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The government need only prove a risk of loss to support McCauley's and Chendeka's convictions for bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "994 F.2d 1107, 1111",
"parenthetical": "holding that deposits of forged checks exposed banks to risk of loss even though they recovered the funds",
"sentence": "See United States v. Barakett, 994 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that deposits of forged checks exposed banks to risk of loss even though they recovered the funds); United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1519 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured); United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 316 (5th Cir.1991) (finding risk of loss to bank from forged endorsed check even though bank suffered no harm); United States v. Church, 888 F.2d 20, 23-24 (5th Cir.1989) (affirming bank fraud conviction for fraudulent overdrafts although “plan was no more likely to succeed than a request that the Bank exchange monopoly money for its face value in U.S. currency”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "244 F.3d 398, 400-02",
"parenthetical": "finding no risk of loss when financial company rather than bank handled fraudulent instrument",
"sentence": "Cf. Odiodio, 244 F.3d 398, 400-02 (finding no risk of loss when financial company rather than bank handled fraudulent instrument)."
} | 1,269,346 | a |
The government need only prove a risk of loss to support McCauley's and Chendeka's convictions for bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "964 F.2d 1514, 1519",
"parenthetical": "holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured",
"sentence": "See United States v. Barakett, 994 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that deposits of forged checks exposed banks to risk of loss even though they recovered the funds); United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1519 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured); United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 316 (5th Cir.1991) (finding risk of loss to bank from forged endorsed check even though bank suffered no harm); United States v. Church, 888 F.2d 20, 23-24 (5th Cir.1989) (affirming bank fraud conviction for fraudulent overdrafts although “plan was no more likely to succeed than a request that the Bank exchange monopoly money for its face value in U.S. currency”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "244 F.3d 398, 400-02",
"parenthetical": "finding no risk of loss when financial company rather than bank handled fraudulent instrument",
"sentence": "Cf. Odiodio, 244 F.3d 398, 400-02 (finding no risk of loss when financial company rather than bank handled fraudulent instrument)."
} | 1,269,346 | a |
The government need only prove a risk of loss to support McCauley's and Chendeka's convictions for bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "941 F.2d 309, 316",
"parenthetical": "finding risk of loss to bank from forged endorsed check even though bank suffered no harm",
"sentence": "See United States v. Barakett, 994 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that deposits of forged checks exposed banks to risk of loss even though they recovered the funds); United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1519 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured); United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 316 (5th Cir.1991) (finding risk of loss to bank from forged endorsed check even though bank suffered no harm); United States v. Church, 888 F.2d 20, 23-24 (5th Cir.1989) (affirming bank fraud conviction for fraudulent overdrafts although “plan was no more likely to succeed than a request that the Bank exchange monopoly money for its face value in U.S. currency”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "244 F.3d 398, 400-02",
"parenthetical": "finding no risk of loss when financial company rather than bank handled fraudulent instrument",
"sentence": "Cf. Odiodio, 244 F.3d 398, 400-02 (finding no risk of loss when financial company rather than bank handled fraudulent instrument)."
} | 1,269,346 | a |
The government need only prove a risk of loss to support McCauley's and Chendeka's convictions for bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "244 F.3d 398, 400-02",
"parenthetical": "finding no risk of loss when financial company rather than bank handled fraudulent instrument",
"sentence": "Cf. Odiodio, 244 F.3d 398, 400-02 (finding no risk of loss when financial company rather than bank handled fraudulent instrument)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "888 F.2d 20, 23-24",
"parenthetical": "affirming bank fraud conviction for fraudulent overdrafts although \"plan was no more likely to succeed than a request that the Bank exchange monopoly money for its face value in U.S. currency\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Barakett, 994 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that deposits of forged checks exposed banks to risk of loss even though they recovered the funds); United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1519 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured); United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 316 (5th Cir.1991) (finding risk of loss to bank from forged endorsed check even though bank suffered no harm); United States v. Church, 888 F.2d 20, 23-24 (5th Cir.1989) (affirming bank fraud conviction for fraudulent overdrafts although “plan was no more likely to succeed than a request that the Bank exchange monopoly money for its face value in U.S. currency”)."
} | 1,269,346 | b |
Second, petitioner cites no authority, and we are aware of none, suggesting that due process requires a hearing, as opposed to consideration on the written record, when a post-conviction petitioner wants a new appointed attorney because of dissatisfaction with existing counsel. Such a requirement is not compelled by Geist, and we decline to so extend its rationale. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "314 Or 353, 368",
"parenthetical": "post-conviction petitioner was not denied due process because of statutory time limitation for filing petition",
"sentence": "See Geist, 310 Or at 190 (holding that fundamental fairness is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands); cf. Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 368, 839 P2d 217 (1992) (post-conviction petitioner was not denied due process because of statutory time limitation for filing petition)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "310 Or 190, 190",
"parenthetical": "holding that fundamental fairness is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands",
"sentence": "See Geist, 310 Or at 190 (holding that fundamental fairness is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands); cf. Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 368, 839 P2d 217 (1992) (post-conviction petitioner was not denied due process because of statutory time limitation for filing petition)."
} | 92,734 | b |
More is exigible. Maine (unlike many other jurisdictions) does not recognize a cause of action in tort for an unembellished bad-faith breach of an insurance policy. Thus, when a plaintiff premises a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on an insurer-insured relationship, the plaintiff-insured must demonstrate that the defendant-insurer caused some harm apart from the withholding of the payments called for by the policy. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "628 A.2d 644, 651",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the insured must show, for example, that the plaintiff \"suffered some accompanying physical injury, or, the contract was such that a breach of it will result in a serious emotional disturbance\"",
"sentence": "See Colford, 687 A.2d at 616 (explaining that, to maintain such an action against a disability insurer, the insured must demonstrate that the Company’s actions “arose independently of its denial of the disability claim”); see also Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 651 (Me.1993) (explaining that the insured must show, for example, that the plaintiff “suffered some accompanying physical injury, or, the contract was such that a breach of it will result in a serious emotional disturbance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "687 A.2d 616, 616",
"parenthetical": "explaining that, to maintain such an action against a disability insurer, the insured must demonstrate that the Company's actions \"arose independently of its denial of the disability claim\"",
"sentence": "See Colford, 687 A.2d at 616 (explaining that, to maintain such an action against a disability insurer, the insured must demonstrate that the Company’s actions “arose independently of its denial of the disability claim”); see also Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 651 (Me.1993) (explaining that the insured must show, for example, that the plaintiff “suffered some accompanying physical injury, or, the contract was such that a breach of it will result in a serious emotional disturbance”)."
} | 219,329 | b |
Notwithstanding the district court's error, such erroneous reasoning does not preclude us from affirming on different grounds that are supported in the record. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.3d 1028, 1041",
"parenthetical": "affirming the denial of a SS 2254 claim on different grounds than those relied upon by the district court",
"sentence": "See Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1041 (11th Cir.1994) (affirming the denial of a § 2254 claim on different grounds than those relied upon by the district court); see also Gay v. United States, 816 F.2d 614, 616 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (explaining that the principles developed in § 2254 cases also apply to § 2255 motions)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that the principles developed in SS 2254 cases also apply to SS 2255 motions",
"sentence": "See Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1041 (11th Cir.1994) (affirming the denial of a § 2254 claim on different grounds than those relied upon by the district court); see also Gay v. United States, 816 F.2d 614, 616 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (explaining that the principles developed in § 2254 cases also apply to § 2255 motions)."
} | 3,680,357 | a |
We recognize that the ninety-day statute of limitations applicable to habeas corpus actions has been declared unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that ninety-day statute of limitations on habeas actions is unreasonable limitation that violates article I, section 11 of Utah Constitution",
"sentence": "See Currier, 862 P.2d 1357 (holding that ninety-day statute of limitations on habeas actions is unreasonable limitation that violates article I, section 11 of Utah Constitution); see also Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995) (upholding court of appeals’ ruling that petition for habeas corpus was not barred by statute of limitations because section 78-12-31.1 had been declared unconstitutional by Currier). However, neither this court nor the court of appeals has held that any statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions, no matter how long, would violate the Utah Constitution, nor has Johnson argued that the four-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional. In the absence of such a challenge or of another provision, therefore, we agree with the district court’s finding that the limitation period for habeas corpus actions applicable to this case is four years."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "904 P.2d 677, 681",
"parenthetical": "upholding court of appeals' ruling that petition for habeas corpus was not barred by statute of limitations because section 78-12-31.1 had been declared unconstitutional by Currier",
"sentence": "See Currier, 862 P.2d 1357 (holding that ninety-day statute of limitations on habeas actions is unreasonable limitation that violates article I, section 11 of Utah Constitution); see also Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995) (upholding court of appeals’ ruling that petition for habeas corpus was not barred by statute of limitations because section 78-12-31.1 had been declared unconstitutional by Currier). However, neither this court nor the court of appeals has held that any statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions, no matter how long, would violate the Utah Constitution, nor has Johnson argued that the four-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional. In the absence of such a challenge or of another provision, therefore, we agree with the district court’s finding that the limitation period for habeas corpus actions applicable to this case is four years."
} | 11,899,803 | a |
. To be clear, the District Court made no factual findings regarding the voluntariness of Awadallah's grand jury testimony and, instead, determined that suppression of his testimony was appropriate because "[n]o one will ever know how Awadallah would have testified had he been subpoenaed rather than imprisoned." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "202 F.Supp.2d 17, 37",
"parenthetical": "noting, in rejecting Awadallah's recantation defense, that \"the questions of whether he was 'confused' or 'forgot' may be relevant to the issue of whether he knowingly lied to the grand jury\"",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F.Supp.2d 17, 37 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\"Awadallah II ”) (noting, in rejecting Awadallah’s recantation defense, that \"the questions of whether he was 'confused' or 'forgot' may be relevant to the issue of whether he knowingly lied to the grand jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 F.Supp.2d 100, 100",
"parenthetical": "and not unlawfully arrested and detained prior to his testimony",
"sentence": "Awadallah III, 202 F.Supp.2d at 82 (rejecting the government’s inevitable discovery argument); see also Awadallah IV, 202 F.Supp.2d at 100. In so holding, the District Court reviewed the conditions of Awadallah’s confinement and the circumstances of his testimony before the grand jury and concluded that, if he had been subpoenaed before the grand jury (and not unlawfully arrested and detained prior to his testimony), he \"would have been well-fed and well-rested, well-prepared and probably less frightened.”"
} | 9,064,594 | b |
Next, we decline to consider his ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. Further, after careful de novo review, we enforce the appeal waiver as to the remaining challenges to Valencia-Mata's sentence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "333 F.3d 886, 889-92",
"parenthetical": "court should enforce appeal waiver and dismiss appeal where it falls within scope of waiver, plea agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and no miscarriage of justice would result",
"sentence": "See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc) (court should enforce appeal waiver and dismiss appeal where it falls within scope of waiver, plea agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and no miscarriage of justice would result); see also United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir.2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 702, 704",
"parenthetical": "de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver",
"sentence": "See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc) (court should enforce appeal waiver and dismiss appeal where it falls within scope of waiver, plea agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and no miscarriage of justice would result); see also United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir.2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver)."
} | 4,085,439 | a |
Finally, with respect to the disparity in power between the harasser and the victim, Kidder was Penn's supervisor at the time he made the comment so this factor initially counsels in favor of Penn. However, there is very little other evidence regarding this relationship in the record. It appears that Kidder was only Penn's supervisor for a brief period of time before the comment was made, and after learning of the comment Penn requested and was granted a transfer. Accordingly, the Court declines to rely exclusively on the fact that Kidder was Penn's supervisor to conclude that the disparity in power was so pronounced that it necessarily made the comment so severe as to alter the conditions of Penn's employment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "648 F.3d 221, 221",
"parenthetical": "explaining that there was a significant disparity in power where harasser was \"a political appointee who sat in the Mayor's cabinet and headed an agency with more than a hundred employees, and plaintiff was a new secretary whose job required her to have a lot of one-on-one contact with [the harasser, who was her boss]\"",
"sentence": "See Okoli 648 F.3d at 221 (explaining that there was a significant disparity in power where harasser was “a political appointee who sat in the Mayor’s cabinet and headed an agency with more than a hundred employees, and plaintiff was a new secretary whose job required her to have a lot of one-on-one contact with [the harasser, who was her boss]”); Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 696-97 (4th Cir.2007) (observing that the harasser was a 45 year-old man and the coach of the 17 year-old plaintiff-victim’s college soccer team and had tremendous power and influence of his players); see also Ziskie, 547 F.3d at 228 (discounting the one or two instances of supervisor harassment, where most of complained-of harassment was by co-workers, and stressing that the supervisor be havior did not “remotely resemble the repeated harassing conduct by someone in a position of authority [described in other Fourth Circuit cases]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "547 F.3d 228, 228",
"parenthetical": "discounting the one or two instances of supervisor harassment, where most of complained-of harassment was by co-workers, and stressing that the supervisor be havior did not \"remotely resemble the repeated harassing conduct by someone in a position of authority [described in other Fourth Circuit cases]\"",
"sentence": "See Okoli 648 F.3d at 221 (explaining that there was a significant disparity in power where harasser was “a political appointee who sat in the Mayor’s cabinet and headed an agency with more than a hundred employees, and plaintiff was a new secretary whose job required her to have a lot of one-on-one contact with [the harasser, who was her boss]”); Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 696-97 (4th Cir.2007) (observing that the harasser was a 45 year-old man and the coach of the 17 year-old plaintiff-victim’s college soccer team and had tremendous power and influence of his players); see also Ziskie, 547 F.3d at 228 (discounting the one or two instances of supervisor harassment, where most of complained-of harassment was by co-workers, and stressing that the supervisor be havior did not “remotely resemble the repeated harassing conduct by someone in a position of authority [described in other Fourth Circuit cases]”)."
} | 4,093,843 | a |
Finally, with respect to the disparity in power between the harasser and the victim, Kidder was Penn's supervisor at the time he made the comment so this factor initially counsels in favor of Penn. However, there is very little other evidence regarding this relationship in the record. It appears that Kidder was only Penn's supervisor for a brief period of time before the comment was made, and after learning of the comment Penn requested and was granted a transfer. Accordingly, the Court declines to rely exclusively on the fact that Kidder was Penn's supervisor to conclude that the disparity in power was so pronounced that it necessarily made the comment so severe as to alter the conditions of Penn's employment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "547 F.3d 228, 228",
"parenthetical": "discounting the one or two instances of supervisor harassment, where most of complained-of harassment was by co-workers, and stressing that the supervisor be havior did not \"remotely resemble the repeated harassing conduct by someone in a position of authority [described in other Fourth Circuit cases]\"",
"sentence": "See Okoli 648 F.3d at 221 (explaining that there was a significant disparity in power where harasser was “a political appointee who sat in the Mayor’s cabinet and headed an agency with more than a hundred employees, and plaintiff was a new secretary whose job required her to have a lot of one-on-one contact with [the harasser, who was her boss]”); Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 696-97 (4th Cir.2007) (observing that the harasser was a 45 year-old man and the coach of the 17 year-old plaintiff-victim’s college soccer team and had tremendous power and influence of his players); see also Ziskie, 547 F.3d at 228 (discounting the one or two instances of supervisor harassment, where most of complained-of harassment was by co-workers, and stressing that the supervisor be havior did not “remotely resemble the repeated harassing conduct by someone in a position of authority [described in other Fourth Circuit cases]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 F.3d 686, 696-97",
"parenthetical": "observing that the harasser was a 45 year-old man and the coach of the 17 year-old plaintiff-victim's college soccer team and had tremendous power and influence of his players",
"sentence": "See Okoli 648 F.3d at 221 (explaining that there was a significant disparity in power where harasser was “a political appointee who sat in the Mayor’s cabinet and headed an agency with more than a hundred employees, and plaintiff was a new secretary whose job required her to have a lot of one-on-one contact with [the harasser, who was her boss]”); Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 696-97 (4th Cir.2007) (observing that the harasser was a 45 year-old man and the coach of the 17 year-old plaintiff-victim’s college soccer team and had tremendous power and influence of his players); see also Ziskie, 547 F.3d at 228 (discounting the one or two instances of supervisor harassment, where most of complained-of harassment was by co-workers, and stressing that the supervisor be havior did not “remotely resemble the repeated harassing conduct by someone in a position of authority [described in other Fourth Circuit cases]”)."
} | 4,093,843 | b |
10. The court cannot amend the defective subpoena. Courts have typically held that subpoenas issued from the wrong court are void under Rule 45, unless the mistake is due to clerical error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2008 WL 4326473, at *2",
"parenthetical": "court may enforce a subpoena captioned from the wrong court if the mistake is due to clerical error, but will not enforce a subpoena issued from the wrong court",
"sentence": "See e.g., Pauliewalnuts, 2008 WL 4326473 at *2 (court may enforce a subpoena captioned from the wrong court if the mistake is due to clerical error, but will not enforce a subpoena issued from the wrong court); see also Kupritz, 155 F.R.D. at 88 (a court might consider a subpoena captioned from the wrong court through an accident or mistake, but could not enforce a subpoena intentionally issued from an incorrect district)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "155 F.R.D. 88, 88",
"parenthetical": "a court might consider a subpoena captioned from the wrong court through an accident or mistake, but could not enforce a subpoena intentionally issued from an incorrect district",
"sentence": "See e.g., Pauliewalnuts, 2008 WL 4326473 at *2 (court may enforce a subpoena captioned from the wrong court if the mistake is due to clerical error, but will not enforce a subpoena issued from the wrong court); see also Kupritz, 155 F.R.D. at 88 (a court might consider a subpoena captioned from the wrong court through an accident or mistake, but could not enforce a subpoena intentionally issued from an incorrect district)."
} | 4,248,754 | a |
Title VII prohibits discrimination against "any individual" with regard to that individual's terms and conditions of employment or application for employment. The statute does not define "any individual," and although we could read the term literally, we have held that only those plaintiffs who are "employees" may bring a Title VII suit. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "698 F.2d 1019, 1021",
"parenthetical": "recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "460 F.2d 553, 556",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an 'employer' engaged in an 'industry affecting commerce' and that [the plaintiff] be an 'employee' as those terms are defined\" in the Act",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | 11,789,491 | b |
Title VII prohibits discrimination against "any individual" with regard to that individual's terms and conditions of employment or application for employment. The statute does not define "any individual," and although we could read the term literally, we have held that only those plaintiffs who are "employees" may bring a Title VII suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "119 F.3d 982, 985",
"parenthetical": "\"Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of 'any individual,' courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.\"",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "698 F.2d 1019, 1021",
"parenthetical": "recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | 11,789,491 | a |
Title VII prohibits discrimination against "any individual" with regard to that individual's terms and conditions of employment or application for employment. The statute does not define "any individual," and although we could read the term literally, we have held that only those plaintiffs who are "employees" may bring a Title VII suit. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "698 F.2d 1019, 1021",
"parenthetical": "recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 487, 491",
"parenthetical": "overruling previous case refusing to \"restrict[ ] the Act's protection to only former, present, and potential employees\"",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | 11,789,491 | b |
Title VII prohibits discrimination against "any individual" with regard to that individual's terms and conditions of employment or application for employment. The statute does not define "any individual," and although we could read the term literally, we have held that only those plaintiffs who are "employees" may bring a Title VII suit. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "698 F.2d 1019, 1021",
"parenthetical": "recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "overruling previous case refusing to \"restrict[ ] the Act's protection to only former, present, and potential employees\"",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | 11,789,491 | b |
Title VII prohibits discrimination against "any individual" with regard to that individual's terms and conditions of employment or application for employment. The statute does not define "any individual," and although we could read the term literally, we have held that only those plaintiffs who are "employees" may bring a Title VII suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "overruling previous case refusing to \"restrict[ ] the Act's protection to only former, present, and potential employees\"",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "698 F.2d 1019, 1021",
"parenthetical": "recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | 11,789,491 | a |
Title VII prohibits discrimination against "any individual" with regard to that individual's terms and conditions of employment or application for employment. The statute does not define "any individual," and although we could read the term literally, we have held that only those plaintiffs who are "employees" may bring a Title VII suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "794 F.2d 793, 796",
"parenthetical": "interpreting identical \"any individual\" language in the ADEA to provide coverage \"solely in favor of a person who is an employee\"",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "698 F.2d 1019, 1021",
"parenthetical": "recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer",
"sentence": "See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.1972) (stating that “[i]f the provisions of Title VII are to apply to the relationship between [the defendant] and [the plaintiff,] it is necessary that [the defendant] be an ‘employer’ engaged in an ‘industry affecting commerce’ and that [the plaintiff] be an ‘employee’ as those terms are defined” in the Act); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (“Although the language [of Title VII] speaks of ‘any individual,’ courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.”); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to “restrict[ ] the Act’s protection to only former, present, and potential employees”); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical “any individual” language in the ADEA to provide coverage “solely in favor of a person who is an employee”); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (“any individual” not limited to “employees”); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer)."
} | 11,789,491 | a |
Further, Rule 9(g) requires that items of special damage be specifically pled. A number of courts have held that at least in some contexts, requests for attorney's fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pled, failing which they are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to plead attorney's fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 801-02 (6th Cir.1988) (claims for attorney’s fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g)); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (buyer’s failure to state specifically a claim for attorney’s fees under state’s unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees); Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir.1973); In re Odom, 113 B.R. 623 (C.D.Cal.Bankr.1990); cf. Crosby v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 210, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to plead attorney’s fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310, at 702 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "851 F.2d 794, 801-02",
"parenthetical": "claims for attorney's fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 801-02 (6th Cir.1988) (claims for attorney’s fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g)); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (buyer’s failure to state specifically a claim for attorney’s fees under state’s unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees); Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir.1973); In re Odom, 113 B.R. 623 (C.D.Cal.Bankr.1990); cf. Crosby v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 210, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to plead attorney’s fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310, at 702 (1990)."
} | 7,846,424 | b |
Further, Rule 9(g) requires that items of special damage be specifically pled. A number of courts have held that at least in some contexts, requests for attorney's fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pled, failing which they are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "buyer's failure to state specifically a claim for attorney's fees under state's unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 801-02 (6th Cir.1988) (claims for attorney’s fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g)); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (buyer’s failure to state specifically a claim for attorney’s fees under state’s unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees); Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir.1973); In re Odom, 113 B.R. 623 (C.D.Cal.Bankr.1990); cf. Crosby v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 210, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to plead attorney’s fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310, at 702 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to plead attorney's fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 801-02 (6th Cir.1988) (claims for attorney’s fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g)); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (buyer’s failure to state specifically a claim for attorney’s fees under state’s unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees); Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir.1973); In re Odom, 113 B.R. 623 (C.D.Cal.Bankr.1990); cf. Crosby v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 210, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to plead attorney’s fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310, at 702 (1990)."
} | 7,846,424 | a |
Further, Rule 9(g) requires that items of special damage be specifically pled. A number of courts have held that at least in some contexts, requests for attorney's fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pled, failing which they are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to plead attorney's fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 801-02 (6th Cir.1988) (claims for attorney’s fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g)); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (buyer’s failure to state specifically a claim for attorney’s fees under state’s unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees); Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir.1973); In re Odom, 113 B.R. 623 (C.D.Cal.Bankr.1990); cf. Crosby v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 210, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to plead attorney’s fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310, at 702 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "buyer's failure to state specifically a claim for attorney's fees under state's unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 801-02 (6th Cir.1988) (claims for attorney’s fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g)); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (buyer’s failure to state specifically a claim for attorney’s fees under state’s unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees); Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir.1973); In re Odom, 113 B.R. 623 (C.D.Cal.Bankr.1990); cf. Crosby v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 210, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to plead attorney’s fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310, at 702 (1990)."
} | 7,846,424 | b |
Further, Rule 9(g) requires that items of special damage be specifically pled. A number of courts have held that at least in some contexts, requests for attorney's fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pled, failing which they are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "buyer's failure to state specifically a claim for attorney's fees under state's unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 801-02 (6th Cir.1988) (claims for attorney’s fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g)); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (buyer’s failure to state specifically a claim for attorney’s fees under state’s unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees); Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir.1973); In re Odom, 113 B.R. 623 (C.D.Cal.Bankr.1990); cf. Crosby v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 210, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to plead attorney’s fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310, at 702 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to plead attorney's fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 801-02 (6th Cir.1988) (claims for attorney’s fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g)); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (buyer’s failure to state specifically a claim for attorney’s fees under state’s unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees); Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir.1973); In re Odom, 113 B.R. 623 (C.D.Cal.Bankr.1990); cf. Crosby v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 210, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to plead attorney’s fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310, at 702 (1990)."
} | 7,846,424 | a |
Further, Rule 9(g) requires that items of special damage be specifically pled. A number of courts have held that at least in some contexts, requests for attorney's fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pled, failing which they are not recoverable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "buyer's failure to state specifically a claim for attorney's fees under state's unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 801-02 (6th Cir.1988) (claims for attorney’s fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g)); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (buyer’s failure to state specifically a claim for attorney’s fees under state’s unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees); Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir.1973); In re Odom, 113 B.R. 623 (C.D.Cal.Bankr.1990); cf. Crosby v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 210, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to plead attorney’s fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310, at 702 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to plead attorney's fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794, 801-02 (6th Cir.1988) (claims for attorney’s fees are items of special damages which must be specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g)); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 716 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 155, 78 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983) (buyer’s failure to state specifically a claim for attorney’s fees under state’s unfair trade practices act barred recovery of such fees); Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir.1973); In re Odom, 113 B.R. 623 (C.D.Cal.Bankr.1990); cf. Crosby v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 210, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to plead attorney’s fees as an item of special damages did not bar recovery where the claim, though not pled, was advanced during pretrial conferences such that pleadings could properly be considered as having been amended to include such claim); see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1310, at 702 (1990)."
} | 7,846,424 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 Md. 344, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "112 N.J. 384, 431-32",
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 Md. 344, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 Md. 344, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 Md. 344, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 Md. 344, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 Md. 344, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 Md. 344, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 Md. 344, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 Md. 344, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "306 Md. 344, 359",
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "112 N.J. 384, 431-32",
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "112 N.J. 384, 431-32",
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 Nev. 127, 133-34",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 Nev. 127, 133-34",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 Nev. 127, 133-34",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 Nev. 127, 133-34",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 Nev. 127, 133-34",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 Nev. 127, 133-34",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 Nev. 127, 133-34",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 Nev. 127, 133-34",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 Nev. 127, 133-34",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "108 Nev. 127, 133-34",
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "112 N.J. 384, 431-32",
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized \"narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]\"",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | a |
In contrast to this approach, some courts have concluded that the common-law right of allocution applies to capital sentencing hearings. The majority of these jurisdictions, however, limit the right of allocution to pleas of mercy or leniency and expressions of future hope. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future",
"sentence": "Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 359, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (“under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right”); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-34, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (concluding that capital defendants enjoy common-law right of allocution, limited to expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency and plans or hopes for future); see State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 431-32, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction over state criminal trials, court authorized “narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase [of a capital case]”), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S. Ct. 1146,103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 897, 900, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (acknowledging right of allocution in capital case, but limiting right to pleas for mercy, and concluding that defendant went beyond permissible bounds of allocution and, thus, trial court properly permitted state to cross-examine him), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992)."
} | 3,593,641 | b |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a \"serious violation of the law\" that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 N.Y.2d 281, 287",
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a \"serious violation of the law\" that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | b |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22",
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a \"serious violation of the law\" that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a \"serious violation of the law\" that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 N.Y.2d 281, 287",
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a \"serious violation of the law\" that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a \"serious violation of the law\" that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | b |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a \"serious violation of the law\" that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 N.Y.2d 281, 287",
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a \"serious violation of the law\" that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a \"serious violation of the law\" that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 N.Y.2d 281, 287",
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 N.Y.2d 281, 287",
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | b |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | b |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 N.Y.2d 281, 287",
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | b |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | b |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 N.Y.2d 281, 287",
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "115 N.Y. 506, 511-512",
"parenthetical": "stating principle that \"[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | b |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "115 N.Y. 506, 511-512",
"parenthetical": "stating principle that \"[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "115 N.Y. 506, 511-512",
"parenthetical": "stating principle that \"[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 N.Y.2d 281, 287",
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating principle that \"[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | b |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating principle that \"[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
I also agree with defendant that plaintiff is barred from seeking damages stemming from his wife's death, under New York's public policy against allowing individuals to profit from their own wrongdoing. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating principle that \"[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy \"beyond claims where the parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Manning v. Brown, 91 N.Y.2d 116, 120-22, 667 N.Y.S.2d 336, 689 N.E.2d 1382 (1997) (plaintiffs knowing participation in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was a “serious violation of the law” that precluded her suit against her accomplice driver even though the driver negligently caused the accident and the plaintiffs injuries); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 28-29, 479 N.Y.S.2d 201, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984) (plaintiff could not seek damages against defendants who gave him gunpowder to make a pipe bomb, which severely injured plaintiff when it exploded as plaintiff was making it, because plaintiffs own wrong-making a pipe bomb-constituted a serious violation of law that transcended contributory negligence and comparative fault); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (stating principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime”); see also Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 739 N.Y.S.2d 867, 766 N.E.2d 574 (2002) (recognizing public policy against permitting judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act, but refusing to extend policy “beyond claims where thé parties to the suit were involved in the underlying criminal conduct ... ”) (emphasis added)."
} | 1,304,267 | a |
Having determined that nothing in the records was relevant to appellant's purposes, the court concluded that the State's strong interest in protecting the privacy of its students generally, and this student particularly, outweighed appellant's need for disclosure of the records. Having carefully reviewed the subject records, we agree with the trial court's conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Board's motion for a protective order. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant's motion for production of entire contents of FBI's informant file",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "282 Md. 125, 140",
"parenthetical": "request for production of documents in the State's control ordinarily within the trial court's discretion",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | 4,376,165 | a |
Having determined that nothing in the records was relevant to appellant's purposes, the court concluded that the State's strong interest in protecting the privacy of its students generally, and this student particularly, outweighed appellant's need for disclosure of the records. Having carefully reviewed the subject records, we agree with the trial court's conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Board's motion for a protective order. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "request for production of documents in the State's control ordinarily within the trial court's discretion",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant's motion for production of entire contents of FBI's informant file",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | 4,376,165 | b |
Having determined that nothing in the records was relevant to appellant's purposes, the court concluded that the State's strong interest in protecting the privacy of its students generally, and this student particularly, outweighed appellant's need for disclosure of the records. Having carefully reviewed the subject records, we agree with the trial court's conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Board's motion for a protective order. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "248 Md. 279, 291",
"parenthetical": "administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court's discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant's motion for production of entire contents of FBI's informant file",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | 4,376,165 | b |
Having determined that nothing in the records was relevant to appellant's purposes, the court concluded that the State's strong interest in protecting the privacy of its students generally, and this student particularly, outweighed appellant's need for disclosure of the records. Having carefully reviewed the subject records, we agree with the trial court's conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Board's motion for a protective order. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant's motion for production of entire contents of FBI's informant file",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court's discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | 4,376,165 | a |
Having determined that nothing in the records was relevant to appellant's purposes, the court concluded that the State's strong interest in protecting the privacy of its students generally, and this student particularly, outweighed appellant's need for disclosure of the records. Having carefully reviewed the subject records, we agree with the trial court's conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Board's motion for a protective order. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "76 Md.App. 250, 271",
"parenthetical": "trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist's notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant's motion for production of entire contents of FBI's informant file",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | 4,376,165 | b |
Having determined that nothing in the records was relevant to appellant's purposes, the court concluded that the State's strong interest in protecting the privacy of its students generally, and this student particularly, outweighed appellant's need for disclosure of the records. Having carefully reviewed the subject records, we agree with the trial court's conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Board's motion for a protective order. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist's notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant's motion for production of entire contents of FBI's informant file",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | 4,376,165 | b |
Having determined that nothing in the records was relevant to appellant's purposes, the court concluded that the State's strong interest in protecting the privacy of its students generally, and this student particularly, outweighed appellant's need for disclosure of the records. Having carefully reviewed the subject records, we agree with the trial court's conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Board's motion for a protective order. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist's notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant's motion for production of entire contents of FBI's informant file",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | 4,376,165 | b |
Having determined that nothing in the records was relevant to appellant's purposes, the court concluded that the State's strong interest in protecting the privacy of its students generally, and this student particularly, outweighed appellant's need for disclosure of the records. Having carefully reviewed the subject records, we agree with the trial court's conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Board's motion for a protective order. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist's notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant's motion for production of entire contents of FBI's informant file",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | 4,376,165 | b |
Having determined that nothing in the records was relevant to appellant's purposes, the court concluded that the State's strong interest in protecting the privacy of its students generally, and this student particularly, outweighed appellant's need for disclosure of the records. Having carefully reviewed the subject records, we agree with the trial court's conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Board's motion for a protective order. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant's motion for production of entire contents of FBI's informant file",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist's notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | 4,376,165 | a |
Having determined that nothing in the records was relevant to appellant's purposes, the court concluded that the State's strong interest in protecting the privacy of its students generally, and this student particularly, outweighed appellant's need for disclosure of the records. Having carefully reviewed the subject records, we agree with the trial court's conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Board's motion for a protective order. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant's motion for production of entire contents of FBI's informant file",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist's notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information",
"sentence": "See United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (no abuse of discretion when trial court, after in camera review, denied defendant’s motion for production of entire contents of FBI’s informant file); see also Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 140, 383 A.2d 389 (1978) (request for production of documents in the State’s control ordinarily within the trial court’s discretion); Williams v. Moran, 248 Md. 279, 291, 236 A.2d 274 (1967) (administration of discovery rules lies within the trial court’s discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse); Craig v. State, 76 Md.App. 250, 271, 544 A.2d 784 (1988) (trial court did not err when it refused to disclose to defendant accused of child sexual abuse therapist’s notes containing statements of child witnesses and other related information), rev’d on other grounds, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)."
} | 4,376,165 | a |
In contrast to these authorities, numerous courts have held that employee compensation is "subject to reduction" under SS 541.118(a) if a policy of the employer provides for deductions disallowed by the DOL regulations for salaried employees regardless of whether such deductions have been made. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "992 F.2d 85, 85-86",
"parenthetical": "focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy",
"sentence": "See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11; Abshire, 908 F.2d at 487; Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F.Supp. 1023, 1025 (E.D.Ark.1988) (no showing of actual deduction needed); Hawks v. City of Newport News, Va., 707 F.Supp. 212, 215 (E.D.Va.1988) (employer’s policy under attack under FLSA and whether policy has been applied does not alter policy itself); Persons v. City of Gresham, Or., 704 F.Supp. 191, 194 (D.Or.1988) (immaterial that an instance of actual deduction not alleged); Knecht v. City of Redwood City, 683 F.Supp. 1307, 1311 (N.D.Cal.1987) (lack of actual pay reduction does not alter analysis); see also Shockley, 997 F.2d at 21-25 (focusing upon defendant’s policy); Michigan Ass’n of Governmental Employees, 992 F.2d at 85-86 (focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy). Moreover, courts have explicitly considered the impact of the enigmatic paragraph in the 1986 letter ruling upon their analysis and, in the opinion of the undersigned, correctly interpreted the 1986 letter ruling so that, although an occasional unpermitted deduction which is inadvertent or unintentional would not change an employee’s salary status, the frequency of actual deductions is immaterial to finding employees’ compensation “subject to reduction” where the employer has a policy allowing deductions for unpermitted reasons."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "707 F.Supp. 212, 215",
"parenthetical": "employer's policy under attack under FLSA and whether policy has been applied does not alter policy itself",
"sentence": "See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11; Abshire, 908 F.2d at 487; Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F.Supp. 1023, 1025 (E.D.Ark.1988) (no showing of actual deduction needed); Hawks v. City of Newport News, Va., 707 F.Supp. 212, 215 (E.D.Va.1988) (employer’s policy under attack under FLSA and whether policy has been applied does not alter policy itself); Persons v. City of Gresham, Or., 704 F.Supp. 191, 194 (D.Or.1988) (immaterial that an instance of actual deduction not alleged); Knecht v. City of Redwood City, 683 F.Supp. 1307, 1311 (N.D.Cal.1987) (lack of actual pay reduction does not alter analysis); see also Shockley, 997 F.2d at 21-25 (focusing upon defendant’s policy); Michigan Ass’n of Governmental Employees, 992 F.2d at 85-86 (focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy). Moreover, courts have explicitly considered the impact of the enigmatic paragraph in the 1986 letter ruling upon their analysis and, in the opinion of the undersigned, correctly interpreted the 1986 letter ruling so that, although an occasional unpermitted deduction which is inadvertent or unintentional would not change an employee’s salary status, the frequency of actual deductions is immaterial to finding employees’ compensation “subject to reduction” where the employer has a policy allowing deductions for unpermitted reasons."
} | 3,830,151 | b |
In contrast to these authorities, numerous courts have held that employee compensation is "subject to reduction" under SS 541.118(a) if a policy of the employer provides for deductions disallowed by the DOL regulations for salaried employees regardless of whether such deductions have been made. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "708 F.Supp. 1024, 1024-25",
"parenthetical": "letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court",
"sentence": "April 16, 1991); Knecht, 683 F.Supp. at 1311; cf. Banks, 708 F.Supp. at 1024-25 (letter ruling relied upon by defendant but not provided to court). But see Harris, 709 F.Supp. at 241; District of Columbia Nurses’ Ass’n, 1988 WL 156191, at *2 n. 1. Even if the cited paragraph from the 1986 letter ruling had the significance urged upon the Court by defendants, the “letter ruling cannot override the express provisions of a Department of Labor regulation” in any event."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "707 F.Supp. 212, 215",
"parenthetical": "employer's policy under attack under FLSA and whether policy has been applied does not alter policy itself",
"sentence": "See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11; Abshire, 908 F.2d at 487; Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F.Supp. 1023, 1025 (E.D.Ark.1988) (no showing of actual deduction needed); Hawks v. City of Newport News, Va., 707 F.Supp. 212, 215 (E.D.Va.1988) (employer’s policy under attack under FLSA and whether policy has been applied does not alter policy itself); Persons v. City of Gresham, Or., 704 F.Supp. 191, 194 (D.Or.1988) (immaterial that an instance of actual deduction not alleged); Knecht v. City of Redwood City, 683 F.Supp. 1307, 1311 (N.D.Cal.1987) (lack of actual pay reduction does not alter analysis); see also Shockley, 997 F.2d at 21-25 (focusing upon defendant’s policy); Michigan Ass’n of Governmental Employees, 992 F.2d at 85-86 (focusing upon policy but, finding policy ambiguous, looking to application of policy). Moreover, courts have explicitly considered the impact of the enigmatic paragraph in the 1986 letter ruling upon their analysis and, in the opinion of the undersigned, correctly interpreted the 1986 letter ruling so that, although an occasional unpermitted deduction which is inadvertent or unintentional would not change an employee’s salary status, the frequency of actual deductions is immaterial to finding employees’ compensation “subject to reduction” where the employer has a policy allowing deductions for unpermitted reasons."
} | 3,830,151 | b |
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