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A motion for failure to state a claim may be granted if a party fails to plead a claim that is cognizable under state law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "304 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1328, n. 15",
"parenthetical": "\"The Court finds that the assessment of the merits of Plaintiffs' legal theory in this case can adequately be assessed without factual development, and consequently, dismissal of this action for Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim should not be rejected simply because Plaintiffs' theories are novel\"",
"sentence": "See Lieberman v. A &W Rests., Inc., 2003 WL 21252008, at *7 (D.Minn. May 28, 2003) (dismissing claim when, to accept it “would be to recognize a new cause of action[.]”); see also Kuhn v. Thompson, 304 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1328, n. 15 (M.D.Ala.2004) (“The Court finds that the assessment of the merits of Plaintiffs’ legal theory in this case can adequately be assessed without factual development, and consequently, dismissal of this action for Plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim should not be rejected simply because Plaintiffs’ theories are novel”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2003 WL 21252008, at *7",
"parenthetical": "dismissing claim when, to accept it \"would be to recognize a new cause of action[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Lieberman v. A &W Rests., Inc., 2003 WL 21252008, at *7 (D.Minn. May 28, 2003) (dismissing claim when, to accept it “would be to recognize a new cause of action[.]”); see also Kuhn v. Thompson, 304 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1328, n. 15 (M.D.Ala.2004) (“The Court finds that the assessment of the merits of Plaintiffs’ legal theory in this case can adequately be assessed without factual development, and consequently, dismissal of this action for Plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim should not be rejected simply because Plaintiffs’ theories are novel”)."
} | 4,284,065 | b |
Officer Bentley's evidence about what he was told by the dispatcher was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The statements were admitted in order to explain why Bentley went to Gilbert's house even though police had already been there earlier that day to investigate his death. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "officer's testimony concerning phone call not hearsay when offered to explain what prompted his investigation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collins, 996 F.2d 950, 953 (8th Cir.1993) (out of court statement to officer not hearsay if offered to explain why investigation was undertaken); see also Nottingham v. Arkansas, 29 Ark.App. 95, 778 S.W.2d 629, 630 (1989) (officer’s testimony concerning phone call not hearsay when offered to explain what prompted his investigation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "996 F.2d 950, 953",
"parenthetical": "out of court statement to officer not hearsay if offered to explain why investigation was undertaken",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collins, 996 F.2d 950, 953 (8th Cir.1993) (out of court statement to officer not hearsay if offered to explain why investigation was undertaken); see also Nottingham v. Arkansas, 29 Ark.App. 95, 778 S.W.2d 629, 630 (1989) (officer’s testimony concerning phone call not hearsay when offered to explain what prompted his investigation)."
} | 2,160,946 | b |
Officer Bentley's evidence about what he was told by the dispatcher was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The statements were admitted in order to explain why Bentley went to Gilbert's house even though police had already been there earlier that day to investigate his death. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "996 F.2d 950, 953",
"parenthetical": "out of court statement to officer not hearsay if offered to explain why investigation was undertaken",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collins, 996 F.2d 950, 953 (8th Cir.1993) (out of court statement to officer not hearsay if offered to explain why investigation was undertaken); see also Nottingham v. Arkansas, 29 Ark.App. 95, 778 S.W.2d 629, 630 (1989) (officer’s testimony concerning phone call not hearsay when offered to explain what prompted his investigation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "778 S.W.2d 629, 630",
"parenthetical": "officer's testimony concerning phone call not hearsay when offered to explain what prompted his investigation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Collins, 996 F.2d 950, 953 (8th Cir.1993) (out of court statement to officer not hearsay if offered to explain why investigation was undertaken); see also Nottingham v. Arkansas, 29 Ark.App. 95, 778 S.W.2d 629, 630 (1989) (officer’s testimony concerning phone call not hearsay when offered to explain what prompted his investigation)."
} | 2,160,946 | a |
We lack jurisdiction to review the agency's discretionary determination that Sosa failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. Sosa's contention that the agency deprived him of due process by misapplying the law to the facts of his case and by disregarding their evidence of hardship is not supported by the record and does not amount to a colorable constitutional claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "424 F.3d 926, 930",
"parenthetical": "\"traditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (“traditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.”); see also Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the “misapplication of case law” may not be reviewed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "255 F.3d 775, 779",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"misapplication of case law\" may not be reviewed",
"sentence": "See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (“traditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.”); see also Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the “misapplication of case law” may not be reviewed)."
} | 3,566,143 | a |
Calloway's later admission regarding the presence of marijuana in the house was a fruit of the illegal detention, and could not be used to justify the subsequent search. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "674 So.2d 896, 897",
"parenthetical": "\"A consent to search given after illegal police conduct is presumptively tainted and is deemed involuntary absent 'clear and convincing proof of an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint of prior official illegal action.' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Turner v. State, 674 So.2d 896, 897 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“A consent to search given after illegal police conduct is presumptively tainted and is deemed involuntary absent ‘clear and convincing proof of an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint of prior official illegal action.’ ”) (quoting Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643, 647 (Fla.1980))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "422 F.3d 711, 714",
"parenthetical": "evidence \"obtained by exploitation of [an unlawful detention] instead of by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint\" must be excluded",
"sentence": "United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir.2005) (evidence “obtained by exploitation of [an unlawful detention] instead of by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint” must be excluded). His mother’s consent to search the home was also tainted by the officer’s illegal order that everyone vacate the home."
} | 6,998,987 | b |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Wyoming Knife\" which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had \"common lawful purpose,\" and thus such knife was not \"offensive weapon\" for purposes of statute",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | 7,859,823 | a |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Wyoming Knife\" which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had \"common lawful purpose,\" and thus such knife was not \"offensive weapon\" for purposes of statute",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | 7,859,823 | a |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Wyoming Knife\" which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had \"common lawful purpose,\" and thus such knife was not \"offensive weapon\" for purposes of statute",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | 7,859,823 | a |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Wyoming Knife\" which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had \"common lawful purpose,\" and thus such knife was not \"offensive weapon\" for purposes of statute",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | 7,859,823 | a |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | 7,859,823 | b |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | 7,859,823 | b |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | 7,859,823 | b |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | 7,859,823 | b |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | 7,859,823 | a |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | 7,859,823 | a |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | 7,859,823 | a |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | 7,859,823 | a |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | 7,859,823 | b |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | 7,859,823 | b |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | 7,859,823 | b |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | 7,859,823 | a |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "absent proof that knife, which did not have blade \"exposed in an automatic way,\" had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth's evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was \"offensive weapon\"",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | 7,859,823 | b |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "absent proof that knife, which did not have blade \"exposed in an automatic way,\" had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth's evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was \"offensive weapon\"",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | 7,859,823 | a |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "absent proof that knife, which did not have blade \"exposed in an automatic way,\" had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth's evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was \"offensive weapon\"",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | 7,859,823 | b |
As reflected in the comment's language, knives are often considered not to constitute objects that are of such of a nature that they should be prohibited under section 908. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975) (court used an improper circumstances-of-possession approach to determine that a thirty-inch knife found in possession of defendant while in a high crime urban area in the early morning had no common lawful purpose and was a prohibited weapon under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "absent proof that knife, which did not have blade \"exposed in an automatic way,\" had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth's evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was \"offensive weapon\"",
"sentence": "See Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979) (“Wyoming Knife” which consisted of metal handle with two finger holes incorporating two cutting blades, one facing outward and the other inward, was hunting implement which had “common lawful purpose,” and thus such knife was not “offensive weapon” for purposes of statute); Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350 (1978) (Section 908 does not define a simple kitchen knife as a prohibited offensive weapon); Commonwealth v. Artis, 275 Pa.Super. 127, 418 A.2d 644 (1980) (although defendant waved a folding knife with a seven-inch blade in a crowded bar, the knife, which was purchased at a sporting goods store and used for hunting, was not an implement for infliction of serious bodily injury that served no common lawful purpose within the meaning of statute); Commonwealth v. Myers, 273 Pa.Super. 381, 417 A.2d 700 (1980) (thirteen-inch butcher knife which defendant carried while he was charging up a crowded street and threatening to kill another person had a common lawful purpose and thus defendant was not guilty of possession of prohibited offensive weapon); Ashford, 263 Pa.Super. 100, 397 A.2d 420 (1979) (absent proof that knife, which did not have blade “exposed in an automatic way,” had no common lawful purpose, Commonwealth’s evidence in prosecution for possession of prohibited offensive weapon failed to prove essential element that such knife was “offensive weapon”)."
} | 7,859,823 | b |
I do not believe the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate an indispensible element of a retaliation claim: that is, that the decision makers actually knew of the employee's complaint so that their adverse action could have been causally related to that protected activity. See Gibbons v. State Pub. Emps. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 1328995, *2",
"parenthetical": "\"A court will not presume that a decisionmaker was motivated to retaliate by something unknown to him or her.\"",
"sentence": "Relations Comm’n, 702 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“The plaintiff, at a minimum, must establish that the employer was aware of the protected expression when it took the adverse employment action.”); see also Johnson v. State of Florida, Dep’t of Elder Affairs, 2010 WL 1328995, *2 (N.D.Fla.2010) (“A court will not presume that a decisionmaker was motivated to retaliate by something unknown to him or her.”); Brown v. Sybase, Inc., 287 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1347 (S.D.Fla.2003)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "702 So.2d 536, 537",
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff, at a minimum, must establish that the employer was aware of the protected expression when it took the adverse employment action.\"",
"sentence": "Relations Comm’n, 702 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“The plaintiff, at a minimum, must establish that the employer was aware of the protected expression when it took the adverse employment action.”); see also Johnson v. State of Florida, Dep’t of Elder Affairs, 2010 WL 1328995, *2 (N.D.Fla.2010) (“A court will not presume that a decisionmaker was motivated to retaliate by something unknown to him or her.”); Brown v. Sybase, Inc., 287 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1347 (S.D.Fla.2003)."
} | 7,033,694 | b |
While Ghosh has pointed out numerous gaps and/or errors in the information provided by DOH, these failings in DOH's submissions do nothing to advance Ghosh's claim that DOH's failure to hire him was a result of improper motives. As discussed above, though the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is "not onerous," it is nonetheless the plaintiff's burden, and it cannot be met with conclu-sory assertions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 106, 110",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (“The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2000) (describing plaintiffs “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff’); see also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (noting that “even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "450 U.S. 258, 258",
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (“The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2000) (describing plaintiffs “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff’); see also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (noting that “even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment”)."
} | 65,545 | b |
While Ghosh has pointed out numerous gaps and/or errors in the information provided by DOH, these failings in DOH's submissions do nothing to advance Ghosh's claim that DOH's failure to hire him was a result of improper motives. As discussed above, though the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is "not onerous," it is nonetheless the plaintiff's burden, and it cannot be met with conclu-sory assertions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (“The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2000) (describing plaintiffs “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff’); see also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (noting that “even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 106, 110",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (“The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2000) (describing plaintiffs “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff’); see also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (noting that “even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment”)."
} | 65,545 | a |
While Ghosh has pointed out numerous gaps and/or errors in the information provided by DOH, these failings in DOH's submissions do nothing to advance Ghosh's claim that DOH's failure to hire him was a result of improper motives. As discussed above, though the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is "not onerous," it is nonetheless the plaintiff's burden, and it cannot be met with conclu-sory assertions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "118 F.3d 106, 110",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (“The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2000) (describing plaintiffs “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff’); see also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (noting that “even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "232 F.3d 83, 90",
"parenthetical": "describing plaintiffs \"ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff'",
"sentence": "See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (“The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2000) (describing plaintiffs “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff’); see also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (noting that “even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment”)."
} | 65,545 | b |
Because the assignment declination code was appropriate, Mr. Young was not entitled to reenlistment or a promotion prior to his date of separation on April 12, 2005. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "988 F.2d 1208, 1208",
"parenthetical": "holding that no serviceperson has a right to enlist or to reenlist in the armed forces \"unless specially granted one\"",
"sentence": "See Dodson, 988 F.2d at 1208 (holding that no serviceperson has a right to enlist or to reenlist in the armed forces “unless specially granted one”); see also Dysart, 369 F.3d at 1313-15 (requiring a clear legal right to a promotion to successfully assert a denial of a promotion claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "369 F.3d 1313, 1313-15",
"parenthetical": "requiring a clear legal right to a promotion to successfully assert a denial of a promotion claim",
"sentence": "See Dodson, 988 F.2d at 1208 (holding that no serviceperson has a right to enlist or to reenlist in the armed forces “unless specially granted one”); see also Dysart, 369 F.3d at 1313-15 (requiring a clear legal right to a promotion to successfully assert a denial of a promotion claim)."
} | 4,127,333 | a |
Where it is claimed'that counsel failed to move for a violation of his or her client's right to speedy trial, a thirty month delay between arraignment and trial has not been deemed sufficient to warrant post-conviction relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "262 F.Supp.2d 25, 37",
"parenthetical": "denying petitioner's- ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised upon counsel's alleged failure to move for recovery from a speedy trial where the under lying speedy trial claim \"would not have been successful[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Mallet v. Miller, 432 F.Supp.2d 366, 384 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (denying ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to move for a violation of right to speedy trial where there was á delay of thirty months between arraignment and trial due to pretrial hearings and inability of the prosecution to locate a key witness, and where the underlying speedy trial claim was merit-less); see also Curnen v. Yelich, No. 11-CV-7499, 2015 WL 3827693, at *9 (S.D.N.Y; June 19, 2015), appeal filed No. 15-2166 (2d Cir, July 8, 2015) (denying petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on allegations that counsel had refused to file a motion for relief with respect to violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial where the lower court would have rejected claim as merit-less, and where petitioner could not have shown prejudice because government could have acquired new indictment on the same conduct); Walker v. Bennett, 262 F.Supp.2d 25, 37 (W.D.N.Y.2003) (denying petitioner’s- ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised upon counsel’s alleged failure to move for recovery from a speedy trial where the under lying speedy trial claim “would not have been successful[.]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "432 F.Supp.2d 366, 384",
"parenthetical": "denying ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's failure to move for a violation of right to speedy trial where there was a delay of thirty months between arraignment and trial due to pretrial hearings and inability of the prosecution to locate a key witness, and where the underlying speedy trial claim was merit-less",
"sentence": "See Mallet v. Miller, 432 F.Supp.2d 366, 384 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (denying ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to move for a violation of right to speedy trial where there was á delay of thirty months between arraignment and trial due to pretrial hearings and inability of the prosecution to locate a key witness, and where the underlying speedy trial claim was merit-less); see also Curnen v. Yelich, No. 11-CV-7499, 2015 WL 3827693, at *9 (S.D.N.Y; June 19, 2015), appeal filed No. 15-2166 (2d Cir, July 8, 2015) (denying petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on allegations that counsel had refused to file a motion for relief with respect to violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial where the lower court would have rejected claim as merit-less, and where petitioner could not have shown prejudice because government could have acquired new indictment on the same conduct); Walker v. Bennett, 262 F.Supp.2d 25, 37 (W.D.N.Y.2003) (denying petitioner’s- ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised upon counsel’s alleged failure to move for recovery from a speedy trial where the under lying speedy trial claim “would not have been successful[.]”)."
} | 4,014,699 | b |
For at least two reasons, the court rejects Dreyfus's position. First, as this court has explained, "the public policy exception in the conflicts arena is intended to effectuate the forum state's concern for and interest in protecting its residents." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2004 WL 902114, at *3",
"parenthetical": "finding that California had a substantial interest in its rule of joint and several liability for economic damages in order to make sure that \"resident plaintiffs receive all of the damages to which they are entitled since the economic impact of any shortfall will be felt in California' \"",
"sentence": "Broadhead v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 773 F.Supp. 882, 904 (S.D.Miss.1991); see also Mitchell, 211 So.2d at 514 (observing that “[t]his state is especially concerned with the protection of its injured domiciliaries and their families, and the distribution of its domiciliaries’ estates,” and that “[t]he comparative negligence statute of this State has been effectively administered for many years and we have an interest in applying it to Mississippi residents”); Gann v. Fruehauf Corp., 52 F.3d 1320, 1325 n. 4 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that “[w]here the specific public policy issue involves a non-resident ..., Mississippi courts have held that its public policy concerns are not implicated”); Perry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606 F.Supp. 270, 274 (N.D.Miss.1985) (public policy did not require application of Mississippi stacking laws since the plaintiffs and their decedent were not residents of Mississip pi); cf. Villarreal v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 2004 WL 902114, at *3 (CaLApp. April 28, 2004) (finding that California had a substantial interest in its rule of joint and several liability for economic damages in order to make sure that “resident plaintiffs receive all of the damages to which they are entitled since the economic impact of any shortfall will be felt in California’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]here the specific public policy issue involves a non-resident ..., Mississippi courts have held that its public policy concerns are not implicated\"",
"sentence": "Broadhead v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 773 F.Supp. 882, 904 (S.D.Miss.1991); see also Mitchell, 211 So.2d at 514 (observing that “[t]his state is especially concerned with the protection of its injured domiciliaries and their families, and the distribution of its domiciliaries’ estates,” and that “[t]he comparative negligence statute of this State has been effectively administered for many years and we have an interest in applying it to Mississippi residents”); Gann v. Fruehauf Corp., 52 F.3d 1320, 1325 n. 4 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that “[w]here the specific public policy issue involves a non-resident ..., Mississippi courts have held that its public policy concerns are not implicated”); Perry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606 F.Supp. 270, 274 (N.D.Miss.1985) (public policy did not require application of Mississippi stacking laws since the plaintiffs and their decedent were not residents of Mississip pi); cf. Villarreal v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 2004 WL 902114, at *3 (CaLApp. April 28, 2004) (finding that California had a substantial interest in its rule of joint and several liability for economic damages in order to make sure that “resident plaintiffs receive all of the damages to which they are entitled since the economic impact of any shortfall will be felt in California’ ”)."
} | 3,168,833 | b |
For at least two reasons, the court rejects Dreyfus's position. First, as this court has explained, "the public policy exception in the conflicts arena is intended to effectuate the forum state's concern for and interest in protecting its residents." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2004 WL 902114, at *3",
"parenthetical": "finding that California had a substantial interest in its rule of joint and several liability for economic damages in order to make sure that \"resident plaintiffs receive all of the damages to which they are entitled since the economic impact of any shortfall will be felt in California' \"",
"sentence": "Broadhead v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 773 F.Supp. 882, 904 (S.D.Miss.1991); see also Mitchell, 211 So.2d at 514 (observing that “[t]his state is especially concerned with the protection of its injured domiciliaries and their families, and the distribution of its domiciliaries’ estates,” and that “[t]he comparative negligence statute of this State has been effectively administered for many years and we have an interest in applying it to Mississippi residents”); Gann v. Fruehauf Corp., 52 F.3d 1320, 1325 n. 4 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that “[w]here the specific public policy issue involves a non-resident ..., Mississippi courts have held that its public policy concerns are not implicated”); Perry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606 F.Supp. 270, 274 (N.D.Miss.1985) (public policy did not require application of Mississippi stacking laws since the plaintiffs and their decedent were not residents of Mississip pi); cf. Villarreal v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 2004 WL 902114, at *3 (CaLApp. April 28, 2004) (finding that California had a substantial interest in its rule of joint and several liability for economic damages in order to make sure that “resident plaintiffs receive all of the damages to which they are entitled since the economic impact of any shortfall will be felt in California’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "606 F.Supp. 270, 274",
"parenthetical": "public policy did not require application of Mississippi stacking laws since the plaintiffs and their decedent were not residents of Mississip pi",
"sentence": "Broadhead v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 773 F.Supp. 882, 904 (S.D.Miss.1991); see also Mitchell, 211 So.2d at 514 (observing that “[t]his state is especially concerned with the protection of its injured domiciliaries and their families, and the distribution of its domiciliaries’ estates,” and that “[t]he comparative negligence statute of this State has been effectively administered for many years and we have an interest in applying it to Mississippi residents”); Gann v. Fruehauf Corp., 52 F.3d 1320, 1325 n. 4 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that “[w]here the specific public policy issue involves a non-resident ..., Mississippi courts have held that its public policy concerns are not implicated”); Perry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606 F.Supp. 270, 274 (N.D.Miss.1985) (public policy did not require application of Mississippi stacking laws since the plaintiffs and their decedent were not residents of Mississip pi); cf. Villarreal v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 2004 WL 902114, at *3 (CaLApp. April 28, 2004) (finding that California had a substantial interest in its rule of joint and several liability for economic damages in order to make sure that “resident plaintiffs receive all of the damages to which they are entitled since the economic impact of any shortfall will be felt in California’ ”)."
} | 3,168,833 | b |
However, if the general employer and special employer have entered into a contract assigning liability to one of the parties, courts will give effect to that contract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp. 550, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"[U]nder Maryland law, whatever the status of an employee under the 'borrowed servant' doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss resulting from the employee's negligent acts.\"",
"sentence": "See Temp. Staffing, 765 A.2d at 611 (directing workers’ compensation commission to consider contract between co-employers when assigning liability for benefits, for injured employee); Hercules Powder Co. v. Harry T. Campbell Sons Co., 156 Md. 346, 144 A. 510, 518 (1929) (reversing jury verdict in favor of special employer where contract between general and special employer assigned liability for employee’s negligence to special employer); see also Sea Land Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Ship Repair Corp., 530 F.Supp. 550, 563 (D. Md. 1982) (“[U]nder Maryland law, whatever the status of an employee under the ‘borrowed servant’ doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss resulting from the employee’s negligent acts.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "765 A.2d 611, 611",
"parenthetical": "directing workers' compensation commission to consider contract between co-employers when assigning liability for benefits, for injured employee",
"sentence": "See Temp. Staffing, 765 A.2d at 611 (directing workers’ compensation commission to consider contract between co-employers when assigning liability for benefits, for injured employee); Hercules Powder Co. v. Harry T. Campbell Sons Co., 156 Md. 346, 144 A. 510, 518 (1929) (reversing jury verdict in favor of special employer where contract between general and special employer assigned liability for employee’s negligence to special employer); see also Sea Land Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Ship Repair Corp., 530 F.Supp. 550, 563 (D. Md. 1982) (“[U]nder Maryland law, whatever the status of an employee under the ‘borrowed servant’ doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss resulting from the employee’s negligent acts.”)."
} | 12,171,879 | b |
However, if the general employer and special employer have entered into a contract assigning liability to one of the parties, courts will give effect to that contract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp. 550, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"[U]nder Maryland law, whatever the status of an employee under the 'borrowed servant' doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss resulting from the employee's negligent acts.\"",
"sentence": "See Temp. Staffing, 765 A.2d at 611 (directing workers’ compensation commission to consider contract between co-employers when assigning liability for benefits, for injured employee); Hercules Powder Co. v. Harry T. Campbell Sons Co., 156 Md. 346, 144 A. 510, 518 (1929) (reversing jury verdict in favor of special employer where contract between general and special employer assigned liability for employee’s negligence to special employer); see also Sea Land Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Ship Repair Corp., 530 F.Supp. 550, 563 (D. Md. 1982) (“[U]nder Maryland law, whatever the status of an employee under the ‘borrowed servant’ doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss resulting from the employee’s negligent acts.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing jury verdict in favor of special employer where contract between general and special employer assigned liability for employee's negligence to special employer",
"sentence": "See Temp. Staffing, 765 A.2d at 611 (directing workers’ compensation commission to consider contract between co-employers when assigning liability for benefits, for injured employee); Hercules Powder Co. v. Harry T. Campbell Sons Co., 156 Md. 346, 144 A. 510, 518 (1929) (reversing jury verdict in favor of special employer where contract between general and special employer assigned liability for employee’s negligence to special employer); see also Sea Land Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Ship Repair Corp., 530 F.Supp. 550, 563 (D. Md. 1982) (“[U]nder Maryland law, whatever the status of an employee under the ‘borrowed servant’ doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss resulting from the employee’s negligent acts.”)."
} | 12,171,879 | b |
However, if the general employer and special employer have entered into a contract assigning liability to one of the parties, courts will give effect to that contract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "530 F.Supp. 550, 563",
"parenthetical": "\"[U]nder Maryland law, whatever the status of an employee under the 'borrowed servant' doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss resulting from the employee's negligent acts.\"",
"sentence": "See Temp. Staffing, 765 A.2d at 611 (directing workers’ compensation commission to consider contract between co-employers when assigning liability for benefits, for injured employee); Hercules Powder Co. v. Harry T. Campbell Sons Co., 156 Md. 346, 144 A. 510, 518 (1929) (reversing jury verdict in favor of special employer where contract between general and special employer assigned liability for employee’s negligence to special employer); see also Sea Land Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Ship Repair Corp., 530 F.Supp. 550, 563 (D. Md. 1982) (“[U]nder Maryland law, whatever the status of an employee under the ‘borrowed servant’ doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss resulting from the employee’s negligent acts.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "144 A. 510, 518",
"parenthetical": "reversing jury verdict in favor of special employer where contract between general and special employer assigned liability for employee's negligence to special employer",
"sentence": "See Temp. Staffing, 765 A.2d at 611 (directing workers’ compensation commission to consider contract between co-employers when assigning liability for benefits, for injured employee); Hercules Powder Co. v. Harry T. Campbell Sons Co., 156 Md. 346, 144 A. 510, 518 (1929) (reversing jury verdict in favor of special employer where contract between general and special employer assigned liability for employee’s negligence to special employer); see also Sea Land Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Ship Repair Corp., 530 F.Supp. 550, 563 (D. Md. 1982) (“[U]nder Maryland law, whatever the status of an employee under the ‘borrowed servant’ doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss resulting from the employee’s negligent acts.”)."
} | 12,171,879 | b |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "553 F.3d 65, 74-76",
"parenthetical": "vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the \"possession of any kind of pornographic material\" because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and \"no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | a |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "585 F.3d 182, 185-87",
"parenthetical": "holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult \"pornography\" where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | a |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "494 F.3d 660, 667-68",
"parenthetical": "upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir.2007) (upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir.2003) (acknowledging that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” is “somewhat vague,” but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that “the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores”)."
} | 4,115,625 | a |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "319 F.3d 177, 192-93",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the ban on \"sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials\" is \"somewhat vague,\" but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that \"the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir.2007) (upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir.2003) (acknowledging that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” is “somewhat vague,” but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that “the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores”)."
} | 4,115,625 | a |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 F.3d 868, 872",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"any pornography,\" including legal adult pornography, because \"a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on 'pornography' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "553 F.3d 65, 74-76",
"parenthetical": "vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the \"possession of any kind of pornographic material\" because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and \"no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | a |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "585 F.3d 182, 185-87",
"parenthetical": "holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult \"pornography\" where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 F.3d 868, 872",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"any pornography,\" including legal adult pornography, because \"a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on 'pornography' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | b |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 F.3d 868, 872",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"any pornography,\" including legal adult pornography, because \"a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on 'pornography' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "494 F.3d 660, 667-68",
"parenthetical": "upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir.2007) (upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir.2003) (acknowledging that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” is “somewhat vague,” but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that “the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores”)."
} | 4,115,625 | a |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 F.3d 868, 872",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"any pornography,\" including legal adult pornography, because \"a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on 'pornography' \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "319 F.3d 177, 192-93",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the ban on \"sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials\" is \"somewhat vague,\" but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that \"the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir.2007) (upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir.2003) (acknowledging that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” is “somewhat vague,” but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that “the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores”)."
} | 4,115,625 | a |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "553 F.3d 65, 74-76",
"parenthetical": "vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the \"possession of any kind of pornographic material\" because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and \"no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 F.3d 251, 265",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | b |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 F.3d 251, 265",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "585 F.3d 182, 185-87",
"parenthetical": "holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult \"pornography\" where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | a |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "494 F.3d 660, 667-68",
"parenthetical": "upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir.2007) (upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir.2003) (acknowledging that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” is “somewhat vague,” but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that “the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 F.3d 251, 265",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | b |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "319 F.3d 177, 192-93",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the ban on \"sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials\" is \"somewhat vague,\" but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that \"the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir.2007) (upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir.2003) (acknowledging that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” is “somewhat vague,” but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that “the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "237 F.3d 251, 265",
"parenthetical": "striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of \"all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | b |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "585 F.3d 182, 185-87",
"parenthetical": "holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult \"pornography\" where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "553 F.3d 65, 74-76",
"parenthetical": "vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the \"possession of any kind of pornographic material\" because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and \"no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | b |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "494 F.3d 660, 667-68",
"parenthetical": "upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir.2007) (upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir.2003) (acknowledging that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” is “somewhat vague,” but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that “the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "553 F.3d 65, 74-76",
"parenthetical": "vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the \"possession of any kind of pornographic material\" because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and \"no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | b |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "553 F.3d 65, 74-76",
"parenthetical": "vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the \"possession of any kind of pornographic material\" because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and \"no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "319 F.3d 177, 192-93",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the ban on \"sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials\" is \"somewhat vague,\" but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that \"the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir.2007) (upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir.2003) (acknowledging that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” is “somewhat vague,” but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that “the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores”)."
} | 4,115,625 | a |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "585 F.3d 182, 185-87",
"parenthetical": "holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult \"pornography\" where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "494 F.3d 660, 667-68",
"parenthetical": "upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir.2007) (upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir.2003) (acknowledging that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” is “somewhat vague,” but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that “the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores”)."
} | 4,115,625 | a |
Our conclusion is generally consistent with our sister circuits' approaches to this challenging area. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "319 F.3d 177, 192-93",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the ban on \"sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials\" is \"somewhat vague,\" but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that \"the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores\"",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir.2007) (upholding the breadth of the supervised release condition in part because the defendant was found guilty of producing child pornography); United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 192-93 (5th Cir.2003) (acknowledging that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials” is “somewhat vague,” but narrowing it so that it does not reach magazines and so that “the prohibition on patronizing sexually oriented establishments refers ... to places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "585 F.3d 182, 185-87",
"parenthetical": "holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult \"pornography\" where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2005) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stim ulating materials”); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.2002) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “any pornography,” including legal adult pornography, because “a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on ‘pornography’ ”); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir.2001) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a supervised release condition banning the possession of “all forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography”); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 486 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Second Circuit has “strongly suggested] that the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague for defendants whose statute of conviction does not define it.” (citing United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2003)); ' United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384 (2d Cir.2003)); see also United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74-76 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating a condition of supervised release that banned the “possession of any kind of pornographic material” because the district court did not provide an explanation for this condition, and “no evidence in the record ... justifies the ban”); cf. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185-87 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an unexplained three-year prohibition on adult “pornography” where defendant had been convicted of threatening federal officials)."
} | 4,115,625 | b |
In reviewing a probable cause determination, this court does not review the determination de novo; rather the court looks to see if the officer "had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed at the time of invoking the implied consent law." An officer needs only one objective indication of intoxication to constitute probable cause to believe a person is under the influence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "340 N.W.2d 363, 365",
"parenthetical": "making clear that even single objective indication may be sufficient depending on circumstances",
"sentence": "Holtz v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 340 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn.App.1983) (making clear that even single objective indication may be sufficient depending on circumstances); see Martin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 353 N.W.2d 202 (Minn.App.1984) (reiterating that “it is fundamental that each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reiterating that \"it is fundamental that each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances\"",
"sentence": "Holtz v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 340 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn.App.1983) (making clear that even single objective indication may be sufficient depending on circumstances); see Martin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 353 N.W.2d 202 (Minn.App.1984) (reiterating that “it is fundamental that each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances”)."
} | 10,723,433 | a |
The District Court also did not err in denying Day's due process claim to the extent that Day claimed that his classification deprived him of liberty without due process. Day did not have a liberty interest in the degree of his confinement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 236, 242",
"parenthetical": "\"As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 472, 484",
"parenthetical": "holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are \"generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | 8,455,073 | a |
The District Court also did not err in denying Day's due process claim to the extent that Day claimed that his classification deprived him of liberty without due process. Day did not have a liberty interest in the degree of his confinement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are \"generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 236, 242",
"parenthetical": "\"As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | 8,455,073 | b |
The District Court also did not err in denying Day's due process claim to the extent that Day claimed that his classification deprived him of liberty without due process. Day did not have a liberty interest in the degree of his confinement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are \"generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 U.S. 236, 242",
"parenthetical": "\"As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | 8,455,073 | b |
The District Court also did not err in denying Day's due process claim to the extent that Day claimed that his classification deprived him of liberty without due process. Day did not have a liberty interest in the degree of his confinement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 472, 484",
"parenthetical": "holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are \"generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | 8,455,073 | a |
The District Court also did not err in denying Day's due process claim to the extent that Day claimed that his classification deprived him of liberty without due process. Day did not have a liberty interest in the degree of his confinement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are \"generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | 8,455,073 | b |
The District Court also did not err in denying Day's due process claim to the extent that Day claimed that his classification deprived him of liberty without due process. Day did not have a liberty interest in the degree of his confinement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are \"generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | 8,455,073 | a |
The District Court also did not err in denying Day's due process claim to the extent that Day claimed that his classification deprived him of liberty without due process. Day did not have a liberty interest in the degree of his confinement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 472, 484",
"parenthetical": "holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are \"generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | 8,455,073 | b |
The District Court also did not err in denying Day's due process claim to the extent that Day claimed that his classification deprived him of liberty without due process. Day did not have a liberty interest in the degree of his confinement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are \"generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | 8,455,073 | a |
The District Court also did not err in denying Day's due process claim to the extent that Day claimed that his classification deprived him of liberty without due process. Day did not have a liberty interest in the degree of his confinement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are \"generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life\"",
"sentence": "See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that liberty interests implicating the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)."
} | 8,455,073 | a |
Bloomfield expressly abandoned this claim in her brief in opposition to Whirlpool's motion. (Doc. No. 38 at p. 22 n. 21). Accordingly, "Whirlpool is entitled to summary judgment on Bloomfield's sex discrimination claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 256, 256-57",
"parenthetical": "noting Rule 56 requires a party to produce affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (noting Rule 56 requires a party to produce affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment); Contract Design Group, Inc. v. Wayne State Univ., No. 10-14702, 2013 WL 2199957, at *7 (E.D.Mich. May 20, 2013) (granting defendant summary judgment where plaintiffs abandoned a claim asserted in their complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "2013 WL 2199957, at *7",
"parenthetical": "granting defendant summary judgment where plaintiffs abandoned a claim asserted in their complaint",
"sentence": "See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (noting Rule 56 requires a party to produce affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment); Contract Design Group, Inc. v. Wayne State Univ., No. 10-14702, 2013 WL 2199957, at *7 (E.D.Mich. May 20, 2013) (granting defendant summary judgment where plaintiffs abandoned a claim asserted in their complaint)."
} | 4,058,488 | a |
Bloomfield expressly abandoned this claim in her brief in opposition to Whirlpool's motion. (Doc. No. 38 at p. 22 n. 21). Accordingly, "Whirlpool is entitled to summary judgment on Bloomfield's sex discrimination claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting Rule 56 requires a party to produce affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (noting Rule 56 requires a party to produce affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment); Contract Design Group, Inc. v. Wayne State Univ., No. 10-14702, 2013 WL 2199957, at *7 (E.D.Mich. May 20, 2013) (granting defendant summary judgment where plaintiffs abandoned a claim asserted in their complaint)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "2013 WL 2199957, at *7",
"parenthetical": "granting defendant summary judgment where plaintiffs abandoned a claim asserted in their complaint",
"sentence": "See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (noting Rule 56 requires a party to produce affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment); Contract Design Group, Inc. v. Wayne State Univ., No. 10-14702, 2013 WL 2199957, at *7 (E.D.Mich. May 20, 2013) (granting defendant summary judgment where plaintiffs abandoned a claim asserted in their complaint)."
} | 4,058,488 | a |
We acknowledge that a prosecutor may not present argument that penalizes or impinges upon a defendant's exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "274 Ind. 247, 249",
"parenthetical": "\"It is true that . #.. any direct or indirect reference to the defendant's failure to testify has been strictly regarded as an impingement of his constitutional and statutory rights not to testify.\"",
"sentence": "Boatright v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1038, 1048 (Ind.2001) (“The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence.”) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see also Crosson v. State, 274 Ind. 247, 249, 410 N.E.2d 1194, 1195 (1980) (“It is true that . ■.. any direct or indirect reference to the defendant’s failure to testify has been strictly regarded as an impingement of his constitutional and statutory rights not to testify.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "759 N.E.2d 1038, 1048",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence.\"",
"sentence": "Boatright v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1038, 1048 (Ind.2001) (“The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence.”) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see also Crosson v. State, 274 Ind. 247, 249, 410 N.E.2d 1194, 1195 (1980) (“It is true that . ■.. any direct or indirect reference to the defendant’s failure to testify has been strictly regarded as an impingement of his constitutional and statutory rights not to testify.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 6,938,660 | b |
We acknowledge that a prosecutor may not present argument that penalizes or impinges upon a defendant's exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "759 N.E.2d 1038, 1048",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence.\"",
"sentence": "Boatright v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1038, 1048 (Ind.2001) (“The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence.”) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see also Crosson v. State, 274 Ind. 247, 249, 410 N.E.2d 1194, 1195 (1980) (“It is true that . ■.. any direct or indirect reference to the defendant’s failure to testify has been strictly regarded as an impingement of his constitutional and statutory rights not to testify.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "410 N.E.2d 1194, 1195",
"parenthetical": "\"It is true that . #.. any direct or indirect reference to the defendant's failure to testify has been strictly regarded as an impingement of his constitutional and statutory rights not to testify.\"",
"sentence": "Boatright v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1038, 1048 (Ind.2001) (“The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence.”) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see also Crosson v. State, 274 Ind. 247, 249, 410 N.E.2d 1194, 1195 (1980) (“It is true that . ■.. any direct or indirect reference to the defendant’s failure to testify has been strictly regarded as an impingement of his constitutional and statutory rights not to testify.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 6,938,660 | a |
Nevertheless, we hold that the district court's failure to comply with Rule 32(c)(3)(D)'s requirement and with our eases is harmless error. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 270, 270",
"parenthetical": "harmless error analysis applied to erroneous use of PSR as evidence at sentencing",
"sentence": "Hammer, 3 F.3d at 270 (harmless error analysis applied to erroneous use of PSR as evidence at sentencing); see also United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir.1989) (failure to rule on controverted matters in PSR subject to harmless error analysis)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "891 F.2d 1273, 1279",
"parenthetical": "failure to rule on controverted matters in PSR subject to harmless error analysis",
"sentence": "Hammer, 3 F.3d at 270 (harmless error analysis applied to erroneous use of PSR as evidence at sentencing); see also United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir.1989) (failure to rule on controverted matters in PSR subject to harmless error analysis)."
} | 10,512,394 | a |
And for most cases, it may not matter which test is employed. Id. (noting that the analysis between the two lines of cases may be "entirely interchangeable"). The crucial analytical step of both tests is the same; which is to say, that under both lines of cases, intermediate scrutiny is applied if the challenged law is found to be either content neutral or for the purpose of decreasing secondary effects. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 289, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Pap’s A.M. 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (“We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O’Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 448, 448",
"parenthetical": "\"A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.\"",
"sentence": "See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.”); R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 408 (7th Cir.2004) (“[OJnly after confirming that a zoning ordinance’s purpose is to combat the secondary effects of speech do we employ Renton’s intermediate scrutiny test.”)."
} | 3,775,736 | b |
And for most cases, it may not matter which test is employed. Id. (noting that the analysis between the two lines of cases may be "entirely interchangeable"). The crucial analytical step of both tests is the same; which is to say, that under both lines of cases, intermediate scrutiny is applied if the challenged law is found to be either content neutral or for the purpose of decreasing secondary effects. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 448, 448",
"parenthetical": "\"A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.\"",
"sentence": "See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.”); R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 408 (7th Cir.2004) (“[OJnly after confirming that a zoning ordinance’s purpose is to combat the secondary effects of speech do we employ Renton’s intermediate scrutiny test.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Pap’s A.M. 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (“We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O’Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.”)."
} | 3,775,736 | a |
And for most cases, it may not matter which test is employed. Id. (noting that the analysis between the two lines of cases may be "entirely interchangeable"). The crucial analytical step of both tests is the same; which is to say, that under both lines of cases, intermediate scrutiny is applied if the challenged law is found to be either content neutral or for the purpose of decreasing secondary effects. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.\"",
"sentence": "See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.”); R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 408 (7th Cir.2004) (“[OJnly after confirming that a zoning ordinance’s purpose is to combat the secondary effects of speech do we employ Renton’s intermediate scrutiny test.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 289, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Pap’s A.M. 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (“We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O’Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.”)."
} | 3,775,736 | a |
And for most cases, it may not matter which test is employed. Id. (noting that the analysis between the two lines of cases may be "entirely interchangeable"). The crucial analytical step of both tests is the same; which is to say, that under both lines of cases, intermediate scrutiny is applied if the challenged law is found to be either content neutral or for the purpose of decreasing secondary effects. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.\"",
"sentence": "See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.”); R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 408 (7th Cir.2004) (“[OJnly after confirming that a zoning ordinance’s purpose is to combat the secondary effects of speech do we employ Renton’s intermediate scrutiny test.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Pap’s A.M. 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (“We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O’Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.”)."
} | 3,775,736 | a |
And for most cases, it may not matter which test is employed. Id. (noting that the analysis between the two lines of cases may be "entirely interchangeable"). The crucial analytical step of both tests is the same; which is to say, that under both lines of cases, intermediate scrutiny is applied if the challenged law is found to be either content neutral or for the purpose of decreasing secondary effects. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 289, 289",
"parenthetical": "\"We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Pap’s A.M. 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (“We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O’Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "361 F.3d 402, 408",
"parenthetical": "\"[OJnly after confirming that a zoning ordinance's purpose is to combat the secondary effects of speech do we employ Renton's intermediate scrutiny test.\"",
"sentence": "See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.”); R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 408 (7th Cir.2004) (“[OJnly after confirming that a zoning ordinance’s purpose is to combat the secondary effects of speech do we employ Renton’s intermediate scrutiny test.”)."
} | 3,775,736 | b |
And for most cases, it may not matter which test is employed. Id. (noting that the analysis between the two lines of cases may be "entirely interchangeable"). The crucial analytical step of both tests is the same; which is to say, that under both lines of cases, intermediate scrutiny is applied if the challenged law is found to be either content neutral or for the purpose of decreasing secondary effects. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Pap’s A.M. 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (“We now clarify that government restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O’Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "361 F.3d 402, 408",
"parenthetical": "\"[OJnly after confirming that a zoning ordinance's purpose is to combat the secondary effects of speech do we employ Renton's intermediate scrutiny test.\"",
"sentence": "See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.”); R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402, 408 (7th Cir.2004) (“[OJnly after confirming that a zoning ordinance’s purpose is to combat the secondary effects of speech do we employ Renton’s intermediate scrutiny test.”)."
} | 3,775,736 | b |
The Supreme Court has stated that an error is harmless when the error "did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed." On the other hand, when we are not certain that the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence had it not committed a procedural error, we have declined to find the error harmless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "578 F.3d 695, 695-96",
"parenthetical": "remanding for resentencing where district court committed procedural error by failing to calculate advisory guideline range for supervised release term",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 528 (7th Cir.2009) (remanding for resentencing where district court’s statements did “not approach the firm assurances that we had in the cases where we have found a sentencing error harmless”); United States v. Edwards, 581 F.3d 604, 613 (7th Cir.2009) (remanding for a further sentencing hearing where it was unclear whether a procedural error had occurred that affected the choice of sentence); see also Gibbs, 578 F.3d at 695-96 (remanding for resentencing where district court committed procedural error by failing to calculate advisory guideline range for supervised release term)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "580 F.3d 515, 528",
"parenthetical": "remanding for resentencing where district court's statements did \"not approach the firm assurances that we had in the cases where we have found a sentencing error harmless\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 528 (7th Cir.2009) (remanding for resentencing where district court’s statements did “not approach the firm assurances that we had in the cases where we have found a sentencing error harmless”); United States v. Edwards, 581 F.3d 604, 613 (7th Cir.2009) (remanding for a further sentencing hearing where it was unclear whether a procedural error had occurred that affected the choice of sentence); see also Gibbs, 578 F.3d at 695-96 (remanding for resentencing where district court committed procedural error by failing to calculate advisory guideline range for supervised release term)."
} | 3,792,018 | b |
The Supreme Court has stated that an error is harmless when the error "did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed." On the other hand, when we are not certain that the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence had it not committed a procedural error, we have declined to find the error harmless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "578 F.3d 695, 695-96",
"parenthetical": "remanding for resentencing where district court committed procedural error by failing to calculate advisory guideline range for supervised release term",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 528 (7th Cir.2009) (remanding for resentencing where district court’s statements did “not approach the firm assurances that we had in the cases where we have found a sentencing error harmless”); United States v. Edwards, 581 F.3d 604, 613 (7th Cir.2009) (remanding for a further sentencing hearing where it was unclear whether a procedural error had occurred that affected the choice of sentence); see also Gibbs, 578 F.3d at 695-96 (remanding for resentencing where district court committed procedural error by failing to calculate advisory guideline range for supervised release term)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "581 F.3d 604, 613",
"parenthetical": "remanding for a further sentencing hearing where it was unclear whether a procedural error had occurred that affected the choice of sentence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 528 (7th Cir.2009) (remanding for resentencing where district court’s statements did “not approach the firm assurances that we had in the cases where we have found a sentencing error harmless”); United States v. Edwards, 581 F.3d 604, 613 (7th Cir.2009) (remanding for a further sentencing hearing where it was unclear whether a procedural error had occurred that affected the choice of sentence); see also Gibbs, 578 F.3d at 695-96 (remanding for resentencing where district court committed procedural error by failing to calculate advisory guideline range for supervised release term)."
} | 3,792,018 | b |
The majority claims that "the trial court did not err in not explicitly deciding the disputed issue of what standard is appropriate," majority op. at 1265, for a facial constitutional challenge to a statute regulating the right to abortion because "[t]he trial court's finding that the Mandatory Delay Law imposes a significant restriction on all women's fundamental right of privacy, by its plain terms, is sufficient to support an injunction barring the application of the law in its entirety." Majority op. at 1264. But the trial court's temporary injunction order will be searched in vain for any finding that the Mandatory Delay law imposes a "significant restriction" on the right to abortion. Regardless, the majority fails to acknowledge that--as a matter of Florida law--the no-set-of-circumstances test standard applies to Petitioners' facial constitutional challenge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "873 So.2d 430, 434",
"parenthetical": "\"A facial challenge to a statute is more difficult than an 'as applied' challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So.3d 529, 538 (Fla. 2014) (“For a statute to be held facially unconstitutional, the challenger must demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists in which the statute can be constitutionally applied.”); Florida Dept. of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005) (“[A] determination that a statute is facially unconstitutional means that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”); see also Cashatt v. State, 873 So.2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“A facial challenge to a statute is more difficult than an ‘as applied’ challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”). Based on the record here, there is no basis for concluding that Petitioners have established a likelihood that they will prevail in meeting their heavy burden to maintain a successful facial challenge in this case."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "141 So.3d 529, 538",
"parenthetical": "\"For a statute to be held facially unconstitutional, the challenger must demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists in which the statute can be constitutionally applied.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So.3d 529, 538 (Fla. 2014) (“For a statute to be held facially unconstitutional, the challenger must demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists in which the statute can be constitutionally applied.”); Florida Dept. of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005) (“[A] determination that a statute is facially unconstitutional means that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”); see also Cashatt v. State, 873 So.2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“A facial challenge to a statute is more difficult than an ‘as applied’ challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”). Based on the record here, there is no basis for concluding that Petitioners have established a likelihood that they will prevail in meeting their heavy burden to maintain a successful facial challenge in this case."
} | 12,360,649 | b |
The majority claims that "the trial court did not err in not explicitly deciding the disputed issue of what standard is appropriate," majority op. at 1265, for a facial constitutional challenge to a statute regulating the right to abortion because "[t]he trial court's finding that the Mandatory Delay Law imposes a significant restriction on all women's fundamental right of privacy, by its plain terms, is sufficient to support an injunction barring the application of the law in its entirety." Majority op. at 1264. But the trial court's temporary injunction order will be searched in vain for any finding that the Mandatory Delay law imposes a "significant restriction" on the right to abortion. Regardless, the majority fails to acknowledge that--as a matter of Florida law--the no-set-of-circumstances test standard applies to Petitioners' facial constitutional challenge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "873 So.2d 430, 434",
"parenthetical": "\"A facial challenge to a statute is more difficult than an 'as applied' challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So.3d 529, 538 (Fla. 2014) (“For a statute to be held facially unconstitutional, the challenger must demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists in which the statute can be constitutionally applied.”); Florida Dept. of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005) (“[A] determination that a statute is facially unconstitutional means that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”); see also Cashatt v. State, 873 So.2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“A facial challenge to a statute is more difficult than an ‘as applied’ challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”). Based on the record here, there is no basis for concluding that Petitioners have established a likelihood that they will prevail in meeting their heavy burden to maintain a successful facial challenge in this case."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "918 So.2d 250, 256",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] determination that a statute is facially unconstitutional means that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So.3d 529, 538 (Fla. 2014) (“For a statute to be held facially unconstitutional, the challenger must demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists in which the statute can be constitutionally applied.”); Florida Dept. of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005) (“[A] determination that a statute is facially unconstitutional means that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”); see also Cashatt v. State, 873 So.2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“A facial challenge to a statute is more difficult than an ‘as applied’ challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”). Based on the record here, there is no basis for concluding that Petitioners have established a likelihood that they will prevail in meeting their heavy burden to maintain a successful facial challenge in this case."
} | 12,360,649 | b |
Finally, to the extent the Court considers these legal determinations "close calls," the law regarding whether remand provides guidance to courts considering "close-calls." That is, where there is any doubt, the court should resolve the matter in favor of the plaintiff and for remand. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding presumption in favor of remand where issue is close",
"sentence": "Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir.1999) (finding that all questions as to removal must be resolved in the favor of the plaintiff and state court jurisdiction); see also Branch v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 83 F.Supp.2d 631, 632 n. 3, 635 (D.S.C.2000) (finding presumption in favor of remand where issue is close). For these reasons and relying on the McCormick opinion from this District, the plaintiffs motion for remand is hereby GRANTED."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "187 F.3d 422, 425",
"parenthetical": "finding that all questions as to removal must be resolved in the favor of the plaintiff and state court jurisdiction",
"sentence": "Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir.1999) (finding that all questions as to removal must be resolved in the favor of the plaintiff and state court jurisdiction); see also Branch v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 83 F.Supp.2d 631, 632 n. 3, 635 (D.S.C.2000) (finding presumption in favor of remand where issue is close). For these reasons and relying on the McCormick opinion from this District, the plaintiffs motion for remand is hereby GRANTED."
} | 11,527,159 | b |
It may well be that no curative instruction could have overcome the impact of the witness' statements. However, we are confident that the one given here was completely ineffectual. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 R.I. 144, 149",
"parenthetical": "holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant",
"sentence": "See State v. Manfredi, 118 R.I. 144, 149, 372 A.2d 975, 977 (1977) (holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant); see also State v. Costa, 111 R.I. 602, 609-10, 306 A.2d 36,40 (1973) (stating that “there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury’s mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "111 R.I. 602, 609-10",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury's mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Manfredi, 118 R.I. 144, 149, 372 A.2d 975, 977 (1977) (holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant); see also State v. Costa, 111 R.I. 602, 609-10, 306 A.2d 36,40 (1973) (stating that “there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury’s mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence”)."
} | 8,246,433 | a |
It may well be that no curative instruction could have overcome the impact of the witness' statements. However, we are confident that the one given here was completely ineffectual. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 R.I. 144, 149",
"parenthetical": "holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant",
"sentence": "See State v. Manfredi, 118 R.I. 144, 149, 372 A.2d 975, 977 (1977) (holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant); see also State v. Costa, 111 R.I. 602, 609-10, 306 A.2d 36,40 (1973) (stating that “there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury’s mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 A.2d 36, 40",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury's mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Manfredi, 118 R.I. 144, 149, 372 A.2d 975, 977 (1977) (holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant); see also State v. Costa, 111 R.I. 602, 609-10, 306 A.2d 36,40 (1973) (stating that “there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury’s mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence”)."
} | 8,246,433 | a |
It may well be that no curative instruction could have overcome the impact of the witness' statements. However, we are confident that the one given here was completely ineffectual. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "111 R.I. 602, 609-10",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury's mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Manfredi, 118 R.I. 144, 149, 372 A.2d 975, 977 (1977) (holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant); see also State v. Costa, 111 R.I. 602, 609-10, 306 A.2d 36,40 (1973) (stating that “there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury’s mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "372 A.2d 975, 977",
"parenthetical": "holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant",
"sentence": "See State v. Manfredi, 118 R.I. 144, 149, 372 A.2d 975, 977 (1977) (holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant); see also State v. Costa, 111 R.I. 602, 609-10, 306 A.2d 36,40 (1973) (stating that “there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury’s mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence”)."
} | 8,246,433 | b |
It may well be that no curative instruction could have overcome the impact of the witness' statements. However, we are confident that the one given here was completely ineffectual. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "306 A.2d 36, 40",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury's mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Manfredi, 118 R.I. 144, 149, 372 A.2d 975, 977 (1977) (holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant); see also State v. Costa, 111 R.I. 602, 609-10, 306 A.2d 36,40 (1973) (stating that “there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury’s mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "372 A.2d 975, 977",
"parenthetical": "holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant",
"sentence": "See State v. Manfredi, 118 R.I. 144, 149, 372 A.2d 975, 977 (1977) (holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant); see also State v. Costa, 111 R.I. 602, 609-10, 306 A.2d 36,40 (1973) (stating that “there remains for the appellate court the question of whether such instructions were adequate to have disabused the jury’s mind of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable evidence”)."
} | 8,246,433 | b |
Although a trial justice is required to give a limiting instruction when admitting evidence of prior bad acts under one of the exceptions to Rule 404(b), it is not required that the instruction be given immediately after the pertinent testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The trial justice always should take it upon himself or herself to offer a limiting instruction when admitting evidence of other sex acts.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Cardoza, 649 A.2d 745, 748 (R.I. 1994) (“[TJhere is no requirement that this instruction be given immediately after the testimony has been given.”); see also State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 234 n. 2 (R.I.1993) (“The trial justice always should take it upon himself or herself to offer a limiting instruction when admitting evidence of other sex acts.”); Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533-34. When a defendant fails to object to the introduction of the evidence at trial, the trial justice’s failure to issue a sua sponte cautionary instruction constitutes reversible error only if a defendant does not attempt to utilize the uncharged incidents to his or her advantage."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "649 A.2d 745, 748",
"parenthetical": "\"[TJhere is no requirement that this instruction be given immediately after the testimony has been given.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Cardoza, 649 A.2d 745, 748 (R.I. 1994) (“[TJhere is no requirement that this instruction be given immediately after the testimony has been given.”); see also State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 234 n. 2 (R.I.1993) (“The trial justice always should take it upon himself or herself to offer a limiting instruction when admitting evidence of other sex acts.”); Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533-34. When a defendant fails to object to the introduction of the evidence at trial, the trial justice’s failure to issue a sua sponte cautionary instruction constitutes reversible error only if a defendant does not attempt to utilize the uncharged incidents to his or her advantage."
} | 8,191,817 | b |
Moreover, even greater lenience is due to domestic relations orders which were drafted prior to the REA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1994 WL 224352, at *5",
"parenthetical": "noting practice of finding QDRO despite absence of technical requirements for DROs entered before enactment of REA",
"sentence": "See Metropolitan Life v. Marsh, 119 F.3d 415, 422 (6th Cir.1997) (“As the divorce decree was written before the REA amended ERISA in 1984, we should not demand literal compliance where Congress’ intent has been to give effect to domestic relations orders where it is clear what the decree intended.”); Cummings by Techmeier v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 388-89 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008, 107 S.Ct. 648, 93 L.Ed.2d 703 (1986); see also Layton v. TDS Healthcare Sys. Corp., No. C-93-1827-MHP, 1994 WL 224352, at *5 (N.D.Cal. May 17, 1994) (noting practice of finding QDRO despite absence of technical requirements for DROs entered before enactment of REA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "119 F.3d 415, 422",
"parenthetical": "\"As the divorce decree was written before the REA amended ERISA in 1984, we should not demand literal compliance where Congress' intent has been to give effect to domestic relations orders where it is clear what the decree intended.\"",
"sentence": "See Metropolitan Life v. Marsh, 119 F.3d 415, 422 (6th Cir.1997) (“As the divorce decree was written before the REA amended ERISA in 1984, we should not demand literal compliance where Congress’ intent has been to give effect to domestic relations orders where it is clear what the decree intended.”); Cummings by Techmeier v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 388-89 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008, 107 S.Ct. 648, 93 L.Ed.2d 703 (1986); see also Layton v. TDS Healthcare Sys. Corp., No. C-93-1827-MHP, 1994 WL 224352, at *5 (N.D.Cal. May 17, 1994) (noting practice of finding QDRO despite absence of technical requirements for DROs entered before enactment of REA)."
} | 11,663,633 | b |
It has been held that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. However, the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "516 F.2d 78, 86",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 86 (5th Cir.1975) (holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "410 U.S. 458, 467",
"parenthetical": "holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973) (holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant). In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 (1978), the court held that a defendant who, after the introduction of evidence, deliberately chooses to seek termination of the proceedings against him by a motion to dismiss, unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the State is permitted to appeal and seek reversal of the dismissal."
} | 10,018,550 | b |
It has been held that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. However, the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "516 F.2d 78, 86",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 86 (5th Cir.1975) (holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072",
"parenthetical": "holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973) (holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant). In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 (1978), the court held that a defendant who, after the introduction of evidence, deliberately chooses to seek termination of the proceedings against him by a motion to dismiss, unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the State is permitted to appeal and seek reversal of the dismissal."
} | 10,018,550 | b |
It has been held that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. However, the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433",
"parenthetical": "holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973) (holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant). In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 (1978), the court held that a defendant who, after the introduction of evidence, deliberately chooses to seek termination of the proceedings against him by a motion to dismiss, unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the State is permitted to appeal and seek reversal of the dismissal."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "516 F.2d 78, 86",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 86 (5th Cir.1975) (holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | 10,018,550 | a |
It has been held that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. However, the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "437 U.S. 82, 98-99",
"parenthetical": "holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973) (holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant). In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 (1978), the court held that a defendant who, after the introduction of evidence, deliberately chooses to seek termination of the proceedings against him by a motion to dismiss, unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the State is permitted to appeal and seek reversal of the dismissal."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "516 F.2d 78, 86",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 86 (5th Cir.1975) (holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | 10,018,550 | a |
It has been held that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. However, the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "516 F.2d 78, 86",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 86 (5th Cir.1975) (holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198",
"parenthetical": "holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973) (holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant). In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 (1978), the court held that a defendant who, after the introduction of evidence, deliberately chooses to seek termination of the proceedings against him by a motion to dismiss, unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the State is permitted to appeal and seek reversal of the dismissal."
} | 10,018,550 | b |
It has been held that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. However, the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79",
"parenthetical": "holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant",
"sentence": "See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1973) (holding that the granting of a mistrial due to a defect in the wording of the indictment did not prevent retrial even though the mistrial was declared after the jury was impaneled and sworn and over the objection of defendant). In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 (1978), the court held that a defendant who, after the introduction of evidence, deliberately chooses to seek termination of the proceedings against him by a motion to dismiss, unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the State is permitted to appeal and seek reversal of the dismissal."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "516 F.2d 78, 86",
"parenthetical": "holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 86 (5th Cir.1975) (holding that a defendant who delays, for reasons of trial tactics, filing a motion attacking an indictment until after the jury is sworn and some evidence has been heard is not entitled to prevent a retrial on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause)."
} | 10,018,550 | a |
We have found no cases, and Jones points to none, requiring prison regulations to be written and publicized in order to meet constitutional requirements. Rather, the constitutionality of a prison regulation, whether written, unwritten, publicized or unpublicized, is governed by Turner. Indeed, we and other circuits have applied Turner to unwritten prison policies and other prison actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "369 F.3d 475, 479, 483-86",
"parenthetical": "applying Turner to unwritten prison policy requiring inmates who wish to obtain an elective medical procedure to obtain a court order",
"sentence": "See Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (10th Cir.1990) (\"Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as the transfer here.\"); see also Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 479, 483-86 (5th Cir.2004) (applying Turner to unwritten prison policy requiring inmates who wish to obtain an elective medical procedure to obtain a court order); Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 508-10 (7th Cir.1996) (applying Turner to unwritten policy prohibiting prison employees from writing Prison Review Board directly); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir.1992) (noting Turner \"has been applied to unwritten prison policies as well as prison regulations”); c.f."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 560, 562",
"parenthetical": "\"Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as the transfer here.\"",
"sentence": "See Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (10th Cir.1990) (\"Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as the transfer here.\"); see also Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 479, 483-86 (5th Cir.2004) (applying Turner to unwritten prison policy requiring inmates who wish to obtain an elective medical procedure to obtain a court order); Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 508-10 (7th Cir.1996) (applying Turner to unwritten policy prohibiting prison employees from writing Prison Review Board directly); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir.1992) (noting Turner \"has been applied to unwritten prison policies as well as prison regulations”); c.f."
} | 2,919,966 | b |
We have found no cases, and Jones points to none, requiring prison regulations to be written and publicized in order to meet constitutional requirements. Rather, the constitutionality of a prison regulation, whether written, unwritten, publicized or unpublicized, is governed by Turner. Indeed, we and other circuits have applied Turner to unwritten prison policies and other prison actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 560, 562",
"parenthetical": "\"Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as the transfer here.\"",
"sentence": "See Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (10th Cir.1990) (\"Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as the transfer here.\"); see also Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 479, 483-86 (5th Cir.2004) (applying Turner to unwritten prison policy requiring inmates who wish to obtain an elective medical procedure to obtain a court order); Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 508-10 (7th Cir.1996) (applying Turner to unwritten policy prohibiting prison employees from writing Prison Review Board directly); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir.1992) (noting Turner \"has been applied to unwritten prison policies as well as prison regulations”); c.f."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "100 F.3d 506, 508-10",
"parenthetical": "applying Turner to unwritten policy prohibiting prison employees from writing Prison Review Board directly",
"sentence": "See Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (10th Cir.1990) (\"Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as the transfer here.\"); see also Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 479, 483-86 (5th Cir.2004) (applying Turner to unwritten prison policy requiring inmates who wish to obtain an elective medical procedure to obtain a court order); Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 508-10 (7th Cir.1996) (applying Turner to unwritten policy prohibiting prison employees from writing Prison Review Board directly); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir.1992) (noting Turner \"has been applied to unwritten prison policies as well as prison regulations”); c.f."
} | 2,919,966 | a |
We have found no cases, and Jones points to none, requiring prison regulations to be written and publicized in order to meet constitutional requirements. Rather, the constitutionality of a prison regulation, whether written, unwritten, publicized or unpublicized, is governed by Turner. Indeed, we and other circuits have applied Turner to unwritten prison policies and other prison actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 560, 562",
"parenthetical": "\"Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as the transfer here.\"",
"sentence": "See Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (10th Cir.1990) (\"Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as the transfer here.\"); see also Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 479, 483-86 (5th Cir.2004) (applying Turner to unwritten prison policy requiring inmates who wish to obtain an elective medical procedure to obtain a court order); Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 508-10 (7th Cir.1996) (applying Turner to unwritten policy prohibiting prison employees from writing Prison Review Board directly); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir.1992) (noting Turner \"has been applied to unwritten prison policies as well as prison regulations”); c.f."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "963 F.2d 912, 917",
"parenthetical": "noting Turner \"has been applied to unwritten prison policies as well as prison regulations\"",
"sentence": "See Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (10th Cir.1990) (\"Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as the transfer here.\"); see also Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 479, 483-86 (5th Cir.2004) (applying Turner to unwritten prison policy requiring inmates who wish to obtain an elective medical procedure to obtain a court order); Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 508-10 (7th Cir.1996) (applying Turner to unwritten policy prohibiting prison employees from writing Prison Review Board directly); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir.1992) (noting Turner \"has been applied to unwritten prison policies as well as prison regulations”); c.f."
} | 2,919,966 | a |
We conclude that the facts pleaded are insufficient to make out such a claim. None of Scott's allegations with respect to the DOC defendants include assertions that affirmative actions taken by these defendants after Earley violated her rights; they refer only to the DOC defendants' failure to act. And Scott has not pleaded facts giving rise to a clearly established affirmative legal obligation on the part of the DOC defendants to take any of the actions that Scott alleges they failed to take. A claim for failure to act is cognizable only in the presence of a corresponding duty to have acted. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "836 F.2d 736, 743",
"parenthetical": "\"As a general rule, a government official is not liable for failing to prevent another from violating a person's constitutional rights, unless the official is charged with an affirmative duty to act.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (finding no violation of law where Environmental Protection Agency allegedly failed to consider certain factors pertaining to air quality after the 9/11 attacks because “there is no allegation of any failure to carry out a mandatory duty to take a discrete action required by the [National Contingency Plan]”); cf. Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 743 (2d Cir.1988) (“As a general rule, a government official is not liable for failing to prevent another from violating a person’s constitutional rights, unless the official is charged with an affirmative duty to act.”). In the absence of such an allegation, this claim must fail."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "523 F.3d 119, 132",
"parenthetical": "finding no violation of law where Environmental Protection Agency allegedly failed to consider certain factors pertaining to air quality after the 9/11 attacks because \"there is no allegation of any failure to carry out a mandatory duty to take a discrete action required by the [National Contingency Plan]\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (finding no violation of law where Environmental Protection Agency allegedly failed to consider certain factors pertaining to air quality after the 9/11 attacks because “there is no allegation of any failure to carry out a mandatory duty to take a discrete action required by the [National Contingency Plan]”); cf. Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 743 (2d Cir.1988) (“As a general rule, a government official is not liable for failing to prevent another from violating a person’s constitutional rights, unless the official is charged with an affirmative duty to act.”). In the absence of such an allegation, this claim must fail."
} | 6,049,587 | b |
The court's position is confused because the plain-error rule does not actually have a different purpose than the common-law forfeiture doctrine. We have repeatedly recognized that the purpose and effect of the plain-error rule, like the common-law forfeiture doctrine, is to encourage contemporaneous objections. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "556 U.S. 184, 184-36",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the plain-error rule is tied directly to the contemporaneous-objection requirement as it \"sets forth the consequences\" for failing to object and promotes \"judicial efficiency\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pearson, 775 N.W.2d at 161 (“The plain error doctrine encourages defendants to object while in the trial court so that any errors can be corrected before their full impact is realized.”); Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 298-99; see also Puckett, 556 U.S. at 184-36, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (recognizing that the plain-error rule is tied directly to the contemporaneous-objection requirement as it “sets forth the consequences” for failing to object and promotes “judicial efficiency”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "775 N.W.2d 161, 161",
"parenthetical": "\"The plain error doctrine encourages defendants to object while in the trial court so that any errors can be corrected before their full impact is realized.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pearson, 775 N.W.2d at 161 (“The plain error doctrine encourages defendants to object while in the trial court so that any errors can be corrected before their full impact is realized.”); Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 298-99; see also Puckett, 556 U.S. at 184-36, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (recognizing that the plain-error rule is tied directly to the contemporaneous-objection requirement as it “sets forth the consequences” for failing to object and promotes “judicial efficiency”)."
} | 6,906,655 | b |
The court's position is confused because the plain-error rule does not actually have a different purpose than the common-law forfeiture doctrine. We have repeatedly recognized that the purpose and effect of the plain-error rule, like the common-law forfeiture doctrine, is to encourage contemporaneous objections. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "775 N.W.2d 161, 161",
"parenthetical": "\"The plain error doctrine encourages defendants to object while in the trial court so that any errors can be corrected before their full impact is realized.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pearson, 775 N.W.2d at 161 (“The plain error doctrine encourages defendants to object while in the trial court so that any errors can be corrected before their full impact is realized.”); Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 298-99; see also Puckett, 556 U.S. at 184-36, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (recognizing that the plain-error rule is tied directly to the contemporaneous-objection requirement as it “sets forth the consequences” for failing to object and promotes “judicial efficiency”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that the plain-error rule is tied directly to the contemporaneous-objection requirement as it \"sets forth the consequences\" for failing to object and promotes \"judicial efficiency\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pearson, 775 N.W.2d at 161 (“The plain error doctrine encourages defendants to object while in the trial court so that any errors can be corrected before their full impact is realized.”); Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 298-99; see also Puckett, 556 U.S. at 184-36, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (recognizing that the plain-error rule is tied directly to the contemporaneous-objection requirement as it “sets forth the consequences” for failing to object and promotes “judicial efficiency”)."
} | 6,906,655 | a |
For example, the Pierces never indicated that they were preparing to repair the property or to demolish it on their own and that they needed additional time to do so. Indeed, the record suggests that the Pierces were financially unable either to repair or demolish the property. In light of the adequacy of notice and the lack of any response, we see no due process violation in this ex parte proceeding. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "4 F.3d 693, 696",
"parenthetical": "no due process violation where property owner had actual notice of municipality's intent",
"sentence": "See Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156, 1159 (5th Cir.1974) (where procedural fairness has been accorded the property owner, the Due Process Clause does not require “that a judicial determination precede the demolition of property found to be a nuisance.”); cf. Hroch v. City of Omaha, 4 F.3d 693, 696 (8th Cir.1993) (no due process violation where property owner had actual notice of municipality’s intent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "492 F.2d 1156, 1159",
"parenthetical": "where procedural fairness has been accorded the property owner, the Due Process Clause does not require \"that a judicial determination precede the demolition of property found to be a nuisance.\"",
"sentence": "See Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156, 1159 (5th Cir.1974) (where procedural fairness has been accorded the property owner, the Due Process Clause does not require “that a judicial determination precede the demolition of property found to be a nuisance.”); cf. Hroch v. City of Omaha, 4 F.3d 693, 696 (8th Cir.1993) (no due process violation where property owner had actual notice of municipality’s intent)."
} | 1,830,329 | b |
The dates of a public official's term of office are adjudicative facts within the meaning of this rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "631 P.2d 1163, 1164",
"parenthetical": "court may take judicial notice of term of public office",
"sentence": "See Larsen v. Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo.App. 1981) (court may take judicial notice of term of public office); cf. Lovato v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 1203, 1204 (Colo.1980) (court properly took judicial notice that Utah judge was a \"magistrate\" under Utah law); People ex rel. Flanders v. Neary, 113 Colo. 12, 16, 154 P.2d 48, 50 (1944) (supreme court took judicial notice of district attorney's term of office)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "617 P.2d 1203, 1204",
"parenthetical": "court properly took judicial notice that Utah judge was a \"magistrate\" under Utah law",
"sentence": "See Larsen v. Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo.App. 1981) (court may take judicial notice of term of public office); cf. Lovato v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 1203, 1204 (Colo.1980) (court properly took judicial notice that Utah judge was a \"magistrate\" under Utah law); People ex rel. Flanders v. Neary, 113 Colo. 12, 16, 154 P.2d 48, 50 (1944) (supreme court took judicial notice of district attorney's term of office)."
} | 8,364,376 | a |
The dates of a public official's term of office are adjudicative facts within the meaning of this rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "631 P.2d 1163, 1164",
"parenthetical": "court may take judicial notice of term of public office",
"sentence": "See Larsen v. Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo.App. 1981) (court may take judicial notice of term of public office); cf. Lovato v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 1203, 1204 (Colo.1980) (court properly took judicial notice that Utah judge was a \"magistrate\" under Utah law); People ex rel. Flanders v. Neary, 113 Colo. 12, 16, 154 P.2d 48, 50 (1944) (supreme court took judicial notice of district attorney's term of office)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "113 Colo. 12, 16",
"parenthetical": "supreme court took judicial notice of district attorney's term of office",
"sentence": "See Larsen v. Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Colo.App. 1981) (court may take judicial notice of term of public office); cf. Lovato v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 1203, 1204 (Colo.1980) (court properly took judicial notice that Utah judge was a \"magistrate\" under Utah law); People ex rel. Flanders v. Neary, 113 Colo. 12, 16, 154 P.2d 48, 50 (1944) (supreme court took judicial notice of district attorney's term of office)."
} | 8,364,376 | a |
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