony by a jury); see also State v. Spaulding, 296 N.W.2d 870, 878 (Minn.1980) (reversing and remanding for a new trial where the trial court refused to exercise its discretion by determining at the outset of deliberations that it would deny any jury requests to review trial transcript)."
} | 8,454,790 | b |
Although the Pennsylvania case law, as does ours, presents a variety of factual scenarios, it includes cases, like this one, in which one household vehicle, the vehicle the insured occupied when injured, was excluded from UIM coverage under the policy insuring another household vehicle, and the exclusion was upheld. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "972 A.2d 507, 507",
"parenthetical": "claimant, injured while riding his motorcycle, sought UIM benefits under a policy covering his three other vehicles",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Baker, 972 A.2d at 507 (claimant, injured while riding his motorcycle, sought UIM benefits under a policy covering his three other vehicles); Prudential Prop. & Cos. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747 (2002) (son injured in his own ■ car sought UIM benefits under the policy cov ering the vehicles of his parents, with whom he resided); Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 551 Pa. 558, 711 A.2d 1006 (1998) (same except resident son injured while riding motorcycle)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "809 A.2d 204, 204",
"parenthetical": "in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant's personal vehicle",
"sentence": "See also Burstein, 809 A.2d at 204, and Williams, 32 A.3d at 1195, (in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant’s personal vehicle)."
} | 7,091,940 | a |
Although the Pennsylvania case law, as does ours, presents a variety of factual scenarios, it includes cases, like this one, in which one household vehicle, the vehicle the insured occupied when injured, was excluded from UIM coverage under the policy insuring another household vehicle, and the exclusion was upheld. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "972 A.2d 507, 507",
"parenthetical": "claimant, injured while riding his motorcycle, sought UIM benefits under a policy covering his three other vehicles",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Baker, 972 A.2d at 507 (claimant, injured while riding his motorcycle, sought UIM benefits under a policy covering his three other vehicles); Prudential Prop. & Cos. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747 (2002) (son injured in his own ■ car sought UIM benefits under the policy cov ering the vehicles of his parents, with whom he resided); Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 551 Pa. 558, 711 A.2d 1006 (1998) (same except resident son injured while riding motorcycle)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 A.3d 1195, 1195",
"parenthetical": "in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant's personal vehicle",
"sentence": "See also Burstein, 809 A.2d at 204, and Williams, 32 A.3d at 1195, (in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant’s personal vehicle)."
} | 7,091,940 | a |
Although the Pennsylvania case law, as does ours, presents a variety of factual scenarios, it includes cases, like this one, in which one household vehicle, the vehicle the insured occupied when injured, was excluded from UIM coverage under the policy insuring another household vehicle, and the exclusion was upheld. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "809 A.2d 204, 204",
"parenthetical": "in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant's personal vehicle",
"sentence": "See also Burstein, 809 A.2d at 204, and Williams, 32 A.3d at 1195, (in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant’s personal vehicle)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "son injured in his own # car sought UIM benefits under the policy cov ering the vehicles of his parents, with whom he resided",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Baker, 972 A.2d at 507 (claimant, injured while riding his motorcycle, sought UIM benefits under a policy covering his three other vehicles); Prudential Prop. & Cos. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747 (2002) (son injured in his own ■ car sought UIM benefits under the policy cov ering the vehicles of his parents, with whom he resided); Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 551 Pa. 558, 711 A.2d 1006 (1998) (same except resident son injured while riding motorcycle)."
} | 7,091,940 | b |
Although the Pennsylvania case law, as does ours, presents a variety of factual scenarios, it includes cases, like this one, in which one household vehicle, the vehicle the insured occupied when injured, was excluded from UIM coverage under the policy insuring another household vehicle, and the exclusion was upheld. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "son injured in his own # car sought UIM benefits under the policy cov ering the vehicles of his parents, with whom he resided",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Baker, 972 A.2d at 507 (claimant, injured while riding his motorcycle, sought UIM benefits under a policy covering his three other vehicles); Prudential Prop. & Cos. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747 (2002) (son injured in his own ■ car sought UIM benefits under the policy cov ering the vehicles of his parents, with whom he resided); Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 551 Pa. 558, 711 A.2d 1006 (1998) (same except resident son injured while riding motorcycle)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 A.3d 1195, 1195",
"parenthetical": "in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant's personal vehicle",
"sentence": "See also Burstein, 809 A.2d at 204, and Williams, 32 A.3d at 1195, (in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant’s personal vehicle)."
} | 7,091,940 | a |
Although the Pennsylvania case law, as does ours, presents a variety of factual scenarios, it includes cases, like this one, in which one household vehicle, the vehicle the insured occupied when injured, was excluded from UIM coverage under the policy insuring another household vehicle, and the exclusion was upheld. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "809 A.2d 204, 204",
"parenthetical": "in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant's personal vehicle",
"sentence": "See also Burstein, 809 A.2d at 204, and Williams, 32 A.3d at 1195, (in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant’s personal vehicle)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "son injured in his own # car sought UIM benefits under the policy cov ering the vehicles of his parents, with whom he resided",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Baker, 972 A.2d at 507 (claimant, injured while riding his motorcycle, sought UIM benefits under a policy covering his three other vehicles); Prudential Prop. & Cos. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747 (2002) (son injured in his own ■ car sought UIM benefits under the policy cov ering the vehicles of his parents, with whom he resided); Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 551 Pa. 558, 711 A.2d 1006 (1998) (same except resident son injured while riding motorcycle)."
} | 7,091,940 | b |
Although the Pennsylvania case law, as does ours, presents a variety of factual scenarios, it includes cases, like this one, in which one household vehicle, the vehicle the insured occupied when injured, was excluded from UIM coverage under the policy insuring another household vehicle, and the exclusion was upheld. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 A.3d 1195, 1195",
"parenthetical": "in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant's personal vehicle",
"sentence": "See also Burstein, 809 A.2d at 204, and Williams, 32 A.3d at 1195, (in both cases, claimant was injured while occupying a regularly used, non-owned vehicle and was denied UIM coverage under the policy covering the claimant’s personal vehicle)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "son injured in his own # car sought UIM benefits under the policy cov ering the vehicles of his parents, with whom he resided",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Baker, 972 A.2d at 507 (claimant, injured while riding his motorcycle, sought UIM benefits under a policy covering his three other vehicles); Prudential Prop. & Cos. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747 (2002) (son injured in his own ■ car sought UIM benefits under the policy cov ering the vehicles of his parents, with whom he resided); Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 551 Pa. 558, 711 A.2d 1006 (1998) (same except resident son injured while riding motorcycle)."
} | 7,091,940 | b |
.The Court draws on Title VII case law because "the same analytical framework and proof requirements that apply to employment discrimination claims under Title VII also ap ply to discrimination claims under Section 1981." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Title VII and section 1981 claims together at the motion to dismiss stage",
"sentence": "Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing Title VII and section 1981 claims together at the motion to dismiss stage); see also Cooper v. S. Co., 260 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1356-57 (N.D. Ga. 2003), aff’d, 390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that pattern and practice claims are viable under section 1981)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "260 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1356-57",
"parenthetical": "noting that pattern and practice claims are viable under section 1981",
"sentence": "Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing Title VII and section 1981 claims together at the motion to dismiss stage); see also Cooper v. S. Co., 260 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1356-57 (N.D. Ga. 2003), aff’d, 390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that pattern and practice claims are viable under section 1981)."
} | 12,266,894 | a |
.The Court draws on Title VII case law because "the same analytical framework and proof requirements that apply to employment discrimination claims under Title VII also ap ply to discrimination claims under Section 1981." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that pattern and practice claims are viable under section 1981",
"sentence": "Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing Title VII and section 1981 claims together at the motion to dismiss stage); see also Cooper v. S. Co., 260 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1356-57 (N.D. Ga. 2003), aff’d, 390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that pattern and practice claims are viable under section 1981)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing Title VII and section 1981 claims together at the motion to dismiss stage",
"sentence": "Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing Title VII and section 1981 claims together at the motion to dismiss stage); see also Cooper v. S. Co., 260 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1356-57 (N.D. Ga. 2003), aff’d, 390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that pattern and practice claims are viable under section 1981)."
} | 12,266,894 | b |
The instructions here thus failed to provide the jury with a complete understanding of the applicable law, and indeed, they imposed independent burdens on the plaintiff that have been rejected by the Illinois courts. We therefore cannot say with any degree of certainty that the instructional errors were harmless. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "30 F.3d 898, 901",
"parenthetical": "remanding for new trial where jury verdict for the plaintiff in a vehicle defect case could have been based on an improper legal theory",
"sentence": "See Simmons, Inc., 762 F.2d at 599 n. 3 (in a ease where the jury could have based its decision on a valid or an invalid theory, we cannot speculate as to which the jury chose); cf. Bammerlin v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 901 (7th Cir.1994) (remanding for new trial where jury verdict for the plaintiff in a vehicle defect case could have been based on an improper legal theory)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in a ease where the jury could have based its decision on a valid or an invalid theory, we cannot speculate as to which the jury chose",
"sentence": "See Simmons, Inc., 762 F.2d at 599 n. 3 (in a ease where the jury could have based its decision on a valid or an invalid theory, we cannot speculate as to which the jury chose); cf. Bammerlin v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 901 (7th Cir.1994) (remanding for new trial where jury verdict for the plaintiff in a vehicle defect case could have been based on an improper legal theory)."
} | 10,526,544 | b |
The Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search of a vehicfcs and any containers or compartments found within it, where probable cause exists to search the vehicle. This court has held that the odor of marijuana, without more, emanating from a properly-stopped vehicle, may provide the requisite probable cause to support the warrantless search of both the vehicle and the baggage therein. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "372 F.3d 653, 659",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a police officer has probable cause to arrest for marijuana possession if the officer \"smells the odor of marijuana in circumstances where the officer can localize its source to a person\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 183-84 (4th Cir.2002) (upholding as valid the search of a knapsack in a car based on officers’ detection of odor of marijuana); see also United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir.2004) (concluding that a police officer has probable cause to arrest for marijuana possession if the officer “smells the odor of marijuana in circumstances where the officer can localize its source to a person”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 F.3d 175, 183-84",
"parenthetical": "upholding as valid the search of a knapsack in a car based on officers' detection of odor of marijuana",
"sentence": "See United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 183-84 (4th Cir.2002) (upholding as valid the search of a knapsack in a car based on officers’ detection of odor of marijuana); see also United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir.2004) (concluding that a police officer has probable cause to arrest for marijuana possession if the officer “smells the odor of marijuana in circumstances where the officer can localize its source to a person”)."
} | 3,489,794 | b |
Furthermore, it was Wife's burden as the movant to establish she was entitled to an award of fees on appeal.' Although Wife, filed a motion alleging Husband was capable of paying Wife's attorney fees, the record reflects no evidence of the parties' financial conditions at the time of the. motion hearing ten months later. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "210 S.W.3d 517, 517",
"parenthetical": "noting evidence of financial condition eight months after dissolution should have been presented at hearing on mov-ant's motion for appellate attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See also Davis, 210 S.W.3d at 517 (noting evidence of financial condition eight months after dissolution should have been presented at hearing on mov-ant’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "303 S.W.3d 197, 197",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he court is to consider the financial resources of the parties since the dissolution, even if the time period between the dissolution' hearing and the appellate Tee hearing is relatively short.\"",
"sentence": "See Potts v. Potts, 303 S.W.3d at 197 (“[T]he court is to consider the financial resources of the parties since the dissolution, even if the time period between the dissolution' hearing and the appellate Tee hearing is relatively short.”)."
} | 6,811,236 | b |
Moreover, Pando was not available for cross-examination concerning his assertion that he had been threatened. Herrera and similar cases cited by the defendant are simply inapposite. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "591 F.2d 278, 283",
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 251 (2d Cir.1968) (when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness’s account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1091, 1098",
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received)."
} | 11,301,677 | b |
Moreover, Pando was not available for cross-examination concerning his assertion that he had been threatened. Herrera and similar cases cited by the defendant are simply inapposite. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 251 (2d Cir.1968) (when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness’s account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1091, 1098",
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received)."
} | 11,301,677 | b |
Moreover, Pando was not available for cross-examination concerning his assertion that he had been threatened. Herrera and similar cases cited by the defendant are simply inapposite. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 251 (2d Cir.1968) (when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness’s account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1091, 1098",
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received)."
} | 11,301,677 | b |
Moreover, Pando was not available for cross-examination concerning his assertion that he had been threatened. Herrera and similar cases cited by the defendant are simply inapposite. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1091, 1098",
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 251 (2d Cir.1968) (when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness’s account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969)."
} | 11,301,677 | a |
Moreover, Pando was not available for cross-examination concerning his assertion that he had been threatened. Herrera and similar cases cited by the defendant are simply inapposite. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "390 F.2d 244, 251",
"parenthetical": "when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness's account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 251 (2d Cir.1968) (when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness’s account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1091, 1098",
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received)."
} | 11,301,677 | b |
Moreover, Pando was not available for cross-examination concerning his assertion that he had been threatened. Herrera and similar cases cited by the defendant are simply inapposite. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1091, 1098",
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness's account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 251 (2d Cir.1968) (when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness’s account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969)."
} | 11,301,677 | a |
Moreover, Pando was not available for cross-examination concerning his assertion that he had been threatened. Herrera and similar cases cited by the defendant are simply inapposite. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1091, 1098",
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness's account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 251 (2d Cir.1968) (when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness’s account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969)."
} | 11,301,677 | a |
Moreover, Pando was not available for cross-examination concerning his assertion that he had been threatened. Herrera and similar cases cited by the defendant are simply inapposite. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 1091, 1098",
"parenthetical": "defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding a threat he had received)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness's account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.) (defendant sought to testify in court regarding statements made to him), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 251 (2d Cir.1968) (when defense counsel pointed out inconsistency in witness’s account, the witness was allowed to testify regarding a threat in order to explain the inconsistency), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969)."
} | 11,301,677 | a |
In Thompson, this court considered the question whether a claim for services rendered in violation of the Medicare anti-kickback statutes necessarily constitutes a false claim. While we noted that a claim is not necessarily "false" simply because it involves a statutory violation, we indicated that a claim is necessarily false when it involves a knowingly false certification of compliance with a statute or regulation and that certification is a prerequisite to payment of the asserted claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 1261, 1266",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that, while not all breaches of contract or regulatory violations automatically give rise to liability under the FCA, \"the false certification of compliance ... creates liability when certification is a prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902 (“[W]here the government has conditioned payment of a claim upon a claimant’s certification of compliance with, for example, a statute or regulation, a claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim when he or she falsely certifies compliance with that statute or regulation.”); see also United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir.1996) (recognizing that, while not all breaches of contract or regulatory violations automatically give rise to liability under the FCA, “the false certification of compliance ... creates liability when certification is a prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit”) (emphasis in original). We ultimately remanded Thompson to the district court because we were unable to determine from the record whether the certifications of compliance at issue in that ease were actually prerequisites to the defendant’s entitlement to the funds claimed."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 F.3d 902, 902",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here the government has conditioned payment of a claim upon a claimant's certification of compliance with, for example, a statute or regulation, a claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim when he or she falsely certifies compliance with that statute or regulation.\"",
"sentence": "See Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902 (“[W]here the government has conditioned payment of a claim upon a claimant’s certification of compliance with, for example, a statute or regulation, a claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim when he or she falsely certifies compliance with that statute or regulation.”); see also United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir.1996) (recognizing that, while not all breaches of contract or regulatory violations automatically give rise to liability under the FCA, “the false certification of compliance ... creates liability when certification is a prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit”) (emphasis in original). We ultimately remanded Thompson to the district court because we were unable to determine from the record whether the certifications of compliance at issue in that ease were actually prerequisites to the defendant’s entitlement to the funds claimed."
} | 9,438,722 | b |
P. 1.413(1) (emphasis added). This codifies a "but for" causation reqdirement, limiting a fee-based' sanction to the fees that would have been avoided but for the improper filings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "774 N.W.2d 495, 495",
"parenthetical": "holding the district court abused its discretion by imposing-a sanction- that included fees expended before the sanctionable filings",
"sentence": "See Everly, 774 N.W.2d at 495. (holding the district court abused its discretion by imposing-a sanction- that included fees expended before the sanctionable filings); see also Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. v. Architectural Research Corp.) 989 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[B]efore an award of attorneys’ fees may be made under [Rule 11], .it must be shown that the fees were- incurred be cause of the filing of an improper pleading.”); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Only attorney time which is in response to that which has been sanctioned should be evaluated.”). As the United States Supreme Court recently explained,"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "989 F.2d 213, 218",
"parenthetical": "\"[B]efore an award of attorneys' fees may be made under [Rule 11], .it must be shown that the fees were- incurred be cause of the filing of an improper pleading.\"",
"sentence": "See Everly, 774 N.W.2d at 495. (holding the district court abused its discretion by imposing-a sanction- that included fees expended before the sanctionable filings); see also Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. v. Architectural Research Corp.) 989 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[B]efore an award of attorneys’ fees may be made under [Rule 11], .it must be shown that the fees were- incurred be cause of the filing of an improper pleading.”); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Only attorney time which is in response to that which has been sanctioned should be evaluated.”). As the United States Supreme Court recently explained,"
} | 12,339,026 | a |
P. 1.413(1) (emphasis added). This codifies a "but for" causation reqdirement, limiting a fee-based' sanction to the fees that would have been avoided but for the improper filings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 505, 523",
"parenthetical": "\"Only attorney time which is in response to that which has been sanctioned should be evaluated.\"",
"sentence": "See Everly, 774 N.W.2d at 495. (holding the district court abused its discretion by imposing-a sanction- that included fees expended before the sanctionable filings); see also Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. v. Architectural Research Corp.) 989 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[B]efore an award of attorneys’ fees may be made under [Rule 11], .it must be shown that the fees were- incurred be cause of the filing of an improper pleading.”); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Only attorney time which is in response to that which has been sanctioned should be evaluated.”). As the United States Supreme Court recently explained,"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "774 N.W.2d 495, 495",
"parenthetical": "holding the district court abused its discretion by imposing-a sanction- that included fees expended before the sanctionable filings",
"sentence": "See Everly, 774 N.W.2d at 495. (holding the district court abused its discretion by imposing-a sanction- that included fees expended before the sanctionable filings); see also Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. v. Architectural Research Corp.) 989 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[B]efore an award of attorneys’ fees may be made under [Rule 11], .it must be shown that the fees were- incurred be cause of the filing of an improper pleading.”); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Only attorney time which is in response to that which has been sanctioned should be evaluated.”). As the United States Supreme Court recently explained,"
} | 12,339,026 | b |
The concurrence argues that the Court "retreats" from its decisions in Computer Assocs. In most discovery rule cases, courts are faced with common-law causes of action and general statutes of limitations. We held in Altai and confirmed in S.V. v. R.V. that the elements of inherent undiscoverability and objective verifiability "balance the conflicting policies in statutes of limitations: the benefits of precluding stale or spurious claims versus the risks of precluding meritorious claims that happen to fall outside an arbitrarily set period." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "699 S.W.2d 205, 208",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Legislature's intent in passing Art. 4590i, SS 10.01, was to abolish the discovery rule in cases governed by the Medical Liability Act\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex.1985) (“[T]he Legislature’s intent in passing Art. 4590i, § 10.01, was to abolish the discovery rule in cases governed by the Medical Liability Act”); cf. Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex.1985) (holding that former article 4590i, section 10.01 violated the open courts provision when it abridged the right to sue before the claimant had a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "685 S.W.2d 11, 12",
"parenthetical": "holding that former article 4590i, section 10.01 violated the open courts provision when it abridged the right to sue before the claimant had a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex.1985) (“[T]he Legislature’s intent in passing Art. 4590i, § 10.01, was to abolish the discovery rule in cases governed by the Medical Liability Act”); cf. Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex.1985) (holding that former article 4590i, section 10.01 violated the open courts provision when it abridged the right to sue before the claimant had a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong)."
} | 11,916,257 | a |
Consequently, unable to discern any express or implied manifestations of intent that B.R. 7062 was designed to enlarge the limited application of F.R.Civ.P. 62(a) as described above, this court must find that the ten day stay within those rules was not intended to apply to orders involving the dismissal of bankruptcy petitions without a contrary order of the court. Therefore, because no stay was imposed by Rule 7062, and because the Debtor never secured a stay pending appeal, Cibula was free to pursue his state court remedies with complete immunity immediately upon the effective date of the dismissal. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "automatic stay does not remain in effect for ten days following dismissal of Chapter 13 petition",
"sentence": "(See In re Lashley, 825 F.2d 362 (11th Cir.1987) (bankruptcy court could not retroactively void foreclosure sale to enable Chapter 13 debtors to pursue appeal in absence of stay pending appeal); Norton v. Hoxie State Bank, 61 B.R. 258 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan.1986) (in accord); Matter of Bluford, 40 B.R. 640 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1984) (automatic stay does not remain in effect for ten days following dismissal of Chapter 13 petition); In re Linton, 35 B.R. 695 (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 1983) (perfection of security interest in collateral within 10 days of order dismissing Chapter 13 case held enforceable); In re Weathersfield Farms, Inc., 34 B.R. 435 (Bkrtcy.D.Vt.1983) (absent order staying dismissal of Chapter 11 case, stay terminated upon dismissal and mortgagee was restored to position it assumed at the commencement of the case); Contra In re Cooper, 16 B.R. 19 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1981) (repossession and sale of automobile within 10 days of dismissal constituted a violation of stay); But c.f."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "repossession and sale of automobile within 10 days of dismissal constituted a violation of stay",
"sentence": "(See In re Lashley, 825 F.2d 362 (11th Cir.1987) (bankruptcy court could not retroactively void foreclosure sale to enable Chapter 13 debtors to pursue appeal in absence of stay pending appeal); Norton v. Hoxie State Bank, 61 B.R. 258 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan.1986) (in accord); Matter of Bluford, 40 B.R. 640 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1984) (automatic stay does not remain in effect for ten days following dismissal of Chapter 13 petition); In re Linton, 35 B.R. 695 (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 1983) (perfection of security interest in collateral within 10 days of order dismissing Chapter 13 case held enforceable); In re Weathersfield Farms, Inc., 34 B.R. 435 (Bkrtcy.D.Vt.1983) (absent order staying dismissal of Chapter 11 case, stay terminated upon dismissal and mortgagee was restored to position it assumed at the commencement of the case); Contra In re Cooper, 16 B.R. 19 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1981) (repossession and sale of automobile within 10 days of dismissal constituted a violation of stay); But c.f."
} | 6,480,104 | a |
Consequently, unable to discern any express or implied manifestations of intent that B.R. 7062 was designed to enlarge the limited application of F.R.Civ.P. 62(a) as described above, this court must find that the ten day stay within those rules was not intended to apply to orders involving the dismissal of bankruptcy petitions without a contrary order of the court. Therefore, because no stay was imposed by Rule 7062, and because the Debtor never secured a stay pending appeal, Cibula was free to pursue his state court remedies with complete immunity immediately upon the effective date of the dismissal. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "repossession and sale of automobile within 10 days of dismissal constituted a violation of stay",
"sentence": "(See In re Lashley, 825 F.2d 362 (11th Cir.1987) (bankruptcy court could not retroactively void foreclosure sale to enable Chapter 13 debtors to pursue appeal in absence of stay pending appeal); Norton v. Hoxie State Bank, 61 B.R. 258 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan.1986) (in accord); Matter of Bluford, 40 B.R. 640 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1984) (automatic stay does not remain in effect for ten days following dismissal of Chapter 13 petition); In re Linton, 35 B.R. 695 (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 1983) (perfection of security interest in collateral within 10 days of order dismissing Chapter 13 case held enforceable); In re Weathersfield Farms, Inc., 34 B.R. 435 (Bkrtcy.D.Vt.1983) (absent order staying dismissal of Chapter 11 case, stay terminated upon dismissal and mortgagee was restored to position it assumed at the commencement of the case); Contra In re Cooper, 16 B.R. 19 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1981) (repossession and sale of automobile within 10 days of dismissal constituted a violation of stay); But c.f."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "perfection of security interest in collateral within 10 days of order dismissing Chapter 13 case held enforceable",
"sentence": "(See In re Lashley, 825 F.2d 362 (11th Cir.1987) (bankruptcy court could not retroactively void foreclosure sale to enable Chapter 13 debtors to pursue appeal in absence of stay pending appeal); Norton v. Hoxie State Bank, 61 B.R. 258 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan.1986) (in accord); Matter of Bluford, 40 B.R. 640 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1984) (automatic stay does not remain in effect for ten days following dismissal of Chapter 13 petition); In re Linton, 35 B.R. 695 (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 1983) (perfection of security interest in collateral within 10 days of order dismissing Chapter 13 case held enforceable); In re Weathersfield Farms, Inc., 34 B.R. 435 (Bkrtcy.D.Vt.1983) (absent order staying dismissal of Chapter 11 case, stay terminated upon dismissal and mortgagee was restored to position it assumed at the commencement of the case); Contra In re Cooper, 16 B.R. 19 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1981) (repossession and sale of automobile within 10 days of dismissal constituted a violation of stay); But c.f."
} | 6,480,104 | b |
Consequently, unable to discern any express or implied manifestations of intent that B.R. 7062 was designed to enlarge the limited application of F.R.Civ.P. 62(a) as described above, this court must find that the ten day stay within those rules was not intended to apply to orders involving the dismissal of bankruptcy petitions without a contrary order of the court. Therefore, because no stay was imposed by Rule 7062, and because the Debtor never secured a stay pending appeal, Cibula was free to pursue his state court remedies with complete immunity immediately upon the effective date of the dismissal. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "absent order staying dismissal of Chapter 11 case, stay terminated upon dismissal and mortgagee was restored to position it assumed at the commencement of the case",
"sentence": "(See In re Lashley, 825 F.2d 362 (11th Cir.1987) (bankruptcy court could not retroactively void foreclosure sale to enable Chapter 13 debtors to pursue appeal in absence of stay pending appeal); Norton v. Hoxie State Bank, 61 B.R. 258 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan.1986) (in accord); Matter of Bluford, 40 B.R. 640 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1984) (automatic stay does not remain in effect for ten days following dismissal of Chapter 13 petition); In re Linton, 35 B.R. 695 (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 1983) (perfection of security interest in collateral within 10 days of order dismissing Chapter 13 case held enforceable); In re Weathersfield Farms, Inc., 34 B.R. 435 (Bkrtcy.D.Vt.1983) (absent order staying dismissal of Chapter 11 case, stay terminated upon dismissal and mortgagee was restored to position it assumed at the commencement of the case); Contra In re Cooper, 16 B.R. 19 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1981) (repossession and sale of automobile within 10 days of dismissal constituted a violation of stay); But c.f."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "repossession and sale of automobile within 10 days of dismissal constituted a violation of stay",
"sentence": "(See In re Lashley, 825 F.2d 362 (11th Cir.1987) (bankruptcy court could not retroactively void foreclosure sale to enable Chapter 13 debtors to pursue appeal in absence of stay pending appeal); Norton v. Hoxie State Bank, 61 B.R. 258 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan.1986) (in accord); Matter of Bluford, 40 B.R. 640 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1984) (automatic stay does not remain in effect for ten days following dismissal of Chapter 13 petition); In re Linton, 35 B.R. 695 (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 1983) (perfection of security interest in collateral within 10 days of order dismissing Chapter 13 case held enforceable); In re Weathersfield Farms, Inc., 34 B.R. 435 (Bkrtcy.D.Vt.1983) (absent order staying dismissal of Chapter 11 case, stay terminated upon dismissal and mortgagee was restored to position it assumed at the commencement of the case); Contra In re Cooper, 16 B.R. 19 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1981) (repossession and sale of automobile within 10 days of dismissal constituted a violation of stay); But c.f."
} | 6,480,104 | a |
Pinell testified that these same events took place "some" time after 6:25 a.m. Accordingly, there is no direct conflict between the two accounts, and the evidence related to the parking lot video is sufficiently reliable to merit consideration. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 776, 815",
"parenthetical": "\"The magistrate does not weigh conflicting evidence and make factual determinations but, rather, determines only where there is competent evidence to support the belief that the accused has committed the charged offense.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Sainez, 2008 WL 366135 at *18, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9573 at *55-56 (rejecting inconsistencies and conflicts as “not sufficient to negate the showing of probable cause.”); see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 815 (9th Cir.1986) (“The magistrate does not weigh conflicting evidence and make factual determinations but, rather, determines only where there is competent evidence to support the belief that the accused has committed the charged offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2008 WL 366135, at *18",
"parenthetical": "rejecting inconsistencies and conflicts as \"not sufficient to negate the showing of probable cause.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Sainez, 2008 WL 366135 at *18, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9573 at *55-56 (rejecting inconsistencies and conflicts as “not sufficient to negate the showing of probable cause.”); see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 815 (9th Cir.1986) (“The magistrate does not weigh conflicting evidence and make factual determinations but, rather, determines only where there is competent evidence to support the belief that the accused has committed the charged offense.”)."
} | 3,751,241 | b |
Pinell testified that these same events took place "some" time after 6:25 a.m. Accordingly, there is no direct conflict between the two accounts, and the evidence related to the parking lot video is sufficiently reliable to merit consideration. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "783 F.2d 776, 815",
"parenthetical": "\"The magistrate does not weigh conflicting evidence and make factual determinations but, rather, determines only where there is competent evidence to support the belief that the accused has committed the charged offense.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Sainez, 2008 WL 366135 at *18, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9573 at *55-56 (rejecting inconsistencies and conflicts as “not sufficient to negate the showing of probable cause.”); see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 815 (9th Cir.1986) (“The magistrate does not weigh conflicting evidence and make factual determinations but, rather, determines only where there is competent evidence to support the belief that the accused has committed the charged offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9573, at *55-56",
"parenthetical": "rejecting inconsistencies and conflicts as \"not sufficient to negate the showing of probable cause.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Sainez, 2008 WL 366135 at *18, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9573 at *55-56 (rejecting inconsistencies and conflicts as “not sufficient to negate the showing of probable cause.”); see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 815 (9th Cir.1986) (“The magistrate does not weigh conflicting evidence and make factual determinations but, rather, determines only where there is competent evidence to support the belief that the accused has committed the charged offense.”)."
} | 3,751,241 | b |
The California Supreme Court has long held that state wage and hour laws "although at times patterned after federal regulations, also sometimes provide greater protection than is provided under federal law in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and accompanying federal regulations." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74",
"parenthetical": "rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40",
"parenthetical": "rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | 12,395,542 | a |
The California Supreme Court has long held that state wage and hour laws "although at times patterned after federal regulations, also sometimes provide greater protection than is provided under federal law in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and accompanying federal regulations." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74",
"parenthetical": "rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | 12,395,542 | b |
The California Supreme Court has long held that state wage and hour laws "although at times patterned after federal regulations, also sometimes provide greater protection than is provided under federal law in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and accompanying federal regulations." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40",
"parenthetical": "rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | 12,395,542 | a |
The California Supreme Court has long held that state wage and hour laws "although at times patterned after federal regulations, also sometimes provide greater protection than is provided under federal law in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and accompanying federal regulations." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | 12,395,542 | a |
The California Supreme Court has long held that state wage and hour laws "although at times patterned after federal regulations, also sometimes provide greater protection than is provided under federal law in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and accompanying federal regulations." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40",
"parenthetical": "rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | 12,395,542 | a |
The California Supreme Court has long held that state wage and hour laws "although at times patterned after federal regulations, also sometimes provide greater protection than is provided under federal law in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and accompanying federal regulations." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim",
"sentence": "Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 (1999); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 67, 68, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010) (reiterating Ramirez’s, holding “that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced”; when “the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated.”); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 592, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal.4th 557, 573-74, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296 (1996) (rejecting federal rule for calculating the overtime rate of pay in a California overtime claim); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 40, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (rejecting FLSA averaging in favor of California requirement to be paid minimum wage for all hours required to remain at work); Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323-24, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005) (FLSA minimum wage standards different' from California’s significantly; employer violated minimum wage statute even if average of paid and unpaid hours exceeded minimum wage)."
} | 12,395,542 | b |
Under these circumstances, we see no reasons to deviate from our general rule that the plain-error standard governs the review of unpreserved errors. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 73, 73",
"parenthetical": "noting that failure to review unpreserved errors under the plain-error standard creates a perverse incentive for defendants to \"simply relax and wait to see if the sentence later struck him [or her] as satisfactory\"",
"sentence": "See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 73, 122 S.Ct. 1043 (noting that failure to review unpreserved errors under the plain-error standard creates a perverse incentive for defendants to “simply relax and wait to see if the sentence later struck him [or her] as satisfactory”); see also United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir.2014) (“Because [defendant] neither objected to the judge’s involvement in plea discussions, nor made an attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, we consider his appellate argument under the rigorous plain error standard.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "774 F.3d 812, 815",
"parenthetical": "\"Because [defendant] neither objected to the judge's involvement in plea discussions, nor made an attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, we consider his appellate argument under the rigorous plain error standard.\"",
"sentence": "See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 73, 122 S.Ct. 1043 (noting that failure to review unpreserved errors under the plain-error standard creates a perverse incentive for defendants to “simply relax and wait to see if the sentence later struck him [or her] as satisfactory”); see also United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir.2014) (“Because [defendant] neither objected to the judge’s involvement in plea discussions, nor made an attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, we consider his appellate argument under the rigorous plain error standard.”)."
} | 4,356,312 | a |
Under these circumstances, we see no reasons to deviate from our general rule that the plain-error standard governs the review of unpreserved errors. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that failure to review unpreserved errors under the plain-error standard creates a perverse incentive for defendants to \"simply relax and wait to see if the sentence later struck him [or her] as satisfactory\"",
"sentence": "See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 73, 122 S.Ct. 1043 (noting that failure to review unpreserved errors under the plain-error standard creates a perverse incentive for defendants to “simply relax and wait to see if the sentence later struck him [or her] as satisfactory”); see also United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir.2014) (“Because [defendant] neither objected to the judge’s involvement in plea discussions, nor made an attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, we consider his appellate argument under the rigorous plain error standard.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "774 F.3d 812, 815",
"parenthetical": "\"Because [defendant] neither objected to the judge's involvement in plea discussions, nor made an attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, we consider his appellate argument under the rigorous plain error standard.\"",
"sentence": "See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 73, 122 S.Ct. 1043 (noting that failure to review unpreserved errors under the plain-error standard creates a perverse incentive for defendants to “simply relax and wait to see if the sentence later struck him [or her] as satisfactory”); see also United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir.2014) (“Because [defendant] neither objected to the judge’s involvement in plea discussions, nor made an attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, we consider his appellate argument under the rigorous plain error standard.”)."
} | 4,356,312 | a |
At the same time, the VRPA is as targeted as it is comprehensive, protecting consumer data while "allowing the information's ... disclosure in only a few narrow and well-justified circumstances." Additionally, there is no evidence that the Michigan legislature enacted the VRPA because it disagreed with the message of those who use consumer identifying information. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Vermont may be displeased that [marketers] ... are effective in promoting brand-name drugs -- But [it cannot] burden the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction,\"",
"sentence": "See id, at 578-79, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (“Vermont may be displeased that [marketers] ... are effective in promoting brand-name drugs — But [it cannot] burden the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction,”); see also King, 903 F.Supp.2d at 309 (“[T]he Somll decision largely rested on the fact that Vermont was restraining a certain form of speech communicated by a certain speaker solely because of the State’s disagreement with it.”). ■"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "903 F.Supp.2d 309, 309",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Somll decision largely rested on the fact that Vermont was restraining a certain form of speech communicated by a certain speaker solely because of the State's disagreement with it.\"",
"sentence": "See id, at 578-79, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (“Vermont may be displeased that [marketers] ... are effective in promoting brand-name drugs — But [it cannot] burden the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction,”); see also King, 903 F.Supp.2d at 309 (“[T]he Somll decision largely rested on the fact that Vermont was restraining a certain form of speech communicated by a certain speaker solely because of the State’s disagreement with it.”). ■"
} | 12,126,719 | a |
Our decisions concerning criminal laws infected with discrimination are illustrative. The Court must entertain the objection -- and reverse the conviction -- even if the right to equal treatment resides in someone other than the defendant. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "429 U. S. 190, 192, 210",
"parenthetical": "law penalizing sale of beer to males but not females aged 18 to 20 could not be enforced against vendor",
"sentence": "See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 452-455 (1972) (reversing conviction for distributing contraceptives because the law banning distribution violated the recipient’s right to equal protection); cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 192, 210, and n. 24 (1976) (law penalizing sale of beer to males but not females aged 18 to 20 could not be enforced against vendor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "405 U. S. 438, 452-455",
"parenthetical": "reversing conviction for distributing contraceptives because the law banning distribution violated the recipient's right to equal protection",
"sentence": "See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 452-455 (1972) (reversing conviction for distributing contraceptives because the law banning distribution violated the recipient’s right to equal protection); cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 192, 210, and n. 24 (1976) (law penalizing sale of beer to males but not females aged 18 to 20 could not be enforced against vendor)."
} | 5,924,754 | b |
Admittedly whether the firearm at issue was "recently stolen" is a close call given the fifteen-month period between the theft of the firearm and its recovery. We note that courts have found lengthy lapses of time (ialbeit shorter than the one presented here) to be within the permissible time limitation of the presumption. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "77 F.2d 977, 982",
"parenthetical": "possession of pistols 293 days after theft, \"cannot in any sense be considered so recent a possession as to sustain a finding of guilty knowledge that the property was stolen.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. Lee v. United States, 363 F.2d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1966) (lapse of five months from time of burglary to apprehension with stolen securities sufficiently recent to justify inference of guilt); Hale v. United States, 410 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1969) (six-month period from time of automobile theft to vehicle’s recovery sufficient to infer guilty knowledge); But see Gargotta v. United States, 77 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1935) (possession of pistols 293 days after theft, “cannot in any sense be considered so recent a possession as to sustain a finding of guilty knowledge that the property was stolen.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 F.2d 469, 475",
"parenthetical": "lapse of five months from time of burglary to apprehension with stolen securities sufficiently recent to justify inference of guilt",
"sentence": "See e.g. Lee v. United States, 363 F.2d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1966) (lapse of five months from time of burglary to apprehension with stolen securities sufficiently recent to justify inference of guilt); Hale v. United States, 410 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1969) (six-month period from time of automobile theft to vehicle’s recovery sufficient to infer guilty knowledge); But see Gargotta v. United States, 77 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1935) (possession of pistols 293 days after theft, “cannot in any sense be considered so recent a possession as to sustain a finding of guilty knowledge that the property was stolen.”)."
} | 12,386,882 | b |
Admittedly whether the firearm at issue was "recently stolen" is a close call given the fifteen-month period between the theft of the firearm and its recovery. We note that courts have found lengthy lapses of time (ialbeit shorter than the one presented here) to be within the permissible time limitation of the presumption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "410 F.2d 147, 151",
"parenthetical": "six-month period from time of automobile theft to vehicle's recovery sufficient to infer guilty knowledge",
"sentence": "See e.g. Lee v. United States, 363 F.2d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1966) (lapse of five months from time of burglary to apprehension with stolen securities sufficiently recent to justify inference of guilt); Hale v. United States, 410 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1969) (six-month period from time of automobile theft to vehicle’s recovery sufficient to infer guilty knowledge); But see Gargotta v. United States, 77 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1935) (possession of pistols 293 days after theft, “cannot in any sense be considered so recent a possession as to sustain a finding of guilty knowledge that the property was stolen.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "77 F.2d 977, 982",
"parenthetical": "possession of pistols 293 days after theft, \"cannot in any sense be considered so recent a possession as to sustain a finding of guilty knowledge that the property was stolen.\"",
"sentence": "See e.g. Lee v. United States, 363 F.2d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1966) (lapse of five months from time of burglary to apprehension with stolen securities sufficiently recent to justify inference of guilt); Hale v. United States, 410 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1969) (six-month period from time of automobile theft to vehicle’s recovery sufficient to infer guilty knowledge); But see Gargotta v. United States, 77 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1935) (possession of pistols 293 days after theft, “cannot in any sense be considered so recent a possession as to sustain a finding of guilty knowledge that the property was stolen.”)."
} | 12,386,882 | a |
Courts have held that a fact finder is rational in deciding that the starvation of a child can constitute an act of commission and omission. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the \"prolonged and purposeful\" starvation of child as a \"deliberate act,\" and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of \"acts which result in injury or death but do not require force\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | 6,886,460 | a |
Courts have held that a fact finder is rational in deciding that the starvation of a child can constitute an act of commission and omission. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing parents' conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as \"acts of commission and omission\" that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants' convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the \"prolonged and purposeful\" starvation of child as a \"deliberate act,\" and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | 6,886,460 | b |
Courts have held that a fact finder is rational in deciding that the starvation of a child can constitute an act of commission and omission. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the \"prolonged and purposeful\" starvation of child as a \"deliberate act,\" and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 A.2d 988, 1004",
"parenthetical": "describing parents' conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as \"acts of commission and omission\" that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants' convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | 6,886,460 | a |
Courts have held that a fact finder is rational in deciding that the starvation of a child can constitute an act of commission and omission. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of \"acts which result in injury or death but do not require force\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the \"prolonged and purposeful\" starvation of child as a \"deliberate act,\" and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | 6,886,460 | b |
Courts have held that a fact finder is rational in deciding that the starvation of a child can constitute an act of commission and omission. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing parents' conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as \"acts of commission and omission\" that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants' convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the \"prolonged and purposeful\" starvation of child as a \"deliberate act,\" and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | 6,886,460 | b |
Courts have held that a fact finder is rational in deciding that the starvation of a child can constitute an act of commission and omission. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 A.2d 988, 1004",
"parenthetical": "describing parents' conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as \"acts of commission and omission\" that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants' convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing the \"prolonged and purposeful\" starvation of child as a \"deliberate act,\" and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | 6,886,460 | b |
Courts have held that a fact finder is rational in deciding that the starvation of a child can constitute an act of commission and omission. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 P.3d 474, 524-25",
"parenthetical": "describing the \"prolonged and purposeful\" starvation of child as a \"deliberate act,\" and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of \"acts which result in injury or death but do not require force\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | 6,886,460 | a |
Courts have held that a fact finder is rational in deciding that the starvation of a child can constitute an act of commission and omission. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 P.3d 474, 524-25",
"parenthetical": "describing the \"prolonged and purposeful\" starvation of child as a \"deliberate act,\" and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing parents' conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as \"acts of commission and omission\" that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants' convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | 6,886,460 | a |
Courts have held that a fact finder is rational in deciding that the starvation of a child can constitute an act of commission and omission. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "616 A.2d 988, 1004",
"parenthetical": "describing parents' conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as \"acts of commission and omission\" that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants' convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 P.3d 474, 524-25",
"parenthetical": "describing the \"prolonged and purposeful\" starvation of child as a \"deliberate act,\" and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture",
"sentence": "See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474, 524-25 (2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 611, 621 n. 17 (Okla.Crim.App.1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”); Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1004 (1992) (describing parents’ conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis)."
} | 6,886,460 | b |
Moreover, to maintain a claim for abuse of process the plaintiff must allege that he was unlawfully arrested or his property unlawfully seized. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "346 Md. 45, 45-46",
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.\"",
"sentence": "Herring, 21 Md.App. at 536, 321 A.2d 182 (“[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it) are limited to an improper arrest of the person or an improper seizure of property.”); see also One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45-46, 694 A.2d 952 (“The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.”). Unfortunately, appellant has failed to allege either impropriety."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "21 Md.App. 536, 536",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it",
"sentence": "Herring, 21 Md.App. at 536, 321 A.2d 182 (“[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it) are limited to an improper arrest of the person or an improper seizure of property.”); see also One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45-46, 694 A.2d 952 (“The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.”). Unfortunately, appellant has failed to allege either impropriety."
} | 1,306,976 | b |
Moreover, to maintain a claim for abuse of process the plaintiff must allege that he was unlawfully arrested or his property unlawfully seized. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "21 Md.App. 536, 536",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it",
"sentence": "Herring, 21 Md.App. at 536, 321 A.2d 182 (“[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it) are limited to an improper arrest of the person or an improper seizure of property.”); see also One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45-46, 694 A.2d 952 (“The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.”). Unfortunately, appellant has failed to allege either impropriety."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.\"",
"sentence": "Herring, 21 Md.App. at 536, 321 A.2d 182 (“[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it) are limited to an improper arrest of the person or an improper seizure of property.”); see also One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45-46, 694 A.2d 952 (“The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.”). Unfortunately, appellant has failed to allege either impropriety."
} | 1,306,976 | a |
Moreover, to maintain a claim for abuse of process the plaintiff must allege that he was unlawfully arrested or his property unlawfully seized. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "346 Md. 45, 45-46",
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.\"",
"sentence": "Herring, 21 Md.App. at 536, 321 A.2d 182 (“[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it) are limited to an improper arrest of the person or an improper seizure of property.”); see also One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45-46, 694 A.2d 952 (“The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.”). Unfortunately, appellant has failed to allege either impropriety."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it",
"sentence": "Herring, 21 Md.App. at 536, 321 A.2d 182 (“[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it) are limited to an improper arrest of the person or an improper seizure of property.”); see also One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45-46, 694 A.2d 952 (“The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.”). Unfortunately, appellant has failed to allege either impropriety."
} | 1,306,976 | b |
Moreover, to maintain a claim for abuse of process the plaintiff must allege that he was unlawfully arrested or his property unlawfully seized. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it",
"sentence": "Herring, 21 Md.App. at 536, 321 A.2d 182 (“[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it) are limited to an improper arrest of the person or an improper seizure of property.”); see also One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45-46, 694 A.2d 952 (“The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.”). Unfortunately, appellant has failed to allege either impropriety."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.\"",
"sentence": "Herring, 21 Md.App. at 536, 321 A.2d 182 (“[T]he injuries contemplated by this particular tort (and an indispensable element of it) are limited to an improper arrest of the person or an improper seizure of property.”); see also One Thousand Fleet, 346 Md. at 45-46, 694 A.2d 952 (“The plaintiff [must] establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.”). Unfortunately, appellant has failed to allege either impropriety."
} | 1,306,976 | a |
I disagree. I would hold that the district court acted within its discretion in striking Pickle's claim on a basis that is unquestionably recognized by our precedent, numerous rulings from other courts, the language of Rule G, and the Advisory Committee Note. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "672 F.3d 642, 642",
"parenthetical": "\"The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a",
"sentence": "See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 642 (“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property and to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing!.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also $154,853.00, 744 F.3d at 563 (observing that the purpose of Rule G(6)(a) “is to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing”) (citing $133,420) (in ternal quotation marks omitted); United States v. $25,982.28 in U.S. Currency, No. 5:14 CV 150, 2015 WL 410590, at *2 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 29, 2015) (“While it is claimant’s burden to establish standing, Rule G(6) entitles the government to serve special interrogatories to determine whether the claimant has a sufficient interest in the seized property to contest the forfeiture, that is, whether the claimant has standing....”) (citations and footnote reference omitted); United States v. Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck, 680 F.Supp.2d 816, 822 (E.D.Mich.2010) (noting that “[statutory standing is established through strict compliance with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S. Currency, 947 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (D.Md.2013) (“To facilitate the Government’s ability to challenge claims on standing grounds, Rule G(6) permits the Government to serve the Claimant with special interrogatories that focus on the Claimant’s identity and her interest in the defendant property."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "744 F.3d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "observing that the purpose of Rule G(6)(a) \"is to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather information that bears on the claimant's standing\"",
"sentence": "See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 642 (“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property and to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing!.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also $154,853.00, 744 F.3d at 563 (observing that the purpose of Rule G(6)(a) “is to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing”) (citing $133,420) (in ternal quotation marks omitted); United States v. $25,982.28 in U.S. Currency, No. 5:14 CV 150, 2015 WL 410590, at *2 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 29, 2015) (“While it is claimant’s burden to establish standing, Rule G(6) entitles the government to serve special interrogatories to determine whether the claimant has a sufficient interest in the seized property to contest the forfeiture, that is, whether the claimant has standing....”) (citations and footnote reference omitted); United States v. Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck, 680 F.Supp.2d 816, 822 (E.D.Mich.2010) (noting that “[statutory standing is established through strict compliance with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S. Currency, 947 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (D.Md.2013) (“To facilitate the Government’s ability to challenge claims on standing grounds, Rule G(6) permits the Government to serve the Claimant with special interrogatories that focus on the Claimant’s identity and her interest in the defendant property."
} | 4,229,384 | a |
I disagree. I would hold that the district court acted within its discretion in striking Pickle's claim on a basis that is unquestionably recognized by our precedent, numerous rulings from other courts, the language of Rule G, and the Advisory Committee Note. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "672 F.3d 642, 642",
"parenthetical": "\"The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a",
"sentence": "See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 642 (“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property and to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing!.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also $154,853.00, 744 F.3d at 563 (observing that the purpose of Rule G(6)(a) “is to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing”) (citing $133,420) (in ternal quotation marks omitted); United States v. $25,982.28 in U.S. Currency, No. 5:14 CV 150, 2015 WL 410590, at *2 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 29, 2015) (“While it is claimant’s burden to establish standing, Rule G(6) entitles the government to serve special interrogatories to determine whether the claimant has a sufficient interest in the seized property to contest the forfeiture, that is, whether the claimant has standing....”) (citations and footnote reference omitted); United States v. Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck, 680 F.Supp.2d 816, 822 (E.D.Mich.2010) (noting that “[statutory standing is established through strict compliance with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S. Currency, 947 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (D.Md.2013) (“To facilitate the Government’s ability to challenge claims on standing grounds, Rule G(6) permits the Government to serve the Claimant with special interrogatories that focus on the Claimant’s identity and her interest in the defendant property."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2015 WL 410590, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"While it is claimant's burden to establish standing, Rule G(6",
"sentence": "See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 642 (“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property and to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing!.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also $154,853.00, 744 F.3d at 563 (observing that the purpose of Rule G(6)(a) “is to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing”) (citing $133,420) (in ternal quotation marks omitted); United States v. $25,982.28 in U.S. Currency, No. 5:14 CV 150, 2015 WL 410590, at *2 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 29, 2015) (“While it is claimant’s burden to establish standing, Rule G(6) entitles the government to serve special interrogatories to determine whether the claimant has a sufficient interest in the seized property to contest the forfeiture, that is, whether the claimant has standing....”) (citations and footnote reference omitted); United States v. Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck, 680 F.Supp.2d 816, 822 (E.D.Mich.2010) (noting that “[statutory standing is established through strict compliance with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S. Currency, 947 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (D.Md.2013) (“To facilitate the Government’s ability to challenge claims on standing grounds, Rule G(6) permits the Government to serve the Claimant with special interrogatories that focus on the Claimant’s identity and her interest in the defendant property."
} | 4,229,384 | a |
I disagree. I would hold that the district court acted within its discretion in striking Pickle's claim on a basis that is unquestionably recognized by our precedent, numerous rulings from other courts, the language of Rule G, and the Advisory Committee Note. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "680 F.Supp.2d 816, 822",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[statutory standing is established through strict compliance with Supplemental Rules G(5",
"sentence": "See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 642 (“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property and to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing!.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also $154,853.00, 744 F.3d at 563 (observing that the purpose of Rule G(6)(a) “is to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing”) (citing $133,420) (in ternal quotation marks omitted); United States v. $25,982.28 in U.S. Currency, No. 5:14 CV 150, 2015 WL 410590, at *2 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 29, 2015) (“While it is claimant’s burden to establish standing, Rule G(6) entitles the government to serve special interrogatories to determine whether the claimant has a sufficient interest in the seized property to contest the forfeiture, that is, whether the claimant has standing....”) (citations and footnote reference omitted); United States v. Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck, 680 F.Supp.2d 816, 822 (E.D.Mich.2010) (noting that “[statutory standing is established through strict compliance with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S. Currency, 947 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (D.Md.2013) (“To facilitate the Government’s ability to challenge claims on standing grounds, Rule G(6) permits the Government to serve the Claimant with special interrogatories that focus on the Claimant’s identity and her interest in the defendant property."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "672 F.3d 642, 642",
"parenthetical": "\"The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a",
"sentence": "See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 642 (“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property and to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing!.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also $154,853.00, 744 F.3d at 563 (observing that the purpose of Rule G(6)(a) “is to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing”) (citing $133,420) (in ternal quotation marks omitted); United States v. $25,982.28 in U.S. Currency, No. 5:14 CV 150, 2015 WL 410590, at *2 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 29, 2015) (“While it is claimant’s burden to establish standing, Rule G(6) entitles the government to serve special interrogatories to determine whether the claimant has a sufficient interest in the seized property to contest the forfeiture, that is, whether the claimant has standing....”) (citations and footnote reference omitted); United States v. Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck, 680 F.Supp.2d 816, 822 (E.D.Mich.2010) (noting that “[statutory standing is established through strict compliance with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S. Currency, 947 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (D.Md.2013) (“To facilitate the Government’s ability to challenge claims on standing grounds, Rule G(6) permits the Government to serve the Claimant with special interrogatories that focus on the Claimant’s identity and her interest in the defendant property."
} | 4,229,384 | b |
I disagree. I would hold that the district court acted within its discretion in striking Pickle's claim on a basis that is unquestionably recognized by our precedent, numerous rulings from other courts, the language of Rule G, and the Advisory Committee Note. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "947 F.Supp.2d 560, 565",
"parenthetical": "\"To facilitate the Government's ability to challenge claims on standing grounds, Rule G(6",
"sentence": "See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 642 (“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property and to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing!.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also $154,853.00, 744 F.3d at 563 (observing that the purpose of Rule G(6)(a) “is to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing”) (citing $133,420) (in ternal quotation marks omitted); United States v. $25,982.28 in U.S. Currency, No. 5:14 CV 150, 2015 WL 410590, at *2 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 29, 2015) (“While it is claimant’s burden to establish standing, Rule G(6) entitles the government to serve special interrogatories to determine whether the claimant has a sufficient interest in the seized property to contest the forfeiture, that is, whether the claimant has standing....”) (citations and footnote reference omitted); United States v. Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck, 680 F.Supp.2d 816, 822 (E.D.Mich.2010) (noting that “[statutory standing is established through strict compliance with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S. Currency, 947 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (D.Md.2013) (“To facilitate the Government’s ability to challenge claims on standing grounds, Rule G(6) permits the Government to serve the Claimant with special interrogatories that focus on the Claimant’s identity and her interest in the defendant property."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "672 F.3d 642, 642",
"parenthetical": "\"The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a",
"sentence": "See $133,420.00, 672 F.3d at 642 (“The issue of standing is subject to adversarial testing under Supplemental Rule G(6)(a), which gives the government the right to question the claimant regarding the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant property and to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing!.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also $154,853.00, 744 F.3d at 563 (observing that the purpose of Rule G(6)(a) “is to permit the government to file limited interrogatories at any time after the claim is filed to gather information that bears on the claimant’s standing”) (citing $133,420) (in ternal quotation marks omitted); United States v. $25,982.28 in U.S. Currency, No. 5:14 CV 150, 2015 WL 410590, at *2 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 29, 2015) (“While it is claimant’s burden to establish standing, Rule G(6) entitles the government to serve special interrogatories to determine whether the claimant has a sufficient interest in the seized property to contest the forfeiture, that is, whether the claimant has standing....”) (citations and footnote reference omitted); United States v. Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck, 680 F.Supp.2d 816, 822 (E.D.Mich.2010) (noting that “[statutory standing is established through strict compliance with Supplemental Rules G(5) and G(6)”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. $104,250.00 in U.S. Currency, 947 F.Supp.2d 560, 565 (D.Md.2013) (“To facilitate the Government’s ability to challenge claims on standing grounds, Rule G(6) permits the Government to serve the Claimant with special interrogatories that focus on the Claimant’s identity and her interest in the defendant property."
} | 4,229,384 | b |
Instead, the provision merely provides the BIA the discretion to reopen immigration proceedings as it sees fit. Federal circuit courts consistently have interpreted the provision in this way. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying petition to reopen but noting that the BIA could have reopened the deportation proceeding under 8 C.F.R. SS 3.2(a",
"sentence": "See Mejia Rodriguez, 178 F.3d at 1145 n.5 (denying petition to reopen but noting that the BIA could have reopened the deportation proceeding under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a)); Karapetian v. INS, 162 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir.1998) (same); see also Wright, 171 F.3d at 9 (describing 3.2(a) as a discretionary provision under which the BIA at its own initiative can reopen proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "171 F.3d 9, 9",
"parenthetical": "describing 3.2(a) as a discretionary provision under which the BIA at its own initiative can reopen proceedings",
"sentence": "See Mejia Rodriguez, 178 F.3d at 1145 n.5 (denying petition to reopen but noting that the BIA could have reopened the deportation proceeding under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a)); Karapetian v. INS, 162 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir.1998) (same); see also Wright, 171 F.3d at 9 (describing 3.2(a) as a discretionary provision under which the BIA at its own initiative can reopen proceedings)."
} | 11,579,257 | a |
Persons within state police custody enjoy the protections afforded by the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, which include the right to obtain adequate medical care. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "849 F.2d 863, 866",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause",
"sentence": "Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir.1988) (explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir.1990) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of Con victed prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.”); Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir.1989) (“A violation of the Eighth Amendment standard ... may be used, however, to determine a due process violation.”) (citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n. 4 (4th Cir.1984))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "463 U.S. 239, 244",
"parenthetical": "holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment",
"sentence": "Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir.1988) (explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir.1990) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of Con victed prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.”); Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir.1989) (“A violation of the Eighth Amendment standard ... may be used, however, to determine a due process violation.”) (citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n. 4 (4th Cir.1984))."
} | 3,863,956 | a |
Persons within state police custody enjoy the protections afforded by the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, which include the right to obtain adequate medical care. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment",
"sentence": "Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir.1988) (explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir.1990) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of Con victed prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.”); Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir.1989) (“A violation of the Eighth Amendment standard ... may be used, however, to determine a due process violation.”) (citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n. 4 (4th Cir.1984))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "849 F.2d 863, 866",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause",
"sentence": "Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir.1988) (explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir.1990) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of Con victed prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.”); Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir.1989) (“A violation of the Eighth Amendment standard ... may be used, however, to determine a due process violation.”) (citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n. 4 (4th Cir.1984))."
} | 3,863,956 | b |
Persons within state police custody enjoy the protections afforded by the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, which include the right to obtain adequate medical care. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment",
"sentence": "Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir.1988) (explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir.1990) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of Con victed prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.”); Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir.1989) (“A violation of the Eighth Amendment standard ... may be used, however, to determine a due process violation.”) (citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n. 4 (4th Cir.1984))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "849 F.2d 863, 866",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause",
"sentence": "Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir.1988) (explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir.1990) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of Con victed prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.”); Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir.1989) (“A violation of the Eighth Amendment standard ... may be used, however, to determine a due process violation.”) (citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n. 4 (4th Cir.1984))."
} | 3,863,956 | b |
Persons within state police custody enjoy the protections afforded by the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, which include the right to obtain adequate medical care. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "898 F.2d 32, 34",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of Con victed prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.\"",
"sentence": "Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir.1988) (explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir.1990) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of Con victed prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.”); Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir.1989) (“A violation of the Eighth Amendment standard ... may be used, however, to determine a due process violation.”) (citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n. 4 (4th Cir.1984))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "849 F.2d 863, 866",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause",
"sentence": "Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir.1988) (explaining that the denial of medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial detainees have under the Eighth Amendment); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir.1990) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of Con victed prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee.”); Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir.1989) (“A violation of the Eighth Amendment standard ... may be used, however, to determine a due process violation.”) (citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n. 4 (4th Cir.1984))."
} | 3,863,956 | b |
Contrary to Madueno-Gonzalez's contention, the IJ did not violate his due process rights by admitting the 1-213 record of deportable/inadmissible alien, which documented his attempt to enter the United States by misrepresenting his identity and immigration status and which was supported by the preparing officer's testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 F.2d 1274, 1278",
"parenthetical": "no due process violation because \"the bare assertion that a statement is involuntary is insufficient\" to prove coercion",
"sentence": "See Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir.1979) (no due process violation because “the bare assertion that a statement is involuntary is insufficient” to prove coercion); see also Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir.1995) (“The burden of establishing a basis for exclusion of evidence from a government record falls on the opponent of the evidence, who must come forward with enough negative factors to persuade the court not to admit it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 308, 310",
"parenthetical": "\"The burden of establishing a basis for exclusion of evidence from a government record falls on the opponent of the evidence, who must come forward with enough negative factors to persuade the court not to admit it.\"",
"sentence": "See Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir.1979) (no due process violation because “the bare assertion that a statement is involuntary is insufficient” to prove coercion); see also Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir.1995) (“The burden of establishing a basis for exclusion of evidence from a government record falls on the opponent of the evidence, who must come forward with enough negative factors to persuade the court not to admit it.”)."
} | 3,581,597 | a |
Based on the foregoing, and "under the facts interpreted most favorably to plaintiffs], it was not reasonable for [Atchison] to adversely treat [plaintiffs] because [they were women]." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "365 F.3d 130, 130",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity where it was possible that a jury could find that the individual defendants discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of SS 1983",
"sentence": "Kantha v. Blue, 262 F.Supp.2d 90, 109 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (denying qualified immunity on plaintiffs § 1983 disparate treatment claim); see also Back, 365 F.3d at 130 (denying qualified immunity where it was possible that a jury could find that the individual defendants discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of § 1983); Dawson, 351 F.Supp.2d at 198 (denying qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs § 1983 claim where the individual defendant was “the cause” of the alleged sex discrimination and “under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his acts were unlawful”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "262 F.Supp.2d 90, 109",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity on plaintiffs SS 1983 disparate treatment claim",
"sentence": "Kantha v. Blue, 262 F.Supp.2d 90, 109 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (denying qualified immunity on plaintiffs § 1983 disparate treatment claim); see also Back, 365 F.3d at 130 (denying qualified immunity where it was possible that a jury could find that the individual defendants discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of § 1983); Dawson, 351 F.Supp.2d at 198 (denying qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs § 1983 claim where the individual defendant was “the cause” of the alleged sex discrimination and “under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his acts were unlawful”)."
} | 4,222,206 | b |
Based on the foregoing, and "under the facts interpreted most favorably to plaintiffs], it was not reasonable for [Atchison] to adversely treat [plaintiffs] because [they were women]." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "351 F.Supp.2d 198, 198",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs SS 1983 claim where the individual defendant was \"the cause\" of the alleged sex discrimination and \"under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his acts were unlawful\"",
"sentence": "Kantha v. Blue, 262 F.Supp.2d 90, 109 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (denying qualified immunity on plaintiffs § 1983 disparate treatment claim); see also Back, 365 F.3d at 130 (denying qualified immunity where it was possible that a jury could find that the individual defendants discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of § 1983); Dawson, 351 F.Supp.2d at 198 (denying qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs § 1983 claim where the individual defendant was “the cause” of the alleged sex discrimination and “under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his acts were unlawful”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "262 F.Supp.2d 90, 109",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity on plaintiffs SS 1983 disparate treatment claim",
"sentence": "Kantha v. Blue, 262 F.Supp.2d 90, 109 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (denying qualified immunity on plaintiffs § 1983 disparate treatment claim); see also Back, 365 F.3d at 130 (denying qualified immunity where it was possible that a jury could find that the individual defendants discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of sex in violation of § 1983); Dawson, 351 F.Supp.2d at 198 (denying qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs § 1983 claim where the individual defendant was “the cause” of the alleged sex discrimination and “under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his acts were unlawful”)."
} | 4,222,206 | b |
. Under the federal standards for qualified immunity, a prosecutor would be "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 800, 818",
"parenthetical": "recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and suits under United States Constitution",
"sentence": "Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and suits under United States Constitution); see Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 427 n. 3 (Tex.2004) (noting similarity of qualified immunity and official immunity); cf. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1994) (Under Texas common law, official immunity provides government officials \"immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as they are (3) acting within the scope of their authority.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "883 S.W.2d 650, 653",
"parenthetical": "Under Texas common law, official immunity provides government officials \"immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1",
"sentence": "Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and suits under United States Constitution); see Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 427 n. 3 (Tex.2004) (noting similarity of qualified immunity and official immunity); cf. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1994) (Under Texas common law, official immunity provides government officials \"immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as they are (3) acting within the scope of their authority.”)."
} | 7,264,185 | a |
. Under the federal standards for qualified immunity, a prosecutor would be "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "883 S.W.2d 650, 653",
"parenthetical": "Under Texas common law, official immunity provides government officials \"immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1",
"sentence": "Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and suits under United States Constitution); see Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 427 n. 3 (Tex.2004) (noting similarity of qualified immunity and official immunity); cf. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1994) (Under Texas common law, official immunity provides government officials \"immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as they are (3) acting within the scope of their authority.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and suits under United States Constitution",
"sentence": "Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and suits under United States Constitution); see Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 427 n. 3 (Tex.2004) (noting similarity of qualified immunity and official immunity); cf. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1994) (Under Texas common law, official immunity provides government officials \"immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as they are (3) acting within the scope of their authority.”)."
} | 7,264,185 | b |
. Under the federal standards for qualified immunity, a prosecutor would be "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "883 S.W.2d 650, 653",
"parenthetical": "Under Texas common law, official immunity provides government officials \"immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1",
"sentence": "Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and suits under United States Constitution); see Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 427 n. 3 (Tex.2004) (noting similarity of qualified immunity and official immunity); cf. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1994) (Under Texas common law, official immunity provides government officials \"immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as they are (3) acting within the scope of their authority.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and suits under United States Constitution",
"sentence": "Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and suits under United States Constitution); see Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 427 n. 3 (Tex.2004) (noting similarity of qualified immunity and official immunity); cf. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1994) (Under Texas common law, official immunity provides government officials \"immunity from suit arising from the performance of their (1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as they are (3) acting within the scope of their authority.”)."
} | 7,264,185 | b |
Although dismissal is the presumptive sanction contemplated by CIPA when a defendant is prevented from disclosing classified information found to be material and favorable, 18 U.S.C.App. 3 SS 6(e)(2), in the interest of justice, a district court may exercise its discretion to fashion and impose less draconian sanctions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 671, 671-72",
"parenthetical": "finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 65, 65",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Government's refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | 9,092,608 | b |
Although dismissal is the presumptive sanction contemplated by CIPA when a defendant is prevented from disclosing classified information found to be material and favorable, 18 U.S.C.App. 3 SS 6(e)(2), in the interest of justice, a district court may exercise its discretion to fashion and impose less draconian sanctions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 65, 65",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Government's refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | 9,092,608 | b |
Although dismissal is the presumptive sanction contemplated by CIPA when a defendant is prevented from disclosing classified information found to be material and favorable, 18 U.S.C.App. 3 SS 6(e)(2), in the interest of justice, a district court may exercise its discretion to fashion and impose less draconian sanctions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 671, 671-72",
"parenthetical": "finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Government's refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | 9,092,608 | b |
Although dismissal is the presumptive sanction contemplated by CIPA when a defendant is prevented from disclosing classified information found to be material and favorable, 18 U.S.C.App. 3 SS 6(e)(2), in the interest of justice, a district court may exercise its discretion to fashion and impose less draconian sanctions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Government's refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | 9,092,608 | b |
Although dismissal is the presumptive sanction contemplated by CIPA when a defendant is prevented from disclosing classified information found to be material and favorable, 18 U.S.C.App. 3 SS 6(e)(2), in the interest of justice, a district court may exercise its discretion to fashion and impose less draconian sanctions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 671, 671-72",
"parenthetical": "finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "126 F.3d 317, 317",
"parenthetical": "finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government's failure to comply with the district court's discovery order regarding the defendant's selective prosecution claim",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | 9,092,608 | b |
Although dismissal is the presumptive sanction contemplated by CIPA when a defendant is prevented from disclosing classified information found to be material and favorable, 18 U.S.C.App. 3 SS 6(e)(2), in the interest of justice, a district court may exercise its discretion to fashion and impose less draconian sanctions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "126 F.3d 317, 317",
"parenthetical": "finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government's failure to comply with the district court's discovery order regarding the defendant's selective prosecution claim",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant",
"sentence": "See 18 U.S.C.App. 36(e)(2); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 163; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 65, 77 S.Ct. 623 (noting that the Government’s refusal to provide the defense with the name and address of an informant who could have offered trial testimony that would have been helpful to the defense should have been punished by dismissal of the relevant count in the indictment); Hastings, 126 F.3d at 317 (finding that dismissal of the indictment was too severe a sanction for the Government’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order regarding the defendant’s selective prosecution claim); United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir.1996); cf. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (finding that a criminal case must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce to the defense information the trial court has found to be relevant)."
} | 9,092,608 | a |
The cashing of the checks resulted, therefore, in satisfaction of the accord. Because there was an accord and satisfaction, appellant is precluded from suing either on the original claim or on the accord. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upon cashing defendant's check, plaintiff who failed to perform condition of settlement agreement estopped from asserting original claim",
"sentence": "Cf. McGehee v. Mata, 330 So.2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (upon cashing defendant’s check, plaintiff who failed to perform condition of settlement agreement estopped from asserting original claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "circumstances and conditions under which appellant received and cashed check established compromise in settlement",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Yelen v. Cindy’s Inc., 386 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), pet. for rev. dismissed, 394 So.2d 1154 (Fla.1980) (circumstances and conditions under which appellant received and cashed check established compromise in settlement); Hannah v. James A. Ryder, Corp., supra at 510 (noting common law rule with respect to cashing check purporting to full payment); Pino v. Lopez, 361 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. dismissed, 365 So.2d 714 (Fla.1978) (check cashed in full and final payment for all goods, services and claims was accord and satisfaction)."
} | 9,589,278 | b |
The cashing of the checks resulted, therefore, in satisfaction of the accord. Because there was an accord and satisfaction, appellant is precluded from suing either on the original claim or on the accord. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upon cashing defendant's check, plaintiff who failed to perform condition of settlement agreement estopped from asserting original claim",
"sentence": "Cf. McGehee v. Mata, 330 So.2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (upon cashing defendant’s check, plaintiff who failed to perform condition of settlement agreement estopped from asserting original claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "circumstances and conditions under which appellant received and cashed check established compromise in settlement",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Yelen v. Cindy’s Inc., 386 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), pet. for rev. dismissed, 394 So.2d 1154 (Fla.1980) (circumstances and conditions under which appellant received and cashed check established compromise in settlement); Hannah v. James A. Ryder, Corp., supra at 510 (noting common law rule with respect to cashing check purporting to full payment); Pino v. Lopez, 361 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. dismissed, 365 So.2d 714 (Fla.1978) (check cashed in full and final payment for all goods, services and claims was accord and satisfaction)."
} | 9,589,278 | b |
The cashing of the checks resulted, therefore, in satisfaction of the accord. Because there was an accord and satisfaction, appellant is precluded from suing either on the original claim or on the accord. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upon cashing defendant's check, plaintiff who failed to perform condition of settlement agreement estopped from asserting original claim",
"sentence": "Cf. McGehee v. Mata, 330 So.2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (upon cashing defendant’s check, plaintiff who failed to perform condition of settlement agreement estopped from asserting original claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "check cashed in full and final payment for all goods, services and claims was accord and satisfaction",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Yelen v. Cindy’s Inc., 386 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), pet. for rev. dismissed, 394 So.2d 1154 (Fla.1980) (circumstances and conditions under which appellant received and cashed check established compromise in settlement); Hannah v. James A. Ryder, Corp., supra at 510 (noting common law rule with respect to cashing check purporting to full payment); Pino v. Lopez, 361 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. dismissed, 365 So.2d 714 (Fla.1978) (check cashed in full and final payment for all goods, services and claims was accord and satisfaction)."
} | 9,589,278 | b |
The cashing of the checks resulted, therefore, in satisfaction of the accord. Because there was an accord and satisfaction, appellant is precluded from suing either on the original claim or on the accord. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upon cashing defendant's check, plaintiff who failed to perform condition of settlement agreement estopped from asserting original claim",
"sentence": "Cf. McGehee v. Mata, 330 So.2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (upon cashing defendant’s check, plaintiff who failed to perform condition of settlement agreement estopped from asserting original claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "check cashed in full and final payment for all goods, services and claims was accord and satisfaction",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Yelen v. Cindy’s Inc., 386 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), pet. for rev. dismissed, 394 So.2d 1154 (Fla.1980) (circumstances and conditions under which appellant received and cashed check established compromise in settlement); Hannah v. James A. Ryder, Corp., supra at 510 (noting common law rule with respect to cashing check purporting to full payment); Pino v. Lopez, 361 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. dismissed, 365 So.2d 714 (Fla.1978) (check cashed in full and final payment for all goods, services and claims was accord and satisfaction)."
} | 9,589,278 | b |
Jolicoeur contemplates that an insurance administrator could, under appropriate circumstances, illicitly interfere with the contract of its principal. Like any other agent, an administrator could accomplish this feat by acting beyond the scope of its authority. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "798 A.2d 416, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"An agent, however, may be personally liable for unauthorized acts outside the scope of the agency[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Kennett v. Marquis, 798 A.2d 416, 419 (R.I.2002) (per curiam) (“An agent, however, may be personally liable for unauthorized acts outside the scope of the agency[.]”); Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217, 223 (Okla.Civ.App.2002) (remarking that an independent insurance adjuster could be liable for tortiously interfering with an insurance contract by acting beyond the scope of its authority from the insurer); see also Michelson v. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co., 808 F.2d 1005,1007-08 (3d Cir.1987) (holding that a corporate officer, acting in his or her official capacity, could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents); Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 225 (7th Cir.1983) (similar); Am. Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Int’l Importing Enter., Ltd., 757 F.Supp. 545, 555-56 (E.D.Pa. 1991) (same); Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d 1, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054, 1068 (1990) (same); Hickman v. Winston County Hosp. Bd., 508 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala. 1987) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "808 F.2d 1005, 1007-08",
"parenthetical": "holding that a corporate officer, acting in his or her official capacity, could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents",
"sentence": "See Kennett v. Marquis, 798 A.2d 416, 419 (R.I.2002) (per curiam) (“An agent, however, may be personally liable for unauthorized acts outside the scope of the agency[.]”); Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217, 223 (Okla.Civ.App.2002) (remarking that an independent insurance adjuster could be liable for tortiously interfering with an insurance contract by acting beyond the scope of its authority from the insurer); see also Michelson v. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co., 808 F.2d 1005,1007-08 (3d Cir.1987) (holding that a corporate officer, acting in his or her official capacity, could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents); Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 225 (7th Cir.1983) (similar); Am. Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Int’l Importing Enter., Ltd., 757 F.Supp. 545, 555-56 (E.D.Pa. 1991) (same); Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d 1, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054, 1068 (1990) (same); Hickman v. Winston County Hosp. Bd., 508 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala. 1987) (same)."
} | 3,837,046 | a |
Jolicoeur contemplates that an insurance administrator could, under appropriate circumstances, illicitly interfere with the contract of its principal. Like any other agent, an administrator could accomplish this feat by acting beyond the scope of its authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "808 F.2d 1005, 1007-08",
"parenthetical": "holding that a corporate officer, acting in his or her official capacity, could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents",
"sentence": "See Kennett v. Marquis, 798 A.2d 416, 419 (R.I.2002) (per curiam) (“An agent, however, may be personally liable for unauthorized acts outside the scope of the agency[.]”); Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217, 223 (Okla.Civ.App.2002) (remarking that an independent insurance adjuster could be liable for tortiously interfering with an insurance contract by acting beyond the scope of its authority from the insurer); see also Michelson v. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co., 808 F.2d 1005,1007-08 (3d Cir.1987) (holding that a corporate officer, acting in his or her official capacity, could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents); Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 225 (7th Cir.1983) (similar); Am. Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Int’l Importing Enter., Ltd., 757 F.Supp. 545, 555-56 (E.D.Pa. 1991) (same); Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d 1, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054, 1068 (1990) (same); Hickman v. Winston County Hosp. Bd., 508 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala. 1987) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 P.3d 217, 223",
"parenthetical": "remarking that an independent insurance adjuster could be liable for tortiously interfering with an insurance contract by acting beyond the scope of its authority from the insurer",
"sentence": "See Kennett v. Marquis, 798 A.2d 416, 419 (R.I.2002) (per curiam) (“An agent, however, may be personally liable for unauthorized acts outside the scope of the agency[.]”); Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217, 223 (Okla.Civ.App.2002) (remarking that an independent insurance adjuster could be liable for tortiously interfering with an insurance contract by acting beyond the scope of its authority from the insurer); see also Michelson v. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co., 808 F.2d 1005,1007-08 (3d Cir.1987) (holding that a corporate officer, acting in his or her official capacity, could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents); Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 225 (7th Cir.1983) (similar); Am. Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Int’l Importing Enter., Ltd., 757 F.Supp. 545, 555-56 (E.D.Pa. 1991) (same); Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d 1, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054, 1068 (1990) (same); Hickman v. Winston County Hosp. Bd., 508 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala. 1987) (same)."
} | 3,837,046 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 Pa. 167, 170",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "424 Pa.Super. 29, 34",
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "424 Pa.Super. 29, 34",
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 A.2d 661, 662",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | 7,862,136 | a |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "424 Pa.Super. 29, 34",
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "311 A.2d 896, 898",
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "424 Pa.Super. 29, 34",
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "621 A.2d 1023, 1026",
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 Pa. 167, 170",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | 7,862,136 | a |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "621 A.2d 1023, 1026",
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "252 A.2d 661, 662",
"parenthetical": "where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness' indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness's interest in the immediate matter",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | 7,862,136 | a |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "621 A.2d 1023, 1026",
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
. While, guilty pleas of a co-defendant cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, we are cognizant that the Commonwealth is permitted to bring out the circumstances surrounding a witness' agreement on direct examination in order to avoid any inference by the jury that the Commonwealth is attempting to keep a possible bias from them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "311 A.2d 896, 898",
"parenthetical": "a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 662 (1969) (where a witness is under indictment for the same crime for which the defendant is being tried, evidence of witness’ indictment is relevant as bearing on the witness’s interest in the immediate matter); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 452 311 A.2d 896, 898 (1973) (a witness who is under indictment for the same crime involved in a case in which he is testifying may be cross-examined about that indictment in order to allow the jury to evaluate whether witness testified for prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "621 A.2d 1023, 1026",
"parenthetical": "Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 34, 621 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 611, 656 A.2d 117 (1994) (Commonwealth agreements should be fully, fairly and honestly disclosed at trial because they have a significant bearing on a witness' motive for testifying)."
} | 7,862,136 | b |
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