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a9d74f54-477a-4d87-9daf-cee7e8717026 | . The temporal proximity of relevant events can be significant where evidence is authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4). In Sample, 468 Md. at 567-68, 228 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
79c6f32d-12c0-477c-953f-35e5401c94ee | .3d at 176, we determined that “the temporal proximity of the attempted armed robbery to the unfriending” was one of the circumstances that authenticated social media evidence indicating that the defendant unfriended his accomplice after the offense. In Sublet, 442 Md. at 676, 113 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
68761f40-e817-4f90-ab59-5c205009e189 | .3d at 721, we concluded that a reasonable juror could have found that tweets were authentic, in part, because of “the temporal proximity” between the tweets and direct messages that had already been authenticated. Similarly, in this case, the temporal proximity of the shooting to the events before and after that were depicted on the video and that Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
63b044c4-19f8-49dd-bd46-58fb5c166631 | . Zimmerman had personal knowledge of gives rise to a reasonable inference that the video more likely than not fairly and accurately showed the shooting. Mr. Zimmerman testified that he reviewed the video in preparation for trial and that - 34 - the video truthfully and accurately depicted the events that occurred and did not appear to have been edited or altered.14 Because Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
04713d29-487e-49cf-a9b6-753a49bc8acc | . Zimmerman had personal knowledge of events that occurred within seconds before and after the shooting and testified that the video accurately depicted those events, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the video also fairly and accurately depicted the shooting.15 And, although the burden was on the State to authenticate the video, it is worth observing that, while Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
9dea4549-4fd9-48ce-97bf-17072494c1b3 | . Mooney’s counsel argued in the circuit court that “there’s no way to know if that video’s been altered[,]” Mr. Mooney did not allege that the video was altered or tampered with. Another important circumstance supporting the conclusion that a reasonable juror could have found that the video fairly and accurately depicted the shooting involves the nature and origin of the video | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
ba085c4e-20d7-4221-8248-134b5f302692 | . Detective Liu testified that, when officers arrive at a crime scene, the first thing they do is look for witnesses and cameras, and that he obtained the video from an individual with a camera mounted on the exterior wall of his residence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
cbac38c3-0c34-48c8-987a-1d60fe9a8107 | . Although the record does not reveal the identity of the individual who provided the video to Detective Liu, there was sufficient evidence to infer that the video was recorded by a camera belonging to a local resident and that it was obtained the same night as the shooting. 14Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
4d21bb83-199c-4db1-a70b-3192b94d4098 | . Zimmerman’s testimony that the video did not appear to be altered or edited constituted testimony that the content of the video did not vary or contradict his observations of the events that occurred. Although Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
4594dd51-fc33-44db-b81d-df9db01205e6 | . Zimmerman’s testimony did not verify the manner of production of the video and was not the equivalent of testimony required for authentication of a video under the “silent witness” theory, Mr. Zimmerman’s testimony confirmed that the events shown on the video truthfully and accurately depicted his observations of what occurred | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
ed0f8281-6d53-421a-9331-c1c4656c4c37 | . 15After the video was played, consistent with his testimony that he had watched the video and it accurately depicted the events that occurred, Mr. Zimmerman confirmed that the video showed him running to McDonald’s after the shooting. - 35 - That the video was recovered the night of the shooting from a source not connected to either Mr. Zimmerman or Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
9fbf0e30-33c3-4732-ad40-6e94b842a879 | . Mooney, or the police, supports the conclusion that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the video was what it was claimed to be—a fair and accurate depiction of the shooting | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
1981f39a-d700-43f5-8db0-16cbc81a5113 | . While there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find in favor of authentication in this case, authentication of video footage through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) will generally require more fulsome questioning than the type of inquiry typically used to establish the necessary foundation for authentication under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1), where a witness | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
4ca68121-4379-48f3-86c7-682a014c20df | may be asked if the item is a fair an accurate depiction of what it purports to be | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
3dec89e0-0e09-49d4-bcd1-3a8c8618e596 | . To be sure, in this case, the prosecutor asked Mr. Zimmerman whether the video showed what he knew to be the 3900 block of Falls Road and confirmed with Mr. Zimmerman that the video showed him in his vehicle. And, after a bench conference at which the circuit court questioned whether a proper foundation had been laid for admission of the video, the prosecutor asked Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
5b95ec12-ab5c-4495-8be7-111df2a59f34 | . Zimmerman if he had watched the video and if the video was a true and accurate depiction of the events that occurred on the night of the shooting | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
037f589b-9445-49cf-8d9b-6563b5ae6569 | . Although these were certainly valid questions and are the type of questions typically associated with authenticating evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1), authentication of video footage through circumstantial evidence will generally require more specific questioning tailored to the particular circumstances of the case to establish a sufficient foundation for admission of evidence under | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
64577099-8f9b-442d-8b6c-d60030920831 | Maryland Rule 5- 901(b)(4) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
d1ff935a-fed0-47bd-ba05-c379dfae2b2d | . - 36 - In this case, given the extremely close temporal proximity of the shooting to the events before and after the shooting (of which Mr. Zimmerman had personal knowledge), Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
06f01775-3f06-44f2-bfee-0f4bcf8e0002 | . Zimmerman’s testimony that the video was a true and accurate depiction of the events that occurred, and the nature and origin of the video, the absence of more specific questioning, generating additional circumstantial evidence to corroborate events in the video, does not detract from our ability to conclude that the video was properly authenticated. G | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
41c75ae2-5427-4443-ba2a-48ddded1d3c9 | . Conclusion Video footage, like social media evidence, is susceptible to alteration, and the increased availability of new technology, particularly the advent of image-generating artificial intelligence, may present unique challenges in authenticating videos and photographs | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
d41504b2-8ca9-4ccd-8fd5-db7cc9b8da48 | . As we have noted, “[p]hotographic manipulation, alterations and fabrications are nothing new, nor are such changes unique to digital imaging, although it might be easier in this digital age.” Washington, 406 Md. at 651, 961 A.2d at 1115. Nonetheless, at this time, video footage can be authenticated through vigilant application of existing methods for authentication of evidence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
de0499e6-edc1-453c-a384-f67127bf953f | . Like other evidence, video footage can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the video is what it purports to be | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
8d3a147a-221c-4a48-87c7-7b273ee92e2f | . As with social media evidence, the proponent of the evidence “‘need not rule out all possibilities that are inconsistent with authenticity, or prove beyond any doubt that the [] evidence is what it purports to be.’” Sample, 468 Md. at 599, 228 A.3d at 195 (quoting Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715) (brackets omitted) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
731e2a62-aa89-4bc7-8bbd-c0a7fbad8a2f | . What matters is that there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable - 37 - juror to find that more likely than not the video footage is what it is claimed to be. Because that test was met here, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
ab929612-abfe-4e46-8058-351b5072840d | . 32 September Term, 2023 ______________________________________ CHRISTOPHER MOONEY v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Fader, C.J. Watts Booth Biran Gould Eaves Hotten, Michele D. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Concurring Opinion by Fader, C.J | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
26907c8a-7b0b-49c8-94c3-7ab76b528d3f | . ______________________________________ Filed: August 13, 2024 Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 121280030 Argued: June 3, 2024 I join the Majority opinion in full. I write separately to express one additional thought. Justice Gould begins his thoughtful dissent with a reference to “the age of artificial intelligence” and the growing “risk of fabricated or altered evidence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
ed67640f-84d2-4f7c-b584-c63177cda5b7 | .” The evidentiary concerns associated with the growth and proliferation of artificial intelligence, especially generative artificial intelligence, are real and pressing | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
a117f3fd-46c4-49e2-8726-c96a19d10591 | . Courts should be alert to claims that evidence has been altered by the use of artificial intelligence, and artificial intelligence technology may ultimately require us to adjust our rules and procedures for authenticating electronic evidence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
22b5c653-fff6-4e4d-a73e-157a0b844935 | . But the record in this case does not contain any hint that artificial intelligence may have played a role, nor was there any suggestion that the video may have been altered in any way. We can expect to need to tackle issues associated with artificial intelligence soon, but this is not the case. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
9bba6d51-6cda-4266-ba39-79158f2ebfcd | . 32 September Term, 2023 ______________________________________ CHRISTOPHER MOONEY v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Fader, C.J. Watts Booth Biran Gould Eaves Hotten, Michele D. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Dissenting Opinion by Gould, J | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
07b08f78-a208-4e8d-913f-557dcf5f1f01 | . ______________________________________ Filed: August 13, 2024 Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 121280030 Argued: June 3, 2024 I respectfully dissent to the Majority’s well-written and thorough opinion. In the age of artificial intelligence, the risk of fabricated or altered evidence has never been greater, and that risk will only increase as technology advances | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
bd4dc362-83d3-4572-9c71-303c6df10915 | . The Majority optimistically posits that “at this time, video footage can be authenticated through vigilant application of existing methods for authentication of evidence.” Maj. Op. at 36. I hope so, but my concerns are that Maryland Rule 5-901 was not vigilantly applied here, when the trial court admitted the video into evidence over Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
1dcf20d0-2365-4929-8823-9253c8de59b6 | . Mooney’s objection and that, as a result, the Majority is lowering the bar by affirming the trial court’s ruling. In my view, the trial court should not have admitted the entire video but instead should have required the State to edit out the parts where Mr. Zimmerman lacked personal knowledge, including the footage of the shooting | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
348d1a5c-c822-40ab-bf3b-6f4add1de9cd | . Those critical few seconds were not authenticated by the pictorial testimony method, the silent witness method, or with circumstantial evidence. I write separately to explain my reasoning | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
fa7681aa-73d4-4a4d-9ff5-4e5928537b6b | . Before delving into my analysis, I must emphasize that this dissent does not and should not be interpreted as calling into question the integrity of the officers, detectives, attorneys, or anyone else who may have touched the video exhibit at issue here. I have no reason to believe—and thus I do not believe—that the video was altered in any respect | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
dbf0d512-fe18-4543-a8fc-bc7b3241f2c8 | . But that is irrelevant to the legal issue before us. The relevant issue is whether the State satisfied its burden in establishing the authenticity of the video, based on the record evidence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
ff3e7e94-fc90-4593-b4ab-b60e0fe0468d | . Thus, any hypothetical speculation that the video has been fabricated or altered is solely to demonstrate what I believe are the weaknesses in the Majority’s reasoning, not to suggest that there is any reason to believe such foul play occurred here. 2 The Pictorial Testimony Method At trial, the State relied solely on the “pictorial testimony” method of authentication. See Mooney v. State, No | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
3fedd293-0b60-4e65-8c8c-04f482e19529 | . 1561, Sept. Term, 2022, 2023 WL 6783388, at *9 n.3 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 13, 2023). Under that method, a video may be authenticated if a witness with firsthand knowledge of events testifies that the video fairly and accurately depicts those events. See Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs. v. Cole, 342 Md. 12, 20-21 (1996); see also Maj. Op. at 2 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
6da5f3f1-f3c1-46b3-9d73-dfe97a347d1c | . That the pictorial testimony method was used is evident in the bench conference following the defense’s objection to the video’s admission, during which the court and the State discussed how to lay a proper foundation for authenticating the video: [MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: I mean, there’s no way to know if that video’s been altered. It’s somebody else’s Ring camera | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
f65341d7-1478-4019-8e96-3ac47fb6fe85 | . These aren’t still photographs of what happened. THE COURT: Has he watched it? [MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: I mean -- THE COURT: I don’t think that’s necessarily -- [MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: And that was other -- THE COURT: -- a difference between still photographs and, um, video. If he’s able to authenticate it, he’s able to authenticate it, but I don’t. [MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: Right | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
998090ef-5d11-4962-a935-712e4eb8e565 | . But I don’t know that he watched the whole thing either -- THE COURT: I don’t know either. [MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: -- which is what I wanted to voir dire him on. THE COURT: Yeah. 3 [PROSECUTOR]: He has watched it in view, in preparation of this trial, he has -- THE COURT: Well, you -- you can ask him all that before, you haven’t laid the appropriate foundation for it yet | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
a3a91f7c-75d3-45b2-9dcc-edad416a42ac | . I don’t know if that video -- [PROSECUTOR]: He’s authenticated it as to be the date and the time of the incident, it was a true and accurate reflection of that date and time. THE COURT: There are other questions you need to ask him, like, has he watched it. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. THE COURT: And is it a fair and accurate representation of what happened. I mean, I’m not trying -- [PROSECUTOR]: Okay | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
a06b986d-00a2-469e-9b7e-3985e57b3ef5 | . THE COURT: Ask some more foundational questions. [PROSECUTOR]: Sure. After the bench conference, the State questioned Mr. Zimmerman in the manner suggested by the court and the court admitted the video: [PROSECUTOR]: Did you watch this video in preparation? [MR. ZIMMERMAN]: Yes, I did. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
d4fa8895-0b8c-45c7-8bad-2ae879b6fae4 | . And after seeing that video[,] was that a true and accurate depiction of the events that occurred that day? [MR. ZIMMERMAN]: Yes. [PROSECUTOR]: And there was nothing that was changed or altered? [MR. ZIMMERMAN]: No. [PROSECUTOR]: From your recollection thereof? [MR. ZIMMERMAN]: No. 4 [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, the State at this time would move into evidence State’s Exhibit 1A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
793fc296-7f5b-4d68-be6f-b4768758dbda | . THE COURT: Over objection, State’s 1A is admitted. The problem here is that Mr. Zimmerman did not see Mr. Mooney after he walked past Mr. Zimmerman’s car. Mr. Zimmerman testified that as Mr. Mooney was walking past his car, he thought Mr. Mooney was about to say something because “it looked like he slowed down, like he was about to say something.” Mr. Zimmerman explained that: . . | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
7db3204d-3d2d-4b76-a7dd-f8823cbc8006 | . I seen him walk, and I didn’t know which way he went and so I’m looking. And then, I’m thinking he’s going to come run up to my front side of my -- my passen -- or the drive’s seat. . . . And, um, I look out my, I cracked my door and I’m looking out and I didn’t see him. As soon as I sat back that’s when the gunshots happened. Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
a235fc48-ba16-4891-8438-b4a2dddf61ef | . Zimmerman gave his account of the incident before the State sought to authenticate the video—that is before Mr. Zimmerman answered “yes” when the State asked him if the video was “a true and accurate depiction of the events that occurred that day.” By his admission, therefore, Mr. Zimmerman’s first-hand knowledge of the events did not include the shooting | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
768f4254-88fa-4d65-b490-0f528925a469 | . A reasonable juror would have had no basis to conclude from Mr. Zimmerman’s testimony that the depiction of the shooting was true, accurate, and unaltered. Thus, that part of the video should have been edited out of the version presented to the jury. 5 Circumstantial Evidence The Majority concludes that the footage depicting the shooting was authenticated by circumstantial evidence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
a727fad1-c1b5-4e2d-bd73-1d1434fb45b3 | . One such piece of circumstantial evidence, according to the Majority, is the “close temporal proximity” of the relevant events. Maj. Op. at 31-33. “Temporal proximity” refers to the amount of time between two or more events | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
8e23c84b-52fe-42f0-993e-7935644536cb | . Under the Majority’s use of “temporal proximity,” the relevant events are (1) the moments depicted in the video leading up to the shooting, (2) the shooting, and (3) the moments after the shooting. Mr. Zimmerman had personal knowledge of the first and third events, but not the second | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
ee3aa8a8-ecc9-48db-ad48-90b9658cfd79 | .1 The Majority reasons that because the video is short and because the second event, which lasted just a few seconds, was sandwiched between the first and third events, a reasonable juror could infer that the “video fairly and accurately showed” the second event, even though Mr. Zimmerman did not see it. Maj. Op. at 32-33. Put another way: According to the Majority, Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
0d9bbd26-40ba-42e8-97c0-65d14d2bc210 | . Zimmerman’s ability to authenticate some of the video provides a basis on which a reasonable juror could conclude that another part of the video was neither fabricated nor altered. I disagree with the Majority’s reasoning. The authentication requirement exists to prevent the admission of tampered evidence. If someone wanted to frame Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
0e3f9100-d11a-4ce9-ab6a-b3f7bff709e1 | . Mooney by tampering with the video, we would expect that person to alter the minimum amount necessary to achieve that purpose. Here, that could be altering only the appearance of the shooter. So, the fact that Mr. Zimmerman can authenticate the parts he did see does not mean the parts he could not see were 1 As to the third event, Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
5c3ca46b-0fc5-438c-b659-5335b90e087b | . Zimmerman’s personal knowledge was limited as well, as he did not testify that he saw the shooter leave the scene. 6 untampered with. The Majority relies on two cases for its temporal proximity analysis: Sublet v. State, 442 Md. 632 (2015) and State v. Sample, 468 Md. 560 (2020) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
f8004365-e1f3-4336-b72c-5bb0304ec200 | . If the Majority’s reliance on these cases is limited to the proposition that temporal proximity can theoretically provide circumstantial evidence of authenticity in certain contexts—that is, to establish that the concept of temporal proximity is potentially relevant in an authentication analysis—I do not disagree | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
5e157bc9-105b-4a49-be12-9344ab8f5492 | . But if the Majority relies on Sublet and Sample as precedents to justify how it uses temporal proximity here, I disagree. The nature of and relevance of the evidence at issue in both cases were different than that of the video at issue here. So too are the authentication challenges raised in the respective cases. In Sublet, this Court decided three cases consolidated for appeal. 442 Md | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
8c43dea2-0082-41c2-9c80-4909c960221b | . at 636-37. The second case, Harris v. State, involved private messages and public tweets on X (formerly Twitter). Id. at 645-52. The State apparently believed that the content of those communications was evidence of the defendant’s guilt; that is, what the defendant said in those communications was inculpatory. See id. at 645-52, 674-76 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
f8028b67-4eee-4a11-9dea-f45652a74774 | . But the State had to establish that the communications were the handiwork of the defendant. It was in that context that temporal proximity came into play: The timing of the communications relative to other events connecting the defendant to the alleged crime was circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s authorship. Id. at 674-76 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
41722dd3-ad46-4b07-a74f-cedf54b2f417 | . In Sample, the social media action was the unfriending on Facebook by one person—the defendant—of the defendant’s alleged accomplice. 468 Md. at 565-68. The State asserted that this act of unfriending was evidence of the defendant’s guilt in that it 7 showed the defendant was trying to distance himself from his alleged accomplice. See id. at 567 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
984e77b0-ba9d-4919-a6d0-f1ab2b1da157 | . The names on the accounts of both the person who did the unfriending and the person who was unfriended did not identify the real names of the account holder | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
02ebbd6a-7ed7-4c8e-9af9-13ad5746f329 | . Thus, the authenticity challenge was twofold: (1) to show that the accounts were held by the defendant and the accomplice, respectively; and (2) to show that the defendant, and not someone else who might have gained access to the account, committed the act of unfriending. Id | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
33f1e073-a685-478b-b4c3-105f3241689b | . In that context, the temporal proximity of the alleged crime to the act of unfriending was among the circumstantial evidence from which, we held, a reasonable juror could conclude that the unfriending was done by the defendant. Id. at 568, 602-05 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
6ad95b20-4f66-43da-9534-39a0f9bf6f9e | . In both Sublet and Sample, the relevance of the evidence hinged on whether the defendant was the person who generated the evidence at issue—in Sublet, the social media communications and in Sample, the unfriending. In other words, the authentication issue was not so much whether the evidence was real or fake; the issue was whether the defendant was the actor who created the evidence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
1d30fda9-a4ab-439e-a61e-5d753506eb3f | . So, the act of generating that evidence was a critical piece of the temporal proximity analysis. In contrast, here, the relevance of the piece of evidence—the video—does not hinge on who created it, but instead on whether it was real or fake | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
c26f83f4-24e2-474d-8740-278e9b5bee04 | . Here, the authentication issue was not to show that a particular person created the video; it was whether the State demonstrated that the video was neither fabricated nor altered. And the creation of the video was not a relevant event in the Majority’s temporal proximity analysis. Accordingly, in my view, Sublet and Sample do not support how the Majority uses temporal proximity here | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
95c24d63-cee9-44b8-b82b-123528a1e546 | . 8 Silent Witness Testimony The Majority tries to fill the gap left by the pictorial method by using the “silent witness” approach to authenticating the video, pointing to “the nature and origin of the video.” Maj. Op. at 34. Recall that the State introduced and entered the video into evidence through the testimony of Mr. Zimmerman. Detective Liu, who received the video, testified after Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
ba8e6aa5-f17f-4c86-9a5d-d80381b1181c | . Zimmerman. So, to begin with, the trial court did not admit the video based on the silent witness approach based on Detective Liu’s testimony. In any event, Detective Liu’s testimony was insufficient under the silent witness approach | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
b642e71d-224e-4ec4-9bc9-73907ddf3b11 | . Here’s what we know from Detective Liu’s testimony: (1) When officers arrive at the scene of the crime, the first thing they do is look for witnesses and cameras; and (2) he obtained the video from someone with a camera mounted on the exterior wall of his residence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
9716d494-9237-48ab-b763-67e680dd8305 | . From these two facts, the Majority holds that a reasonable juror could conclude that the “video was recorded by a camera belonging to a local resident and that it was obtained the same night of the shooting.” Maj. Op. at 34. I have no problem with the first inference—that the video was recorded by a local resident’s camera. But the second inference is a bridge too far | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
1e05f5d2-33b4-4ea5-8d55-be31a33fdeec | . There is no basis to draw any conclusion as to when Detective Liu received the video. Maybe the resident was home when Detective Liu canvassed the area; maybe not. Maybe Detective Liu left a card at the residence’s front door on the day of the shooting and received a call back the next day, or maybe he received a return call in the following weeks or months | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
411155d1-57b5-49ee-bf13-fb15e2f76477 | . The record reveals nothing about when Detective Liu received the video. There is much we do not know, but should know, to be consistent with the standard 9 this Court has set for the “silent witness” approach to authenticating photos or videos | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
b46cc7a3-0e06-43e2-a076-cebbc8a911ff | . Which type of camera was used? What media was used to record the images? Where were the images from the camera stored? Did Detective Liu receive a copy of the video or the original? If it was a copy, who made the copy, and when and how was it made? Was the video emailed to Detective Liu? Did he receive a thumb drive? Was Detective Liu given access to a cloud account where the video was stored | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
6db91ec0-6040-475d-a152-de53ef8f034f | ? Was the video recorded in a format that made it easy to alter? Who had access to the video before it was provided to Detective Liu? Who had access to the video after Detective Liu received it? The inability to answer these questions on this record is troubling, in my view, particularly when compared to other cases in which video evidence was admitted or excluded | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
0aed2d7f-ab6b-46ab-86e0-c843d049cbc7 | . In Cole, for instance, this Court held that a videotape of a prisoner’s extraction from his cell was properly authenticated. 342 Md. at 27 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
299aaa73-08c4-4270-959b-39a32aeca65a | . There, the prison warden testified that videotaping cell extractions was a routine practice at the prison, that each videotape was routinely labeled with the date and time of the extraction, that each videotape was routinely labeled with the names of the prison officers and inmates involved, that each videotape was maintained in a security vault, and that each videotape could only be viewed by | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
fa5a0e1b-484b-4d10-ad98-a69dcf7c12ad | signing it out on a custody form | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
492756e3-2a99-40e4-ac1b-850fe1f5e696 | . Id. In Jackson v. State, 460 Md. 107 (2018), we held that video footage of an ATM was properly authenticated when a bank employee described in detail the process for obtaining that footage and providing it to police | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
6b91d1b2-e478-44c9-bab4-2cd9432ada8b | . The employee testified that the process involved accessing a digital video recorder program that prevented him from modifying the video or even copying it to an external storage device. Id. at 117. To send the video to the police, 10 the employee was required to submit a request to bank employees outside of Maryland, who would then mail the video directly to the police. Id. Finally, in Reyes v | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
0750d1cf-4b11-44ce-8717-6e24bb637667 | . State, 257 Md. App | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
c089f8a6-a994-4cb3-afc3-f46673bf9582 | . 596 (2023), the Appellate Court of Maryland held that a video taken by a man’s residential security camera was properly authenticated when he testified to the camera’s “general reliability” and other pertinent facts, including that he had installed the camera in the front window of the residence, that the camera was motion-activated and would send an alert to his phone when it began recording, | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
754e4ef3-65fb-4280-8878-723482be7738 | and that he received such an alert on the night the video in issue was taken | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
59f46800-1a38-498b-9fb1-4d765aecd828 | . Id. at 612, 631. In contrast, in Washington v. State, 406 Md. 642 (2008), we held that a video was not properly authenticated because an unknown person created the video “through some unknown process” by compiling footage from eight surveillance cameras onto a CD and then copying that footage to a videotape. Id. at 655 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
3f29b47a-6946-4992-a078-eb51b09fe67d | . As we noted, “[t]here was no testimony as to the process used, the manner of operation of the cameras, the reliability or authenticity of the images, or the chain of custody of the pictures.” Id. So too here. On this record, there was insufficient evidence to authenticate the video using the silent witness method | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
b70f9b28-9ae0-4691-a487-3c607eb75094 | . * * * In sum, the most critical part of the video—the shooting—was not properly authenticated using the pictorial testimony method, the silent witness method, or with other circumstantial evidence. In my view, that part of the video should not have been admitted. I would therefore reverse and remand the case for a new trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
6363aade-d8ea-4bee-8158-27dcc26b1882 | 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSELORS, Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, et al., Defendants. Civil Action Nos. 11-443, 11-444, 11-445 (BAH) Judge Beryl A | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
376cc02c-ca80-4657-8310-1c6542416e0a | . Howell MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff National Security Counselors (“NSC”) brought these three related actions against six federal agencies pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, claiming that the defendant agencies have violated the FOIA in numerous ways | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
488b30ce-65d8-4d9e-a850-3c43a532ba11 | .1 NSC’s claims run the gamut, including challenges to: the withholding of specific information; the adequacy of the agencies’ search efforts; the refusal to process FOIA requests; the refusal to produce responsive records in an electronic format; and certain policies or practices which the plaintiff claims are ongoing and systematic FOIA violations | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
bd6d8a31-835c-482b-9b5d-e12237875c67 | . Although six agencies are named as defendants,2 the vast majority of the plaintiff’s claims relate to the actions of the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) in processing and responding to FOIA requests. The defendants previously moved to dismiss many of the plaintiff’s claims, which this Court previously granted in part and denied in part. See Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA (“NSC I”), 898 F. Supp | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
2fc41340-8be1-4b1e-a542-700254bc9857 | . 2d 233 1 The plaintiff filed each of these actions on the same day and notified the Court that all three cases are related to one another because they involve common factual and legal issues. See Notice of Related Case, No. 11-444, ECF No. 2; Notice of Related Case, No. 11-445, ECF No. 2 | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
62a8b637-a95f-4506-80a6-960b54805a1c | . Although the Court has not formally consolidated these actions, due to their interrelated nature and in the interests of judicial economy the Court has adjudicated dispositive motions in the three cases in consolidated opinions | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
3b2c9e9b-7a62-4028-8c0b-c59f87bafe22 | . For these same reasons, the Court administratively stayed all three actions for approximately four months while the parties completed the briefing of summary judgment motions and cross-motions in each case. See Minute Order dated Mar. 21, 2013 | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
cd5fa2c0-5a8a-46ee-b9b6-0f537d7bdcc9 | . 2 The six defendants are: the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”), the Department of State (“State Department”), the National Security Agency (“NSA”), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (“ODNI”). 2 (D.D.C. 2012) | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
25e1c13f-420e-4880-82e8-face0b4c17f6 | . The defendants now move for summary judgment on all of the plaintiff’s remaining claims, and the plaintiff has also cross-moved for summary judgment on a portion of those claims. Additionally, the plaintiff has filed a motion for sanctions in one of the related cases and a motion for leave to file an amended complaint in another | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
758df363-0a4c-499b-88c7-3cb807c0675d | . For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, grants in part and denies in part the plaintiff’s cross-motions for summary judgment, denies the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, and denies the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Table of Contents I. Background ...................................... | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
57c504ef-7531-458b-b094-3141ab9ff7ed | ........................................................................................ 5 A. 2009 FOIA Requests ............................................................................................................ 6 1. Count Twenty in No. 11-444: September 25, 2009 FOIA Request to the CIA ............... 6 2. Count Eight in No. 11-445: October 22, 2009 FOIA Request to the DOJ ............. | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
f11fae0e-0748-46d0-a8ab-8b1a132e75dc | ......... 7 3. Counts One, Five and Six in No. 11-445: December 1, 2009 FOIA Requests to the CIA, DIA, and ODNI ....................................................................................................................... 8 B. 2010 FOIA Requests .......................................................................................................... 10 1 | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
4e804204-56e7-4a21-9cfd-f55aad9a9c67 | . Counts Seven, Nine and Ten in No. 11-445: February 6, 2010 FOIA Requests to the CIA, State Department, and NSA ......................................................................................... 10 2. Counts Two and Three in No. 11-445: February 9, 2010 FOIA Requests to the CIA... 12 3. Count Seventeen in No. 11-444: May 4, 2010 FOIA Requests to the CIA ................... 14 4 | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
88652b15-1791-46cf-b3a1-c2c9707ab346 | . Count Three in No. 11-443: May 12, 2010 FOIA Request to the CIA .......................... 15 3 5. Count Nine in No. 11-444: May 13, 2010 FOIA Request to the CIA .......................... 16 6. Count Eight in No. 11-444: July 5, 2010 FOIA Request to the CIA ............................. 18 7. Count One in No. 11-444: August 8, 2010 FOIA Requests to the CIA ......................... 19 C | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
4ab77a98-5dca-496d-a796-6b3157d2d959 | . 2011 FOIA Requests .......................................................................................................... 20 1. Count Eighteen in No. 11-444: January 26, 2011 FOIA Request to the CIA ................ 20 2. Count Thirteen in No. 11-445: February 11, 2011 FOIA Request to the CIA............... 21 3. Count Ten in No. 11-444: February 16, 2011 FOIA Request to the CIA ............ | National_Security_Counselors_2013-08-15.txt |
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