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In contrast to these authorities, numerous courts have held that employee compensation is "subject to reduction" under SS 541.118(a) if a policy of the employer provides for deductions disallowed by the DOL regulations for salaried employees regardless of whether such deductions have been made. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "709 F.Supp. 241, 241",
"parenthetical": "letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court",
"sentence": "April 16, 1991); Knecht, 683 F.Supp. at 1311; cf. Banks, 708 F.Supp. at 1024-25 (letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court). But see Harris, 709 F.Supp. at 241; District of Columbia Nurses’ Ass’n, 1988 WL 156191, at *2 n. 1. Even if the cited paragraph from the 1986 letter ruling had the significance urged upon the Court by defendants, the “letter ruling cannot override the express provisions of a Department of Labor regulation” in any event."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "707 F.Supp. 212, 215",
"parenthetical": "employer's policy under attack under FLSA and whether policy has been applied does not alter policy itself",
"sentence": "See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11; Abshire, 908 F.2d at 487; Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F.Supp. 1023, 1025 (E.D.Ark.1988) (no showing of actual deduction needed); Hawks v. City of Newport News, Va., 707 F.Supp. 212, 215 (E.D.Va.1988) (employer’s policy under attack under FLSA and whether policy has been applied does not alter policy itself); Persons v. City of Gresham, Or., 704 F.Supp. 191, 194 (D.Or.1988) (immaterial that an instance of actual deduction not alleged); Knecht v. City of Redwood City, 683 F.Supp. 1307, 1311 (N.D.Cal.1987) (lack of actual pay reduction does not alter analysis); see also Shockley, 997 F.2d at 21-25 (focusing upon defendant’s policy); Michigan Ass’n of Governmental Employees, 992 F.2d at 85-86 (focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy). Moreover, courts have explicitly considered the impact of the enigmatic paragraph in the 1986 letter ruling upon their analysis and, in the opinion of the undersigned, correctly interpreted the 1986 letter ruling so that, although an occasional unpermitted deduction which is inadvertent or unintentional would not change an employee’s salary status, the frequency of actual deductions is immaterial to finding employees’ compensation “subject to reduction” where the employer has a policy allowing deductions for unpermitted reasons."
} | 3,830,151 | b |
In contrast to these authorities, numerous courts have held that employee compensation is "subject to reduction" under SS 541.118(a) if a policy of the employer provides for deductions disallowed by the DOL regulations for salaried employees regardless of whether such deductions have been made. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "708 F.Supp. 1024, 1024-25",
"parenthetical": "letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court",
"sentence": "April 16, 1991); Knecht, 683 F.Supp. at 1311; cf. Banks, 708 F.Supp. at 1024-25 (letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court). But see Harris, 709 F.Supp. at 241; District of Columbia Nurses’ Ass’n, 1988 WL 156191, at *2 n. 1. Even if the cited paragraph from the 1986 letter ruling had the significance urged upon the Court by defendants, the “letter ruling cannot override the express provisions of a Department of Labor regulation” in any event."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "992 F.2d 85, 85-86",
"parenthetical": "focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy",
"sentence": "See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11; Abshire, 908 F.2d at 487; Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F.Supp. 1023, 1025 (E.D.Ark.1988) (no showing of actual deduction needed); Hawks v. City of Newport News, Va., 707 F.Supp. 212, 215 (E.D.Va.1988) (employer’s policy under attack under FLSA and whether policy has been applied does not alter policy itself); Persons v. City of Gresham, Or., 704 F.Supp. 191, 194 (D.Or.1988) (immaterial that an instance of actual deduction not alleged); Knecht v. City of Redwood City, 683 F.Supp. 1307, 1311 (N.D.Cal.1987) (lack of actual pay reduction does not alter analysis); see also Shockley, 997 F.2d at 21-25 (focusing upon defendant’s policy); Michigan Ass’n of Governmental Employees, 992 F.2d at 85-86 (focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy). Moreover, courts have explicitly considered the impact of the enigmatic paragraph in the 1986 letter ruling upon their analysis and, in the opinion of the undersigned, correctly interpreted the 1986 letter ruling so that, although an occasional unpermitted deduction which is inadvertent or unintentional would not change an employee’s salary status, the frequency of actual deductions is immaterial to finding employees’ compensation “subject to reduction” where the employer has a policy allowing deductions for unpermitted reasons."
} | 3,830,151 | b |
In contrast to these authorities, numerous courts have held that employee compensation is "subject to reduction" under SS 541.118(a) if a policy of the employer provides for deductions disallowed by the DOL regulations for salaried employees regardless of whether such deductions have been made. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "709 F.Supp. 241, 241",
"parenthetical": "letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court",
"sentence": "April 16, 1991); Knecht, 683 F.Supp. at 1311; cf. Banks, 708 F.Supp. at 1024-25 (letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court). But see Harris, 709 F.Supp. at 241; District of Columbia Nurses’ Ass’n, 1988 WL 156191, at *2 n. 1. Even if the cited paragraph from the 1986 letter ruling had the significance urged upon the Court by defendants, the “letter ruling cannot override the express provisions of a Department of Labor regulation” in any event."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "992 F.2d 85, 85-86",
"parenthetical": "focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy",
"sentence": "See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11; Abshire, 908 F.2d at 487; Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F.Supp. 1023, 1025 (E.D.Ark.1988) (no showing of actual deduction needed); Hawks v. City of Newport News, Va., 707 F.Supp. 212, 215 (E.D.Va.1988) (employer’s policy under attack under FLSA and whether policy has been applied does not alter policy itself); Persons v. City of Gresham, Or., 704 F.Supp. 191, 194 (D.Or.1988) (immaterial that an instance of actual deduction not alleged); Knecht v. City of Redwood City, 683 F.Supp. 1307, 1311 (N.D.Cal.1987) (lack of actual pay reduction does not alter analysis); see also Shockley, 997 F.2d at 21-25 (focusing upon defendant’s policy); Michigan Ass’n of Governmental Employees, 992 F.2d at 85-86 (focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy). Moreover, courts have explicitly considered the impact of the enigmatic paragraph in the 1986 letter ruling upon their analysis and, in the opinion of the undersigned, correctly interpreted the 1986 letter ruling so that, although an occasional unpermitted deduction which is inadvertent or unintentional would not change an employee’s salary status, the frequency of actual deductions is immaterial to finding employees’ compensation “subject to reduction” where the employer has a policy allowing deductions for unpermitted reasons."
} | 3,830,151 | b |
To the extent the Plaintiff continues to seek to pursue this claim, the Court finds that there are no facts alleged or evidence put forth that supports a claim of gender discrimination as a result of the claimed retaliatory actions taken by the County Defendants, including Geier. In any event, the Second Circuit has explained, albeit in the racial discrimination context, that no such cause of action exists. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "79 F.3d 318, 323",
"parenthetical": "\"[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (“[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.”); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (“[R]ight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.”); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“defendants’ alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 338, 340-41",
"parenthetical": "finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination",
"sentence": "Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (“[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.”); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (“[R]ight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.”); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“defendants’ alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.”)."
} | 3,582,340 | a |
To the extent the Plaintiff continues to seek to pursue this claim, the Court finds that there are no facts alleged or evidence put forth that supports a claim of gender discrimination as a result of the claimed retaliatory actions taken by the County Defendants, including Geier. In any event, the Second Circuit has explained, albeit in the racial discrimination context, that no such cause of action exists. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "885 F.2d 399, 414",
"parenthetical": "\"[R]ight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.\"",
"sentence": "Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (“[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.”); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (“[R]ight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.”); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“defendants’ alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "79 F.3d 318, 323",
"parenthetical": "\"[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (“[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.”); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (“[R]ight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.”); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“defendants’ alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.”)."
} | 3,582,340 | b |
To the extent the Plaintiff continues to seek to pursue this claim, the Court finds that there are no facts alleged or evidence put forth that supports a claim of gender discrimination as a result of the claimed retaliatory actions taken by the County Defendants, including Geier. In any event, the Second Circuit has explained, albeit in the racial discrimination context, that no such cause of action exists. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419",
"parenthetical": "\"defendants' alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.\"",
"sentence": "Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (“[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.”); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (“[R]ight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.”); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“defendants’ alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "79 F.3d 318, 323",
"parenthetical": "\"[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (“[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.”); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (“[R]ight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.”); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“defendants’ alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.”)."
} | 3,582,340 | b |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "371 U.S. 178, 182",
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 113, 115",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | 4,171,386 | a |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "371 U.S. 178, 182",
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 115, 115",
"parenthetical": "\"In assessing 'futility,' the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | 4,171,386 | a |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 113, 115",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | 4,171,386 | a |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 115, 115",
"parenthetical": "\"In assessing 'futility,' the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | 4,171,386 | b |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 113, 115",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.\"",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | 4,171,386 | b |
Leave to amend will not be granted. "Though leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the motion is committed to the district court's sound discretion." "The court may deny leave to amend, among other reasons, on the basis of the futility of the amendment." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "213 F.3d 115, 115",
"parenthetical": "\"In assessing 'futility,' the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party",
"sentence": "Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (other reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, and undue prejudice to opposing party); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir.1989)); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000) (“ ‘Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 954; see also Shane, 213 F.3d at 115 (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)."
} | 4,171,386 | b |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "347 U.S. 230, 230",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 536, 536",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer \" and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant \"should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | 4,143,915 | b |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 536, 536",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer \" and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant \"should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | 4,143,915 | b |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 F.3d 637, 637",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "347 U.S. 230, 230",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | 4,143,915 | a |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 F.3d 637, 637",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | 4,143,915 | a |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 F.3d 423, 431",
"parenthetical": "\"By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors' states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "347 U.S. 230, 230",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | 4,143,915 | a |
Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court \"should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a #hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1 F.3d 423, 431",
"parenthetical": "\"By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors' states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----\"",
"sentence": "See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that “district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer ” and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant “should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under Qath”); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that “the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]”); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (“By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors’ states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----”); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a ■hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate”)."
} | 4,143,915 | b |
However, a defendant's due process rights are not violated by a good-faith "battle of the experts." That Pandeli's experts disagreed with Dr. Bayless's diagnosis merely goes to the weight and credibility of Dr. Bayless's opinion, matters reserved for the fact-finder's consideration and determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "27 Ariz.App. 363, 368",
"parenthetical": "finding that disputed facts in the ease \"were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert's] version,\" and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have recognized that a trial court’s admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.”); see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding that disputed facts in the ease “were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert’s] version,” and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have recognized that a trial court's admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have recognized that a trial court’s admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.”); see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding that disputed facts in the ease “were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert’s] version,” and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony)."
} | 12,310,139 | b |
However, a defendant's due process rights are not violated by a good-faith "battle of the experts." That Pandeli's experts disagreed with Dr. Bayless's diagnosis merely goes to the weight and credibility of Dr. Bayless's opinion, matters reserved for the fact-finder's consideration and determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "555 P.2d 120, 125",
"parenthetical": "finding that disputed facts in the ease \"were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert's] version,\" and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have recognized that a trial court’s admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.”); see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding that disputed facts in the ease “were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert’s] version,” and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have recognized that a trial court's admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have recognized that a trial court’s admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.”); see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding that disputed facts in the ease “were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert’s] version,” and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony)."
} | 12,310,139 | b |
However, a defendant's due process rights are not violated by a good-faith "battle of the experts." That Pandeli's experts disagreed with Dr. Bayless's diagnosis merely goes to the weight and credibility of Dr. Bayless's opinion, matters reserved for the fact-finder's consideration and determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "27 Ariz.App. 363, 368",
"parenthetical": "finding that disputed facts in the ease \"were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert's] version,\" and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have recognized that a trial court’s admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.”); see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding that disputed facts in the ease “were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert’s] version,” and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "365 P.3d 358, 364",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have recognized that a trial court's admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have recognized that a trial court’s admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.”); see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding that disputed facts in the ease “were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert’s] version,” and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony)."
} | 12,310,139 | b |
However, a defendant's due process rights are not violated by a good-faith "battle of the experts." That Pandeli's experts disagreed with Dr. Bayless's diagnosis merely goes to the weight and credibility of Dr. Bayless's opinion, matters reserved for the fact-finder's consideration and determination. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "365 P.3d 358, 364",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have recognized that a trial court's admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have recognized that a trial court’s admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.”); see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding that disputed facts in the ease “were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert’s] version,” and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "555 P.2d 120, 125",
"parenthetical": "finding that disputed facts in the ease \"were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert's] version,\" and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony",
"sentence": "See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 27, 365 P.3d 358, 364 (2016) (“[W]e have recognized that a trial court’s admission of disputed expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the role of assessing its weight and credibility.”); see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App. 363, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding that disputed facts in the ease “were either not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching his opinion, or were immaterial to his opinion, or were legitimately contested facts and evidence ... that supported [the expert’s] version,” and that the trial court properly left it to the jury to assign weight to that testimony)."
} | 12,310,139 | a |
Because Dawson produced no evidence that Samu, Adams and Estep participated or acquiesced in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights or inadequately trained or supervised the officers who allegedly did (Bowker and Johnson), the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to these defendants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 1892, 1400",
"parenthetical": "\"supervisor liability [under SS 1983] requires allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence\"",
"sentence": "See McKee, 703 F.2d at 483 (“defendant Heggy is liable to [plaintiff] only if Mr. Heggy participated or acquiesced in [plaintiff]’s deprivation or if he inadequately trained or supervised the officers who did”); see also Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1892, 1400 (10th Cir.1992) (“supervisor liability [under § 1983] requires allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence”) (quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "703 F.2d 483, 483",
"parenthetical": "\"defendant Heggy is liable to [plaintiff] only if Mr. Heggy participated or acquiesced in [plaintiff]'s deprivation or if he inadequately trained or supervised the officers who did\"",
"sentence": "See McKee, 703 F.2d at 483 (“defendant Heggy is liable to [plaintiff] only if Mr. Heggy participated or acquiesced in [plaintiff]’s deprivation or if he inadequately trained or supervised the officers who did”); see also Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1892, 1400 (10th Cir.1992) (“supervisor liability [under § 1983] requires allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence”) (quotations omitted)."
} | 3,530,577 | b |
If subsection (10)(b) is read in isolation, it is rendered ambiguous and ineffective because it does not confer a right of redemption nor does it contain any of the essential terms for exercising that right i.e., fair value. Such an absurd reading was not intended and should be avoided by courts when construing a statute. "[Statutes must be con strued as to avoid an unreasonable or absurd result." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "943 F.2d 1284, 1287",
"parenthetical": "\"A basic premise of statutory construction is that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.\"",
"sentence": "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rush, 777 So.2d 1027, 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (noting that “provisions of an act are to be read as consistent with one another”), rev. dismissed, 790 So.2d 1101 (Fla.2001) (citing City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla.1983)); Pavolini v. Bird, 769 So.2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), rev. denied, 790 So.2d 1102 (Fla.2001); Meeks ex rel. Estate of Meeks v. Florida Power & Light Co., 816 So.2d 1125, 1131-33 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); see also Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1208 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted); United States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.1991) (“A basic premise of statutory construction is that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "777 So.2d 1027, 1032",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"provisions of an act are to be read as consistent with one another\"",
"sentence": "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rush, 777 So.2d 1027, 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (noting that “provisions of an act are to be read as consistent with one another”), rev. dismissed, 790 So.2d 1101 (Fla.2001) (citing City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla.1983)); Pavolini v. Bird, 769 So.2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), rev. denied, 790 So.2d 1102 (Fla.2001); Meeks ex rel. Estate of Meeks v. Florida Power & Light Co., 816 So.2d 1125, 1131-33 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); see also Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1208 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted); United States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.1991) (“A basic premise of statutory construction is that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.”)."
} | 11,436,095 | b |
Second, they argue it is excessive compared to other cases where the plaintiff suffered emotional distress of a magnitude comparable to Wulf s. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987) (plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.); see also Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (3d Cir.1986) (no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was “depressed and humiliated” by retaliatory transfer); Ramsey, 772 F.2d at 1313-14 (and cases cited therein)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was \"depressed and humiliated\" by retaliatory transfer",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987) (plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.); see also Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (3d Cir.1986) (no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was “depressed and humiliated” by retaliatory transfer); Ramsey, 772 F.2d at 1313-14 (and cases cited therein)."
} | 10,533,800 | a |
Second, they argue it is excessive compared to other cases where the plaintiff suffered emotional distress of a magnitude comparable to Wulf s. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was \"depressed and humiliated\" by retaliatory transfer",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987) (plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.); see also Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (3d Cir.1986) (no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was “depressed and humiliated” by retaliatory transfer); Ramsey, 772 F.2d at 1313-14 (and cases cited therein)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987) (plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.); see also Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (3d Cir.1986) (no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was “depressed and humiliated” by retaliatory transfer); Ramsey, 772 F.2d at 1313-14 (and cases cited therein)."
} | 10,533,800 | b |
Second, they argue it is excessive compared to other cases where the plaintiff suffered emotional distress of a magnitude comparable to Wulf s. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was \"depressed and humiliated\" by retaliatory transfer",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987) (plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.); see also Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (3d Cir.1986) (no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was “depressed and humiliated” by retaliatory transfer); Ramsey, 772 F.2d at 1313-14 (and cases cited therein)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987) (plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.); see also Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (3d Cir.1986) (no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was “depressed and humiliated” by retaliatory transfer); Ramsey, 772 F.2d at 1313-14 (and cases cited therein)."
} | 10,533,800 | b |
Second, they argue it is excessive compared to other cases where the plaintiff suffered emotional distress of a magnitude comparable to Wulf s. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was \"depressed and humiliated\" by retaliatory transfer",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987) (plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.); see also Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (3d Cir.1986) (no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was “depressed and humiliated” by retaliatory transfer); Ramsey, 772 F.2d at 1313-14 (and cases cited therein)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987) (plaintiff received damages totaling $113,000, a portion of which represented lost income, where her distress was so severe she was unable to work.); see also Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (3d Cir.1986) (no recovery for emotional distress where plaintiff testified she was “depressed and humiliated” by retaliatory transfer); Ramsey, 772 F.2d at 1313-14 (and cases cited therein)."
} | 10,533,800 | b |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | 659,868 | b |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 372, 380",
"parenthetical": "stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences \"are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "80 U.S. 335, 357",
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "80 U.S. 335, 357",
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 372, 380",
"parenthetical": "stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences \"are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 372, 380",
"parenthetical": "stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences \"are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | 659,868 | b |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 359, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 359, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 372, 380",
"parenthetical": "stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences \"are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | 659,868 | a |
The fact that one of Benson's (suspended) terms of imprisonment was later found to have been imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not mean that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The] erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "211 F.3d 372, 380",
"parenthetical": "stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences \"are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 357, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (“[The] erroneous manner in which [the court’s] jurisdiction was exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not ... render the defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the plaintiff, as though the court had proceeded without having any jurisdiction whatever.”) cited in Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099; cf. id. at 352, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction [not in the clear absence thereof] and would be immune.”); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir.2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that laws affecting the maximum length of sentences “are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction.”)"
} | 659,868 | a |
It followed a hearing at which the trial court heard evidence on whether to extend the injunctive relief sought by Morgan. See generally OCGA SS 9-11-65 (b) (setting forth procedure by which court conducts hearing to determine whether either to dissolve previously-entered ex parte temporary restraining order or to grant interlocutory injunction). As such, the order's function and substance was to deny Morgan interlocutory injunctive relief pending the litigation of the various claims raised in his complaint and amended complaint. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 Ga. 740, 741",
"parenthetical": "when determining whether order is directly appeal-able, we consider its function and substance rather than its nomenclature",
"sentence": "See Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 278 Ga. 740, 741 (1) (609 SE2d 324) (2004) (when determining whether order is directly appeal-able, we consider its function and substance rather than its nomenclature)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Ga. 141, 142",
"parenthetical": "order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 (1) (466 SE2d 846) (1996) (where trial court’s decision effectively denied party’s request for interlocutory injunctive relief, it was the equivalent to a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction application and was therefore directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4)); Spell v. Blalock, 243 Ga. 459, 460-461 (1) (254 SE2d 842) (1979) (trial court’s ruling on whether to continue a restraining order was directly appealable under predecessor to OCGA § 5-6-34 as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgment); Nat. Hills Exchange v. Thompson, 319 Ga. App. 777-778 (736 SE2d 480) (2013) (trial court’s order extending temporary restraining order in effect granted directly appealable preliminary injunction); see also Dolinger v. Driver, 269 Ga. 141, 142 (1) (498 SE2d 252) (1998) (order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought)."
} | 3,807,798 | a |
It followed a hearing at which the trial court heard evidence on whether to extend the injunctive relief sought by Morgan. See generally OCGA SS 9-11-65 (b) (setting forth procedure by which court conducts hearing to determine whether either to dissolve previously-entered ex parte temporary restraining order or to grant interlocutory injunction). As such, the order's function and substance was to deny Morgan interlocutory injunctive relief pending the litigation of the various claims raised in his complaint and amended complaint. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where trial court's decision effectively denied party's request for interlocutory injunctive relief, it was the equivalent to a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction application and was therefore directly appealable under OCGA SS 5-6-34 (a",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 (1) (466 SE2d 846) (1996) (where trial court’s decision effectively denied party’s request for interlocutory injunctive relief, it was the equivalent to a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction application and was therefore directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4)); Spell v. Blalock, 243 Ga. 459, 460-461 (1) (254 SE2d 842) (1979) (trial court’s ruling on whether to continue a restraining order was directly appealable under predecessor to OCGA § 5-6-34 as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgment); Nat. Hills Exchange v. Thompson, 319 Ga. App. 777-778 (736 SE2d 480) (2013) (trial court’s order extending temporary restraining order in effect granted directly appealable preliminary injunction); see also Dolinger v. Driver, 269 Ga. 141, 142 (1) (498 SE2d 252) (1998) (order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Ga. 141, 142",
"parenthetical": "order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 (1) (466 SE2d 846) (1996) (where trial court’s decision effectively denied party’s request for interlocutory injunctive relief, it was the equivalent to a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction application and was therefore directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4)); Spell v. Blalock, 243 Ga. 459, 460-461 (1) (254 SE2d 842) (1979) (trial court’s ruling on whether to continue a restraining order was directly appealable under predecessor to OCGA § 5-6-34 as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgment); Nat. Hills Exchange v. Thompson, 319 Ga. App. 777-778 (736 SE2d 480) (2013) (trial court’s order extending temporary restraining order in effect granted directly appealable preliminary injunction); see also Dolinger v. Driver, 269 Ga. 141, 142 (1) (498 SE2d 252) (1998) (order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought)."
} | 3,807,798 | a |
It followed a hearing at which the trial court heard evidence on whether to extend the injunctive relief sought by Morgan. See generally OCGA SS 9-11-65 (b) (setting forth procedure by which court conducts hearing to determine whether either to dissolve previously-entered ex parte temporary restraining order or to grant interlocutory injunction). As such, the order's function and substance was to deny Morgan interlocutory injunctive relief pending the litigation of the various claims raised in his complaint and amended complaint. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 Ga. 459, 460-461",
"parenthetical": "trial court's ruling on whether to continue a restraining order was directly appealable under predecessor to OCGA SS 5-6-34 as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgment",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 (1) (466 SE2d 846) (1996) (where trial court’s decision effectively denied party’s request for interlocutory injunctive relief, it was the equivalent to a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction application and was therefore directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4)); Spell v. Blalock, 243 Ga. 459, 460-461 (1) (254 SE2d 842) (1979) (trial court’s ruling on whether to continue a restraining order was directly appealable under predecessor to OCGA § 5-6-34 as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgment); Nat. Hills Exchange v. Thompson, 319 Ga. App. 777-778 (736 SE2d 480) (2013) (trial court’s order extending temporary restraining order in effect granted directly appealable preliminary injunction); see also Dolinger v. Driver, 269 Ga. 141, 142 (1) (498 SE2d 252) (1998) (order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Ga. 141, 142",
"parenthetical": "order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 (1) (466 SE2d 846) (1996) (where trial court’s decision effectively denied party’s request for interlocutory injunctive relief, it was the equivalent to a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction application and was therefore directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4)); Spell v. Blalock, 243 Ga. 459, 460-461 (1) (254 SE2d 842) (1979) (trial court’s ruling on whether to continue a restraining order was directly appealable under predecessor to OCGA § 5-6-34 as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgment); Nat. Hills Exchange v. Thompson, 319 Ga. App. 777-778 (736 SE2d 480) (2013) (trial court’s order extending temporary restraining order in effect granted directly appealable preliminary injunction); see also Dolinger v. Driver, 269 Ga. 141, 142 (1) (498 SE2d 252) (1998) (order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought)."
} | 3,807,798 | a |
It followed a hearing at which the trial court heard evidence on whether to extend the injunctive relief sought by Morgan. See generally OCGA SS 9-11-65 (b) (setting forth procedure by which court conducts hearing to determine whether either to dissolve previously-entered ex parte temporary restraining order or to grant interlocutory injunction). As such, the order's function and substance was to deny Morgan interlocutory injunctive relief pending the litigation of the various claims raised in his complaint and amended complaint. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "269 Ga. 141, 142",
"parenthetical": "order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 (1) (466 SE2d 846) (1996) (where trial court’s decision effectively denied party’s request for interlocutory injunctive relief, it was the equivalent to a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction application and was therefore directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4)); Spell v. Blalock, 243 Ga. 459, 460-461 (1) (254 SE2d 842) (1979) (trial court’s ruling on whether to continue a restraining order was directly appealable under predecessor to OCGA § 5-6-34 as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgment); Nat. Hills Exchange v. Thompson, 319 Ga. App. 777-778 (736 SE2d 480) (2013) (trial court’s order extending temporary restraining order in effect granted directly appealable preliminary injunction); see also Dolinger v. Driver, 269 Ga. 141, 142 (1) (498 SE2d 252) (1998) (order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court's order extending temporary restraining order in effect granted directly appealable preliminary injunction",
"sentence": "See Ga. Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331 (1) (466 SE2d 846) (1996) (where trial court’s decision effectively denied party’s request for interlocutory injunctive relief, it was the equivalent to a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction application and was therefore directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4)); Spell v. Blalock, 243 Ga. 459, 460-461 (1) (254 SE2d 842) (1979) (trial court’s ruling on whether to continue a restraining order was directly appealable under predecessor to OCGA § 5-6-34 as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgment); Nat. Hills Exchange v. Thompson, 319 Ga. App. 777-778 (736 SE2d 480) (2013) (trial court’s order extending temporary restraining order in effect granted directly appealable preliminary injunction); see also Dolinger v. Driver, 269 Ga. 141, 142 (1) (498 SE2d 252) (1998) (order granting temporary restraining order is directly appealable where it is entered after a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants the plaintiff all of the relief sought)."
} | 3,807,798 | b |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "940 F.2d 226, 232",
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant's prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | b |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "737 F.2d 521, 534",
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | b |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "692 F.2d 320, 325",
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son's affiliation with a labor union",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son's affiliation with a labor union",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | b |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son's affiliation with a labor union",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son's affiliation with a labor union",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | b |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "673 F.2d 1185, 1190",
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | a |
Several other circuits have concluded that the Constitution does not require a presumption of bias in situations where jurors have been potentially prejudiced. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "551 F.2d 553, 554",
"parenthetical": "no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime",
"sentence": "Britz v. Thieret, 940 F.2d 226, 232 (7th Cir.1991) (no per se bias when six jurors had heard news accounts reporting defendant’s prior conviction for the same crime and all twelve jurors had admitted some familiarity with the case); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 534 (6th Cir.1984) (no per se bias when five jurors reported receiving threatening phone calls during the trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 325 (4th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when juror concealed information during voir dire about her son’s affiliation with a labor union), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 84, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983); Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.1982) (no per se bias when seventeen-year-old juror misstated her age during voir dire), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 740, 74 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983); contra Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir.1977) (no showing of actual bias required when three jurors had been on a prior jury convicting the same defendant of a similar crime)."
} | 1,863,251 | a |
In this case, the Kays argue that the language is clear, but they further contend that the Partnership's tax sheltering purpose informs the partnership provisions and unequivocally establishes the Note partners' personal liability for calls related to the Notes. The Kays are correct in their assertion that, in order to qualify for a pass-through deduction at the time that the Partnership was formed, the relevant tax laws required a limited partner to be "at risk", i.e., the limited partner had to assume personal and ultimate liability for certain debts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 747, 750",
"parenthetical": "finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not \"at risk,\" and therefore not entitled to deductions",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that limited partner’s obligation to make additional capital contributions under the partnership agreement satisfied the “at risk” requirement of I.R.C. § 465); Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1471, 1499-1502, 1986 WL 22070 (1986) (same, both under I.R.C. § 465 and under § 752); cf. Goatcher v. United States, 944 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir.1991) (finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not “at risk,” and therefore not entitled to deductions)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that limited partner's obligation to make additional capital contributions under the partnership agreement satisfied the \"at risk\" requirement of I.R.C. SS 465",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that limited partner’s obligation to make additional capital contributions under the partnership agreement satisfied the “at risk” requirement of I.R.C. § 465); Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1471, 1499-1502, 1986 WL 22070 (1986) (same, both under I.R.C. § 465 and under § 752); cf. Goatcher v. United States, 944 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir.1991) (finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not “at risk,” and therefore not entitled to deductions)."
} | 1,356,240 | b |
In this case, the Kays argue that the language is clear, but they further contend that the Partnership's tax sheltering purpose informs the partnership provisions and unequivocally establishes the Note partners' personal liability for calls related to the Notes. The Kays are correct in their assertion that, in order to qualify for a pass-through deduction at the time that the Partnership was formed, the relevant tax laws required a limited partner to be "at risk", i.e., the limited partner had to assume personal and ultimate liability for certain debts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 747, 750",
"parenthetical": "finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not \"at risk,\" and therefore not entitled to deductions",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that limited partner’s obligation to make additional capital contributions under the partnership agreement satisfied the “at risk” requirement of I.R.C. § 465); Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1471, 1499-1502, 1986 WL 22070 (1986) (same, both under I.R.C. § 465 and under § 752); cf. Goatcher v. United States, 944 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir.1991) (finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not “at risk,” and therefore not entitled to deductions)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 T.C. 1471, 1499-1502",
"parenthetical": "same, both under I.R.C. SS 465 and under SS 752",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that limited partner’s obligation to make additional capital contributions under the partnership agreement satisfied the “at risk” requirement of I.R.C. § 465); Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1471, 1499-1502, 1986 WL 22070 (1986) (same, both under I.R.C. § 465 and under § 752); cf. Goatcher v. United States, 944 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir.1991) (finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not “at risk,” and therefore not entitled to deductions)."
} | 1,356,240 | b |
In this case, the Kays argue that the language is clear, but they further contend that the Partnership's tax sheltering purpose informs the partnership provisions and unequivocally establishes the Note partners' personal liability for calls related to the Notes. The Kays are correct in their assertion that, in order to qualify for a pass-through deduction at the time that the Partnership was formed, the relevant tax laws required a limited partner to be "at risk", i.e., the limited partner had to assume personal and ultimate liability for certain debts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "same, both under I.R.C. SS 465 and under SS 752",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that limited partner’s obligation to make additional capital contributions under the partnership agreement satisfied the “at risk” requirement of I.R.C. § 465); Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1471, 1499-1502, 1986 WL 22070 (1986) (same, both under I.R.C. § 465 and under § 752); cf. Goatcher v. United States, 944 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir.1991) (finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not “at risk,” and therefore not entitled to deductions)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "944 F.2d 747, 750",
"parenthetical": "finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not \"at risk,\" and therefore not entitled to deductions",
"sentence": "See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644, 646^47 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that limited partner’s obligation to make additional capital contributions under the partnership agreement satisfied the “at risk” requirement of I.R.C. § 465); Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1471, 1499-1502, 1986 WL 22070 (1986) (same, both under I.R.C. § 465 and under § 752); cf. Goatcher v. United States, 944 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir.1991) (finding that taxpayers, subchapter S shareholders, as mere guarantors of debt to corporation, were not “at risk,” and therefore not entitled to deductions)."
} | 1,356,240 | a |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a troublesome question, requiring careful assessment of congressional purpose. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "426 U.S. 229, 238-42",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "469 U.S. 287, 292-99",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | 571,755 | b |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a troublesome question, requiring careful assessment of congressional purpose. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "469 U.S. 287, 292-99",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | 571,755 | b |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a troublesome question, requiring careful assessment of congressional purpose. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "469 U.S. 287, 292-99",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | 571,755 | b |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a troublesome question, requiring careful assessment of congressional purpose. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "426 U.S. 229, 238-42",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | 571,755 | a |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a troublesome question, requiring careful assessment of congressional purpose. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | 571,755 | a |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a troublesome question, requiring careful assessment of congressional purpose. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19",
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | 571,755 | a |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a troublesome question, requiring careful assessment of congressional purpose. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "426 U.S. 229, 238-42",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | 571,755 | b |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a troublesome question, requiring careful assessment of congressional purpose. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49",
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | 571,755 | a |
As a matter of law, we note that it is unclear whether the LRRA forbids only intended targeting of RRGs, or whether it also prohibits legislation with an unintended disparate impact. The Supreme Court has indicated that the application of disparate impact theory to a given statute's anti-discrimination provisions is a troublesome question, requiring careful assessment of congressional purpose. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to SS 504 of the Rehabilitation Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99, 105 S.Ct. 712, 715-19, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)(considering whether to apply disparate impact theory to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)(finding of discrimination under Equal Protection Clause generally requires showing of invidious intent)."
} | 571,755 | b |
In light of the court's conclusion that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim pursuant to the RFRA, the court will refrain from addressing plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim",
"sentence": "Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (acknowledging the “ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available”); see Tyndale House, 904 F.Supp.2d at 113 n. 7 (where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging the \"ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available\"",
"sentence": "Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (acknowledging the “ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available”); see Tyndale House, 904 F.Supp.2d at 113 n. 7 (where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim)."
} | 4,224,672 | b |
In light of the court's conclusion that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim pursuant to the RFRA, the court will refrain from addressing plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim",
"sentence": "Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (acknowledging the “ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available”); see Tyndale House, 904 F.Supp.2d at 113 n. 7 (where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging the \"ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available\"",
"sentence": "Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (acknowledging the “ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available”); see Tyndale House, 904 F.Supp.2d at 113 n. 7 (where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim)."
} | 4,224,672 | b |
In light of the court's conclusion that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim pursuant to the RFRA, the court will refrain from addressing plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging the \"ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available\"",
"sentence": "Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (acknowledging the “ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available”); see Tyndale House, 904 F.Supp.2d at 113 n. 7 (where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim",
"sentence": "Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12, 547, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (acknowledging the “ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available”); see Tyndale House, 904 F.Supp.2d at 113 n. 7 (where the court found that the plaintiffs had made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits under the RFRA, as well as strong showings with respect to the other preliminary injunction requirements, it only addressed the merits of the RFRA claim)."
} | 4,224,672 | a |
Second, the trial court compounded its error by resentencing Thompson in reliance upon the transcript from the August 26, 2016, hearing at which both Thompson and his counsel were absent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "38 So.3d 827, 828",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here a defendant is denied counsel during a resentencing hearing held to correct a judicial error, the trial court commits fundamental error.\"",
"sentence": "See Payne v. State, 38 So.3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[W]here a defendant is denied counsel during a resentencing hearing held to correct a judicial error, the trial court commits fundamental error.”); see also Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (stating that full panoply of due process considerations apply at resen-tencing, including appointment of counsel); Mullins v. State, 997 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“[T]he defendant has the right to be present and have assistance of counsel at the new sentencing hearing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "76 So.3d 1103, 1104",
"parenthetical": "stating that full panoply of due process considerations apply at resen-tencing, including appointment of counsel",
"sentence": "See Payne v. State, 38 So.3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[W]here a defendant is denied counsel during a resentencing hearing held to correct a judicial error, the trial court commits fundamental error.”); see also Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (stating that full panoply of due process considerations apply at resen-tencing, including appointment of counsel); Mullins v. State, 997 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“[T]he defendant has the right to be present and have assistance of counsel at the new sentencing hearing.”)."
} | 12,360,888 | a |
Second, the trial court compounded its error by resentencing Thompson in reliance upon the transcript from the August 26, 2016, hearing at which both Thompson and his counsel were absent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "997 So.2d 443, 445",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he defendant has the right to be present and have assistance of counsel at the new sentencing hearing.\"",
"sentence": "See Payne v. State, 38 So.3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[W]here a defendant is denied counsel during a resentencing hearing held to correct a judicial error, the trial court commits fundamental error.”); see also Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (stating that full panoply of due process considerations apply at resen-tencing, including appointment of counsel); Mullins v. State, 997 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“[T]he defendant has the right to be present and have assistance of counsel at the new sentencing hearing.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "38 So.3d 827, 828",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here a defendant is denied counsel during a resentencing hearing held to correct a judicial error, the trial court commits fundamental error.\"",
"sentence": "See Payne v. State, 38 So.3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[W]here a defendant is denied counsel during a resentencing hearing held to correct a judicial error, the trial court commits fundamental error.”); see also Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (stating that full panoply of due process considerations apply at resen-tencing, including appointment of counsel); Mullins v. State, 997 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“[T]he defendant has the right to be present and have assistance of counsel at the new sentencing hearing.”)."
} | 12,360,888 | b |
Also, just as in Mastrobuono, the parties here entered into an agreement in which, without the choice-of-law provision, the FAA rule would apply. Finally, also as in Mastrobuono, the clause does not unequivocally suggest an intent to displace the default federal standard. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 294, 294-95",
"parenthetical": "drawing the same conclusion about the choice-of-law clause in that case based on Mastrobuono's language",
"sentence": "See id. at 62, 115 S.Ct. 1212 (“At most, the choice-of-law provision introduces an ambiguity into an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive damages awards.”); see also Roadway Package Sys., 257 F.3d at 294-95 (drawing the same conclusion about the choice-of-law clause in that case based on Mastrobuono’s language)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"At most, the choice-of-law provision introduces an ambiguity into an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive damages awards.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 62, 115 S.Ct. 1212 (“At most, the choice-of-law provision introduces an ambiguity into an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive damages awards.”); see also Roadway Package Sys., 257 F.3d at 294-95 (drawing the same conclusion about the choice-of-law clause in that case based on Mastrobuono’s language)."
} | 9,174,434 | b |
1 36 Given the dynamic nature of the state law-making process, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature intends its statutes to work in tandem with our case law, and we reconcile the common law with statutory law whenever possible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 UT 36, ¶ 10",
"parenthetical": "\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 UT 29, ¶ 39",
"parenthetical": "\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.)."
} | 6,971,161 | b |
1 36 Given the dynamic nature of the state law-making process, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature intends its statutes to work in tandem with our case law, and we reconcile the common law with statutory law whenever possible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 UT 29, ¶ 39",
"parenthetical": "\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.)."
} | 6,971,161 | a |
1 36 Given the dynamic nature of the state law-making process, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature intends its statutes to work in tandem with our case law, and we reconcile the common law with statutory law whenever possible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 UT 36, ¶ 10",
"parenthetical": "\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.)."
} | 6,971,161 | b |
1 36 Given the dynamic nature of the state law-making process, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature intends its statutes to work in tandem with our case law, and we reconcile the common law with statutory law whenever possible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"",
"sentence": "See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (\"We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law. ...\"); see also Bishop, 2002 UT 36, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 218 (\"[The common law must necessarily give way\" to statutory law only when the two are \"in conflict\" or when the legislature intended to preempt the common law.)."
} | 6,971,161 | b |
Although the government argues that the "frisk" did not begin until Officer Harvey patted down the outside of Johnson's clothing, it has provided no authority to support its position, and I have found scant support. Furthermore, our prior cases suggest that the frisk began, at the latest, when Officer Harvey manipulated Johnson's body to effectuate the frisk. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 A.2d 1082, 1087",
"parenthetical": "finding that factors that manifested themselves after the suspect was ordered to assume the position and after the decision to frisk had been made should not have been included in the reasonable suspicion determination",
"sentence": "See Jackson v. United States, 805 A.2d 979, 987 (D.C.2002) (“[B]y the time [appellant] was asked to turn around (apparently in preparation for a frisk), and the officer touched [appellant’s] jacket, the police crossed the critical line between consent and coercion.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Powell v. United States, 649 A.2d 1082, 1087 (D.C.1994) (opinion of Sullivan, J.) (finding that factors that manifested themselves after the suspect was ordered to assume the position and after the decision to frisk had been made should not have been included in the reasonable suspicion determination); id. at 1090 (Farrell, J., concurring) (considering only facts known to the officers before “ordering [appellant] to place his hands on the car and patting him down”); see also United States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663, 670 (D.C.Cir.1999) (“[W]e assess a Terry search from the standpoint of the moment of the stop ... not from the subsequent period in which the officer begins to take protective measures.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "187 F.3d 663, 670",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e assess a Terry search from the standpoint of the moment of the stop ... not from the subsequent period in which the officer begins to take protective measures.\"",
"sentence": "See Jackson v. United States, 805 A.2d 979, 987 (D.C.2002) (“[B]y the time [appellant] was asked to turn around (apparently in preparation for a frisk), and the officer touched [appellant’s] jacket, the police crossed the critical line between consent and coercion.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Powell v. United States, 649 A.2d 1082, 1087 (D.C.1994) (opinion of Sullivan, J.) (finding that factors that manifested themselves after the suspect was ordered to assume the position and after the decision to frisk had been made should not have been included in the reasonable suspicion determination); id. at 1090 (Farrell, J., concurring) (considering only facts known to the officers before “ordering [appellant] to place his hands on the car and patting him down”); see also United States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663, 670 (D.C.Cir.1999) (“[W]e assess a Terry search from the standpoint of the moment of the stop ... not from the subsequent period in which the officer begins to take protective measures.”)."
} | 7,268,183 | a |
As discussed above, making false or misleading statements about medical devices is prohibited by federal law. This means that Schouest's state law fraud claims based on false off-label promotion would, if proven, also amount to a violation of federal law, and thus such claims could survive preemption. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "957 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1179-80",
"parenthetical": "holding that state fraud-based claims \"are parallel or `genuinely equivalent' to federal law\"",
"sentence": "See Houston, 957 F.Supp.2d at 1179-80 (holding that state fraud-based claims \"are parallel or `genuinely equivalent' to federal law\"); cf. In re Epogen & Aranesp Off-Label Marketing & Sales Practices Litig., 590 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1292 (C.D.Cal.2008) (observing in fraud case based on drug manufacturer's alleged misrepresentations that \"insofar as Plaintiffs can identify specific representations by Defendants that are literally false, misleading, or contain material omissions, the claims are actionable\" under California law)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "590 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1292",
"parenthetical": "observing in fraud case based on drug manufacturer's alleged misrepresentations that \"insofar as Plaintiffs can identify specific representations by Defendants that are literally false, misleading, or contain material omissions, the claims are actionable\" under California law",
"sentence": "See Houston, 957 F.Supp.2d at 1179-80 (holding that state fraud-based claims \"are parallel or `genuinely equivalent' to federal law\"); cf. In re Epogen & Aranesp Off-Label Marketing & Sales Practices Litig., 590 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1292 (C.D.Cal.2008) (observing in fraud case based on drug manufacturer's alleged misrepresentations that \"insofar as Plaintiffs can identify specific representations by Defendants that are literally false, misleading, or contain material omissions, the claims are actionable\" under California law)."
} | 4,220,477 | a |
See Tex.Crim. Nevertheless, where a trial judge imposes an "invalid" condition, "the proper remedy is to reform the judgment of conviction by deleting the condition." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "842 S.W.2d 284, 285",
"parenthetical": "holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition, and deleting the provision as a condition of applicant's deferred adjudication probation",
"sentence": "Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation); see also Ex parte Gingell, 842 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition, and deleting the provision as a condition of applicant’s deferred adjudication probation); Milligan v. State, 465 S.W.2d 157, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation, and deleting the 90 day jail penalty)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "789 S.W.2d 50, 51",
"parenthetical": "deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation",
"sentence": "Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation); see also Ex parte Gingell, 842 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition, and deleting the provision as a condition of applicant’s deferred adjudication probation); Milligan v. State, 465 S.W.2d 157, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation, and deleting the 90 day jail penalty)."
} | 11,519,195 | b |
See Tex.Crim. Nevertheless, where a trial judge imposes an "invalid" condition, "the proper remedy is to reform the judgment of conviction by deleting the condition." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "789 S.W.2d 50, 51",
"parenthetical": "deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation",
"sentence": "Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation); see also Ex parte Gingell, 842 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition, and deleting the provision as a condition of applicant’s deferred adjudication probation); Milligan v. State, 465 S.W.2d 157, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation, and deleting the 90 day jail penalty)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 S.W.2d 157, 158-59",
"parenthetical": "holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation, and deleting the 90 day jail penalty",
"sentence": "Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation); see also Ex parte Gingell, 842 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition, and deleting the provision as a condition of applicant’s deferred adjudication probation); Milligan v. State, 465 S.W.2d 157, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation, and deleting the 90 day jail penalty)."
} | 11,519,195 | a |
"A primary purpose of ERISA is to ensure the integrity and primacy of the written plans ... [so that] the plain language of an ERISA plan should be given its literal and natural meaning." Against this plain legislative purpose, if the ERISA plan expressly provides that its members are obligated to reimburse the plan for "the value of services provided, arranged, or paid for," we do not think it can be considered "unfair" to require plan members to abide by the agreement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "78 F.3d 127, 127",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Enrichment is not \"unjust\" where it is allowed by the express terms of the ... plan.' \"",
"sentence": "See Ryan, 78 F.3d at 127 (\" 'Enrichment is not \"unjust” where it is allowed by the express terms of the ... plan.' \") (citation omitted); cf. Pierce v. Christmas Tree Shops, Inc., 429 Mass. 91, 706 N.E.2d 633, 636 n. 5 (Mass.1999) (rejecting same argument, under Massachusetts law); cf. also Health Cost Controls, 139 F.3d at 1072 (noting that defendant \"has not identified to this Court that application of a set-off under a[n] equitable common fund doctrine would advance any explicit statutory purpose of ERISA”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "139 F.3d 1072, 1072",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant \"has not identified to this Court that application of a set-off under a[n] equitable common fund doctrine would advance any explicit statutory purpose of ERISA\"",
"sentence": "See Ryan, 78 F.3d at 127 (\" 'Enrichment is not \"unjust” where it is allowed by the express terms of the ... plan.' \") (citation omitted); cf. Pierce v. Christmas Tree Shops, Inc., 429 Mass. 91, 706 N.E.2d 633, 636 n. 5 (Mass.1999) (rejecting same argument, under Massachusetts law); cf. also Health Cost Controls, 139 F.3d at 1072 (noting that defendant \"has not identified to this Court that application of a set-off under a[n] equitable common fund doctrine would advance any explicit statutory purpose of ERISA”)."
} | 9,497,798 | a |
The Court will not require either of these measures. In camera review is not required where the Court is satisfied that the agency has adequately supported their exemption claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 1311, 1311",
"parenthetical": "error to require agency to provide Vaughn index detailing documents withheld when the basis for exemption was law enforcement purposes",
"sentence": "In re DOJ, 999 F.2d at 1311 (error to require agency to provide Vaughn index detailing documents withheld when the basis for exemption was law enforcement purposes); see also Barney, 618 F.2d at 1273-74 (holding that no Vaughn index would be required since the record clearly demonstrated that the FOIA requestor was subject to an ongoing law enforcement investigation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "618 F.2d 1273, 1273-74",
"parenthetical": "holding that no Vaughn index would be required since the record clearly demonstrated that the FOIA requestor was subject to an ongoing law enforcement investigation",
"sentence": "In re DOJ, 999 F.2d at 1311 (error to require agency to provide Vaughn index detailing documents withheld when the basis for exemption was law enforcement purposes); see also Barney, 618 F.2d at 1273-74 (holding that no Vaughn index would be required since the record clearly demonstrated that the FOIA requestor was subject to an ongoing law enforcement investigation)."
} | 4,283,204 | a |
What "fairly concrete" means is not clear. However, the district court clearly did not define "property" in general, or "indirect economic benefit" in particular, only in terms of legal or equitable rights or ownership interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "183 B.R. 247, 247",
"parenthetical": "noting that tithing does not give debtors enforceable property right, contract right or equitable right to attend or partake in services offered by church",
"sentence": "Compare 148 B.R. at 891 (bankruptcy court arguably limited “property” to legal or equitable rights and things subject to ownership) with id. at 893-94 (value requires transfer of economic benefit to debtor’s estate); cf. In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 247 (noting that tithing does not give debtors enforceable property right, contract right or equitable right to attend or partake in services offered by church)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "148 B.R. 891, 891",
"parenthetical": "bankruptcy court arguably limited \"property\" to legal or equitable rights and things subject to ownership",
"sentence": "Compare 148 B.R. at 891 (bankruptcy court arguably limited “property” to legal or equitable rights and things subject to ownership) with id. at 893-94 (value requires transfer of economic benefit to debtor’s estate); cf. In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 247 (noting that tithing does not give debtors enforceable property right, contract right or equitable right to attend or partake in services offered by church)."
} | 7,647,618 | b |
Service in this fashion is expressly authorized by Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(9). Hammer initiated these proceedings by filing his petition, and it was his responsibility to apprise the bankruptcy court of his forwarding address. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "770 F.2d 815, 815",
"parenthetical": "affirming default judgment where defendant foreign corporation failed to provide correct address to state licensing authority",
"sentence": "See Pena, 770 F.2d at 815 (affirming default judgment where defendant foreign corporation failed to provide correct address to state licensing authority); see also In re Muzquiz, 122 B.R. 56, 59 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tex.1990) (holding service not defective where debtor had failed to notify court of his new address)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "122 B.R. 56, 59",
"parenthetical": "holding service not defective where debtor had failed to notify court of his new address",
"sentence": "See Pena, 770 F.2d at 815 (affirming default judgment where defendant foreign corporation failed to provide correct address to state licensing authority); see also In re Muzquiz, 122 B.R. 56, 59 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tex.1990) (holding service not defective where debtor had failed to notify court of his new address)."
} | 12,257,661 | a |
Even so, I do not believe that a simple statement that the court would have imposed the same sentence is sufficient, at least where the imposed sentence exceeds what would have been the Guidelines range absent the procedural error. The district court's explanation fails to distinguish its reasons for a within-Guidelines sentence from those for an above-Guidelines sentence, and thus fails to provide the necessary certainty to know it would have imposed the same sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "522 F.3d 1108, 1117",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, it is hard for us to imagine a case where it would be procedurally reasonable for a district court to announce that the same sentence would apply even if. correct guidelines calculations are so substantially different, without cogent explanation.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 389 (3d Cir.2013) (“Though probative of harmless error, [a statement that the court would have imposed the same sentence] will not always suffice to show that an error in calculating the Guidelines range is harmless; indeed, a district court still must explain its reasons for imposing the sentence under either Guidelines range.”); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir.2009) (Guidelines error harmless because district court’s alternative sentence provided “detailed explanation of the basis for the parallel result”); see also United States v. Peña-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1117 (10th cir.2008) (“Indeed, it is hard for us to imagine a case where it would be procedurally reasonable for a district court to announce that the same sentence would apply even if. correct guidelines calculations are so substantially different, without cogent explanation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "560 F.3d 660, 667",
"parenthetical": "Guidelines error harmless because district court's alternative sentence provided \"detailed explanation of the basis for the parallel result\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 389 (3d Cir.2013) (“Though probative of harmless error, [a statement that the court would have imposed the same sentence] will not always suffice to show that an error in calculating the Guidelines range is harmless; indeed, a district court still must explain its reasons for imposing the sentence under either Guidelines range.”); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir.2009) (Guidelines error harmless because district court’s alternative sentence provided “detailed explanation of the basis for the parallel result”); see also United States v. Peña-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1117 (10th cir.2008) (“Indeed, it is hard for us to imagine a case where it would be procedurally reasonable for a district court to announce that the same sentence would apply even if. correct guidelines calculations are so substantially different, without cogent explanation.”)."
} | 4,066,243 | b |
. Reading Brown-Forman's proscription against the "direct regulation" of "interstate" commerce in context, it is clear that the Court had in its sights the regulation of extraterrito rial conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 U.S. 579, 579-84",
"parenthetical": "examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 332, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the ‘practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause”); 1 Tribe § 6-8, at 1074 (equating \"extraterritorial state regulations” with \"laws which directly regulate out-of-state commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 332, 332",
"parenthetical": "explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 332, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the ‘practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause”); 1 Tribe § 6-8, at 1074 (equating \"extraterritorial state regulations” with \"laws which directly regulate out-of-state commerce”)."
} | 4,280,963 | a |
. Reading Brown-Forman's proscription against the "direct regulation" of "interstate" commerce in context, it is clear that the Court had in its sights the regulation of extraterrito rial conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 332, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the ‘practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause”); 1 Tribe § 6-8, at 1074 (equating \"extraterritorial state regulations” with \"laws which directly regulate out-of-state commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 U.S. 579, 579-84",
"parenthetical": "examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 332, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the ‘practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause”); 1 Tribe § 6-8, at 1074 (equating \"extraterritorial state regulations” with \"laws which directly regulate out-of-state commerce”)."
} | 4,280,963 | b |
. Reading Brown-Forman's proscription against the "direct regulation" of "interstate" commerce in context, it is clear that the Court had in its sights the regulation of extraterrito rial conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 332, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the ‘practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause”); 1 Tribe § 6-8, at 1074 (equating \"extraterritorial state regulations” with \"laws which directly regulate out-of-state commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 U.S. 332, 332",
"parenthetical": "explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 332, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the ‘practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause”); 1 Tribe § 6-8, at 1074 (equating \"extraterritorial state regulations” with \"laws which directly regulate out-of-state commerce”)."
} | 4,280,963 | a |
. Reading Brown-Forman's proscription against the "direct regulation" of "interstate" commerce in context, it is clear that the Court had in its sights the regulation of extraterrito rial conduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 332, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the ‘practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause”); 1 Tribe § 6-8, at 1074 (equating \"extraterritorial state regulations” with \"laws which directly regulate out-of-state commerce”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause\"",
"sentence": "See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (examining whether the challenged statute \"regulates commerce in other States”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 332, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (explaining that BrownForman \"reaffirm[ed] and elaborated] on our established view that a state law that has the ‘practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause”); 1 Tribe § 6-8, at 1074 (equating \"extraterritorial state regulations” with \"laws which directly regulate out-of-state commerce”)."
} | 4,280,963 | a |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "56 Cal. 4th 1126, 1126",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23",
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | 12,419,137 | b |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23",
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | 12,419,137 | b |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23",
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | 12,419,137 | b |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23",
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | 12,419,137 | a |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23",
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | 12,419,137 | b |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "56 Cal. 4th 1126, 1126",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | 12,419,137 | b |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | 12,419,137 | a |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | 12,419,137 | a |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | 12,419,137 | a |
As stated above, the putative spouse doctrine protects "innocent parties who believe they were validly married." "[A] proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] finding of whether a party's belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.\"",
"sentence": "Welch v. State, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1378, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (2000) (emphasis in original); In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722-23, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (1988) (“the requisite belief is in a lawful marriage, that is to say, a marriage which complies with statutory requirements”) (emphasis in original); see also, Ceja, 56 Cal. 4th at 1126, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (“[A] finding of whether a party’s belief was genuinely held in good faith will be informed, in part, by whether that party was aware of facts that were inconsistent -with a rational belief in the validity or lawfulness of a marriage.”). In evaluating a party’s state of mind, courts consider “whether efforts were made to create a valid marriage and whether the party was ignorant of the infirmity rendering the marriage void or voidable.” Id. at 1121, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211 (citations omitted)."
} | 12,419,137 | a |
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