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Congress did not define "member" when it enacted IGRA, nor would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive authority to determine membership issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe's membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that \"a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "249 F.2d 915, 920",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | 7,846,813 | b |
Congress did not define "member" when it enacted IGRA, nor would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive authority to determine membership issues. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe's membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that \"a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | 7,846,813 | a |
Congress did not define "member" when it enacted IGRA, nor would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive authority to determine membership issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe's membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that \"a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | 7,846,813 | b |
Congress did not define "member" when it enacted IGRA, nor would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive authority to determine membership issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe's membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that \"a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | 7,846,813 | b |
Congress did not define "member" when it enacted IGRA, nor would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive authority to determine membership issues. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe's membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that \"a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | 7,846,813 | a |
Congress did not define "member" when it enacted IGRA, nor would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive authority to determine membership issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe's membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that \"a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | 7,846,813 | b |
Congress did not define "member" when it enacted IGRA, nor would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive authority to determine membership issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe's membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that \"a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | 7,846,813 | b |
Congress did not define "member" when it enacted IGRA, nor would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive authority to determine membership issues. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe's membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that \"a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | 7,846,813 | b |
Congress did not define "member" when it enacted IGRA, nor would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive authority to determine membership issues. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe's membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that \"a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | 7,846,813 | a |
Congress did not define "member" when it enacted IGRA, nor would federally imposed criteria be consonant with federal Indian policy. The great weight of authority holds that tribes have exclusive authority to determine membership issues. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe's membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that \"a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 1374, 2 L.Ed.2d 1376 (1958) (“[t]he Courts have consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political entity”); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) (holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribe’s membership requirements violated ICRA, and noting that “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community”)."
} | 7,846,813 | a |
In fact, this terminology is generally employed interchangeably, often within the same opinion." And the Alaska courts have stated that "a plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable value of the services rendered to the defendant" "[kinder. the doctrine of quantum meruit" only "when a valid contract does not exist...." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "37 P.3d 411, 419",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"plaintiffs may generally recover in quantum meruit for services rendered\" only \"[w]hen parties to a contract dispute do not have a valid contract\"",
"sentence": "Romero v. Cox, 166 P.3d 4, 9 (Alaska 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Krossa v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., 37 P.3d 411, 419 (Alaska 2001) (noting that “plaintiffs may generally recover in quantum meruit for services rendered” only “[w]hen parties to a contract dispute do not have a valid contract”); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006 n. 1 (Alaska 1983) (“It is well settled that proof of an express contract covering the services in question precludes relief in quantum meru-it.”); cf. Nicdao, 839 F.Supp.2d at 1071 (discussing the requirements for showing unjust enrichment under Alaska law, and stating that “[generally, a[p]laintiff may not rely on a theory of implied contract where a valid, express contract governs” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933, 940 (Alaska 2004) (“Enforcement of a valid contract does not constitute unjust enrichment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "95 P.3d 933, 940",
"parenthetical": "\"Enforcement of a valid contract does not constitute unjust enrichment.\"",
"sentence": "Romero v. Cox, 166 P.3d 4, 9 (Alaska 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Krossa v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., 37 P.3d 411, 419 (Alaska 2001) (noting that “plaintiffs may generally recover in quantum meruit for services rendered” only “[w]hen parties to a contract dispute do not have a valid contract”); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006 n. 1 (Alaska 1983) (“It is well settled that proof of an express contract covering the services in question precludes relief in quantum meru-it.”); cf. Nicdao, 839 F.Supp.2d at 1071 (discussing the requirements for showing unjust enrichment under Alaska law, and stating that “[generally, a[p]laintiff may not rely on a theory of implied contract where a valid, express contract governs” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933, 940 (Alaska 2004) (“Enforcement of a valid contract does not constitute unjust enrichment.”)."
} | 4,338,253 | a |
In fact, this terminology is generally employed interchangeably, often within the same opinion." And the Alaska courts have stated that "a plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable value of the services rendered to the defendant" "[kinder. the doctrine of quantum meruit" only "when a valid contract does not exist...." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that proof of an express contract covering the services in question precludes relief in quantum meru-it.\"",
"sentence": "Romero v. Cox, 166 P.3d 4, 9 (Alaska 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Krossa v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., 37 P.3d 411, 419 (Alaska 2001) (noting that “plaintiffs may generally recover in quantum meruit for services rendered” only “[w]hen parties to a contract dispute do not have a valid contract”); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006 n. 1 (Alaska 1983) (“It is well settled that proof of an express contract covering the services in question precludes relief in quantum meru-it.”); cf. Nicdao, 839 F.Supp.2d at 1071 (discussing the requirements for showing unjust enrichment under Alaska law, and stating that “[generally, a[p]laintiff may not rely on a theory of implied contract where a valid, express contract governs” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933, 940 (Alaska 2004) (“Enforcement of a valid contract does not constitute unjust enrichment.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "95 P.3d 933, 940",
"parenthetical": "\"Enforcement of a valid contract does not constitute unjust enrichment.\"",
"sentence": "Romero v. Cox, 166 P.3d 4, 9 (Alaska 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Krossa v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., 37 P.3d 411, 419 (Alaska 2001) (noting that “plaintiffs may generally recover in quantum meruit for services rendered” only “[w]hen parties to a contract dispute do not have a valid contract”); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006 n. 1 (Alaska 1983) (“It is well settled that proof of an express contract covering the services in question precludes relief in quantum meru-it.”); cf. Nicdao, 839 F.Supp.2d at 1071 (discussing the requirements for showing unjust enrichment under Alaska law, and stating that “[generally, a[p]laintiff may not rely on a theory of implied contract where a valid, express contract governs” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933, 940 (Alaska 2004) (“Enforcement of a valid contract does not constitute unjust enrichment.”)."
} | 4,338,253 | a |
Based on this procedural history, the court cannot conclude that the plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations was tolled during the time that the plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis and his motion for reconsideration were pending. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "150 F.Supp.2d 17, 19",
"parenthetical": "noting that the defendant conceded that \"the lodging of a request to proceed IFP tolls the limitations period until the court rules on the plaintiffs request\"",
"sentence": "Baker v. Henderson, 150 F.Supp.2d 17, 19 (D.D.C.2001) (noting that the defendant conceded that “the lodging of a request to proceed IFP tolls the limitations period until the court rules on the plaintiffs request”); see also Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 & 1053 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1988) (tolling the statute of limitations while the plaintiffs motion to alter judgment of dismissal was pending); Barnes v. United States, 2004 WL 2203456, at *5 & n. 7 (D.Kan. Sept.27, 2004) (stating that “numerous courts have held in various contexts that submission of a complaint for filing without the required filing fee or IFP application constitutes ‘filing’ for purposes of the statute of limitations”), rev’d on other grounds, Barnes v. United States, 137 Fed.Appx. 184, (10th Cir.2005)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "tolling the statute of limitations while the plaintiffs motion to alter judgment of dismissal was pending",
"sentence": "Baker v. Henderson, 150 F.Supp.2d 17, 19 (D.D.C.2001) (noting that the defendant conceded that “the lodging of a request to proceed IFP tolls the limitations period until the court rules on the plaintiffs request”); see also Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 & 1053 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1988) (tolling the statute of limitations while the plaintiffs motion to alter judgment of dismissal was pending); Barnes v. United States, 2004 WL 2203456, at *5 & n. 7 (D.Kan. Sept.27, 2004) (stating that “numerous courts have held in various contexts that submission of a complaint for filing without the required filing fee or IFP application constitutes ‘filing’ for purposes of the statute of limitations”), rev’d on other grounds, Barnes v. United States, 137 Fed.Appx. 184, (10th Cir.2005)."
} | 3,862,813 | a |
Based on this procedural history, the court cannot conclude that the plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations was tolled during the time that the plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis and his motion for reconsideration were pending. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "150 F.Supp.2d 17, 19",
"parenthetical": "noting that the defendant conceded that \"the lodging of a request to proceed IFP tolls the limitations period until the court rules on the plaintiffs request\"",
"sentence": "Baker v. Henderson, 150 F.Supp.2d 17, 19 (D.D.C.2001) (noting that the defendant conceded that “the lodging of a request to proceed IFP tolls the limitations period until the court rules on the plaintiffs request”); see also Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 & 1053 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1988) (tolling the statute of limitations while the plaintiffs motion to alter judgment of dismissal was pending); Barnes v. United States, 2004 WL 2203456, at *5 & n. 7 (D.Kan. Sept.27, 2004) (stating that “numerous courts have held in various contexts that submission of a complaint for filing without the required filing fee or IFP application constitutes ‘filing’ for purposes of the statute of limitations”), rev’d on other grounds, Barnes v. United States, 137 Fed.Appx. 184, (10th Cir.2005)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"numerous courts have held in various contexts that submission of a complaint for filing without the required filing fee or IFP application constitutes 'filing' for purposes of the statute of limitations\"",
"sentence": "Baker v. Henderson, 150 F.Supp.2d 17, 19 (D.D.C.2001) (noting that the defendant conceded that “the lodging of a request to proceed IFP tolls the limitations period until the court rules on the plaintiffs request”); see also Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 & 1053 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1988) (tolling the statute of limitations while the plaintiffs motion to alter judgment of dismissal was pending); Barnes v. United States, 2004 WL 2203456, at *5 & n. 7 (D.Kan. Sept.27, 2004) (stating that “numerous courts have held in various contexts that submission of a complaint for filing without the required filing fee or IFP application constitutes ‘filing’ for purposes of the statute of limitations”), rev’d on other grounds, Barnes v. United States, 137 Fed.Appx. 184, (10th Cir.2005)."
} | 3,862,813 | a |
Based on this procedural history, the court cannot conclude that the plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations was tolled during the time that the plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis and his motion for reconsideration were pending. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "150 F.Supp.2d 17, 19",
"parenthetical": "noting that the defendant conceded that \"the lodging of a request to proceed IFP tolls the limitations period until the court rules on the plaintiffs request\"",
"sentence": "Baker v. Henderson, 150 F.Supp.2d 17, 19 (D.D.C.2001) (noting that the defendant conceded that “the lodging of a request to proceed IFP tolls the limitations period until the court rules on the plaintiffs request”); see also Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 & 1053 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1988) (tolling the statute of limitations while the plaintiffs motion to alter judgment of dismissal was pending); Barnes v. United States, 2004 WL 2203456, at *5 & n. 7 (D.Kan. Sept.27, 2004) (stating that “numerous courts have held in various contexts that submission of a complaint for filing without the required filing fee or IFP application constitutes ‘filing’ for purposes of the statute of limitations”), rev’d on other grounds, Barnes v. United States, 137 Fed.Appx. 184, (10th Cir.2005)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"numerous courts have held in various contexts that submission of a complaint for filing without the required filing fee or IFP application constitutes 'filing' for purposes of the statute of limitations\"",
"sentence": "Baker v. Henderson, 150 F.Supp.2d 17, 19 (D.D.C.2001) (noting that the defendant conceded that “the lodging of a request to proceed IFP tolls the limitations period until the court rules on the plaintiffs request”); see also Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 & 1053 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1988) (tolling the statute of limitations while the plaintiffs motion to alter judgment of dismissal was pending); Barnes v. United States, 2004 WL 2203456, at *5 & n. 7 (D.Kan. Sept.27, 2004) (stating that “numerous courts have held in various contexts that submission of a complaint for filing without the required filing fee or IFP application constitutes ‘filing’ for purposes of the statute of limitations”), rev’d on other grounds, Barnes v. United States, 137 Fed.Appx. 184, (10th Cir.2005)."
} | 3,862,813 | a |
Further, Appellants were in a position at the time the goods were delivered to the Debtor to more adequately protect their interests by retaining and perfecting a purchase money security interest in the goods sold and notifying the secured creditors of their security interest. They chose not to do so and therefore, lost the right to prevent the commingling and use of then-products so that it is now impossible to determine whose inventory remains in the Debtor's possession. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "32 B.R. 923, 923",
"parenthetical": "\"the UCC presents the seller the possibility of complete protection through a different medium [rather than the reclamation process], the purchase money security interest.\"",
"sentence": "See Steinberg’s, 226 B.R. at 11 (“reclaiming seller could always have availed itself of greater protection by procuring a purchase money security interest on the subject goods”); see also Wathen’s Elevators, Inc., 32 B.R. at 923 (“the UCC presents the seller the possibility of complete protection through a different medium [rather than the reclamation process], the purchase money security interest.”); U.S. Billiards Co., Inc. v. Greenberger (In re Bensar Co., Inc.), 36 B.R. 699, 704 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1984); U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-312(3)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "226 B.R. 11, 11",
"parenthetical": "\"reclaiming seller could always have availed itself of greater protection by procuring a purchase money security interest on the subject goods\"",
"sentence": "See Steinberg’s, 226 B.R. at 11 (“reclaiming seller could always have availed itself of greater protection by procuring a purchase money security interest on the subject goods”); see also Wathen’s Elevators, Inc., 32 B.R. at 923 (“the UCC presents the seller the possibility of complete protection through a different medium [rather than the reclamation process], the purchase money security interest.”); U.S. Billiards Co., Inc. v. Greenberger (In re Bensar Co., Inc.), 36 B.R. 699, 704 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1984); U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-312(3)."
} | 9,243,405 | b |
. In Edgar, a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that the boundary is similar to the familiar line demarcating the jurisdiction of a state's courts. However, the Court has subsequently cast considerable doubt on this suggestion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "593 F.3d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.\"",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 298, 305-313",
"parenthetical": "discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | 4,280,963 | b |
. In Edgar, a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that the boundary is similar to the familiar line demarcating the jurisdiction of a state's courts. However, the Court has subsequently cast considerable doubt on this suggestion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "492 F.3d 491, 491",
"parenthetical": "\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market's undoing.\"",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 298, 305-313",
"parenthetical": "discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | 4,280,963 | b |
. In Edgar, a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that the boundary is similar to the familiar line demarcating the jurisdiction of a state's courts. However, the Court has subsequently cast considerable doubt on this suggestion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "593 F.3d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.\"",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | 4,280,963 | a |
. In Edgar, a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that the boundary is similar to the familiar line demarcating the jurisdiction of a state's courts. However, the Court has subsequently cast considerable doubt on this suggestion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "492 F.3d 491, 491",
"parenthetical": "\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market's undoing.\"",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | 4,280,963 | a |
. In Edgar, a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that the boundary is similar to the familiar line demarcating the jurisdiction of a state's courts. However, the Court has subsequently cast considerable doubt on this suggestion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "593 F.3d 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.\"",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | 4,280,963 | a |
. In Edgar, a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that the boundary is similar to the familiar line demarcating the jurisdiction of a state's courts. However, the Court has subsequently cast considerable doubt on this suggestion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "492 F.3d 491, 491",
"parenthetical": "\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market's undoing.\"",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses",
"sentence": "See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-313, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (discussing differing scope of and concerns animating the Due Process and Commerce Clauses); cf. Midwest Title, 593 F.3d at 668 (\"[I]f the presence of an interest that might support state jurisdiction ... dissolved the constitutional objection to extraterritorial regulation, there wouldn't be much left of Healy and its cognates.”); Carolina Trucks, 492 F.3d at 491 (\"If a state could leverage contacts within its borders to control a company's conduct elsewhere without being held to regulate extraterritorially, this would be the national market’s undoing.”)."
} | 4,280,963 | b |
Rather, the FMIA merely notes the consequences of adulterated meat on the meat industry. 21 U.S.C. SS 602 (stating that adulterated meat products "result in sundry losses to ... processors of meat"). Based on the plain language of the statute, as Defendant correctly argues, the purpose of the FMIA is to protect the "health and welfare of consumers." Id. Therefore Plaintiff, as a matter of law, is not the intended direct beneficiary of Defendant's inspection duties under the FMIA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "448 F.3d 1065, 1067",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"the FSIS conducts inspections to ensure that the poultry sold to the public is sanitary, not to benefit chicken-processing plants or their owners\" and therefore concluding that the government could not be liable under Section 323's Good Samaritan rule",
"sentence": "See Barnes v. United States, 448 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir.2006) (finding that “the FSIS conducts inspections to ensure that the poultry sold to the public is sanitary, not to benefit chicken-processing plants or their owners” and therefore concluding that the government could not be liable under Section 323’s Good Samaritan rule); cf. Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3d Cir.1982) (finding that the Ports and Waterways Safety Act created inspection duties only to the public generally and therefore concluding that Section 323 was inapplicable)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "687 F.2d 707, 716",
"parenthetical": "finding that the Ports and Waterways Safety Act created inspection duties only to the public generally and therefore concluding that Section 323 was inapplicable",
"sentence": "See Barnes v. United States, 448 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir.2006) (finding that “the FSIS conducts inspections to ensure that the poultry sold to the public is sanitary, not to benefit chicken-processing plants or their owners” and therefore concluding that the government could not be liable under Section 323’s Good Samaritan rule); cf. Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3d Cir.1982) (finding that the Ports and Waterways Safety Act created inspection duties only to the public generally and therefore concluding that Section 323 was inapplicable)."
} | 3,088,594 | a |
However, Plaintiff alleges that the eavesdropping violation occurred "[i]n between the demonstrations" and while Plaintiff and his colleagues were "video reeoi'd[ing] the Circus' treatment of animals over the [loading dock] wall" near the back of the San Jose arena. There is no allegation that Plaintiff, by "lean[ing] in close to the ear of Mark Ennis" after having "looked around to visually ensure no one" else was listening, id. P 48, was addressing anyone other than Ennis, let alone members of the public at a public meeting, rally, or assembly of some sort. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "characterizing \"a large, public celebration held outdoors in a public park, featuring, in the course of a political campaign, a public official as the principal speaker\" as a \"public meeting\" or \"public gathering\"",
"sentence": "See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 609 (7th Cir.2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (explaining that the term “public gathering,” as used in section 632(c), “connotes a public meeting of some sort”); cf. In re Kay, 1 Cal.3d 930, 83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142, 151, 153 (1970) (characterizing “a large, public celebration held outdoors in a public park, featuring, in the course of a political campaign, a public official as the principal speaker” as a “public meeting” or “public gathering”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "679 F.3d 583, 609",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the term \"public gathering,\" as used in section 632(c",
"sentence": "See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 609 (7th Cir.2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (explaining that the term “public gathering,” as used in section 632(c), “connotes a public meeting of some sort”); cf. In re Kay, 1 Cal.3d 930, 83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142, 151, 153 (1970) (characterizing “a large, public celebration held outdoors in a public park, featuring, in the course of a political campaign, a public official as the principal speaker” as a “public meeting” or “public gathering”)."
} | 5,759,260 | b |
However, Plaintiff alleges that the eavesdropping violation occurred "[i]n between the demonstrations" and while Plaintiff and his colleagues were "video reeoi'd[ing] the Circus' treatment of animals over the [loading dock] wall" near the back of the San Jose arena. There is no allegation that Plaintiff, by "lean[ing] in close to the ear of Mark Ennis" after having "looked around to visually ensure no one" else was listening, id. P 48, was addressing anyone other than Ennis, let alone members of the public at a public meeting, rally, or assembly of some sort. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "679 F.3d 583, 609",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the term \"public gathering,\" as used in section 632(c",
"sentence": "See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 609 (7th Cir.2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (explaining that the term “public gathering,” as used in section 632(c), “connotes a public meeting of some sort”); cf. In re Kay, 1 Cal.3d 930, 83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142, 151, 153 (1970) (characterizing “a large, public celebration held outdoors in a public park, featuring, in the course of a political campaign, a public official as the principal speaker” as a “public meeting” or “public gathering”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "characterizing \"a large, public celebration held outdoors in a public park, featuring, in the course of a political campaign, a public official as the principal speaker\" as a \"public meeting\" or \"public gathering\"",
"sentence": "See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 609 (7th Cir.2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (explaining that the term “public gathering,” as used in section 632(c), “connotes a public meeting of some sort”); cf. In re Kay, 1 Cal.3d 930, 83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142, 151, 153 (1970) (characterizing “a large, public celebration held outdoors in a public park, featuring, in the course of a political campaign, a public official as the principal speaker” as a “public meeting” or “public gathering”)."
} | 5,759,260 | a |
However, Plaintiff alleges that the eavesdropping violation occurred "[i]n between the demonstrations" and while Plaintiff and his colleagues were "video reeoi'd[ing] the Circus' treatment of animals over the [loading dock] wall" near the back of the San Jose arena. There is no allegation that Plaintiff, by "lean[ing] in close to the ear of Mark Ennis" after having "looked around to visually ensure no one" else was listening, id. P 48, was addressing anyone other than Ennis, let alone members of the public at a public meeting, rally, or assembly of some sort. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "464 P.2d 142, 151, 153",
"parenthetical": "characterizing \"a large, public celebration held outdoors in a public park, featuring, in the course of a political campaign, a public official as the principal speaker\" as a \"public meeting\" or \"public gathering\"",
"sentence": "See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 609 (7th Cir.2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (explaining that the term “public gathering,” as used in section 632(c), “connotes a public meeting of some sort”); cf. In re Kay, 1 Cal.3d 930, 83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142, 151, 153 (1970) (characterizing “a large, public celebration held outdoors in a public park, featuring, in the course of a political campaign, a public official as the principal speaker” as a “public meeting” or “public gathering”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "679 F.3d 583, 609",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the term \"public gathering,\" as used in section 632(c",
"sentence": "See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 609 (7th Cir.2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (explaining that the term “public gathering,” as used in section 632(c), “connotes a public meeting of some sort”); cf. In re Kay, 1 Cal.3d 930, 83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142, 151, 153 (1970) (characterizing “a large, public celebration held outdoors in a public park, featuring, in the course of a political campaign, a public official as the principal speaker” as a “public meeting” or “public gathering”)."
} | 5,759,260 | b |
After de novo review, we find no legal error in the district court's conclusion that, based on the facts admitted by Hunt, the SS 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement applied. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting Booker constitutional challenge to district court's imposition of U.S.S.G. SS 2B3.1(b",
"sentence": "See United States v. Cover, 199 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir.2000) (\"In sentencing guidelines cases, we review for clear error a district court’s factual findings and review de novo the district court’s application of law to those facts.”); see also United States v. Petho, 409 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 n. 1 (11th Cir.2005) (rejecting Booker constitutional challenge to district court's imposition of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) enhancement for making a threat of death in the course of robbery of a financial institution; defendant admitted underlying facts and \"[t]he determinations that the bank was a financial institution and that the note constituted a threat of death were not factual findings, but legal conclusions properly made by the court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "199 F.3d 1270, 1274",
"parenthetical": "\"In sentencing guidelines cases, we review for clear error a district court's factual findings and review de novo the district court's application of law to those facts.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Cover, 199 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir.2000) (\"In sentencing guidelines cases, we review for clear error a district court’s factual findings and review de novo the district court’s application of law to those facts.”); see also United States v. Petho, 409 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 n. 1 (11th Cir.2005) (rejecting Booker constitutional challenge to district court's imposition of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) enhancement for making a threat of death in the course of robbery of a financial institution; defendant admitted underlying facts and \"[t]he determinations that the bank was a financial institution and that the note constituted a threat of death were not factual findings, but legal conclusions properly made by the court”)."
} | 1,226,458 | b |
In Lindh v. Murphy, which concerned the retroactive effect of AEDPA's provision heightening the standards for the availability of habeas relief in noncapital cases, the Supreme Court elaborated further on the initial step of the Landgraf analysis. Finding that silence as to temporal reach in one provision of the statute implied prospectivity where Congress had expressly provided for retroactivity to pending cases in another provision, the Lindh Court established negative implication as one of the "normal rules of statutory construction" to be used by the courts in determining a statute's temporal reach. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "describing Lindh as having added a \"new step\" to the Landgraf analysis",
"sentence": "See also Mayers, 175 F.3d at 1302 {“Lindh expands the tools available to courts to determine congressional intent”); Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 240 (“the Lindh Court made clear that the rule of negative implication is part of the normal rules of statutory construction”); cf. Mathews v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 161 F.3d 156 (3d Cir.1998) (describing Lindh as having added a “new step” to the Landgraf analysis)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "166 F.3d 240, 240",
"parenthetical": "\"the Lindh Court made clear that the rule of negative implication is part of the normal rules of statutory construction\"",
"sentence": "See also Mayers, 175 F.3d at 1302 {“Lindh expands the tools available to courts to determine congressional intent”); Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 240 (“the Lindh Court made clear that the rule of negative implication is part of the normal rules of statutory construction”); cf. Mathews v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 161 F.3d 156 (3d Cir.1998) (describing Lindh as having added a “new step” to the Landgraf analysis)."
} | 11,543,752 | b |
The buyer, however, testified at sentencing that Mendoza had arranged the drug deal and had sold drugs to her on several previous occasions. Mendoza offered no evidence to rebut this witness's testimony, which the district court found credible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "221 F.3d 1058, 1059",
"parenthetical": "district court did not clearly err in determining defendant was not fully truthful and in thus denying safety-valve relief, because defendant did not introduce any evidence to support his position",
"sentence": "See United States v. Castaneda, 221 F.3d 1058, 1059 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (district court did not clearly err in determining defendant was not fully truthful and in thus denying safety-valve relief, because defendant did not introduce any evidence to support his position); cf. United States v. Quintana, 340 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir.2003) (where district court directly observed defendant and other witnesses testify, finding no clear error in court’s assessment of their truthfulness)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "340 F.3d 700, 703",
"parenthetical": "where district court directly observed defendant and other witnesses testify, finding no clear error in court's assessment of their truthfulness",
"sentence": "See United States v. Castaneda, 221 F.3d 1058, 1059 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (district court did not clearly err in determining defendant was not fully truthful and in thus denying safety-valve relief, because defendant did not introduce any evidence to support his position); cf. United States v. Quintana, 340 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir.2003) (where district court directly observed defendant and other witnesses testify, finding no clear error in court’s assessment of their truthfulness)."
} | 5,728,884 | a |
In fact, he said that if a person had even a "moderate limitation" adhering to a schedule or concentrating or understanding or handling instructions, then she would be precluded from work (Id.). The ALJ's failure to address this issue in her opinion raises a red flag that, at a minimum, needs to be acknowledged on remand and then lowered if the Commissioner continues to deny Title II benefits for the relevant period. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "900 F.Supp. 994, 1003-04",
"parenthetical": "holding that the ALJ did not consider the vocational expert's testimony on cross-examination and failed to articulate a basis for rejecting this evidence, which was a basis for remand",
"sentence": "See Sayles v. Barnhart, No. 00 C 7200, 2001 WL 1568850, at *9 (N.D.Ill., Dec. 7, 2001)(finding that “the fundamental problem with the ALJ’s determination is that both in the body of her ruling and in her findings, she addressed the vocational expert’s opinion in response to only one of the hypotheticals ... and disregarded the others”); see also Connor v. Shalala, 900 F.Supp. 994, 1003-04 (N.D.Ill.1995) (holding that the ALJ did not consider the vocational expert’s testimony on cross-examination and failed to articulate a basis for rejecting this evidence, which was a basis for remand)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2001 WL 1568850, at *9",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"the fundamental problem with the ALJ's determination is that both in the body of her ruling and in her findings, she addressed the vocational expert's opinion in response to only one of the hypotheticals ... and disregarded the others\"",
"sentence": "See Sayles v. Barnhart, No. 00 C 7200, 2001 WL 1568850, at *9 (N.D.Ill., Dec. 7, 2001)(finding that “the fundamental problem with the ALJ’s determination is that both in the body of her ruling and in her findings, she addressed the vocational expert’s opinion in response to only one of the hypotheticals ... and disregarded the others”); see also Connor v. Shalala, 900 F.Supp. 994, 1003-04 (N.D.Ill.1995) (holding that the ALJ did not consider the vocational expert’s testimony on cross-examination and failed to articulate a basis for rejecting this evidence, which was a basis for remand)."
} | 3,835,448 | b |
Remand for the requisite findings is not appropriate here because the wife failed to bring forth any evidence to support such findings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing attorney's fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Davis, 613 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the Rowe factors, reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees); Wiley v. Wiley, 485 So.2d 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court, the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorney’s fees); see also Broyles v. Broyles, 573 So.2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (reversing attorney’s fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed), review dismissed, 584 So.2d 997 (Fla.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the Rowe factors, reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Davis, 613 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the Rowe factors, reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees); Wiley v. Wiley, 485 So.2d 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court, the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorney’s fees); see also Broyles v. Broyles, 573 So.2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (reversing attorney’s fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed), review dismissed, 584 So.2d 997 (Fla.1991)."
} | 11,995,107 | b |
Remand for the requisite findings is not appropriate here because the wife failed to bring forth any evidence to support such findings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the Rowe factors, reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Davis, 613 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the Rowe factors, reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees); Wiley v. Wiley, 485 So.2d 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court, the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorney’s fees); see also Broyles v. Broyles, 573 So.2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (reversing attorney’s fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed), review dismissed, 584 So.2d 997 (Fla.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing attorney's fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Davis, 613 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the Rowe factors, reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees); Wiley v. Wiley, 485 So.2d 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court, the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorney’s fees); see also Broyles v. Broyles, 573 So.2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (reversing attorney’s fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed), review dismissed, 584 So.2d 997 (Fla.1991)."
} | 11,995,107 | a |
Remand for the requisite findings is not appropriate here because the wife failed to bring forth any evidence to support such findings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing attorney's fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Davis, 613 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the Rowe factors, reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees); Wiley v. Wiley, 485 So.2d 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court, the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorney’s fees); see also Broyles v. Broyles, 573 So.2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (reversing attorney’s fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed), review dismissed, 584 So.2d 997 (Fla.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court, the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Davis, 613 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the Rowe factors, reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees); Wiley v. Wiley, 485 So.2d 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court, the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorney’s fees); see also Broyles v. Broyles, 573 So.2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (reversing attorney’s fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed), review dismissed, 584 So.2d 997 (Fla.1991)."
} | 11,995,107 | b |
Remand for the requisite findings is not appropriate here because the wife failed to bring forth any evidence to support such findings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing attorney's fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Davis, 613 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the Rowe factors, reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees); Wiley v. Wiley, 485 So.2d 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court, the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorney’s fees); see also Broyles v. Broyles, 573 So.2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (reversing attorney’s fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed), review dismissed, 584 So.2d 997 (Fla.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court, the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Davis, 613 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the Rowe factors, reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees); Wiley v. Wiley, 485 So.2d 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court, the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorney’s fees); see also Broyles v. Broyles, 573 So.2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (reversing attorney’s fee award where it was entered without notice to the husband and without the husband first having an opportunity to review and rebut the reasonableness of the amount claimed), review dismissed, 584 So.2d 997 (Fla.1991)."
} | 11,995,107 | b |
Illinois courts distinguish bailments from conditional sales, which create only an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailment exists when goods are \"disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner's] benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (“[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.”); see also People v. Moses, 375 Ill. 336, 31 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1940) (bailment exists when goods are “disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner’s] benefit”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.\"",
"sentence": "See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (“[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.”); see also People v. Moses, 375 Ill. 336, 31 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1940) (bailment exists when goods are “disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner’s] benefit”)."
} | 4,236,842 | b |
Illinois courts distinguish bailments from conditional sales, which create only an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "31 N.E.2d 585, 587",
"parenthetical": "bailment exists when goods are \"disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner's] benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (“[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.”); see also People v. Moses, 375 Ill. 336, 31 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1940) (bailment exists when goods are “disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner’s] benefit”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.\"",
"sentence": "See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (“[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.”); see also People v. Moses, 375 Ill. 336, 31 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1940) (bailment exists when goods are “disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner’s] benefit”)."
} | 4,236,842 | b |
Illinois courts distinguish bailments from conditional sales, which create only an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "22 N.E. 542, 543",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.\"",
"sentence": "See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (“[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.”); see also People v. Moses, 375 Ill. 336, 31 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1940) (bailment exists when goods are “disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner’s] benefit”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "bailment exists when goods are \"disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner's] benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (“[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.”); see also People v. Moses, 375 Ill. 336, 31 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1940) (bailment exists when goods are “disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner’s] benefit”)."
} | 4,236,842 | a |
Illinois courts distinguish bailments from conditional sales, which create only an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "31 N.E.2d 585, 587",
"parenthetical": "bailment exists when goods are \"disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner's] benefit\"",
"sentence": "See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (“[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.”); see also People v. Moses, 375 Ill. 336, 31 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1940) (bailment exists when goods are “disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner’s] benefit”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "22 N.E. 542, 543",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.\"",
"sentence": "See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (“[W]hen the identical thing is to be restored in the same or an altered form, the contract is one of bailment ... but when there is no obligation to restore the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, or the money value ... it is a sale.”); see also People v. Moses, 375 Ill. 336, 31 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1940) (bailment exists when goods are “disposed of in some particular manner as directed or agreed upon for [the owner’s] benefit”)."
} | 4,236,842 | b |
Plainly, under Godfrey, the instruction at issue in this case, providing for a depravity-of-mind aggravating circumstance, was unconstitutionally vague. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the same Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey",
"sentence": "See Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 994, 123 S.Ct. 1788, 155 L.Ed.2d 695 (2003) (holding the same Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey); Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir.1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Angelone v. Deutscher, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 1678, 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991) (same); see also McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1487-90 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a similar Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "65 F.3d 1483, 1487-90",
"parenthetical": "holding a similar Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey",
"sentence": "See Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 994, 123 S.Ct. 1788, 155 L.Ed.2d 695 (2003) (holding the same Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey); Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir.1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Angelone v. Deutscher, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 1678, 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991) (same); see also McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1487-90 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a similar Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey)."
} | 4,157,826 | a |
Plainly, under Godfrey, the instruction at issue in this case, providing for a depravity-of-mind aggravating circumstance, was unconstitutionally vague. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the same Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey",
"sentence": "See Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 994, 123 S.Ct. 1788, 155 L.Ed.2d 695 (2003) (holding the same Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey); Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir.1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Angelone v. Deutscher, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 1678, 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991) (same); see also McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1487-90 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a similar Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "65 F.3d 1483, 1487-90",
"parenthetical": "holding a similar Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey",
"sentence": "See Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 994, 123 S.Ct. 1788, 155 L.Ed.2d 695 (2003) (holding the same Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey); Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir.1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Angelone v. Deutscher, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 1678, 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991) (same); see also McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1487-90 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a similar Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey)."
} | 4,157,826 | a |
Plainly, under Godfrey, the instruction at issue in this case, providing for a depravity-of-mind aggravating circumstance, was unconstitutionally vague. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "65 F.3d 1483, 1487-90",
"parenthetical": "holding a similar Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey",
"sentence": "See Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 994, 123 S.Ct. 1788, 155 L.Ed.2d 695 (2003) (holding the same Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey); Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir.1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Angelone v. Deutscher, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 1678, 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991) (same); see also McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1487-90 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a similar Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the same Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey",
"sentence": "See Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 994, 123 S.Ct. 1788, 155 L.Ed.2d 695 (2003) (holding the same Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey); Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir.1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Angelone v. Deutscher, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 1678, 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991) (same); see also McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1487-90 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a similar Nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague, under Godfrey)."
} | 4,157,826 | b |
Harvest States argues that collateral estoppel can be based on a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. While we have never addressed this specific issue, we believe that Harvest States' argument has merit. This court has held that an order that is not technically a "judgment" can still give rise to issue preclusion if it is an appealable final judgment for purposes of Appellate Rule 202. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "413 P.2d 165, 168",
"parenthetical": "an order dismissing a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over an indispensable party is an appealable order under the predecessor to Appellate Rule 202",
"sentence": "See Calhoun v. Greening, 636 P.2d 69, 72-73 & n. 4 (Alaska 1981) (because denial of Civil Rule 60(b) motion is appealable under Appellate Rule 202, it will be treated as final judgment for res judicata purposes); see also City of Fairbanks v. Electric Distrib. Sys., 413 P.2d 165, 168 (Alaska 1966) (an order dismissing a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over an indispensable party is an appealable order under the predecessor to Appellate Rule 202)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because denial of Civil Rule 60(b) motion is appealable under Appellate Rule 202, it will be treated as final judgment for res judicata purposes",
"sentence": "See Calhoun v. Greening, 636 P.2d 69, 72-73 & n. 4 (Alaska 1981) (because denial of Civil Rule 60(b) motion is appealable under Appellate Rule 202, it will be treated as final judgment for res judicata purposes); see also City of Fairbanks v. Electric Distrib. Sys., 413 P.2d 165, 168 (Alaska 1966) (an order dismissing a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over an indispensable party is an appealable order under the predecessor to Appellate Rule 202)."
} | 10,349,974 | b |
The Daphne plaintiffs argue that the 1999 Act violates SS 95, Ala. Const.1901, because, they say, the Legislature changed a rule of decision "midstream" in order to affect the outcome of Dispute I. Section 95 provides that "[a]fter suit has been commenced on any cause of action, the legislature shall have no power to take away such cause of action, or destroy any existing defense to such suit." See United Cos. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the Legislature cannot change the law to lessen a plaintiffs recovery once the plaintiff files an action",
"sentence": "Lending Corp. v. Autrey, 723 So.2d 617 (Ala.1998) (the Legislature cannot change the law to lessen a plaintiffs recovery once the plaintiff files an action); see also Kemp v. Britt, 410 So.2d 31 (Ala.1982) (the Legislature may not change the law to lessen a state employee’s benefits after the employee has sued to collect those benefits)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the Legislature may not change the law to lessen a state employee's benefits after the employee has sued to collect those benefits",
"sentence": "Lending Corp. v. Autrey, 723 So.2d 617 (Ala.1998) (the Legislature cannot change the law to lessen a plaintiffs recovery once the plaintiff files an action); see also Kemp v. Britt, 410 So.2d 31 (Ala.1982) (the Legislature may not change the law to lessen a state employee’s benefits after the employee has sued to collect those benefits)."
} | 9,102,625 | a |
The crucial question is whether the 1968 Act was either intended to render, or had the effect of rendering the National Guard more federal in character to the point where technician supervisory personnel and the adjutant general can no longer be considered as acting under color of state law when participating in personnel decisions resulting in the discharge of ANG technicians. This question has been considered by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, both of which have held that the 1968 Act was not designed to federalize the National Guard, and that Guard officials may be sued under section 1983. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "following Lasher after explicitly finding that the 1968 Act did not federalize the Guard",
"sentence": "See also Schultz v. Wellman, 717 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.1983) (following Rowe); Bollen v. National Guard Bureau, 449 F.Supp. 343, 349 (W.D.Pa.1978) (following Lasher without discussing the 1968 Act); Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air National Guard, 371 F.Supp. 1349 (W.D.Pa.1974) (following Lasher after explicitly finding that the 1968 Act did not federalize the Guard), rev ’d on other grounds, 537 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.1976); contra Vargas v. Char don, 405 F.Supp. 1348, 1351 (D.P.R.1975) (holding adjutant general not liable under section 1983 without discussing the 1968 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "405 F.Supp. 1348, 1351",
"parenthetical": "holding adjutant general not liable under section 1983 without discussing the 1968 Act",
"sentence": "See also Schultz v. Wellman, 717 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.1983) (following Rowe); Bollen v. National Guard Bureau, 449 F.Supp. 343, 349 (W.D.Pa.1978) (following Lasher without discussing the 1968 Act); Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air National Guard, 371 F.Supp. 1349 (W.D.Pa.1974) (following Lasher after explicitly finding that the 1968 Act did not federalize the Guard), rev ’d on other grounds, 537 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.1976); contra Vargas v. Char don, 405 F.Supp. 1348, 1351 (D.P.R.1975) (holding adjutant general not liable under section 1983 without discussing the 1968 Act)."
} | 1,531,238 | a |
The crucial question is whether the 1968 Act was either intended to render, or had the effect of rendering the National Guard more federal in character to the point where technician supervisory personnel and the adjutant general can no longer be considered as acting under color of state law when participating in personnel decisions resulting in the discharge of ANG technicians. This question has been considered by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, both of which have held that the 1968 Act was not designed to federalize the National Guard, and that Guard officials may be sued under section 1983. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "405 F.Supp. 1348, 1351",
"parenthetical": "holding adjutant general not liable under section 1983 without discussing the 1968 Act",
"sentence": "See also Schultz v. Wellman, 717 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.1983) (following Rowe); Bollen v. National Guard Bureau, 449 F.Supp. 343, 349 (W.D.Pa.1978) (following Lasher without discussing the 1968 Act); Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air National Guard, 371 F.Supp. 1349 (W.D.Pa.1974) (following Lasher after explicitly finding that the 1968 Act did not federalize the Guard), rev ’d on other grounds, 537 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.1976); contra Vargas v. Char don, 405 F.Supp. 1348, 1351 (D.P.R.1975) (holding adjutant general not liable under section 1983 without discussing the 1968 Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "following Lasher after explicitly finding that the 1968 Act did not federalize the Guard",
"sentence": "See also Schultz v. Wellman, 717 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.1983) (following Rowe); Bollen v. National Guard Bureau, 449 F.Supp. 343, 349 (W.D.Pa.1978) (following Lasher without discussing the 1968 Act); Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air National Guard, 371 F.Supp. 1349 (W.D.Pa.1974) (following Lasher after explicitly finding that the 1968 Act did not federalize the Guard), rev ’d on other grounds, 537 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.1976); contra Vargas v. Char don, 405 F.Supp. 1348, 1351 (D.P.R.1975) (holding adjutant general not liable under section 1983 without discussing the 1968 Act)."
} | 1,531,238 | b |
Having determined that Section 362(k)(l)'s award of attorneys' fees apply to prosecuting damages actions, we have no trouble concluding that defending that judgment on appeal is also within the statute's fee-shifting authorization. This Court has held many times that fee-shifting statutes--which Section 362(k) undoubtedly is--entitle parties not only to fees in the court of first instance, but also to appellate fees incurred in defending the judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "496 U.S. 154, 161-62",
"parenthetical": "noting that fee-shifting statutes treat \"a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "334 F.3d 1242, 1245",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. SS ] 1988 fee\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | 12,269,554 | b |
Having determined that Section 362(k)(l)'s award of attorneys' fees apply to prosecuting damages actions, we have no trouble concluding that defending that judgment on appeal is also within the statute's fee-shifting authorization. This Court has held many times that fee-shifting statutes--which Section 362(k) undoubtedly is--entitle parties not only to fees in the court of first instance, but also to appellate fees incurred in defending the judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that fee-shifting statutes treat \"a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "334 F.3d 1242, 1245",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. SS ] 1988 fee\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | 12,269,554 | b |
Having determined that Section 362(k)(l)'s award of attorneys' fees apply to prosecuting damages actions, we have no trouble concluding that defending that judgment on appeal is also within the statute's fee-shifting authorization. This Court has held many times that fee-shifting statutes--which Section 362(k) undoubtedly is--entitle parties not only to fees in the court of first instance, but also to appellate fees incurred in defending the judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that fee-shifting statutes treat \"a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "334 F.3d 1242, 1245",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. SS ] 1988 fee\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | 12,269,554 | b |
Having determined that Section 362(k)(l)'s award of attorneys' fees apply to prosecuting damages actions, we have no trouble concluding that defending that judgment on appeal is also within the statute's fee-shifting authorization. This Court has held many times that fee-shifting statutes--which Section 362(k) undoubtedly is--entitle parties not only to fees in the court of first instance, but also to appellate fees incurred in defending the judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 1497, 1508",
"parenthetical": "holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 claim was \"entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred [on] appeal\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "496 U.S. 154, 161-62",
"parenthetical": "noting that fee-shifting statutes treat \"a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | 12,269,554 | a |
Having determined that Section 362(k)(l)'s award of attorneys' fees apply to prosecuting damages actions, we have no trouble concluding that defending that judgment on appeal is also within the statute's fee-shifting authorization. This Court has held many times that fee-shifting statutes--which Section 362(k) undoubtedly is--entitle parties not only to fees in the court of first instance, but also to appellate fees incurred in defending the judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 1497, 1508",
"parenthetical": "holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 claim was \"entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred [on] appeal\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that fee-shifting statutes treat \"a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | 12,269,554 | a |
Having determined that Section 362(k)(l)'s award of attorneys' fees apply to prosecuting damages actions, we have no trouble concluding that defending that judgment on appeal is also within the statute's fee-shifting authorization. This Court has held many times that fee-shifting statutes--which Section 362(k) undoubtedly is--entitle parties not only to fees in the court of first instance, but also to appellate fees incurred in defending the judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 1497, 1508",
"parenthetical": "holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 claim was \"entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred [on] appeal\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that fee-shifting statutes treat \"a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rosenberg, 779 F.3d at 1265; Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., Inc., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “an attorney may recover fees for time spent litigating the award of a [11 U.S.C. § ] 1988 fee”); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was “entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred [on] appeal”); see also Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) (noting that fee-shifting statutes treat “a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”)."
} | 12,269,554 | a |
As indicated in Part II.A.2. above, the " 'rational basis' " element means there must be a "clinically demonstrable presence of [the toxic substance] in the plaintiffs body, or some indication of [toxin]induced disease, i.e., some physical manifestation of [toxic] contamination." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "241 A.D.2d 294, 294",
"parenthetical": "finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs' need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury",
"sentence": "Abusio, 238 A.D.2d at 455, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer “[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a ‘rational basis’ for their fear of developing the disease”); see, e.g., Allen v. General Electric Co., 32 A.D.3d 1163, 1164-65, 821 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (4th Dep’t 2006) (“Allen”) (overturning a judgment that dismissed medical monitoring claims by plaintiffs who “were exposed to the toxins but exhibit no present illness or injury as a result of that exposure”); Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs’ need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury); Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, Inc., 149 Misc.2d 657, 657-59, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Sup.Ct.West."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "238 A.D.2d 455, 455",
"parenthetical": "upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer \"[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a 'rational basis' for their fear of developing the disease\"",
"sentence": "Abusio, 238 A.D.2d at 455, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer “[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a ‘rational basis’ for their fear of developing the disease”); see, e.g., Allen v. General Electric Co., 32 A.D.3d 1163, 1164-65, 821 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (4th Dep’t 2006) (“Allen”) (overturning a judgment that dismissed medical monitoring claims by plaintiffs who “were exposed to the toxins but exhibit no present illness or injury as a result of that exposure”); Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs’ need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury); Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, Inc., 149 Misc.2d 657, 657-59, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Sup.Ct.West."
} | 6,047,705 | b |
As indicated in Part II.A.2. above, the " 'rational basis' " element means there must be a "clinically demonstrable presence of [the toxic substance] in the plaintiffs body, or some indication of [toxin]induced disease, i.e., some physical manifestation of [toxic] contamination." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "672 N.Y.S.2d 190, 190",
"parenthetical": "finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs' need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury",
"sentence": "Abusio, 238 A.D.2d at 455, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer “[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a ‘rational basis’ for their fear of developing the disease”); see, e.g., Allen v. General Electric Co., 32 A.D.3d 1163, 1164-65, 821 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (4th Dep’t 2006) (“Allen”) (overturning a judgment that dismissed medical monitoring claims by plaintiffs who “were exposed to the toxins but exhibit no present illness or injury as a result of that exposure”); Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs’ need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury); Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, Inc., 149 Misc.2d 657, 657-59, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Sup.Ct.West."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "238 A.D.2d 455, 455",
"parenthetical": "upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer \"[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a 'rational basis' for their fear of developing the disease\"",
"sentence": "Abusio, 238 A.D.2d at 455, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer “[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a ‘rational basis’ for their fear of developing the disease”); see, e.g., Allen v. General Electric Co., 32 A.D.3d 1163, 1164-65, 821 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (4th Dep’t 2006) (“Allen”) (overturning a judgment that dismissed medical monitoring claims by plaintiffs who “were exposed to the toxins but exhibit no present illness or injury as a result of that exposure”); Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs’ need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury); Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, Inc., 149 Misc.2d 657, 657-59, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Sup.Ct.West."
} | 6,047,705 | b |
As indicated in Part II.A.2. above, the " 'rational basis' " element means there must be a "clinically demonstrable presence of [the toxic substance] in the plaintiffs body, or some indication of [toxin]induced disease, i.e., some physical manifestation of [toxic] contamination." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "656 N.Y.S.2d 372, 372",
"parenthetical": "upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer \"[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a 'rational basis' for their fear of developing the disease\"",
"sentence": "Abusio, 238 A.D.2d at 455, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer “[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a ‘rational basis’ for their fear of developing the disease”); see, e.g., Allen v. General Electric Co., 32 A.D.3d 1163, 1164-65, 821 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (4th Dep’t 2006) (“Allen”) (overturning a judgment that dismissed medical monitoring claims by plaintiffs who “were exposed to the toxins but exhibit no present illness or injury as a result of that exposure”); Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs’ need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury); Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, Inc., 149 Misc.2d 657, 657-59, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Sup.Ct.West."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "241 A.D.2d 294, 294",
"parenthetical": "finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs' need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury",
"sentence": "Abusio, 238 A.D.2d at 455, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer “[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a ‘rational basis’ for their fear of developing the disease”); see, e.g., Allen v. General Electric Co., 32 A.D.3d 1163, 1164-65, 821 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (4th Dep’t 2006) (“Allen”) (overturning a judgment that dismissed medical monitoring claims by plaintiffs who “were exposed to the toxins but exhibit no present illness or injury as a result of that exposure”); Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs’ need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury); Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, Inc., 149 Misc.2d 657, 657-59, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Sup.Ct.West."
} | 6,047,705 | a |
As indicated in Part II.A.2. above, the " 'rational basis' " element means there must be a "clinically demonstrable presence of [the toxic substance] in the plaintiffs body, or some indication of [toxin]induced disease, i.e., some physical manifestation of [toxic] contamination." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "672 N.Y.S.2d 190, 190",
"parenthetical": "finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs' need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury",
"sentence": "Abusio, 238 A.D.2d at 455, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer “[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a ‘rational basis’ for their fear of developing the disease”); see, e.g., Allen v. General Electric Co., 32 A.D.3d 1163, 1164-65, 821 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (4th Dep’t 2006) (“Allen”) (overturning a judgment that dismissed medical monitoring claims by plaintiffs who “were exposed to the toxins but exhibit no present illness or injury as a result of that exposure”); Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs’ need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury); Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, Inc., 149 Misc.2d 657, 657-59, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Sup.Ct.West."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "656 N.Y.S.2d 372, 372",
"parenthetical": "upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer \"[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a 'rational basis' for their fear of developing the disease\"",
"sentence": "Abusio, 238 A.D.2d at 455, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (upholding dismissal of claims for future cost of medical monitoring for cancer “[b]ecause the appellants failed to show a ‘rational basis’ for their fear of developing the disease”); see, e.g., Allen v. General Electric Co., 32 A.D.3d 1163, 1164-65, 821 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (4th Dep’t 2006) (“Allen”) (overturning a judgment that dismissed medical monitoring claims by plaintiffs who “were exposed to the toxins but exhibit no present illness or injury as a result of that exposure”); Dangler, 241 A.D.2d at 294, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (finding that, as to claims of cancerphobia resulting from exposure to toxic emissions from landfill, trial court erred in excluding evidence as to plaintiffs’ need for medical monitoring and in not submitting that issue to the jury); Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, Inc., 149 Misc.2d 657, 657-59, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003-04 (Sup.Ct.West."
} | 6,047,705 | b |
Incarceration alone does not necessarily preclude a person from acting in a parental role. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "287 Minn. 501, 507",
"parenthetical": "stating that termination is unwarranted for incarcerated parent who maintains parenting role while in prison",
"sentence": "See In re Welfare of Staat, 287 Minn. 501, 507, 178 N.W.2d 709, 713 (1970) (stating that termination is unwarranted for incarcerated parent who maintains parenting role while in prison); see also M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d at 378-79 (affirming district court’s denial of termination for mother incarcerated for murdering child, based on mother’s continued relationship with child at issue and amenability to services while incarcerated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 N.W.2d 378, 378-79",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's denial of termination for mother incarcerated for murdering child, based on mother's continued relationship with child at issue and amenability to services while incarcerated",
"sentence": "See In re Welfare of Staat, 287 Minn. 501, 507, 178 N.W.2d 709, 713 (1970) (stating that termination is unwarranted for incarcerated parent who maintains parenting role while in prison); see also M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d at 378-79 (affirming district court’s denial of termination for mother incarcerated for murdering child, based on mother’s continued relationship with child at issue and amenability to services while incarcerated)."
} | 7,089,574 | a |
Incarceration alone does not necessarily preclude a person from acting in a parental role. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "462 N.W.2d 378, 378-79",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's denial of termination for mother incarcerated for murdering child, based on mother's continued relationship with child at issue and amenability to services while incarcerated",
"sentence": "See In re Welfare of Staat, 287 Minn. 501, 507, 178 N.W.2d 709, 713 (1970) (stating that termination is unwarranted for incarcerated parent who maintains parenting role while in prison); see also M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d at 378-79 (affirming district court’s denial of termination for mother incarcerated for murdering child, based on mother’s continued relationship with child at issue and amenability to services while incarcerated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "178 N.W.2d 709, 713",
"parenthetical": "stating that termination is unwarranted for incarcerated parent who maintains parenting role while in prison",
"sentence": "See In re Welfare of Staat, 287 Minn. 501, 507, 178 N.W.2d 709, 713 (1970) (stating that termination is unwarranted for incarcerated parent who maintains parenting role while in prison); see also M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d at 378-79 (affirming district court’s denial of termination for mother incarcerated for murdering child, based on mother’s continued relationship with child at issue and amenability to services while incarcerated)."
} | 7,089,574 | b |
To support his argument, plaintiff relies upon Arizona authority that seems to lend direct support to his position. Significantly, however, the decisions upon which plaintiff relies all were issued prior to Jepson, and none address any of the factors the Jepson court found central to review of decisions granting or denying Rule 60(c) relief. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming trial court's refusal to set aside dismissal of case despite failure of plaintiff to receive Rule V(e",
"sentence": "But see Ursel v. Pizzo, 126 Ariz. 316, 614 P.2d 858 (App.1980) (affirming trial court’s refusal to set aside dismissal of case despite failure of plaintiff to receive Rule V(e) notice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court's Rule 60(c) order setting aside a Rule V(d",
"sentence": "See McKinley v. Town of Fredonia, 140 Ariz. 189, 680 P.2d 1250 (App.1984) (trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to reinstate a case dismissed for lack of prosecution without evidence that the plaintiff received notice of pending dismissal; decision focuses on whether mailing presumes receipt without considering evidence of diligence); Black v. Greer, 17 Ariz.App. 383, 498 P.2d 225 (1972) (trial court’s Rule 60(c) order setting aside a Rule V(d) dismissal for lack of prosecution due to lack of notice not an abuse of discretion; no discussion of Jepson factors); Thunderbird Farms v. Hernandez, 11 Ariz.App. 383, 464 P.2d 829 (1970) (trial court’s Rule 60(c) order setting aside a dismissal and reinstating the cause on the inactive calendar not an abuse of discretion due to lack of notice of impending dismissal or a secretarial mistake; no discussion of Jepson factors)."
} | 1,504,438 | b |
To support his argument, plaintiff relies upon Arizona authority that seems to lend direct support to his position. Significantly, however, the decisions upon which plaintiff relies all were issued prior to Jepson, and none address any of the factors the Jepson court found central to review of decisions granting or denying Rule 60(c) relief. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming trial court's refusal to set aside dismissal of case despite failure of plaintiff to receive Rule V(e",
"sentence": "But see Ursel v. Pizzo, 126 Ariz. 316, 614 P.2d 858 (App.1980) (affirming trial court’s refusal to set aside dismissal of case despite failure of plaintiff to receive Rule V(e) notice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court's Rule 60(c) order setting aside a Rule V(d",
"sentence": "See McKinley v. Town of Fredonia, 140 Ariz. 189, 680 P.2d 1250 (App.1984) (trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to reinstate a case dismissed for lack of prosecution without evidence that the plaintiff received notice of pending dismissal; decision focuses on whether mailing presumes receipt without considering evidence of diligence); Black v. Greer, 17 Ariz.App. 383, 498 P.2d 225 (1972) (trial court’s Rule 60(c) order setting aside a Rule V(d) dismissal for lack of prosecution due to lack of notice not an abuse of discretion; no discussion of Jepson factors); Thunderbird Farms v. Hernandez, 11 Ariz.App. 383, 464 P.2d 829 (1970) (trial court’s Rule 60(c) order setting aside a dismissal and reinstating the cause on the inactive calendar not an abuse of discretion due to lack of notice of impending dismissal or a secretarial mistake; no discussion of Jepson factors)."
} | 1,504,438 | b |
To support his argument, plaintiff relies upon Arizona authority that seems to lend direct support to his position. Significantly, however, the decisions upon which plaintiff relies all were issued prior to Jepson, and none address any of the factors the Jepson court found central to review of decisions granting or denying Rule 60(c) relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court's Rule 60(c) order setting aside a Rule V(d",
"sentence": "See McKinley v. Town of Fredonia, 140 Ariz. 189, 680 P.2d 1250 (App.1984) (trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to reinstate a case dismissed for lack of prosecution without evidence that the plaintiff received notice of pending dismissal; decision focuses on whether mailing presumes receipt without considering evidence of diligence); Black v. Greer, 17 Ariz.App. 383, 498 P.2d 225 (1972) (trial court’s Rule 60(c) order setting aside a Rule V(d) dismissal for lack of prosecution due to lack of notice not an abuse of discretion; no discussion of Jepson factors); Thunderbird Farms v. Hernandez, 11 Ariz.App. 383, 464 P.2d 829 (1970) (trial court’s Rule 60(c) order setting aside a dismissal and reinstating the cause on the inactive calendar not an abuse of discretion due to lack of notice of impending dismissal or a secretarial mistake; no discussion of Jepson factors)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming trial court's refusal to set aside dismissal of case despite failure of plaintiff to receive Rule V(e",
"sentence": "But see Ursel v. Pizzo, 126 Ariz. 316, 614 P.2d 858 (App.1980) (affirming trial court’s refusal to set aside dismissal of case despite failure of plaintiff to receive Rule V(e) notice)."
} | 1,504,438 | a |
To support his argument, plaintiff relies upon Arizona authority that seems to lend direct support to his position. Significantly, however, the decisions upon which plaintiff relies all were issued prior to Jepson, and none address any of the factors the Jepson court found central to review of decisions granting or denying Rule 60(c) relief. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court's Rule 60(c) order setting aside a Rule V(d",
"sentence": "See McKinley v. Town of Fredonia, 140 Ariz. 189, 680 P.2d 1250 (App.1984) (trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to reinstate a case dismissed for lack of prosecution without evidence that the plaintiff received notice of pending dismissal; decision focuses on whether mailing presumes receipt without considering evidence of diligence); Black v. Greer, 17 Ariz.App. 383, 498 P.2d 225 (1972) (trial court’s Rule 60(c) order setting aside a Rule V(d) dismissal for lack of prosecution due to lack of notice not an abuse of discretion; no discussion of Jepson factors); Thunderbird Farms v. Hernandez, 11 Ariz.App. 383, 464 P.2d 829 (1970) (trial court’s Rule 60(c) order setting aside a dismissal and reinstating the cause on the inactive calendar not an abuse of discretion due to lack of notice of impending dismissal or a secretarial mistake; no discussion of Jepson factors)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming trial court's refusal to set aside dismissal of case despite failure of plaintiff to receive Rule V(e",
"sentence": "But see Ursel v. Pizzo, 126 Ariz. 316, 614 P.2d 858 (App.1980) (affirming trial court’s refusal to set aside dismissal of case despite failure of plaintiff to receive Rule V(e) notice)."
} | 1,504,438 | a |
In addition, courts have consistently treated the failure to promote as a discrete act; one that is more in the nature of an isolated employment decision than a persistent pattern. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02",
"parenthetical": "\"Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts",
"sentence": "Pauling v. Secretary of the Interior, 960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a ‘series of related acts.’ ”); see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature); but see Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (stating that “since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 F.3d 907, 907",
"parenthetical": "finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature",
"sentence": "Pauling v. Secretary of the Interior, 960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a ‘series of related acts.’ ”); see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature); but see Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (stating that “since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations”)."
} | 930,715 | a |
In addition, courts have consistently treated the failure to promote as a discrete act; one that is more in the nature of an isolated employment decision than a persistent pattern. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02",
"parenthetical": "\"Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts",
"sentence": "Pauling v. Secretary of the Interior, 960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a ‘series of related acts.’ ”); see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature); but see Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (stating that “since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations\"",
"sentence": "Pauling v. Secretary of the Interior, 960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a ‘series of related acts.’ ”); see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature); but see Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (stating that “since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations”)."
} | 930,715 | a |
In addition, courts have consistently treated the failure to promote as a discrete act; one that is more in the nature of an isolated employment decision than a persistent pattern. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "771 F.Supp. 47, 49",
"parenthetical": "\"As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a 'series of related acts.' \"",
"sentence": "Pauling v. Secretary of the Interior, 960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a ‘series of related acts.’ ”); see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature); but see Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (stating that “since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 F.3d 907, 907",
"parenthetical": "finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature",
"sentence": "Pauling v. Secretary of the Interior, 960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a ‘series of related acts.’ ”); see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature); but see Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (stating that “since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations”)."
} | 930,715 | a |
In addition, courts have consistently treated the failure to promote as a discrete act; one that is more in the nature of an isolated employment decision than a persistent pattern. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "771 F.Supp. 47, 49",
"parenthetical": "\"As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a 'series of related acts.' \"",
"sentence": "Pauling v. Secretary of the Interior, 960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a ‘series of related acts.’ ”); see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature); but see Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (stating that “since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations\"",
"sentence": "Pauling v. Secretary of the Interior, 960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a ‘series of related acts.’ ”); see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature); but see Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (stating that “since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations”)."
} | 930,715 | a |
In addition, courts have consistently treated the failure to promote as a discrete act; one that is more in the nature of an isolated employment decision than a persistent pattern. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 F.3d 907, 907",
"parenthetical": "finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature",
"sentence": "Pauling v. Secretary of the Interior, 960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a ‘series of related acts.’ ”); see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature); but see Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (stating that “since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations\"",
"sentence": "Pauling v. Secretary of the Interior, 960 F.Supp. 793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Demotion, failure to promote, and termination have all been deemed discrete acts); Samuel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 771 F.Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“As decided by several courts in this Circuit, a number of incidents of failure to promote cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a ‘series of related acts.’ ”); see also Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (finding that alleged demotions and denials of pay-grade increases were completed acts not continuing in nature); but see Williams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (stating that “since [plaintiff] alleges a series of related discriminatory events including several denials of the same promotion, her complaint is deemed one of continuing violations”)."
} | 930,715 | a |
I can think of no more critical a stage in criminal proceedings than the admission of inculpatory evidence against a defendant. Several of our sister circuits agree. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "809 F.2d 1257, 1263",
"parenthetical": "\"It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant's guilt.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that “the portions of the consolidated proceedings in which evidence relating to [the defendant’s] case” was presented constituted a critical stage, and the absence of defense counsel at such a stage resulted in structural error); Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (“When the government presents evidence probative of a defendant’s culpability in criminal activity, or evidence that further implicates a defendant in criminal conduct, that portion of a criminal trial is sufficiently critical to the ultimate question of guilt to trigger the protections of Cronic.”); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he presentation of evidence against a defendant is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.”); see also Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir.) (“It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant’s guilt.”), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806, 108 S.Ct. 52, 98 L.Ed.2d 17 (1987) (mem.), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2000)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"the portions of the consolidated proceedings in which evidence relating to [the defendant's] case\" was presented constituted a critical stage, and the absence of defense counsel at such a stage resulted in structural error",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that “the portions of the consolidated proceedings in which evidence relating to [the defendant’s] case” was presented constituted a critical stage, and the absence of defense counsel at such a stage resulted in structural error); Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (“When the government presents evidence probative of a defendant’s culpability in criminal activity, or evidence that further implicates a defendant in criminal conduct, that portion of a criminal trial is sufficiently critical to the ultimate question of guilt to trigger the protections of Cronic.”); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he presentation of evidence against a defendant is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.”); see also Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir.) (“It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant’s guilt.”), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806, 108 S.Ct. 52, 98 L.Ed.2d 17 (1987) (mem.), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2000)."
} | 12,277,144 | b |
I can think of no more critical a stage in criminal proceedings than the admission of inculpatory evidence against a defendant. Several of our sister circuits agree. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant's guilt.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that “the portions of the consolidated proceedings in which evidence relating to [the defendant’s] case” was presented constituted a critical stage, and the absence of defense counsel at such a stage resulted in structural error); Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (“When the government presents evidence probative of a defendant’s culpability in criminal activity, or evidence that further implicates a defendant in criminal conduct, that portion of a criminal trial is sufficiently critical to the ultimate question of guilt to trigger the protections of Cronic.”); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he presentation of evidence against a defendant is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.”); see also Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir.) (“It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant’s guilt.”), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806, 108 S.Ct. 52, 98 L.Ed.2d 17 (1987) (mem.), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2000)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"the portions of the consolidated proceedings in which evidence relating to [the defendant's] case\" was presented constituted a critical stage, and the absence of defense counsel at such a stage resulted in structural error",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that “the portions of the consolidated proceedings in which evidence relating to [the defendant’s] case” was presented constituted a critical stage, and the absence of defense counsel at such a stage resulted in structural error); Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (“When the government presents evidence probative of a defendant’s culpability in criminal activity, or evidence that further implicates a defendant in criminal conduct, that portion of a criminal trial is sufficiently critical to the ultimate question of guilt to trigger the protections of Cronic.”); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he presentation of evidence against a defendant is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.”); see also Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir.) (“It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant’s guilt.”), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806, 108 S.Ct. 52, 98 L.Ed.2d 17 (1987) (mem.), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2000)."
} | 12,277,144 | b |
I can think of no more critical a stage in criminal proceedings than the admission of inculpatory evidence against a defendant. Several of our sister circuits agree. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "809 F.2d 1257, 1263",
"parenthetical": "\"It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant's guilt.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that “the portions of the consolidated proceedings in which evidence relating to [the defendant’s] case” was presented constituted a critical stage, and the absence of defense counsel at such a stage resulted in structural error); Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (“When the government presents evidence probative of a defendant’s culpability in criminal activity, or evidence that further implicates a defendant in criminal conduct, that portion of a criminal trial is sufficiently critical to the ultimate question of guilt to trigger the protections of Cronic.”); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he presentation of evidence against a defendant is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.”); see also Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir.) (“It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant’s guilt.”), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806, 108 S.Ct. 52, 98 L.Ed.2d 17 (1987) (mem.), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2000)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "224 F.3d 561, 568",
"parenthetical": "\"When the government presents evidence probative of a defendant's culpability in criminal activity, or evidence that further implicates a defendant in criminal conduct, that portion of a criminal trial is sufficiently critical to the ultimate question of guilt to trigger the protections of Cronic.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that “the portions of the consolidated proceedings in which evidence relating to [the defendant’s] case” was presented constituted a critical stage, and the absence of defense counsel at such a stage resulted in structural error); Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (“When the government presents evidence probative of a defendant’s culpability in criminal activity, or evidence that further implicates a defendant in criminal conduct, that portion of a criminal trial is sufficiently critical to the ultimate question of guilt to trigger the protections of Cronic.”); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he presentation of evidence against a defendant is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.”); see also Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir.) (“It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant’s guilt.”), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806, 108 S.Ct. 52, 98 L.Ed.2d 17 (1987) (mem.), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2000)."
} | 12,277,144 | b |
I can think of no more critical a stage in criminal proceedings than the admission of inculpatory evidence against a defendant. Several of our sister circuits agree. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "224 F.3d 561, 568",
"parenthetical": "\"When the government presents evidence probative of a defendant's culpability in criminal activity, or evidence that further implicates a defendant in criminal conduct, that portion of a criminal trial is sufficiently critical to the ultimate question of guilt to trigger the protections of Cronic.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that “the portions of the consolidated proceedings in which evidence relating to [the defendant’s] case” was presented constituted a critical stage, and the absence of defense counsel at such a stage resulted in structural error); Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (“When the government presents evidence probative of a defendant’s culpability in criminal activity, or evidence that further implicates a defendant in criminal conduct, that portion of a criminal trial is sufficiently critical to the ultimate question of guilt to trigger the protections of Cronic.”); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he presentation of evidence against a defendant is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.”); see also Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir.) (“It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant’s guilt.”), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806, 108 S.Ct. 52, 98 L.Ed.2d 17 (1987) (mem.), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2000)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant's guilt.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that “the portions of the consolidated proceedings in which evidence relating to [the defendant’s] case” was presented constituted a critical stage, and the absence of defense counsel at such a stage resulted in structural error); Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (“When the government presents evidence probative of a defendant’s culpability in criminal activity, or evidence that further implicates a defendant in criminal conduct, that portion of a criminal trial is sufficiently critical to the ultimate question of guilt to trigger the protections of Cronic.”); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he presentation of evidence against a defendant is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.”); see also Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir.) (“It is difficult to perceive a more critical stage of a trial than the taking of evidence on the defendant’s guilt.”), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806, 108 S.Ct. 52, 98 L.Ed.2d 17 (1987) (mem.), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2000)."
} | 12,277,144 | a |
Closely intertwined with the not-a-stranger principle is the fundamental precept that a nonparty to a contractual relationship who nevertheless has a sufficiently direct economic stake in that relationship has a right to protect its own economic interest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "271 F.3d 832, 832",
"parenthetical": "applying the principle under California law that \"the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage was not intended broadly to limit individuals or commercial entities in choosing their commercial relationships, whether their motives in doing so might be -- unless those motives are independently unlawful\"",
"sentence": "See Marin Tug, 271 F.3d at 832 (applying the principle under California law that “the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage was not intended broadly to limit individuals or commercial entities in choosing their commercial relationships, whether their motives in doing so might be — unless those motives are independently unlawful”); see also A-Mark Coin v. Gen’l Mills, Inc., 148 Cal.App.3d 312, 324, 195 Cal.Rptr. 859 (1983) (stating that “in the absence of prohibition by statute, illegitimate means, or some other unlawful element, a defendant seeking to increase his own business may ... enter into secret negotiations behind the plaintiffs back, refuse to deal with him ... or even refuse to deal with third parties unless they cease dealing with the plaintiff, all without incurring liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "148 Cal.App.3d 312, 324",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in the absence of prohibition by statute, illegitimate means, or some other unlawful element, a defendant seeking to increase his own business may ... enter into secret negotiations behind the plaintiffs back, refuse to deal with him ... or even refuse to deal with third parties unless they cease dealing with the plaintiff, all without incurring liability\"",
"sentence": "See Marin Tug, 271 F.3d at 832 (applying the principle under California law that “the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage was not intended broadly to limit individuals or commercial entities in choosing their commercial relationships, whether their motives in doing so might be — unless those motives are independently unlawful”); see also A-Mark Coin v. Gen’l Mills, Inc., 148 Cal.App.3d 312, 324, 195 Cal.Rptr. 859 (1983) (stating that “in the absence of prohibition by statute, illegitimate means, or some other unlawful element, a defendant seeking to increase his own business may ... enter into secret negotiations behind the plaintiffs back, refuse to deal with him ... or even refuse to deal with third parties unless they cease dealing with the plaintiff, all without incurring liability”)."
} | 3,553,946 | a |
Closely intertwined with the not-a-stranger principle is the fundamental precept that a nonparty to a contractual relationship who nevertheless has a sufficiently direct economic stake in that relationship has a right to protect its own economic interest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in the absence of prohibition by statute, illegitimate means, or some other unlawful element, a defendant seeking to increase his own business may ... enter into secret negotiations behind the plaintiffs back, refuse to deal with him ... or even refuse to deal with third parties unless they cease dealing with the plaintiff, all without incurring liability\"",
"sentence": "See Marin Tug, 271 F.3d at 832 (applying the principle under California law that “the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage was not intended broadly to limit individuals or commercial entities in choosing their commercial relationships, whether their motives in doing so might be — unless those motives are independently unlawful”); see also A-Mark Coin v. Gen’l Mills, Inc., 148 Cal.App.3d 312, 324, 195 Cal.Rptr. 859 (1983) (stating that “in the absence of prohibition by statute, illegitimate means, or some other unlawful element, a defendant seeking to increase his own business may ... enter into secret negotiations behind the plaintiffs back, refuse to deal with him ... or even refuse to deal with third parties unless they cease dealing with the plaintiff, all without incurring liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "271 F.3d 832, 832",
"parenthetical": "applying the principle under California law that \"the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage was not intended broadly to limit individuals or commercial entities in choosing their commercial relationships, whether their motives in doing so might be -- unless those motives are independently unlawful\"",
"sentence": "See Marin Tug, 271 F.3d at 832 (applying the principle under California law that “the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage was not intended broadly to limit individuals or commercial entities in choosing their commercial relationships, whether their motives in doing so might be — unless those motives are independently unlawful”); see also A-Mark Coin v. Gen’l Mills, Inc., 148 Cal.App.3d 312, 324, 195 Cal.Rptr. 859 (1983) (stating that “in the absence of prohibition by statute, illegitimate means, or some other unlawful element, a defendant seeking to increase his own business may ... enter into secret negotiations behind the plaintiffs back, refuse to deal with him ... or even refuse to deal with third parties unless they cease dealing with the plaintiff, all without incurring liability”)."
} | 3,553,946 | b |
Among other things, the district court properly deferred to the credibility determination of the judge who had observed Emmett's in-court testimony. In addition, the fact that the recantation itself appeared to have been coached supports the court's finding that Christenot sought to influence Emmett's testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "258 F.3d 971, 975",
"parenthetical": "holding that an appellate court may review the entire record to determine whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fernandez-Vidana, 857 F.2d 673, 675 (9th Cir.1988) (“Only when the hearsay is so inadequately supported that the ‘factual basis for believing [it is] almost nil’ can it be argued that the evidence should not have been considered” in sentencing); see also United States v. Berry, 258 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that an appellate court may review the entire record to determine whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "857 F.2d 673, 675",
"parenthetical": "\"Only when the hearsay is so inadequately supported that the 'factual basis for believing [it is] almost nil' can it be argued that the evidence should not have been considered\" in sentencing",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fernandez-Vidana, 857 F.2d 673, 675 (9th Cir.1988) (“Only when the hearsay is so inadequately supported that the ‘factual basis for believing [it is] almost nil’ can it be argued that the evidence should not have been considered” in sentencing); see also United States v. Berry, 258 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that an appellate court may review the entire record to determine whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable)."
} | 4,119,901 | b |
Because the species of Fourth Amendment violation alleged in this case arises by way of analogy to the common law tort of malicious prosecution, courts historically have looked to the common law for guidance as to the constituent elements of the claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "91 F.3d 573, 579",
"parenthetical": "\"In order to state a prima facie case for a section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must establish the elements of the common law tort as it has developed over time.\"",
"sentence": "See also Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579 (3rd Cir.1996) (“In order to state a prima facie case for a section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must establish the elements of the common law tort as it has developed over time.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where an arrest is made after the filing of an information and the arrest is the basis of a Fourth Amendment section 1983 claim, we think the tort of malicious prosecution is the most analogous tort to the section 1983 claim.\"",
"sentence": "See Whiting, 85 F.3d at 585 n. 7 (“Where an arrest is made after the filing of an information and the arrest is the basis of a Fourth Amendment section 1983 claim, we think the tort of malicious prosecution is the most analogous tort to the section 1983 claim.”)."
} | 191,777 | b |
Based on the foregoing, we view the two causes of action addressed by the circuit court in the instant case as equitable in nature. Therefore, this court may review the circuit court's factual findings in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Nonetheless, we defer to the circuit court's determinations of witness credibility. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 S.C. 593, 593",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.\"",
"sentence": "See Laughon, 360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.E.2d at 111 (“However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Ballard, 399 S.C. at 593, 733 S.E.2d at 109 (“[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "360 S.C. 524, 524-25",
"parenthetical": "\"However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.\"",
"sentence": "See Laughon, 360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.E.2d at 111 (“However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Ballard, 399 S.C. at 593, 733 S.E.2d at 109 (“[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.”)."
} | 12,278,903 | b |
Based on the foregoing, we view the two causes of action addressed by the circuit court in the instant case as equitable in nature. Therefore, this court may review the circuit court's factual findings in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Nonetheless, we defer to the circuit court's determinations of witness credibility. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "360 S.C. 524, 524-25",
"parenthetical": "\"However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.\"",
"sentence": "See Laughon, 360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.E.2d at 111 (“However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Ballard, 399 S.C. at 593, 733 S.E.2d at 109 (“[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "733 S.E.2d 109, 109",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.\"",
"sentence": "See Laughon, 360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.E.2d at 111 (“However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Ballard, 399 S.C. at 593, 733 S.E.2d at 109 (“[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.”)."
} | 12,278,903 | a |
Based on the foregoing, we view the two causes of action addressed by the circuit court in the instant case as equitable in nature. Therefore, this court may review the circuit court's factual findings in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Nonetheless, we defer to the circuit court's determinations of witness credibility. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "399 S.C. 593, 593",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.\"",
"sentence": "See Laughon, 360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.E.2d at 111 (“However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Ballard, 399 S.C. at 593, 733 S.E.2d at 109 (“[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "602 S.E.2d 111, 111",
"parenthetical": "\"However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.\"",
"sentence": "See Laughon, 360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.E.2d at 111 (“However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Ballard, 399 S.C. at 593, 733 S.E.2d at 109 (“[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.”)."
} | 12,278,903 | b |
Based on the foregoing, we view the two causes of action addressed by the circuit court in the instant case as equitable in nature. Therefore, this court may review the circuit court's factual findings in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Nonetheless, we defer to the circuit court's determinations of witness credibility. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "602 S.E.2d 111, 111",
"parenthetical": "\"However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.\"",
"sentence": "See Laughon, 360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.E.2d at 111 (“However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Ballard, 399 S.C. at 593, 733 S.E.2d at 109 (“[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "733 S.E.2d 109, 109",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.\"",
"sentence": "See Laughon, 360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.E.2d at 111 (“However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Ballard, 399 S.C. at 593, 733 S.E.2d at 109 (“[T]his broad scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.”)."
} | 12,278,903 | a |
Thus, on appeal, the government argues that Stout waived his right to dispute alleged errors in his presen-tence report. Because Rule 32 contemplates that a defendant will inform the district court of any error in the presentence report prior to, or at, the sentencing hearing, Stout may have waived his right to dispute the probation office's estimate of his offense severity rating. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "873 F.2d 283, 284",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no question that the defendant can waive the requirements of Rule 32(c",
"sentence": "See Brown, 870 F.2d at 1361 (The defendant \"was required to object at the sentencing hearing if the presentence report contained any inaccuracies.”); see also United States v. Atehortua, 875 F.2d 149, 151 (7th Cir.1989) (The defendant \"has not found any case excusing failure to raise an objection to the presentence report in a timely fashion; neither have we.”); Martorana v. United States, 873 F.2d 283, 284 (11th Cir.1989) (“There is no question that the defendant can waive the requirements of Rule 32(c)(3)(D).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "870 F.2d 1361, 1361",
"parenthetical": "The defendant \"was required to object at the sentencing hearing if the presentence report contained any inaccuracies.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 870 F.2d at 1361 (The defendant \"was required to object at the sentencing hearing if the presentence report contained any inaccuracies.”); see also United States v. Atehortua, 875 F.2d 149, 151 (7th Cir.1989) (The defendant \"has not found any case excusing failure to raise an objection to the presentence report in a timely fashion; neither have we.”); Martorana v. United States, 873 F.2d 283, 284 (11th Cir.1989) (“There is no question that the defendant can waive the requirements of Rule 32(c)(3)(D).”)."
} | 1,820,796 | b |
With regard to the defendant's second claim involving whether or not Dr. Kathryn Edminston is allowed to express her opinion about the risks associated with breast cancer in terms of statistical rates of recurrence over her lifetime, it should be noted that discussions of life expectancy, survival rate and treatment options are not usually considered to be outside the realm of a doctor's expertise. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that generally qualified experts do not require a sub-specialty in order to testify to things within their expertise",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291 (holding that generally qualified experts do not require a sub-specialty in order to testify to things within their expertise)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "165 F.R.D. 31, 33",
"parenthetical": "issues of diagnosis, prognosis and causation are matters considered within the normal scope of the patient's care and treatment",
"sentence": "Salas v. United States, 165 F.R.D. 31, 33 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (issues of diagnosis, prognosis and causation are matters considered within the normal scope of the patient’s care and treatment); LaMere v. NY State Office for the Aging, 223 F.R.D. 85, 90 (treating physician can express “an opinion as to the cause of any medical condition present in a patient, the diagnosis, the prognosis and the extent of the disability”) (citing Zanowic v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3857, 2002 WL 373229, at *3); Cella v. United States, 825 F.Sup. 1383, 1395-96 (N.D.Ind. 1991); Owens-Corning Fiberglas v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 139-40 (1992)."
} | 3,625,490 | b |
This Court is inclined to agree. In Clement v. CDC, the Ninth Circuit held that a CDC policy which prohibited inmates from receiving internet generated materials was unconstitutional. That the District Court decision in Clement issued after Defendants' alleged conduct does not change the fact that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to \"all cases on direct review\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "479 U.S. 314, 328",
"parenthetical": "\"A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | 1,291,888 | a |
This Court is inclined to agree. In Clement v. CDC, the Ninth Circuit held that a CDC policy which prohibited inmates from receiving internet generated materials was unconstitutional. That the District Court decision in Clement issued after Defendants' alleged conduct does not change the fact that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to \"all cases on direct review\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | 1,291,888 | a |
This Court is inclined to agree. In Clement v. CDC, the Ninth Circuit held that a CDC policy which prohibited inmates from receiving internet generated materials was unconstitutional. That the District Court decision in Clement issued after Defendants' alleged conduct does not change the fact that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to \"all cases on direct review\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | 1,291,888 | a |
This Court is inclined to agree. In Clement v. CDC, the Ninth Circuit held that a CDC policy which prohibited inmates from receiving internet generated materials was unconstitutional. That the District Court decision in Clement issued after Defendants' alleged conduct does not change the fact that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "479 U.S. 314, 328",
"parenthetical": "\"A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 738, 739",
"parenthetical": "applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to \"all cases on direct review\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | 1,291,888 | b |
This Court is inclined to agree. In Clement v. CDC, the Ninth Circuit held that a CDC policy which prohibited inmates from receiving internet generated materials was unconstitutional. That the District Court decision in Clement issued after Defendants' alleged conduct does not change the fact that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 738, 739",
"parenthetical": "applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to \"all cases on direct review\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | 1,291,888 | b |
This Court is inclined to agree. In Clement v. CDC, the Ninth Circuit held that a CDC policy which prohibited inmates from receiving internet generated materials was unconstitutional. That the District Court decision in Clement issued after Defendants' alleged conduct does not change the fact that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 738, 739",
"parenthetical": "applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to \"all cases on direct review\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | 1,291,888 | a |
This Court is inclined to agree. In Clement v. CDC, the Ninth Circuit held that a CDC policy which prohibited inmates from receiving internet generated materials was unconstitutional. That the District Court decision in Clement issued after Defendants' alleged conduct does not change the fact that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "479 U.S. 314, 328",
"parenthetical": "\"A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to \"all cases on direct review\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | 1,291,888 | b |
This Court is inclined to agree. In Clement v. CDC, the Ninth Circuit held that a CDC policy which prohibited inmates from receiving internet generated materials was unconstitutional. That the District Court decision in Clement issued after Defendants' alleged conduct does not change the fact that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to \"all cases on direct review\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | 1,291,888 | b |
This Court is inclined to agree. In Clement v. CDC, the Ninth Circuit held that a CDC policy which prohibited inmates from receiving internet generated materials was unconstitutional. That the District Court decision in Clement issued after Defendants' alleged conduct does not change the fact that Plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to \"all cases on direct review\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 739, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (applying holding on constitutional rights retroactively to “all cases on direct review”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S., 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“A new rule for conduct of criminal prosecution is applied retroactively to all cases... pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”)."
} | 1,291,888 | a |
This means that the defendant must have "specifically and deliberately undertaken the duty"; and that the party, on whose behalf the duty is being undertaken, must "relinquish control of the obligation". | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "948 N.E.2d 359, 359-60",
"parenthetical": "\"the party who adopts the duty must be acting 'in lieu of the original party\"",
"sentence": "Griffin, 948 N.E.2d at 359-60 (“the party who adopts the duty must be acting ‘in lieu of the original party”); Marks v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 954 N.E.2d 948, 955 (Ind.App.2011); Bd. of Comm’rs of Monroe Cty v. Hatton, 427 N.E,2d 696, 699-700 (Ind.App.1981) (“precisely what has been undertaken must be determined because liability is no broader than the actual duty assumed”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "893 N.E.2d 1100, 1106",
"parenthetical": "noting that the issue of control, specifically whether the defendant exercised \"control or active supervision of safety at the job site\", is determinative in cases involving a common law duty of safety at a workplace",
"sentence": "See also Peterson v. Ponda, 893 N.E.2d 1100, 1106 (Ind.App.2008) (noting that the issue of control, specifically whether the defendant exercised “control or active supervision of safety at the job site”, is determinative in cases involving a common law duty of safety at a workplace)."
} | 4,291,450 | a |
Osterhaus concludes most, if not all, of these matters could not have been discovered through reasonable inspection. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "277 Kan. 411, 411",
"parenthetical": "buyer could not reasonably rely upon representations of seller when truth or falsity of representation would have been revealed by an inspection of the property, unless fraud \"prevented the making of a full, fair, and complete examination of the property\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Alires, 277 Kan. at 411 (buyer could not reasonably rely upon representations of seller when truth or falsity of representation would have been revealed by an inspection of the property, unless fraud “prevented the making of a full, fair, and complete examination of the property”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "37 Kan. App. 2d 379, 379",
"parenthetical": "fraudulent nondisclosure, or fraud by silence, depends in large part on the buyer's inability to discover a defect with a reasonable inspection",
"sentence": "See Brennan, 37 Kan. App. 2d at 379 (fraudulent nondisclosure, or fraud by silence, depends in large part on the buyer’s inability to discover a defect with a reasonable inspection)."
} | 4,148,633 | b |
. Although the defendant briefly suggests that the January 2004 e-mail does not qualify as protected activity, Def.'s Mot. at 25, the email contains allegations of discrimination against the African-American members of the Task Force in receiving foreign assignments, and thus likely does constitute protected activity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "899 F.2d 203, 209",
"parenthetical": "finding informal protests of discriminatory practices, including complaints to management, to be protected activity",
"sentence": "See Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding that \"[n]ot every complaint garners its author protection under Title VII ... the complaint must in some way allege unlawful discrimination, not just frustrated ambition”) (internal citations omitted); see also Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.1990) (finding informal protests of discriminatory practices, including complaints to management, to be protected activity)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "437 F.3d 1226, 1232",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[n]ot every complaint garners its author protection under Title VII ... the complaint must in some way allege unlawful discrimination, not just frustrated ambition\"",
"sentence": "See Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding that \"[n]ot every complaint garners its author protection under Title VII ... the complaint must in some way allege unlawful discrimination, not just frustrated ambition”) (internal citations omitted); see also Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.1990) (finding informal protests of discriminatory practices, including complaints to management, to be protected activity)."
} | 4,184,811 | b |
The district court found that all but one of these claims were procedurally defaulted because Jones failed to either preserve them at trial or present them in his appeal from the denial of his state motion for post-conviction relief. All of Jones's additional points of error were also deemed procedurally defaulted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "767 S.W.2d 43, 43",
"parenthetical": "noting that Jones abandoned all his claims except ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure \"to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase\"",
"sentence": "See Jones, 767 S.W.2d at 43 (noting that Jones abandoned all his claims except ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure “to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase”); see also Gilmore v. Armon-trout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir.1988) (procedural bar under former Missouri Rule 27.26), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114, 109 S.Ct. 3176, 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 674, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994) (same procedural bar arises for failure to appeal under current Missouri Rule 29.15)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "28 F.3d 816, 818",
"parenthetical": "same procedural bar arises for failure to appeal under current Missouri Rule 29.15",
"sentence": "See Jones, 767 S.W.2d at 43 (noting that Jones abandoned all his claims except ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure “to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase”); see also Gilmore v. Armon-trout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir.1988) (procedural bar under former Missouri Rule 27.26), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114, 109 S.Ct. 3176, 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 674, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994) (same procedural bar arises for failure to appeal under current Missouri Rule 29.15)."
} | 11,333,746 | a |
The district court found that all but one of these claims were procedurally defaulted because Jones failed to either preserve them at trial or present them in his appeal from the denial of his state motion for post-conviction relief. All of Jones's additional points of error were also deemed procedurally defaulted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "same procedural bar arises for failure to appeal under current Missouri Rule 29.15",
"sentence": "See Jones, 767 S.W.2d at 43 (noting that Jones abandoned all his claims except ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure “to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase”); see also Gilmore v. Armon-trout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir.1988) (procedural bar under former Missouri Rule 27.26), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114, 109 S.Ct. 3176, 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 674, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994) (same procedural bar arises for failure to appeal under current Missouri Rule 29.15)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "767 S.W.2d 43, 43",
"parenthetical": "noting that Jones abandoned all his claims except ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure \"to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase\"",
"sentence": "See Jones, 767 S.W.2d at 43 (noting that Jones abandoned all his claims except ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure “to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase”); see also Gilmore v. Armon-trout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir.1988) (procedural bar under former Missouri Rule 27.26), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114, 109 S.Ct. 3176, 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 674, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994) (same procedural bar arises for failure to appeal under current Missouri Rule 29.15)."
} | 11,333,746 | b |
The district court found that all but one of these claims were procedurally defaulted because Jones failed to either preserve them at trial or present them in his appeal from the denial of his state motion for post-conviction relief. All of Jones's additional points of error were also deemed procedurally defaulted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "767 S.W.2d 43, 43",
"parenthetical": "noting that Jones abandoned all his claims except ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure \"to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase\"",
"sentence": "See Jones, 767 S.W.2d at 43 (noting that Jones abandoned all his claims except ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure “to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase”); see also Gilmore v. Armon-trout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir.1988) (procedural bar under former Missouri Rule 27.26), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114, 109 S.Ct. 3176, 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 674, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994) (same procedural bar arises for failure to appeal under current Missouri Rule 29.15)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "same procedural bar arises for failure to appeal under current Missouri Rule 29.15",
"sentence": "See Jones, 767 S.W.2d at 43 (noting that Jones abandoned all his claims except ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure “to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase”); see also Gilmore v. Armon-trout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir.1988) (procedural bar under former Missouri Rule 27.26), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114, 109 S.Ct. 3176, 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 674, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994) (same procedural bar arises for failure to appeal under current Missouri Rule 29.15)."
} | 11,333,746 | a |
Hackworth appears to suggest that she was blinded by bright lights of the Mini-Mart, and thus failed to see the puddle she claims existed. The court finds, however, that given Hack-worth's knowledge of the rainy conditions, the close attention Hackworth says she was paying to the floor, and the fact that a three-foot wide puddle could not be entirely obstructed by overhead lights, the Government had no duty to warn. This finding comports with the great majority of Federal Tort Claims Act cases involving slip and fall accidents on wet floors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rainwater that accumulated on post office floor was open and obvious hazard and patron injured in slip and fall could not recover under FTCA",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 918 F.Supp. 87, 89 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (“The cases essentially are uniform which have considered the United States’ liability under the FTCA in customers’ slip and fall cases arising from injuries suffered when slipping on wet post office floors during or after a rainstorm. Even in the case where no sign was posted, no mats or runners were provided, and recommended mopping procedures were not followed, the courts have repeatedly found that the Government did not breach a duty to postal customers because a proprietor’s duty to warn does not extend to obvious dangers.”); see also Gunter v. United States, 10 F.Supp.2d 534 (M.D.N.C.1998) (rainwater that accumulated on post office floor was open and obvious hazard and patron injured in slip and fall could not recover under FTCA); Faircloth v. United States, 837 F.Supp. 123, 128-30 (E.D.N.C.1993) (“Everybody knows that the hallways ... during a continued rainstorm are tracked all over by the wet feet of people coming from the wet sidewalks, and are thereby rendered more slippery than they otherwise would be."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "918 F.Supp. 87, 89",
"parenthetical": "\"The cases essentially are uniform which have considered the United States' liability under the FTCA in customers' slip and fall cases arising from injuries suffered when slipping on wet post office floors during or after a rainstorm. Even in the case where no sign was posted, no mats or runners were provided, and recommended mopping procedures were not followed, the courts have repeatedly found that the Government did not breach a duty to postal customers because a proprietor's duty to warn does not extend to obvious dangers.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 918 F.Supp. 87, 89 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (“The cases essentially are uniform which have considered the United States’ liability under the FTCA in customers’ slip and fall cases arising from injuries suffered when slipping on wet post office floors during or after a rainstorm. Even in the case where no sign was posted, no mats or runners were provided, and recommended mopping procedures were not followed, the courts have repeatedly found that the Government did not breach a duty to postal customers because a proprietor’s duty to warn does not extend to obvious dangers.”); see also Gunter v. United States, 10 F.Supp.2d 534 (M.D.N.C.1998) (rainwater that accumulated on post office floor was open and obvious hazard and patron injured in slip and fall could not recover under FTCA); Faircloth v. United States, 837 F.Supp. 123, 128-30 (E.D.N.C.1993) (“Everybody knows that the hallways ... during a continued rainstorm are tracked all over by the wet feet of people coming from the wet sidewalks, and are thereby rendered more slippery than they otherwise would be."
} | 8,977,987 | b |
In precisely the same manner, enjoining the commencement of other actions against the Petitioners, Israel Re or its property will aid the Israeli court in achieving equality for creditors. The guiding premise of the Bankruptcy Code is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "536 F.2d 509, 513",
"parenthetical": "\"the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | 6,516,284 | a |
In precisely the same manner, enjoining the commencement of other actions against the Petitioners, Israel Re or its property will aid the Israeli court in achieving equality for creditors. The guiding premise of the Bankruptcy Code is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "25 B.R. 621, 629",
"parenthetical": "court \"not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "536 F.2d 509, 513",
"parenthetical": "\"the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | 6,516,284 | b |
In precisely the same manner, enjoining the commencement of other actions against the Petitioners, Israel Re or its property will aid the Israeli court in achieving equality for creditors. The guiding premise of the Bankruptcy Code is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | 6,516,284 | a |
In precisely the same manner, enjoining the commencement of other actions against the Petitioners, Israel Re or its property will aid the Israeli court in achieving equality for creditors. The guiding premise of the Bankruptcy Code is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "25 B.R. 621, 629",
"parenthetical": "court \"not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court\"",
"sentence": "Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459; Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir.) (“the road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); see also Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First National Bank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) (mad scramble to the United States courts for immediate attachments was in con travention of the established goal of United States and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable distribution for all creditors wherever located); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (court “not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring uniform administration in a foreign court”)."
} | 6,516,284 | a |
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