id
stringlengths 36
36
| text
stringlengths 1
400
| source
stringclasses 10
values |
|---|---|---|
fe473979-3000-4744-a610-63352e7871f4 | . stated that he would have adopted the “reasonable juror” test used by United States Courts of Appeals for authentication of social media evidence because it was consistent with Maryland Rule 5-901. See id. at 366, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
177a74ff-7342-4f88-8e64-0fa39fe59526 | . Judge Harrell explained that, in his view, applying the reasonable juror test would have led to the conclusion that the social media evidence at issue was properly authenticated. See id. at 367, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting). Four years later, in Sublet, 442 Md. at 637-38, 113 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
b300aa85-e1f0-45af-b8ac-e9c9313335ee | .3d at 697-98, we adopted the reasonable juror test for social media evidence and applied it in the three cases that were consolidated for purposes of the opinion: Sublet v. State, Harris v. State, and Monge- Martinez v. State. We explained that, in United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
fce773f4-75eb-4f29-bf6c-bbd91bdc1f0d | . 2014), the Second Circuit had determined that Federal Rule of Evidence 901 “is satisfied if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification.” Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715 (quoting Vayner, 769 F.3d at 129-30) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Sublet, id. at 638, 113 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
2bd822d3-32e7-4e88-b3f3-5890a24ef1e9 | .3d at 698, we held that social media evidence is authenticated under Maryland Rule 5-901 where a trial court determines that a reasonable juror could find that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be. Five years later, in Sample, 468 Md. at 567-68, 228 A.3d at 176, we concluded that the “reasonable juror” test is subject to the preponderance of the evidence standard, i.e | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
94d9e743-341f-4e8e-8897-d721fc77c7d1 | ., - 18 - the more likely than not standard, and we reaffirmed that, under Maryland Rule 5- 901(b)(4), social media evidence may be authenticated through circumstantial evidence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
a7af6e1a-dea6-4c19-af54-d1c1bc0bed47 | . We stated that, with respect to the authentication of social media evidence through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), “‘the inquiry is context- specific,’” and the presence or absence of certain information is not necessarily dispositive. Id. at 599, 228 A.3d at 195 (quoting Sublet, 442 Md. at 676-77, 113 A.3d at 721) (brackets omitted) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
8fc9ce56-f866-4ca7-802c-71d5f45e1aaa | . We explained that the proponent of the evidence “‘need not rule out all possibilities that are inconsistent with authenticity, or prove beyond any doubt that the social media evidence is what it purports to be.’” Id. at 599, 228 A.3d at 195 (quoting Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715) (brackets omitted).8 C | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
b0dd13fa-b383-44ea-b5d0-e17742663f45 | . Authentication of Videos: Cole, Washington, Jackson, and Other Case Law We have previously addressed issues as to authentication of videos in three instances. See Cole, 342 Md. at 27, 672 A.2d at 1123; Washington, 406 Md. at 646, 961 8In a civil case, Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. Pifer, 478 Md. 645, 651, 674-75, 276 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
cc41290f-478b-4d1d-9e00-9258ee5ed52c | .3d 533, 536, 550 (2022), we applied the “reasonable juror” test and concluded that establishing a chain of custody was not a requirement for authentication of the evidence at issue | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
36a4a868-0130-4f22-873b-78e1a9afba40 | . We held that containers purchased on eBay were properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) because “a reasonable juror [could] find by a preponderance of the evidence that the powder within the containers was Strait-Line marking chalk.” Id. at 651, 678-79, 276 A.3d at 536, 552-53 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
8dbaf4b1-3371-4d2e-a585-e4893a7ad8da | . We addressed the possibility of tampering as follows: Insofar as negating the possibility of tampering is concerned, there is no hard and fast requirement that in a civil case where the issue of tampering is raised or where a substance may be susceptible to tampering, the proponent of the offered evidence is required to establish a chain of custody for the evidence to be admissible. Id | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
04eb6961-f425-49db-8ede-615785f45f5a | . at 678, 276 A.3d at 552. - 19 - A.2d at 1112; Jackson, 460 Md. at 119, 188 A.3d at 982. In Cole, 342 Md. at 26-27, 672 A.2d at 1122-23, as a matter of first impression, we held that the “silent witness” theory of authentication can apply to videos and affirmed the admission of a video under that theory. In Cole, id. at 18, 672 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
21e207cb-9e53-4626-895e-d61eab9fcd90 | .2d at 1118, a correctional officer’s employment had been terminated because the officer deliberately injured an inmate while extracting him from a cell. The incident was videotaped. See id. at 18, 672 A.2d at 1118 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
7176f9c3-6154-4d46-8a4d-b2066a96ab0f | . At a hearing before an administrative law judge (“the ALJ”), the warden testified that it was the regular practice of the prison for extractions of inmates from cells to be recorded by video. See id. at 18, 672 A.2d at 1118 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
abdf0570-ad25-43b0-99a4-ed84e47384ae | . The warden explained that each such videotape was “routinely labelled with the date and time of the extraction and the names of the inmate and officers involved[,]” was “kept in an individual envelope[,] and [was] stored in a security vault at the institution[,] where they [could] be viewed only by signing in and out on a chain of custody form.” Id. at 27, 672 A.2d at 1122 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
4d0f3e84-3e80-431e-8dca-705a93cf673c | . Over objection, the ALJ admitted into evidence the videotape of the correctional officer injuring the inmate. See id. at 19, 672 A.2d at 1118. No witness with knowledge testified that the content of the video fairly and accurately depicted the events shown on it. See id. at 17, 672 A.2d at 1118 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
cf1c721a-7fc6-4b50-b035-2bfff36d4ce4 | . We explained that the “pictorial testimony” theory of authentication, in which a witness with knowledge of the events depicted on the video provides testimony, is not the sole method of authenticating video evidence. See id. at 21, 672 A.2d at 1119. We held that, like a photograph, a video can be authenticated under the “silent witness” theory of authentication. See id. at 26, 672 A.2d at 1122 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
92e7ea6f-8921-4b5b-9057-430bcf260989 | . We described the “silent witness” theory as an alternative way to authenticate video evidence under which a witness with personal - 20 - knowledge of the content of the video is not required. Id. at 21, 672 A.2d at 1119 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
b37b4dee-baf1-4070-b416-374e716b1571 | . We refrained from setting forth rigid prerequisites for the foundation necessary to authenticate under the “silent witness” theory, explaining that “[t]he facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the photographic evidence and its intended use at trial will vary greatly from case to case, and the trial judge must be given some discretion in determining what is an adequate foundation.” Id | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
a5ae3ec6-b2b2-4956-9af8-c50770577a97 | . at 26, 672 A.2d at 1122 (citation omitted). We concluded that the videotape at issue was sufficiently authenticated under the “silent witness” theory based on the warden’s testimony and that the ALJ properly admitted it into evidence. See id. at 27, 672 A.2d at 1123.9 In Washington, 406 Md. at 644-46, 961 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
78e72d4a-6578-4550-bf28-c03ad5807b85 | .2d at 1111-12, where the defendant was charged with shooting a person outside of a bar and an unknown technician (who had been hired by the owner of the bar) compiled a CD from multiple surveillance cameras and transferred information from the CD to a VHS tape which was given to the police, we held that the trial court erred in admitting the video and that the error was not harmless beyond a | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
7532fb88-d9ff-45de-a5c4-5fc04f3689d9 | reasonable doubt | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
78422297-4c6e-4a6a-9759-1a530c3233aa | . The Appellate Court had concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the videotape because the State failed to properly authenticate the tape but that the error was harmless. See id. at 648-49, 961 A.2d at 1113-14 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
2ebca7a1-95b3-40d3-9229-e53d7af973fb | .10 In reviewing 9We also concluded that authentication as a business record was an independent basis for authenticating the videotape because “there was enough evidence elicited at the administrative hearing to conclude that a record was made and kept in the course of the correctional institution’s regularly conducted business and that the videotape was made and kept as a valuable part of that | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
6acc99ab-5dcf-4e93-afc7-4ff02e915675 | record | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
15d480e8-1897-411b-8171-2965f66888a9 | .” Cole, 342 Md. at 30, 672 A.2d at 1124. 10We granted certiorari with respect to three questions, the third of which was: - 21 - the issue of harmless error, we discussed in detail how the “silent witness” and “pictorial testimony” methods of authentication may be used to authenticate photographs and videos. See id. at 652-55, 961 A.2d at 1115-17. Citing Cole, 342 Md. at 20, 672 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
d420f989-9a8b-49ec-bf3a-ac757939e85e | .2d at 1119, we explained that “[a] videotape is considered a photograph for admissibility purposes. It is admissible in evidence and is subject to the same general rules of admissibility as a photograph.” Washington, 406 Md. at 651, 961 A.2d at 1115 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
c8c28f7f-a6e2-4185-98cb-24c377e96e2d | . We stated that the Appellate Court had succinctly set out the rules for admission of photographs and quoted the following passage of the Appellate Court’s opinion: “Photographs may be admissible under one of two distinct rules | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
87890c31-5878-4449-9973-616932b4f3e3 | . Typically, photographs are admissible to illustrate testimony of a witness when that witness testifies from first-hand knowledge that the photograph fairly and accurately represents the scene or object it purports to depict as it existed at the relevant time. There is a second, alternative method of authenticating photographs that does not require first-hand knowledge | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
50e8a65f-5279-4807-9483-9837d38ca222 | . The ‘silent witness’ theory of admissibility authenticates ‘a photograph as a ‘mute’ or ‘silent’ independent photographic witness because the photograph speaks with its own probative effect.’” Id. at 652, 961 A.2d at 1115 (quoting Washington v. State, 179 Md. App. 32, 44, 943 A.2d 704, 711 (2008)) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
0b130e60-4ddf-4469-b228-db4164f1d6f1 | . After quoting the Appellate Court, we observed that both the “pictorial Did the [Appellate Court of Maryland] err when it held that the introduction of an improperly authenticated surveillance videotape and photographs was harmless error, where the videotape and the photographs purportedly placed the petitioner at the scene of the crime, where they purportedly showed the petitioner committing | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
40673439-9987-48c4-9fd8-0232c0a4e783 | the crime and where the prosecutor, in opening and closing arguments, repeatedly referred to, and relied on, those exhibits to argue that the petitioner was not guilty | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
059837c1-8026-4098-b5a7-ab93a6cf1543 | ? Because we reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court on this question, we did not address the first two questions, which did not involve authentication of the videotape and are not relevant to our discussion in this case | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
df7182d5-2a9a-42dc-968b-6ecf3bdf784b | . - 22 - testimony” theory and the “silent witness” method of authentication allow photographic evidence to be authenticated. Id. at 652, 961 A.2d at 1116. We reiterated that, “to satisfy the evidentiary requirement for authentication, the proponent of the evidence must show that the evidence is ‘sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.’” Id | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
f45d7195-270e-482d-b5b9-c2dc05f76d06 | . at 651, 961 A.2d at 1115 (quoting Md. R. 5-901(a)). Before addressing the issue of harmless error, we held “that the trial court erred in admitting the videotape and still photographs without first requiring an adequate foundation to support a finding that the matter in question [was] what the State claimed it to be” Id. at 655-56, 961 A.2d at 1118 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
c34f6549-3c4c-465d-9664-1fc59a8c2020 | . We did not issue a holding with respect to the applicability of either the “pictorial testimony” or “silent witness” method of authentication | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
99692db8-3269-472e-a350-818a84ffa15d | . In assessing whether the improper admission of the videotape constituted harmless error, we concluded that, without the videotape, the State’s identification of the petitioner as the shooter depended primarily on the testimony of “a witness who had declined on several occasions pretrial to identify petitioner as the shooter[,]” and that admission of “the videotape, relied upon so heavily by the | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
0434328c-24cb-491b-ab75-7d350137ff57 | State, under these circumstances, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
50c62efb-2633-456f-bd48-034791f1e0eb | .” Id. at 658, 961 A.2d at 1119. In Jackson, 460 Md. at 119, 188 A.3d at 982, we held that a surveillance video “was properly authenticated” and “serve[d] as a silent witness of the continuous activity at [an] ATM” during the twenty-minute period that it showed | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
ba897b5f-82d8-4a42-8f46-d329c014e638 | . After an alleged home invasion robbery, over the course of several hours, the defendant purportedly used a debit card to make unauthorized withdrawals at an ATM at a branch of Bank of America. See id. at - 23 - 111, 188 A.3d at 977 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
63fa4a1e-b745-4f8f-b198-a0fc779e3a37 | . The trial court admitted into evidence two CDs, each with a surveillance video of the ATM—one from a twenty-minute period on the night of the robbery, and one from a twenty-minute period in the early morning hours on the following date. See id. at 112, 188 A.3d at 978. The trial court also admitted into evidence two still images from surveillance videos. See id. at 112, 188 A.3d at 978 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
1cec51b5-00ff-453a-bc61-7c12e9f4f502 | . Only the surveillance video from the twenty-minute period on the night of the robbery was at issue before us— i.e., in this Court, the defendant did not contend that the other surveillance video or the still images were not properly authenticated. See id. at 112 n.4, 114, 188 A.3d at 978 n.4, 979 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
3c6fa355-b40c-4634-bde4-e596b5a00ff8 | . The surveillance video at issue was recorded by four cameras, each showing the ATM from a different angle. See id. at 118, 188 A.3d at 982. A protective services manager from Bank of America testified that he accessed a digital video recording (“DVR”) program and pulled up surveillance videos from the relevant dates, times, and cameras. Id. at 117, 188 A.3d at 981 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
75d538ec-daa4-4cca-8fa7-f85e4974d9f4 | . The manager testified that the surveillance video at issue was among the ones that he watched when he accessed the DVR program. See id. at 118-19, 188 A.3d at 982. The manager testified that, after accessing the DVR program and pulling up surveillance videos, he exported them to a digital file, which he emailed to a detective. See id. at 117, 188 A.3d at 981 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
f0053b5d-cb18-4741-bc80-a77a73c419cd | . The manager testified that he could not “modify, cut, paste, or enhance the video in any way[,]” and he “did not even have the ability to copy the file directly to another storage device, such as a thumb drive or DVD.” Id. at 117, 188 A.3d at 981 (emphasis omitted) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
6351abd0-e58a-43d0-9cd7-04dcae20cb48 | . Based on the manager’s detailed testimony, we affirmed the trial court’s admission of the surveillance video, as the video was properly authenticated. See id. at 119, 129, 188 - 24 - A.3d at 982, 988. We noted that we had “previously explained that, for purposes of admissibility, a videotape is subject to the same authentication requirements as a photograph.” Id. at 116, 188 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
099467f6-0ecd-4df7-b872-6a98ea7ec05e | .3d at 980 (citing Washington, 406 Md. at 651, 961 A.2d at 1115). Quoting Washington, 406 Md. at 652, 961 A.2d at 1116, we stated that, “‘so long as sufficient foundational evidence is presented to show the circumstances under which it was taken and the reliability of the reproduction process,’” a photograph is admissible as evidence. Jackson, 460 Md. at 116-17, 188 A.3d at 981 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
08323f1e-c4a6-419b-be36-7bc67277179e | . We reiterated that “[t]he question of authenticity is whether the evidence ‘is what the proponent claims it to be[,]’” and concluded that the video surveillance footage was properly authenticated. Id. at 118-19, 188 A.3d at 982 (quoting Md. R. 5-901(a)) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
2bc78e39-168e-41a8-96a2-4f6ff4f69ebc | . Like this Court, the Appellate Court of Maryland has addressed issues concerning the authentication of videos and affirmed the admission of videos under the “silent witness” method of authentication. In Reyes v. State, 257 Md. App. 596, 612 & n.6, 629, 292 A.3d 416, 425 & n | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
f7a62b0c-fdd1-4230-afa4-542bee52b1f7 | .6, 435 (2023), the Appellate Court of Maryland held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a video and still images recorded by a home security camera called a Nest camera manufactured and sold by Google. Reyes, id. at 609, 292 A.3d at 423, involved a nonfatal shooting that took place near a residential area | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
6143a9a6-a5d2-4717-b5a8-ea8052107fb3 | . At trial, a witness who lived in the area of the shooting testified that he had installed a home security camera “in the front window of his house” and explained “that it was Wi-Fi-enabled and motion-activated, and sends an alert to his phone when it begins and ends recording.” Id. at 609, 612, 292 A.3d at 423, 425 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
356260d3-eb26-4a2e-b2c7-a645b539abe0 | . According to the witness, around the time of the - 25 - shooting, he received an alert on his phone that the home security camera had begun recording. See id. at 609, 292 A.3d at 423. The witness testified that he reviewed the resulting video, which showed the shooting, and emailed the video to law enforcement. See id. at 609, 612, 292 A.3d at 423, 425 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
123de4a9-5a36-49b1-9f13-8001b1b32153 | . The witness testified that the State’s exhibit containing the video was the same as the video that he emailed to law enforcement and that it “accurately depicted the conditions on the night of the shooting[s.]” Id. at 612, 292 A.3d at 425. The victim also testified that still images from the video accurately depicted the scene on the night of the shooting. See id. at 613, 292 A.3d at 425 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
744d083f-143f-4ff8-b727-bac701bf9d0e | . Over objection, the trial court admitted the video and still images into evidence. See id. at 613, 292 A.3d at 425. The Appellate Court concluded that the witness’s testimony about the video “provided an ‘adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the process producing [the video and still images],’ and as such, the evidence was properly ‘received as a so-called silent witness.’” Id | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
acf050df-2504-4dec-a6a2-772a9b8fa35b | . at 631-32, 292 A.3d at 436-37 (quoting Washington, 406 Md. at 653, 961 A.2d at 1116) (brackets omitted) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
db5fd629-b1ee-49ca-9b18-9b129ca2aad5 | . The Appellate Court observed that, because it held that the still images were properly authenticated through the witness’s testimony under the “silent witness” theory of authentication, it was not necessary to address the State’s alternative argument that the still images could be authenticated through the victim’s testimony under the “pictorial testimony” theory of authentication. See id | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
0888a680-8f02-4c9b-b925-9dd65be08e60 | . at 632 n.21, 292 A.3d at 437 n.21. The Appellate Court explained that “all photographic evidence, including video evidence, may be authenticated under several theories, including the ‘pictorial testimony’ theory and the ‘silent witness’ theory[.]” Id. at 630, 292 A.3d at 435 - 26 - (citations omitted).11 D | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
0c8b2dc9-0da5-45bf-bc9f-bf1107a004c5 | . Case Law From Other Jurisdictions Courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that video footage was sufficiently authenticated through circumstantial evidence, and, in some instances, courts have explained that video footage may be authenticated by various forms of evidence. In Commonwealth v. Davis, 168 N.E.3d 294, 311 (Mass | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
5c32d8e1-0e1a-48e3-a79e-517bb2ae3203 | . 2021), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that “circumstantial evidence was sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find that [a] video was what it purported to be.” A law enforcement officer testified that, after responding to the scene of a shooting, he saw a car with its driver’s side door open that had crashed into a pole. See id. at 298-99, 311 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
e01c27d3-815c-46f6-9c28-3f4e1aace146 | . While canvassing the area for witnesses and cameras, the officer saw a camera affixed to a residence. See id. at 299. The officer testified that a person who lived at the residence allowed him to view on a computer a video recorded by the camera. See id | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
37aeca11-8b52-41c8-a26b-1b9284fae8f0 | . According to the officer, because the person did not know how to download the video or copy it to another device, the officer used his cell phone to record the video. See id. The defendant challenged only the authenticity of the video contained on the computer, not the authenticity of the video recorded by the officer’s cell phone. See id. at 310 & n.22 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
9adbf213-5f08-4c10-b9eb-bd0f7a1c4015 | . Over objection, the trial court admitted into evidence the video the officer had recorded on his cell phone, i.e., the officer’s recording of the 11Additional reported opinions in which the Appellate Court has held that videos were properly authenticated under the “silent witness” method include Covel v. State, 258 Md. App. 308, 324, 297 A.3d 1228, 1238, cert. denied, 486 Md. 157, 303 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
60306a04-d71f-4a92-b8d0-4ba93aa4dc1a | .3d 969 (2023) and Prince v. State, 255 Md. App. 640, 652-54, 284 A.3d 795, 802 (2022), cert. denied, 482 Md. 746, 290 A.3d 608 (2023). - 27 - surveillance video from the computer. See id. at 310. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the surveillance video into evidence. See id. at 311 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
74d24cfb-ec93-4244-9356-49a95b916a82 | . The Court observed that a vehicle depicted in the video that had crashed into the pole was the same color and body style as a vehicle in photographs taken at the crime scene that the officer had testified were fair and accurate representations of the scene of the shooting. See id | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
dbfa6417-199d-41ed-ab22-5990478b82bd | . The Court also noted that the video and one of the photographs of the scene both depicted the same sign advertising a church in front of the car. See id | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
2a3b0b4d-8036-4c3c-a050-8d250d3e0428 | . The Court concluded that the circumstance that the officer viewed the surveillance video “in the immediate aftermath of the shooting[s], after he personally approached the resident to whom the surveillance system belonged[,] mitigate[d] concerns that the video could have been manipulated.” Id. (citation omitted) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
3e20cd46-fc1d-4c88-9df9-54b987a93c68 | . In addition, the Court determined that another witness’s testimony about events that she observed at the scene matched information in the video and “provide[d] further circumstantial evidence to authenticate the video.” Id | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
0dcd55c6-0499-49f9-8336-3439a5618fb2 | . The Court explained that the “silent witness” and “pictorial testimony” methods are not “the exclusive ways that a video can be authenticated” and that evidence can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence alone. Id. at 310-11.12 Davis is not the only case in which a court in another jurisdiction has held that a video was authenticated through circumstantial evidence. In Holley v | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
7677e79d-3b01-4cda-8c79-90629d4da392 | . State, 871 S.E.2d 12Despite finding no abuse of discretion in the admission of the video, the Court reversed on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence related to a GPS device. Davis, 168 N.E.3d at 298-99. - 28 - 13, 18-19 (Ga. Ct. App | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
92cce669-80e4-4092-8af1-76d9ea08db4b | . 2022), the Court of Appeals of Georgia concluded, under a statute providing for authentication through “testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be[,]” that there was “ample circumstantial evidence . . . to authenticate [a] video” that the defendant allegedly posted on her Facebook page. (Cleaned up). In Lamb v. State, 246 So. 3d 400, 408-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
3550c694-9d6c-4f37-ba90-b0c0c81f6f83 | . App. 2018), the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, held that a video that one of the codefendants allegedly posted on Facebook was properly authenticated because of its “distinctive characteristics and content, in conjunction with circumstantial evidence[.]” In Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848-50 (Tex. Crim. App | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
336b26fc-a2e7-4de1-8858-e1b0c25048da | . 2018), the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas concluded that “circumstantial evidence [] authenticate[d]” a surveillance video from a store, including the circumstance that the video showed the defendant at the store at the date and time identified on a receipt found near a vehicle that the defendant allegedly stole. E | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
8bbba09e-8ab5-4d96-acd8-58c468371aa7 | . The Applicable Standard in this Case We have not previously addressed whether a video can be authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) or whether the “reasonable juror” test applies to authentication of video evidence—i.e., these are matters of first impression | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
488709e7-2698-4619-bf41-985551e85c10 | . We now unequivocally hold that the “reasonable juror” test applies to authentication of videos, just as it does to authentication of social media evidence and other evidence. See Sublet, 442 Md. at 638, 113 A.3d at 698; Sample, 468 Md. at 568, 228 A.3d at 176 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
cf2d1f00-cbec-443f-a75a-4a6e8daf96fd | . We conclude that, for a trial court to admit a video, there must be sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the video is - 29 - authentic. We also hold that a video can be authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
1d621b0a-1318-4ab3-8788-ccd676a07af9 | . We agree with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that what we have called the “pictorial testimony” and “silent witness” theories of authentication are not “the exclusive ways a video can be authenticated[.]” Davis, 168 N.E.3d at 310-11. Video footage can be authenticated under several theories,13 including through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
52d300f6-7dad-47ba-b0d6-7cb068225c0a | . We have never held that the “pictorial testimony” and “silent witness” theories of authentication—or the “business record” theory, for that matter—are the only ways to authenticate a video, or that a video cannot be authenticated through other means | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
d6310228-0bf5-4b3e-9658-5fc895249462 | . Such reasoning would be at odds with the principle that, without exception, Maryland Rule 5- 901(b)(4) permits a proponent of evidence to authenticate it through circumstantial evidence, and with our holdings in Sample, Sublet, and Griffin, which applied Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) to the authentication of social media evidence. See Sample, 468 Md. at 565, 228 A.3d at 174; Sublet, 442 Md | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
c8c45355-0611-44cc-bfd6-0798aa925f97 | . at 677, 113 A.3d at 721; Griffin, 419 Md. at 357, 19 A.3d at 423-24. As with social media evidence, Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) applies to the admission of video footage, and the question that we must answer in reviewing a trial court’s ruling is whether there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of evidence that the video is what it is claimed to be | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
fcb56125-ca3b-482d-9556-22874cc92a13 | . Our discussion of the “silent witness” and the “pictorial testimony” theories in 13As demonstrated in Cole, 342 Md. at 27, 30, 672 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
87b15062-fd1e-4224-8050-1f06518d0ade | .2d at 1123, 1124, in which we concluded that the video at issue could be authenticated as a business record as well as under the “silent witness” theory, the “pictorial testimony” and “silent witness” theories of authentication are not the only ways to authenticate a video. - 30 - Washington, 406 Md. at 652-55, 961 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
8d64e51b-e91f-4a3a-b7c9-c65fdc2eae06 | .2d at 1115-17, does not stand for the proposition that they are the exclusive methods for authentication of video footage. Our holding in Washington, id. at 655-56, 658, 961 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
5ca7191f-1937-4a12-8578-015190206f7e | .2d at 1117-18, 1119, was that the video at issue was not properly authenticated because the State failed to demonstrate that the video was what it purported to be and that the trial court’s improper admission of the video was not harmless error | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
747c9737-06b2-459f-8cb8-ab63723090b8 | . Although we quoted the Appellate Court’s discussion of the “pictorial testimony” and the “silent witness” theories, we expressed no view one way or the other as to whether we interpreted the Appellate Court’s discussion to mean that there are only two methods for authentication of video evidence. See id. at 652, 961 A.2d at 1115 | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
07f7cf30-59c5-449a-9ce6-15b4ed85131c | . And, to the extent that the language in the Appellate Court’s opinion originated from our decision in Cole, nothing in Cole indicated that there are two exclusive methods for authentication of video evidence. In Cole, 342 Md. at 26-28, 672 A | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
9e474f0b-f2b6-484d-9c60-c26b4dd8f4e4 | .2d at 1122-23, we adopted the “silent witness” method and determined that the surveillance video at issue could also have been authenticated as a business record. In addition, unlike in this case, in Washington, the State did not contend that the video was properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
7664e292-090d-496d-80fb-1b4c345313ea | . We did not even mention Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) in Washington, much less decline to apply it. In short, Washington does not in any way preclude authentication of a video through means other than the “silent witness” and “pictorial testimony” theories of authentication, including through use of circumstantial evidence | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
d21b5bfe-a9cc-4f1c-853f-093c993c8fbb | . Video footage can be authenticated in different ways under the rules governing authentication, including through the testimony of a witness with knowledge under - 31 - Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1), circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), or a combination of both, as is the circumstance in this case | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
5267e00d-2412-4e16-a278-088b677f9cd8 | . There need not be a witness with personal knowledge of every single event depicted in a video for the video to be authenticated. What matters is that the proponent of the video must demonstrate that the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the video is what it is claimed to be. F | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
845d0549-8d48-466b-88c5-8e0e6ecc2e60 | . The State Met Its Burden to Prove That the Video Was Authentic In this case, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video at issue because it was properly authenticated through a combination of the testimony of a witness with knowledge under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1) and circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
a4a9fff7-c10e-4a84-b763-b57a963a5810 | . A reasonable juror could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that the video was what it purported to be— namely, a fair and accurate video of the shooting and the events surrounding it. The parts of the video showing the events that Mr. Zimmerman saw were properly authenticated under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1) through his testimony as a witness with knowledge | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
58438ad3-1470-4166-94ef-423e23e04758 | . Before the video was admitted into evidence, based on his firsthand knowledge, Mr. Zimmerman testified that the video showed him sitting in his vehicle on what he knew to be the 3900 block of Falls Road, that the video was a true and accurate depiction of the events on the night of the shooting, and that there did not seem to have been any alterations or edits to the video. Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
ad10bab0-c311-448f-bb40-ce1eefe8eee5 | . Zimmerman testified about the following facts that he had personal knowledge of and that were depicted in the video: • While Mr. Zimmerman was sitting in his vehicle, Mr. Mooney walked down the - 32 - street toward him on his right. • The area had lights, and nothing obstructed Mr. Zimmerman’s view of Mr. Mooney, who was not wearing a face mask. • At some point, Mr. Mooney slowed down. • Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
73649b58-a757-4d1d-9949-77a6c09b9f8a | . Mooney kept walking until he passed where Mr. Zimmerman was sitting in the vehicle. • Mr. Zimmerman opened the door of his vehicle next to the driver’s seat to look for Mr. Mooney. • As soon as Mr. Zimmerman sat back in the driver’s seat, he was shot. To be sure, Mr. Zimmerman did not testify that he saw the shooting, and he lacked firsthand knowledge of who the shooter was | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
d9b9b4bc-9839-4675-965a-ce61bae635e3 | . Even so, the part of the video depicting the shooting was properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could have inferred that the video fairly and accurately showed the shooting | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
df91d715-5952-4eb9-ab6e-a3e75a62e0ee | . The close temporal proximity of the shooting to the events before and after the shooting of which Mr. Zimmerman had personal knowledge gave rise to an inference that the video accurately depicted the shooting. Mr. Zimmerman testified that the video was a true and accurate depiction of the events that occurred and that the video did not appear to have been edited or altered | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
6a6fe97e-de93-43f0-9b60-c4ae79c3cf4f | . And, there was evidence of the nature and origin of the video, indicating that the video was obtained from the crime scene from a source not connected to law enforcement or the shooting, as Detective Liu testified that he obtained the video from an individual with a camera mounted on the exterior wall of his residence near the crime scene | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
4a897b37-dace-4aa8-abf8-70a67ae02549 | . - 33 - With respect to the immediacy of the events, the entire video was short, lasting only 1 minute and 51 seconds. The part of the video showing the shooting and the events that occurred before and after is even briefer. The shooting occurred within mere seconds in a series of events depicted on the video that Mr. Zimmerman had firsthand knowledge of. In other words, Mr | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
afb8305c-9ddd-43df-af93-1e1d7da5ff11 | . Zimmerman could verify the accuracy of numerous events depicted in the video that occurred mere seconds before and after the shooting. Mr. Zimmerman had personal knowledge of Mr. Mooney walking by his vehicle and Mr. Mooney slowing down, and of himself opening the door of his vehicle next to the driver’s seat and being shot immediately thereafter | Mooney_v_State_2024-08-13.txt |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.