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In precisely the same manner, enjoining the commencement of other actions against the Petitioners, Israel Re or its property will aid the Israeli court in achieving equality for creditors. The guiding premise of the Bankruptcy Code is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | 6,516,284 | a |
In precisely the same manner, enjoining the commencement of other actions against the Petitioners, Israel Re or its property will aid the Israeli court in achieving equality for creditors. The guiding premise of the Bankruptcy Code is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "25 B.R. 621, 629",
"parenthetical": "court \"not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | 6,516,284 | a |
In precisely the same manner, enjoining the commencement of other actions against the Petitioners, Israel Re or its property will aid the Israeli court in achieving equality for creditors. The guiding premise of the Bankruptcy Code is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | 6,516,284 | b |
In precisely the same manner, enjoining the commencement of other actions against the Petitioners, Israel Re or its property will aid the Israeli court in achieving equality for creditors. The guiding premise of the Bankruptcy Code is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "25 B.R. 621, 629",
"parenthetical": "court \"not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | 6,516,284 | b |
The administrative search exception has been used to permit legislatively authorized warrantless inspections of commercial property in cases in which the government interest in conducting the search would be frustrated by requiring prior notice. Cases applying the administrative search exception generally involve statutory schemes aimed at ensuring safety or other "substantial" government interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "397 U.S. 72, 76-77",
"parenthetical": "approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | 10,533,784 | a |
The administrative search exception has been used to permit legislatively authorized warrantless inspections of commercial property in cases in which the government interest in conducting the search would be frustrated by requiring prior notice. Cases applying the administrative search exception generally involve statutory schemes aimed at ensuring safety or other "substantial" government interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | 10,533,784 | b |
The administrative search exception has been used to permit legislatively authorized warrantless inspections of commercial property in cases in which the government interest in conducting the search would be frustrated by requiring prior notice. Cases applying the administrative search exception generally involve statutory schemes aimed at ensuring safety or other "substantial" government interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | 10,533,784 | a |
The administrative search exception has been used to permit legislatively authorized warrantless inspections of commercial property in cases in which the government interest in conducting the search would be frustrated by requiring prior notice. Cases applying the administrative search exception generally involve statutory schemes aimed at ensuring safety or other "substantial" government interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47",
"parenthetical": "upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "397 U.S. 72, 76-77",
"parenthetical": "approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | 10,533,784 | a |
The administrative search exception has been used to permit legislatively authorized warrantless inspections of commercial property in cases in which the government interest in conducting the search would be frustrated by requiring prior notice. Cases applying the administrative search exception generally involve statutory schemes aimed at ensuring safety or other "substantial" government interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47",
"parenthetical": "upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | 10,533,784 | a |
The administrative search exception has been used to permit legislatively authorized warrantless inspections of commercial property in cases in which the government interest in conducting the search would be frustrated by requiring prior notice. Cases applying the administrative search exception generally involve statutory schemes aimed at ensuring safety or other "substantial" government interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47",
"parenthetical": "upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | 10,533,784 | a |
The administrative search exception has been used to permit legislatively authorized warrantless inspections of commercial property in cases in which the government interest in conducting the search would be frustrated by requiring prior notice. Cases applying the administrative search exception generally involve statutory schemes aimed at ensuring safety or other "substantial" government interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "397 U.S. 72, 76-77",
"parenthetical": "approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | 10,533,784 | a |
The administrative search exception has been used to permit legislatively authorized warrantless inspections of commercial property in cases in which the government interest in conducting the search would be frustrated by requiring prior notice. Cases applying the administrative search exception generally involve statutory schemes aimed at ensuring safety or other "substantial" government interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | 10,533,784 | a |
The administrative search exception has been used to permit legislatively authorized warrantless inspections of commercial property in cases in which the government interest in conducting the search would be frustrated by requiring prior notice. Cases applying the administrative search exception generally involve statutory schemes aimed at ensuring safety or other "substantial" government interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry",
"sentence": "See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2646-47, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards where state had substantial interest in reducing growing problem of motor vehicle theft associated with this industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540 (permitting warrantless safety inspections of mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596-97, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (approving warrantless searches pursuant to gun control legislation); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 776-77, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (approving congressional scheme of war-rantless searches and seizures in liquor industry in light of long history of regulation of this industry)."
} | 10,533,784 | a |
Because the Regulation clearly applies to Mclsaac's conduct, he cannot challenge it for facial vagueness. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "452 F.2d 489, 491",
"parenthetical": "police officer may not challenge vagueness of regulation prohibiting conduct \"unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen\" when his own conduct properly could have been subjected to departmental disciplinary action even in the absence of any such regulation",
"sentence": "See also Allen v. City of Greensboro, 452 F.2d 489, 491 (4th Cir. 1971) (police officer may not challenge vagueness of regulation prohibiting conduct “unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen” when his own conduct properly could have been subjected to departmental disciplinary action even in the absence of any such regulation)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "417 U.S. 733, 757",
"parenthetical": "\"Since appellee could have had no reasonable doubt that his public statements . . . were both 'unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen,' and 'to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces,' . . . his challenge to [those terms] as unconstitutionally vague . . . must fail\"",
"sentence": "Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 (1974) (“Since appellee could have had no reasonable doubt that his public statements . . . were both ‘unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen,’ and ‘to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces,’ . . . his challenge to [those terms] as unconstitutionally vague . . . must fail”)."
} | 6,109,214 | b |
. Even if the disclaimer was not tainted, Nikzad contends that he nevertheless retained a privacy interest in the briefcase's contents because the briefcase itself was located within a closed container under his ownership and control. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "647 F.2d 999, 999",
"parenthetical": "defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Veatch, 647 F.2d at 999 (defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "708 F.2d 1365, 1368",
"parenthetical": "despite defendant's disclaimer of ownership, he retained a privacy interest in journals found inside his locked safe",
"sentence": "See United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983) (despite defendant’s disclaimer of ownership, he retained a privacy interest in journals found inside his locked safe); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1763, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) (despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control)."
} | 654,401 | b |
. Even if the disclaimer was not tainted, Nikzad contends that he nevertheless retained a privacy interest in the briefcase's contents because the briefcase itself was located within a closed container under his ownership and control. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "647 F.2d 999, 999",
"parenthetical": "defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Veatch, 647 F.2d at 999 (defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite defendant's disclaimer of ownership, he retained a privacy interest in journals found inside his locked safe",
"sentence": "See United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983) (despite defendant’s disclaimer of ownership, he retained a privacy interest in journals found inside his locked safe); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1763, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) (despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control)."
} | 654,401 | b |
. Even if the disclaimer was not tainted, Nikzad contends that he nevertheless retained a privacy interest in the briefcase's contents because the briefcase itself was located within a closed container under his ownership and control. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite defendant's disclaimer of ownership, he retained a privacy interest in journals found inside his locked safe",
"sentence": "See United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983) (despite defendant’s disclaimer of ownership, he retained a privacy interest in journals found inside his locked safe); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1763, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) (despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "647 F.2d 999, 999",
"parenthetical": "defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Veatch, 647 F.2d at 999 (defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile)."
} | 654,401 | a |
. Even if the disclaimer was not tainted, Nikzad contends that he nevertheless retained a privacy interest in the briefcase's contents because the briefcase itself was located within a closed container under his ownership and control. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control",
"sentence": "See United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983) (despite defendant’s disclaimer of ownership, he retained a privacy interest in journals found inside his locked safe); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1763, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) (despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "647 F.2d 999, 999",
"parenthetical": "defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Veatch, 647 F.2d at 999 (defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile)."
} | 654,401 | a |
. Even if the disclaimer was not tainted, Nikzad contends that he nevertheless retained a privacy interest in the briefcase's contents because the briefcase itself was located within a closed container under his ownership and control. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control",
"sentence": "See United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983) (despite defendant’s disclaimer of ownership, he retained a privacy interest in journals found inside his locked safe); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1763, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) (despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "647 F.2d 999, 999",
"parenthetical": "defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Veatch, 647 F.2d at 999 (defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile)."
} | 654,401 | a |
. Even if the disclaimer was not tainted, Nikzad contends that he nevertheless retained a privacy interest in the briefcase's contents because the briefcase itself was located within a closed container under his ownership and control. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "647 F.2d 999, 999",
"parenthetical": "defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Veatch, 647 F.2d at 999 (defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control",
"sentence": "See United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983) (despite defendant’s disclaimer of ownership, he retained a privacy interest in journals found inside his locked safe); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1763, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) (despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control)."
} | 654,401 | b |
. Even if the disclaimer was not tainted, Nikzad contends that he nevertheless retained a privacy interest in the briefcase's contents because the briefcase itself was located within a closed container under his ownership and control. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "647 F.2d 999, 999",
"parenthetical": "defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Veatch, 647 F.2d at 999 (defendant abandoned his privacy interest by disclaiming ownership of a wallet found in passenger section of his automobile)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control",
"sentence": "See United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983) (despite defendant’s disclaimer of ownership, he retained a privacy interest in journals found inside his locked safe); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1763, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) (despite disclaimer of ownership, defendant maintained a privacy interest in the contents of two paper bags found in the locked trunk of a car under his control)."
} | 654,401 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "636 F.2d 921, 923",
"parenthetical": "finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant's case",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "560 F.2d 448, 455",
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | 348,957 | a |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "636 F.2d 921, 923",
"parenthetical": "finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant's case",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "636 F.2d 921, 923",
"parenthetical": "finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant's case",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "636 F.2d 921, 923",
"parenthetical": "finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant's case",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | 348,957 | a |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "560 F.2d 448, 455",
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75",
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75",
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | 348,957 | a |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75",
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75",
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | 348,957 | a |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "560 F.2d 448, 455",
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | 348,957 | a |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | 348,957 | a |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "560 F.2d 448, 455",
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | 348,957 | a |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | 348,957 | a |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "560 F.2d 448, 455",
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | 348,957 | b |
The court reasoned that the victim's loss stemmed from the passing of the counterfeit bills and not from the crime of possession for which the defendant stood convicted: "[T]he mere possession and concealment of the bogus money by itself did not harm the [victim]. Therefore, Burger's offense did not 'cause' the loss for which he now is required to make restitution." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel",
"sentence": "Id. at 811; see also United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir.1980) (finding it improper to order restitution of the costs of investigating the defendant’s case); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir.) (rejecting order of restitution for the cost of court-appointed defense counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 216, 62 L.Ed.2d 140 (1979)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a \"fine\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (upholding the assessment of fees for court-appointed counsel under section 3651 as a “fine”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977)."
} | 348,957 | a |
This conclusion is supported by an examination of Plaintiffs brief and expert reports, which do not allege that the fire was caused by any defect in the electricity, but rather by PSE & G's failure to promptly discontinue electrical service to the building. Because this conduct relates to the maintenance of the electrical service, and not a defect inherent in the product, it does not qualify as "harm caused by a product" and is therefore not cognizable under the NJPLA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "707 A.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims of improper maintenance and installation are governed by negligence law, not the NJPLA",
"sentence": "See Potwora v. Grip, 319 N.J.Super. 386, 725 A.2d 697, 704 (1999)(concluding that when an injury does not result from a defective product, but rather from a service, the NJPLA is inapplicable because the plaintiffs claim is “not ‘for harm caused by a product’ within the meaning of the Act”); see also Ridenour, 707 A.2d at 1097 (holding that claims of improper maintenance and installation are governed by negligence law, not the NJPLA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that when an injury does not result from a defective product, but rather from a service, the NJPLA is inapplicable because the plaintiffs claim is \"not 'for harm caused by a product' within the meaning of the Act\"",
"sentence": "See Potwora v. Grip, 319 N.J.Super. 386, 725 A.2d 697, 704 (1999)(concluding that when an injury does not result from a defective product, but rather from a service, the NJPLA is inapplicable because the plaintiffs claim is “not ‘for harm caused by a product’ within the meaning of the Act”); see also Ridenour, 707 A.2d at 1097 (holding that claims of improper maintenance and installation are governed by negligence law, not the NJPLA)."
} | 11,212,175 | b |
This conclusion is supported by an examination of Plaintiffs brief and expert reports, which do not allege that the fire was caused by any defect in the electricity, but rather by PSE & G's failure to promptly discontinue electrical service to the building. Because this conduct relates to the maintenance of the electrical service, and not a defect inherent in the product, it does not qualify as "harm caused by a product" and is therefore not cognizable under the NJPLA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "725 A.2d 697, 704",
"parenthetical": "concluding that when an injury does not result from a defective product, but rather from a service, the NJPLA is inapplicable because the plaintiffs claim is \"not 'for harm caused by a product' within the meaning of the Act\"",
"sentence": "See Potwora v. Grip, 319 N.J.Super. 386, 725 A.2d 697, 704 (1999)(concluding that when an injury does not result from a defective product, but rather from a service, the NJPLA is inapplicable because the plaintiffs claim is “not ‘for harm caused by a product’ within the meaning of the Act”); see also Ridenour, 707 A.2d at 1097 (holding that claims of improper maintenance and installation are governed by negligence law, not the NJPLA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "707 A.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims of improper maintenance and installation are governed by negligence law, not the NJPLA",
"sentence": "See Potwora v. Grip, 319 N.J.Super. 386, 725 A.2d 697, 704 (1999)(concluding that when an injury does not result from a defective product, but rather from a service, the NJPLA is inapplicable because the plaintiffs claim is “not ‘for harm caused by a product’ within the meaning of the Act”); see also Ridenour, 707 A.2d at 1097 (holding that claims of improper maintenance and installation are governed by negligence law, not the NJPLA)."
} | 11,212,175 | a |
' By contrast, courts have found that where a plaintiff "could fully preserve in state court" as a defense the claims asserted in federal court, the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is not applicable because the "pendency of the state court proceedings would not meaningfully threaten th[e] Court's jurisdiction". | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2008 WL 4820247, at *7",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the Suffolk County District Court, Fifth District because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act",
"sentence": "Sierra v. City of New York, 528 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2008); Bosch v. Lamattina, No. 08-CV-238, 2008 WL 4820247, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2008) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the Suffolk County District Court, Fifth District because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act); Armstrong v. Real Estate Intern., Ltd., No. 05-CV-5883, 2006 WL 354983, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because “claims for rescission under TILA can be brought in state court, including as a defense to an eviction claim in Housing Court”); cf. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295, 90 S.Ct. at 1747 (“the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "398 U.S. 295, 295",
"parenthetical": "\"the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts\"",
"sentence": "Sierra v. City of New York, 528 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2008); Bosch v. Lamattina, No. 08-CV-238, 2008 WL 4820247, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2008) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the Suffolk County District Court, Fifth District because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act); Armstrong v. Real Estate Intern., Ltd., No. 05-CV-5883, 2006 WL 354983, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because “claims for rescission under TILA can be brought in state court, including as a defense to an eviction claim in Housing Court”); cf. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295, 90 S.Ct. at 1747 (“the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts”)."
} | 4,009,174 | a |
' By contrast, courts have found that where a plaintiff "could fully preserve in state court" as a defense the claims asserted in federal court, the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is not applicable because the "pendency of the state court proceedings would not meaningfully threaten th[e] Court's jurisdiction". | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "90 S.Ct. 1747, 1747",
"parenthetical": "\"the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts\"",
"sentence": "Sierra v. City of New York, 528 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2008); Bosch v. Lamattina, No. 08-CV-238, 2008 WL 4820247, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2008) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the Suffolk County District Court, Fifth District because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act); Armstrong v. Real Estate Intern., Ltd., No. 05-CV-5883, 2006 WL 354983, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because “claims for rescission under TILA can be brought in state court, including as a defense to an eviction claim in Housing Court”); cf. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295, 90 S.Ct. at 1747 (“the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2008 WL 4820247, at *7",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the Suffolk County District Court, Fifth District because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act",
"sentence": "Sierra v. City of New York, 528 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2008); Bosch v. Lamattina, No. 08-CV-238, 2008 WL 4820247, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2008) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the Suffolk County District Court, Fifth District because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act); Armstrong v. Real Estate Intern., Ltd., No. 05-CV-5883, 2006 WL 354983, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because “claims for rescission under TILA can be brought in state court, including as a defense to an eviction claim in Housing Court”); cf. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295, 90 S.Ct. at 1747 (“the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts”)."
} | 4,009,174 | b |
' By contrast, courts have found that where a plaintiff "could fully preserve in state court" as a defense the claims asserted in federal court, the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is not applicable because the "pendency of the state court proceedings would not meaningfully threaten th[e] Court's jurisdiction". | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2006 WL 354983, at *4",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because \"claims for rescission under TILA can be brought in state court, including as a defense to an eviction claim in Housing Court\"",
"sentence": "Sierra v. City of New York, 528 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2008); Bosch v. Lamattina, No. 08-CV-238, 2008 WL 4820247, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2008) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the Suffolk County District Court, Fifth District because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act); Armstrong v. Real Estate Intern., Ltd., No. 05-CV-5883, 2006 WL 354983, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because “claims for rescission under TILA can be brought in state court, including as a defense to an eviction claim in Housing Court”); cf. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295, 90 S.Ct. at 1747 (“the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "398 U.S. 295, 295",
"parenthetical": "\"the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts\"",
"sentence": "Sierra v. City of New York, 528 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2008); Bosch v. Lamattina, No. 08-CV-238, 2008 WL 4820247, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2008) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the Suffolk County District Court, Fifth District because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act); Armstrong v. Real Estate Intern., Ltd., No. 05-CV-5883, 2006 WL 354983, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because “claims for rescission under TILA can be brought in state court, including as a defense to an eviction claim in Housing Court”); cf. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295, 90 S.Ct. at 1747 (“the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts”)."
} | 4,009,174 | a |
' By contrast, courts have found that where a plaintiff "could fully preserve in state court" as a defense the claims asserted in federal court, the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is not applicable because the "pendency of the state court proceedings would not meaningfully threaten th[e] Court's jurisdiction". | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2006 WL 354983, at *4",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because \"claims for rescission under TILA can be brought in state court, including as a defense to an eviction claim in Housing Court\"",
"sentence": "Sierra v. City of New York, 528 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2008); Bosch v. Lamattina, No. 08-CV-238, 2008 WL 4820247, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2008) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the Suffolk County District Court, Fifth District because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act); Armstrong v. Real Estate Intern., Ltd., No. 05-CV-5883, 2006 WL 354983, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because “claims for rescission under TILA can be brought in state court, including as a defense to an eviction claim in Housing Court”); cf. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295, 90 S.Ct. at 1747 (“the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "90 S.Ct. 1747, 1747",
"parenthetical": "\"the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts\"",
"sentence": "Sierra v. City of New York, 528 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2008); Bosch v. Lamattina, No. 08-CV-238, 2008 WL 4820247, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2008) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the Suffolk County District Court, Fifth District because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act); Armstrong v. Real Estate Intern., Ltd., No. 05-CV-5883, 2006 WL 354983, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings because “claims for rescission under TILA can be brought in state court, including as a defense to an eviction claim in Housing Court”); cf. Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295, 90 S.Ct. at 1747 (“the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this [labor dispute] and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts”)."
} | 4,009,174 | a |
How can this court force the grocery store to sell the vendor's product when it cannot, and will not, force the customers to patronize the store? The business decision should, and does, rest squarely with the one who bears the risk of the decision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "818 F.2d 312, 317",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"it is not for the courts or juries to second-guess\" certain business decisions",
"sentence": "See Smithy Braedon Co. v. Hadid, 825 F.2d 787, 790 (4th Cir.1987) (quoting Justice Holmes regarding freedom of contract: “I think that at least it is safe to say that the most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground for interference is very clear.”); Richland Wholesale Liquors v. Glenmore Distilleries, Co., 818 F.2d 312, 317 (4th Cir.1987) (noting that “it is not for the courts or juries to second-guess” certain business decisions); cf., Glaesner v. Beck/Amley Corp., 790 F.2d 384, 390 (4th Cir.1986) (noting that “South Carolina law has never equated the exercise of reasonable business judgment with an act of tor-tious bad faith.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "790 F.2d 384, 390",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"South Carolina law has never equated the exercise of reasonable business judgment with an act of tor-tious bad faith.\"",
"sentence": "See Smithy Braedon Co. v. Hadid, 825 F.2d 787, 790 (4th Cir.1987) (quoting Justice Holmes regarding freedom of contract: “I think that at least it is safe to say that the most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground for interference is very clear.”); Richland Wholesale Liquors v. Glenmore Distilleries, Co., 818 F.2d 312, 317 (4th Cir.1987) (noting that “it is not for the courts or juries to second-guess” certain business decisions); cf., Glaesner v. Beck/Amley Corp., 790 F.2d 384, 390 (4th Cir.1986) (noting that “South Carolina law has never equated the exercise of reasonable business judgment with an act of tor-tious bad faith.”)."
} | 9,263,731 | a |
In contrast, for example, subsection (g)(1)(B), 5 U.S.C. SS 552a(g)(l)(B), applies to a specific subsection of the Act that incorporates the Act's system of records requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "678 F.2d 1375, 1375-76",
"parenthetical": "\"The language of paragraph (d)(1) expressly limits its applicability to records contained within a system of records.\"",
"sentence": "See id. (providing civil relief for a “refus[al] to comply with an individual request under subsection (d)(1) of this section”); id. § 552a(d)(l) (addressing a “request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the system ”) (emphasis added); see Clarkson, 678 F.2d at 1375-76 (“The language of paragraph (d)(1) expressly limits its applicability to records contained within a system of records.”); cf. Dickson, 828 F.2d at 39 (“[T]he statute expressly limits the judicial remedies available under section (g)(1)(A) and (B) to violations of other named sections of the Act."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "828 F.2d 39, 39",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statute expressly limits the judicial remedies available under section (g)(1)(A) and (B",
"sentence": "See id. (providing civil relief for a “refus[al] to comply with an individual request under subsection (d)(1) of this section”); id. § 552a(d)(l) (addressing a “request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the system ”) (emphasis added); see Clarkson, 678 F.2d at 1375-76 (“The language of paragraph (d)(1) expressly limits its applicability to records contained within a system of records.”); cf. Dickson, 828 F.2d at 39 (“[T]he statute expressly limits the judicial remedies available under section (g)(1)(A) and (B) to violations of other named sections of the Act."
} | 3,261,632 | a |
In construing this statute, I am conscious of the fact that the New Hampshire legislature passed the legislation in question as remedial law to protect subcontractors and others who are not by and large particularly skilled or sophisticated in legal language. The law should be construed in terms of its purpose and in terms of the audience of which it was addressed. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "236 U.S. 558, 560",
"parenthetical": "bankrupt law is a \"prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "133 N.H. 887, 889",
"parenthetical": "\"we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | 6,448,208 | b |
In construing this statute, I am conscious of the fact that the New Hampshire legislature passed the legislation in question as remedial law to protect subcontractors and others who are not by and large particularly skilled or sophisticated in legal language. The law should be construed in terms of its purpose and in terms of the audience of which it was addressed. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "133 N.H. 887, 889",
"parenthetical": "\"we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "35 S.Ct. 287, 288",
"parenthetical": "bankrupt law is a \"prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | 6,448,208 | a |
In construing this statute, I am conscious of the fact that the New Hampshire legislature passed the legislation in question as remedial law to protect subcontractors and others who are not by and large particularly skilled or sophisticated in legal language. The law should be construed in terms of its purpose and in terms of the audience of which it was addressed. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bankrupt law is a \"prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "133 N.H. 887, 889",
"parenthetical": "\"we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | 6,448,208 | b |
In construing this statute, I am conscious of the fact that the New Hampshire legislature passed the legislation in question as remedial law to protect subcontractors and others who are not by and large particularly skilled or sophisticated in legal language. The law should be construed in terms of its purpose and in terms of the audience of which it was addressed. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "236 U.S. 558, 560",
"parenthetical": "bankrupt law is a \"prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | 6,448,208 | b |
In construing this statute, I am conscious of the fact that the New Hampshire legislature passed the legislation in question as remedial law to protect subcontractors and others who are not by and large particularly skilled or sophisticated in legal language. The law should be construed in terms of its purpose and in terms of the audience of which it was addressed. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "35 S.Ct. 287, 288",
"parenthetical": "bankrupt law is a \"prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | 6,448,208 | b |
In construing this statute, I am conscious of the fact that the New Hampshire legislature passed the legislation in question as remedial law to protect subcontractors and others who are not by and large particularly skilled or sophisticated in legal language. The law should be construed in terms of its purpose and in terms of the audience of which it was addressed. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bankrupt law is a \"prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business\"",
"sentence": "Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254 (1991) (“we will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose”); cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 560, 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (bankrupt law is a “prosy thing intended for ready application to the everyday affairs of practical business”)."
} | 6,448,208 | a |
Br. of Appellant at 8. And we further note that visible bruising itself rises to the level of temporary substantial disfigurement. See State v. Hovig, 149 Wn. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"serious\" \"red and violet teeth-mark[ ]\" bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted \"substantial bodily injury\"",
"sentence": "App. 1, 5, 13, 202 P.3d 318 (“serious” “red and violet teeth-mark[ ]” bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted “substantial bodily injury”), review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1020 (2009); see also State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 444, 455, 859 P.2d 60 (1993) (bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were “ ‘temporary but substantial disfigurement’ ” (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "71 Wn. App. 444, 455",
"parenthetical": "bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were \" 'temporary but substantial disfigurement' \" (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b",
"sentence": "App. 1, 5, 13, 202 P.3d 318 (“serious” “red and violet teeth-mark[ ]” bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted “substantial bodily injury”), review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1020 (2009); see also State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 444, 455, 859 P.2d 60 (1993) (bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were “ ‘temporary but substantial disfigurement’ ” (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b)))."
} | 4,006,896 | a |
Br. of Appellant at 8. And we further note that visible bruising itself rises to the level of temporary substantial disfigurement. See State v. Hovig, 149 Wn. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"serious\" \"red and violet teeth-mark[ ]\" bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted \"substantial bodily injury\"",
"sentence": "App. 1, 5, 13, 202 P.3d 318 (“serious” “red and violet teeth-mark[ ]” bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted “substantial bodily injury”), review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1020 (2009); see also State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 444, 455, 859 P.2d 60 (1993) (bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were “ ‘temporary but substantial disfigurement’ ” (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were \" 'temporary but substantial disfigurement' \" (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b",
"sentence": "App. 1, 5, 13, 202 P.3d 318 (“serious” “red and violet teeth-mark[ ]” bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted “substantial bodily injury”), review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1020 (2009); see also State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 444, 455, 859 P.2d 60 (1993) (bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were “ ‘temporary but substantial disfigurement’ ” (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b)))."
} | 4,006,896 | a |
Br. of Appellant at 8. And we further note that visible bruising itself rises to the level of temporary substantial disfigurement. See State v. Hovig, 149 Wn. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "71 Wn. App. 444, 455",
"parenthetical": "bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were \" 'temporary but substantial disfigurement' \" (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b",
"sentence": "App. 1, 5, 13, 202 P.3d 318 (“serious” “red and violet teeth-mark[ ]” bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted “substantial bodily injury”), review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1020 (2009); see also State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 444, 455, 859 P.2d 60 (1993) (bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were “ ‘temporary but substantial disfigurement’ ” (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b)))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"serious\" \"red and violet teeth-mark[ ]\" bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted \"substantial bodily injury\"",
"sentence": "App. 1, 5, 13, 202 P.3d 318 (“serious” “red and violet teeth-mark[ ]” bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted “substantial bodily injury”), review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1020 (2009); see also State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 444, 455, 859 P.2d 60 (1993) (bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were “ ‘temporary but substantial disfigurement’ ” (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b)))."
} | 4,006,896 | b |
Br. of Appellant at 8. And we further note that visible bruising itself rises to the level of temporary substantial disfigurement. See State v. Hovig, 149 Wn. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were \" 'temporary but substantial disfigurement' \" (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b",
"sentence": "App. 1, 5, 13, 202 P.3d 318 (“serious” “red and violet teeth-mark[ ]” bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted “substantial bodily injury”), review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1020 (2009); see also State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 444, 455, 859 P.2d 60 (1993) (bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were “ ‘temporary but substantial disfigurement’ ” (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b)))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"serious\" \"red and violet teeth-mark[ ]\" bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted \"substantial bodily injury\"",
"sentence": "App. 1, 5, 13, 202 P.3d 318 (“serious” “red and violet teeth-mark[ ]” bruising that lasted for 7 to 14 days constituted “substantial bodily injury”), review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1020 (2009); see also State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 444, 455, 859 P.2d 60 (1993) (bruises that resulted from being hit by a shoe were “ ‘temporary but substantial disfigurement’ ” (quoting RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b)))."
} | 4,006,896 | b |
On several occasions, this Court has commented that it is improper for a prosecutor to ask the court members to infer guilt because an accused has exercised his constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "39 MJ 259, 262",
"parenthetical": "improper to comment on appellant's refusal to consent to search",
"sentence": "See United States v. Turner, 39 MJ 259, 262 (CMA 1994) (improper to comment on appellant’s refusal to consent to search); United States v. Toro, 37 MJ 313, 318 (CMA 1993) (improper to comment of exercise of right to remain silent); United States v. Edwards, 35 MJ 351, 355 (CMA 1992) (improper to comment on refusal to plead guilty); United States v. Clifton, 15 MJ 26, 29 (CMA 1983) (improper to argue that accused “asserted his rights” and “fought this every inch of the way”); see also United States v. Causey, 37 MJ 308, 311 (CMA 1993) (improper to urge members to reject innocent ingestion defense in drug cases in order to deter others from making similar claims)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "37 MJ 308, 311",
"parenthetical": "improper to urge members to reject innocent ingestion defense in drug cases in order to deter others from making similar claims",
"sentence": "See United States v. Turner, 39 MJ 259, 262 (CMA 1994) (improper to comment on appellant’s refusal to consent to search); United States v. Toro, 37 MJ 313, 318 (CMA 1993) (improper to comment of exercise of right to remain silent); United States v. Edwards, 35 MJ 351, 355 (CMA 1992) (improper to comment on refusal to plead guilty); United States v. Clifton, 15 MJ 26, 29 (CMA 1983) (improper to argue that accused “asserted his rights” and “fought this every inch of the way”); see also United States v. Causey, 37 MJ 308, 311 (CMA 1993) (improper to urge members to reject innocent ingestion defense in drug cases in order to deter others from making similar claims)."
} | 80,954 | a |
On several occasions, this Court has commented that it is improper for a prosecutor to ask the court members to infer guilt because an accused has exercised his constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "37 MJ 313, 318",
"parenthetical": "improper to comment of exercise of right to remain silent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Turner, 39 MJ 259, 262 (CMA 1994) (improper to comment on appellant’s refusal to consent to search); United States v. Toro, 37 MJ 313, 318 (CMA 1993) (improper to comment of exercise of right to remain silent); United States v. Edwards, 35 MJ 351, 355 (CMA 1992) (improper to comment on refusal to plead guilty); United States v. Clifton, 15 MJ 26, 29 (CMA 1983) (improper to argue that accused “asserted his rights” and “fought this every inch of the way”); see also United States v. Causey, 37 MJ 308, 311 (CMA 1993) (improper to urge members to reject innocent ingestion defense in drug cases in order to deter others from making similar claims)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "37 MJ 308, 311",
"parenthetical": "improper to urge members to reject innocent ingestion defense in drug cases in order to deter others from making similar claims",
"sentence": "See United States v. Turner, 39 MJ 259, 262 (CMA 1994) (improper to comment on appellant’s refusal to consent to search); United States v. Toro, 37 MJ 313, 318 (CMA 1993) (improper to comment of exercise of right to remain silent); United States v. Edwards, 35 MJ 351, 355 (CMA 1992) (improper to comment on refusal to plead guilty); United States v. Clifton, 15 MJ 26, 29 (CMA 1983) (improper to argue that accused “asserted his rights” and “fought this every inch of the way”); see also United States v. Causey, 37 MJ 308, 311 (CMA 1993) (improper to urge members to reject innocent ingestion defense in drug cases in order to deter others from making similar claims)."
} | 80,954 | a |
On several occasions, this Court has commented that it is improper for a prosecutor to ask the court members to infer guilt because an accused has exercised his constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "37 MJ 308, 311",
"parenthetical": "improper to urge members to reject innocent ingestion defense in drug cases in order to deter others from making similar claims",
"sentence": "See United States v. Turner, 39 MJ 259, 262 (CMA 1994) (improper to comment on appellant’s refusal to consent to search); United States v. Toro, 37 MJ 313, 318 (CMA 1993) (improper to comment of exercise of right to remain silent); United States v. Edwards, 35 MJ 351, 355 (CMA 1992) (improper to comment on refusal to plead guilty); United States v. Clifton, 15 MJ 26, 29 (CMA 1983) (improper to argue that accused “asserted his rights” and “fought this every inch of the way”); see also United States v. Causey, 37 MJ 308, 311 (CMA 1993) (improper to urge members to reject innocent ingestion defense in drug cases in order to deter others from making similar claims)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "15 MJ 26, 29",
"parenthetical": "improper to argue that accused \"asserted his rights\" and \"fought this every inch of the way\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Turner, 39 MJ 259, 262 (CMA 1994) (improper to comment on appellant’s refusal to consent to search); United States v. Toro, 37 MJ 313, 318 (CMA 1993) (improper to comment of exercise of right to remain silent); United States v. Edwards, 35 MJ 351, 355 (CMA 1992) (improper to comment on refusal to plead guilty); United States v. Clifton, 15 MJ 26, 29 (CMA 1983) (improper to argue that accused “asserted his rights” and “fought this every inch of the way”); see also United States v. Causey, 37 MJ 308, 311 (CMA 1993) (improper to urge members to reject innocent ingestion defense in drug cases in order to deter others from making similar claims)."
} | 80,954 | b |
Inconsistencies in his testimony might be attributed to the tricks memory often plays when a person wishes the past were different from what it was. See U.S.S.G. SS 3C1.1 cmt. 1 ("inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and, thus, not all ... reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice"). An allegation of perjury is not supported. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27",
"parenthetical": "arguing that a requirement of \"automatic enhancement\" upon a district court's finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant's constitutional right to testify",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. SS 3C1.1 based upon defendant's alleged false testimony",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | 11,686,285 | b |
Inconsistencies in his testimony might be attributed to the tricks memory often plays when a person wishes the past were different from what it was. See U.S.S.G. SS 3C1.1 cmt. 1 ("inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and, thus, not all ... reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice"). An allegation of perjury is not supported. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. SS 3C1.1 based upon defendant's alleged false testimony",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "arguing that a requirement of \"automatic enhancement\" upon a district court's finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant's constitutional right to testify",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | 11,686,285 | a |
Inconsistencies in his testimony might be attributed to the tricks memory often plays when a person wishes the past were different from what it was. See U.S.S.G. SS 3C1.1 cmt. 1 ("inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and, thus, not all ... reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice"). An allegation of perjury is not supported. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17",
"parenthetical": "clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. SS 3C1.1 based upon defendant's alleged false testimony",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27",
"parenthetical": "arguing that a requirement of \"automatic enhancement\" upon a district court's finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant's constitutional right to testify",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | 11,686,285 | a |
Inconsistencies in his testimony might be attributed to the tricks memory often plays when a person wishes the past were different from what it was. See U.S.S.G. SS 3C1.1 cmt. 1 ("inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and, thus, not all ... reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice"). An allegation of perjury is not supported. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "arguing that a requirement of \"automatic enhancement\" upon a district court's finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant's constitutional right to testify",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17",
"parenthetical": "clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. SS 3C1.1 based upon defendant's alleged false testimony",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | 11,686,285 | b |
Inconsistencies in his testimony might be attributed to the tricks memory often plays when a person wishes the past were different from what it was. See U.S.S.G. SS 3C1.1 cmt. 1 ("inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and, thus, not all ... reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice"). An allegation of perjury is not supported. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27",
"parenthetical": "arguing that a requirement of \"automatic enhancement\" upon a district court's finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant's constitutional right to testify",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. SS 3C1.1 based upon defendant's alleged false testimony",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | 11,686,285 | b |
Inconsistencies in his testimony might be attributed to the tricks memory often plays when a person wishes the past were different from what it was. See U.S.S.G. SS 3C1.1 cmt. 1 ("inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and, thus, not all ... reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice"). An allegation of perjury is not supported. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. SS 3C1.1 based upon defendant's alleged false testimony",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "arguing that a requirement of \"automatic enhancement\" upon a district court's finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant's constitutional right to testify",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | 11,686,285 | a |
Inconsistencies in his testimony might be attributed to the tricks memory often plays when a person wishes the past were different from what it was. See U.S.S.G. SS 3C1.1 cmt. 1 ("inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and, thus, not all ... reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice"). An allegation of perjury is not supported. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27",
"parenthetical": "arguing that a requirement of \"automatic enhancement\" upon a district court's finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant's constitutional right to testify",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 43, 45-46",
"parenthetical": "\"A district court may enhance a defendant's sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.\"",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | 11,686,285 | b |
Inconsistencies in his testimony might be attributed to the tricks memory often plays when a person wishes the past were different from what it was. See U.S.S.G. SS 3C1.1 cmt. 1 ("inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and, thus, not all ... reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice"). An allegation of perjury is not supported. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 43, 45-46",
"parenthetical": "\"A district court may enhance a defendant's sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.\"",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "arguing that a requirement of \"automatic enhancement\" upon a district court's finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant's constitutional right to testify",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(b) (“committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” .warrant obstruction \"of justice enhancement); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116-17, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (clear finding of perjury required for enhancement under U.S.S.C. § 3C1.1 based upon defendant’s alleged false testimony); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1993) (“A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence for obstruction of justice if the defendant commits perjury.”); cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (arguing that a requirement of “automatic enhancement” upon a district court’s finding of perjury undercuts sound policy and a defendant’s constitutional right to testify), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085 (1997)."
} | 11,686,285 | a |
In light of the foregoing, we find Petitioner established that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected her plea coun sel's performance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "372 S.C. 549, 551-52",
"parenthetical": "Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner's father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 143-45, 551 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel’s performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine); see also Staggs v. State, 372 S.C. 549, 551-52, 643 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (2007) (Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner’s father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges); see generally Allan L. Schwartz, Circumstances Giving Rise to Conflict of Interest Between or Among Criminal Codefendants Precluding Representation by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 (1970 & Supp.2008) (outlining cases which consider what particular circumstances give rise to conflict of interest where single counsel represents multiple codefendants)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "346 S.C. 140, 143-45",
"parenthetical": "holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel's performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 143-45, 551 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel’s performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine); see also Staggs v. State, 372 S.C. 549, 551-52, 643 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (2007) (Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner’s father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges); see generally Allan L. Schwartz, Circumstances Giving Rise to Conflict of Interest Between or Among Criminal Codefendants Precluding Representation by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 (1970 & Supp.2008) (outlining cases which consider what particular circumstances give rise to conflict of interest where single counsel represents multiple codefendants)."
} | 3,791,963 | b |
In light of the foregoing, we find Petitioner established that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected her plea coun sel's performance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "346 S.C. 140, 143-45",
"parenthetical": "holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel's performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 143-45, 551 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel’s performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine); see also Staggs v. State, 372 S.C. 549, 551-52, 643 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (2007) (Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner’s father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges); see generally Allan L. Schwartz, Circumstances Giving Rise to Conflict of Interest Between or Among Criminal Codefendants Precluding Representation by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 (1970 & Supp.2008) (outlining cases which consider what particular circumstances give rise to conflict of interest where single counsel represents multiple codefendants)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "643 S.E.2d 690, 691-92",
"parenthetical": "Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner's father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 143-45, 551 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel’s performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine); see also Staggs v. State, 372 S.C. 549, 551-52, 643 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (2007) (Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner’s father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges); see generally Allan L. Schwartz, Circumstances Giving Rise to Conflict of Interest Between or Among Criminal Codefendants Precluding Representation by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 (1970 & Supp.2008) (outlining cases which consider what particular circumstances give rise to conflict of interest where single counsel represents multiple codefendants)."
} | 3,791,963 | a |
In light of the foregoing, we find Petitioner established that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected her plea coun sel's performance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "551 S.E.2d 254, 256",
"parenthetical": "holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel's performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 143-45, 551 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel’s performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine); see also Staggs v. State, 372 S.C. 549, 551-52, 643 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (2007) (Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner’s father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges); see generally Allan L. Schwartz, Circumstances Giving Rise to Conflict of Interest Between or Among Criminal Codefendants Precluding Representation by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 (1970 & Supp.2008) (outlining cases which consider what particular circumstances give rise to conflict of interest where single counsel represents multiple codefendants)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "372 S.C. 549, 551-52",
"parenthetical": "Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner's father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 143-45, 551 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel’s performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine); see also Staggs v. State, 372 S.C. 549, 551-52, 643 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (2007) (Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner’s father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges); see generally Allan L. Schwartz, Circumstances Giving Rise to Conflict of Interest Between or Among Criminal Codefendants Precluding Representation by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 (1970 & Supp.2008) (outlining cases which consider what particular circumstances give rise to conflict of interest where single counsel represents multiple codefendants)."
} | 3,791,963 | a |
In light of the foregoing, we find Petitioner established that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected her plea coun sel's performance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "643 S.E.2d 690, 691-92",
"parenthetical": "Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner's father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 143-45, 551 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel’s performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine); see also Staggs v. State, 372 S.C. 549, 551-52, 643 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (2007) (Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner’s father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges); see generally Allan L. Schwartz, Circumstances Giving Rise to Conflict of Interest Between or Among Criminal Codefendants Precluding Representation by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 (1970 & Supp.2008) (outlining cases which consider what particular circumstances give rise to conflict of interest where single counsel represents multiple codefendants)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "551 S.E.2d 254, 256",
"parenthetical": "holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel's performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 143-45, 551 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (holding Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that affected her counsel’s performance given counsel jointly represented Petitioner and her husband in a case where solicitor offered a plea . bargain that would allow the charge against one spouse to be dismissed if the other spouse would plead guilty to the entire amount of cocaine); see also Staggs v. State, 372 S.C. 549, 551-52, 643 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (2007) (Petitioner in PCR proceeding demonstrated actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s trial performance where his counsel, who represented him on the charge of murder, also simultaneously represented Petitioner’s father, mother, and brother on related accessory after the fact of murder charges); see generally Allan L. Schwartz, Circumstances Giving Rise to Conflict of Interest Between or Among Criminal Codefendants Precluding Representation by Same Counsel, 34 A.L.R.3d 470 (1970 & Supp.2008) (outlining cases which consider what particular circumstances give rise to conflict of interest where single counsel represents multiple codefendants)."
} | 3,791,963 | b |
Since Prudential, the supreme court has consistently emphasized that mandamus relief is appropriate "to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "355 S.W.3d 611, 615",
"parenthetical": "\"Requiring eight separate suits here, when only one is proper, would be a clear waste of the resources of the State, the landowners, and the court.\"",
"sentence": "In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex.2014) (orig.proceeding) (concluding that appeal provided an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s refusal to dismiss an injured worker’s claim for declaratory judgment regarding insurance coverage in a personal injury action in “light of the conflict of interest and prejudice that we have noted”); see, e.g., In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex.2011) (orig.proceeding) (collecting cases) (“Requiring eight separate suits here, when only one is proper, would be a clear waste of the resources of the State, the landowners, and the court.”); In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex.2008) (orig.proceeding) (“The most frequent use we have made of mandamus relief involves cases in which the very act of proceeding to trial — regardless of the outcome — would defeat the substantive right involved.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 S.W.3d 524, 528",
"parenthetical": "concluding that appeal provided an inadequate remedy for the trial court's refusal to dismiss an injured worker's claim for declaratory judgment regarding insurance coverage in a personal injury action in \"light of the conflict of interest and prejudice that we have noted\"",
"sentence": "In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex.2014) (orig.proceeding) (concluding that appeal provided an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s refusal to dismiss an injured worker’s claim for declaratory judgment regarding insurance coverage in a personal injury action in “light of the conflict of interest and prejudice that we have noted”); see, e.g., In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex.2011) (orig.proceeding) (collecting cases) (“Requiring eight separate suits here, when only one is proper, would be a clear waste of the resources of the State, the landowners, and the court.”); In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex.2008) (orig.proceeding) (“The most frequent use we have made of mandamus relief involves cases in which the very act of proceeding to trial — regardless of the outcome — would defeat the substantive right involved.”)."
} | 6,782,104 | b |
Since Prudential, the supreme court has consistently emphasized that mandamus relief is appropriate "to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "450 S.W.3d 524, 528",
"parenthetical": "concluding that appeal provided an inadequate remedy for the trial court's refusal to dismiss an injured worker's claim for declaratory judgment regarding insurance coverage in a personal injury action in \"light of the conflict of interest and prejudice that we have noted\"",
"sentence": "In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex.2014) (orig.proceeding) (concluding that appeal provided an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s refusal to dismiss an injured worker’s claim for declaratory judgment regarding insurance coverage in a personal injury action in “light of the conflict of interest and prejudice that we have noted”); see, e.g., In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex.2011) (orig.proceeding) (collecting cases) (“Requiring eight separate suits here, when only one is proper, would be a clear waste of the resources of the State, the landowners, and the court.”); In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex.2008) (orig.proceeding) (“The most frequent use we have made of mandamus relief involves cases in which the very act of proceeding to trial — regardless of the outcome — would defeat the substantive right involved.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "275 S.W.3d 458, 465",
"parenthetical": "\"The most frequent use we have made of mandamus relief involves cases in which the very act of proceeding to trial -- regardless of the outcome -- would defeat the substantive right involved.\"",
"sentence": "In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex.2014) (orig.proceeding) (concluding that appeal provided an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s refusal to dismiss an injured worker’s claim for declaratory judgment regarding insurance coverage in a personal injury action in “light of the conflict of interest and prejudice that we have noted”); see, e.g., In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex.2011) (orig.proceeding) (collecting cases) (“Requiring eight separate suits here, when only one is proper, would be a clear waste of the resources of the State, the landowners, and the court.”); In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex.2008) (orig.proceeding) (“The most frequent use we have made of mandamus relief involves cases in which the very act of proceeding to trial — regardless of the outcome — would defeat the substantive right involved.”)."
} | 6,782,104 | a |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "370 N.J.Super. 282, 293-94",
"parenthetical": "\"Our Supreme Court has indicated that a court should be especially hesitant in implying a right to a private cause of action against an entity that is subject to such pervasive regulation by a State agency.\"",
"sentence": "See Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J.Super. 282, 293-94, 851 A.2d 88 (App.Div.2004) (“Our Supreme Court has indicated that a court should be especially hesitant in implying a right to a private cause of action against an entity that is subject to such pervasive regulation by a State agency.”) (citing R.J."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "182 N.J.Super. 24, 24",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | 4,225,812 | a |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "370 N.J.Super. 282, 293-94",
"parenthetical": "\"Our Supreme Court has indicated that a court should be especially hesitant in implying a right to a private cause of action against an entity that is subject to such pervasive regulation by a State agency.\"",
"sentence": "See Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J.Super. 282, 293-94, 851 A.2d 88 (App.Div.2004) (“Our Supreme Court has indicated that a court should be especially hesitant in implying a right to a private cause of action against an entity that is subject to such pervasive regulation by a State agency.”) (citing R.J."
} | 4,225,812 | b |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "182 N.J.Super. 24, 24",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our Supreme Court has indicated that a court should be especially hesitant in implying a right to a private cause of action against an entity that is subject to such pervasive regulation by a State agency.\"",
"sentence": "See Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J.Super. 282, 293-94, 851 A.2d 88 (App.Div.2004) (“Our Supreme Court has indicated that a court should be especially hesitant in implying a right to a private cause of action against an entity that is subject to such pervasive regulation by a State agency.”) (citing R.J."
} | 4,225,812 | b |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our Supreme Court has indicated that a court should be especially hesitant in implying a right to a private cause of action against an entity that is subject to such pervasive regulation by a State agency.\"",
"sentence": "See Castro v. NYT Television, 370 N.J.Super. 282, 293-94, 851 A.2d 88 (App.Div.2004) (“Our Supreme Court has indicated that a court should be especially hesitant in implying a right to a private cause of action against an entity that is subject to such pervasive regulation by a State agency.”) (citing R.J."
} | 4,225,812 | b |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "182 N.J.Super. 24, 24",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "168 N.J. 280, 280-81",
"parenthetical": "refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of \"comprehensive regulation\" 'of insurance industry",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | 4,225,812 | b |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "168 N.J. 280, 280-81",
"parenthetical": "refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of \"comprehensive regulation\" 'of insurance industry",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | 4,225,812 | b |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "182 N.J.Super. 24, 24",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of \"comprehensive regulation\" 'of insurance industry",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | 4,225,812 | b |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of \"comprehensive regulation\" 'of insurance industry",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | 4,225,812 | a |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "155 N.J. 245, 266",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the elaborate regulatory scheme\" under which casinos operate, the Court \"decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.\"",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "182 N.J.Super. 24, 24",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | 4,225,812 | a |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "155 N.J. 245, 266",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the elaborate regulatory scheme\" under which casinos operate, the Court \"decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.\"",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | 4,225,812 | a |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Given the elaborate regulatory scheme\" under which casinos operate, the Court \"decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.\"",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "182 N.J.Super. 24, 24",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | 4,225,812 | a |
Moreover, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature or the Racing Commission intended to create a private right of action. Indeed, the regulations provide for enforcement of the Trainer Responsibility Rule by Racing Commission stewards through the imposition of administrative sanctions (such as fines and suspensions), see N.J.A.C. 13:70-14A.7, 13:70-16.7, suggesting that no other remedy for violation of the Rule should be implied by the Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Given the elaborate regulatory scheme\" under which casinos operate, the Court \"decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.\"",
"sentence": "Gaydos, 168 N.J. at 280-81, 773 A.2d 1132 (refusing to recognize implied private cause of action against insurance company in light of “comprehensive regulation” 'of insurance industry); Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 155 N.J. 245, 266, 714 A.2d 299 (1998) (“Given the elaborate regulatory scheme” under which casinos operate, the Court “decline[d] to imply a cause of action [against casino] when no such cause of action exist[ed] at common law.”)); see also Jalowiecki, 182 N.J.Super. at 24, 440 A.2d 21 (no private right of action conferred by environmental regulations because Department of Environmental Protection has enforcement authority)."
} | 4,225,812 | b |
But when, particularly after having mentioned that petitioner had served four months in a treatment-type institution, the district court ordered twelve months to be served consecutively to the term for the marijuana conviction, the most logical -- and we hold proper -- reading is that the judge intended twelve more months of incarceration rather than twelve months as reduced by the four months served several years before. This construction is in accord with that given by all of the other circuit courts that have considered the issue. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "883 F.2d 209, 211",
"parenthetical": "\"when a convicted defendant receives less than the maximum possible sentence, it is presumed that the trial court has credited defendant with time already served unless the record shows otherwise\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kendis, 883 F.2d 209, 211 (3d Cir.1989) (“when a convicted defendant receives less than the maximum possible sentence, it is presumed that the trial court has credited defendant with time already served unless the record shows otherwise”); Davis v. United States, 790 F.2d 716, 718 (8th Cir.1986); Ochoa v. Lennon, 750 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 979, 106 S.Ct. 382, 88 L.Ed.2d 335 (1985); Granger v. United States, 688 F.2d 1296, 1297 (9th Cir.1982)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "415 F.2d 344, 345",
"parenthetical": "same presumption for pre-sentence custody time when court's sentence is less than the maximum sentence that could have been imposed",
"sentence": "Cf. Davis v. Willingham, 415 F.2d 344, 345 (10th Cir.1969) (same presumption for pre-sentence custody time when court’s sentence is less than the maximum sentence that could have been imposed)."
} | 7,410,849 | a |
. We also note that the stay of a civil forfeiture action where there is a related criminal action often can serve to benefit criminal defendants who are claimants to the property that is the subject of the civil forfeiture action; the stay in the civil case prevents the government from using civil discovery as a means to obtain information to flesh out the criminal case against the claimants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "781 F.Supp. 830, 834-35",
"parenthetical": "granting a stay of discovery in a civil forfeiture action to protect a criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment rights",
"sentence": "See Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1203 (Fed.Cir.1987) (\"The broad scope of civil discovery may present to both the prosecution, and at times the criminal defendant, an irresistible temptation to use that discovery to one's advantage in the criminal case.”); see also United States v. A Certain Parcel of Land, 781 F.Supp. 830, 834-35 (D.N.H.1992) (granting a stay of discovery in a civil forfeiture action to protect a criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment rights)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "820 F.2d 1198, 1203",
"parenthetical": "\"The broad scope of civil discovery may present to both the prosecution, and at times the criminal defendant, an irresistible temptation to use that discovery to one's advantage in the criminal case.\"",
"sentence": "See Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1203 (Fed.Cir.1987) (\"The broad scope of civil discovery may present to both the prosecution, and at times the criminal defendant, an irresistible temptation to use that discovery to one's advantage in the criminal case.”); see also United States v. A Certain Parcel of Land, 781 F.Supp. 830, 834-35 (D.N.H.1992) (granting a stay of discovery in a civil forfeiture action to protect a criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment rights)."
} | 4,053,710 | b |
Defendant is correct that plaintiff did not assert the allegations in counts 4, 8, 10, and 11 before the ABCMR. When a plaintiff fails to raise arguments before the ABCMR, he or she is precluded from raising those arguments for the first time before this court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "582 F.3d 1358, 1367",
"parenthetical": "holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board\"",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 4,008,889 | a |
Defendant is correct that plaintiff did not assert the allegations in counts 4, 8, 10, and 11 before the ABCMR. When a plaintiff fails to raise arguments before the ABCMR, he or she is precluded from raising those arguments for the first time before this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "591 F.3d 1372, 1374",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board\"",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "582 F.3d 1358, 1367",
"parenthetical": "holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 4,008,889 | b |
Defendant is correct that plaintiff did not assert the allegations in counts 4, 8, 10, and 11 before the ABCMR. When a plaintiff fails to raise arguments before the ABCMR, he or she is precluded from raising those arguments for the first time before this court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 F.3d 991, 999",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board\"",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 4,008,889 | a |
Defendant is correct that plaintiff did not assert the allegations in counts 4, 8, 10, and 11 before the ABCMR. When a plaintiff fails to raise arguments before the ABCMR, he or she is precluded from raising those arguments for the first time before this court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 F.3d 991, 999",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "591 F.3d 1372, 1374",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board\"",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 4,008,889 | a |
Defendant is correct that plaintiff did not assert the allegations in counts 4, 8, 10, and 11 before the ABCMR. When a plaintiff fails to raise arguments before the ABCMR, he or she is precluded from raising those arguments for the first time before this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board\"",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "398 F.3d 1342, 1354",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father's constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 4,008,889 | b |
Defendant is correct that plaintiff did not assert the allegations in counts 4, 8, 10, and 11 before the ABCMR. When a plaintiff fails to raise arguments before the ABCMR, he or she is precluded from raising those arguments for the first time before this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "591 F.3d 1372, 1374",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board\"",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "398 F.3d 1342, 1354",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father's constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 4,008,889 | b |
Defendant is correct that plaintiff did not assert the allegations in counts 4, 8, 10, and 11 before the ABCMR. When a plaintiff fails to raise arguments before the ABCMR, he or she is precluded from raising those arguments for the first time before this court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283",
"parenthetical": "\"When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims' review is limited to the administrative record.\"",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board\"",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 4,008,889 | a |
Defendant is correct that plaintiff did not assert the allegations in counts 4, 8, 10, and 11 before the ABCMR. When a plaintiff fails to raise arguments before the ABCMR, he or she is precluded from raising those arguments for the first time before this court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "591 F.3d 1372, 1374",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board\"",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283",
"parenthetical": "\"When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims' review is limited to the administrative record.\"",
"sentence": "See Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed.Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”) (citations omitted); Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979)) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.”); see also Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed.Cl. 545, 560 (2008) (“[t]he court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review board”), aff'd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 4,008,889 | b |
Tr. at 36:19-37:15. Indeed, Uber argued that so long as just one driver opted-out of the 2013 Agreement's arbitration provision, the opt-out right necessarily must have been "real," and thus the arbitration provision (and importantly for this discussion, the delegation clause) was not oppressive or otherwise procedurally unconscionable. And even if Uber had presented such evidence, this Court has significant doubts that the California Supreme Court would vindicate an opt-out clause simply because a few signatories out of thousands were able to (and did) successfully opt-out. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "42 Cal.4th 471, 471-72",
"parenthetical": "finding that even the presence of a conspicuous opt-out provision did not render an arbitration provision entirely without procedural unconscionability or oppression",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 471-72, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (finding that even the presence of a conspicuous opt-out provision did not render an arbitration provision entirely without procedural unconscionability or oppression); see also Duran v. Discover Bank, 2009 WL 1709569, at *5 (Cal.Ct.App.2009) (unpublished) (concluding that Gentry held generally that “even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1709569, at *5",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Gentry held generally that \"even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion\"",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 471-72, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (finding that even the presence of a conspicuous opt-out provision did not render an arbitration provision entirely without procedural unconscionability or oppression); see also Duran v. Discover Bank, 2009 WL 1709569, at *5 (Cal.Ct.App.2009) (unpublished) (concluding that Gentry held generally that “even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion”)."
} | 4,365,077 | a |
Tr. at 36:19-37:15. Indeed, Uber argued that so long as just one driver opted-out of the 2013 Agreement's arbitration provision, the opt-out right necessarily must have been "real," and thus the arbitration provision (and importantly for this discussion, the delegation clause) was not oppressive or otherwise procedurally unconscionable. And even if Uber had presented such evidence, this Court has significant doubts that the California Supreme Court would vindicate an opt-out clause simply because a few signatories out of thousands were able to (and did) successfully opt-out. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that even the presence of a conspicuous opt-out provision did not render an arbitration provision entirely without procedural unconscionability or oppression",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 471-72, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (finding that even the presence of a conspicuous opt-out provision did not render an arbitration provision entirely without procedural unconscionability or oppression); see also Duran v. Discover Bank, 2009 WL 1709569, at *5 (Cal.Ct.App.2009) (unpublished) (concluding that Gentry held generally that “even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1709569, at *5",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Gentry held generally that \"even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion\"",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 471-72, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (finding that even the presence of a conspicuous opt-out provision did not render an arbitration provision entirely without procedural unconscionability or oppression); see also Duran v. Discover Bank, 2009 WL 1709569, at *5 (Cal.Ct.App.2009) (unpublished) (concluding that Gentry held generally that “even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion”)."
} | 4,365,077 | a |
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