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2,017 | /releases | docid-32317442.pdf | 124-10353-10179 | 12/15/2017 | In Part | FBI | 7/9/63 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | ELSUR 92-113C-258 | HQ | LA | 1 | FBI | LA | 11/30/2017 | null | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
6/4/2015
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10353-10179
RECORD SERIES: LA
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ELSUR 92-113C-258
Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection det of 1992
144 USC 2107 Note!.
Case#:N 45945 Date:
11-17-2017
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LA
TO: HQ
TITLE :
DATE:
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
07/09/1963
JOHN ROSELLI (ELSUR)
DOCUMENT TYPE :
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION:
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 4; 10(a)2
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 11/17/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
HH 45945
DocId: 32317442
Page 1
---
## Page 2
AIRIEL
7/9/63
AIRISL
AIR MAIL - REGESTERED
TO:
FROM:
AB :
DIRECTOR, FBI (92-
SAC, LOS ANGELES
(92-113-C)
JOHN ROSELLI, aka
BEN FARBER, AUSA, Los Angeles, who is handling OCD
cases i calling a number of witnesses to appear before a
Federas Grand Jury in Los Anseles on
/JFK Law 10(a)2
subpoena was being issued for
HARBER advised that a
to appear as a witness
for purpose of asking him about
Information pot yet received as to whether subpoena
actually served onl
LA 4396-C° has been able to furnish no definite
Information as to when ROSSELLI returned from Las Vegas
subsequent to his departure from Los Angeles on 7/30/63.
His car was not at his apartment from 7/1/63 through 7/5/63.
It was at the apartment on 7/6/63 and then was gone from
7/7 and 7/8/63.
IA 4268-C advised that ROSSELLI was at the Friars
Club on the afternoon of 7/8/63 in company with MAURICE
FRIEDMAN, part owner of the New Frontier Hotel, Las Vegas,
Nevada.
Bureau
Los Angeles
HAD : GOD
140)
SEARCHED
INDEXED
SERIALIZED
FILED
AIRTEL
FBI LA
# OF XEROX COPIES
2
- DATE 3117 INITIAIS e
HIH
45945 DooId:32317442 Page 2
94-1130458
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32404025.pdf | 104-10330-10038 | 07/24/2017 | In Part | CIA | 02/29/1996 | PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | PROJFILES-CORRESPONDENCE | BARRY HARRELSON. CSI | JEREMY GUNN, ARRB STAFF | MEMO: 1967 IG REPORT | null | CIA | JFK | 06/22/2017 | JFK-M-15 : F3 : 2000.02.03.12:34:40:873035 : | null | ## Page 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY. : CIA
RECORD NUMBER
RECORD SERIES
:104-10330-10038
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
: PROJFILES -CORRESPONDENCE
Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of
1992 144 USC
Cas#:NW 53217
ate: 06-22-2017
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : BARRY HARRELSON. CSI
TO
: JEREMY GUNN, ARRB STAFF
TITLE
MEMO: 1967
' IG REPORT
DATE
02/29/1996
PAGES
: 1
SUBJECTS : JFK ASSASSINATION
CASTRO PLOT
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS
UNCLASSIFIED
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW
: 03/12/03
COMMENTS :
JFK-M-15: F3: 2000.02.03.12:34:40:873035
__-__-==-
. . . = - - = = = = ~ - — -
[R]
_ ITEM
IS
RESTRICTED
104-10330-10038
NW 53217 DocId: 32404025
Page 1
---
## Page 2
=
CENTER for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE
29 February 1996
Memorandum For:
Jeremy Gunn
ARRB Staff
From:
J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
CIA/DCI/CSI /HRG
Subject:
1967 IG Report
1.
Attached is a copy of the 1967 IG Report on Plots
to Assassinate Fidel Castro for review by the ARRB.
Information and names to be protected under current
guidelines are highlighted in blue.
This document is from
Box 64, Reel 48, Folder ZZ of the microfilm portion of the
CIA'S JFK material. Please note that there are no 104
numbers for documents in this part of the file.
2. Per our agreement, true names of CIA staff
employees, agents, assets and sources will not be released
to the public at this time, but will be postponed for re-
review in six months. We have provided pseudonyms and/or
appropriate descriptions as substitute language.
-
HW
53217 DocId: 32404025
Central Intelligence Agency • Washingson, D.C. 20505 • (703) 351-2698 Fax (703) 243-8343
Page
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32315547.pdf | 124-10342-10265 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 00/00/0000 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | ELSUR 92-228-822 | DE | CONKLIN | 3 | FBI | DE | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 741 USC 21U7 Hotel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date:
5/7/2015
Agency Information
AGENCY:
FBI
RECORD NUMBER:
124-10342-10265
RECORD SERIES :
DE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ELSUR 92-228-822
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
CONKLIN
TO :
DE
TITLE :
DATE:
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
00/00/0000
3
ANTHONY GIACALONE (ELSUR)
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION:
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
12/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
DocId: 32315547
Page 1
36
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act or 1992 111 USC 2107 Nöter.
DATE: 11-14-2017
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
ME
MORANDUM
TO:
SAC, DETROIT (137-2885)
FROM: SA BARRON T. CONKLIN
SUBJECT: DE 868-C- TE
DATE:
CI
PCI
SI
PSI
Dates of Contact 3-27-29; 4-1-63
Titles and File #s on which contacted
DOMINIC CORRADO, AR (assigned ARNETT)
DOMINIC SPARKY CORRADO,
"AR (MOORE)
JOE MASSCO, AR (SHIRLEY)
JOE MASSEI
PETE LICAVOLT, AR (SHIRLEY)
AR (MONTEFIORE)
ANTHONY TOCCO,
ANTHONY TONY BESASE
MIKE POLIZZI
, AR (BICKFORD)
TONY GIACALONE
AR (LUNT)
VINCENT RICCOBONO, AR (BICKFORD)
ANTHONY ZERILLI,
AR (CHURCHILL)
CRIME CONDITIONS IN MICHIGAN, AR (MONTEFTORE)
NICK DITTA,
AR (TRANSETH)
MIKE RUBINO
, AR (MONTEFIORE)
ED HOLLY, IGA. (CONKLIN)
DANNY COSENTINO, AR. (HEYSTEK)
Purpose
and results of contact
/X/
NEGATIVE
POSITIVE
DE
92-448
DE
92-590
DE
92-574
DE
DE
92-258
92-217
DE
DE
92-486
92-369
DE
92-219
DE
92-228
DE 92-1002
DE
DE
92-568
92-876
DE
92-833
DE 92-229
DE 162-16
DE: 92-1053
Intormant certified that he has
furnished all information obtained
by him since last contact.
Personal Data
Rating
Excellent
Coverage
Same
BTC: AMG
(17)
92-228-812
SEARCHED
INDEXED:
SERIAL:
APR 1 2 1963
Lunt if
DocId: 32315547 Page 2
---
## Page 3
'Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote)
DATE: 11-14-2017
DE. 137-2885
MIKE RUBINO, AR
DE 92-229
DOMINIC CORRADO, AR
DE 92-448
DOMINIC SPARKY CORRADO, AR
DE 92-590
ED HOLLY, IGA
162-16
JACK TOCCO, AR
DE 92-574
ANTHONY ZERILLI, AR
DE 92-568
TONY GIACALONE, AR
DE 92-228
ua 3/21/63
Informant stated/that DOMINIC CORRADO is in
Florida and is not expected back in Michigan for several
weeks.
Informant stated SPARKY CORRADO'S brother is going
to Florida to drive DOMINIC (FAT DOMINIC) CORRADO'S car
back. Informant stated that DOMINIC (FAT DOMINIC) CORRADO
bought MIKE POLIZZI'S boat when MIKE POLIZZI acquired a
big 48 foot cruiser.
DOMINIC CORRADO'S boat has twin screws
and goes 45 mph.
It is all black.
MIKE POLIZZI and TONY
ZERILLI purchased a big 48 foot cruiser and TONY ZERILLI
is planning to use this on several trips next summer.
TONY ZERILLI may go to Rodgers City as he likes this area.
DOMINIC CORRADO inherited a 15,000 acre ranch which was
owned
by his father, PETE CORRADO, and this has been sold.
DOMINIC (FAT DOMINIC) CORRADO has several very fine horses
at MIKE RUBINO'S farm.
One is a five gaiter and SPARKY
CORRADO'S brother JIMMY makes a special trip to the farm
week to feed this horse carrots and vitamins.
DocId: 32315547 Page 3
---
## Page 4
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (14 USC 2107 Hote)
DATE: 11-14-2017
DE 137-2885
Tony Secacalone
normant stated on Wednesday, March 27, 1963,
SPARKY CORRADO, JACK TOCCO, TONY ZERILLI and DANNY COSENTINO
were ant at the Hillcrest Golf and Country Club. Informant
stated that most every Wednesday thereafter most of the
prominent Italians will play golf at the Hillerest Golf and
Country Club. Informant stated that among those who plan to
play most every Wednesday are JACK TOCCO,
TONY TOCCO,
MIKE POLIZZI, TONY ZERILLI,
SPARKY CORRADO, DANNY COSENTINO
and ED HOLLY. Informant stated that after
they play golf
most of these will go to ED HOLLY'S restaurant known as the
Carousal which is located on M 97 for dinner and drinks.
Informant stated that a place that most of these persons
are found on Monday and Friday nights is the American Italian
Informant stated that the poker game is
hugh and there are $300 to $500 in some of the pots.
Informant stated that the different players will win or lose
from $2000to $5000 a night.
Informant stated that the
following all play: JACKIE TOCCO,
MIKE POLIZZI, DOMINIC
SPARKY CORRADO, TONY ZERILLI, RICKY RICCOBONO,
LEE SCHOENDITH, owner of the Roostertail, and GINO (LNU) ,
who owns the Falcon Show Bar.
Informant stated that
LEE SCHOENDITH is CloSe to TONY TOCCO and that they both
like the same thing, that is, women, boats and money.
DocId: 32315547
Page 4
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10071-10032.pdf | 104-10071-10032 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 11/13/1968 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | FBI | CI/SO | SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINESE PROPAGANDA BOOKLET SUPPORTING THE NEGRO UPRISINGS IN THE UNITED DOSS | 2 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK15 : F3 : 1993.07.29.17:43:20:090058 : | 2 | ## Page 1
104-10071-10032
HE CLASSIFIED
!
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
'FIDENTIAL
SECRET
SUBJECT: (Optional).
FROM:
CI/SO
TO: (Officer designation; room, number, and
building)..
DATE
EXTENSION
5847
OFFICER'S
INITIALS.
RECEIVED.
FORWARDED
NO.
RL-188
DATE
:13. November 1968
COMMENTS (Number each comment. lo show from whom
to whom..
Draw a' line across column after doch commont.).
where,
EYES ONLY
Originated by:
CI/SO:
(13 Nov
68)
based on: Memo, 7 Oct 68 from
WH/2
CA/CF draft memo
based on OELA 49850
Disseminated to: FBI on
13 Nov 68
10.
4200
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
File: RI-Memos (record copy)
(w/att)
CC:
"Chinese Connections"
(sens. soft w/att)
cc: JWK (W/att)
1524
60 USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
EVES ONLY
INTERNAL
USE ONLY.
446
RL-188
UNCLASSIFIED
---
## Page 2
14-00000
SECKET
NO FORIES CROSSES NO DISCE ABROADS
RL-188
13 NOV 1968
SUBJECT:
Communist Chinese Propaganda Booklet Supporting the
Negro Uprisings in the United States
Attached are copies of the Spanish and English versions
of a propaganda
booklet prepared in Conmunist China supporting
-the Negro uprisings in the United States.
The Spanish version
was shipped to the Peoples Party - Communist in Panama and
was
received from a sensitive source.
The English version was
vincluded with a copy of the May 1968 issue of Crusader.
2. The booklet, entitled,
"Statement by Comrade Mao
Ise-Tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China, in Support of the Afro-American Struggle
Against Violent Repression," is dated 15 April 1968, a few
Vdays after the assassination of Martin Luther King.
..It cites
the Negro struggle in the United States as part of
the world
struggle against the "yankee imperialists,
asserts that
world
revolution has entered a new
to unite and eliminate this enemy.
era, and urges all people
PLEASE TRANSMIG REPLY VIL LINSON, MR. S. J. PAPIOE
Enclosures: 2, as listed
Based on:
Memo, 7 Oct 68 from WH/2
CA/CF draft memo based on OELA 49850
Originated by:
CI/SO
:13 November 1968
NO T3
SEN NO BOSEN PONCAD
RECEPT
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32304633.pdf | 124-10286-10263 | 07/24/2017 | In Part | FBI | 08/24/1962 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-110055-33, 34 | SAC, NY | DIRECTOR, FBI | null | FBI | HQ | 05/25/2017 | INC MEMO, FOREIGN LANGUAGE DOC | null | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10286-10263
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
105-110055-33, 34
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
SAC, NY
TO :
DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
DATE: 08/24/1962
PAGES:
20
SUBJECTS :
ELC, ADMIN
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS: INC MEMO, FOREIGN LANGUAGE DOC
v9.1
HH 53074
25
DocId: 32304633
Page 1
Date:
4/29/201
Released under the John
Assassination Records
Collection Aet of 1992
I44 USC 2107 Notel.
Cased:NW 53074 Date:
55-25-2017
---
## Page 2
TORTIONAL FOEM NO. 10 %
UNITED STATE
Memorandum
CONNDENTIAL
_MENT
TO
DIRECTOR:
FBT
(705-110055)
DATE:
8/24/62
FROM
SAC, NEW YORK (105-55242) (RUC)
DECIASSIFIED BE FAM
SUBJECT:
EJERCITO LIBERTADOR DE CUBA
0_4-20-94
(LIBERATION ARMY OF CUBA) (ELC)
IS - CUBA
WHo report of sA Hotter wiNe i dated 6/21/62 and
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau, Miami, San Juan
June, 1962-(UCytertador de Cuba (aIC), inica Is dated
and Washington Field are translations of the 13 page document
of the Ejercito
This document, written in Spanish, was furnished
to the NYO
to
8/3%61
hee; OII
bw-1
let to
The translation of this document was made
by Translator Miss ESTHER LAFONT.
Classis
A bY SP6BTALEL
Declas
on: OADR6/6/85
REC- 55,
105 110055-33
NOT RECORDED
18 AUG 2Y 1962
Bureau (105-110055) (Encl. 1) (RM)
- Miami (105-5049)
(Info) (Enci. 1) (RM)
1
~ San Juan (Info)
(Encl. 1) (RM)
Field. (105-47736) (Info) (Encl. 1) (RM)
- New York (134-702774 Inv.)
1
- New York (105-55242)
FJO: 1g6
(7)
ENCLOSURE
ENCIOSURE: ATTACHED,
ALL INFO
HEREIN I
EXCE
221°
IN CONTAINED
LASSIFIED
CONTIE
68 SEP 5
1962
NW 53074 DocId: 32304633
Page 2
---
## Page 3
CONTENTAL
DIRECTOR, FBI (105-110055)
8/24/62
SAC, NEW YORK (105-55242) (RUC)
DECLASSIFIED.BY C
EJERCITO LXBERTADOR DE CUBAON 4:20-99
(LIBERATION ARMY OF CUBA) (ELE)
IS - CUBA
Re NI lecter to the Director, 7/9/62 and
Who report 01 sA HOWARD P. WINTER, dated 6/27/62.
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau, Miami, San Juan
and Washington Field are translations of the 13 page document
of the Ejercito Libertador de Cuba (ELC), which is dated
June, 1962.
This document, written in Spanish, was furnished
to the wu on 8/0/02g by Dr, ERNESTO ARAGON Y GODOY, Secretary
tO DE. JOSE MIRO CARDONA of
the Cuban Revolutionary Council.
The translation of this document was made
by Translator MIss ESTHER LAFONT.
AED INPORMATION CONTAINED
MA•BIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
22T WHERE SHOWN
IRWISE
B54/6CL
Declassi oN: OADR 76/85
- Bureau (105-110055) (Enci. 1) (RM)
Miami (105-5849)
(Into) (Enol.
1) (RM)
- New York 7105-55242400
FJO: 186
(7)/
py
1057110855-33
TH-583
NH 53074
DocId: 32304633
Page 3
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | 104-10226-10086.pdf | 104-10226-10086 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 11/30/1962 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | DIRECTOR | SANTO DOMINGO | CABLE RE: BACKGROUND FOR BROADCAST BASED ON UPI STORY OF 23 NOV QUOTING | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-61 : F5 : 20040316-1058754 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10226-10086
4;3
- 32 NOr E.
• 10
DIRECTOR
i BROA
SANTO DOMINGO
ACT.O*& Tr 10
INFO
CLASSIGED PRESPACE
SEENAT
POUTING
NOY 30 19447 62
ROTTINE
IN 27899
DIR INFO MEXI CITE SUTO 194?
(SCORDORY ACTING).
DO PACKETOLD FOR SROADCAST BASED ON UPI STORY OF 23 MOY QUOTING
MODESTA VARDUEZ, RADIO SANTO DOMINDO USED THIS STORY FOR
THELO 98RE PA NEUSCASTO ACCORDING EMPEAT-L MOST OTHER
STATIONS
PIPEATED THIS STORY.
2. OPVINIS VAZQUEZ STORY BASED ON PAMPHLET PREPARED BY MOVIXENTO
MICAD REVOLUCICYARIO
sara Bine:
DATED ¡2 NOV FROT MIAMI ENTITLED " A LOS LIDERES
CEL MUIDO LIBRE Y A LA OPINION PUBLICA DE AMERICA Y. DEL MUNDO".
3O SUMT!! ARRAVIZATION RECTIVES ABDUL PAMPHLETT 29 NOV. MOVIMIENTO
FLOS LOCATEO I SOUTHEAST NINTH STRET MANS OUR KiLo
A. PRE INSO ALSO PUOLISHTO IN DIADIO LAS AMERICAS 21-28 NOY..
DO OF MESSAGE
E/S COMMENT: "HOS QUERIED RE REPORT OF MISSILE SITES.
GROUP Y
SECRET
RIPIODUCTION BY OTHIE THAN. THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIBITED.
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32308927.pdf | 124-10297-10054 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/21/1969 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-6054-2576 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, BU | 3 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/20/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10297-10054
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
92-6054-2576
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
SAC, BU
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
DATE:
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
03/21/1969
3
LCN, MEMBERS A/O ASSOC, CRIMINAL ACT, INDICTMENT
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/24/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
V9.1
DocId: 32308927
21
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
DATE: 17211-2017
FBI WASH DC
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 2 1 1969
TELET
(11 USC 2107 Hote):
Mr. Tolson.
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop-
Mr.
Casper_
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Mr. Roser
Mr. Sullivan
Mr.
Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy
FBI-BUFFALO
1-13 P URGENT 3/21/69 CIMSP
TO DIRECTOR (92-6054)
FROM BURBLO 892-3371
st
-
LA COSA NOSTRA,
BUFFALO DIVISION.
REMYTEL, OCT. IWENTYFOUR LASI, CAPTIONED "RUSSELL
DE CICCO, AKA; ETAL, IISP DASH MI, O0 BUFFALO, BUFILE
EIGHTYSEVEN DASH ONE ZERO ONE FIVE NINE NINE."
Buffere
AS REPORTED IN RETEL, FORMER NU FOUR FIVE ONE DASH
C DASH TE, AND BU FOUR SIX IWO DASH C. PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED
INFO WHICH RESULTED IN RECOVERY BY BUFFALO AGENT ON AUG.
TWENTYNINE LAST OF APPROXIMATELY ONE AND ONE HALF MILLION
DOLLARS IN STOLEN ART TREASURES. THESE IRREPLACEABLE
TREASURES WHICH INCLUDED PAINTINGS BY
101549
SCOLDED COPY FILED IN
PICASSO, RENOIR,
CEZANNE AND RODIN WERE STOLEN FROM DR. I. EDWARD HANLEY
RESIDENCE IN BRADFORD, PENNSYLVANIA ON AUG. TWENTYONE
LAST.
REC 99 92-6054-9576
FORMER BU FOUR FIVE ONE DASH C DASH TE IDENTIFIED
SUBJECTS AND AGREED TO TESTIFY IN USDC REGARDING THIS MAJOR 26 1969
THEFT. AS A RESULE
OF TESTIMONY BY THIS INFORMANT AND BUREAU
AGENTS,
EN
APR-2 - 1969
ENDED LAST MIGHT WHEN JURY FOUND RUSSELL DE C1OCO,
MAR
DocId: 32308927 Page 2
---
## Page 3
•Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: J4=11-2017
PAGE TWO.
RENE DE CICCO, GREGORY PARNESS AND LOUIS MARKUS GUILTY OF VIOLATION
OF TITLE EIGHTEEN, USC, SECTION THREE SEVEN ONE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER
VERDICT, USDA JOHNO. HENDERSON RAISED RUSSELL DE CICCORS BAIL IO
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS AND HE WAS REMANDED TO ERIE COUNTY
JAIL IN LIEU OF THIS HIGH BAIL. ALL OTHER SUBJECIS CONTINUED ON
BAIL PENDING APPEAL.
IT IS NOTED THAT THIS TRIAL IS FIRST OF MANY MAJOR LCN
INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED AND SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED BY BUFFALO
OFFICE TO REACH USDO, BUFFALO. AMONG THOSE UNDER INDICIMENI ARE
STEFANO MAGADDINO, "CHAIRMAN" OF LON COMMISSION AND MOSI POWERFUL
LON LEADER IN NORTH AMERICA, ALSO CHARGED IN CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER
INVESTIGATION IS RUSSELL A. BUFALINO, "BOSS" OF THE PITISION DASH
SCRANTON FAMILY OF LON.
DEPARIMENTAL ATTORNEY EDWARD T. JOYCE ADVISED LAST
NIGHT THAT HE ANTICIPATES THAT THE BUFALINO CASE WILL IN LIKELIHOD
BE NEXI ORGANIZED CRIME CASE TRIED IN USDO, BUFFALO. SINCE FORMER BU
FOUR FIVE ONE DASH C DASH TE IS THE MAJOR GOVERNMENT WITNESS AGAINSI
BUFALINO.
END PAGE TWO
DocId: 32308927 Page 3
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10216-10172.pdf | 104-10216-10172 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 6/10/64 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | N. SANCHEZ | REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF AN INCOMING SW MESSAGE-N. SANCHEZ. | 5 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-51 : F3 : 1998.05.09.11:21:05:763107 : | 5 | ## Page 1
(104-10216-10172
".:
1:199
SECRET
DATE. 10 June 6le
REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF AN INCOMING SW MESSAGE
Division or Branch: NH/SA/sO
To:
Ilo Sanches
(Field Units Use Pseudo)
Report on the Development of SW Message #
_ FrOm _AHTASEA.
(Agent Crypto)
Mailed from
to
Date Letter 4 Apr 6l _ Postmark
- Rec'd Lab 20 Pine Sle
1. It is requested that the Case Officer examine the visible correspondence for content and appear-
ance, in order to assess its effectiveness as a cover for the SlY message.
2. Results of the Technical Examination:
a. Did the envelope appear to have been opened in transit? Not received
b. Was any evidence of the SW visible prior to development?
3. Technical Comments:
No Si present
4. Technical Suggestions To Be Relayed to the Agent:
Bendy
Submitted by:
(Field Units Sign in Pseudo)
Photocopies of the letter and envelope and a photocopy or transcript of the developed SW
are transmitted herewith.
Its just lt list
case.
Form 60-1 (IN)
Revised Feb. 1963
SECRET
---
## Page 2
;
Gal mado y guanido amijo Carlos:
Reciti tu canta de
Die. 29 peo no le la. tabia coulatad specudo sua buina
aportmudad pe pera sla seguo que legania a tes mana
ju el conco slo smay deficite debido como bren
sass al bloguro noleamencano hocia misla asla -
"prosedio que mistio comun aungo el'FEO" Parsoull
vo autestante la i cantante alguic coso a
Yo stay bie relatinamente, trabajo e al Hosjital
aduna gano buen sweld
para cubri nes gasta que noi zai Data-Po an
lado mne tanlengo en contielo sempre con la
Aoi noy visendo; de vz en cuando vey o Umacleo
ue sempre semantini bello y lleno di sal yoerida.
Scento mudio ni padana il junita , comparla juta
cestono de ni y ai: al que detato a la hemoni o
que fuerai vilente osesmachs por Ventina y se
---
## Page 3
1 De Muzo de c-stane que lo Re de vez au cuando
culo; ha u se trabajo de recita e in, nue 20
que tu lo habia Clamacio el cêo cic y se juess muy.
conlento pue el le geres. mudo.
Po aguillo, coo madica ma o meno Aguao que
cuando nos mina en Marianile Ya toda los
estanant, sta abata, con biona
comida!!
se demente sempre..
El mucha fiel del hogAr
VA como bAncA fieRdIda.
QuE no sabE donde vA -.
To sure bien poque ti ligo ile hallo de sta
que le gustaria nete,.
---
## Page 4
Los falagangia que os hicimo en EnGVo quedes
nuy quens, yo supougo Mini te hara mandado
copia ó tengo el negativos en la joyeria:
Pepir, el Moro j deira li ricidau ricuado...
El ata dia la lleve los muestra de Pastura do Liling
a Bati, quiza hijano regocio in
sion sede ut co no dentale deo
ha so no lo ayudaria - 81 veceila trabajo un poro,
necsito apinedia esta aportandad que tengo
de el plospital a estudia bostauto a lisa de mi
situacon polilicca la cual me acujo senque
solante trango.
Si no le ss mudio pableina cenian con el
---
## Page 5
Erionteme con el 'Fes y dive como acada
Il Alance Paris.- y pora arando sola por ves si
puedo osestar a la inangraciana.-
Dile a Blina que cucudo fui a vesila ce zu
por la tanto no pueda cuy fauna con su jili
ni entregarle lo que le mando. A Aluvido si
le de su encaço y le gusto mucho y uo hablo
muy ben de ella.
Bueno muchos cacri fosa il Vigo-Di Veja
a ladre y las niña.
Para, ti un fuente al rozo.
alau lle
regentamine
De sus serenais i
20 72
seis meces 2"1
2:2116r
otero dios
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | 104-10250-10140.pdf | 104-10250-10140 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 11/17/1952 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION: KIMSEY, HERMAN. | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK43 : F24A : 1998.03.10.20:24:51:840102 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10250-10140]
....
COLINED PERSONNEL ICTION
S- T.- C- R- F-T
Socurity Infornation
Pare 33 0 20 m;s.
(1) Staff or Division
s4; (2) Dete I/O improvodi ilei
FROM
(4)
(5)
NAME
ORG. INF. 8e
POS TITLE
(0)
SCHIEDUTE
STRIPS-GRIF
DIVISION
Spocial issistance Division (Cont'a)
DEVPLOIMUNT + PRING BR
Chemist
Laubinger,
Frank Ho
OPERATIONNI
, BRANCH
Chemist
Chemist
Irng Off-Toch Flds
MISCEL LANECUS TECINIQUES
Scals Technician
-* Kimscy, Horman Io :il39
Seals Technician
GS-12
GS-7
GS-12
GS-: 9
GS-11
GS-9
239
242
24,3
251
246
247
# Candidate in Process
_(3) Effrotira dato of action lici
1(8)
03
03
ORG. IIF. i
FOS TITTE
(10)
SCHEDULE
STnITS-J.DF
+
B
B
SPECIAL ASSISTANCI DIV.
Chemist
Chamist
Chemist
TRAINING
46-1320-12
GS-1320-7
GS-1322-12
GS-1711-3
05-301-11
B
Seals Technidan
11 Toch Prol 50?
(12) APPROVED BY:
APPROVED BY:L
fonstari or bav, chist S-E-Calat-T
Class. & Wage Division
_(14) APPROVED BY:
Security Information
Personnel orti m
-..
(11)
SLOT 10.
BE
193
199
202
54"
206
110 ini
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10179-10117.pdf | 104-10179-10117 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 06/25/1962 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | DIRECTOR | SAN JOSE | CABLE RE: IS GENERALLY FAVORABLE TO MANOLO RAY | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-15 : F7 : 20040303-1053806 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10179-10117
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
844
DATE : 25 AN E2
was
• TO : DIRECTOR:
FROM : SAN JOSE
ACTION: TIN 10)
INFO: DOP, FI, FU/INT 2, MN 7, S/C 2.
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECREPSS
day.
ROUTING
PAPROF
MN 26 0646z 62
ROUTINE
- IN 17+06
DIR INFO WAVE CITE SANJ 5816
TEF: DIR 14588
(aut 01207)
GROSE
VeRAS.
ACCORDING TORNADULAR, CHÚMAIL7 IS GENERALLY FAVORABLE TO MANOLO
RAY, BUT NO FURTHER INFO.
WILL-TRY TO ELICIT.
TENDiOF MESSAGE
C/S COMMENT®
"HOS DESIRES INFO RE EXTENT MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT GIVEN RAY
ANO MAP BY LA POLITICAL PERSONAGE
do tong.
SECRET
REPACOUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUINO OFFICE IS PROMIBITED
HEAT
Copy No.
3g00
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 104-10431-10056.pdf | 104-10431-10056 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 12/7/81 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | RUSS HOLMES WORK FILES | C/DDA/OIS/INFO & PRIVACY DIVISION | C/DDO/IMS/FPLG/PROC. SECTION | MEMO:DAVID BELIN REQUEST F75-5963:EXTERNAL COORDINATION/REFERRAL OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS | 4 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK-RH18 : F07 : 1998.12.16.08:43:20:106120 : FOURTH PAGE IS FORM:FOIA REQUEST COVER SHEET. | 4 | ## Page 1
1104-70431-100561
PRIORITY HANDLING
SUBJECT: (Optional)
David Belin Request F75-5963:
Coordination/ Referral of Top Secret Documents
FROM:
Donald Baker
IMS/ FPLG/PS
1442
1H5113 Hqs. CY-1 Green
SUSPENSE DATE
TO:
(Officer designation, room number, and
DATE
building)
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
%
8.
9.
10.
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
C/ FPLG/PS
DC/FPLG
C/ FPLG
DO/IRO
File Room
• 1H5118
FOIA REQUEST
F75-5963
7 December 1981
COMMENTS (Number eoch
comment to show from whom
to whom.
Draw o line ocross column offer eoch comment.)
0-8LOG OUT PLEASE
C/IPD
ATTN :
Chris Rehder
-John Ruffner
12.
RETURN TO:
PRIORITY HANDLINGES
3749
FOIA REQUEST
---
## Page 2
13-00000
- 0.
.;..
2 - Inters! lee Only
7 December 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ATTENTION
FROM
SUBJECT
John E. Bacon
Chief, DDA/OIS/Information and Privacy Division
Chief, DDO/IMS/FPLG/Processing Section
coord malin quest 5- Top Secree Documents
This memo refers to documents hand-carried to your offic
on 12 November 1981 by DDO/IMS/OG/Sensitive Information Section
Twelve (12) of these documents require referral to, or coordination
with, the State Department.
The thirteenth requires referral to
the Navy Department.
These documents are grouped under three DO
Top Secret Control Numbers as follows:
A. TS-187817-B: Refer to State Department
Top Secret Memorandum,
tary of stabruary Alexis
from Deputy Undersecretary of Stafhis memo
Johnson,
to DDP, Richard Helms.
contains copies
of ten cables exchanged in the
State Department's Roger Channel with the
Embassy in
Mexico City. These cables are numbered
2 through 11 as follows:
2) Top Secret In Cable 1180, Control 16652, dated
23 November 1963,
from Ambassador Mann, Mexico
City, to the Secretary of State.
3)
In Cable 1182, Control 16978,
dated 23 November
1963,
from the American Embassy, Mexico City,
to the Secretary of State.
4)
Out Cable 958, dated 26 November 1963, from
Alexis Johnson, State Department, to Ambassador
Nann, Mexico City.
Adminishielia - Intowel Use Only
---
## Page 3
13-00000.
5) Out Cable 961, dated 27 November 1963,
from Alexis
State Department,: to Ambassador Mann,
Mexico City.
6) Out Cable 969, dated 27 November 1963, from Alexis
Johnson, State Department, to Ambassador Mann,
Mexico City.
7)
In Cable 1197, Control 18347, dated 27 November
1963, from Ambassador Mann, Mexico City, to the
Secretary of State.
8) Out Cable 976,
Johnson,
State
dated 28 November 1963,
from Alexis
Department, to Ambassador Mann,
Mexico City.
9) Out Cable 1201,
dated 28 November 1963, from
Ambassador Mann, Mexico City, to the Secretary
of State.
10)
I963, 1emAo Assador Man Metice City, dember
from Ambassador Mann,
AleXis Johnson, State Department.
11)
In Cable 1226, Control 1590, dated
3 December
1963, from Ambassador Mann,
Mexico
City, to
Alexis Johnson, State Department.
B. TS-187817: Coordinate with State Department
12) Top Secret Memorandum,
dated 25 February
1964, from
DDP, Richard Helms,
to Deputy
Indersecretary of State, U. Alexis Johnson:
Subject:
Telegrams Exchanged in the
Department's Roger Channel with the Embassy
in Mexico City regarding the OSWALD Case.
C. TS-768255: Refer to Navy Department
Top Secret Navy Cable (IN-67327), dated
24 November 1963, from
ALUSNA,
Canberra,
Australia, to RUECW/DNI; Subject:
Possible Soviet Informer.
When these documents are forwarded to their originating
agencies,
we would appreciate your requesting a classification
review of documents numbered 1, 12 and 13.
-2-
---
## Page 4
13-00000
Me tatio - lateral Wee Caly
requesters listed below
a. David Belin F75-5963.
b. Pamela Butler F76-0512
c. Mel Elfin F77-0068; F77-0235
d. Bernard Fensterwald F77-0086
e. Edward M. Fouhy F77-0067; F77-0141; F77-0238
f. Norman Kempster F77-0071; F77-0234
g. Mark Lane F77-0070; F77-0233
h. George Lardner, Jr. F77-0069; F77-0140; F77-0237
i. David C. Martin F77-0065; F77-0139; F77-0236
j. Alan J. Weberman F77-0155
k. Harold Weisberg F75-6669*
5.
The DO has made certain deletions pertaining to Agency
equities and information, pursuant to exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3)
of the FOIA..
The documents have been marked accordingly.
Please address any questions you may have concerning these
documents to Mr. Donald Baker, X1320 or X5348.
VC/DDO/IMS/ FPLG/PS
Our records indicate that although the Agency has promised to
forward additional Kennedy/Oswald Material
' Weisberg,
urrently owes the Agency more than $1000,
and we doubt further
information will be released to him. We defer to IPD on this point.
- 3-
Administrative - Internal Use 2.,
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32303053.pdf | 124-10283-10065 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/15/1960 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-2914-1ST NR 69, 2ND NR 69 | DIRECTOR, FBI | FORSYTH, THOMAS G. III | 14 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | INC MEMO, ADMIN PAGE | null | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
5/28/201
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10283-10065
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2914-1ST NR 69, 2ND NR 69
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
FORSYTH, THOMAS G. III
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
DATE:
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
03/15/1960
14
GM, PERSONAL HISTORY AND BKG, RES, ASSOC, CRIMINAL
ACT, RACK AND SUBV, GAMBLING, ADMIN
DOCUMENT TYPE:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/15/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
INC MEMO, ADMIN PAGE
v9.1
NW 45852 DocId: 32303053 Page 1
12
---
## Page 2
PG 92-228
92-236
action.
Although the trial in the case captioned, "STUART
SUTOR, etal,
ITSP; TGP;
"PPA; NM; CONSPIRACY," involving
several MANNARINO
associates, resulted in convictions in the
S. District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania,
Pittsburgh, in February, 1960, new information has come to
the attention of the Pittsburgh Office which involves four
additional subjects and which will require extensive,
concentrated investigation.
Also, new information has been
received which will require investigation in the case
of tho so,
captioned, "BERNARD J. EZHAYA, etal, ITSP - MT. "
Investigation
of the foregoing matters is for all practical purposes
investigation of the MANNARINO organization.
Coverage on the
MANNARINO organization's activities in the New Kensington,
Pa., area will be maintained by contact with informants and
PCIS.
INFORMANTS
PG T-1 1s PCI
• a Springdale,
physician and
Gambler who furnished information to sA THOMAS
G. FORSYTH, III on 1/19/60 to 9,18/60 and 3/8/60.
PG T-2 1s PCI
a New Kensington, Pa,, numbers
operator, who
furnished information to SA FORSYTH on 1/28/60.
PG T-3 1s PCI
], a New Kensington, Pa,, resident
close to the activities of gamblers; who furnished information
to SA RICHARD GORDON DOUGE on 12/23/59 and 2/15/60.
RO I-4 is PCI
a New Kensington,
Pa,,
numbers
writer, who furnished information to SA DOUCE on 2/12/60.
Pa T-5 1s PG 585-C, who furnished information to SA ROBERT
A. VOEGE on 12/4/59.
PG T-6 16 PQ: 545-0
who furnished information to SA DOUGE on
12/15/59 and 2/11/60.
OTHER 4
- 3* -
COVER PAGE
HW
45852 DocId: 32303053
Page 2
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32304930.pdf | 124-10287-10060 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 11/29/1962 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-3267-388 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 2 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/1/2015
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY :
RECORD NUMBER:
RECORD SERIES :
FBI
124-10287-10060
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
92-3267-388
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: SAC, LA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE: 11/29/1962
PAGES:
2
SUBJECTS :
JRO, ASSOC, BUSS, INVESTMENTS
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/11/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
DocId: 32304930
Page 1
3
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
PERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U, S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 2 9 1962
TELETYPE
Nir. Tolson.
Mr. Belmont.
Mr. Mohr
Mr.
Casper.
Mr.
Callahan
Mr.
Conrad
Mr.
Mr. Evar
Mx.
Gale
Mr.
Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter.
Tele. Room.
Miss Holmes
Mies Gandy...
URGENT
11/29/62 6-39
PM
AH
TO DIRECTOR, FBI 92-3267
FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES 92-1136
2P
JOHN ROSELLI, AKA. AR•
ROSSELLI NOT OBSERVED L. A. APARTMENT EVENING NOVEMBER
TWENTY EIGHT LAST OR MORNING NOVEMBER TWENTY NINE INSTANT BY
NEIGHBORHOOD SOURCES. LA FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT C DID NOT SEE HIM
AT FRIAR-S CLUB, B. Ho, ON NOVEMBER TWENTY EIGHT LAST, ALTHOUGH
MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN, FRIEND OF ROSSELLI, WAS THERE PLAYING CARDS.
RECORDS, VETERANS HOSPITAL, LO A., CALIFORNIA, REFLECT -
HERMAN SPITZEL, CLOSE FRIEND AND FORMER EMPLOYER OF ROSSELLI,
ADMITTED AS PATIENT NOVEMBER EIGHT LAST AND DISCHARGED NOVEMBER
TWENTY SIX LAST• HE WAS TREATED FOR QUOTE BLADDER TUMOR UNQUOTE.
ROSSELLI HAS BEEN USING SPITZEL-S CAR WHILE SPITZEL IN HOSPITAL.
RECORDS, UNION BANK, L. A., REFLECT ON OCTOBER SIXTEEN
LAST EMANUEL ROTHMAN, ROSSELLI-S AUDITOR, DREW THIRTY FIVE
HUNDRED DOLLAR CHECK ON ROTAMAN AND HAMILTON, CLIENT-S TRUST
ACCOUNT. THIS ACCOUNT HAS BEEN USED IN PAST FOR SOME OF
END PAGE ONE DECA
REC- 13 9 d
-3267
-388
1S NOV 30 1982
DocId: 32304930 Page 2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10122-10246.pdf | 104-10122-10246 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 08/17/1976 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | MEMO FOR THE RECORD | REARDON, R. M., SAG, CIA | MEMO FOR THE RECORD: FROM APPROXIMATELY JULY 1964 UNTIL JUNE 1966, THOMAS EARL EVANS WAS UNDER NON-OFFICIAL COVER IN THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA. | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK44 : F2 : 1994.03.25.07:44:18:560007 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10122-10246
CLASSIFICATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT
DATE
17 August 1976
FILE NUMBER
43 980
Fron approximately July 1964 until June 196b, Subject was under non-
official cover in the Washington, DC area. During this period subject
was ostensibly employed by Robert A. Maheu Associates. At that time
Hobert A. Maheu Associates was attempting to build up trade relations
between the USSR and the US.
As a result of the Watergate incident and the involvement of Robert A.
Maheu in Agency plotting to assasinate Fidel Castro, the relationship
between saheu and the Agency has received widespread publicity.
The purpose of this memorandum is to record the fact that the Agency's
forner relationship with Maheu and his company is widely known in case this
should in some way be significant in some future assigment Subject may
be considered for.
Robert A. Maheu file
Robert A Maheu Associates file
" 111 540267 548
SIGNATURE
1.88 | 954
teardon SA
z/ps
CLASSIFICATION
GROUP 1
CLUOSNORADINO ARNA
CLABBIRCAT!
140)
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32306835.pdf | 124-10290-10475 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/30/1968 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-6054-2485 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 2 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | INC A/T | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/20/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
. 124-10290-10475
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-6054-2485
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FBI
FROM: SAC, NY
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
DATE :
'PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
12/30/1968
2
LCN, MARI, FRANKIE T., MRA, MEMBERS, MEETING
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/27/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
INC A/T
v9.1
DocId: 32306835
Page 1
11
---
## Page 2
DATE:
under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (11 USC 2107
Hev14-22047
Transmit the following in
Via
AIRTEL
TO
FROM
SUBJECT:
FBI
Date:
12/30/68
(Type in plaintext or code)
(Priority)
: DIRECTOR, FBI (92-6054)
SAC, NEW YORK (92-2300)
-LA COSA NOSTRA
AR CONSPIRACY
_On 12/30/68, NY 4336-C-TE advised that FRANKIE "m"
"underboss"
• the SCIACCA
"family" of La Cosa Nostra
(ZON), was presently in Miami, FlorIda, and had been there for
approximately a week.
Iniormant explained no specific knowledge as to the
reason for MART's visit in Miami other than that MART had
expressed the intention of meeting some high ranking members
of LCN
there.
Informant stated that he and MARI had made tentative
plans to meet together in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on or about
1/20/68 for vacation purposes.
Bureau and Miami will be advised if any further
specific information is received concerning MARI's activities
in Miami.
IS - Bishop
Bureau
1
Miami (92-853) (Info)
1
- New York
92-2711)
1
- New York
(137-5031)
1
- New York
TMD: rkh
(8)
antel to
n-y
1-20697
REC 49 92-6054-2485
12 ĐEC S1 1968
1-3-66
UNRECORDED COPY FLED IN
Approved:
JAN 6 1969
Sent
_M
Per
dent in Charc
DocId: 32306835 Page 2
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | 104-10248-10184.pdf | 104-10248-10184 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 10/30/1953 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH | ERMAL P. GEISS | SUBJECT: CERTIFICATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES. | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK40 : F25C : 1998.05.06.20:26:23:043102 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10248-10184
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
A DO NOS Reproduce
45872
30 October 1953
Office of Naval Resenrch
Department of the Navy
Wishington 25,
C.
Attention:
It. Conds. Harold Smith
seeurity officer
subject: Certification of Security Clearances
Dear SIra
We have been requested to Inform you of the security
clearances granted by thie Agency to the follouing nemed IndivI-
on the one in
duals, who ve have been Informed will be vialting It. Williem
B. Murray, JI.. Office of Navel reBeerch, il. S. Navy.
This in to advise that, besed on full field investigatlone
and Natlonal Agency name checks, the following namec incividual
were granted security approvnl for accesa to CIA informatior
clnssified through Top fecret on the dates set forth opposite
thoir nrnes:
0.3
27 October 1719
27 May 1953
7 April 1953
13 February 1953
end to Christ
Henry C. Knutson
24 November 1950
16 June 1353
19 Apr11 1952
24 March 1950
W112iam W. Cowgill
20 September 1951
If ve enn be of further service in this matter, please
advise.
FOR THE DIRECTOP OF SECURITY
SO/ACS:kad - 29 Oct 53
• each file
1 = chrono
CC:
Office of Chief, Naval Operations
Ermal P. Coles
Chief, security Divialon
CONTISENTAL
2/PJ
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32350547.pdf | 104-10074-10224 | 07/24/2017 | In Part | CIA | 1/3/64 | PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | DIRECTOR | JMWAVE/MEXICO CITY | FIRING OF TERESA PROENZA FROM CUBAN EMBASSY JOB IN MEXICO REPORTEDLY CAUSED PARTLY BY POOR RELATIONSHIP WITH WIFE OF GUSTAVO TORROELLAS. | null | CIA | JFK | 6/8/17 | JFK16 : F70 : 1993.07.19.17:46:06:560150 : | null | ## Page 1
Date: 12/28/04
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY
AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER
: 104-10074-10224
RECORD
SERIES
JEK
FILE
NUMBER
80T01357A
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Recorde
Collection Act of 1992
144 USC 2107 Notel.
Case#:NW 53199 Date:
06-08-2017
AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO
: JMWAVE/MEXICO CITY
TITLE
FIRING OF TERESA PROENZA FROM CUBAN EMBASSY JOB IN
MEXICO REPORTEDLY CAUSED PARTLY BY POOR RELATIONSHIP
WITH WIFE OF GUSTAVO TORROELLAS.
DATE :
01/03/1964
PAGES :
1
SUBJECTS : CUBA EMBASSY
TORROELLAS, G
PROENZA, TERESA
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPEF
CLASSIFICATION
: SECRE'I
RESTRICTIONS
1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW
: 07/19/93
COMMENTS : JEK16 : F70 : 1993.07.19.17:46:06:560150
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
104-10074-10224
HH 53199
DocId: 32350547
Page
1
---
## Page 2
ORIS
DATE :
TO :
FROM:
CONF:
INFO.:
Словим
CEASSIFIED MESSAGE
LAS,
72574
WINDEX
30S SChET
O NO INDEX
201-20481
3 January 1963 FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-291531
JHHAVE MEXICO. CITY
DIRECTOR
ST SAS:
DDPS ADDP, C/CLS C/EL 2, RI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 5, VR
TO
WAVE
INFO
MEXI
BYBATS
REFE MIXI 7613 (IN 91186) (NOT SENT WAVE)
ROUTINGY
.4.
5
3 JAN 64 23
DEFERREG CEN
ROUTINE
34Z
CITE DIR
92577
IVAN CONNECTION REPORT THAT FIRING OF TERESA PROENZA FROM CUBAN
SUBASSY JOB MEXIWAS CAUSED PARTLY BY POOR RELATIONSHIP WITH WIFE OF
GUSTAVE TORROELLAS, REQUEST ANTHRILL/ 1 BE ASKED HEB EVALUATION OF
OFFICERS CUBAN EMBASSY HEXI AND INDICATE NATURE HER RELATIONSHIP
FITH EACH:
2. PLEASE DO NOT PINPOINT PROENZA AS OBJECT OUR INTEREST BUT
INCLUDE HER NAME IN LIST PRINCIPAL OFFICERS TO BE DISCUSSED
END OF MESSAGE
C/S. COMMENT: *RE LITAMIL-9 REPORTS THAT TERESA PROENZA WAS SUMMARILY FIRED
FROM: HER JOB AS RESULT OPEN CABLE FROM FOMIN PAUL ROA RECEIVED ABOUTS TENT
OR. TWELVE DEC.
dup of
#10264
Falsen
DESMOND FITZGERALD
REL ERAS OFFICER
SAS/MOB
SAS/ BOB
WH/3/MEX
COORDINATING OFFICER
SAMUEL/HALPERN
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
SAS/EXO
AUTHENTICATING
downgrading and
3-20
declassification
OFFICER
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER: THAN THE ISSÜING: OFFICE IS PROHIBITED: 22
_ Copy: No.
HW 53199 DocId: 32350547.
Page 2
101-391531
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32341633.pdf | 104-10015-10281 | 07/24/2017 | In Part | CIA | 11/25/1963 | PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 201-289248 | DIRECTOR | MEXICO CITY | CABLE REQUESTING CABLE SUMMARY ON INFO ON SILVIA T. DURAN. | null | CIA | JFK | 6/6/17 | OSW1 : V6 : 1993.12.09.17:37:46:960028 : | null | ## Page 1
AGENCY
RECORD NUMBER
RECORD SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification
: CIA
: 104-10015-10281
:
JFK
201-289248
Released
under
the
John
Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Aet of
1992
144 USC 2107 Notel.
Case#: NT
53199 Date:
06-06-2017
June 24, 1996
Status of Document:
Postponed in Part
Number of releases of previously postponed information: 0
Number of Postponements: 1
Postponement # 1 (Page 1):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may
be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.
Substitute Language: "LI-crypt"
Release Date: 05/2006
Board Review Completed: 05/14/96
HW 53199 DocId:32341633
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Date: 06/24/96
Page:
1
JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION
FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER :
104-10015-10281
RECORD
SERIES:
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
JFK
201-289248
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR :
FROM
TO
TITLE
DATE
PAGES
SUBJECTS :
CIA
: DIRECTOR
MEXICO CITY
CABLE REQUESTING CABLE
SUMMARY ON INFO ON SILVIA T. DURAN.
11/25/63
1
DURAN, SILVIA
INTERROGATION
ARREST
MEXICO CITY
CUBA EMBASSY
USSR EMBASSY
OSWALD CONTACTS
DOCUMENT TYPE
CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTIONS
CURRENT STATUS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW
OPENING CRITERIA
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
SECRET
1B
RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
12/09/93
COMMENTS : OSW1:V6 1993.12.09.17:37:46:960028:
IRI - ITEM IS
RESTRICTED
Nw 53199 DocId: 32341633
Page 2
---
## Page 3
DISTR:
ACTION:
(NFỘ:
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
DATE:
FILE:
25 NOC 63
TO:
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
DEFERRED
PRIORITY
INITIALS
INITRES
DIG
251415Z
INCOMING NUMBER
6706
ROUTINE
OPERATIONAL
IMMEDIATE
INFO
CITE
PRIORITY MEXI
DIR 8U926
10 REQUEST CABLE SUMMARY ALL STATION INFO ON SILVIA T. DURAN•
2 ALSO REQUEST LITAMIL NINE BE QUERIED AS TO HIS KNOWLEDGE
LEE OSWALD CONTACTS WITH CUBAN AND SOVIET EMBASSIES•
DUP OF
95-36
p.8579
25/1510Z
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING
ITH 53199 DocId:32341633
Page 3
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32174418.pdf | 124-10179-10237 | 12/15/2017 | In Full | CR 100-00-1765, 1766 | null | LS | null | ## Page 1
__-
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
12/6/201
AGENCY:
RECORD NUMBER :
RECORD SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
FBI
124-10179-10237
LS
CR 100-00-1765, 1766
Released under the John
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
144 USC 2107 Motel.
Caset: NH 55509 Date:
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FROM:
TO
TITLE:
DATE :
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
00/00/0000
0
NAR
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION:
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
Not Assassination Related
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
07/26/1994
OPENING CRITERIA:
INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
HW 55509 DocId: 32174418
Page 1
---
## Page 2
NR 946 WA CODE
721PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB
TO ALL SACS
FROM DIRECIOR
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENIAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF
FIELD AGENT. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL
TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH
SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED
TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES.
OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOI ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES,
SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY
CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY
BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.
END
YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD
SEARCHE
10 - 00-12
INDEXIN
SERIALIZED
I FILED
MÃR/2 4 1975 &
HOLD
151°
00
MLS FBI LS ACK UR ONE
NN 55509 DocId:32174418 Page 2
---
## Page 3
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
Transmit the following in
Via
PLAINTEXT
CODED
FBI
Date:
MARCH 25, 1975
(Type in plaintext or code)
NITEL
(Priority)
013.
PAW
TO
DIRECTOR
FROM LOUISVILLE
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
REBUTEL TO ALL SACS, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.
PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, FOLLOWING DATA
PERTAINS TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELIIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:
SUPERVISOR (1) 40% IS, 10% CI; AGENT (1) 85% IS, 10% CI;
AGENT (1) 25% IS, 0% CI; AGENT. (1) 50% IS, 25% CI; AGENT (1)
25% IS, 08 CI; AGENT (1) 308 IS, 403 CI; AGENT (1) 40% IS,
10% CI; AGENT (1) 50% IS, 259 CI; AGENT (1) 10% IS, 0% CI.
END.
EVA/pkd
ADDENDUM (DO NOT TRANSMIT) :
PERSONNEL LISTED HEREIN ARE IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
110500
115507-010
100-00-1766
Searched
Serialized
india s
Approved:
Sent
945
Special Agent ih
Charge
M
U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972-455-574
H# 55509 DocId:32174418 Page 3
---
## Page 4
FD-36 (Rev. '5-22-641
FBI
Date:
Transmit the following in
Via
(Type in plaintext or code)
(Priority)
PERSONNEL (NUMBER)
IDENTITY
SUPERVISOR (1)
SUPV. ROBERT E. PETERS
AGENT (L)
SA EDMUND V. ARMENTO
AGENT (1)
SA BARTLEY J. GORI
AGENT (1)
SA CHRIS R. HOEHLE
AGENT (1)
SA JOHN MICHAEL KOZIOL
AGENT (1)
SA RICHARD B. VIVIAN
AGENT (1)
SA JOHN M. BARRY
AGENT (1)
SA J. ROBERT SAFFELL
AGENT (1)
SA ROBERT H. BREWER
Percentages expressed herein are estimates
based on average case load assignments to agent personnel
listed.
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
Sent
Per
U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574
NH 55509 DocId:32174418
Page 4
--- |
|||||||||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10167-10426.pdf | 104-10167-10426 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 03/25/1963 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | MULTIPLE ADDRESSEES | SAS/REGISTRY | AMSWIRL-1 CANCELLATION OF FILE. | 3 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-6 : F14 : 1998.02.05.18:17:55:186031 : FIRST PAGE IS ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET AND LAST PAGE IS CANCELLATION TO DIVISION NOTICE. | 3 | ## Page 1
104-10167-10426
• UNCLASSIFIED
SUREST: 1005301)
FROM:
849/R20ITET
00-8702
$6572
TO: (Office dangeris
aruikling)
weak
3.
Las/ Mos
5.
CAL
A100/F=
Misers?
10.
12.
$3.
610 " ones
SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Heproduce .
USE
•LY
U
CONFIDE TAL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
I SECRET •
ATTASION A
25 W:9 1963
DATE
RECEIVED
POPWARE
OFFICERS
INITIALS
FIZASE YILE AS INDICATI
28 H4K2 g:M1:S005
Miyarcase
• CONFIDENTIAL
D
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
D
UNCLASSIFIED
---
## Page 2
14-00000
110B/1418640
see Coate Sade 2d
2che8/27.
Tari.
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4:B123-53
415112
FREE ATTRiCOD
Barber: ST7L47775
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ASFIII-1
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Diatrilution:
2 - HATE
J = ssch 201-
3i-8ar2r
201-313157
202-310904
391-335934
90930938838;
+ 2523
201
21-3
231-327677
32-325,13
PHD 0? 1753403
Jaze Ginauled
8 jeruary 186
à are my 1553
BANCUHENYN
marry
#333336:36838866323358
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PATE EAT. AND PURE
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2: 319132A
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$19/1500
1 - erch 207
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---
## Page 3
14-00000
SECRET
CANCELLATION TO DIVISION
DATE.
5 teb 63 pre
MEHORANDUN FOR: SAS •
ATTENTION:
Paul. Magedo
cH 100985
M10B
Maggio
The file on
and closed in CI/DA for ice fallowing reason:
-i= cancelled
Pailure to subait PRA II as required linder CSI No, 1045 or to troicato uny
furtber intereste
x6157
Prior to any future use of Subject, 1t vill be necessary to furnish
a sew approval request (Fors #792) t0 CI/QA.
-strainia
CHIET, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUFPOPT DIVISION
SECRET
901-316-41
8.8a
691
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32334086.pdf | 124-90110-10079 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 4/10/59 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 100-42303-536 | HQ | MM | 66 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | RPT | null | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
6/2/2015
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90110-10079
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
CR 100-42303-536
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
MM
TO: HQ
TITLE :
DATE:
PAGES:
SUBJECTS:
04/10/1959
66
JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA
MAFIA
DOCUMENT TYPE:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
4
CURRENT STATUS:
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
08/06/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
RPT
v9.1
HW 45876 DocId: 32334086 Page 1
18
---
## Page 2
MM 62-3381
INFORMANTS
MM T-1 is MM 509-C, Miami, Florida.
MM T-2 18 WILLIAM EISENBERG, Miami, Florida.
MM T-3 is JOSEPH MEROLA, Miami, Florida.
MM T-4 18 JOHN KERNAN, PCI, Miami, Florida.
MM T-5 is MM 647-PC, Miami, Florida.
MM I-6 18 TONY LE FATCH, PCI, Cleveland, Ohio.
MM T-7 is
]PCI, Miami, Florida.
MM T-8 18 AUGUST SAVARESE, former PCI, Miami, Florida.
MM: T-9 is
PCI, Havana, Cuba.
MM T-10 is MM 650-C, Miami, Florida.
MM T-I1 is MF 334, Miami, Florida.
MM T-12 is MM 656-C, Miami, Florida.
MM T-13 1s LOUIS SACCAROMA, PCI, Miami, Florida.
MM I-14 is Legat, Havana, Cuba.
MM T-15 is MM 416-C.
OTHER 4
D.
- COVER PAGE
P. y
HW
45876 DocId: 32334086 Page 2
---
## Page 3
MM 62-3381
accurate with a revolver, as well as being very
capable at throwing a stiletto. MM T-9 said that SCALIA was made
manager of the "popular" casino, an adjunct to the main
casino in the Sans Souci, shortly after his
arrival and
thereafter became manager of the gambling casino in the
Hotel Comodoro.
MM T-9 said that SCALIA obviously was not
qualified for either position and that this was his "reward."
MM T-9 noted that he, himself, was sentenced to
prison in Havana in the late spring of 1958 and was in
prison at the time SCALIA was arrested in November,
1958.
SCALIA's arrest was based on the shooting of SCALIA's
mistress. MM T-9 said that he shared a cell with SCALIA
for the short time SCALIA was detained in prison and that
SCALIA indicated his bail had been set at $20,000.00.
SCALIA told MM I-9 that if TRAFFICANTE "knew what was
good
for him," he would put up the bail and get SCALIA off.
MM T-9 stated that SCALIA was released from jail with his
bail paid by TRAFFICANTE within four days after his
imprisonment.
Mr. ROCKY POMERANCE, Constable, Miami Beach,
Florida, advised on March 28, 1959, that recently DAVE
FBI Number 655697, an associate of MICHAEL COPPOLA, and his
FIA.
son, RONNIE YARAS, went to the El Patio Restaurant, Dade
Boulevard, Miami Beach, which is operated by (FNU) BARNETT,
brother of BARNEY BARNETT, associate of MAX EDER, aka MAX
RAYMOND. While there they got in a fight and struck BARNETT over:/
When BARNEY BARNETT heard about the
incident he sent word out that he was going to get DAVE
YARAS. As a result of this' argument, DAVE YARAS, MAX RAYMOND,
and BARNEY BARNETT were summoned to the residence of MICHAEL
COPPOLA and the matter was reportedly straightened out.
T-2 advised on March 17, 1959, that two years
CARMINE
LOMBARDOZZ was given the assignment of killing
*(FNU) ROSENBLUM in Miami, Florida, who had been 17
Miami the past 12 or 13 years. LOMBARDOZZI sent SAMMAURO
aka MINTZ, and another to Miami to handle the job. When
Flo
-60.
119•
45876 DocId: 32334086
Page 3
---
## Page 4
MM 62-3381
INFORMANTS
MM T-1 is MM 509-C, Miami, Florida.
MM T-2 is WILLIAM EISENBERG, Miami, Florida.
MM T-3 is JOSEPH MEROLA, Miami, Florida.
MM T-4 is JOHN KERNAN, PCI, Miami, Florida.
MM T-5 is MM 647-PC, Miami, Florida.
MM I-6 18 TONY LE FATCH, PCI, Cleveland, Ohio.
MM T-7 is
, PCI, Miami, Florida.
MM T-8 is AUGUST SAVARESE, former PCI, Miami, Florida.
MM T-9 is
PCI, Havana, Cuba.
• MM T-10 is MM 650-C, Miami, Florida.
MM T-11 1s MF 334, Miami, Florida.
MM T-12 1s MM 656-C, Miami, Florida.
MM I-13 1S LOUIS SACCAROMA, PCI, Miami, Florida.
MM T-14 is Legat, Havana, Cuba:
MM T-15 is MM 416-c.
OTHER 4
D.
- COVER PAGE
HW
45876 DocId: 32334086 Page 4
---
## Page 5
MM 62-3381
accurate with a revolver, as well as being very
capable at throwing a stiletto. MM T-9 said that SCALIA was made
manager of the "popular" casino, an adjunct to the main
casino in the Sans Souci, shortly after his arrival and
thereafter became manager of the gambling casino in the
Hotel Comodoro®
MM T-9 said that SCALIA obviously was not
qualified for either position and that this was his "reward."
MM T-9 noted that he, himself, was sentenced to
prison in Havana in the late spring of
1958 and was in
SCAtA a are was based on the hared a ce of scat sa
mistress. MM T-9 said that he shared a cell with SCALIA
for the short time SCALIA was detained in prison and that
SCALIA indicated his bail had been set at $20,000.00.
SCALIA told MM T-9 that if TRAFFICANTE "knew what was good
for him," he would put up the bail and get SCALIA off.
MM T-9 stated that SCALIA was released from jail with his
bail paid by TRAFFICANTE within four days after his
imprisonment.
Mr. ROCKY POMERANCE, Constable, Miami Beach,
Florida, advised on March 28, 1959, that recently DAVE YARAS,
FBI Number 655697, an associate of MICHAEL COPPOLA, and his
son, RONNIE YARAS, went to the El Patio Restaurant, Dade
Boulevard, Miami, Beach, which is operated by (FNU) BARNETT,
brother of BARNEY BARNETT, associate of MAX EDER, aka MAX
RAYMOND. While there they got in a fight and struck BARNETT over./
the head with a bottle.
When BARNEY BARNETT heard about the
incident he sent word
out that he was going to get DAVE
YARAS.
As a result of this argument, DAVE YARAS, MAX RAYMOND,
and BARNEY BARNETT were summoned to the residence of MICHAEL
COPPOLA and the matter was reportedly straightened out.
MM T-2 advised on March 17, 1959, that two years
ago CARMINE LOMBARDOZZI was given the assignment of killing
one (FNU) ROSENBLUM in Miami, Florida, who had been in
Miami the past 12 or 13 years. LOMBARDOZZI sent SAM MAURO,
aka MINTZ, and another to Miami to handle the job. When
-60.
NW 45876 DocId:32334086 Page 5
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32334317.pdf | 124-90116-10023 | 07/24/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/27/1965 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-3395-128 | NO | HQ | null | FBI | NO | 05/25/2017 | FD-306 | null | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
6/4/2015
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-90116-10023
RECORD SERIES: NO
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-3395-128
Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Recorde
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
NO
TO: HQ
TITLE:
DATE:
'PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
01/27/1965
5
MINUTEMEN
DOCUMENT TYPE:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
08/10/1998
OPENING CRITERIA:
INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
FD-306
v9.1
HH 53074
DooId: 32334317
Page
1
---
## Page 2
COVER SHEET FOR INFORMANT REPORT OR MATERIAL
FD-306 (3-21-58)
Date Received
1/27/65
Received from (name or symbol number) Received by
NO 1271-R
SA STEPHEN
M. CALLENDER
Method of delivery
¿in person & orally
It orally furnished and reduced to writing by Agent:
Date
Dictated
to
-
Transcribed
Date of Report
Date(s) of activity
-
Authenticated
by Informant orally refused to sign
Brief description of activity or material
Comments of ARVIS. WARNER
1/24/65
+
File where original
located if not attached
170-20A
Remarks:
In event any information is utilized for reporting
purposes
and is to be disseminated outside the Bureau
it should be properly paraphrased in order to fully
protect informant.
1: 170-20A
1: 157-3149 (RANDLE C. POUNDS)
157-2926
(ARVIS WARNER)
1:
157-3000 (BILLY C. MORRIS)
1:
157-3351
(PAUL COONE)
1: 157-3301
1:
157-3360
(DEWEY SMITH)
1:
(BERNARD HALL)
157-3037
(ALBERT APPLEWHITE)
62-3395
(MINUTEMEN)
173-173
1:
173-201
1: 105-1057 (OKKKK)
SuC: gas
1-157-2980
(13)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
62-3395-128
* FEB 5 1965
Yet Reel
HH 53074 DocId:32334317 Page 2
---
## Page 3
On January 24, 1965, the following conversation
was
overheard between ARVIS WARNER and PAUL COONE, both members of
the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (OKKKK) as well as
the Minutemen in Bogalusa.
WARNER stated that "JELLY" POUNDS is self-employed
as a painter and his real name is RANDLE C. POUNDS, telephone
RE 2-4975.
WARNER also remarked that after the Minutemen meeting
on January 26, 1965, the members would go to the area of the
residence of LOU MAJORS and ostensibly have a flat tire and
then proceed to make a loud noise changing this tire in order
to aggravate MAJORS. WARNER stated that an individual by
the name of ROBERT RICHMOND, an attorney, resides next door
to MAJORS and RICHMOND had been forewarned of this so that he
and his family would not be concerned.
WARNER also related that he had been advised by
an unknown waitress at Graham's Cafe that the owner of the
cafe had been informed by Mayor JESSE CUTRER and ANDY OVERTON,
the Commissioner of Finance, that during this week Negroes
would be testing his establishment to see whether they would
be served. WARNER stated that CUTRER and also ARNOLD SPIERS,
the Commissioner of Safety, had told the proprietor of the
1
HH 53074 DocId: 32334317 Page 3
---
## Page 4
WARNER was overheard to tell COONE that he
wanted COONE to obtain a can of spray paint and a can of
spray glue which could be placed in the lock and door
to the office of LoU MaJoRs,
BASCOM TALLEY and RALPH
BLUMBERG, in order to make these doors and locks inoperable.
COONE was overheard to ask WARNER if his Minutemen
unit in Bogalusa was in any way associated with the national
organization of the same name and also asked WARNER for any
literature on the Minutemen so that he, COONE, could give
it to the members of his unit. WARNER stated that the
Minutemen in Bogalusa are associated with the national
organization of the same name but did not have any literature
to give to COONE as this was
another way in which the FBI
could check on the members.
WARNER added that a second Minutemen unit has
been started in Bogalusa by ALBERT APPLEWHITE and this
unit has 10 members, not further identified, and their
first project was placing a dead animal on the back porch
of RALPH BLUMBERG's residence who is also the owner of
radio station WBOX, Bogalusa.
WARNER stated that in the past Klan leaders have
had to use a great deal of persuasion on "JELLY" POUNDS,
-3
1H 53074 DocId: 32334317
Page 4
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | 104-10227-10086.pdf | 104-10227-10086 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 03/26/1961 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | BELL | JMWAVE | CABLE:AS RESULT CONVERSATION 25 MARCH | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-62 : F16 : 1998.05.28.07:44:44:076120 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10227-10086
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
ROUtING
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NICHE C7 MARCH ESOLSO I APRARCING AREKFAST 'IT
1 FOLL ARRIVAL SUAT CITY.
HIRO'S SHORT SIZE, ONE SEVEN AND O
JEOUS BEILa: (202-299279)
AS FASULE OF CONVERSATIGN 25 MANCH DESAEER MIRO
CARICHA AND ROLLITO ALINOCARU MUMMP DECILENC
SUNSTINTED TONY VARUNA COM SUJECI
CaU
201-299279
-0. 19
30%7
ICLC
7:54-2343319-124-2011
GORM MARCHA (201-18056)
AS RESHUR DE CUNVEIISAUION 25 KAINCH BELSEN
CARDONA AND ROBERTO AILJOS-ARZIS FORMER DACILED TO
STESTITUIE SUNECT
FOR. ESCOTET: (201749279)
20S5 1OD0 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
Copy No.
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 104-10088-10250.pdf | 104-10088-10250 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 10/21/1964 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | NEWSPAPER ARTICLE ALLEGING THAT CIA WITHHELD VITAL INTELLIGENCE FROM WARREN COMMISSION. | 1 | OPEN | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK28 : F51 : 1993.08.13.14:36:53:060054 : | 1 | ## Page 1
1104-10088-10250
COPY NO
PAGE
312
319
0003096
Inside Washington.
2100164
CIA Withheld Vital Intelligence From War ren Commission
1lguld
or compressed
for security
reasons re
issed
dismissal of such persons
By KOBERT S. ALIEN
And PAUL SCOTT
WASHINGTON, Oct. 20.
_The Central
Intelli-
Kence
Agency
withheld
vit:l
intelligence
infor.
mation from
the Warren
Commission during its in-
cials who actively oppose
•Soviel policies
Titled
"Soviet Stralegle
Executive
Action,"
the
suppressed
CIA
docu-
it lant int he sents
delails of how agents
KGB, the Sovict secret
arc
trained to do
with Western Icad-
@cluding officials in
and to
then ashs a po make
make
natubal
Oh:
causes.
wotthe KGB's new..
devised
assassination
on his yet
to bc
Westo
rom public office,
at oh.
form.
'Ihe gus is
agalost
fatal
port
that
CIA
Director
anysligh
ern offich
fendieds of
er
limes
even
having'
within
seconds
and
an
Jolin
McCone inade
no
KGB
agents
eavurtly op.
them' eliminated'
physi-
autopsy would not reveal
mention of this explosive
Non-trace able
document in
his
secret
craling outside
Ilussia
cally.
its usc.
testimony
before tie-
have
bech
suppilad
with
"Such
activities
arc
poisons have been report.
Conmission.
this
•known
to be undertaken
ed which do not take ci.
Warren
fect
until several hours
While McCone furnish-l
Iniled lo
turn
over a
tional
intelligence
cstio
male
barning
that
it
is
Kremlin policy to remove
from public office by
25-
sassination
Western
offi.
orders
from Moscow
it.
The
-Woappns
HIGHLIGHTS Of, th e
suppressed
intelligence
estimate, which is. Joelted
in
security ared
within
the tightly-guardcycon
are as follows:
"It
has
been
reposted
endcavors
leaves i
rettoyanthe, threatet
other: evl Soviet interests
cause of certain members ol
WEs
ern goves
som
Limes
anging
against
other types of
persons in the West, not..
after being administereg
the commission with
ably
defectors from
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thus allowing an assassin
the CIA's secret
surveil
U.S.S.R.
and from
to be lar from thes
countries
of
the
other
Leo
Sovict
when his victim dres
reports
on
Oswald's
bloc.
"A knowledgeable
yey
cight
"One recently reported
source has
deserted,
days in Mexico City
bia
The assassination. in
assassination technique is
details
Osa
clectrocute an individ.
pneumatically
him
poison
ice
with
the
val
luring
scontact
use
a teleprine, connect.
which
leaves
no
or other evidence
10
head 16g13
agent in the
ed to a high-voltage wire,
cause of death."
, Sovie
embassy
there,
daniel
gave
no
during a thunderstorm.
Congressional
invest
Kremlin's
"Another
involves
the
gators,
who
have
asker
of
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which
that
the
name
of
then
policy.
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gas in
committee
be
withhcl
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NN 15. 5008993
Other suppressed
Documents
by: idminis
officinis to Spcaker.
OTHER. V.S. Intolllo
McCormack (Mnss.),
gence exports,
nex!
very du.
In line to succeed Presi-
Dious of Russia's co-ox:
dent Johnson.
istence line, stress that
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FBI
officials
Warren Commis
warnod Speaker
sion's
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might
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mack,
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dedicated anti-:
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vecn
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that he is on
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estimale and
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documents
SUp-
the list of Western
clals foareä by. tle Krem-
pressed by the State De.
lin,
TO
CIA
authority
partment had been sunil.
has shown the No. 2 man
able for study.
government
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out • that
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suppressed cloner link.
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--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10333-10011.pdf | 104-10333-10011 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 09/19/1994 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | PROJFILES-ARRB MATTERS | ARRB - PROPOSED REGULATION (DEFINITION OF ASSASSINATION RECORD) | 65 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK-M-18 : F12 : 2000.02.17.08:40:16:700044 : UNIT INDEX One doc with several attachments. | 65 | ## Page 1
104-10333-10011
AJESTY- INTERNAL USE ONLY
PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PROSCT
OGC-94-52916
19 September 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR: David P. Holmes
Deputy General Counsel
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Robert J. Eatinger.Jr.
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC
DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect
to JFK Assassination Records
Prossane
1. Per your request, I have attached a copy of the
President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (ARCA), Pub. L. 102-526, 106 Stat.
3443-3458, repriried at
44 U.S.C. § 2107 note.
For your convenience, I have higkigheed
the pertinent provisions that will aid in responding to an
inquiry regarding the statute's effect on the DCI's statutory
autrority to protect intelligence sources and methods.
2.
The clear language and intent of the law is to supe-sede
statutes that prohibit disclosure of information, except for some y:
irrelevant subject areas, such
tax records.
The statute
provides that "it shall take
precedence over
any other law
(except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judicial
decision construing such law, or common law doctrine that would
otherwise prohibit" the disclosure of information subject to the
ARCA § 11(a). This language, taken with the provisions
discussed below which limit the intelligence
sources and metrods
thai may be protected and set a strict procedural scheme by which
information is to be reviewed under the ARCA,
effectively
supersedes the DCI's National Security Act authority with respect v
to intelligence sources and methods information subject to the
ARCA.
3.
Section 6 of the ARCA provides the grounds for which the
release of information may be "postponed."
The statute
contemplates that all information will eventually be released.
Indeed, it specifies that all information will be made available
to the public no later than 25 years after the passage of the
ARCA (which occurred in October 1992) unless the president
certifies that continued postponement is necessary.
ARCA
§ 4(g) (2) (D).
With respect to intelligence-related information,
ARCA allows postponement if:
" (1) the threat to ... intelligence operations
... is
of such gravity that it outweighs
the public interest, and
such public disclosure would reveal-.
PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
AGENCY - INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 2
14-00000 /
SUBJECT:
AGENCY - INTERNAL USE ONLY
PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PROC:CT
DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK
Assassination
Records
(A)
requires
an
intelligence agent whose identity currently
protection;
(B)
an
intelligence source or method which is
currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be
utilized, by the United States Government and which has
not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which
would interfere with the conduct of intelligence
activities; or
intelligence operations
Ligence opheat donter curre diy resure de nich
would demonstrably impair the natioral security of the
United States."
ARCA § 6(1) (Emphasis added.)
4.
The originating agency is to make the first review to
identify information that meets the standards for
postponement.
ARCA § 4(C) (2) (D) (1) .
For CIA, this effort is being undertaken
by the Historical Review Group,
in consultation with the
Directorate of Operations and other appropria: Agency
components.
Information the originaiing agercies identify for
postponement must be transmitted to the Revie. Board.
§ 4(c) (2) (E). The Review Board "shall consider and render
decisions
on a determination by a Government office to seek to
postpone the disclosure of assassinaiion records."
ARCA §
7(1) (1). Specifically, the "Review Board sha'l consider and
render decisions on
... whether an
assassination record or
particular information in a record qualifies for postponement of
disclosure under the Act."
ARCA § 7(i) (2) (B).
5.
If
the Review Board determines to order the disclosure
of information that the originating agency feit met the criteria
for postponement, it "shall notify the head o the originating
body of its determination and publish a copy of the determination
made. " ARCA § 9(c) (A). If the information contained in an
executive branch, the President shall have the sole and
nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or postponement
... the information under the standards set forth in
ARCA § 9 (d) (1) (emphasis added). The President's
decision must be certified to the Review Board within 30 days of
Id. Records postponed by the
2
PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
AGENCY - INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 3
AGENCY- INTERNAL USE ONLY
FRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PROSUCT
SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK
Assassination Records
6. I would be happy to discuss this further if you so
You might also want to contact John Pereira (x30373)
since he has met with some or all of the Review Board members.
Attachment
3
PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
AGENCY - INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 4
1d-0d0
SUBJECT:
DCI Sources and Methods Authority w/Respect
to
JFK Assassination Records
OGC-94-52916
DCI/OGC/RJEat inger: 76105 (19 Sept 94)-
Original • Addressee */attach) (hand delivered)
- OGC Registry (/attack)
1 - Lit File
1
- RBB (OGC/I1J)
1 - C/HRG (J. Pereira-404 Ames)
1
- RJE - Soft File
(w/attach)
1
- RJE - Signe=
1
-
PDP
1
KK - Ey:
1
- PAS-Ey:
---
## Page 5
14-00000
CIA SPECIAL ETELECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000
DRAFT
CHAPTER XIV - ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
Part 1400 - GUIDANCE FOR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS
COLLECTION ACT OF 1992" (ARCA)
...
Sec.
1400.1 Scope of assassination record.
1400.2 Scope of additional records and information.
1400.3 Sources of assassination records and additional records and
--.
information.
17
---
## Page 6
1d-0d0d
--
DRAFT
I400.4 Types of materials included in scope of assassination record and
additional records and information.
1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety.
1400.6 Originals and copies.
1400.7 Additional guidance.
1400.8 Implementing the ARCA - Notice of Assassination Record Designation.
Authority: 44 U.S.C. 2107 note.
§ 1400.1
Scope of assassination record.
(a)
An assassination record includes, but is not limited to, all records,
public and private, regardless of how labeled or identified, that document,
describe, report on, analyze, or interpret activities, persons, or events reasonably
related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and investigations of or
inquiries into the assassination.
(b)
An assassination record further includes, without limitation:
(1)
All records as defined in Sec. 3(2) of the ARCA;
(2)
All records collected by or segregated by all federal, state, and local
government agencies in conjunction with any investigation or analysis of or
inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy (for example, any intra-
agency investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination; any inter-
agency communication regarding the assassination; any request by the House
Select Committee on Assassinations to collect documents and other materials; or
18
---
## Page 7
1d-0d0d
DRAFT
-
any inter- or intra-agency collection or segregation of documents and other
materials);
(3)
Other records or groups of records listed in the Notice of
Assassination Record Designation, as described in §1400.8 of this chapter.
§1400.2
Scope of additional records and information.
The term additional records and information includes:
(a)
All documents used by government offices and agencies during their
declassification review of assassination records as well as all other documents,
indices, and other material (including but not limited to those that disclose
cryptonyms, code names, or other identifiers that appear in assassination
records) that the Assassination Records Review Board has a reasonable basis to
believe may constitute an assassination record or would assist in the
identification, evaluation or interpretation of an assassination record. The
Assassination Records Review Board will identify in writing those records and
other materials it intends to seek under this section.
(b)
All training manuals, instructional materials, arid guidelines created or
used by the agencies in furtherance of their review of assassination records.
(c)
All records, lists, and documents describing the procedure by which the
agencies identified or selected assassination records for review.
(d)
(e)
Organizational charts of government agencies.
Records necessary and sufficient to describe the agency's:
19
---
## Page 8
(1)
Records policies and schedules;
DRAFT
(2)
Filing systems and organization;
(3)
Storage facilities and locations;
---.-.-.
(4)
Indexing symbols, marks, codes, instructions, guidelines, methods and
procedures;
(5)
Search methods and procedures used in the performance of the agencies'
duties under the ARCA; and
(6)
Reclassification to a higher level, transfer, destruction, or other
information (e.g. theft) regarding the status of assassination records.
(f)
Any other record that does not fall within the scope of assassination
record as described in §1400.1, but which has the potential to enhance, enrich,
and broaden the historical record of the assassination.
§1400.3
Sources of assassination records and additional records and
information.
Assassination records and additional records and information may be located at,
or under the control of, without limitation:
(a)
Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the federal government;
(b)
Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of state and local governments;
- -
20
---
## Page 9
14-00000
DRAFT
(c)
Record repositories and archives of federal, state, and local governments,
including presidential libraries;
(d)
Record repositories and archives of universities, libraries, historical
societies, and other similar organizations;
(e)
Individuals who possess such records by virtue of service with a
government agency, office, or entity;
Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have obtained such
records from sources identified in subparagraphs (a) through (e) of this section;
(g)
Persons, including individuals or corporations, who have themselves
created or have obtained such records from sources other than those identified in
subparagraphs (a) through (e) of this section;
(h)
Federal, state, and local courts where such records are being held under
seal; or
(i)
Foreign governments.
$1400.4
Types of materials included in scope of assassination record and
additional records and information.
The term record in assassination record and additional records and information
includes, for purposes of interpreting and implementing the ARCA:
(a) papers, maps, and other documentary material;
(b) photographs;
(c) motion pictures;
21
---
## Page 10
td-0n0d
DRAFT
(d) sound and video recordings;
(e) machine readable information in any form; and
(f) artifacts.
§1400.5
Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety.
An assassination record shall be disclosed in its entirety except for
portions specifically postponed pursuant to the grounds for postponement of
public disclosure of records established in Sec. 6 of the ARCA, and no portion of
any assassination record shall be, withheld from public disclosure solely on
grounds of non-relevance unless, in the Assassination Records Review Board's
sole discretion, release of part of a record is sufficient to comply with the intent
and purposes of the ARCA.
§1400.6
(a)
Originals and copies.
For purposes of determining whether originals or copies of assassination
records will be made part of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection (the JFK Assassination Records Collection) established under
the ARCA, the following shall apply:
(1)
In the case of papers, maps, and other documentary materials, the
Assassination Records Review Board may determine that record copies of
Government records, either the signed original, original production or a
reproduction that has been treated as the official record maintained to chronicle
22
---
## Page 11
14-00009
... ..
DRAFT
government functions or activities, may be placed in the JFK Assassination
Records Collection;
(2)
In the case of other papers, maps, and other documentary material, the
Assassination Records Review Board may determine that a true and accurate
copy in lieu of the original may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records
Collection;
(3)
In the case of photographs, the original negative, whenever
available (otherwise, the earliest generation print that is a true and accurate
copy) may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;
(4) In the case of motion pictures, the camera original, whenever
available (otherwise, the earliest generation print that is a true and accurate
copy), may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;
(5)
In the case of sound and video recordings, the original recording,
whenever available (otherwise, the earliest generation copy that is a true and
accurate copy), may be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;
(6)
In the case of machine readable information, a true and accurate
copy of the original (duplicating all information contained in the original and in
a format that permits retrieval of the information) may be placed in the JFK
Assassination Records Collection; and
(7)
In the case of artifacts, the original objects themselves may be
placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection.
23
---
## Page 12
4-00000
DRAFT
To the extent records from foreign governments are included in the JFK
Assassination Records Collection, copies of the original records shall be sufficient
for inclusion in the collection.
(c)
In cases where a copy, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section above, is
authorized by the Assassination Records Review Board to be included in the JFK
Assassination Records Collection, the Assassination Records Review Board may,
at its discretion if it determines it to be necessary to ensure the integrity of the
JFK Assassination Records Collection, require a certified copy. In cases where an
original, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, is required for inclusion in
the JFK Assassination Records Collection the Assassination Records Review
Board may, at its discretion, accept the best available copy. In such cases that
records included in the collection, whether originals or copies, contain illegible
portions, such records shall have attached thereto a certified transcription of the
illegible language to the extent practicable.
(d)
For purposes of implementing the ARCA, the term copy means a true and
accurate photocopy duplication by a means appropriate to the medium of the
original record that preserves and displays the integrity of the record and the
information contained in it.
(e)
Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to suggest that additional
copies of any assassination records contained in the JFK Assassination Records
Collection are not also assassination records that, at the Assassination Records
24
---
## Page 13
14-00009
......
DRAFT
«Review Board's discretion, may also be placed in the JFK Assassination Records
Collection.
(1)
Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to prevent or preclude copies
of any assassination records, and particularly assassination records in
audiovisual or machine readable formats, from being made from time to time in
the professional judgment of and at the discretion of the National Archives and
Records Administration for purposes of preservation or reformatting to conform
to different hardware and / or software requirements.
§1400.7
(a)
Additional guidance.
A government agency, office, or entity includes, for purposes of
interpreting and implementing the ARCA, all current, past, and former
departments, agencies, offices, divisions, foreign offices, bureaus, and
deliberative bodies of any federal, state, or local government and includes all
inter- or intra-agency working groups, committees, and meetings that possess or
created records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
(b)
The inclusion of artifacts in the scope of the term assassination
record is understood to apply solely for purposes of establishing the JFK
Assassination Records Collection and for fully implementing the terms of the
ARCA and has no direct or indirect bearing on the interpretation or
implementation of any other statute or regulation.
In the case of artifacts deemed to be assassination records and included in
25
-..
---
## Page 14
14-00009
DRAFT
the JFK Assassination Records Collection, the provision to the public of
photographs, drawings, or similar materials depicting the artifacts shall be
sufficient to comply with the ARCA's requirement that copies of assassination
records be provided to the public upon request. Additional display of or
examination by the public of artifacts in the JFK Assassination Records Collection
shall occur under the terms and conditions established by the National Archives
and Records Administration to ensure their preservation and protection for
posterity.
(d)
The terms and, or, any, all, and the plural and singular forms of nouns
shall be understood in their broadest and most inclusive sense and shall not be
understood to be terms of limitation.
(e)
Unless the Assassination Records Review Board in its sole discretion
directs otherwise, records that are identified with respect to a particular person
shall include all records relating to that person that use or reflect their true name
or any other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol, number, cryptonym or alias
used to identify that person.
-:
(1)
Unless the Assassination Records Review Board in its sole discretion
directs otherwise, records that are identified by the Assassination Records
Review Board with respect to a particular operation or program shall include all
records pertaining to that program by any other name, pseudonym, codeword;
symbol, number or cryptonym.
26
---
## Page 15
14-00000
DRAFT
§1400.8
Implementing the ARCA - Notice of Assassination Record
Designation.
(a)
A Notice of Assassination Record Designation shall be the mechanism for
the Assassination Records Review Board to announce publicly its determination
that a record or group of records meets the definition of assassination records.
(b)
Notice of all designations will be published in the Federal Register within
30 days of the decision to designate such records as assassination records.
In determining that a record or group of records meets the definition of
assassination records, the Assassination Records Review Board must determine
that the record or group of records will more likely than not enhance, enrich, and
broaden the historical record of the assassination.
• ...
-.=
---
## Page 16
14-00000
Calendar No. 552
102D ConGRESs
2d Session
SENATE
THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION
RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992
REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
TO ACCOMPANY
S. 3006
TO PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
RELEVANT TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F.
KENNEDY
# 59.010
JULy 22 (legislative day, JuLy 20), 1992. Ordered to be printed
US. COVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1992
S.Reot. 102-328 0 - 92 - 1
---
## Page 17
14-00000
21
tion, it is important to emphasize and clarify the legislative intent
and importance of particular provisions of the Act
Defining assassination records
'Assassination records" are defined in Section 3. The definitic
f "assassination records" is a threshold consideration for the su
cessful implementation of the Act. Its scope will be the barometer .
of public confidence in the release of assassination records. While
the records of past presidential commissions and congressional
committees established to investigate the assassination of President
Kennedy are included as assassination records under this Act, it is
intended and emphasized that the search and disclosure of records
under this Act must go beyond those records. While such records
are valuable, they reflect the views, theories, political constraints,
and prejudices of past inquiries. Proper implementation of this Act
and providing the American public with the opportunity to judge
he surrounding history of the assassination for themselves
re
uires including not only, but going beyond, the records of the
Warren and Rockefeller Commissions, and the Church and House
Select Assassination Committees.
The term
bout the universe of records would have been premature, an
ould have further injected the government between the record
government offices will begin to organize and review their records..:
before the Review Board is established. Government offices are re-
quired to begin the review and disclosure of records upon enact-
ment to expedite public access to the many records which do not
require additional review or postponement. However, the ultimate
work of the Review Board will involve not only the review of
records recommended for postponement, but requiring government
ifices to provide additional intormation and records, where appro
riate. Guidance, especially that developed in consultation with the
public, scholars, and affected government offices, will prove valua-
ble to ensure the fullest possible disclosure and create public confi-
dence in a working definition that was developed in an independ-
ent and open manner.
Autopsy Records
The Act specifically excludes from the definition
of "assassi
nation records"
the autopsy records and copies or reproductions
made from such records donated by the Kennedy family pursuant
to a deed of gift executed on October 29, 1966. These records in-
clude the autopsy photographs and X-rays of President Kennedy.
The Committee believes that this exclusion is a sound policy. The
Committee believes that there is a compelling justification for pro-
tecting the privacy of the Kennedy family from the unwarranted
C9655053 45254007398
---
## Page 18
!
19
operations, or foreign relations of the United States.
The Assassination Records Review Board is an independent
agency within the executive branch. The five-member Review
Board will be appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the United States Senate. The confirmation hearings will be
conducted by the Committee on Governmental Affairs. The Act re
quires that the Review Board include at least one historian and
one attorney
resting he appoin he tie, the reseel to quire consider r to
ization of American Historics, the Societ A Americahe Orchi-
mation of American Histomans.
vists, and the American Bar Association.
Board has the authority to direct any government office to produce
additional information and records which it believes are related to
the assassination. It has the authority to subpoena private persons
and to enforce the subpoenas through the courts.
ence to less than one year if that is the time determined as neces-
of government offices and agencies, and the possible need for addi-
tional time or authority from Congress.
IV. BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
On November 22, 1963,
ated. It was a tragic and definine moment in American histor
he desire by the American public to understand who assassinate
President Kennedy, and why, has resulted in several official inves-
cigations and a broad spectrum of private inquiries and scholar
ship. Unfortunately, in the eyes of the public, each investigatior
and inquiry served to raise additional questions, and did so while
increasing the volume of secret government records about the as
sassination. In 1992, the public demand, fostered by increased
ognition by the Congress
records related to the assassination of President Kennedy should be
fully disclosed.
In addition to the legislation considered by the Committee, and
its counterpart considered by the House Committee on Government
Operations, four other related,
though more limited, measures:
were introduced in the House of Representatives in 1992. Two bills
mandating the release of all Kennedy assassination investigation
11
---
## Page 19
7506
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 26 / Wednesday, February 8, 1995 / Proposed Rules
(D) For dependents of active duty
members in pay grades of E-5 and
(B) For dependents of active duty
members in pay grades of E-s and
above, $25; and;
(C) For retirees and their depcadents"
525.
(vi) The copayment for prescription
drugs per prescription, for a maximum
30-day supply, Is as follows:
(A) For dependents of active duty
mombors in pay grades È-1 through E
4, 55:
(B) For dependents of active duty
members in pay grados of E-s and
. above, $S; and.
(C) For retirees and their dependents,
$9.
(wii) The copayment for ambulanco
services is as follows:
(A) For dependents of active duty
• members in pay grades of E-1 through
E 1. $10;
(B) For dopendents of active duty
mombors in pay grados of E-S and
sbove, $25; and.
(C) For retirees and their dependents.
$20..
(e) Inpatient cost shoring
requirements under the Uniform HMO
Benefit-(1) In general. la liou of usual
CHAMPUS cost sharing roquiruments
(500 § 194.4(1)), spooal cost sharing
arDounts are required. The specile
(C) For retirees and their dopendents,
(1) Updates. The enrollment fees for
fiscel year 1995 set under paragraph (c)
of this section and the per services
specific dollar amounts for hscal you
1995 set under paragraphs (d) and (e) of
this section may be updated for
subsoquent yoars to the extent necessary.
to maintain compliance with statutory
roquirements partaining to government
costs. This updating does not apply lo
cost saaring that is expressed as a
porcontago of allowable charges: these
percentages will remain unchanged.
(8) Applicability of the Uniform HMO
Benefit to Uniformed Services
Treatment Facilities Managed Care
Program. The provisions of this section
concerning the Uniform HMO Benefit
shall apply to the Uniformed Services
Troatment Facilities Managed Care
Program, effective October 1, 1995.
Under that program, non-CHAMPUS
eligiblo benefciaries have the sarne
payment responsibilities as CAMPUS.
eligble beneficiartes.
Daled February 2, 1995.
requirements shall be uniforn and shall
be published as a notice annually by-tbe
nisolant sochilty ul Defense (Ilcalu
ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW
BOARD
36 CFR Part 1400
Alternate OSD Faderol Hepaster Larson
Offuer, Department of Gafense.
(2) Structure of cass sharng. For
15K Doc 95-3028 Filer 2-9-55. 8 45 arol
sorvicos olber than mental illness or
BILLING COOE 6000-06-40
substance use treatment, there is a
nominal copayment for sclive duty
dependents and for retired members.
dependents of retired members. and
survivors. Fur inpatient mental bealth
and substanco use treatment, a separate
per day chargo is established.
(3) Amount of inpatient cost sharing
sequirements. Beginning in fiscal your
• 1905, tho inpatient cost sharing
roquirements are ar follows:
0 For acute care admissions and
other non-mental bealth/substance use
treatment admissions, the per diem
charge is as follows, with a minimum
charge of $25 per admission:
(A) For dependents of active duly
members in pay grades E-I through &
Guldance on Interpreting and
Implementing the President John F.
Kennedy Assassinaton Records
Collection Act of 1992
ACENCY: Assassination Records Reviow
Board (ARRB).
ACTION: Iraposed interpretive
regulation.
SUMMARY: The ARRB proposes to issue
regulations providing guidance on the
(B) For dependents of active duly
interpretation of certain terms defined
members in pay grades of E-5 and
in and the implementation of the
_abovo. $11; and,
President John F. Kennedy
(C) For rotirees and their dependente
Assassination Records Collection Act of
511.
(ti) For mental healt/substance use
treatment admissions, and for partial
hospitalization services, the per diem
charge Is as follows. with a minimum
charge of $25 per admission:
A For dependents of active duty
membery in pay grades E-1 through E
1. $20:
DATES: To be considered, comments
must be received on or belore March 10.
ADDRESSES: Comments should be
mailed to the Assassination Records
Raview Board at bUU E Street, NW.
Socond Ivor. Washington, D.C. 20530 ur
delivorod in person lu that address
between the hours of 9:30 a.m. and 4:30
p.m., Monday through Friday (except
legal holidays} Comments ray also bu
faxed to the Board al (202) 724-0457.
Comments received may be inspected in
the Board'& public reading room, located
at the address shown above, between 10
a.m. and J p.ra. Monday through Friday
(except legal holidays). Parsons wishing
to inspect comments in the Board's
public realing room should call the
Doard's office beforehand at (202) 72J
008u for further information.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Sheryl L. Waller (Cencral Counsel).
(202) 724-0088.
• SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The President John F. Konnedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992, 44 U.S.C. 2107 note (as amended)
(ARCA). establisbod the President Jobn
F. Kennedy Assassination Racords .
Collection (the JFK Collection) at the
Nauonal Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). In establisbing ...
lbe procoss for public disclosure of all
records relating to tho assassination.
Congrass created an independent agency
withun the execuave branch, the
Assassinauon Records Review Bourd
(tho Board), which consists of ive
Cilizens appointed by the President.
Under the sialule, the Board is
empowered lo deudo "wether a record
constalutes an assassination record." &
U.5 C 2107 note, Sec. 9(1)(2)(A)
Congress further made clear its intent
that the Board "issue guidance lo assist
in articulaling the scope or universe of
assassination records." President John
F. Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992, S.Rep. 102-328.
102d Cong.. 2d Sess. (1992) at 21.
In constructing the proposed guidance
set out here, the board seeks 1o
• implement congressional intent that the
JFK Collection Contain "be most
comprehensive disclosure of records
related to the assassination of Presidon!
Kennedy," Id. at 18. The Board is also
mindful of Congress's instruction that
tho Board apply a "broad and
encompassing" working definition of
"assassination rocord" in order to
achieve the goal of assembling the
fullest historical record on this tragic
event In American history and on the
investigations that were undertaken in
the assassination's afermath. The Board
recognizes that many agencies have
already begun to organize and reviess
records responsive to the ARCA even
before the Board was appointed and
began its work. Nevertheless, the
Board's aim is that this guldance will
ald in the ultimate assombly and public
---
## Page 20
Federal Register / Vol. 60. No. 26 / Wednesday, February 8, 1995 / Proposed Rules
7507
disclocuro of the fullest possiblo
histoncal rocord on this tragedy and on
subsequent invosugations and inquires
The Board's pruposed guidance is
designod to bolp government agencies
and the Board identify and make
avellable to the public all documonts
that will onhanco, enrich, and broaden
the historical rocurd of the assassination
of Prosidont Jobn F. Kennedy. The
Board socks through this guidance to
f:16ll Congross's "inton(i) and omphasis
that the search and disclosure of rocords
urdur this Act must go boyond" lbe
rocords of previous commissions and
committees established to Invesugate
Prosident Konnody's assassination. id. al
21. The Board also soeks to provide
sutice of the scope of its intended
exercise of authurity lo soek additonal
information or records in ordor to fulfill
is functions and responsibilitios under
In addition, the Board proposas to
create a mochanism to facilitate the
Board's ongoing work and to further
ensure future public access to the
broadest possible historical record. This
mechanism will be known as tbe
"Catalog of Assassination Records"
(COAR). The COAR is intended to be an
• official listing of all records determined
by the Board to meet the definition of
"assassination record and included in
the JFK Collection.
Request for Comments
The Board seeks public comment on
its proposed interpretve regulations
intended so provide guidanco on the
Intorpretation of the term assassination
record, the intended scope of its
exercise of authority to seck additional
Infornation or records, and its
additional proposals for implomontation
of tho ARCA.
List of Subjects in 36 CFR Part 1400
Administrative practice and
procedure, Archives and rocords.
Accordingly, the Assassination
Records Review Board hereby proposes
to establish a new chapter XIV in title
36 ol tho Code of Foderal Regulations lo
ruad as follows:
CHAPTER XIV ASSASSINATION
RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
PART 1400 GUIDANCE FOR
INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
ASSASSINATION RECORDS
COLLECTION ACT OF 1992 (ARCA)
1400.1 Interpretation of assassination
140u.z Interpretation of additigral records
Soures of assassinallon recorde ard
additional recurds and information.
1400.4 Types ol materials included in scope
of assasaination record and additional
rocurde and information.
Requirement that assassinatlon
records be released In their enurely
1100.6 Originals and copies.
1400.7 Additional guidanca
1400 & Implementung the ARCA- Calalog of
Assassination Records
Authority: 44 U S.C. 2107 role.
§ 1400.1 Interpretation of assassinallon
(a) An ussussination record includes.
but is not hmited to, all records, public
and private, regardless of how labeled or
identified, that documont, descnbe,
report, analyze, or interprot activities
and ovants that may havo lod lo the
assassination of President John F.
Kennedy; the assassination itself; and
Investigations of or inquiries into the
assassination.
(b) An assassination record furthor
includes, without limitation:
(1) All records as defined in Soc. 3(2)
of cho ARCA:
(2) All records called by or segregated
by all foderal, state, and local
government agencies in conjunction
with any investigation or analysis of or
Inquiry into the assassination of
President Kennedy. (for example, any
intra-agency investigation or analysis of
or inquiry into the assassination; any
Inter-agency communication regarding
the assessination; any request by the
House Solect Committee on
Assassinations to collect documents and
othor materials; or any inter- or intra.
agency collection or segregation of
- documents and other materials):
(3) Other records or grouns of records
listed in the Catalog of Assassination
Records, as described in § 1400.8 of this
$ 1400.2 Interpretation of additional
records and Informalon.
Tho term additional infonnation and
records includes:
(a) All documents uscd by
governmont offices and agencies during
tholr declassification revlow of
assassination rocords as well as all other
documents, indices; records, and auler
matorial that disclose cryptonyms, code
namos, or other identification material
in assassination rocords.
(b) All training manuals, instructional
materials, and guidelines croated or
used by the agencies in furhorance of
thoir roview of assassination recurds.
(c) All records. lists, und documents
describing the procedure by which the
agencies idenuded or sclocted
assassination recorde for revicto.
(d) Organizational charts of
governmeat agoncles.
(o) Records nocessary and sufferent so
destinbe the agency's:
(1) Rocords policies and schedules:
(2) Filing systems and organization:
(3) Storage facilitios and locations.
§ 1400.3 Sources of assassination records
and additonal records and Infomalion.
Assassination records and additional
records and information may bo localed..
al, or under the control of, without
(a) Agencies, offices, and entities of
the executive, legislativo, and judicial
branches of the federal government;
(b) Agencies, offices, and entities of
the exocutive, legislative, and judicial
branchos of state and local governments:
(c) Record ropositories and archives of
foderal, state, and local governments.
including presidential librarios:
(d) Record ropositories and archives
of universities, libraries, historical
socielles, and othes similar
(o) Individuals who possess such
records by virtue of service with a
government agency, offico, or entity:
(1) Porsons, Including individuals and
corporations, who have obtained such
records from sources identified in
paragraphs (a) through (e) of this
(g) Federal, state, and local courts,
where such rocords are being hold
undor saal; or
(k) Foreign governments.
§ 1400.4 Types of materiais Included in
scope of assassination record and
addillonal recorde and Information.
Tho torm record In assassination
record and additional records and -
information includos. for purposes of
interpreting and implementing tho
ARCA:
(a) Papers, maps. and other
documentary matorial;
(b) Photograpbs;
(c) Motion pictures:
(d) Sound and video recordings:
(o) Machino roadablo Information in
any form: and
---
## Page 21
14-00000
7508
" Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 26 / Wedoesday, February 8, 1995 / Propsed Rules
(1 Artifaces.
§ 1400.5 Requirement that assassinalon
records be relassod In their entroty.
An assassinatiou record shall be
disclosed in its entirety except for
portions spocifically posiponod
pursuant to the grounds for
postponement of public disclosure of
records established in section 6 of the
ARCA, and no portions of any
assassination records shall be withheld
from public disclosure solely an
grounds of non-relevance.
$ 1400.6 Originals and coples.
(a) For purposes of determining
whother originals or copies of
assassination records may bo made part
of the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection (the
JFK Records Colloction) to be
establishod under the ARCA:
(1) In the case of papers, maps, and
olber documentary material, the
Assassination Records Review Board
(the Board) may determine (bat a true
and accurate copy of the origiual is
(2) In the case: of photograpbs, the
fero record means the original negative
if available, otherwisa, le earliest
generation print;
(3) In the case uf mution pictures, the
term record means tbe camera original
if available, otherwise, the earliest
generation print.
(1) la she case of sumel and vidco
rocordings, the term record means the
original recording. ilavailablo,
otherwise, the earliest generation copy;
(5) In the caso of machine-readable
information, the Board may determine
that a true and accurate copy of the
original is suificient: and
(6) Artifacis meaus the original object
(b) In cases where a copy, as dofined
in paragraph (a) of this section is
authorized by the Board to be included
in the FK Records Collection the Board
may, at its discretion, requira a certified
copy. In cases where an original, as
dofined in paragraph (a) of this section,
is required for inclusion in the JFK
Records Collection the Board may, at its
discretion, Accept the best available
copy.
§ 1400.7 Additional guldance:
(a) A govemnient agency, office. or
entity includes. for purposes of
interpreting and implementing the
ARCA, all departments, agencies.
offices, divisions, foreien offices.
buronus, and deliberative bodies of any
federal, state, or local government and
includes oll inter or Intra-agency
working groups. commitrees. and
mootings that possess or croated rocords
relating to the assassination of frosident
John F. Keonady.
(b) The inclusion of arufocts in the
scope of the ter assassination record is
understood to apply solely for purposes
of establishing the President John F.
Konnedy Assassination Records
Collaction and for fully implementing
the terras of tho ARCA and bas no direct
or indirect bearing on the interpretation
or implementauon of any other statute
or regulation.
(c) In the case of artifacts deemed to
be assassination records and included in
the John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collecuon, provision to lbe
public of photographs. drawings. or
similar materials depicting de artifacis
shall be sulficient to comply with the
ARCA's requiramant that copios of
assassination records be provided to the
public upon request. Other display to or
examination by the public of artifacts in
the John F. Kennody Assassination
Records Collection shall occur under
tenns and conditions established by the
National Archives and Records
Administration that are adequato to
preserve and protect the artifaces for
posterity..
(d) Tbo terras and. or. ang. oll, and the
plural and singular forns of nouns shall
be understood in their broadcast and
most inclusive sense and shall not br
understood lo be terms of limitaton.
Any records idenufied with respect lo a
particular person also includes any
records for that person by any other
name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol.
number, cryptonyn or alias. Any record
described with respect to an operation
or program includes any record
pertaining to that program by any other
name, pseudony, codeword, symbol.
number or cryptonym.
$14008 Implemenling the ARCA Catalog
ol Assassination Records
(0) A Catalog of Assassination Records
(COAR) shall be created as the official
listing of all records determined by the
Board to meet the definition of
assassination rocord.
(b) Notice of all decisions to include
records in the COAR will be-published
in the Federal Register within 30 days
of the decision.
(c) In listing records or groups of
records in the COAK, the Bourd must
detennine that the record or group of
records will more hkoly lhan not
enhance, corich, and broaden the
historical record of the assassination.
Dalud: February 3, 1095.
Dawld G. Marwell,
Executive Dirclor, Assassinacion Rocords
Review Board.
IFK DOC 95-3112 Filnd 2-7-45; 8:45 am!
BILLING CODE 8020-TD-UA
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
40 CFR Parts 51 and 93
(FRL-51409)
Transportation Conformity Rule
Amendments: Transiton to the Control
Strategy Perlod
AGENCY: Enviroomental Protoction
Адельу (ЕРА).
ACTION: Proposed rula
SUMMARY: This action proposes to
permanently align the timing of certain
transportation conformity consequences
with the imposition of Clean Air Act
bighway sanctions. For ozone
nonastaiunent areas with an incomplete.
15% emissions-roduction state
implementation plan with a protective
finding; incomplete ozone attainmenu
3% rate-of-progress plan; or finding of
failure to submit an ozono allainment
• 3% ratt-of-progress plan, and areas
whose control strategy implementation
plan for ozone, carbon monoside.
particulate roatter, or nitrogen coxide is
disapproved with a protective finding.
the conformity status of the
transportation plan and program would
not lapse as a result of such failure until
highway sanctions for such failuro are
effective under other Clean Air Act
sections.
This action would delay the lapse in
conformity status, which would
otherwise prevent approval of nos
highway and transit projects, and allow
States more time to prevent the lapse by
submitting complete ozono
implementation plans.
ÉPA bas publisbed in the final rule
soction of this Federal Register @ similar
interim final rule which takes cflect
immediately and applies for six months.
This proposal would apply the
provisions of the interim final rule
permanently,
DATES: Comments on this action must be
received by March 10, 1995. A public
bearing will be held at 10:30 a.ra. on
February 22, 1995 in Washington, DC.
ADDRESSES: Interested parties may
submit written comments (in duplicate.
il possiblo) to: Air and Radiation Docket
and Infonnation Center. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.
Altention: Docket No. A-95-02. 401 M
Street, SW., Washingion, DC 20460.
---
## Page 22
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL. USE ONLY
CSI-0316/95
16 February
1995
NOTE FOR: D/IM/ADDA/IS
DCI/ IRO
DA/ IRO
DI/ IRO
DO/IRO
DS&T/IRO
OGC (Bob Eatinger)
DD/OCA
C/ IP&CRD
C/RDP/MSG/OIT
FROM:
John Pereira
Historical Review Group
SUBJECT: JFK Assassination Records
Proposed Regulations
1.
Attached for your review and comment is a copy of
proposed regulations prepared by the JFK Assassination
Records Review Board.
The regulations focus on the
definition
of "assassination record", which is very broad.
The possibility of requiring additional records searches is
raised.
The Board plans to discuss the regulations at its
next meeting on 6-7 March, so it would be helpful to give
the Board our input in advance of that meeting. Please
provide Barry Harrelson (x30292) or me (x30373)) with your
John
F. Pereira
Attachment
- --
-
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 23
14-00000
=3.8
••d$)
Ud.d
115151
0001
facsimile
TRANSMITTAL
to:
fax #*:
re:
date:
pages:
Dear John:
John Pereira, CLA Historical Review Program
(703) 243-8343
ARRB proposed interpretive regulations
February 9, 1995
4, including cover sheel.
Following this cover sheet is a courtesy copy of the Assassination
Records Review Board's proposed interpretive regulations, published yesterday in the
Federal Register. The proposed regulations include guidance on interpretation of the
scope of certain provisions of the Assassination Records Collection Act, including the
termas "assassination record" and "additional records and information." The Board is
soliciung comment from all interested parties and would welcome any comments that
the CIA may havc. (The commient period is 30 days; the deadline is March 10.)
It you have any questions or need any additional information, please
don's hesitate to give me a call on my direct line or at our main number, 724-0088.
Singerely,
Omely
Sher
1. Walter
General Counsel
From the dese of
Sheryli. Water
General Counsel
_Assassinason Records Review Board
600 E Streer. AW, Second Floor
Washington. D.C. 20530
(202) 724-0915
Fax (202) 724-0457
---
## Page 24
27 February 1995
To:
C/HRG
Subj: Review Board's Proposed
• Regulations
1400.2 (e) (3), Storage facilities and locations, presents a
possible conflict with our continuing protection of
1400.5, Requirement that assassination records be released
in their entirety...and no portion withheld solely on
grounds of non-relevance. For that portion of the documents
we have declared non-relevant that is operational and is
clearly non-relevant we should argue strongly with the
Board. The Director's
statutory responsibility for the
protection of sources and methods must be defended; and we
can be sure that it was not anticipated that a KGB officer
in Mexico City would be transferred to another country and
go on generating much operational information. Furthermore,
we saw it as the
Board's responsibility to review the
records we identified as non-relevant and to support --
publicly those of our decisions that they felt were
justified!
1400.6, Originals and copies, could cause problems if the
Board gets fussy about it. Originals of memos sent outside
che agency would be gone to the addressee. Originals of
sables and despatches are virtually non-existant.
1400.8(c),"
..the Board must determine that the record or
group cecorats more takely than not enhance, enrich,
and broaden the historical record.." Like some of this stuff
might be non-relevant?
Frank
---
## Page 25
New Note
NOTE FOR:
@DOI
FROM:
DATE:
02/27195 05:02:46 PA
SUBJECT: JIK Records
This is in response to vour request that l reviem ASAf Me proqueen regulatiotis by thra JFK
Assassination Rusords Revlow Board.
I ser Sharyl Walters hand very much in endance here I soe from the aftachment that she is the Board's
GC.
Lise you, I am very concemed about the breadth of the rag's refinitions The key in keep in mind is the
allory authority for the Boand. I would argue that the definition ol "assassinalion record" in the stature
694 U.S.C. section 2107 note, section 3(21 of fhe Acl) is more limiter than the reg: The satura dalnes an
assassination record as one "rolated' to me assassinatien of JFK. Thus, when section 1400.2 (d) and lei
of the rea authorize Board access to orgartizational charis of arvernmental agencies and records
nocessary and suttician to describo the agency's records policios and schedules. flina sustens and
organization, and storage facilities and locatiors, I mur argue that such information is way 10o far a-relo.
Therg is no way we can allow the Beard lo have access to this information, which in any event is
prohibited br section 403g from disclosure notwithstanding any other law
The same issue arises with respect la frelion 1400.7(d) of the reg that proposes to include in tha
definition of racord any records tor a person by another name or personal identitier. This mould aupear 8o
authorize Board access to all information about an agent who may have only been tangerially involved in
the ascassination but whose crypt is given in mary other unrelaled document's about unrelated
operations. Talk aboul your canals nose under the tent!
Finally, section 1400.5 of the reg raises an pir dog of an issue. The National Securly Archive (Sharyis
old employer! has been fightina for a long time in FOlA litigation that the TOlA refers to records and that
therefore all information in a responsive record must be released unless otherwies exompl. There se no
FOlA exemption, they arque. for non-responsive material in a record. This is a big problem for multi-lour:
duournents. such as the NID. We.
of churse, argue that agences are only required to process that which
is asked for and delete non-responsive material as unrequested. The proposed reg would mean that lle
Board would lave ancess to all information in a documem abour several unrelated opcratons or events if
Shat document even mentioned the assassination or anything related 1o il. Again. fle camels post.
CC:
@
DCI
---
## Page 26
From the Desk of Robert J. Eatinger
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
Here is advance copy:
J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
Robert J. Eatinger
03/01/95 01:46:44 PM
Comments on proposed JFK reg
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
OGC- 95-50522
1 March 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group
FROM:
Robert J. Eatinger, JI.
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC
SUBJECT:
Comments on JFK Assassination Records Proposed
Regulation
1.
The following are my comments on the Assassination
Records Review Boards proposed interpretive regulations published
in the Federal Register on 8 February 1995.
The term assassination record is defined in the
President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992, Pub.L. 102-525, 106 Stat. 3443, Oct. 26, 1992, reprinted at
44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (the Act). Any interpretive definition by
the Board cannot exceed that in the Act. The Acts definition is
found in Section 3(2) and provides:
(a) Assassination record means a record that is related to
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, that was
created or made available for use by, obtained by, or
otherwise came into possession of
various Federal, State, or local government bodies.
3. The proposed regulation is broader than that in the Act.
The proposed regulation includes as assassination records:
records, public and private, regardless of how labeled or
identified, that document, describe, report, analyze, or
interpret activities and events that may have led to the
ADMINISTRATIVE/ INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 27
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
assassination of President John F. Kennedy; the
assassination itself; and investigations of or inquiries
into the assassination.
$ 1400.1(a). This language in overbroad in two respects. First,
the phrase events that may have led to is both broader than
relates to as in the Act and provides no articulable standard.
For instance, the theme in the Oliver Stone movie JFK appears to
be that President Kennedy was assassinated as a result of a
conspiracy to keep the war in Vietnam from winding down.
Under
the proposed regulation, the Board might consider all records
concerning the war in Vietnam during the Kennedy Administration
as being assassination records.
Without a standard, the phrase
is permits arbitrary and inconsistent application.
Third, it
includes information about investigations and inquiries other
than those conducted by those entities identified in the Act.
Although the Board states that it is following the intent of
Congress in seeking the most comprehensive disclosure of records
related to the assassination, it appears the Board may be
exceeding its authority.
4. The definition further states that assassination record
includes, without limitation
... all records as defined in Sec.
3(2) of the ARCA.
See § 1400.1 (b) (1). Thus, by its terms it
exceeds the statutory definition.
Further, it is unhelpful
because by refusing to limit itself to any articulable class of
records it remains unlimited and subject to constant
re-interpretation by the Board.
5. The proposed definition of additional information and
records under proposed $ 1400.2 is objectionable because the
regulation does not provide the intended use of the definition.
The Board may be attempting to provide a definition useful in
interpreting the Boards authority under §7(j) (1) (C) (ii) of the
Act:
The Review Board shall have the authority to act in a manner
prescribed under this Act Including authority to ... direct
i Government office to make available to the Review Board
and if necessary investigate the facts surrounding,
additional information, records, or testimony from
individuals,
which the Review Board has reason to believe is
required to
, fulfill its functions and responsibilities under
this Act....
(Emphasis added.) If this is the case, the Board should
expressly so state and provide opportunity for informed comment
on that application.
For instance, -proposed § 1400.2 (a) includes
all documents used by the agency during its declassification
review.
This definition could include requests for legal advice
on particular matters.
Such advice would be protected within the
particular agency by attorney-client privilege and should not be
provided to an extra-agency body.
ADMINISTRATIVE • INTERNAL USE ONLY
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## Page 28
14-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
6.
Please
call
me
with any questions or suggestions.
Robert J. Eatinger, JI.
CC:
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 29
14-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
TO:
_@ DCI
FROM:
John F. Pereira
DATE:
03/02/95 05:07:45 PM
SUBJECT:
Re: Proposed Regs by JFK Assassination Records Review Board
A number of us have concerns about the broad approach in the proposed regs. Among others, Bob Eatinger has written a memo on the
subject. We are preparing a formal response for the Board, which will be sent around for comment
In the meantime, I have had an informal discussion with the Board's Executive Director, David Marwell, advising him of our concerns. He
has invited us to propose specific textual changes.
The Board's deadline is 10 March.
Any additional thoughts would be welcome
CC:
Edmund Cohen @ DA @ DCl, J. Edwin Dietel @ DA @ DCI,/
@ DCI
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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## Page 30
11.00000 .
ADMINISTRATIVE • INTERNAL USE ONLY
From the Desk of&
OCA
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
Edmund Cohen @ DA
J. Edwin Dietel @ DA
John F. Pereira @ DA
03/02/95 04:22:48 PM
Proposed Regs by JFK Assassination Records Review Board
Page and I are very concerned about the overly broad reach of the proposed regulations of the JFK Board. I have prepared specific
comments that l will send by separate cover. In essence, we are concerned that the regs reach too far into Agency records and stray too
ar from the definition of an "assassination record" in the law. What input does CIA have into this process and what are the tim
onstraints? It looks like a power grab. It seems to us that Cohen should engage immediately in his role as Chair of the Agency Releas
Panel. The full ARP might wish to address these issues at it 9 March meeting. Please advise.
CC:
A DCI
_@ DCI
-
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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## Page 31
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTE FOR:
J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
FROM:
DATE:
03/02/95 09:25:33 AM
SUBJECT:
Response to the JFK Proposed Regulation
This vehicle seemed to be the best one available to pass my "bullets" to you. Perhaps you can dump them in a Word file and
ammend them with your thoughts.
1400.1 Interpretation of Assassination Record
a.) non-limiting descriptor "may have led to the assassination"
CEp31
otrepart
makes us vulnerable for capricious search demands
1400.2 Interpretation of Additional Records
says R.B should
a.) and b.J This relates to Agency classified resources that refer to
the total Agency mission. - well beyond the "assassination" subject.
vet on a
reasmabo
Identification of all such resources will require a separate effort
basis
requiring substantial resources. In addition it may be impossible to
identify all such specific resources as the review effort involved
attis in egustre.
many people having experience throughout the Agency.
These resources are classified and most probably would be
recommended for "indefinite" postponement.
d.) and e.) Information described in these sections has been and is
protected by the National Security Act
As a time period for this information is not stated it is thus implied to
be open ended and that all such information would be made
available.
Major Concern
201 dopfiles
1400.5 Requirement That Assassintion Records Be Released In Their
Entirety
If an individual's
• Nonrelevance issue will most likely result in marked increase in
minor involuement in
postponed records.
Othe JFk stay or in.
1400.6 Originals and Copies
anti Cuban activitier
a Large prin of AS I calcin our orient make his complete
search for originals will require a massive resource commitment.
.".
The tearin ly site t unto rosy said file fo all filos on
documents in the collections.
1400.7 Additional Guidance
the midividual) we
d.) Application of this requirement may well jeopardize current
postponements aimed at protecting Agency personnel and sources
& will have a majch
soarce protectin
This requirement also implies a new generation of searches to
"round-out" or to verify previous searches and retrieved material..
& privat problem
CC:
--
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## Page 32
14-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
7 March 1995
NOTE FOR: Bob Eatinger, OGC
SUBJECT:
JFK Proposed Regulations
As we discussed, I would appreciate your view as to
whether OGC should send a separate paper to the JFK Board on
the proposed regulations.
The attached is what we in HRG propose to coordinate in
the Agency today, 7 March, depending on your view. I'll
hold off circulating the attached draft for comment until
I've heard from you.
(The Board asks
for comments by 10 March.)
John Pereira
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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## Page 33
14-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
9 March 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Per your request,
J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
JFK Assassination Records Proposed Regulations
concurs with the proposed regulation.
CC:
@ DST
T@ DST
---
## Page 34
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
CSI-0319/95
8 March 1995
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
D/IM/ADDA/IS
DCI / IRO
DA/IRO
DI / IRO
DO / IRO
DS&T/ IRO
OGC (Bob Eatinger)
DD/OCA
C/IP&CRD
C/RDP /MSG/OIT
John Pereira
Historical Review Group
JFK Assassination Records
Proposed Regulations
Please review attached draft comments on the proposed
regulations prepared by the JFK Assassination Review Board.
Our deadline for comments to the Board is 10 March, so
please send me or Barry Harrelson your suggestions by cob
9 March
Jhe Perine
John Pereira
Attachments
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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## Page 35
14-00000
8 Man
Mx.
David Marwell
Dear David,
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the
Assassination Records Review Board's proposed interpretive
egulations as published in the Federal Register
February
8, 1995.
We recognize the value of providing guidance foi
those who are responsible for implementing the Assassination
Records Collection Act.
Our general view is that the regulations are
comprehensive in identifying the range of records that woul
ootentially be relevant to the JFK assassination or the
scope of the investigations into the assassination.
In a few sections of the regulations the wording seems
somewhat overly broad or the meaning is not clear. Attached
for the Board's consideration are comments on these
sections.
In some parts of the text we suggest possible
in wording for purposes of clarification.
We would be pleased to discuss these comments at the
Board's convenience.
It is our intention to continue
cooperating fully with the Board and to make every effort to
release assassination records held by the Agency.
John F. Pereira
Historical Review Group, CIA
---
## Page 36
1d-0n0d
.....
Following are CIA's comments on specific sections of the
Assassination Records Review Board's interpretive
regulations, as published in the Federal Register, February
8,
1995.
1.
Section 1400.1 Interpretation of Assassination Record
In paragraph
(a) the reference to "activities and events
that may have led to the assassination--*
seems overly
broad, and appears to go beyond the limits established in
the Assassination Records Collection Act. We believe that
it would be helpful to include an articulable standard in
The
present text would permit inconsistent
application of the regulations, which might encourage
massive and expensive, additional records searches that are
of doubtful value.
The following change is suggested in paragraph (a):
"activities and events that may reasonably be
considered to have led to the assassination--"
(This would
be consistent with the Act.)
2.
Section 1400.2 Interpretation of additional records and
information
Paragraph (a) raises a question as to the purpose and
definition of "additional records and information.
The
meaning of the phrase "all documents used--during
declassification review of assassination records as well as
all other documents--"seems unclear. Is it the intention to
include any document, book, index, record system, etc.
regardless of relevance to the assassination or
investigations, including for example, legal opinions ? We
assume that the purpose is to enable the Board to request
and review
additional records.
We suggest that the section be made more specific,
including a clearer statement of the intent.
For example,
with
respect to cryptonyms,
codewords, guides, etc. a more
• precise link to events related to the assassination or to a
timeframe could be helpful.
---
## Page 37
1d-0d0d
3.
Section 1400.5
Requirement that assassination records
be released
in their entirety
The introductory paragraph specifies that "no portions
of any assassination record shall be withheld--solely on
grounds of non-relevance."
This appears to open the door
for access to
entire documents that contain information on
sensitive activities even when the documents contain.
Information that is only incidental to the assassination,
such as a passing reference to a name.
There is a potential
risk that sensitive, non-relevant sources and methods would
be compromised.
We suggest that the Board consider adding wording to this
section that accommodates those instances when there is a
to release ample information from a document to
disclose assassination-related material, while still
protecting obviously unrelated, sensitive information. The
Board, of course, would continue to have access to the
entire record.
4. Section 1400.7 Additional guidance
Paragraph (d)
states "any records identified with
respect to a particular person also includes any records for
This appears to require that all records on any individuals
available.
Is the objective really to assure that all files
on an individual or activity be made available regardless of
the labels on the files? If so, we suggest that the text be
modified to reflect this.
---
## Page 38
In the letter to David, I would add at the end of the third
paragraph:
"Our Office of General Counsel provided some legal comments
on the scope of the definition that we've included in the
attached. "
In the attachment under the comments to Section 1400.1:
After the first sentence,
ending with "beyond the limits
established by the [ARCA]", I suggest adding the following
sentences:
"The Act authorized the Board
regulations.
to issue interpretive
Interpretive regulations, while entitled to great
deference, cannot be inconsistent with the congressional intent
to cover only certain specific activities.
Rather, they should
stay within the clearly articulated definitions provided by
Congress.
definition of "assassination records" since the ARCA has a
overriding effect on other statutory grants of power found
necessary in the interests of national security, such as the
National Security Act's direction that the Director of Central
Intelligence protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure.
The ARCA provides a statutory standard
for protecting or "postponing" intelligence sources and methods"
that applies only to "assassination records."
The standard in
the ARCA restricts those sources and methods that can be
protected in assassination records.
The Review Board is given
the ultimate authority to apply that standard, subject to being
overridden only by the President.
Thus, the ARCA reflects a
congressional desire to limit the DCI's
authority to protect
sources and methods, but only for "assassination records" as ARCA
defined it. An interpretive definition by the Board that would
sweep in records not covered by the Act, we believe, would exceec
the Board's limited rulemaking authority.
Thus, the proposed
definition should be limited more clearly to those records
identified by Congress as
"assassination records.
To do this, we
believe
....
---
## Page 39
This page is
FROM
Exitengee
3/10/85
2. General Comment
In the letter to David, I would add at the end of the third
paragraph:
"Our Office of General Counsel provided some legal comments
on the scope of the definition that we've included in the
attached.
In the attachment under the comments to Section 1400.1:
After the first sentence,
ending with "beyond the limits
established by the [ARCAj"
, I suggest adding the following
sentences:
"The Act authorized the Board to issue interpretive
regulations. Interpretive regulations, while entitled to great
deference,
cannot be inconsistent with the congressional intent
to cover only certain specific activities.
Rather, they should
stay within the clearly articulated definitions provided by
Congress.
This is particularly important with respect to the
definition of "assassination records" since the ARCA has a
overriding effect on other statutory grants of power found
necessary in the interests of national security, such as the
National Security Act's direction that the Director of Central
Intelligence protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure.
The
ARCA provides a statutory standard
for protecting or "postponing" intelligence sources and methods"
that applies only to "assassination records."
The standard in
the ARCA restricts those sources and methods that can be
protected in assassination records.
The Review Board is given
the ultimate authority to apply that standard, subject to being
overridden only by the President.
Thus, the ARÇA reflects a
congressional desire to limit the DCI's authority to protect
sources and methods, but only for "assassination records" as ARCA
defined it.
An interpretive definition by the Board that would
sweep in records not covered by the Act, we believe, would exceed
the Board's limited rulemaking authority. Thus, the proposed
definition should be limited more
clearly to those records
identified by Congress as
"assassination records. To do this, we
believe
...
---
## Page 40
2. Following are comments on specific sections of the
Assassination Records Review Board's interpretive
regulations, as published in the Federal Register, February
8, 1995.
a. Section 1400.1 Interpretation of Assassination Record
In paragraph (a) the reference to "activities and events
that may have led to the assassination--"
seems overly
broad, and appears to go beyond the limits established in
the Assassination Records Collection Act.
We believe that
it would be helpful to include an articuable standard in
this section.
The present text would permit inconsistent
application of the regulations, which might encourage
massive and expensive, additional records searches that are
of doubtful value.
The following change is suggested in paragraph (a) :
"activities and events that may reasonably be
considered to have led to the assassination--"
(This would
be consistent with the Act.)
b.
• Section 1400.2 Interpretation of additional records
and information
Paragraph (a) raises a question as to the purpose and
definition of "additional records and information." The
meaning of the phrase "all documents used--during
declassification review of assassination records as well as
all other documents--"seems overly broad and unclear. As
presently worded, this section would appear to include any
locument, book, index, record system, etc. regardless of
relevance to the assassination or investigations, including
for example,
legal opinions.
We assume that the purpose is
to enable the Board to request and review additional
records.
We suggest that the section be made more specific,
including a clearer statement of the intent. For example,
with respect to cryptonyms, codewords, guides, etc. a more
precise link to events related to the assassination or to a
timeframe could be helpful.
Section 1400.5 Requirement that assassination records
be released in their entirety
The introductory paragraph specifies that "no portions of
This appears to open the door
for access
to entire documents that contain information on
---
## Page 41
sensitive activities even when the documents contain
information that is onlv incidental to the assassination,
as a passing reference to a name.
There is a potential
risk that sensitive, non-relevant sources and methods would
be compromised.
We suggest that the Board consider adding wording to this
section that accommodates those instances when there is a
need to release ample information from a document to
disclose assassination-related material, while still
protecting obviously unrelated, sensitive information. The
Board, of course, would continue to have access to the
entire
record.
d.
Section 1400.7 Additional guidance
Paragraph (d) states "any records identified with respect
to a particular person also includes any records for that
person by any other name, pseudonym, codeword," etc.
This
appears to require that all records on any individuals-who
are merely mentioned in an assassination record be made
available.
We assume that the purpose is more specific
i.e., to assure that all files
on an individual or activity
be made available regardless of the labels on the files. We
suggest that the text be modified to reflect this.
---
## Page 42
•MAR 01 '95 12:51PM
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
P.2
1 March 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR:
John Pereira
Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG
FROM:
Kathryn I. Dyer
DI/IRO
SUBJECT:
Comments--ARRB Proposed Interpretive Regulationg
1.
I have reviewed the proposed interpretive regulations
drafted by the Assassination Records Review Board, particularly
the sections addressing the ARRB's interpretation of the scope of
certain provisions of the Assassination Recorde Collection Act.
While I have commente on a number of sections, there is one
section in particular which raises serious concerns--principally
1400.2 regarding additional information and records.
2.
As presently worded, this section opens up significant
records which have nothing to do per se with the assassination.
and which are currently protected by various laws, including the
National Security Act of 1947, and, moreover, are exempt from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
For example, (d) Organizational charts of government agencies.
(e) Records necessary and sufficient to describe the
the
• Agency's:
(1) Records policies and schedules;
(2) Filing systems and organization, and
(3) Storage facilities and location.
tems (a) and (b) of thia section (1400.2) also pose simila
roblems in that (a) includes all documents used by agencie
during their declassification review...Thie includes alz
materials including omnibus classitication guides or other
materials (1.e. not merely those prepared for use in the JEk
review) which would identify sensitive material across the board.
similarly, item (b) includes materials "created or used by
agencies
in furtherance of their review...."
This entire section
should at a minimum be restricted to items created by agencies
for use in the assassination reviews.
For example, if the Do has
a master list of cryptonyms, some of which appear in JEr
documents, only the subset should be included. Generic
categories of information which stand alone on their own merite
should be omitted.
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
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## Page 43
7977599998
MAR 01 '95 12:52PM
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
P.3
Recommend: Delete Items (d) and (e).
subpart (a) should be
confined to documente created by agencies (vice used) during
their declassification review.
to significant areas of information that are protected by other
If provisions (d) and (e) are not deleted and a and b
not limited to materials created by or created solely for use in
the assassination review, an additional section should be added
that applies to section 1400.2 in its entlrety.
This should
state that information created independent of the assassination
review will be released unless protected by other laws, Executive
Orders, and/or regulatione.
3. Other Comments:
1400.1 (a)
Recommend:
Insert the word "reasonably" between "may have
[reasonably) led to the assassination..."
The mere allegation that foreign events or
international developments may have led co the
assassination at this point in time (after all
the investigatione) should not bring recorda
not related to the assassination on their face
within the scope of this act. There should be
an objective standard, 1.e., reasonable person
threshold. Otherwise
subjected to massive records searches on
little more than whim. The JFK assassination is
1400.6
Originals and copies.
Recommend: (2) and (3) Add the word "available" after "the
earliest generation print (availablel."
Otherwise no provision to cover situation when
earliest generation print can't be located.
2
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## Page 44
14-00009
MAR 81 95 12:53PM
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
P. 4
1400.8
Implementing the ARCA - Catalog of Assassina-
tion Records. (COAR)
Sections (a) and (c) appear to be inconsistent.
As presently worded, former specifies all
records will be listed in COAR: latter section
implies not all records will be listed, 1.e..
requirement that in listing one muet determine
that the record will more likely than not
enhance, enrich....
4 .
If any
guestions, please call 54644 (secure).
achryn I. Dyes
3
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 45
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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
John F. Pereira @ DCI
02/21/95 02:15:20 PM
Comments re the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
1. In general there is not much in the regulation to cause the DA undo concern except for Sec. 1400.2 Interpretation of
additional records and information; specifically (e), (11, (2), & (3). The schedules are classified in the agregate, filing systems and
organization structures are classified in toto, and the storage facility is an Agency Records Center at a classified location. I know this
may not be a lot of help, but I have little or no argument/comment concerning the other sections.
2. If you have any questions/comments, please call me on 30683)or note.
CC:
ADMINISTRATIVE • INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 46
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
22 February 1995
Executive Secretariat
Information Review Officer
John F. Pereira
Historical REview Group
Attn:
Barry Harrelson
Barry,
Do not agree with "no portions of any
assassination records shall be withheld
from public disclosure solely on grounds
of non-relevance." See Section 1400.5.
Non-relevant material should not have to
be reviewed for declassification & release.
This could be a never-ending project.
Thanks
for the opportunityato comment.
DCI/ IRO
---
## Page 47
1 March 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. Periera
FROM:
Gary Breneman
SUBJECT:
Comments on Proposed Rules, 36 CFR
Part 1400, Concerning JFK Records
Collection Act of 1992
1. You asked that I review subject proposed rules and
provide my thoughts and concerns. This is in response to
that request.
As a general statement, the proposed rules are not
well written and seem to try to cast the biggest net
possible.
With reference to poor draftsmanship,
note that
at Sec. 1400.2, they introduce a term "additional information
and records,
and describe what the term includes.
Compare
sections 1400.3 relating to "sources" and 1400.4 relating to
"(t)ypes of materials."
In the latter, they have reversed
the term and used "additional records and information."
While the intent is fairly clear, it causes one to wonder
what they had in mind.
3. With reference to the big net approach, it is a
basic rule of statutory and regulatory drafting to not write
laws and regulations which cannot be enforced. In this
regard, I know of no authority in U.S. law, including the
JFK Act, which would give the Board jurisdiction over
records which "may be located at, or under the control
Of,
...
"(foreign governments."
See 1400.4 (b). I have a
similar concern with respect to "private"
records. Cf. Sec.
1400.1 (a).
4. On the nonsensical side of the big net approach is
every book, magazine and newspaper article and which has
ever been written that may "report, analyze, or interpret"
the assassination.
See 1400.1 (a).
If read literally, the
Agency would have to give up all of its collections of
private books, etc. which fall within this definition.
This
is particularly true of those books we referred to here
within HRG for information and understanding as we conducted
the review.
See 1400.2 (a) - (a)ll documents used by
government offices and agencies during their
declassification review of assassination records..."
---
## Page 48
With specific reference to the requirement of
1400.2 (a), the Agency should be concerned about its records
within the
Do which tie crypts to true names of projects and
alias' and pseudos to the true names of individuals.
Because we regularly called the DO office responsible for
these matters for assistance in identifying the projects and
names behind the crypts and alias,' this subsection would
seem to place those document holdings within the reach of
the Board. This needs to be addressed.
Turning to 1400.7 (d), the Agency should be very
careful here.
In HRG's review and release of documents, we i
have often given out an alias but protected the true name.
In others, we have given out the true name but protected the
alias or pseudo.
This section seems to vitiate that effort
and needs to be addressed.
6. I have several thoughts on the non-relevant issue
which would take several more paragraphs.
Suffice it to
say, carried to its extreme, if the Board can in any way
make the case a document is an assassination record, then
they are
entitled to access to it and may direct its
release.
I would be pleased to discuss any of these items
with you if you wish.
---
## Page 49
1d-0d0
• A.
2 March 1995
Assassination Record Definition: Comments
Background Section:
[the statement "search and disclosure of records...must go
beyond the records of previous commissions..." is based on
similar statements on pages 19
& 21 of the Report to
accompany S. 3000]
Section 1400.1 - Interpretation of Assassination Record
records) "At at may hate led to die aliass ination.
[S.3006
states that the "Board should act on a reasonable
basis in requesting additional records. Recommend we insert
"reasonably" into
statement after "have" (or change may to
reasonably could)]
(b) (2) "All records...or segregated by all
Federal...agencies in conjunction with any investigation..."
(means all "microfilm" documents are assassination records,
and will have to be reviewed
and accounted for even if we
are successful in "postponing" most of these records]
1400.2
Interpretation of additional records and
information.
(a) "All documents used by government offices and
agencies during their declassification review of
assassination records as well as
all other documents,
indices, records, and other material that disclose
cryptonyms, code tames, or other identification material in
assassination records.
[Section (a) is too inclusive; as written would include ANY
locument, book, index, record system or other material
consulted or "used" during the review, regardless of
relevance
to JFK assassination.
In fact, most of the
material
"used" in the review was used to determine if
information/names/etc. had been previously released and had
nothing to do with the assassination or investigations.
Also the part of the statement following "as well as" needs
clarification.
Are they asking for all records that contain
information on individuals mentioned in assassination
records or are they asking for the records/indices/etc. that
were
used to identify individuals mentioned by crypt or code
name in assassination records.
I the amendment recommended by FBI covers CIA concerns;
ideally the word "used"
should be changed to "created"]
---
## Page 50
14-00000
1400.2 (continued)
(b) & (c) [ ok]
(d) & (e) ladd
wording to identify time period for
these records such as
"at the time of the assassination and
investigations".]
1400.5 Requirement that assassination records be released in
their entirety.
An assassination record shall be disclosed in its
from public disclosure solely on grounds of non-relevance.
[If this applies to an "individual" assassination record
then there is no problem. However, if it applies, as I
suspect, to files and groups of records then we have a major
problem of privacy and source protection with the OP and 201
files. It may be possible to
"postpone" the 201 and OP
files under the Privacy exemption and National Security deal
the FBI approach to amending the regulation
with "incidental appearance of assassination material" seems
a better approach. Our proposed amendment should include
"files" as well as "records".
1400.6 Originals and Copies
(a) (2) add "available" after "the earliest generation
print"
(b) in cases where a copy, as defined in paragraph (a)
of this section is authorized... the board may...require a
certified copy.
1400.7 Additional guidance
(d). Any records identified with respect to a
particular person also includes any records for that person
by any other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol, number or
cryptonym..•
[This needs clarification. It the goal of this section is.
to ensure that all files on an individual/pröject are
provided regardless of how filed (under name, crypt,
etc.)
then I do not see a problem.
However, with out clarifying
language, this section could lead to the type of situation
described by Gloria. FBI also requested clarification.]
---
## Page 51
Issues:
Non-related (36,000+ pages) and OP (10,000 pages) material
in microfilm collection
The "segregated" records statement negates our claim that
material in the Microfilm is "non-related".
We can point
out that the HSCA requested, but did not review a lot of
these records and that access was given to complete files
even thought the request dealt with specific events or
timeframes.
However, given their objective of going
"beyond" previous investigations, I not sure this would have
any impact.
A different approach would be to deny or postpone personnel
type files including 201s that are not related to the
assassination (guidelines to be established in consultation
with the Board as unwarranted invasion of privacy and/or
protection of sources.
Approximately 25,000 pages of the
Non-related material are from 201 files; the remaining
10,000+ pages are from organization and project files.
---
## Page 52
14-00000
1o mach
I'o:
C/HRG
Subject: OGC's comments on proposed JEK regulations.
Bob's comments
should be included in our response to
however, not as he has recommended.
and bone is very different and does not inserted well into
The language
existing text; I think his comments will work better as a
separate paragraph or as an addendum.
Barry
---
## Page 53
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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
10 March 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
John F. Pereira
JFK Assassination Records Proposed Regulations
10 March 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR:
John F. Pereira @ DA
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
William H. McNair
DO/IRO
JFK Assassination Records Proposed Regulations
CSÍ-0319/95, subject as above, dtd 8 March 1995
1. The DO concurs in ref comments and would add the following:
A. Comment Par 2 re Section 1400.2 - para d and e(3) call for "Organizational
charts of government agencies" and "Records necessary and sufficient to describe and agency's
storage facilities and locations".
Organizational charts of detail are classified and release would have to be
balanced against DCI mandate to protect such details.
Description and location of agency's storage facilities are classified and
release of such information would have to be balanced against security concerns and DCI mandate
to protect such information.
B. Comment 4 re Section 1400.7 - Consideration should be given to protect
records and files of different time frame not related to JFK where the subject is but a passing
name or reference. To reveal full records could endanger national security without adding to
body of information relating to JFK
2. Believe these two comments should be considered for inclusion into official CIA.
remarks.
CC:
CC:
ADMINISTRATIVE • INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 54
14-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE • INTERNAL USE ONLY
MOTE FOR:
John Pereira @ DCI
Barry Harrelson @ DCI
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
Kathryn 1. Dyer @ DI @DCI
03/10/95 08:13:32 AM
Comments re Assassination Records Review Board's Interpretive
Regulations
1. I have reviewed the draft comments prepared for the Agency regarding the AARB's
proposed
interpretive regulations and believe some modifications are in order.
2. First and foremost, the comments regarding Section 1400.2 do not adequately address the concerns previously raised regarding the
unbrided inclusion of categories of records that have nothing to do with JFK's assassination, e.., organization charts, records schedules,
filing systems, etc. This section should
- he limited to items created by agencies for use in the assassination review. Generic categories.
of information which stand alone on their merits should be included. This section is overly broad
and inclusive. (Please see the discussion in my 1 March memorandum.) Contrary to the proposed
comment that the intent of this section is "unclear", I think it is eminently clear, and that's the problem.
I think our concerns would be better served by raising in terms of scope rather than intent. Also
recommend against asking questions such as "Is it the intent...?" Heck, yes! Would suggest wording
along the lines-"As presently worded, this section would appear to include..."
3. The proposed comment on Section 1400.7 opens the door to all records on a person vice those
relevant to the assassination inquiries. Do we really want to set ourselves up for the obvious response to the question we are asking?
There are a number of different points here that need to be clarified, all dealing with scope. The board's legitimate concern that all
records on an individual records be addressed (regardless of how filed, e.g.under another name, pseudonym, etc. ). And an equally
legitimate Agency concern that
1.) records on an individual when the records themselves are not relevant to the assassination inquiry,
(i.e. other records on the individual may be), or 2. ) that all records on individuals who merely happen
to be mentioned in a document falling within the scope of the assassination inquiry (but the individuals themselves are not the subject of
investigation) should not be subsumed within the scope of these
CC:
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 55
14-00000
To:
C/HRG
Subject:
OGC's comments on proposed JFK regulations.
OGC submission
Bob's comments should be included in our response to
the Board
existing text; I think his comments will work better as a
separate paragraph or as an addendum.
2)
DI IRO
Kathy's comments on section 1400.2 are on target, but a
little strong. I don't think the board will buy changed
Our proposed response, as written,
does question the scope but not directly.
(note:
The FBI
if accepted by the board, would
satisfactorily limit the scope of this section).
She does
have a point in changing "intent" to "as presently worded".
On section 1400.7, Kathy's reaction is the same as
Gloria's.
I think our
response adequately address the
concerns here, but could be strengthen without changing the
tone of the response. (Note - OGC comments will also address
"scope" which clearly is Kathy's primary concern.
Barry
---
## Page 56
Mr. David Marwell
Dear David,
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the
1o as cognite Chi value go propone grease are
those who are responsible for implementing the Assassination
Our general view is that the regulations are
comprehensive in identifying the range of records that would
potentially be relevant to the JFK assassination or the
scope of the investigations into the assassination.
In a few sections of the regulations the wording seems
somewhat overly broad or the meaning is not clear. Ättached
for the Board's consideration are comments on these
sections.
In some parts of the text we suggest possible
changes in wording for purposes of clarification.
We would be pleased to discuss these comments at the
Board's convenience.
It is our intention to continue
cooperating fully with the Board and to make every effort to
release assassination records held by the Agency.
John F. Pereira
Historical Review Group, CIA
---
## Page 57
Following are CIA's comments on specific sections of the
Assassination Records Review Board's interpretive
regulations, as published in the Federal Register, February
8, 1995.
1.
Section 1400.1 Interpretation of Assassination Record
In paragraph (a) the reference to "activities and events
that may have led to the
broad, and appears to go beyond the limits established in
the Assassination Records Collection Act. We believe that
this section.
of doubtful value.
The following change is suggested in paragraph (a) :
"activities and events that may reasonably be
considered to have led to the assassination--"
(This would'
be consistent with the Act.)
2.
Section 1400.2 Interpretation of additional records and
information
Paragraph
l (a) raises a question as to the purpose and
definition of
"additional records and information."
The
meaning of the phrase "all documents used--during
declassification review of assassination records as well as
all other documents--"seems unclear.
Is it the intention to
include any document, book, index, record system, etc.
regardless or relevance to the assassination or
investigations, including for example, legal opinions? We
assume that the purpose is to enable the Board to request
and review additional records.
We suggest that the section be made more specific,
including a clearer statement of the intent. For example,
with
respect to cryptonyms, codewords, guides, etc. a more
precise link to events related to the assassination or to a
timeframe could be helpful.
3. Section 1400.5
Requirement that assassination records
be released in their entirety
The introductory paragraph specifies that "no portions
of any assassination record
shall be withheld--solely on
grounds of non-relevance."
This appears to open the doo
for access
co entire documents that contain information o
sensitive activities even when the documents contain
---
## Page 58
14-00000
information that is only incidental to the assassination,
such as a
passing reterence to a name.
There is a potential
risk that sensitive, non-relevant sources and methods would
be compromised.
We suggest that the Board consider adding wording to this
section that accommodates those instances when there is a
need to release ample information from a document to
disclose assassination-related material, while still
protecting obviously unrelated, sensitive information. The
Board, of course, would continue to have access to the
entire record.
4. Section 1400.7 Additional guidance
Paragraph (d) states "any records identified with
respect to a particular person also includes any records for
that person by any other name, pseudonym, codeword,
This appears to require that all records
on any individuals
who are merely mentioned in an assassination record be made
available.
Is the objective really to assure that all files
on an individual or activity be made available regardless of
the labels on the files? If so, we suggest that the text be
modified to reflect this.
---
## Page 59
HAIL AL.ON GONNAINA
AAAN
Federal Register / Vul. 60. No. 124 / Wednesday, june 28, 1995 / Rules and Rogulilions
33345
(0) of thus section shall be completed by
Ocrobest 1, 1995.
paragraph (o) of this section shall be
completed by Octobor 2, 1995.
PART 1926 SAFETY AND HEALTH
REGULATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION
5. The authonty citation of subpart 2
of 29 CFR Part 1936 is reviseel lu read
Authoriry: Secuuns 6 mal 8, Decapational
Salely and Health 461, 29 US.C. uss. 657.
Steichry of Labur's Order Nos 12-71 136,
FK 87541. 8-76 (41 FK 25054). 5-83 /40 FR
337368081-90 (55 FRyu03) as applicable.
and 29 CFk yar 1911
Secion 1926 1101 also lisued under 5
Suction 1920.1102 nur isgued you: 19
Sc. 6860029C1R part lyll. aiso listled
Section 1026 1103 through 1926. 1118 alsu
Section 1920.1128 also esseel under 29
Section 1626.1145 and 1426 1148 also
1s5ued undes 29 U.S C 657
sorion 1916 1890 alao issucd under 24
6 Section 1926.1101 1s amended by
revising paragraph (a) to read as follon's:
§ 1920.1101 Asbosios.
-
(q) Dates. (1) This standard shall
bucome aficetive Octobor 11, 199%.
(2) The provisioas of 30 CFK 1426.58
remain in atlace antil that sean us dates
ol the eccivalent pruvesions of lols
stalada:d
1a1s staidard coramelee: Die thee ofterlit
dare except as follows
(1) Methods of complance. The
enginpuring and word pireice controls
required by paragraph (e) uf dais sectius
shall be implemented by October 1.
1995
(1) Mespiratory protection.
Kaspiratory protection required by
paragraph (h) of thos sector shall be
pruvided by Octobur 1. 1995.
(in) Hugene facilities and practices
for employees Hygience localines and
practices roquered by paragraph (p) of
thas section shall be provided by
Ocrobar 1, 1995.
(iv) Communicaton of hazords
Identiheation, nothication. labeling.and
sign posting, ald training required by
paragraph (k) of thus section shall be
provided by Oirober 1, 1995
(v) Housekeepsg Housekeeping
procuces and controis required hy
paragraph (1) of this section shall be
provided by Oclober 1. 1995.
(vi) Medical surveillance required by
paragraph (in) of this secrion shall be
provided by Outuber 1, 1495
(vo) The designation and trathing of
competent persons required hy
IFR Doc. 95-15990 Fill 6-27-95. 8.45 am)
BILLING CODE 4610-774-00
DFPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
34 CFR Part 685
AIN 1640--ACOS
Willlam D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program
AGENCY: Department col Education.
ACTION: Final regulars 888s
SUMMARY: The Secretary amends the
regulations governing the Walliam D.
Ford Fedoral Dircet Loan Program to
add the Office of Management and
Budget (OMb) contrul number to cortain
sochions of the regulations Those
sections contain intormation colluctun
requiloments appruved by OMB The
Secretary tales this action to inform tha
puthe that these sequireneuts have
been approved, and therefore alfected
parties muse comply with them.
EFFECTIVE DATE: Inturination collection
requirements in the tinal regulauons are
effectivo on July 1, 1992.
FOR FURTHER INFONMATION CONTACT:
Rachel Edelse, Policy Declopment
Division, Olfice uf Postsecondary
Education. US Departmertut
Education foolnde pendraidAronut.
51S. (K00618 Kills- Rélts-3). Wastingion,
DC:. 10201-1100. Triop lone (202) 209-
y105 Individuals sofied lois as
idlecommuscanons detice for the deaf
(TDD) may call the Federal laforiäton
Kelay Service TrikS; a1 1-000-877-4139
berween 8 a.m, ane ô pm Esslera limo.
Monday through Friday
SUPPLEMENTAHY INFORMATION: Final
regulations for the Willian D Furd
Fedoral Direct Loan Proyram were
published on December 1, 1994 (59 FR
f1604). Complauce sail intormanen
collection regenerats in these
regulationi was delayed until those
requirements were approred by Oll
under the Papervurt Reduction Act o!
1980 OMB approved the information
collection requirements on Ducrilies7.
19194. Those re puresents will therefute
bocome effective. with the other
provesions of the resolations on luly 1.
Waver of Proposed Kulemaking
It is the pracuce ut the Secretary lo
ofier inturested parties lie opportunity
to commont on pruposed regulatons
Husvever, the publication of. OMB
control numbers is purely lochnical and
dues not establish substantive policy.
Therefore, the Sectotary has determined
under 5 U.s.C. 553(b)(B), that public
comment on the regulations is
unnecessary and contrary to the public
interest.
List of Sulyects in 34 CFR Pan 645
Adininistrative practice and
procedure. Colleges and univurillior,
Education, Loan prograins-education.
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Student aid. Vocational
education
Duled. June 23, 1995.
Dawl A, Longenecker.
Meistant Scriary fur Posierundury
The Secretary amends Part 605 of
Title 34 of the Code uf Federal
Reguladone as follows:
PART 685 WILLIAM D. FORD
FEDERAL DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM
1. The authorily citation for par 685
continues lo road as follows:
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1087e es seq. unless
2. Sections 685 204, 685.206, 685.209,
685.213. 685.217, 685.215, 605.301.
685.302. 685.303. 685.309, and 685.401
ite amended by adding the OMB control
number following the sectus in read as
(Appioved by the Office ul Management and
Dualget under carted nutter 1880-06i2)
IFK De: 95-15849Flled 6-20.4 is 18unl
ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW
Guidanco on Interpreting and
implemenung the President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
AGENCY: Assassination Rocord: Review
ACTION: Fisal regulations.
SUMMARY: These final interpretive
regulations previde guidance on the
interpretation of certain terms included
in the Presidoat John F Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection act oi
1992 and on amplementation of drain
of the stature's provisions The tinal
Interpretive regulations more effectve
the propused interpretive regularions
previously published by the
Assassinauor Recurds Revier Board
(Koviow Board) The Revies Bord
revised the promused interprotice
---
## Page 60
AAAD
33346 Federal Register / Vol. GO. No. 124 / Wednesdas, June 28, 1995 / Rules and Regulations
regulauuns efter considering public
comment received in writing and
turough testimony al public hearings
convenod by the Review Board
EFFCCTIVE DATE: Thoso interpretativo
regulatione oro olloctive June 28. 1955.
FOR FUATHEN IN OHMATION CONTACT:
T Joromy Gunn, Acung Ceneral
Counsel, Assassination Records Review
Board, 600 E Streor, N.W., 2ud Floor,
Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 724-
0088. fax (202) 724-0457.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background and Statutory Authority
The Presidunt John F. Kennedy
Assassination Rocords Collectsun Act of
1992, 44 U.S.C. 2107 (as amended) lIFk
Act), ostablished the President John F
Kennedy Assassination Kecurds
Colloction UFK Assassination Records
Collection) of the National Archives and
Kecords Administration (NARA). In
octablishing a process fur public
disclosure of all records rolating to lia
assassination, Congress finaler an
independent Federal agancy. the
Assassination Records Kavier® Board.
that consists of live citizens appointed
by tho President and confirmed by the
Sonale in 1954. Under the JFK Act, the
Keview Board is unpowered to decide
"whether a record consitulos an
assassination ricord " 44 U S.C
2107.7(0(4J(A). Congress intendod that
she Review Board "Issue guidance lo
assist in aMiculating the scope or
universe of assassination secords."
President InheF Kennody
Ascassh060n Recurds Collection Acof
2992, S. Kep. 102-320. 102d Cong. id
5056. 11992) at 21. These Anal
interpretive regulations, a proposed
version of which wore published al ou
FR 7506-7508 (Feb. d. 1905), comply
with that mandate.
The Review Board's goul in issuing
tols guidance is to implomont
cungressional intent that the JFK
Cullection contain "the most
comprehonsive disclosure ut records
rolated to the assassinauon of Presidant
Kennedy " S. Kep 102-328. supra at 18.
The Board is also mindul of Congress's
instruction that the board apply i
"broad and encompassin" working
detinition of "assassination racord"
urder to achiove the gual uf assembling
the fullest historical record on this
tragic event in American history and on
the investigations that were undertaken
in the assassination's allermath. The
Board recognizas that any agencies
began to urgunize and review records
responsive lo the JFk Act even belore
the board was appointed and began its
work. Nevertheless. the Board's on is
that this guidance will and in the
ulumate assembly and puble disclosure
ul the fullest possible historical record
on this tregedy and un subsequent
investigations and in gueries into it.
The final interpretive regulations ale
intended lo idenufy comprehensevely
The range of records reasunably related
to the assassination of President
Kennedy and intestgations undertaken
an its aftermath. The final interpretives
regulations are also intended to aid in
the consistent, ellective, and efficient
implementation of the IFK Act and lo
establish procedures for including
assassination records in the FK
Assassination Kocords Collection
established by Congress and housed at
NARA's incilty in College Park.
offices on December 14, 1994, froin
representatives ol NARA on the
question of including artilacts in the
scope of the term "assassination
record." After publication of the
proposed interpretive gulalions and
bufore expiration uf the comment
period, the Review Board heard
. lestimony al a public hearng on March
7.1995, from the fal and from several
individuals and representalives of
private organizations on their views
regarding the taxt of the proposed
interpretive regulations. Copies of all
written comments received and
transcripts of public testimony on tho
proposed interprotive regulations merc
placod in the public reading room at the
Noviow Board's afficos and made
available for inspuction and copying by
Nolace and Comment I'recess
the public upon roquest.
Tho Korew Board sough public
Al a publicieeting hold on May 3.
comment un iis proposed interpretive
1995, for which notice was timely
regularous and selà theny day perivel.
published in the Federal Register
shich ended on March 10. 1995, for the
pursuast to the provisiuns of the
purpose of receiving wrotten comments.
Goverment in the Swishine Act, tho
The Koview board also heard lestimory
Revsew Boaid cursidered i final druh of
al public hearings on sipoels ol the
these interpretive regulations Thut
proposed interpreuve regulations. In
discussion draft iracorporated many of
addition, the Revier Board sent copies
the comments received by the Keview
of the proposed interpretive regulations
Buard on the proposad interpretive
to agchces kuwn to have an interest in
regulations. The Review Board
and lu be allected ly the Keview Board's
unanimously voted to adopt the less uf
work, particularly thoso that either
the discussion draft as its final
created or now huld assassination
interpretivo regulations. The approved
records, and to the approphiate oversight
lext is, warb a low minur cortections that
commitlees in Congress. The Kuview
do notchango the substance, published
Board also sent notices ut the proposed
interpretive rogulations and request fur
communes to many urganizations and
individuals who have destion bated an
interest in the release of materials under
The JrA Act us who have engored in
postarch into the assassination of
Prusident Kennedy
The Keview Board received written
comments on the proposed interpretive
regulations from four Federal agoncies.
three state and lual government
entities, and twenty-one private
individuals and organizations with an
interost in tho Review Board's work.
Federal agencies providing stillen
comments include the Federal Bureau ot
Investigation (fBl), the Central
Intelligonce Agency (CIA). NARA, and
the Deparment of Stale Siate or local
government entites providing writter
comments include the Dallas (fexas)
Gounty Commissioner's Court, dia
Dallas County Historcal Foundation,
and the Caly of Dalla, Recurds
Monagement Division of the Olfice of
Prior to publication of the proposed
interpretive regulations. the Kerien
Board heard testimony at a public
hearing beld at she kaview linard's
Response to Comments
The Review Board found vory helpful
the thoughtul and, in many cases, very
detailed cominonts submitted on tir
proposed interpretive regulations
Nuurly all of the commentators
expressed suppor for what they
characterized as the proposod
comprehensiveness and flexibility. All
comments submitted were caretully
studied and considerod by the Review
Board Submitters made both
substantive and lechnical suggestions.
many of which were incorporated into
the interpretive regulations as issued
here on final lorn. The summary below
includes the principal substantive
comments received and the Review
Board's responses therele.
Comment. The proposed language of
$ 1(a) 1(a) un unduly restrictive because
the phrase "may havo led to the
assassination" requires at least a
porential causal link to tbe
assassination Moreover, determining
whelher there is a causal lunk sould
require the Review Board lo Eraluate he
validityulcompetingaccounts of what
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lod tu the assascination of President
Kounody
Respinse A nunber of commentators
put forward criticisins along these linos.
Some uf these commentalars suggested
that some form of a "reasonably related"
stondard bo cubsululud for the "may
have led to" language, while others
suggesied altemative formulations (e 6.
"that may shed lipht on the
assassination"). In adopting and
eventually applying a "reasonably
related" standard, the Roview Board
does not seok to endorse or reject any
particular theory of the assassination of
President Kennedy, although such
theories may inform the Keview Board's
search for records roasonably related to
the assassination and investigations into
il. The Keview Board believes thet
§ 1400.1(a). as now wordud, advances
Cat effort and will promote a consistent
broad interpretation and
inplencutation of the jFk Ac.
Conment: The proposed language of
5 1400.1(a) is tuo broad and opon ended.
A moro specific nexus to tho
assassination of Prosidont Konnedy
should bu requirod
Response. As lis leat and legislative
history make clear, the JFK Act
contemplates that the Review Board
extond ile search for relevant records
bayond what has been compilud o:
rovowad by previous investgatious ll
is anuvitoble, thorefore. that the Review
Board must esercise juigment in
deteruning whather such records
constitute: "assassination focords." The
Keview Board regarde its "reasonably
related" standard ds sullicient lo ensure
that agencies are not overburdened with
Identifying and reviewing recurds that,
if added to the JFK Assassinatione
Kecords Collection, wuuld not advance
tho purposes of the JFk Arr
Comment Secuon 1400 & should
specifically include as assassination
rocurds any records pertaining lo
panicularly dentified individuals.
Response: The Review Board
doternined that, in almost every cast.
the types uf records commentators
sought to odd were already adiquately
covered by $ 1400.l as proposed
Accordingly, the Review Doard declined
to include rucords or record groups al
the luvol of specilicity urged by thist
commantators beause doing.omght
limit the scage of the Inter pictive
regulations as applied mitially by other
agencies, or orbenvise might prove
duplicative or confusing Howaver, the
Kevine Board welrones and encourages
suggestions frun the public as lo
specile record, or securd groups that
may constitute assassination records,
and intends to pursue such leads.
including those provided an the written
communis lo the proposid interprelve
regulaluns
Comment: Section 1400 2(a) 1s vague
and overly broad in describing the scupe
of additional records and lafonualun
Hesponse The Revon buard lis
auded language to clarily that the
purpose of requesting sidiuonal recurds
and information under § 1400.2(a) is 10
identify, evaluate, or interpret
assassination records, ucluding
assassination records that may nol
initially have been identified as such by
an agency The Keview Hoard also has
addod languago to indicate thee it
intends lu implement this soction
through written requests signed by lis
Executive Directur. The Rewew Board
contemplates that, with rogard to such
requests, dis staff will work closely with
entities to which such requests are
addrussod to implement the JFK Act
effectivoly and efficiently.
Comment. The scope of additional
rocords and information shuuld
specifically include records und
intornation that:
-describe agencies' methods of
searching for records:
doscribe reclassification, transfor.
destruction, or uther disposition of
records; or
-do not constitute assassination
records, but have the potential lu
enhance, enrich, and brulen thie
histurical recore of the assassination.
Response. To the eatent that the
inclusion of socords and information of
the sypor doscribed suuld assist thi
Review Board in meeting its
respunsitulties under the |Fk Act, the
Review Board has adoped the suggested
language
Comment. The scope of
"assession records" under $ 1400 1
and "additional records and
information" under $ 1400.2 should nol
extend to state and local guvummuni or
lo private records that are not in the
pussession of the Federal guvernment.
Response The Retrew Board
considered such comments caretulli.
but concluded that the lerms of the JFK
Act preclude the narrower reading of
Uie Keview Buard': responsibillies
urged by such comments. Sechon
1400.G allows the Review Board, in 1ls
discretion. to accep copies in lieu of
origanado The Reores Board believes
that this llesibilit addresses the
concerns of some commentalors about
the remuval uf original rurds alriady
housed. for chimple. in date or local
archives
Comment: Secton 1900.3 should
include as sources of assassination
records and additions records and
inturnation andividuals and
corporallons that pussess such material
ovan if not obtained from sourcus
identified in paragraphs (a) through (o)
thereuf, and should spocifically include
individuale and corporations that
cuntraciod to provide goods or services
1o the goverument.
Response: The Revow Board has
added paragrapl (D) to this secuon in
response to thuto comments. The
Review board has concluded that, in
viaw of paragraph (0, specifically
identilying goverment contractors or
other private persons would be
unnecessary and rodundant.
Comment. NARA contended has .
5 1400.4 should not include artifacts
among the types of materials included
in the term *"record " Treating artilacts
as "records" would be contrary lo
NARA's accustomed practice and the
unifo ul the lenn "rocords" in other
deas ol Federal records law and would
result in substantial practical
difficulties.
Hesponse: The Review Board has
carofully considered NARA's objectiuns
do lhe inclusion of artfacts as "records,"
but decided chat this inclusion is
necessary lo achievo the purposes of the
JFK Arl. Tha Review Board notes that
artifacts that bocamo exhibits to the
proceedings of the Warreu Connussion
have long been in the custody ui NAKA.
and decided that thoso artifacts should
remain in the JFK Assassination Recordi
Collection. The Revicw Board further
bulovos that the unique issues of public
trust and credibilily uf goverument
prucesses that prompted enactment of
the JFK Act require that arufaces be
included within the JFK Assassination
Records Collection. The strong support
that commenting members of the publi
gave to this position reinforces this
conclusion. Tho Kovier Board ancluded
an its proposed regulations, and retained
an g 1400.7(b)-(c) of tho final
interpretive regulatons, language
intended to addiess NARA's concurns
about potential copying requiremen
and preservation issues unnue 10
artifacts.
Comment: Section 1400.5 should be
mudilied lo allow agencies to withhold
from the JFK Assassination Records
Collection material that is not related to
the assassination of President Kennedy.
oren though at appoars in a record prat
cuntains other material that is relalod lo
the ussassination of President Kennedy.
Response: It remains the intent ot this
coction in matie: cloar lu agencies that, in
a rule, entire records, and not parts
thereal, are to becono part of tie jFk
Assassination Records Collection. The
purpose of requiring that records be
produced in their entirnly is to ansaras
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that the contoxt and integrly of the
records bo proserved. Ondy in rare
anstancos will the Koviow Board assent
du withbolding particular information
within an assassination rocord on the
ground that such infurmation le not
rolovant to the assassinatiou. Secton
1400.5 has been modified to clarity that,
although the Review Board may allow
this practice in extraordinary
circunstancos, this determination is
within the sole direction of the Review
Comment: Tho discussion of originals
and copies in § 1400.6 is, in vorious
respocts, uncloar and confusing
Response: The Roview Board made
extonsive changos to thie saction lu
address thase concems and lo achieve
greater internal consistency. The Review
Board's intent in this section is to
expross its strong preference for
including orginal records in the JFK
Assassination Records Cullection, bul
also its understanding that. for a vorioty
of reasons, thore may be situations
where a copy instead of the original of
tun assassination record may be mure
appropnate for inclusion in the
Collection.
Comment: Section 1400.6 should to
clariñed as to whether "record copies"
of Fodoral agency may be included in
the JFK Assassination Records
Collection.
Hesponse: The Keview Board has
modified § 1-400.6(a)(1) to clarity that
the Koview board may dolerinine theat
rucord copies may be included in the
Collection.
Conment: The Caralog of
Assassination Racords (COAR)
described in § 1400 # should consist of.
or be replaced by, the database and
landing aide prepared by the Federal
agencies in possession of assassinaton
Response This and other comments
niceived regarding the proposed
$ 1400.8 indicaled some confusion as lu
the intent and separation of the
mochanisin establishud in this section
For this reason, the Ruview Board
docided to replace tho term "Calalog ul
Assassination Kecords" with the terin
•Nutice of Assissination Record
Determinalion" (NAKD), and to redrall
this section lu clarity thu Roviow
Board's intant to us the NARD
mechanism simply to document tha
Review Board's ongoing determinations
that, in addmon po records explicitly
chumoraled in the JFK Art as
assassinistlon records (eg. Iccords
reviewed by the HSCA) or identified hy
Federal agencies in their own searches.
contain other records also are
assassination recurds to be included in
the JFK Assassination Records
with the intent and purposes of dis JFK
Colluctiun.
Act.
Sectiun by Section Analysis
Originals and Copies.
Scope of Assossination Recora
Extensive changes dare made lo
As discussed above with rugard to the
$ 1400.6 for reasons of clarity and
public comments, subparagraph (a) of
intemal consislency. The Review Board
§ 1400.1 bas boon muditied to aduul a
also incorporated in the final
"reasonably rolated" standard and the
interpretive regulations languago
term "Catalog of Assassination Records*
clarilying that "record coples" of
has been replaced with "Notice of
Federal agency records may be included
Assassination Record Determination" in
in the JFK Assassination Kecords
Gubparagraph (b)(3) The final
Cullectiun und addrossing the important
interpretive regulations also incorporale
issue of preservallon requirements. In
suggestod technical changes. including
this respoct, the Revies Board sought 10
edits for clarification and revision of
treat records in various nodia in a
this section's title lo make it inore
means appropriate to the unique
characteristics of each medium.
precise.
Additional Guidance
Scope of Additional Records and
Information
In the light of comments received, the
The tille of § 1400.2 was revised lo
Review Board extensively revised
conform do the new title ul § 1400.1.
§ 1400.7. Subparagraph (d), as ir
Addizional editing changos were made
appeared in the proposed interprelive
regulations, has boen broken into trou
for clarry A now subpert (G) was added
lu subparagraph (o) and a now
subparagraphs new subparagraphs (d).
subparograph (1) was added after
(e), and (1) 10 avold porontial confusion
consideration of comments that noted
and to add clanty. The intent of these
the potenuel exclusion of certain
subparagraphs is to mako clear that all
categones from the scope of this section
files on an individual. event,
in the proposed interprelive regulations.
urganization or activity are to be made
The Review Board has added language
available to the Reviow Board regardless
in the final interpretive regulations in
of the labul on the files. where the
clarify that the purpose of this section
records may be found. or whether they
rellect the true name or identifier uf the
is to aid in identifying. evaluating or
Interproting assassination records,
individual. event osganization. or
including assassination records that
may not initially have been adlenniesel
by an aguncy. The Keview Buerd also
has achled language to suggust thai
intends lo implement this section
through watten requests signed by the
Review Board's Exocutive Director.
Sources of Assassination Aecords and
Additional Records und Informanon
A now subparagraph (g) was added lo
$ 1400.3 aller consideration of
corninents noting the potential
eXClusion ol records crialed by
individuals or corporations ur obtained
from sources other than shose already
subparagrapbs
Types of Moterials Included in Scope of
Assassination Hecord and Additional
lecords und Information
No substantive change has been made
10 5 1100.4 as it appeared in tie
proposed interpretive regulations
He quirement That Assassination
Records be Helcased in Their Entirely
Language bas huen addad 1o § 1400.5
lo permit the Revies Board, in ils sole
discretun, lu allus release uf only part
uf an assassination record where such
partial reloas is sullicient to comply
Subparagraphs (b) and (c) $ 1400.7
were included in thu proposud
interpretive regulationg and rotained in
to final interpretive rogulations in
urder to address concerns uxpressed by
NARA regarding the inclusion of
arlifacts in the scope of the material
deemed "assassination rerords." By
including these subparagraphs. the
Review Board wishes to make it clar
that it believes the JFK Actestablishes
unique standarde a6 to the records to be
included in the JFK Assassinaton
Kecoros Collection. By including
artitacis as a typo of "assassination
record," thr: Raviow Board secks lu
fulfill is mandate from Congress lu
assemble all materials reasonably
related to the assassination in the JFK
Assassination Record: Collection. It is
not intanded that the inclusion here of
artifacto fos purposes of implementing
the JFK Act should be construad 1o
affect the implementation oluther
racords laws. Subparagraph (r) is
intended lo ensure that all arifacts an
the collection are preservad for posterily
and that public access be provided lo
those artilacis an a manner consistent
with their prucervation. The Review
Board encourages NARA to set out in
writing the terms and conditions under
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• which access to such matenals shall he
allowel.
Implementing the JFK Ac- Nolice of
Assassination Hecords Defernunation
PAAT 1400 GUIDANCE FOR.
INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PRESIDENT JOMN F. KENNEDY.
The Keview Board has replaced the
ASSASSINATION RECORDS
torn "Catalo; of Assassination Kecords"
COLLECTION ACT OF 1992 (JFK ACT)
that appeared in the proposed.
interprenve mgulations and redrited
§ 1400.810 clarify the Renew Board's
1400.1 Scope of assussination record
Scope of additional records and
. Intont. In the final interprative
regulations, the Keviow Hoard
substitutes the term NAKD for prior
referancos to a "calolog."
Page rword Reduction Act Statement.
The regulamon is not subject to the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1900(41 U.S.C. 0501 et seg.)
bocausa it dous to contain any
in fornaton cullectun requirements.
within the meaning of 4* U.S.C..
3502(4).
Regulatory Floarthly Act Carthcation
As required by the Regulalory
Fleribility Act of 1980 (RFA), § U.S.C.
601-G12). the Boned corefies that this
rule, aladopied, will not have is
significant economic impact on a
substanual number of small onutes and
that, thoreforo, a ragulatory fusibility
analysis need not be prepared. & U.S.C.
60S(b). The proposod rule would not
im pesse any ubligations, including any
obligations on "small entities," as sel
fonh In SUSC 601(3) of the
Regulatory Flexibilty Act. or within the
dofinition of "small businoss." as fourd
in 15 U SC: 632, or withon the Small
Business 507e Standards in regulations
issued by the Small Dusiness
Administration and codified in 13 CFR
part 121.
Neview by OMIS
This regulation has toon reviewed by
OMB under Exeenner Order 12866.
List of Subjects on 30 CFR Part 1400
Administrative practice and
proceduro, Arteros and records
Arcordingle, ile review Board luriby
escalolishes a meso chapier KIV in title je
oftho Cude of Federal Regulstions 10
read as follow.
CHAPTER XIV-ASSASSINATION
RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
(including but not limitod to those that
disclose cryptonyms. cuue maines, o
other.idenuliers that appear.in
assassination records) that the
Astossination Records Review Hoard
(Keview Board) has a masonable basis lo
believe may constitute an essassination
record or would assist in the
identibcation, evaluauon or
interpretauon of an assassination.
record. The Keview Board will identify
in writing those records and othur
materials it intends to seek undur this
Sources of assassination records and
adduonal records and Information.
(b) All waining manuals. instructional
1400.4 Types of materlals Included lo scope
materials, and guidelines created or
of assis laation record and addidonal
used by the agencive in furthoranco of
recorda and Infornation.
that sovlow of assassination rocords.
Requirement that assassination.
(c) All rocords, lists; and documenis.
records be released in thele cnurely..
descriking the procedure by which tho
1400.6 Orkunali and caples.
agencies identifiud or soloctod
1400.8 Implemenung the JFk Act-Nouce
accessinolion records for ruviow.
Di Assassination Hecord Designation •
(d) Organizational charts of.
Authority. 4d U.S.C. 2107.
government ageucies.
(•) Records necessary and sufficient to
§1400.8 Scopo of abusadnanon rocord:• describe the agency's:
(a) An assussinution record includes.
(1) Recordo policies and schedules:
but is not limited lo, all secords, public
2) Filing systems aud organization
(3) Storage facilities and locations
wd private.regardless ofhow labeled or
(4) Indexung symbols, marks, codes.
idontified, that dorment, doscribe.
anstructions, guidelinee, methode. and
report on, analyze or interpret activities,
proceduros;
persons, or events reasurably related lo
(5) Search mothods and procedures
the assassination of President John F
usod in tho porformanco of the agencies
Kennedy and investigations of or
duties under the JFK Acl: and
inquiries into the assassination.
(6) Reclassification to a higher level,
(U) An assussinution recond lurther
transfer, destruction, or other
includes, without linlaliou:
information (eg, theft) regarding the
(1) All records is definud in Section
status of assassinauon records.
(1) Any other record that does not fall
12) All socords collectod by or
within the scope of assassination record
segregated by all Federal, solo, and
as duscribed an § 1400 1. bur which has
leral government agencios in
the potential to enhance, enrich, and
conjunction with any investigation or
broaden the historical record of the
andlysis of or inquiry into the
assassination.
assassination of l'resident Kennedy (fur
example. any intra-agency investigaton
Sourcos of aosassanation recordg
ur analysis of or inquny unte the
and additiona rocordo and informolion.
assassinalion, any intoragency
Assassination records and addional
communication regarding lit
records and infonuation may be localed
assassination, any request by du House
al, ur under the control uf. without
Soluct Committee on Assassinations lu
collect documents and other materials:
or any inter or intra agency collection
or segregation uf documents and uther
(31 Other records ur groups of records
listed in the Notico of Assassination
Kecord Designation, as described in
§ 1400.8 of this chapter.
§ 1400.2 Scope of addillonal records and
Information
Thu turn additional recurds and
injorination melodes
1a1 All documents used by
¿uterument offices and agencies during
their declassification rever uf
assassination records as well as all other
documents, indices. and other material
(a) Agencios, oificos, and untirios of
the executing. legislative. and judicial
branchos of the Federal Govennent:
(u) Agencies, offices, and entities of
the crecutive, legislative, and judicial
branches of state and local govumments:
(0) Recurd repustones and arclives of
Fadoral, Gram, and local governments.
including presidential libraries:
(d) Record repusitories and archives
of universities. hbrares, hastorical
societies, and other sumilar
organizalions.
(c) Individuals who possess such
recurds by virtue of service with a
government agency, office. or entity:
(1) Persons, including individuals and
corporations, who have obtained such
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33350 Federal Kegister / Vul. 60, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 38. 1995 / Kules and Regulations
records from sources identifled in
paragraphe (a) through (o) of this
(g) Persons, Including individuals and
corporations, who have themsolves
created or bave obtained such recurds
from sources other than thuse icontified
in paragraphs (a) through (v) of this
(h) Foderal, state, and local courts
where such records are being held
.. (i) tureign goverments.
$1400.* Types of matortis included in
#cops of art balnation record and
additional records and informaton.
The lerm record in assassination
record and additonul records and
information includes, for purposus of
interpreting and implementing the JFK
Act:
(a) papors. maps, and other
documontary material:
(b) photographs:
(e) motion pictures;
(d) suund and viduo recordings:
(e) machine readable information in
ony torm; and
( artifacts
§14105 Requiremont that assassination
rocords be released in their anuroly.
An assassination rocord shall be
roleased in its entroly except fur
portions specifically postponed
pursuant to the grounds for
postponement of public disclosure of
rocords established in § 2107.6 of the
JFK Act, and no portion of any
assassination record shal! be withheld
from public disclosure solaly on
frounds of non-relevance unless, in the
Kevior Buard's sole discretion. lease
of pert ul a record is sulficient in
comply wich the intent and purposes of
ILe IFK Act
51400.6 Originals and copies
(a) For purposes of deterunning
whether originals or copies of
assassination records will be made part
of the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection JFK
Assassination Records Collection)
established under the JFK Act. the
Tollowing shall apply
(1) In the case of papers. maps. and
other documentary materiuls. che
Reviow Board may delerinine that
rucord copsor of governinent records.
either the signed original. originnl
production or a repruduction that has
been Itated as the official recor
mainiained to chronicle government
functions os activiles, may do placed in
tho IFK Assassination Keroeris
Collection:
(2) In the case of other paper, maps.
and other documentary marenal. te
Kenew Board may dunnine that a true
copies of any assassintion records
and accurate copy of a record in lieu of
containod in the JFK Assassination
the original may be placed in the JFX
Records Collection are not also
Assassination Kerorets Collection;
assassination records that, at the Keview
(3) In the case of photngraphs, the
Joard's discretion, may also be placec
original nogative, whenever available
in the IFK Assassination Records
(otherwiso, the aarliest generation print
Colloction.
(bat is a true and accurate copy), may be
(1) Nothing in this section shall be
placed in the JFK Assassination Rocords
interpraled to prevent or to proclude
copies ul any electronic assassination
(4) In the casA of motion pictures, tho
• records from boing refunnatted
camera onginal. whenever aveilable
electrunically in ordor to conforin to
(othorwise, the earliest generation print
different handward and/ur softwaro
tbat is a true and accurate copy), may be
ruquirements of audiovisual or machine
placed in the JFK Assassination Records
readable formats if such is te
Collertion;
professional judginent of the National
(5) In the case of sound and viduo
Archives and Records Administration.
ocordinge, the original recordins
henever available (otherwise, thi
§ 1400.7 Additional guldance.
earliest generation copy that le a true
(a) A government agency, office. Or
and accurate copy), may bu placed in
entity includes, for purposes of
the JFK Assassination Records
interproting and implementing the JFK
Act, all curront. past, and fonnor
(6) In the case of machine-roodable
dopartments, agencios, offices.
iriormation, a true and accurate copy of
divisions, forcign offices, bureus, and
the orignal (duplicating all Intornation
doliberative bodies uf any Federal, state.
containod in the original and in a format
or local guvernment and includes all .
that permits retrioval of the
intor- or intra-agency working groups.
information), may be placod in the JFK
committees, and meetings that possess
Assassination Records Collection, and
or created rocurds relating'to the
(7) In the case of artifaces, the original
assassination uf Prosident John F.
objects themselves may be placod in the
JFK Assassination Records Colloction.
(u) The inclusion of artfacts in the
(b) To the extent records from foreign
scups of the term assassination rocord 1s
governants are included in the IFK
understood to apply solely to tho JFK
Assassination Records Collection.
Assassination Records Collection and to
copias of the onginal records shall be
Implement fully the torms of the JFK
sufficient for inclusion in the collection.
Act and has no direct or indirect bearing
(c) In cases where a copy, as dolined
on the interpretation or implementation
in paragrapb (a) uf this section, is
of any other stalute or regulation
• authorized by the Review Board to be
(c) Whenever arufacts are included in
mcluded un the JFk Assassination
the JFK Assassinalion Records
Rocords Collection, tha Review Board
Collecton, it shall be sufficiont to
may require thai a copy he ceruñod il.
comply with the JFK Act if the public
1 is discrution. it delosmines a
is providod accois lu photographs.
certificauon to te necessary lo ensure
drawings, or similar materials depicting
the integrity of the JFK Assassination
the artifacts. Auditional display of or
Kecords Collertion. In Cases where on
examination by lie public of artifaces in
original, as dufined in paragraph (a) al
the JFK Assassination Records
this section, Is required for inclucion in
Collection shall deur under the terms
tha JFK Assassination Kecurds
and conditiuns stablished by thes
Collection, the Review Board may, at its
National Archives and Records
discretion, accupt the best available
Adminisuration to ensure their
copy. In such cases that records
preservation and protection for
included in the JFk Assassination
Records Collection, whether originals or
coplai, contain illegible portions, such
records shall have attached thereto a
cortified transcription of the illegible
language to the exient practicable
(d) For purposes of implementing the
JFK Act, the turns copy nimans a true end
accurate photocupy duplication by i
Ineans appropriate to the medium of the
original record that preserves and
disjolays the integry of the record and
the information contained in it.
(e) Nothing in this secton shall io
Idespiorad 1o suggost thaladultonal
(d) Tho tonus and. or. any, all, and the
plural and singular forms of nouns shall
be understoud in their.broadest and
anust inclusive sonse and shall not be
understood to bo terns of limitation.
(e) Unless the Keview Board in its sole
discretion directs otherwise, recuris
that are sduntified with respoc tu a
paracular person shall include all
records ralating lu that person that use
ur soflect the true name ur any uther
nane, proudonym, codeword, symbol
number, cryptonyno, or alias Used to
identify that person
---
## Page 65
- 1
ANND
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 124 / Nodnesday, June 28, 1995 / Rules and Regulations
33351
(1) Unless the Keview Board in its sole
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
discretion directs otherwise, records
Need for Correction
that are identshed by the Review Board
with respact to a particular operation or
As published, the final rule contains
program shall include all recurds.
one error which may prove to be
pertaining lo that programs by any olier
misleading and as in neud of cortection.
name, psaudonym, codowurd, symbol.
Correction ul Publicalion
number. or cryptonym
Accordingly, the publication on
§ 1400.8 Implementing the JFK ACt
Friday, April 7, 1995 (00 FR 17639) ol
Nolice of Assassination Record
the final regulation. FR Doc. У5-8544.
for National Capital Region, is corrected
a mutice of proposed rulemaking (NPR)
for the State of Maine. The NPR
proposed extending the attainment
deadline for ozono for Hancock and
(Valdo Countes, and usted for public
comment. No cummeuls were received.
CNA Requirements and EPA Actions
Concerning Designation and
Classification
Section 107(d)(+) of the Clean Air Act
as amended in 1990 (CAA) required the
(1) A Notice of Assassination Record
Designation (NARD) shall be the
mechanism for the Review Board to
announce publicly its determination
that i record or group of records neuts
the definition of assassination recures
(U) Notice of all NARDs well be
published in the Federal Kegister
iwithin 3n days of the decision to
designate such racords as assassination
In the FR Dor. 05-4599, appearing on
page 17649 in the issue of Fridey, April
7. 1995. the words "the introductory
text of"' need lu be added afler the word
"revising" that appears in the firit
column, beginning on the ninth line,
which now reads "2. Section 7.90 is
amended by revising paragraph (k) (2) tu
-read as follows:" is corruciud 1o rend "2
Section 7.98 is amended by revising the
(c) In deternining loo designate surh
introductory lext of paragraph (lJ(2) 10
recurds as assassinatiun records, thie
real as follows:"
Keview board snuct dutormine that the
secord ur group of record will mure
likely than nut enhanco, eurch, and
broaded tar historical record ol the
Arung Chief, Hungar Araves Divesaon
IFK (4oc-95-15711 Foledi 21-95,89.45a180l
BILLING CODE 4310-70 F
Steles and EPA to designate areas as
attainment, nonallainment. or
unclassifiable for uzura is mnll as other
pollutants for which metronal ambient
alr quality standards (NAAQS) have
• been set. Section 181(a)(1/ (table 1)
requirud that ozone nonattainment arcas
be classified as marginal, moderale.
serious, sevete. or extreine. depending
on their air quality.
In a series of Federal Register notices.
FPA conopolused this primes br
designating and classifying all areas of
the country for ozone. See. cg. 56 Fk
50694 (Nov. G, 1991): 57 FR 56762 (Nut.
30. 1992): 59 FR 189G7 (April 21, 1994)
Areas designaled nonatian ent for
azone ar required to ruter allaument
dates speciled undor the Act For areas
Tealad• June 22, 19115
Dawd C Marwell,
Enecuune Director Assussinalon Fincuris
Revew Buurd.
(FK Doc 45-15819 FileJ 6-27-45; 8 45 ain)
BLUING CODE ENLID-M
classifiud marginal through uxtrera, tha
allainment dates range from November
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
15. 1993 through November 1a, 2010. A
AGENCY
discussion of the attainment dates is
found in 57 FR 13498 (April 16, 1992)
40 C-H Parts 52 and 88
(the General Pruamblo)
(A-Y-AL-5244-5)
The Hancock and Ialdu Counties.
Molnu area was designated
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Cican Air Act Promulgation of
nonattainmont and Classified marginal
Extension of Attainment Date for
for ozone pursuant to S6 FK 58094 (Nov.
National Park Serice
Ozone Nonallenment Area; Maine
u, 1991). By this classification, its
attainment date became Notarnher 15.
36 CFR Part 7
AGENCY: Environmental Protection
RIN 1024-AC1#
Agency (EPA).
AClION: Final rule
CAA Keyuirements and EPA Actions
Concerning Meeting the Allainment
National Capital Region Parks; Speclal
SUMMARY: EPA Is extendulg the:
Regulations; Correction
allammond dale for the Hancoed and
AGENCY: National Pará Service, laterior.
baldo Countes. i marginal 0201g
ACTION: Correction to final regulatinis
nunattainment aica in Maine lo
Novembe: 15, 1994. This extensiun is
SUMMARY: Thee dacmull contams a
haied on part on montored air quality
romection lu the final regulations which
readitags for the nator ambont air
were published Friday, April 7. 1995
quality standard for ozone during 1993.
(G0 FR 17639). The roguloons linn thee:
Thic nonce also updales tables in du
sales un Federal park land lu bouks.
CFR 52.1027 and 40 CFR 01.320
newspapers, leaflets, pampulets, buttons
cuntenung allainment dates in the Stale
and bumper suckers and set standards
for siles, stands and structures used in
such sales within National Capitel
Rogion Porks.
EFFECTIVE DATE: May 8, 1995
FOA FURTHEN IN OHMATION CONIACI:
Sandra Alley, Associate Kegunal
Direcros. Puhlic Aflairs and Tourist.
National Capital Region, National Park
Service, 1100 Ohio Drive SIV
Washingion. D.C.(202)619-7233
EFFECTIVE DATE: This extension becomes
eflective July 28. 1995.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Richard P. Burkhar, Air. Pesticides and
Toues Managemen: Division. U.S.
Envirunmental Proicchion Agency.
RegIoN I. JFK Federal Uild, Boston, MA
02203. Phone. 617-565-327-4
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Fub
22. 1045160 FK 9613). EPA published
SUCtiOn 181(b)(?)iA) roquests the
Administrator, within six months of the
altainment date, de dele roine sole ther
ozone: nonaltallment areas attained the
NAAQS FUrUZUNO, ElA delurmines
attainmont status on the basis of the
expected nunber of exceedances ol tie
NAAQS over the three jas period up
to. and including, the attainment date.
fee General Preamble, 57 FR 13506 In
the cases of ozone manginal
nonallornment arous, to three yoor
period is 1991-93. CrA section
181(U)(2)(A) further states tat, fur areas
classified as manginal, moderate. or
serivus. il the Administrator determines
that the area did not altain the standard
by dis altammont date, the area must be
reclassified upwards
Howover. CAA section 181(a)(5)
provides an exemption frum these bump
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32183321.pdf | 124-10238-10031 | 10/26/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/30/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 89-43-6868 | HQ | NO | 124 | FBI | DL | 09/21/2017 | 124 | ## Page 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10238-10031
RECORD SERIES:
DL
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
89-43-6868
Released under the John
' Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
144 USC 2107 Notel.
Case#:NW 54462 Date:
10-04-2017
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
NO
TO: HQ
TITLE:
DATE: 05/30/1967
PAGES:
124
SUBJECT:
SEE FBI 62-109060-5374
DOCUMENT TYPE:
ORIGINAL
CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE:
STATUS
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Unclassified
10/29/1998
Redact
NEW
CLASSIFICATION:
UPDATE DATE:
02/14/2001
RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (4)
COMMENTS:
HH 54462 DocId: 32183321
Page 1
---
## Page 2
FD-36 (ReY. 5-22-64)
FBI
Date: 5/30/67
Transmit the following in .
Via
AIRTEL
(Type in plaintext or code)
AIRMAIL
(Priority)
TO:
FROM:
DIRECTOR, FBI (62-109060)
SAC, NEW ORLEANS (89-69)
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIG
:3N AND/OR,
RELEASE OF GIA ANFORIVIATION
9503 00/57 179 te)
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY;
DALLAS, TEXAS,
NOVEMBER 22, 1963
MISC. - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(00: DALLAS)
Re Bureau telephone calls to New Orleans, 5/29 and
5/30/67.
A review of the New Orleans files was conducted
concerning allegations made by District Attorney JAMES
GARRISON, Orleans Parish District Attorney, New Orleans,
Louisiana, and any reported statements made by his staff.
There is a possibility that other statements were made by
GARRISON or members of his staff on radio, television, or
to organizations, as well as statements to persons inside
and outside the state of Louisiana, of which this office
would bave no knowledge.
1
- Bureau (AM)
Dallas (89-43) (AM)
New Orleans
STS/jlc
(19)
ALL: INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6 - 7- 93 BY 9803600/KSK
JFK
89-43-6868
SEARCHED
INDEXED.:
SERIALIZED
NiAY & 1 1UDI
Approved:
•Special Agent in Charge
NW 54462 DooId: 32183321 Page 2
Sent
- М Рег
---
## Page 3
NO 89-69/1rs
Source:
Date:
To Whom:
By Whom:
DEAN ANDREWS
April 6, 1967
New Orleans Office, FBI
DEAN ANDREWS
"DEAN ANDREWS advised that District Attorney JAMES
GARRISON wants him to identify CLAY SHAW as CLAY BERTRAND and
Cuban or Latin-type man
to ANDREWS' OffiCe with LEE HARVEY OSWALD."
Source:
Date:
To Whom:
By Whom:
NO 1378-C
April 13, 1967
New Orleans Office, FBI
VERNON BUNDY
"Source advised that several weeks ago he talked
with a fellow prisoner, VERNON BUNDY.
VERNON BUNDY, an
Orleans Parish prisoner, testified in District Attorney JAMES
GARRISON'S KENNEDY assassination probe that he, BUNDY, saw
CLAY L. SHAW pass money to someone on the New Orleans
lakefront.
BUNDY indicated to source he had been offered a deal by District
Attorney GARRISON if he would testify to a story about SHAW.
According to source, this conversation allegedly took place
several weeks ago in New Orleans Parish Prison prior to the
time BUNDY testified at the hearing in Criminal District Court.
anything to get out of his sentence.
his testimony was not true without
stating directly so, or
that a story had been given to him to tell."
Source:
Date:
To Whom:
By Whom:
JACK S. MARTIN
April 21, 1967
New Orleans Office, FBI
JACK S. MARTIN
HH
54462
DooId:32183321 Page 3
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32304870.pdf | 124-10287-10000 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 7/7/61 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-2918-51ST NR 96 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, PG | 2 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/28/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY :
RECORD NUMBER:
FBI
124-10287-10000
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-2918-51ST NR 96
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FBI
FROM:
TO:
SAC, PG
DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE: 07/07/1961
PAGES:
2
SUBJECTS :
SM, TRA, ASSOC, B/F INT
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Confidential
RESTRICTIONS :
4
CURRENT STATUS:
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
08/31/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
DocId: 32304870
76
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (41 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
7/7/61
AIRIEL
90:
FROM:
SUBTECT :
DIRICTOR, FBI (92-2914) (92-2918)
SAC, PITESBUROH (92-235) (92-228)
CABRICI, MANVARINO, aka.
AR
SAMUEL RAMVARTIVO, aka.
on 7/7/61, PO 615-0 advised SA FIONAS G. FORSYTH, III as
follows:
SAM MANNÁRINO has been out of town for three days and will
retum to New Kensington, Fä., either 7/8/61 or 7/9/61.
A12 that le known is that he went "down South" someplace,
Currently,
KELLY MANNARINO has two new, large rooms being
added to his cottage.
over-all supervision of the job 1s
being handled by VICTOR A, STANZIANO, but the carpentry work
i6 being done by two men, allegedly fron Canada.
In SAN MANHARINOiS absence, STANZIANO is detving MANVARINOIS
cate
The pubile fishing lake on Route 56, hear SAM MANNARINO! S
- Bonfire Restaurant, 1s to be drained and
This land
the new road to be bullt whiel
will give aocess to the new homes and shopping centes
STANZIANO will construst in concert with the MANNARINOS.
6
Bureau
83 92-2014)
13 - 92-29185
3 - Pittsburgh
(1 - 137-942)
roD/bac
(9)
198-2918-
NOT RECORDED
98
JUL 1 2 1961
66 JUL 171961
DocId: 32304870 Page 2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32306975.pdf | 124-10291-10115 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/15/1960 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-72630-2ND NR 62 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, WMFO | 2 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | INC LHM | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hotel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/11/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
RECORD NUMBER :
FBI
124-10291-10115
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
105-72630-2ND NR 62
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: SAC, WMFO
TO :
DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
DATE:
02/15/1960
'PAGES:
2
SUBJECTS :
[Restricted]
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/10/1996
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS:
INC LHM
v9.1
DocId: 32306975
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Leasett
under
the Tohn
DATE: 11-14-2017
Assassination Records Col
- ОЛ
Act of 1992 (44 050
2107 Hotel:
.
2/15/60
AIMEL
TO:
DIRECTOR, 8056250289794
SAC, 1F04205-23108)7(8)(4)
RowtOnirtol and letterhead nano
12/12/59,
captioned
"Torosen Political Buctors® Cua.
Barito
100018-210, uhleh
indicatod Cuba's desáre to extradito PsoRd
DINGINE
Tooze are
attachod horeto for tho Barenu fon copio
and for lians one copy for Intosnation of o Letterhoad samo
dated and cnotzoned an abore incosporating angernation
obtarned Iron H8 1125-59-
The
etcoched mono
23
clonosfiod "Confidential"
Esinco it
reLocto avostigntiva covorage of a foraigu
оброас сотово зорида ви sona to
adentity on
ENcos haformont of contiauros
effectiveneos thorool.
alue and coapronico the
Eutuze
Burden
(Back. 10)
(1*105-
PEDRO DEAL LANE)
I-llica (Caci. L) (Into) (BU)
J-77O
Rss/est
(6)
CIAO 2 DDY 5668 540/602
646)
(R" 1/28/98
105-72630
NOT RECORDED
160 FEB I' 1960
DECLAS
62FEB 28 1960
(STiL)
ALL IRFOREATIOE CANTE
WEREIR
ED
EXCEPT NACAL SHOWN
C1 ASSISE
side, 13
IT FILED
IN
DocId: 32306975
Page 2
---
## Page 3
eleased under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Aot of 1992 (41 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
In Reply, Please Refer lo
File No.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
*2:
Doorsemy
Pleasts,
chot the bening on mo exermation of tenser tead of tea
соло ва 100 Росго 5405 LOTS, &
3600.
6vet
the pozac in chicle-tula coso has boor bradlos md
She 69107, Andiestios Chas bott the
Mes Cocounto and ebo Emboooy la Cocaingica, D. Co, have
mac 8016 20 294 94642S 5448 22240566n0 9646204
achose that battercenrons assted tha
bogantre Sanctlotoly sho Bies noster naas Do savon rory
aesar an en to palent so boats to a legions
to coproces tue Unsces states Dopartment of Scoto an thin
26 p080 3a00 00
coast
ens current cho Doosetsent of Stato at a
Koton
datte
This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FEI.
It is i e properly o.
the FBI and is isaned to your agency;
it and its contenic due nut to be
distibuled outride your agency. CLASSIFIED BY 566E SIO/GE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (NA
ALL INFORMATION
CONTANGER
HEREIS IS UNCLASSMIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWA
0THSA8IS6
4AS 24 sosmac
DEGLASSIFY
70252
74430
DocId: 32306975
Page 3
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32301387.pdf | 124-10278-10222 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/31/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-6054-315 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, BU | 4 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Aot of 1992 714 USC 2107 Hotej.
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/14/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-10278-10222
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
92-6054-315
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
SAC, BU
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
DATE:
'PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
05/31/1963
LCN, CHESTER, LOUIS A., GROSS, GEORGIA, BUSS, VSC,
ABR, SM, MEETING, MISUR
DOCUMENT TYPE:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/29/1996
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
DocId: 32301387
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-1-to-2017ev. 12-13-56)
FBI
Date:
5/31/63
Tiunsmit the following in
Via
AIRTEL
(Type in plain text or code)
AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)
Belmont
137r. Mohr
i Mr. Caspor
Mr:
Celianan
Mr.: Conra:
ант.
Bolden
Mr. Evans.
Mr.
Grie
Mr.
Rosen
Mr
Sulliven
Mr. Tavl
Mr. Troiter
Tele. Room
yMiss Haimes
¡Miss Gandy
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI (92-6054)
FROM:
SAC, BUFPALO (92-337)
LA CAUSA NOSTRA
AR - CONSPIRACY
(00 New York)
9 -
Re Philadelphia airtels dated 5/24/63 and 5/29/63:
A further review of information furnished by BU 82-0*
on 5/24/63 has been made and the following additional summary
of pertinent information relating to the meeting between
STEVE MAGADDINO and ANGELO BRUNO 1s set out.
During the conversations between VINCENT A. SCRO,
the
son-in-law of STEVE MAGADDINO, and PASQUALE NATARELLI,
aka
"Titters,
" Patty, the informant reported that SCRO was
insisting that NATARELLI thoroughly read and understand "the
Exemption Certificate" Issued by the Governor General of the
Grand Bahama Islands.
3 - Bureau (AM) (RM)
1
- Cleveland
(92-748) (AM) (RM) (Info)
1 - Miami (92-835) (AM) (RM) (Info)
1
- Newark (92-1203)
(AM) (RM) (Info)
- New. York (92-2300)
(AM). (RM) (Info)
- Philadelphia (92-1027 (AM
• (RM) (Info)
-
Pittsburgh (92-559) (AM. (RM) (Info)
1
- Buffalo
REC. 53
92-6054-315
LFA: mak
(10)
Ca. C. Wick
13 1
Approved:
Sent
-M • Per
Special Agent in Charge
DocId: 32301387
Page 2
---
## Page 3
eased under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 141\U5C 210
v Muter.
DATE: 11-14-2017
BU 92-337
"on. But anyway, so we fo in there this morning,
see,
and
I see JACK GELLMAN (PH) .
JACK GELLMAN has been previously identified as
the former Niagara County District Attroeny and currently
the President of Consolidated Bowling Corporation.
Both
ChantER and GELLMAN were the original promoters of the
Consolidated Bowling Corporation, which operates bowling
alleys, motels, and hotels both
in the United States and
abroad.
In describing the exclusive ownership of the
one of the Bay street boys.
SCRO remarked "coompa, you
know LOU CHESLER is in with LANSKY, MEYER LANSKY, and
VITO
ORDACRATELLI (PH) - they're the ones that do all the
operation of it, do you follow me?
They're the ones that
bought this thing, coompa,
"that's New York, you know "whereupon NATARELLI remarks
At this point, SCRO remarks that ANGELO (BRUNO)
was recently in the Buffalo area and had discussed this
matter with STEVE MAGADDINO.
The discussion apparently
related to the transfer of the license or Exemption
Certificate and that JACK GELLMAN had been consulted about
this matter.
According to SCRO, MAGADDINO told him that "if
they're the only
ones that
got the license then you and I
got to go to New York and we'll straighten it out.
If he's
got the license and can get anybody he wants then I'll
come back up here and we'll straighten out up this end;
but the main thing is to find out first who's got it and
who can run it.
On 5/29/63, Constable ROBERT STONE, National
Criminal Intelligence Unit, Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Toronto, was requested to develop any information he could
obtain concerning the background of Mrs. GEORGIA, GROSS,
apparently the wife of WALLACE GROSS, and of her association
With LOUlS A. CHESLER of Toronto. It is noted that the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police in
Toronto 1s familiar with
-3-
DocId: 32301387
Page 3
---
## Page 4
releasen under the john I. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 741-86 27940
DATE: 11-14-2017
BU 92-337
the background of CHESLER, having received inquiries from
London, England, and Miami, Florida, concerning his
operations.
In connection with this request, Constable STONE
was advised of the fact that the Buffalo FBI Office had
received information from a highly confidential source to
the effect that Buffalo criminals, including STEVE MAGADDINO,
had evidenced interest in attempting to place syndicate
money in a hotel-gambling casino operation, the license for
which had been obtained or was being obtained by LOU CHESLER
and Mrs. GEORGIA GROSS.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police
was further informed at that time that this particular
license was one issued by the Governor General of the Grand
Bahamas,
entitling the holder to operate a gambling casino
and a hotel in the Grand Bahamas.
The Buffalo Office will continue to review the
information furnished by both BU 82-C* and BU 280-g* or
5/24/63, and subsequent dates concerning the developments
of this new gambling venture.
It is noted that the names
VITO CRITELLI
GEORGIA GROSS (A TERRY COLAVITO, POLIANO, and MrS.
are unknown to the Buffalo Office.
UTMOST CAUTION MUST BE TAKEN IN DISCUSSING OR IN
DISSEMINATING ANY INFORMATION SET FORTH ABOVE IN ORDER TO
FULLY PROTECT THE IDENTITY OF BU 82-C* IN BUFFALO, NEW YORK.
-4-
DocId: 32301387
Page 4
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32301016.pdf | 124-10277-10351 | 10/26/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/11/63 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-4474-48, 49 | SAC, MM | DIRECTOR, FBI | 2 | FBI | HQ | 08/25/2017 | INC MEMO | 3 | ## Page 1
Pi.
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
6/4/2015
AGENCY :
RECORD NUMBER :
RECORD SERIES :
FBI
124-10277-10351
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 97-4474-48, 49
Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Recorde
Collection Act of 1992
144 USC 2107 Notel .
Case#:NW 54027 Date:
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI
TO: SAC, MM
TITLE :
DATE: 10/11/1963
• PAGES:
2
SUBJECTS :
MIRR, OBA, ACA, RAIDS, CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
06/18/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
INC MEMO
19.1
HH 54027
DocId: 32301016
Page 1
---
## Page 2
OPTIONAL FORM NO
5010-1070
UNITED STATES GOV
Memoranduri
TO
Director, FBI (97-4474)
DATE:
10/21/63
FROM
SUBJECT:
Or 84C, Miami (67-2354)
MOVIMIENTO INSURRECIONAL DE
RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR)
RA - CUBA; IS - CUBA; NM
(00: Miami)
ReBulet 10/11/63, making reference to Miami tele-
type 8/16/63, which indicated that "MM-726-S, head of the
MIRR, would be interviewed."
Referenced teletype was in error and should have :
read "ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, head of the MIRR,..
.. "
/JFK
SA ROBERT J. DWYER, who prepared this teletype,
can not explain exactly how this confusion occurred, except
that it may have been an error in his dictation.
GAL
GAT
In any event, the error was subsequently corrected,
BOSCH was interviewed, and results submitted by airtel and
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
letterhead memorandum
for dissemination dated September 3,
UNCLASSIFIED
BY SPo Ba
1963.
¿insure that such errors do not occur again.
SA DWYER has advised he will make every effort to
Inasmuch as the teletype was not submitted for
dissemination and the correct information was submitted
subsequently in airtel and letterhead memorandum, no other
administrative action is recommended except scoring this 'as a
non-substantive error against SA DWYER.
HEREIN IS
DATE
- Bureau (RM)
2 - Miami
HRA : egh
(4),
1 - Personnel folder, SA Dwyer
REC 7
92-447449
29
12. OCT 28-1963
•c 00: 311063
UNIT
PERS.
NW 54027 DooId: 32301016
Page 2
---
## Page 3
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
AULAOSIFIEO
BY SPE B JA/sCL
SOSMACKAT
(UFK)
HEREIN IS UN
DATE 9/10/85
2/15/95
2 - Iro Nasca
SAG, Want (205-2855)
20-21-63₴
Director, FBI (97-4474)
LUSUREECTONAE
(UTER)
RA
IS
- CUBA
NEUTRALITY MATI
REVIEWED BY USUFK TASK
7.23.97 dah
RELEASE IN FULL
RELENSE IN PART
Reurtel 8-16-63 in which you indleated ul 726-s, head
of captioned organization in lani, would be interuleued for
information concerning captioned organization. Aduise Bureau
of results of this contact together with any additional pertinent
inforuation which may have been recelved concerning the
organization and its activities.
For your information, at the conference conducted bu
Department of State, on 9-13-03, the details of which were
furnished your office on 9-16-03 by airtel captioned Anti-fidel
Castro Actluities," Grimine called attention to air raids over
Cuba on 8-15-63, 9-5-63, and 9-8-63 for which credts was elained
by captioned anti-Castro organizations
According to Crimins, Custons agents on 9-12-63
interulewed an Anertoan soldier of fortune in Blaini, Bahamas, one
Bi22 Jolmson. Jolson claimed credit for these raide and
inplloated tuo other American adventurers, Jeck Griffin end
one Credener, Jolmoon stated he had used a Cessna 320 plane
and & Cesona 175 and had purchased two converted P 52's which he
hoped to use for raide in the forchcoming week. The raids
arsegedly were undertaken to prove do a cuban group that Cuòc
from the 2are.
check with Custons locally for information concerning the air raids
and captioned organization"e connection with, them.
VEN: Lab labe
MAILED &
REC. 13
91-4474 - 48
(4)
Tolson
Bsinont
Mobr
Casper
Callahon
OCT 10 1963
EX-116
19 OCT 11 1963
- NOTE:
COMM-FBI
Captioned organization reportedly condueted several
tale
we here baite ovar lue any la the sullent of a Custom
Nosen
investigation. In view of the inuolvement of 3ie on
vel!
who is well known to us, it is felt we should obtain pertinent
ormation which Custons may have developed to assist us in
rustine Fate me gations of this type.
930-18121
HH 54027 DoOId: 32301016
Page 3
TOTAL DENIAL
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32556728.pdf | 124-10204-10124 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | 04/17/2018 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | null | 3/7/18 | null | ## Page 1
.......
5/10/66
Airtel
GREGSTE
To:
Legat, Bonn
From: Director, FBI
GUS ALEX
AR
-1140
MAILED 7
MAY 1 1 1966
Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr _
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad -
Felt -
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Chicago has received information from Trans-World
Airlines that a reservation has been made for Alex's paramour,
Suzanne Fueger, under the name D. Fueger for TWA Flight 800,
departing Chicago 3:00 p.I., May 20, next, to Kennedy Airport,
New York City.
• Flight 741 the same
date, leaving from Kennedy Airport for Frankfurt, Germany ,at 17:30 pm. From
Frankfurt she will take Lufthansa Flight 101 on the morning of
May 21, next, departing at 9:50 a.]., bound for Munich, Germany.
As you are aware, Fueger's mother resides near Munich.
Alex has previously applied for passport renewal indicating he
intends to travel in Europe in early June, next.
Chicago
advises it is highly probable he will meet Fueger in Europe
after she has visit with relatives as has been done in the past.
It is requested that appropriate arrangements be made
to receive any information of interest arising from the
Indicated visit of the subject and Fueger and that the Bureau
be kept advised.
In the event informationcomes to your
attention during the proposed travel indicating visits by Alex
and fueger to other areas, interested Legats should be
appropriately advised.
- Legat, Bern (info)
1 - Foreign Liaison (Cleared with Supervisor Gregorio) - Detached
NOTE: Alex and Fueger have been making annual visits to Europe
for vacation purposes and in order that Fueger can visit with
her mother.
Identifying data on both Alex and Fueger previously furnished
to Legats.
MAILI ROOMED
(6)
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 45679 DocId: 32556728
Page 1
--- |
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2,017 | /releases | docid-32565125.pdf | 124-10203-10137, 124-10204-10137 | 26/4/18 00:00 | Redact | 17/4/18 00:00 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | null | 7/3/18 00:00 | null | ## Page 1
PH 92-441
Leads (cont 'd)
PHILADELPHIA: (cont'a)
AT QUAKERTOWN, PA.
Will identify the subscriber to telephone KE 6-9906,
which was
called 5/9/61 and charged to the telephone credit
account of JANE C. COLLINS, and will, unless inadvisable,
interview the subscriber concerning the subject.
AT PHILADELPHIA, PA.
1.. Will identify the subscribers to the following
telephone numbers
and unless inadvisable interview them concerning
their knowledge of the subject:
PE 5-3800 called 6/4/61
LO 3-9819 called 6/4/61
LO 3-1000 called 5/5/61
PE 5-5085 called 5/8/61
KI 5-9919 called 5/28/61.
All of the above calls were charged to the telephone
credit card issued to JANE C. COLLINS and telephone is being used
at times by the subject, RUSSELL BUFALINO.
2. Will follow status of subject's case with INS.
AT PITTSTON, PA.
1.
Will identify the subscriber to Olympic 5-1906,
which was called 5/30/61 and charged to the telephone credit
card of JANE C. COLLINS, and interview subscriber unless inadvisable.
2. Will maintain contact with the following for
information concerning the subject:
PH 521-0, PH 526-0, Sgt.
JOSEPH DELANEY, Pittston, Pa., Police Department.
-E-
COVER PAGE
NW 45739 DocId: 32565125
Page 1
---
## Page 2
PH 92-441
Leads (cont'a)
PHILADELPHIA: (cont'd
AT SCRANTON, PA.
1.
Will maintain contact with the following for
information concerning the subject:
FRANK GRIMES, ATTD, U.S. Treasury Department;
PH. 599-C
PH 577-C
PCI
OTHER 4
PCI
PCI
PCI
PCI
PCI
2. Will identify the subscribers to the following
telephone numbers and, if advisable, will interview them concerning
the subject.
These are numbers which were called and charged to
the telephone credit card of JANE C. COLLINS:
Diamond 3-4721, notation on this call which was
made 5/30/61, indicated the person called as
W. D. MORGAN:
Diamond 7-9166,
called 6/2/61, person called
indicated as E. C. BALDASSARI;
Diamond 7-3373 called 6/5/61
Diamond 6-0745, called 6/5/61, person called
indicated as CARLIN O'MALLEY ;
Diamond 3-9112, called 6/5/61;
Diamond 2-1184, called 6/5/61;
Diamond 7-9166, called 6/6/61;
Diamond 3-4710, called 6/6/61;
-F
-
COVER PAGE
NW 45739 DocId: 32565125
Page 2
---
## Page 3
PH 92-441
PH T-1
PH T-2
PH T-3
PH T-4
Administrative Data (cont'd)
FRANK GRIME. 3. Special Agent, Alcohol Tobacco Tax
Treasury Department
Scranton, Pa.,
contacted by SAA REINHARD on 6/15/61;
Trooper EUGENE CORBETT, PSP, contacted 7/26/61
Dy SA WAYNE D. SMITH; attempts previously
made to contact him by SA SMITH on 5/24, 6/9,
6/30, and7/25/61;
PH: 525-C contacted 6/16, 7/31, and 8/15/61
by SA FREDERICK T. HOULIHAN;
WILLIAM STRUBECK, PCI, contacted 8/8/61
by SA HOULIHAN;
SA
HOULIHAN; PCI, contacted 7/24/62 by
PCI
and
25/61 by SAA REINHARD;
I contacted 7/13
OTHER 4
PCI,
contacted 6/19/61
G. DOUGHERTY;
by
SA VINCENT
Sgt.
JOSEPH DELANEY, Pittston Police Department,
Pittston, Pa., contacted 8/18/61 by SA HOULIHAN;
Trooper CARL MACIEJEWSKI, PSP, Wyoming, Pa.,
contacted 8/21/61 by SA HOULIHAN.
Informants
Miss ANN VANNER, Secretary, Frank Collins, President,
Wyoming Coal Company, Scranton,
Pa. (by request)
PH 577-C
Sgt. JOSEPH DELANEY, Pittston Police Department
WILLIAM J. STRUBECK, PCI
- H -
COVER PAGE
.?..
NW 45739
DocId: 32565125
Page 3
---
## Page 4
PH 92-441
Informants (cont'd)
PH T-5
PH T-6
PH T-7
PH T-8
PH T-9
PH T-10
PH 526-C
OTHER 4
PCI
PCI
Dun and Bradstreet, Scranton, Pa.
PCI
PCI.
-It
COVER PAGE
NW 45739
DocId: 32565125
Page 4
--- |
||||||||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10161-10093.pdf | 104-10161-10093 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 3/2/77 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | PRIORITY DIRECTOR | WITHHELD | CABLE REGARDING ACTIVITY IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA ATTRIBUTED TO DAVID PHILLIPS | 2 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK45 : F3A : 1994.04.06.18:03:44:560031 : | 2 | ## Page 1
104-10161-10093|
_ PCH_.
N'UNIT NOTHIED
VANCE CONG ISSUERSIOTTED
ACTION UNIT
SECRET
= 66 11 3010
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUING
THAN
OFFICE 15
PRONIBITED
DeST
DENGL
CTION #
o/commos, awo 2216-17
SECRET D21944Z MAR 77 STAFF
CI TE
16-17
7 32390
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR..
WN INTEL RY BAT
REF:
32384(N 203537) *
1, CARACAS ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER "THE DAILY JOURNAL"
OF 2 MARCH HAS FOLLOWING EDITORIAL COMMENT ENTITLED "THE NEW YORK
TIMES AGAIN"!
. TEXTI "WHAT IS THE NEW YORK TIMES TRYING TO DO?
#E70
IT PRINTED AN ERRONEOUS REPORT SLANDERING THE HAD OF A
FRIENDLY STATE, BASED ON RUMORS WHICH ITS OWN CORRESPONDENT
THIS
ADMITTED WERE NOT FULLY CHECKED DUT. TIS ACTION CAUSED A SERIOUS
DIPLOMATIC INCIDENT WHICH WAS SETTLED ONLY THROUGH THE PERSONAL
INTERVENTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA.
NOW, THE NEW YORK DAILY, IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO SALVAGE
ITS REPUTATION, HAS DUG UP A SELF-PROCLAIMED FORMER CIA OFFICIAL
GAVE
WHO SAYS THAT THE CIA GVE
MONEY TO THE GOVERNMENT HERE • NOT TO
ANY INDIVIDUAL.
LAST NIGHT, THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALLY AND
EMPHATICALLY DENIED THIS REPORT.
a..".
SECR
ET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
3/N..
---
## Page 2
14-00000
-CABLE SEE DISSEM BY
DER_
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED_.
ADVANCE COPY
ACTION UNIT
ISSUED/SLOTTED
RF . FILE
ACTION A
N
F
т 64 4965
El A1 02
TOTAL COPIES_-
SECRET
AL..
, RUN HY
REPRODUCTION
BY OTHER THAI
ISSUING OFFICE
IS PROHIBITED
ST AF F
VR
5
PAGE 0 2 02
TOR: 021959Z MAR 77
IN 203739
16-17
32 39 0
THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE AND
WITHOUT ANY PROMPTING FROM WASHINGTON, FOUGHT COMMUNIST INSURRECTION
TO A STANDSTILL HERE IN THE EARLY. SIXTIES. THERE WAS NO NEED
OF ANY PAYMENT FROM THE CIA FOR ANYTHING. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERN-
MENT WAS WHOLEHEARTEDLY IN THIS FIGHT FOR ITS OWN REASONS, TO
PROTECT ITS OWN INTERESTS, USING ITS OWN RESOURCES. "
2, NOTE IN THE ABOVE THAT THE JOURNAL HAS MADE THE
SAME ERROR AS THE GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA IN ATTRIBUTING INFO
FROM "INTELLIGENCE SOURCES" AND "AN OLD OFFICIAL OF THE CIA" AS
COMING FROM DAVID PHILLIPS. SINCE ONE OF THE FAVORITE STUNTS IN
THIS COUNTRY IS TO QUOTE STATEMENTS OUT OF CONTEXT AND/OR MISQUOTE
ACCIDENTALLY OR ON PURPOSE, SUCH STATEMENTS RARELY CLARIFY ANY THING;
THEY ONLY COMPLICATE • ALMOST ALWAYS TO OUR DISADVANTAGE.
3, NO FILE. EZ -IMPDET•
*Advised that New York Times article of 1 March has blown the lid off the
situation in Caracas again.
: '
10 10
SECRET
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32342988.pdf | 104-10050-10166 | 07/24/2017 | In Part | CIA | 12/20/1963 | PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | DIRECTOR | MEXICO CITY | PRESENT PLAN IN PASSING INFO TO WC. | null | CIA | JFK | 6/6/17 | JFK3 : F3 : 20031203-1019469 : | null | ## Page 1
Date: 11/29/04
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION EORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER: 104-10050-10166
RECORD SERIES.:.JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
÷ 80701357A
DOCUMENT
INFORMATION
AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : MEXICO
TITLE :
PRESENT PEAN IN PASSING INFO TO WC.
:12/20/1963
PAGES
1
SUBJECTS : DURAN SILVIA
CIA INFORMATION
JFK ASSASSINATION
WC
PAPER
Released under the John
as assination Records
Collection Act of 1992
144 USC 2107 Note!.
Case#:NW 53199 Date:
26-06-2017
DOCUMENT TYPE
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED
IN PARI PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
_ DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/19/04
COMMENTS : JFK3 : F3
: 20031203-1019469
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
104-10050-10166
| MH 53199
DocId: 32342988
Page
---
## Page 2
REPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED
ORIG : 3
JOHN M. W
UNIT :
WH 3
• INDEX
EXT
5613
O NO INDEX
DATE: :
20 DECEMBER 1963 D: FILE IN CS FILE NO.
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SEERBI
12-62
ROUTING
MEXICO CYX
2 0 DEC 63
18
13z
FROM: DIRECTOR
TR STAMP
CONF: C/Wit 2
SIG CEN
DEFERRED
A ROUTINE
INFO D61, D/DCI, DDP, C/CL, C/CI/Sleea:
tartn
TO
INFO. OF $1 = 071+ GIOPS
= OPFLOOR
Note: If do= zur son, site
CITE DIR
90466
reasons and coordinate
RED HEXI 7115 (1I 69636)
11 appropriate.
OUR PRESEN
PLAN IN PASSING INFO IO WARREN COMMISSION IS IQ SUAATE
MEANION
(ON TELEPHONE TAPS, IN ORDER PROTECT TOUR CONTINULIG OPS. WILI RELY
ISTEAD OF SEAMARIS, OF SILVIA DURAI AID ON CONTINIS ME SOVINE CONSULAR FILE
WHICH SOVIDES CAVE ODACID HERE, FILE SHOWS BOTH OSWALD AND WIFE WERE DICKERING
NITE SOVISIS IN HASHINCION BY MAIL IO GEI PURMISSION TO RETURN IO RUSSIA.
1
2. ENACT DETAILED INFO FROM LITAMILS T AND 9 OL JUST WHAT SILVIA 'DURAN AND
OTHER OFFICIALS SAID ABOUT OSWALD'S VISTIS AND HIS DEALINGS WOULD BE VALUABLE
AND USABLE CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE. REQUEST YOU REQUESTION THEM CAREIVITY OU
THESE POINIS, ATTEMPILIG GET AS MUCH AUNHENTIC DATA AS POSSIBLE, HITHOUT
BOXINE IN WHAT THEY FUCH FROM RENSP
PIS CATTAT SHI
AND POUCH
DETAILED STATE
CLASSIFICATION 5 WEY 1975
CONDUCTED ON
END OF MESSAGHE IMPDET CL BY 2I220S
C/S Comment:*Re interrogation of Silvia Duran.
DOC. MICRO. SER.
201-289248
Artille
y authority of
RICHARD HEIdIS
DIDE
RELEASING
OFFICER D- 200-5-41
OS COPY
DEC4
1974
MICROFILMED
Document Number .
420-757
for FOlA Review on
MAY 1976
COORDINATING OFFICERS
GROUP 1
excluded from automatic
SECRET
conneracine and
declassification
REPRODUCTION BY. OTHER TAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
OFFICER-
Copy Now
5011289248
REPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED
HH 53199
DocId: 32342988
Page 2.
16.2141
#D2087
3
PAGE
COPY
• 3
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 157-10002-10398.pdf | 157-10002-10398 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | SSCIA | 6/10/76 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | R-3065 | MILLER, WILLIAM G. | BRECKINRIDGE, S.D. | CIA COMMENTS ON DRAFT COMMITTEE REPORT ON ASSASSINATIONS | 14 | CIA | LETTER W/ATTACHMENTS | 3/12/18 | Box 411Folder 8 | null | ## Page 1
157-10002-10398
Date: 10/09/93
Page: 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10398
RECORDS SERIES :
LETTER W/ATTACHMENTS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : P-3065
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : BRECKINRIDGE, S.D.
TO : MILLER, WILLIAM G.
TITLE :
CIA COMMENTS ON DRAFT COMMITTEE REPORT ON
ASSASCTMATTONC
DATE : 06/10/76
PAGES : 14
SUBJECTS :
JFK ASSASSINATION
CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT
CUBA
CASTRO
CIA
AMLASH/1
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
JMWAVE
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : 0
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/08/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
Box 411
Folder 8
[R] - ITEM IS RESTR
NW 50955
DocId: 32282238
Page 1
---
## Page 2
TOP E
Page 33.
Page 34.
Page 41.
Page 47.
Page 53.
The report also says, here, 'none of this other
activity would seem to warrant Castro's associating
that activity with U.S. leaders to the extent that he
would threaten the safety of American leaders aiding
the plans.". We note without exception.
Footnote * The Cuban Coordinating Committee was
a group for coordinating implementation of established
programs. By memorandum of 22 May 1963, McGeorge.
Bundy, Special Assistant to President Kennedy for
National Security Affairs, designated the State Depart-
ment Coordinator of Cuban Affairs as Chairman of the
Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba with the specific
responsibility for the coordination of day-to-day actions
regarding Cuba. Membership of the Committee con-
sisted of representatives from State, USIA, DoD, CIA,
Justice, Treasury and ad hoc representatives as
necessary.
Footnote ** This seems to indicate that the FBI
learned/ of CIA's operations on 10 October 1963
(a new date?) and that this led to termination of the
AMLASH operation. Of course, that happened much
later.
"Special Affairs Staff"' should read "Special Activities
Staff."
SASICI should read SAS/CI.
Testimony of Karamessines is quoted, in which he is
asked a hypothetical question about use of AMLASH,
and that he answered hypothetically, but the presentation
seems to treat it as fact.
Reference to CIAl
collection capability in
Mexico City should be deleted.
Simply delete the
word?
This small point is a sources-
and-methods question.
- 4-
RECEIVED
JUN 10 19:
CIA
TOP SLOTT
NW 50955
DocId: 32282238
Page 2
---
## Page 3
TOP SECRET
Page 120.
It is requested that CIA support for DRE, JURE
and the 30th November Movement groups be altered
to a generic description of anti-Castro groups.
Persons identified with them in some circles could
suffer from official confirmation of the connection.
This is
still considered as classified. It is noted
that CIA did not have an operational interest in
SNFE or Alpha 66.
Page 122.
The Agency effort to obtain FPCC stationery
for use in a deception
operation is still classified since it involves
sources and methods.
Page 129. That the SAS Executive Officer views the AMLASH
operation as having been an assassination plot is
not very helpful, unless the time sequence and
evolution of the relationship with AMLASH/1 is
made a part of that view. His account in 1967
supported FitzGerald's story of what happened
in the 29 October 1963 meeting.
That SAS/CI speaks broadly may not be all that
helpful either, if the extent of his knowledge,
and when he knew what he says he knew, is
fixed in time. That he wrote a memorandum in
1965 on the security of the operation, does not
qualify him to address where things stood in
1963. In fact, he is quoted at page 139 as saying
that he could not recall the time frame.
Page 133.
The draft report states
that in October 1963 the
FBI knew of the "assassination aspect of the
AMLASH" operation.
As is noted earlier,
there was no such characterization that applied
to it then, so how it could have known is subject
to question.
JUN : i
CIA
FROM
Hi6
-7-
TOP SECRET
NH 50955
DocId: 32282238
Page 3
---
## Page 4
TOP SECRET
Page 161. The 1967 IG report did not consider the issue of when
the operational relationship with AMLASH/1 developed
to the point where AMLASH/1 could feel he had CIA
support for his plans. It simply dealt with events as
they unfolded. The report was used as a primary
source for the brief capsulized summary of the AMLASH
operation that preceded this detailed series of comments.
General. It is requested that reference to cables follow the general
practice employed in the SSC report on alleged assassination
plots. The date the cable was sent, the quoted portion, and
the country of origin should suffice. Specific reference to
Ta CIA "Station! should be deleted, specific destignation of are
colorate to T and out unto or iR emote and to.
the date and time group-of a cable, provide information that
"is subjectitol
and should Nea
be removed.
This technique for treating cables permits
the basic story to be told without providing unnecessary and
harmful, from a security point of view, information.
Instances in the draft presenting the question were noted
at pages 41, 46, 49, and 57. In addition, although JMWAVE
has already been identified officially in SSC published reports,
the basic treatment of communications cited in relation to
that Station should otherwise receive similar technical
treatment; see pages 19, 19a, 56, 106 and 138.
Special.
Page Slaites the CIA. Chief of Station reading a, cable
as being a particularly irritating embarrassmentsto the
Mexican Government.
RECEN ER FROM
JUN 1 4 1976
CiA
-9-
TOP_SECRET
NH 50955 DocId: 32282238
Page 4
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32328318.pdf | 124-90073-10022 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | FBI | 5/7/65 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-7599-7 | HQ | MM | 32 | FBI | HQ | 3/9/18 | RPT | 32 | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
5/5/2015
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90073-10022
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
92-7599-7
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: MM
TO: HQ
TITLE:
DATE: 05/07/1965
PAGES:
32
SUBJECTS:
DAVE YARAS
DAVID YARAS
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION:
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 4
CURRENT STATUS:
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/01/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
RPT
v9.1
HW 45992 DocId: 32328318
Page 1
---
## Page 2
MM 92-1047
MIAMI:
AT MIAMI, FLORIDA
Will continue to follow and report on the
activities of YARAS in Miami and elsewhere.
- INFORMANTS
CONTACTING AGENT
IDENTITY
MM T-24
MM 1003-C-TE
MM T-25
CG 6443-C
MM T-26
Farman
Chicago PCI
MM T-27
CG 6597-C-TE
MM T-28
LOIS S. FLEISCHMAN
(requested), Chicago,
Illinois
MM T-29
Lt. FRANK NASH, Intelligence
Unit, Chicago Police Department
(requested)
SA AUGUST C. KEMPFF
SA JOSEPH G. SHEA
OTHER 4
SA JAMES W. GERBLICK
SA BENJAMIN J. HELSEL, JR.
B.*
COVER PAGE
-
NW 45992 DocId: 32328318 Page 2
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | 104-10336-10027.pdf | 104-10336-10027 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 12/18/1997 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | PROJFILES-ARRB REQUESTS | CIA/HRG | ARRB | ARRB REQUEST: CIA-IR-28: MCCONE FILES | 7 | ARRB | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK-M-20 : F28 : 20030731-973787 : | 7 | ## Page 1
104-10336-10027
Re IR-28 McCone Files
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457
December 18, 1997
Mr. John Pereira
Chief
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
Re:
Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board's Requests for
Additional Information and Records
Dear John:
I am writing to follow-up on our telephone call earlier today and to convey my serious
concern about the status of CIA's responses to the Review Board's requests for
additional information and records. Although CLA has completed its responses to
several requests, and many others have been answered in part, a significant number of
requests have not been answered — including some that were made more than two
years ago. On many occasions we have been assured that responses would be
forthcoming, only to have promised dates come and go without answers. It is now
extremely importan't that these requests be answered promptly so that we may conduct
a proper follow-up if necessary. The issues that we can now identify as being of the
highest priority are identified in the text below by double asterisks (**)' and we request
that they be answered within the next month. We request that the remaining requests
be answered by April 1, 1998.
The remainder of this letter is divided into two parts: first, a listing of the formal
requests for information and records, and second, a listing of the informal requests for
information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the
following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies.
'As identified more fully below, the issues are: CIA-1 Organizational Material,
CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches, CIA-13 Backchannel Communications, CLA-IR-03
HTLINGUAL Documents, CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton Files, CIA-IR-07 Claude
Barnes Capehart, CIA-IR-15 Electronic "take" from Mexico City, CLA-IR-21 DRE
Monthly Operational Reports, CLA-IR-22 "A" Files on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison.
BOARO MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermis L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
---
## Page 2
13-00000
Mr. John Pereira
December 18, 1997
Page 13
request. Once the formal statement documenting this search and its results is
provided, this request will be complete.
CIA-IR-27 Security Files for Five Individuals.
The ARRB staff has reviewed Office of Security files for Richard Case Nagel,
Gordon Novel, Jack Ruby, Harold Weisburg, and Walter Sheridan. The entire
files for Gordon Novel, Jack Ruby, and Richard Case Nagel have been designated
assassination records. Portions of the files for Harold Weisberg and Walter
Sheridan will be designated assassination records. The Novel, Ruby, and Nagel
files should be sent to HRG for processing. The Weisberg and Sheridan files
should be sent to HRG for ARRB review.
CIA-IR-28 McCone Files.
In August 1997, the ARRB staff reviewed an index for the files of former DCI
John McCone and identified some files to be reviewed for assassination records.
A meeting should be set up to examine these files.
CIA-IR-29 Oswald Lewinter.
In November 1997, CIA provided a preliminary oral response to whether it has
files on Mr. Oswald Lewinter. CIA should document its findings in writing.
Once formal documentation of the completed searches has been provided, the
request is complete.
CIA-IR-30 Cherepanov Papers.
In the fall of 1963, Paul Garbler, Chief of Station Moscow, copied a series of KGB
papers from the American Department of the KGB's Second Directorate which
had arrived at the embassy from Aleksandr Cherepanov. The Review Board
requests to review these papers.
CIA-IR-31 Dulles Calendar.
In testimony before the Church Committee on May 4, 1977, Richard Bissell made
reference to the existence of a calendar for former DCI Allen Dulles which would
reflect all of Dulles' meetings. The Review Board requests the Dulles calendar
for January 1959 through his resignation as DCI on November 29, 1961.
---
## Page 3
13-00000
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
From the Desk of David S. Robarge
DCI/CSI/HS
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
OFFICE:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
@ DA
David S. Robarge:
CSI
08/18/97 12:33:55 PM
Records re John McCone and JFK
I am the staff historian currently working on a study of John McCone and was asked by Barry Harrelson of the JFK assassination
declassification group here at CS| to track down some stray records on the subject. _
gof our staff phoned the Executive
egistry and then asked me to write you with the details.) Barry gave me a list of some documents and/or job numbers from an untitler
handwritten page of notes from a member of the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1978. A verbatim rendering of those
notes follows. Some of the material mentioned in items 5 and 6-such as memos for the record, memos of meetings with the President,
and transcripts of telephone calls-are in the McCone DCI files in my office, but under different job, box, and file numbers. The job
numbers given in items 4-6 below do not correspond to anything in our job number listing. If you have any thoughts on what those jobs
are, or on anything eise on the following list, please let me know.
1) Envelope labeled "Dulles Papers-for CIA files only-miscellaneous assortment of material for 1964 & 1965" including CIA
correspondence (Box 9)
2. Folder labeled "Dulles, Allen W.-1953-1966," CIA and other miscellaneous documents and correspondence (Box 14)
3. 7 folders of material-mostly correspondence between Dulles and Rocca (Box 15)
4 Dulles correspondence of:
a) 4/24/63 & cy-Helms/DDP from Elder-notes
ER #64-2925
b) 11/13/63-orig w/att-ER files from O/DDCI
ER #216/2
5. "Telephone Calls-Eyes Only #2
4 March 64-19 May 64
Box 11 of 75-B-698 (McCone file)
6. Box 8 of 75-B-698/McCone
a) meetings w/the Pres 1964
3 April-20 May 64, 1 Jan-2 April 64,
21 May-5 Oct 64
b) meetings w/Pres. Johnson
23 Nov 63
6 JOB 75-B-698
a) Box 2 (Memo for RecordO
b) Box 6 (Pres' Brief)
c) Box 11 (Telephone calls)
d) Box 12 (OC| memo and DC| briefing)
e) Box 6 78-B-01454R
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 4
13-00000
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
• .
Thanks for whatever you can do on this matter. You could also discuss it with Barry Harrelson if you are unable to reach me. Regards.
CC:
J. Barry Harrelson
Sent on 18 August 1997 at 12:33:55 PM
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 5
13-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE • INTERNAL USE ONLY
18 August 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
FROM:
J. Barry Harrelson
OFFICE:
CSI/HRG
SUBJECT:
ARRB Request for DCI McCone's Files
REFERENCE:
Michelle Combs will be at IP Tuesday 19 August to review records and pending requests. What is the status of the ARRB
request for DCI files? I have located Job number 80-B01285 A [ 10 boxes), "Files of Director John A. McCone, 1962-1965 in the History
Staff. Do you personally plan to review the files before giving access? Normally we restrict access to sensitive files to Gunn and
Michelle Combs.
Files have to be reviewed in Agency offices and all notes are left with the Agency for review. When boxes contain
both relevant and non-relevant folders, we usually give them access to the shelf list and they select the folders they want to review.
How do you want to handle these files?
Barry
CC:
@ DO
John Pereira @ DCI
David Robarge @ DCI
Sent on 18 August 1997 at 11:39:05 AM
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 6
13-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
IR-28
25 August 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
FROM:
J. Barry Harrelson
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FOLL
2000
OFFICE:
SUBJECT:
CSI/HRG
ARRB Request • Access to McCone'S Files ten
REFERENCE:
David Robarge, History Staff, has reviewed the Shelf List for Job # 80B01285A (DC| McCone's Files. He identified 28
folders that fall into JFK assassination related time-frames and that potentially could contain assassination-related documents or
information. I am faxing a copy of the shelf list with the folders marked. The request for access appears reasonable. If you approve,
access will be limited to Jeremy Gunn and Michelle Combs and the review will take place at IP. Any notes taken or memos prepared will
be reviewed for classification. Please advise if there are any additional restrictions to be placed on Jeremy's and Michelle's access to the
Thanks and again congratulations on your new job.
Barry
CC:
John Pereira @ DCI
Sent on 25 August 1997 at 01:14:56 PM
ABMINISTRATIVE- INTERNAL USE ONLY
---
## Page 7
13-00000
• CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE T TOLL
2000
fike ey
12 September 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Laura Denk
Executive Director, ARRB
FROM:
J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM
SUBJECT:
CIA-IR-28, McCone Files
1. This is in response to referent request.
2. Searches were made for information responsive to
the request and materials were provided for examination by
ARRB staff.
From that examination, staff members selectec
number of documents to be included within the JFK
Collection.
Those documents have now been included within
the JFK Collection and are being processed
for release to
NARA.
3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request.
If you have any question, please advise.
J.
Barry Harr
elson
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 104-10074-10144.pdf | 104-10074-10144 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 09/28/1959 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | C/WHD | WITHHELD | OPERATIONAL ((DELETION)). | 13 | CIA | JFK | 03/16/2018 | JFK16 : F78 : 1993.07.17.07:59:23:810340 : DISPATCH. | 13 | ## Page 1
104-10074-10144
FROM:
BIn!
RIAN
SECRET
(WHEN ALLED INN)
IDP
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
NOTAi In to abaarco al comment or Indicatton of setter
dereument in filand
COMMENTS
TO
8000 т
NO
DATa
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
WH 046 Barton
2u ore 612
Đ.
Caul/e
Ace
COPY DETACHEO
lubert faleste
COP'
EPRODUCTIONS
1O.
Terre
18.
14.
1Đ.
---
## Page 2
14-00000
COMMENTS
TO
n00м
NO.
lorcampan
8.
WN 046 Barton
4.
6071 The 1
Cạus/c
sión 102
Mcai
K
COPY DETACHED
into
Nubasts fallale
19 8
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citant
19.
15.
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WH3/CARIG
30. RAD71
or.
ANCLAUAR
ACITRACT
INDIA
DATE MICHOFILMID
AIFAIL
FILE NUNGRA
241-215384
DOCUMENIDATE
DOCUMENT NUMOgR
01756
CEN
---
## Page 3
14-00000
FROM
MANCI
DISPATCH
BBORET
71756
narration ind no
anfar, WID
aslas af Statlan,
Mados of
station,
Ha pana
antos of station,
Operational
LIFAIL
16-3
16-16
20 Soptember 1959
4)1
WARNED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JOCED
AT QUALIFIED HQ DESE DALY
Into, only
21-18
0662
LIPALL departed Cludad Trufillo at 0900 loure on 23 Soptsabas 1959, via PAA
Plight No. 432, due to arrivo in liari, Pla. at 150 hours on the ano date.
hold International Pacoport No. 478; 1ooucd by Dominican lmigration on 22 Septenber
1999, containing a U. 3. transit vias.
SUE MARY
2o LIPAIL was brought to thia Station Iato on tho arternoon in a Sopteabor 1959
by tho U. 3. Conaul, tho said ha had a crasy man we should talk to. No accapted tha
young man and tha Conaul demrted.
3o After boing cortain do to LIPAlL'o identity, efforto voro tado so cala him.
Ho paced the floor, wrung hie hande and breathed heavlly, otating sovoral thase that
ho mat got to Marleo City. Ho caid ho cano to tho Denialcan Ropuillo about 15 July
1959 fron Moxico City and roported to Gonoral Failaid, that Santiago Dry oent his.
FulZAZA sent hia to lan Caldoras, Dol. for training with colley.. Thoro vero about
one hundred Cubana and about to hundred othera at lao Caldero, all of unea vero
later transforted to Conoranca, Doll. for countain tralaina, la could bot breal down,
ha caid, tho nationalition of 200 nor cuban trainoon, cacopt to say that there samo
• Pen Brantardo. LIPAL cold ho lao given intensive training in tho uno, brealisa
and descably of light machino gum.
Afar three vesia of thio trainina, ha told a
dootor, Cuban, nano not known, that ho to having serious troublo with his left lane
ond had to got to a hospital in Ciulad Trujillo, Soon thoreaftor, the dootor, and
SIvo othors with the doetorig consent, inoluding LIPAIL, boarded a bus for Cindad
Trujillo and upon arrival oly coattored.
Ho had not coon the othero oinco. Thero
rould bo incorost in kire the domity of the doctor Tho dillear in charma at
Las Caldorso mo a Coloni
The officor tho tranaferred the trainees to Con
stanza, and do in chargo
there la a Yugoslav, nano not lmom, end de
called, "coronal Vucoray".
tatod, o cuban unan ho did not Inos aoked hia about his paooport
(This tao tot
Intonto sorO Vanquas, Dar TRuy 0637).
LIAH roplied that ho would tile hio paront
with his to lao Calderao but in foot ho put it in the botten of a valise, which ha
left in a olooot in hio hotol rom, than he roturned so cludad Frujillo, about
August 1959, he disoovored that hie pacaport had been otolen. lo quantioned ecuaral
of the Cubana living in the hotal and ons of then told hin to chut up, chas facepart
caro for the rovolution.
He then looked for fantlago REY uno, ha cloirad, too carpose
to havo gone to Headloo
City and returned to Cluded Frujillo by that tim.
Ho could
not inderatand my RiY had not cong back. He united a fow dayu and then tolo onc
EXT, locating him in Hardoo City. RY aid ho could not com to Clad Trujillo at
that t1zs, oould not do anything for LIVAIL lemodiatoly and told LIPAll to mie.
LIPAll as questionod vigorouly shout the thait of hia pansport and he stuar to bia
story.
BARD RI
20190
to leave the hoted and go back to training. IPAll than vent to Polla Unist, Inier
& Detaican Inalgration and, an such, sustatant to Join l. Also Caress, thor e
oradaton Intalligenoe. He said ho viaited URIRE soveral tiena and gave his several
/passport photes.
4/PV
19
---
## Page 4
14-00000
DISPATCH
SECRET
-1756 Pago 2.
YO
FROM
ACTIN MOUNTO
28 Septsaber 1959
• 420
MABINO IDA INCHING
8-@UA,19-00N0 DISO
panapart photos. URInE told LIPAll nothing dould bo dona uniona LIPAll obtalray
a Lotter fros FunAzA roquestinz the loouanoe of domesntation.
LIVAL than
volted tho Anarican Labaooy shero the rooftloalot dircoted him to the Adaintotrative
Thio lad not beon loom to the slation. The Ainiatrativo offloc said
la could not do anything for LITAIl and dent hin asy. LIPAll tban mont bade to
FRORARA ON URIER and pleadad Mith each to no Gra1l.
Ho vent to the Adaintotrativo
offices in tha Ensacay agals, ca 9 Soptember 1939, uno sent bia to tha U.B. Consul,
la anothar bullding, spoo.
lin Earpoco, ha esplained, in poles to ta Babacey mao
to report that blo otolen paooport had turned up of Niea1, Floriday that a feload In
Mand, sho had boon inquiring rogularly at Imigration in Mlent, Calorboned IPAIL
and roported that the otolen pooport had been used by another to arter the U.9. :
Dat, he statod, no one would lioten to his and ho to afraid to tall too mois.
Do IMPAIL tO gonnaly frightenado lle orated ho had pald hia bozol b11l co
tho might of l sopranbor at sho sequent of tha dost alori, uno cold bin nor to ea
baaka that tho olori cald la had ordero to that offoot.
LIPAL enotrued tale to
DoSa that FENnAZA had do ordoral, la cald Cuban friendo had Infred bia las Farat
lad calored that no cora Cubana sould bo paraltted to leave tha Doataican Boyabl10
vichou hio condit, and that Doinican Intolligence man honoring that. Ma learnel
that Cubans sio had roported to FEmAll, at the latter! s requert, had been asmartel
and lad dioppared, that ll LIPAId sent to FEllAZA again, ta sould haro to go bac
to training with the codies or ba impriooned, that se ho, liPAll, had partlostated in
the training and had poen what so going on, PuRazA certainly vald nos parale lila
to leavo.
% Added to thio, IIPAIl ocated that SantLago REY had tOld FEDRAZA that ESPAIL
so en agont for tha American Elaooy in Horico City and that, cortainly, PrimAsA
bad ropestel thio to Dosinican Intelligenso.
He salated that o girl named luCIls,
soriang in Dontaican Intollizenso, liad told him to po croful so ho sus botag investa
todD that FrIARA iner that LIAIl had dealt sith coval Manlintal, In Out, h
mobably nicunderotoc the resoon for thie and undoubtedly had reported the 1nie
Elea to Dosinican Intolliganco, that friendo had sariad bia that plairolothes son lad
been making inquirica son hin at tha lo Hetal, LVAIl alco otated that ho tad se
portal tha thart of hio meport to the polloo. This Inforation rould outcatically
ba roferred by the salies to Doninien Intolligence.
Theao foots, plus hin not having
o saula, so pacaport or ochar identification, and hia 1dicnoso, tado LIVAl comoin
of tumentary arrost and ha sao afraid to be coon on the atrocto. His alothing and
to1lot artielon had boen piosed in tha room of a friend at sho hotol. le had Allo
1n billo of union 1i0 voro piaoed in tha siation cato atd ha van allowad to licop 420.
(into conoy so lator poturnod to LIPAIl and 659.30 ol 1t ras used to buy hão ai
In tho absonco of the Chior of Mission at the lins, his despotary
man anked about tho pooo101lley of temporasy coylun of a Cuban stional in the habane
for a for daye. The cecrotary stated that this could not be dona. (Putting LIPArI
In another hotel, apartment house, or boarding house ta not possible breause of
otr1ot1z nicreed laus requiring a saula or other socoprablo identification).
O. After darimess, not inming that alca to do vith LIVAIl, ha sno talea to
cos" hace and proparly provided fer.
Ho ras introduced under a faloe namo, 09 a
fuend fro Cutela.
Tho cervanto vero allered to hear the tana infersation and
ah, erplaining tus ho had pot dond fer soylu in 0031 hono and sad otaying tharo
because of lack of fundo and during inguisy concerning hig pacoport.. The orladnal
of this otatesent do attached for Hoadquarter 'a recordo.
VP/
---
## Page 5
14-00000
DISPATCH
cartervo
SECRET
71756 Page 3.
HEADOUARTEN THE NO
TO
FROM
SPRACT
nate
ACTON MOUNTA
28 Sopteabor 1959
48 433-ICHECK "N" ONE)
MARRED FOR INDEXINO
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXINO CAN CE. JUDGED
AY QUALIFIED NQ DESE ONLY
DEFENCH!
alfAll was taken out late one night, woring
dark grandes and a cap, and
allowed to telophone hia friond, Huberto CANCIO Gonsales, unaa ho described ou a
formor It. Col. In the Cuban Maringo under BATISTA, and a former Cuban Attache in
washington.
CANCIO 18 & Cuban ortle and was waiting for an lenigrant vies to the
Ho got the vlea and doprted Cludad Trujillo on 17 Septenber 195%
lo rewreated
by blial, cancio came in a tor to the yard of the babanay and delivored LirALo
personal possessions in the darkness of shrubbery, while COS stood nourby til the
dark to protoct histo
Othere who warned LIPAIl, he stated, in addition to CANCIO, voro Torean,
the wito of laurcano IBARRA, Cuban, Living on Callo Paotour, near Avo. Indopantonsis.
IBARRA 10 employod by Vos Roninican to esto propaganda broadcaste to lubs nightly.
Toroza and LIFAIL's mothor are close friends. Another tho ramad biAl, tao dullo
ELIZALDB, Cuban, Living in tha Pas Hotel.
Jullo do a brothor of Ho murals, formar
Minioter of lar in Cuba, LIPAIL otated that santlago RIT, PO MIZALIS and Santiago
ALVAREZ (LIPAIL's unolo, In Medeo City) control or at loant have a great deal to do
-mith the Cuban arilos in Mar100.
1lo LIFAll too again taken out late at night and allored to oll Jullo ELIZALs.
The Latter e9ld that ono CANARA (Im), thon in Jullo's rom at the hotol, had cono
thing 8or INPAIL. CANDARA DOlEd that LIPAIL Oma to the hotal but 003 wald not per
LIPAL cald ho did not lao CANTARA, LIPALL eald ho cuppocal sat camina
bad a lotter and poolbly sons nonoy for hin, fraa lipallo molo, santiago altar.
(Thio mao piolied up the night boforo liPAll, doparted, at the ronidends of Find,
choro Jullo MarLiE ma looted. It proved to ba a letter and noma songy fica
BoRtiago ALVAREZ).
Do We bald a oonrorenon with laptain Michae of the las vill on the nice
0f La SoptenDer 1959.
This me arranged through the U.8. Laval Attacio, to roacho
the Captain'o Maoutivo officer.
The Captain out hia gig fer 000 and Cstendel every
O8 Caracas. ARter a fEa opondas roaria by C0S, tha lapiala cald, "you mas to di,"
Thie vas adaitted.
The Captala san told coctial foots without umecessary desailoo.
No sas told that sa had a young man on our tando tose posport ind tom otalang tas
tha san tas a Cuban and no cartainly cubjeot to arrest ond lamiconen ly Benindom
cursorition 11 so did not set him cuto
Ta Captain soled 11 tha request rado ca la
eas Imam to tha calar of micaden, 10s ocated that the cular of Micalon tad bos in
forted by ous that he sould volt him (Captain), but the dolor baira tabea too calaly
abas of dust that nalthor tro Calal of Minsica ver the Ilaaion emia Do involval.
(ita enios of Miasica lad marienly co advised cos).
Sta Captain tao solad to tale
LIal aboard, just bosore cha chip called ca the follenng lady vering, transl
1n a sallorio mit an allo bia to leave tho chip at Guantarco Bag, Tila too
aloonsoed thoronghly.
the Captain cald that tho Chief of licaion would b obeard the
chip nart dsy for lunsay tine all ho santed una a mining sailo from tha lades al
N160108,
lato the fallering afternon, lunay, 13 Bartennes, tha Clot of Miesie
1nscnni do that tha plan and set so thronga, that 1t lad to be abanderedo tha
peralility of tying mint out 10 the laval Manies plane to Aloonaoed with tha
Catal of Micaton, but hia position un that naithor ha vor any cleans of the Miesion
sould partialito in the meter, and that 00s should handle the probler.
13. It la undeabtedly
VRJ
---
## Page 6
14-00000
DISPATCH
"LASPICATION
SECRET
O
DISPAICA SIMBOL AND NO
•MEADOUA RIDES FILE NO
Tage 40
FROM
ACTA IN ArQUIENO
23 Septenber 1959
JT-ICHECA E ONE
MARRED FOR INDININO
NO INDEMINO LIQUIRIO
INDIXINO CAN El AUDOED
BY QUALFIED MQ DESK ONLY
130 It 10 undoubiadly trus that cantiago RIT'o friandonip for 011v0r CALDOSD
eso tho catalyot in the cotiona talen to ovaduato IlPAll..
CALEOND to ESY to Frol
BOSQUE SO FRASE DOSA EO FEmAZA sao tho chalo.
00g bad o long talk cath 8uaa2s and
FERE Sosa ca tha aftarnoon of 19 Eopicbor 195% FiRta Soca 1o a tronblo chesica
and contaot enn for tha Canorallo0120, Aa ouar ho dela e ercat deal vita ABbra.
After non talk and oevoral soundo of otratara uniakoy, PalARA firally consonood
to agros to tho donzentation and doparturo of LiPAlle
Whon 00S oppresdicd FaidarA
and FECE DORa, ChO EStECI Of LIPALL'O departuro lad not bean deosdado
FainAzA saa
otubborn and Piat Boss tas saly.
Thero lad to ba nuah eald by C03 about, "no ong
caldior to another", end "honor botuon ald coldiora", oto. Tha breal comed to con
thon 009 cald, "Qanaral, I would lavo done thio for your coa", (Tha 2000 of lão con
1o a fonder opot.) Tha denoral gulpod a atraigat ober el valakay and Loured his te
ca hio bando.
timad to esy, No vant to ba puro talo san ia not a inalata" la io anguel comu
Esma and told that 003 kne LIYAIL whan the Latter worked for EAC in Bavan (usci
10 not true).
Tho On tho corning of 21 Sopteabz, not having hard fro Frinzi over tha tec
Ga, C00 V151001 ABI.
(FeinarA callod lator and sid ha lad coca ABa). AEsi
Boled cary quastiora about MIlAl, Malay wro olthor anneral footually withous cay
volation of coourity, or succonosully cadete lle orated tica that ha lad infosa
Thio mas vigoualy desiodo After o
confcrenda al ovor on hour Alata est ha toula approvo cho documentation ond capastora
of LIrAIl, and spula so norsty tha Clor of Inigmation, IRIS. (URIES ta thon et o
Lapital chara bio uiso ne diving barôn to a babyo.
to MirO. URTES)• ABBES to alao acoured that 003 knew ITAIl whan tho lateor mag 62
ploged by FRAC.
tatica uno bega. LIAI a Lourd on Interrational Pacapurt ant en cale parcito la
mvo bio ogo do 24 and ho conuation on "otedonto, inilo 60s ran buay sich coo clei
ITAlL told chosnco olori thai ho uno foing to liant and Maxies City.
Finio could tot
bo changed, although li to triod. 003 had hoped to chou that LIPAli sas golEg to
Minal caly, en a tourlot vies.
Ião Al tha UoD, Consulato, diocuica Laving bean marioualy had ulta tho Consul
a Vica COnul puL A tranaii TEa In IMPArLO paDapOrt, Roquot to bada fo o totaL
Fica visioni curecas.
Tho queation of INVAlL not having o Marlean vita tg Alcusoe
salta tho Vico Cenoul. lla anower san "not your ran on tha vay and danie bother ebout
o linican vies" lo capiained that to upply for a lionican ulra toald tean coveral
dayo barcro ita leaganas and that tha lascan Entanoy would quin LIPARl assastio
no to thy ha lad sona to the Deninioan Romubhlo, ung he lad beon in Merles and way ha
wanted to rotur
---
## Page 7
14-00000
DISPATCH
3 KCRET
CHEJATCH SYRAGON ANCO SEO
(HDCA).1758
Page 5
MADONARTIES THE NO
10420
FROM
DATE
28 Septcaber 1959
"AJ-J' - (CMACK "N" ONE)
MARKED FO! INDETING
NO INDELING REQUIRLO
INDEMINO CAN $E JUDORD
#Y QUALILO HQ DESH ONLY
ACTION IQUID
REPERENCRISI
santed to return to Mazico, and protably ook other questions, "that you (003) don't
caro to tavo ansvorci".
Thororare, the inca of a hosican vira man dropped.
Consal ctated that unloso ho dent LIPallio application for a vica to laohington for
olcarance, 003 could tavo to furnich the Consul a manorandus containing the otato
conco ho opporried.
The manorandun sad furniched and a carbon copy lu attached for
Headguarter's informatioa.
1% At tha Fau Amorican Ainaya tlokat offico tho manager 10 a Daminican, Alter
a cany tickor to Minia1 had been pronaoed fron ona of tha clorka to bol ra
quotions, tha carager piched up tha desummo, reviewed than on caid, "Thie van 1o
going to lanieo, lo doça not have a Merican vica and ha 10 not tiolatel to Marloa".
co3 offored to buy o ticket on through to laxico C1ey, but the tanager sid that
could not to dory without tho lionican vies.
C03 then offered to buy luTAl a rou
trip slobot, Clutra Trujillo to Minai and reuro, bur tho mages fortaci becamsa
InFAIL had o tranoit vios and not o toulot vica, dug thon 1iom181ed binali Do cr
Dinesy officer ond capinined that LIAIl would bo nat ty a U.8. offioinl da lem
sno could taby caro of costing a Marican vlos and tielating LIPAIT, on to Merloo Casy.
The manager than demanded a lotter, ca Micaica lottortoad, tha tenna of which ha
ciated, to proscor fill againat tho pocsibility of a 81000 8im.
No would not sellease
tha toot without the otree lus promre une lottor and delivered doo
minal roprcentation equated thin tch the epropat
no fina night bo soconced and the letter given ta
by 003 could ba brought into the opan.
Thoro sas no othor course to take under tha
circmatances. A copy of the lotter 1a atrached for Headquarter'e Inforaticne
10o When LIPAll, tao at tho airport for departuro, donaral FanAza and of Least
818teen othar Cubans varo on hand to ces him off.
Ora Cuban cohed ITAl, Beat toale
Jou chargo for the corcs", 003 nodded to PAIlAZA and etood in tha background, Mem
LIZAIL Loft ho lad 050 U.D. dollara and $2 Dollinican Fasco. (Thio suo rado up of tia
talanco of hio original 1100, plua tha reminder of 8100 ha had recolved frea big
uno lo 1n Want, out of vAlah ho paid 01l sana Indobtednono to FlIRAZA'a Destetasy,
which ras not queationed)
9 + LIPAIL Bao quissed thoroughly and often sa to that to my tave leamed a
so Caldarao, in Cludad Frujillo, end Iras otbar Cubars in gerarado It appeara Cha
ho learned littlo, unlona ha chona to recervo hia rovolationa for poreons in llenico
Citye lo caid hin experienso ot lan Caldero ian dull and that ho nired vory 11601a
with othorog that 1t tas trining, esting and alooping that ho did not go to Con
ofanzs and Imma nothing about 1t, tist thoro 1a no Cuban exilo Leaderahip el
osquenco in tho Desinican Bopabllo Otbos than FEDRAZA, to hia lamlodgo. la cyrosacl
tha idea that do Cantiago PrY did not retura to Cidad Iruj1120, REY Ond INARA Eay
tavo had differonaco. Mo had no cvidenco of this. LIFAlMO considenca el a Gracase
fal tanion of tuna by exiles 1u caro. it oppora that the tim ho opant 10 tha
Dominican Rembllo sao unprofitablo. It can bo curned up, in so for on this Statio
Laws, so trainins vien orlos, during which ho learned nothing al intolligenso valua,
and five took of idleness during unich hs puffered anzloty over hie utalen masapert
and possible arrest with 1ta feared consequenced.
CONISIT: LIPAIL 18 0
z/MV
---
## Page 8
14-00000
DISPATCH
CLALGNCATION
SECRET
ORATCH SYMBOL AND EE
- 71756
HEADQUARTIES PILE NOC
Page 6
TO
INNO
FROM
SUBICI
ToATi
ACTION PIQUIRIO
28 Septeaber 1959
MARKED FOR INDEKING
NO INDETING REQUIRED
INDEXINO CAN dE JUDOED
Y QUALIFIEO NQ DESK ONIY
20. COPINI: LIrAlL 10 a bright young man who displayed culturo. and good
cannero.
He was gonuinaly appreolative for the asaistance given him.
It should ba'
undorstood howover, that he 1s immaturo and, in the face of come clement of danger,
in the a frightened little boy.
The Dosinican Repubilo 1a orual, conscienoclose
and extreraly dangerous for old handa and such a novice has no chanos.. It has beon
the quick undoing of more assoned men. It la balloved that the thait of LiPall'e
psoapart can ba conaldored edvantagoous. If ho had stayed on in the Dominican
Ropubllo, without experienoing the loud us his ransport, it 10 a enfo comption that
ho would
have becond ouapoot, arrestod and thiaked off to prison.
Torture would
have broken him gulakly.
He should not roturn to the Dominican Republio under any
drounatances, and ho was oo informed ephatloally.
Arine
RICHARD F. ARVILLE
Attachaenta
lo Statemant by lIFAl ro nut seeking asylu
2o lotter to Consul requesting vies
Зo Intter to BlA
23 Septembar 1959
Distributions
3 = Hgs. v/atta usa
1 = tarana so atto.
Iw/o attle
16.3
z/V
---
## Page 9
14-00000
8a P6а pon
AA AO
FIOM
DARI
ACTION MIQUISIO
28 Septeaber 1959
"41-J" - (CHECH "I' ONlI
MARRED FOR INDEXINO
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEMINO CAN BE AUDGED
@Y QUALIFIED MQ DESE ONLY
20€
OOMaT: LIrAll ls a bright young man who diaplayed oulture and good
mannars.
He was gonuinely approojative for the analatance given him.
It should be
understood however, that he 10 trature and, in the face of some alomant of danges,
10 11ko a frightened little boy.
The Dominican Rapublio la crual, conscienelong
and extrenoly dangerous for old hando and ouch a novioe has no chanco. It han been
the quick undoing of moro seasoned men. It la belloved that the thoit of LiPaTio
paaaport can ba conaldered advantagoous.
If ha had stayed on in the Domindcan
Rapubllo, without expertonoing the load or hio passport, it 10 a aalo cucuuption that
ho would have becond suspect, arrated and whisked off to prison.
Torture would
have broken him quiolly.
He shoud not return to the Doninican Republio under any
ciromatances, and ho was so informed aphatloally.
RICHARD Y. ARVILLS
Attachmants
do statement by LifAll. ro not rooking asylu
2o lottor to Conoul requenting
vlae
3o Lotter to PlA
28 September 1959
Diatribution:
3 = Hqo. s/atta uno
I - Havans so atto.
w/o attor
16-3
erase
UT FERMIOUS EDIT.ON
CLASLINICATION
---
## Page 10
14-00000
ese
1756
9 Saptember 1959
Hoy vina a la Embajada a roportar el robo do us
pacaporto, al cual fuo unado por alguica para viajar a
1oa Eotados Unidos. Enccntró al sellor Raed en la
Embajada a guión habia conosido en la Habana danda
trabajo con aRAC. El sañor Rood dijo que 61 mandaria
menanjos a los Estados Unidoa para ayudarza o ocnaaguir
mal pasaporte.
lo pido collo y no lo neconito. Por falta de dinero
y dobido a ni aniatad oca ol caller lead, 61 sa ofre016
hospedaje on su casa por unos dise durante aus
avoriguacionos subre mi pasaporte ceno un favor que 61
no concedo.
06
---
## Page 11
14-00000
586.:
2525788:059.09999
441815
28 Septembar 1900
Hiro Harry Loften,
Volo Canoe
I tato catained Datonational Fanapore No. 478 cad an Exit Porale
for orlando fedro Rodrigos Alvarea, fra lainican Ingration, I bara
aleo obtainsa a Pin mariony 610bat for Rodrigas Ind lo 1181 Lena
caudad fragillo en plight lo, 132 at 0000 hours, 1s Deptator 1000.
end be handlod projoriy fra toronto ly enacalatag c1l8 2000 his at
Volo Lagration in llin1 c11 to coro el the catalie, Edriguey vial
Por tha granting of a vieS end I Drand fully remoniora 8or bes ea
tho eat el suriaz the vies. tie Consulate in clarined in toto ty
in thie matter®
---
## Page 12
14-00000
F Araanm 291
06 Art
---
## Page 13
14-00000
DISPATCK
Chiof, Spocial Affairs Staff
CLABBNICATION
mie
INFO
PROCEBBINO
actiOn
MACKED FON MCKE
N9 RECLAIRA REQUIRED
HEADQUAITENS CLER
CAN SUCCI FADEXINO
AESTRALT
• Chios of Station, MANAVE J
" TYPIC/Operational
Tormination of AMTABBY Personnol
ACYIÓN MQUIREO REFLAENCEA
ACTION REQUIRED: Cancel POAs
REFERENCE:
A. WAVE 0026, 27 October 62
B. DIR 03390, ü Decenber 62
C.. DIR 03464,
6 December
62
D. - DIR 16625, 9 February 63
1.
The following individuals
the
were on natandby basis with
ANTABBY Group and have been terminated effective I Any 1963.
Jose Miguel CARVAJAL Gonzalez.
201-291915
Armando CABALLERO Parodi
201-284805
Antonio SOTO Vazquez.
201-294544
Alberto PEREZ Martiner.
201-282574
2. CABALLERO, SOTO and PEREZ have hecH Kenned FOAM. per
Refs B, C and D respectively.
A POA WaS reqUesTed for CARVA.JAI.
per Ref A. It is requested
that
their pOAs be cancelled.
END, OF DISPATCH
Distribution:
50 - Addressce
TION
1161-25454-566 (tilan)
1281-244446o fatalent
18111-
¡CROSS HETERENCE TO
CLASSIFICATION
Liongradicin
P088809a
201- 2917-
DARE TYPEO :
DATE COSTRICHIO
7 Blas 63
DISPATCH STAGDO ANO FARE
UFGA -8925
HEADOUARTUPS FILE AULD#
1. Each 201
019-132-5-10/1
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32332918.pdf | 124-90104-10216 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 01/23/1961 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-2940-64 | CONRAD | MILLEN | 1 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | MEMO | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/11/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90104-10216
RECORD SERIES:
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
92-2940-64
Document Information
ORIGINATOR :
FROM:
FBI
MILLEN
TO: CONRAD
TITLE :
DATE: 01/23/1961
'PAGES:
1
SUBJECTS :
SEBASTIAN JOHN LAROCCA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/31/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
MEMO
v9.1
DocId: 32332918
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC
2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
•OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERIMENT
Memorandum
Tolson.
Mohr
arsoi
elmo
Callahan
TO
Mr. Conrad bu
DATE:
January 23, 1961
JUNE
FROM : Ro 1. Millen ReM
MaGuire
Rosen
C. Sulkivan
Tele. Room
Ingram -
Gandy -
/ SUBJECT:
SEBASTIAN JOHN LA ROCCA, aka
AR
(00: PITTSBURGH)
In the above-captioned case Pittsburgh has conducted a MISUR
survey and submitted FD-142 requesting authority to install a MUTT
transmitter in subject's office.
The Laboratory has studied the survey results and concludes
that the environment, from an electrical standpoint, into which it is
proposed that the installation be made is generally unsuited for a
radio transmitter installation. The concealed equipment and antenna
must be placed directly under a corrugated sheet steel roof. Electrical
machinery in the adjoining elevator building, banks of high tension
transformers adjacent to the point of installation, the transmission
distance along with the high industrial area noise are all considered
to be disruptive elements insofar as obtaining successful transmissions
from this area is concerned. However, due to the importance of this
particular subject, the Laboratory suggests that an installation attempt
be made in spite of the adverse electrical conditions surrounding the
area." In the event the environment precludes successful transmissions
out to a monitoring point, then the equipment would have to be removed
and the plant discontinued. In the event the installation can be made to
function adequately, then, of course, it will be continued by the
Pittsburgh Office.
REG- 4
92-2940-64
•If the Investigative Division agrees that an attempt should be
made under these conditions to establish the MISUR recommended by
Pittsburgh, the Laboratory suggests that an engineer of the Electronics
Section proceed to Pittsburgh in order to supervise the installation.
RECOMMENDATION:
T8, JAN 301961
That the Laboratory's evaluation of the Pittsbursh Survey in this
case be forwarded to the attention of the Investigative Division.
1. - Mr.. John Leggett, Room 2141
JAM MY IQU
ATE
CRIM
DocId: 32332918 Page 2
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32304773.pdf | 124-10286-10403 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/30/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 122-3740-10, 11, 12, 13 | DIRECTOR, FBI | WERELEY, CHARLES L. | 28 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | REFERRED TO DOJ, INC 4 A/T, RPT | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note) .
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
6/24/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-10286-10403
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 122-3740-10, 11, 12, 13
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
WERELEY, CHARLES L.
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE: 10/30/1963
PAGES:
28
SUBJECTS :
APR, MEMBER, TEAMSTERS, P/P, BOAT, SERIAL A/O HULL
NUMBER, B/F INT, RCK, ASSOC, NUMEROUS INTV
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/29/1996
OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF DOJ
COMMENTS: REFERRED TO DOJ, INC 4 A/T, RPT
v9.l
DocId: 32304773
Page
1
2
---
## Page 2
released under the don t. Kennety Assassination Recorus coMection Act of 1992 744 U5c 2107 Hotey.
DATE:
11-14-2017
FE-263 (Rev. 5-1-59)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
REPORTING OFFICE
'NEWARK
OFFICE OF ORIGIN
NEWARK
TITLE OF CASE
DATE
10/30/63
INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
8/22 - 10/24/63
REPORT MADE BY
CHARLES L. WERELEY
CHARACTER OF CASE
TYPED BY
kS
UNSUB; ANTHONY PROVENZANO,
PRESIDENT, LOCAL 560,
IBT, UNION CITY, NEW
' JERSEY
LMRA - IM
REFERENCES
- Newark airtel to Bureau dated 8/22/63.
Newark airtel to Bureau dated 10/17/63.
Bureau airtel to Newark dated 10/24/63.
APPROVED
COPIES MADE:
ADMINISTRATIVE
The period covered by this report is due to the
fact that due to the nature of the complaint and the limited!
information furnished by complainant it appeared to be
necessary to determine the whereabouts of the boat involved
in this case prior to making extensive open inquiries.
The complainant in this case, according to Bureau communica-s
tion; was GEORGE PHILLIPs, who has furnished information on
a confidential basis to Justice Department officials for
SevEral Years. PHILLIPS is the leader of a strong opposition
group who has opposed ANTHONY PROVENZANO in Local 560,.
Discreet inquiries were made after it was determined
SPECIAL AGENT
IN CHARGE
DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
12243740-10
REC 14
2l0
'Bureau (122-3740)
1 - USA, Newark
2 - Newark (122-318)
07 DCT 91 1963
EX-103
AGENCY
REQUEST BECO
DATE FWD.
HOW FWD..
BY.
DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT
HAC
Criminal Division
Attention:
Mr. Walter J
Room 2509
0-60
Sheridan
/ U.S: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
NOTATIONS
10-76324-1
JP-PA23
DocId: 32304773 Page 2
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32315407.pdf | 124-10342-10125 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 07/17/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | ELSUR 92-802-27 | HQ | CV | 4 | FBI | DE | 11/17/2017 | MEMO | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/7/2015
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY :
FBI-
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10342-10125
RECORD SERIES : DE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ELSUR 92-802-27
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
CV
TO:
HQ
TITLE :
DATE: 07/17/1964
PAGES:
4
SUBJECTS :
ANTHONY GIACALONE, ELSUR
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
Redact
09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS:
MEMO
v01
DocId: 32315407
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note)
DATE: 11-14-2017
CV 92-1075
on 6/24/64, Cleveland requested Las Vegas to furnish a
photograph of LEVINSON and background information regarding LEVINSON's
Miami was requested to furnish a photograph of SIGELBAUM
and other Miami hoodlums who might attend this reception.
By teletype dated 6/24/64, Las Vegas requested Los Angeles
to furnish Cleveland background information on LEVINSON's wife, the
former BETTY SALLY STEINBERG and Identity of her relatives in
Cleveland®
By teletype dated 6/24/64, Los Angeles advised that
IEVINSON had
married BETTY SALLY STEINBERG, nee soss, at Los Angeles,
on 5/31/64.
Her parents were DANIEL SOSS and ANNA KAUFMAN SOSS.
on 6/25/64, CV 616-C advised SA JOHN J. BARRETT that
he had received the following information from MORTON SOSS, brother
BETTY S. LEVINSON, regarding EDWARD LEVINSON's proposed
trip
to Cleveland.
It is noted that MORTON SOSS is self-employed as a
CPA with offices in the Hippodrome Building, Cleveland.
soss stated that EDWARD LEVINSON, owner of the Fremont
Hotel, Las Vegas, had married his sister BETTY STEINBERG, the widow
Of DAVID STEINBERG, on 5/31/64, In Los Angeles, and that a family
get together was being planned
in Cleveland so
that the SOSS family
could meet LEVINSON for the first time.
He further advised that
BETTY LEVINSON, with her two children SHELLEY STEINBERG, age 10
and MATTHEW STEINBERG,
age l1, were presently in Cleveland and were
staying at the home of her sister, MrS. WILLIAM WILKOFF, nee Jean
Soss, at 17551 Shaker Boulevard, Shaker Heights, Ohio. According
to SOSS, EDWARD LEVINSON, upon his arrival In Cleveland, would be
a house guest of the WILKOFFs during his stay in Cleveland. SOSS
further advised that LEVINSON was expected to arrive In Cleveland
6/25/64, accompanied by his son, RICHARD,
and his wife,
and also
MICHAEL LEVINSON, brother of EDWARD.
stated that these individuals
would be staying at the Shaker House Motel, Shaker Heights, Ohio,
as would other out-of-town guest who were to arrive later.
Soss stated that the following activitles were planned
for the LEVINSONs during their stay in Cleveland:
During the evening of 6/25/64, a cookout was to be held
at the residence of Mrs. ROBERT SILL, 24144 Duffield Road, Shaker
-2 -
DocId: 32315407
Page 2
---
## Page 3
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote
DATE: 11-14-2017
CV 92-1075
Heights, Oh10. Mrs. SILL 1s the daughter of Mrs. JEAN WILKOFF.
During the evening of 6/26/64, a cocktail party and
dinner for the family and out-of-town guests was to be held
at the WILKOFF residence.
On Saturday evening, 6/27/64, a cocktail party and
dinner dance was to be held at the Hotel Cleveland Sheraton,
honoring the LEVINSONs and approximately 150 individuals were
expected to attend this affair. According to sOSS, LEVINSON was
paying for this affair.
On Sunday, 6/28/64, MORTON SOSS and his brother, BERNIE
SoSs of Youngstown,
Ohio, were to hold a brunch at the Executive
club, woodmere Village, Ohio, for the family and out-of-town guests.
SOSS
stated LEVINSON was expected to leave Cleveland on 6/30/64.
soss also advised that SAM GARFIELD, President of Mammouth
011 Company, Clare, Michigan, was expected to attend the reception
and discuss with LEVINSON his o1l interests in Morrow County, Ohio.
Soss stated that there was no indication that. MEYER LANSKY waS
expected in Cleveland for this affair.
Bureau Agents observed the arrival of EDWARD LEVINSON,
his brother MICHAEL, and his son and daughter-in-law at the Cleveland
airport on the afternoon of 6/25/64.
During the evening of 6/27/64, SAS JAMES F. KELLY and
JOHN W. TOULAN, JR., observed SAM GARFIELD and BENJAMIN SIGELBAUM
entering the reception in honor of LEVINSON at the Hotel Cleveland
Sheraton.
SAM GIANCANA nor MEYER LANSKY were observed. It is
an ones
to be noted that the Miami Office had reported that MEYER LANSKY
was observed at Hallandale, Florida, on 6/27/64.
On 6/29/64, CV 617-C advised that BENJAMIN SIGELBAUM
had left Cleveland by plane for Miami at 10:00 AM on 6/28/64.
This source advised that SAM GARFIELD left by automobile for
Detroit during the afternoon of 6/28/64.
Source also advised that LEVINSON and his wife departed
for Las Vegas on 7/1/64, and their arrival was verified by the las
Vegas Office on 7/1/64.
It is to be noted that in connection with captioned case,
the Las Vegas Office had advised Cleveland on 6/23/64, that EDWARD
.- 3-
DocId: 32315407 Page 3
---
## Page 4
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note)
DATE: 11-14-2017
CV 92-1075
TORRES, Owner of the Fremont Hotel, Las Vegas, and a suspected
courier of skimmea funds, accompanied by MARVIN COLE, alsO Of
Las
Vegas, had left Las Vegas
on 6/23/64, at 1:30 AM and were to
arrive at Marion, Ohio, at approximately 10:30 AM on the same
Investigation by the Cleveland Office at Marion, Ohio,
on
with MEYER LANSKY at the Holiday Inn, Marion,
Ohio, and after
visiting the oil fields with GARFIELD returned to Las Vegas by
plane athat evening, arriving in the early morning hours of 6/24/64.
Later in the day, on 0/24/04,
LEVINSON was observed by Las Vegas
Agents in conference with TORRES, BRYANT BURTON, Attorney for the
Fremont Hotel, at the Las Vegas
airport.
In view of the above incident and the fact that LEVINSON
had left for Cleveland during the evening of 6/24/64, Cleveland
was alerted to ascertain any possible meeting between LEVINSON and
NEVER LANSKY, It was later determined that LANSKY had left Marion,
Ohio, on the
alternoon of 6/24/64, destination unknown; however.
as noted above he was observed at Hallandale, Florida, on 6/27/64.
on 6/30/64, cv 616-c advised that he had no information
regarding any discussion between LEVINSON and SAM GARFIELD regarding
01] interests, but added that he understood they had been friends
for many, many years.
DocId: 32315407
Page 4
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32282012.pdf | 157-10002-10172 | 07/24/2017 | In Part | SSCIA | 6/4/75 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | R-173 | TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM COLBY - 6/4/75 | null | SSCIA | TRANSCRIPT | 6/6/17 | Box 321Folder 2 | null | ## Page 1
Date: 10/05/93
Page: 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10002-10172
RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
Released under the John
• Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
144 USC 2107 Note!.
Case#:NW 53244 Date:
06-13-2017
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
-ROM :
TITLE :
EXECUTIVE SESSION OF CHURCH COMMITTEE
DATE : 07/25/75
PAGES : 40
SUBJECTS :
CHURCH COMMITTEE
KENNEDY ASSASSINATION
CUBA
CASTRO
AMLASH
MAHEU, ROBERT
RUBY, JACK
LANSDALE, EDWARD
OPERATION MONGOOSE
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/30/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS:
Box 321
Folder 2
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
NW 53244 DocId:32282012 Page 1
---
## Page 2
3
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
1
2
4
5
6
was put in charge of the task force on Track II.
Senator Schweiker. Has he really resigned?
Mr. Schwarz.
He is doing that. I don't know.
A man called Wimpert who was in the Army and became in
effect one of the AGency's principal agents in Chile -- they
referred to him as Co-op 2.
Karamessines, who was either the head of the Deputy
Director for Plans or very high up in the operation section,
and who really was the principal Washington action officer on
it.
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
And then Mr. Kissinger, running in a schedule that would
get that whole group done by the fifth, and we can have Mr.
Kissinger in on the fifth.
Haig, a possibility, not as clear. And Haig and
General Bennett from DIA, and the head of the Joint Chiefs
of
Staff, people who may be involved, and in the case of
General Bennett and the case of the head of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, they think we ought to depose them, and we may
get a small piece of information.
In the case of Cuba there is one Agency person that I
think we need for short testimony on the Cubella or AMLASH pe
period. He is a man named Nesto Anchest a Spanish-speaking
agent, a mani who met with AMLASH in Paris at the end of
October and on November 22, 1963.
We have Mr. Maheu down for Tuesday morning.
NH 53244 DocId:32282012 Page 2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32308867.pdf | 124-10296-10195 | 10/26/2017 | In Part | FBI | 1/9/57 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 109-430-1603 | DIRECTOR, FBI | DAVIS, GEORGE E. JR. | 16 | FBI | HQ | 08/17/2017 | 16 | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
6/12/201
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER:
124-10296-10195
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 109-430-1603
Released under the John
c. kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
i44 USC 2107 Notel .
Cased -NT 53932 Date:
08-17-2017
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FBI
FROM:
DAVIS, GEORGE E. JR.
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE: 01/09/1957
PAGES:
16
SUBJECTS :
JAN, ASSOC, P/P, POLIT ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/08/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
HH 53932
DocId: 32308867
Page 1
---
## Page 2
MM 97-139
Identity
of Source
INFORMANTS
Date of Activity
Or Description
of Information
Date
Received
I.
Agent to
whom
Furnished
9/24/56 < GEORGE E.
DAVIS, JR.
$/29/56 Rac
7/1/56
11
8/29/56
"
File Number
where
Located
July 26 Club
CS-MM-492-S
membership
1-1:
CS-
Club Activities
MM-492-S
T-2: CS-
MM-550-S•
Cuban Club
T-3:
MARCEL
HAUWAERTS,
International
Dept., Ist Nat'1
Bank, Miami
$250 transfer
order
T-1: CS-
MM-492-S
Transfer order
8/24/56
T-3:
MARCEL
HAUWAERTS
Draft or
transfer order
8/29/56
I-1:
CS-
MM-492-S
July 26 Club
9/24/56 V
T-4:
EDUARDO
HERNANDEZ,
Cuban Consul,
Miami
Invasion report
'10/10 and
201/56
T-1
Instant file
11
{(U)
tt
11
Invasion report 10/15/56
ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE
- 108 -
HH 53932 DocId:32308867 Page 2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 124-10193-10032.pdf | 124-10193-10032 | 12/15/2017 | In Part | FBI | 3/1/90 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR SEE TITLE | DIRECTOR, CIA | GOW, W. DOUGLAS | CR 105-379908-76 | 7 | FBI | HQ | 11/30/2017 | 25 OF 35 PAGES NAR, INC RPT | null | ## Page 1
124-10193-10032
JEK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10193-10032
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR SEE TITLE
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: GOW, W. DOUGLAS
TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
TITLE: CR 105-379908-76
DATE: 03/01/1990
PAGES: 7
SUBJECT: LHO, RP, MNO, SOVIET PERMISSION, RETURN TO US
DOCUMENT TYPE:
ORIGINAL
CLASSIFICATION:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Secret
NEW
CLASSIFICATION:
UPDATE DATE:
REVIEW DATE:
STATUS
01/13/1999
Redact
02/12/2001
COMMENTS:
RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (1)(B)
JFK Act 6 (1)(C)
25 OF 35 PAGES NAR, INC RPT
NH 50953 DocId:32177784 Page 1
---
## Page 2
SSP
CEASO
SRC'D
737-514
CIA" MAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. CS Sunitied
SECRET
Date:
TO:
1 - Mr. J. J. Berkin
91785811/2198
BY LIAISON
CLASSIFIED BY: 5668-520/pede
REASON: 1.5 (C, d)
DECLASSIFY ON: XOSC6DSF4
Pages -3 PEnlues 1-3, 33,3413.
From:
Subject?
March 1, 1990
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Soviet/East European Division
Attn: 11
Chief/SOVOPS
NHB
3.IXOJ C5J
w.
Douglas Gow
Assistant Director in Charge
Intelligence Division
FLASH-RUN.
MARION COUNTERIVELICENCE - SOVIES UNION ES
This communication is classified "Secret" mite
4, 8,6,7, 8)
10, 11, 12, 13,
4 6, 292720
25;27,28, 19,30
32,74
,35
entirety.
Enclosed are copies of debriefing reports relating to
the captioned subject,
a former Major in the Second Chief
Directorate of the KGB who defected to the United states in
November
1989. FLASH RUN is presently being resettled by your
Agency
Copies of those debriefing reports which are relevant
have been furnished tol
I to the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the military
intelligence services, the National Security Agency, and to other
appropriate members of the Intelligence Community. E
Information from this source is being obtained on a
continuous basis, and copies of future reports from him will be
provided to you as they become available.
Such reports will also
be disseminated by this Bureau to other interested members of the
Intelligence
• Community-and to appropriate allied foreign
governments.
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
Enclosures - 9ENGLOSUNE
Exec AD Adm, ..
- JUB: tInk
Exoc AD Inv.
(4)
Exac AD LES
AT 1IXYD
Asst. Dir.:
MORONA TO US LA DITTED ENORED'
SECRET
Adm. Servs.
Crim, inv.
Classified
ident.
• Insp.
Declassify
Intell.
"* Lab.
Legal Coun.
Olf. Cong. &
Public Affs.
Hes.
Mgnt.
Tach. Servs.
Tralning
Off. Lialson &
Int. Afis.
0ES/504
MEDELIVERED, BY LIAISON
PATEL
1/5/20
Telephone
Am.
Liaisen
DI 56555 Dow44:327/7784
Page 2
76(5
SEE NOTE PAGE THREE
G- 3
OADR
91as36
3:1-94/05-RMB/nle
Ридна 1-3. Еля, Рие 1-3,3425; ?
we гере
---
## Page 3
00
SECRET
i to coRn intelligence senor i
Questions may be directed to Supervisory Special Agent
Jeffrey J. Berkin, CI-IB Unit,
Intelligence Division, FBIHQ,
telephone (202) 324-4587 (STO'III) -(
SECRET
- 2 -
HH 50953
DocId: 32177784
Page 3
---
## Page 4
00..
SECRET
intelligence Agency (ia)
NOTE:
Full Field investigation authorized November 25, 1989(5)
This communication provides CIAHQ's Deputy Director for
Operations of the Soviet/East European Division (SE)
complete xerox copy of our debriefings of the FLASH RUN subject / 57
to date.&
1053/504
Tuit
SECRET
= 3-
50953
DocId: 32177784
Page 4
---
## Page 5
917/98
CLASSIMED DY: 5666S 520/mde
NFASON:
1.6 (c,0l)
DECLASSIFY ON: XCJC6BFA
л.i
17930N.
cloloner, page an papes 34,35,1,2,5,
wer erneue fer Clus enti
ENCLOSURE:
54 ((5)
NH 50953
DocId: 32172784
Page 5
---
## Page 6
"THOSE,"
SECRET
405R
NOSENKO
Yuriy NOSENKO spent much of his career in the Sixth
Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD), which
was
responsible for tourists.
He spent only a short time
of his
career in the First Department, SCD, which was responsible for
American officials at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
NOSENKO had excellent family connections because his
father was Minister for the Shipbuilding Industry in the USSR.
That is how NOSENKO managed to become a security officer for the
Soviet delegation which traveled to Geneva, Switzerland, for arms
control talks. He defected to the United
States
from this
position.
The SCD was quite pleased when U.s. intelligence began
to believe NOSENKO was not a bona fide defector.
They were
particularly pleased when he was harshly interrogated by the CIA.
According to the source, NOSENKO was not sent to the
United States to be a false defector.
The source said that it is
against KGB policy to send an intelligence officer as a false
defector.
Also, the KGB would never have selected him
for such a
-mission because
his father is a high-level Party official.
The source doubts that NOSENKO ever saw OSWALD's
file.
According to the source, NOSENKO was not higher than a Captain or .
Major when he defected to the United States.
The source belleves
that NOSENKO may have tried to show himself more valuable to the
CIA than he really was.
At the time of his defection, NOSENKO
was mixing in high circles of Moscow golden youth. The source
believes he defected for material gain.
REFERENCES:
1. January 12, 1990, Debriefing.
Tape #2A.
counter #342-432. (5)
SECRET
NW 50953. DocId: DoeId:32177784
77
---
## Page 7
SECRET
- _LEE
HAI
NOSWALD AND WIFE MARINA
-. t
The source discussed the Lee Harvey OSWALD case with
former instructors at
Counterintelligen GlU)
Minsk KGB Higher School of
Following his defection to the USSR, OSWALD waS
resettled in Minsk, outside of Moscow.
He was placed under full
surveillance by the regional or territorial KGB in Minsk.
officers from the Second Directorate of the White Russian KGB
were in contact with Oswald and considered him an agent because
he would provide them with some information on his past. Marina
was also considered an agent.
Oswald resided very close to Victory Square and the KGB
Higher School in Minsk. His apartment was very nice by Soviet
standards.
Oswald was also interrogated several times by KEB
officers in Moscow. The source does not know what type of
information OSWALD provided to the KGB in Minsk or Moscow.
1.
OSWALD fell into deep depression in the USSR. He was
-homesick and wanted to return to the United States.
eventually received Soviet permission to return to the United
States with his wife Marina.
His KGB handlers did consider passing OSWALD to the
First Chief Directorate to be handled by a KCB residency in the
United States.
This proposal was ultimately rejected, however,
because OSWALD was considered too unstable.
According to the
source, the KGB did not handle OSWALD in the United States and
had no
further contacts with him.
Marina was considered
an agent, but she did not like to
cooperate with the KGB.
She was interested in OSWALD, but even
more interested in getting away from the soviet Union
and
poverty.
The KEB instructors who told the source about OSWALD
were (Coloner Torchuk, Colonel Sluzel
and colonel schlobochekov. (S
Ihese individuals used to be members de, the White Russian KGB
SCD Officers Aleksey YEGOROV and Leonid GOLUBOVSKIY also told
him
SECRET
H₩ 50953 DocId: 32177784
Page 7
---
## Page 8
23407
SECRET
According to the source, l
each one of these officers
76214
told him that the KGB did not handle Oswald after his redefection
to the United States, and
the KGB did not give any tasks to
OSWALD.
They also said that the KGB never gave OSWALD a task. to
kill President Kennedy.
The source said that rumors in the west suggesting the
KGB was involved in KENNEDY's assassination were absurd.
According to the source, the KGB would never risk the scandal of
assassinating a major world leader.
-
DEBRIEFER'S COMMENTS:
Needless to say, we will go back over his knowledge of
OSWALD in an effort to
acquire any additional information.
REFERENCES:
1. January 12, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #2A.
counter #240-342 (5)
SECRET
-2-
HH 50953
DoeId: 32177784
Page 8
-
25
---
## Page 9
..
_SECRET
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
In Reply, Please Refer to
- File No.
ATI. INFORMATION CONTAINED
*....
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPS}
WERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
(NEWARK, NEW JERSEY (5),
December 12, 1989
Classified by 05-FMBlmo
Declassity on: DADRO
вим
(SOVIET KGB OFFICERS] (S)
This
reine communication is classified "SECRET".
WARNING: THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM A SOURCE OF
EXTREME SENSITIVITY. DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN MAY REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF THE
SOURCE'S IDENTITY, AND TO THE LOSS OF THE SOURCE.
WARNING: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROVIDED
FOR LEAD PURPOSES ONLY. IT'S ORIGIN MUST BE SUITABLY DISCUISED
TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.
WARNING: NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION
MAY BE MADE WITHOUI FBIHO AUTHORIT
On December 11, 1989 NK
T-1, a source with whom there
- has been limited contact,
but who is in a position to know the
type of intormation which follows, and who is believed to be
reliable, próvided information on
the following individuals:
(FNU) SHEBARDIN, replaced KRYUCHKOV as head of First
Chief Directorate
(FCD) •
SHEBARDIN was formerly the resident
in
India and worked wit
/OLUBOVSKIY, the current head of the second
Chief Directorate's
KONSTANT VERGASOY WORD In ELLE
in that country (5)
Department, SCE
and is an ethnic Tatar.
Higher School in Moscow.
Three years ago he worked against the
U. S. consulate in Leningrad. He speaks no english.
()
SECRET
Classifi
by: G-3
Declassify
en: OADR
This document contains neither the recommendations no
conclusions of
the FBI.
It is the property of the FBI and is
loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.
50953
DocId: 32177784
Page g
---
## Page 10
SECRET
D03-19334
ALEKSANDR YUREVICH,
PINIGIN is a Captain in Directorate
He
the Sixteenth Directorate for two years, then the lst section,
Bangi ret are so a e
is was born in 195v,
is a graduate of the FCD's Red
Banner Institute, second faculty (European languages), served in
Second Department, SCD, and finally transferred to the FCD
approximately three years ago:
He will be sent to Britain
another Commonwealth country in the near future. His father,
YURT
NIGIN, is a Colonel And the head of a department in the
KGB Inspection Directorate
0U3-19374
- ALEKSAN
SHURYGIN isan Officer in Directorate s, FCD.
Ke was born in Lipetsk circa 1953, has two front gold teeth, is
5'9" tall, has blond hair, and graduated from a Minsk technical
college.
He was initially in the second line of the territorial
KGB in Lipetsk, but then married the daughter of a local official
was sent to the FCD Red Banner Institute for three years S
-SERGEY STEPANOVICH
Directorate.
-KOROLEY is the head of the Fifteenth
e. Prior to this he was the First Deputy head of head
of the Ninth Directorate. He resides at 9 zoologicheskaya
LEsa near the Moscow 200. Many KGB generals reside at this
45R
has travelled many abroad many times. S
USSR (surveillance) :
RASHCHEPOY is the head of the Seventh Directorate
He is a Lieutenant General
"Ten years ago
was the head of the First Department, SCDS
- ANDREY
ASHCHTININ Is a case officer in Directorate K,
FCD specializing
1) the merchant marine. He graduated the. KGB
Higher School, Minsk, with the
source.
He was born in Leningrad, listh
and formerly worked at the Leningrad territorial KGB in the 4th
line. He graduated the FCD school three years ago. (S)
head of the want year a colone gratua
He graduated
IrOm the Baumanskiy Higher Technical Institute, then went to the
2nd faculty (european Languages), KGB Higher School, Moscow, then
was assigned as the deputy head, Second Department, SCD.S).
EUGENIX ANDREICH CUMEN UK 1- 125 eutenant colonel
and a deputy head
of the second Department, SCD.
He was formerly a
Ninth Directorate personal
later requested that he receive
a KGB higher education.
GUMEN YUK (S)
SECRET
2
50953 DooId: 32177784
Page 10
---
## Page 11
(SECRET
worked for one year
in the consular group, First Section, Second
Department, SCD
ALEXSANDRABOZENOY i a senior lieutenant in the secana
Department,
He is a graduate of the Baumanskiy Higher
Technical Institute, served two years in the Air Defense troops
(PVO), attended the
Dzerzhinskiy KGB Higher School, Moscow, eight
faculty for tho
years, then was assigned to the Second
Department.
SECRET
3 *
raisieur:
HH
50953
DocId: 32177764
Page
11
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32289665.pdf | 124-10201-10441 | 10/26/2017 | In Part | FBI | 5/11/62 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-106633-14 | DIRECTOR, FBI | EDMISTON, CHARLES W. | 8 | FBI | HQ | 08/21/2017 | 8 | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10201-10441
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 105-106633-14
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: EDMISTON, CHARLES W.
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE :
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
05/11/1962
8
FCH, TRA, INTV, SOCARRAS, CARLOS PRIO
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :
Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
06/11/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
NW 953932
DocId: 32289665
Page 1
Date:
4/2/2015
Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records
i on see a 10 3 a2, v3c
---
## Page 2
sil
FEDERAL®
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONX
REPORTING OFFICE
MIAMI
TITLE OF CASE
OFFICE OF ORIGIN
SAN JUAN
FRANK CHAVEZ, aka
REFERENCES:
Reports of SA JOHN A NORRIS, JR., dated
2/20/62, and 4/30/62, at San Juan.
Miami letters to the Bureau dated 4/20/62,
and 5/1/62.
DATE
INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
MAY 1 1 1962
2/26-5/8/62
REPORT MADE BY
TYPED BY
CHARLES W.
EDMIS TONO OBJECTION CH
LA HAC
CHARACTER OF CASE
DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IS-DR- CUBAY THIS DOCUMENT. JM
6-25-97
SID/ISR
7-28-97
(FIC)
-RUC -
AZE INTORNATION CONTAINED
ADMINISTRATIVE
M:CASE SHOWS OTUERWISE.
Information copy is furnished Washington Field, as
Washington Field is attempting to verify travel of subject as
did Miami.
1/-30-94
lassified be SiL& Muc/nde
INFORMANTS Declassity on: OADR
The following Dominican Sources of the Miami Office
were contacted on the dates indicated by Special: Agent CHARLES
W. EDMISTON:
VICTOR LEON AYBAR SOSA,
PSI
March i5, 1962
APPROVED
SPEC CHARGENT
DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
COT BE
105-
106633-14
- San Juan (105-5396) (RM)
(1-ONI, 10th ND:
San Juan) (RM)
(1-471st INTC Det. San Juan) (RM)
5 MAY 14 1962
REG 16
X-115
1 - Miami (105-5578)
t'BT
DISSEMINATION RECORD" OF ATTACHÈD REPORT BA
AGENCY
-REQUEST-RECD.
DATE FWD.
HOW Fu!
BY.
- Aesi, Legat Oldin
5118-2
IS (0-143/-14F/0-6/0-14011-140/0-14 h/0-1
MAY 431962
1EO04
U.S. GOVERNMENT
76324- 55.
HH 53932
DocId: 32289665
Page 2
---
## Page 3
MM 105-5578
ALTAGRACIA G. FOX, PSI
FELIPE CARTAGENA
PORTALATIN, PSI (under
development)
CS MM 749-S.
DANIEL BATISTA,
JR., PSI
March 6, 1962
March
7, 1962
March
8,
1962
March 12, 1962
Careful consideration was given to each source
concealed and I symbols were utilized only in those instances
where the identities of the sources must be concealed.
B*
- COVER PAGE -
gn110dd ..
HW 53932
DocId: 32289665
Page 3
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10186-10451.pdf | 104-10186-10451 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 3/8/65 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | MFR | C/WH/C/RR/OS | SUBJECT: AMMUG/1 DEBRIEFING REPORT #316 - "ZORAIDA." | 2 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-21 : F5 : 1998.06.18.17:39:21:186102 : | 2 | ## Page 1
104-10186-10451
SEGMET
& March 1065
LaX-9518
MENORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
General:
AMMUG/1 Debriefiaz Report 1916
Specifle:
"ZORAIDA*
REFECENCE: CS 818/00115-64, 8 July 1064
A. BASIC BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
Alias:
"ZORAIDA"
I thina Cuban
I thias only Spanich
A PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Age:
welzht:
Hielzht:
Complexion:
Bulld:
Hals:
Face:
Neck:
Clothes:
C. JOE DATA
Job Title:
where employed:
Roceipt of mail:
Dispatch of mall:
Intra-Jilice com-
munication:
• 20-25 years
150 pouade, more or les
5°6°-59789
white
dat
Dark Brown
Round
Short and thick
Sport clothes
Utlice Clers, DGI
building Tri" DGI
In the DG!
la the DGI
personal and telephone
---
## Page 2
D. MISCELLANSOUS IN FORMATION
Access to target laformation:
Elles in her olfice.
Sarney Hidalgo
#E/C/RR/OS
C/WE/C/aR/OS
Distribution:
2- RI (19-5-1)
2-AMMUG/1 Production
1-Marg/Beraice
1- Chrono
1- Lols
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32309408.pdf | 124-10298-10195 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | FBI | 07/27/1961 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-3171-332 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, NY | 5 | FBI | HQ | 3/9/18 | 5 | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
5/7/2015
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10298-10195
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
92-3171-332
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: SAC, NY
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE: 07/27/1961
'PAGES:
5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
[Restricted]
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Unclassified
4
Redact
01/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
NW 45792 DocId: 32309408 Page 1
258
---
## Page 2
FD-S, (Rey. 12-13-561
Transmit the following in
Via
AIRTEL
FBI
Date:
PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)
7/26/61
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DIRECTOR, FBI (92-3171)
SAC, NEW YORK (92-793)
SAMUEL M. GIANCANA; aka
HEREIN
6•84
UNCLASSIFIED
I CONTANNED
ReNYtel to Bureau dated 7/24/61:
524 East Tora street, NYC,
Garage Manager, Taft Garage Corp.,
was interviewed by SAS PAUL G.
DURKIN and CHARLES G. DONNELLY on 7/25/61, and he advised
that in addition to his duties of Garage Manager, he
likewise drives for the McGuire Sisters.
In connection
with his chauffeuring duties, he stated that he met the
subject about one year ago and claims that he never knew
his last name to be GIANCANA but that he believed it to
be MOONEY. However in general, he related that he
generally referred to subject as "Mr. SAM". U
advised that during the past year as far
as he knows
subject has been the boyfriend of PHYLLIS
MC GUIRE.
He added that he was very surprised that the
romance has lasted this long inasmuch as PHYLLIS had many
boyfriends in
prolonged time.
the past but has had none of them for any
He said in his opinion the romance has lasTed
subedoted this long because subject generally travels to
various cities where the McGuire Sisters will be doing a show.
3- Bureau (92-3171)
1- Chicago (92-349)
]- Newark (92-958)
I- New York (92-793)
REC- 91
92-3171-332
PGD :ald
(7)
& JUL 28 1961
OTHER 4
C C # Wick!
Approved:
62 AUG 1
125?.
Copm
Special Agent in Charge
NW 45792 DocId: 32309408
Page 2
Sent
_M
Per
---
## Page 3
NY 92-793
advised that he knew very little concerning
the background of subject and only knows that he was a gangster
and hoodlum because he was so informed by JOHN TEETER,
the husband of CHRISTINE MC GUIRE.
During his association
with the subject,
claimed that he never met any of
his associates and never
learned anything about his activities. U
further related that generally subject attempts
to appear as a legitimate businessman and no type of
Illegitimate activity was ever disclosed. y
About Christmas, 1960,
said he recalled
that GIANCANA was in New York City and that on one
occasions he chauffeured him while he went shopping,
however, he advised he did not know the exact places he
_to wait there
until he returned.
Because of traffic conditions he would
have to drive around
the block and usually the subject would
be waiting for him.
On this particular shopping tour, I
has no knowledge of any specific item which subject purchased
either for
himself or for PHYLLIS MC GUIRE. U
Recently according tol
I subject gave PHYLLIS
a new 1961 Cadillac White Convertible.
He added that he
has no direct knowledge of this but that it was heresay
information most likelys He said, he heard thds either
from PHYLLIS' sisters or their husbands. U
Jadvised that in a general way he is familiar
with PHYLISS" Jewelry collection and as far as he knows
subject only gave her a very expensive set of earrings
or necklace. Again he claimed that he was not able to
YeT a tene
determine the value of any particular pieced jewelry
but heard that the gift was expensive either from the
sisters or their husbands. u
OTHER 4
- 2 -
NW 45792 DocId: 32309408 Page 3
---
## Page 4
....
NY 92-793
never knew subject in the past year to
have given PHYLLIS any kind of
a mink or fur coat. He
added that
he knows the sisters have identical fur pieces.u
While in New York City
Jadvised that subject
has stayed overnight in PHYLLIS'
apartment and the only
other place he stayed to his knowledge while In New York
City was at the Hotel Plaza.
However, he added he has no
knowledge whether subject used his true name or an alias
while registered at this Hotel.U
said that while in conversation with the
subject in December, 1960, subject mentioned that he
Had been in Miami.
He claimed he never knows subject's
definite plans for travel but was of the opinion that he
returned to Chicago each time after leaving the various
cities. U
On Sunday, 7/23/61,
advised that he went
to the Seaside Hotel, Atlantic City, New Jersey, in order
to drive the station wagon back to New York City. As far
as he knew PHYLLIS was going to drive her new car, however,
he doubts that PHYLLIS would drive this distance and
even though he does not have definite knowledge, he is of
the opinion that subject drove PHYLLIS back to New York
ubject in in New York citya in the cat the
Jis of the opinion
that he will be either staying at PHYLLIS' apartment or
at the Plaza Hotel. He added that most likely he will be
in contact with PHYLLIS and that he will attempt to
discreetly ascertain subject's current whereabouts. u
On Monday, 7/24/61,
advised that he picked
up PHYLLIS' car and
stored it
In his garage inasmuch as
he was informed by her that she would not have use for it
during the next week.u
On each occasion that he has seen subject he
said he has been very expensively dressed and he recalls
he wears very expensive shoes however, he has never seen
- 3 -
NW 45792 DocId: 32309408 Page 4
OTHER
---
## Page 5
NY 92-7931
him wear the same pair of shoes on two occasions.
said that the McGuire Sisters when they go out together
Little Club, Hotel Plaza, Shambors, Four
To ta ge the seven cheer ham bone they 40 venuen eat,
visited the King Henry V Restaurant but because of an
incident there in the recent past, they do not go there
According tol
CHRISTINE and DOROTHY MC GUIRE
also go to the theater but PHYLLIS does not go inasmuch as
she does not like the theater shows. u
advised that PHYLLIS will be going to
Mass; in the near future but as yet he does notknow the exact
date.
He added that he believes the sisters' next show
will be on the Ed Sullivan Program and that immediately
afterward they will leave for an engagement in London. u
requested that any information he furnishes
be kept contidential by the FBI because of his relationship
with the McGuire Sisters.
In viewd this, a PCI case
will be opened in the
New York Office.
He added that he
will cooperate in every way possible with the. FBI and
positively will not inform PHYLLIS or any members of her
family that he has been contacted by the FBI. U
During the late part of the afternoon on 7/25/61,
telephonically advised SA DURKIN that he had just
received a phone call from PHYLLIS who informed him to drive
her car to her residence.
He said that most likely she
wanted him to do something and that the car was not for
her personal use. U
advised SA DURKIN that PHYLLIS
manted ane in the eat gration on the ca, pate eat and
that the car is actually registered in her name, however,
OTHER 4
-4:
NW 45792 DocId: 32309408 Page 5
---
## Page 6
NY 92-793
he advised that he knows the car was purchased in Chicago
and that he checked the mileage and is of the opinion that
it was driven from Chicago to Las Vegas to Atlantic City
and then to New York City.
After fixing the air conditioner
returned her car to the garage. U
advised that subject was not in the apartment
while he was there and that after discreetly checking 1t
doubts that he has been there during the past several days. y
TERRY MC PARALAND, Secretary to JOHN J. WALSH,
York City,
1s not currently registered under his true name or commonly
used aliases.
She also advised a check of the guest card
history failed to reflect any registration for him in the
past. 4
On 7/25/61, photographs of the subject were displayed
to JERRY COLLINS, JOHN DRISCOLL, and ART YOUNG, elevator
operators at PHYLLIS MC GUIRE's residence, 525 Park
Avenue, New Yak City. U
All advised that they have seen PHYLLIS MC GUIRE
but they did not see the subject with her an 7/23,24 or 25/61.
GIANCANA SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.
OTHER
-5 -
NW 45792 Docid:32309408 Page 6
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32309799.pdf | 124-10301-10065 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 2/12/63 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 2-1423-2ND NR 87 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, WMFO | 4 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | INC LHM | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
4/29/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY :
FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-10301-10065
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 2-1423-2ND NR 87
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FBI
FROM: SAC, WMFO
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE: 02/12/1963
PAGES:
4
SUBJECTS :
IID, ASSOC, POLIT, FINANCES
DOCUMENT TYPE:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/20/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS:
INC LHM
y9.1
DocId: 32309799
15
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Relgased.underothe John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44
USC 2107 Hote)
DATE: 11-14-2017
FBI
Date: 2/12/63
Transmit the following in
Via
AIRTEL,
SECRET
•or code)
2-7-98
(Priority or Method of Mailing)
--- GLASSIFIEDBY.
5668 540/KSR
DECLASSIFY CN: 25X7
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI (100-143895J5)
PROM: SAC, WFO (<205-19678)] (P)(S)
4278-94
\EMBASSY OF NICARAGUA
Classified ly 3p. 8 NAC /KSR
IS - NICARAGUA.
(5)
Declassify on:
OADE
OKK)
Enclosed for the Bureau are nine copies of a
letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.
The informant mentioned in the enclosed letterhead
menorandun is WE 970-5* (5)
For the information of the Bureau
It Is notec
that the, conversation between DAVIDSON and MORALES eeported
in the enclosure was conducted in fa
very circumspect fashion. (S)
At no time did they fully disclose
She subiect matter under
discussion.
the use of the words "Grand Jury" possibly
refers to hearings being conducted by the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations relative to lobbying activities
1/63
The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified
"Confidential inasmuch as it reflects
Arrestigative interest
infa foreign diplomatic establishment,
Walso because
intormation reported could reasonably result in identification
of a confidential informant of continuing value and
his future effectivenesse
11473
ACCORDED
Bureau (Enc
62 FEB 18 1963
Let to dau
compromise
JES: fe's
(4.)
1t0
AIRTEL
place
11A1
2 - 1432/8, ing
Dase
07-79942 Sonade Farings
Білас]!
convicte"
Ja FEB 1A060
TON CONTAINT
NAVASSIFIED
WHERE SHOWN
INTE CEC.
Exits
inte...
Approved:
4 14-63
Special Agent In
trai
Charge
Sent
M
Per
SECRET
F5B 18 1963
DocId: 32309799
Page 2
---
## Page 3
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
Fa..
CONPOENTAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
27.98
SECRET
CLASSIFIED BY 5668-5-1/1580
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1, 6
(JFK)
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
February 12, 1963
ENBASSY OF NICARAGUA
TERNAL, SECURITY - NICARAGUA
(S)
On February 11, 1963, a confidential informant,
who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised
that he was not aware of its significance, but
furnished
the tollowing intornation concerning a conversation, on
that date,Lbetween Coneral
Julio C. Moralos, Nicaraguan
Mt litary and Air Attache,and I. Irving bavidson, registered
agent for Nicaragua:
Without fully identifying the individual or
matter being discussed, Davidson
conmented that "he" should
stay there awhile because they are now sitting for the
"Grand Jury",
and they want to ask hin about those two
chocke. Davidson continued by conjecturing that what
probably happened was that "Prank" got his regular check for
& thousand, and that "Flood" re-endorsed it and cashed it
at the bank in the Capitol for "franky,)Davidson Larned
Morales to got word to Nicaragua, and
Commented on the
rocent elections in
Nicaragua indicating that this could
wreck overything:
askod if there was any way to stop it, and Davidson replied
that although he is close to "Drew", he could do nothing.
He said that he had even tried "plata» (slang for silver).
Davidson continued by relating that about a year
ago he had a drink with "Frank" and the "Goneral® at which
time he said "Look, Frank, you should not have done that."
"Frank" replied by
indicating complete unconcern for Drew
Pearson:
Davidson esplained to #Frank that it did not
matter whether he was sight or vrong, that Pearson would
pat it in
anyway, and that everybody would read
12-8-44
Classified Hi 508 MAR/ISR
Declassify on:
DADR,
32/C203
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded fr
automatic
2-1425
dongrading and.?
declassification
710
Lin
B ENCiASSIFIED
SHOWN
WHERE
APHERWISE
DocId: 32309799
Page 3
---
## Page 4
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
CONFIDENTIAL.
ENDALEX ON
NICARAGUA](5)
SECRET
1t.
Davidson
said
he agreed that tho man enty cached a
check
for "Erank®,
but noted that it could caume
cobarrassront.
Davidson then stated
to the #Genera) *
that maybe he
and tho "General! were
not seeing eye to
oye,
but publio relations for Nicaragua were more importont
then their antty little fight about
Lthe "Ambassedor and
his alster"-(s)
pavidson felt that the natter under discueston
was probably brought up at thie time
becanse of the #foreign
agonte inveatigation",
Ho continued that then
they callod
hin, they czaninod all his papers and found that every time
ho sot a check fron Nienragua, ho filed it correctly and
did everything right.
Davidson suncosted that Morales handle the
mattor right broy, and concludod by comnienting that
instoad
of-staying there ton deys, tho" should stay there 30 days.
ReiChar
Moralos con bavideon told the antonnant
the nature of the
Identites of the
individuals mentioned.
It to noted,
however, that one frank Barry 19 rogietered with tho
United
States Departuent of Justice as an agont of the Nicaraguan
Coverment,
On January 31, 1963, the informant furniored
Infornation indicating that Prank Barry would be in
Nicaragua subsequent to Pebruary 7, 1963.
The
"Congressional Directory" dated January,
1962, reflocte
Daniol J. Flood as
a menber of the Unitod
States louse of Rapresentatives, fron Pennsylvanda.
Drew Pearson is a syndicated colunniet appearing
An The Washington
Post
• Iines Herald".
Coneral Anastania
Mastonal Guard.
The "General" roferred to above is possibly
Somoad,
Hoad of the Hicaraguan
u)
SECRET
-2-
SON-I CONFIDENTIAL
DocId: 32309799
Page 4
---
## Page 5
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
CONFIDE
NTIAL!
BE BADASSE OR NIGARAGIAJ(5)
SECRET
ponition
veritled througn the Dinionatio lieu
1962, pablished by the /United States
Department of State 1%
This document contains neither
recommendations
nor
conclusions of
the FBI.
It is the property of
the FBI and is looned
to your agency?
it and its contents are not to be
distrikuted outside your agency.
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
30110009.
DocId: 32309799 Page 5
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | 104-10006-10265.pdf | 104-10006-10265 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 03/18/1964 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 201-289248 | NAME CHECK REQUEST - MONICA F. KRAMER | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | OSW12 : V53B : 1996.06.10.09:11:26:410092 : | 1 | ## Page 1
1104-1006-10265,
FROM:. (questers name) O
BRANCH
ROOM
TO
TUBE
ROOM
i..a
RID/ INDEX
DT- 5
REQUESTER
RID/FILES
REQUESTER
RID/ANALYSIS
GT-7
RID/201
DW- 6
RID/MIS
1210/ 10E PLOT.
SURNAME
KPAMEK
SPELLING VARIATIONS
CHECKED
AKA, ALIASES
SECRET
• BADGE NO.
EXTENSION
DATE
DATE
NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST
RID CONTROL NO.
INITIALS
18 HAR 64
CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED
GIVEN NAMES
MAS
Monie
OTHS. ADENTLEYING DATA (Occupation, sex, CP membership,
DATE OF BIRTH
PLACE OF BIRTH
NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK
COMMENTS
CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED
INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS
IN ALL, CASES
Use gummed label; type or print al1
entries.
Upon receipt of index card reproductions
draw a green diagonal line across the
items you do not want.
Edit (use green) the reproduced index
cards to indicate:
(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with
green D and note reason for destruction) below:
Examples: document destroyed; duplicate
or less informative than retained in
formation; information of no CS value.
(b)
corrections and additions, inclu-
ding infinity symbol oo when
card in-
cludes all facts contained in the
document.
201 CONSOLIDATION
1. Return this form with the card repro-
luctions, also return pertinent documents
aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 or
the subject exists.
(2) 201-011 ate anto
(b) [ Open 201 file on subject.
RESTRICTION (If any)
REGRES
Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG
OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS
TYES
I NO
are in RID/ARD, and those that meet
TRIO
DESK
indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are
Note 2.
Information concerning foreig
carded in the CS Main Index.
If you
public personalities (except mili
believe there could be additional in-
tary) may be available in BR/OCR
formation of value in these records,
x7997.
you must request an Archives Index
search.
DATE
SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10123-10246.pdf | 104-10123-10246 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 12/10/58 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | CIA | WITHHELD | REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF HEDE MASSING. | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK44 : F8 : 1994.04.08.09:06:01:850007 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10123-10246]
petring
CLA
172341
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION&-CEdELUE L
RUC
(CATEGORY OF REPORT)
New York Field Office
(FIELD OFFICE)
CASE NO.
#172341-H.M. (with akas)
PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION
9 December 1958
OFFICE OF ORIGIN
DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE
REPORT MADE BY
03
DATE
10 December 1958
ADE:
SSI!
Der
A:
ch :
CHARACTER OF CASE
CSC-IB/3
03
APPROVED:
Copies:
DFO - 1
18s Tits
IrO " 1
(SPECIAL AGENT IN
thru DFO
NAL
FORM NO. 046 PIRACES FORM 38-100
I MAYSS
WMICH MAY BE USED
CLASS:
(43)
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 104-10054-10049.pdf | 104-10054-10049 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 1/8/60 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DD/P | GEORGE, W. LLOYD, CHIEF, FOREIGN IN | PROJECT LIEMPTY (RENEWAL) | 18 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK7 : F6 : 20031203-1019670 : | 18 | ## Page 1
164-10054-1049
SECRET
0002-113
JAN 1050
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief
of Operations, DD/P
SUBJECT
: Project LIonery (Renewal)
•WH - Mezico
1.
The attached
project, originating in WH Division, 1s
presanted for renewal for the period 1 December 1959 through
31 November 1960.
The project provides for physical and photo-
graphic surveillance operations in support and exploitation of
other Mexico City operations, particularly those targetted at
Soviet personnel and installations.
2.
Authority is
requested to obligate $84,910 from the
DD/P-WH Division operating
budget;
$49,495 for
fiscal year
1960 and $35,425 for fiscal
1901g subject to the avallability
of funds.
These
sums include $61,910 compensation for five
contract agents (three
of whom serve as principal agents for
segments
of the project), and sixteen support agents; $3,500
for vehicle maintenance and commercial carrier travel; $7,500
for operational equipment;
$5, 000
for
maintenance of three
safehouses : $2,000
for additional safenouse, post office box
and vehicle rental; $1,000 exchange commodities; $2,000 "key"
money, broken contracts. etc.;. and
$2,000 for the purchase of
information, documents,
payment of bribes, etc.
3.
The
and
attached renewal request, prepared in the Division
the
supported by
project review prepared in the Field, reviers
activitics of the
project during the
past jear and present
a detailed breakdown of the funde requested
The project
operates
in three sogments:
(a) jontract agent Oliver G.
SCANTEING
is
an independent asset who is used to follow-up
and
exploit operational information on target personnel and installa-
tions,
go case
various installations of interest, acquire pro-
pertys
eic.; (b) a photographic surveillance teamn, under prin-
cipal
agent ragmond ii. GeneNde,
utilizing three houses or apart-
ents and one photo truck; and (c) a physical surveillance tear
under principal agent Simon D. CLAGsOrT, consisting oi three
-raines dembers at the present tine.
The astached renewal
sequest raviers the activitieo and accomplishments of the bro-
Jess
i2 berns of these three aecmonto and: in relecion tomo-
Jeet oujeotives.
ScANgEOle contribution so.che colLacuser
of operacional informabion pertaining to sortel. personnel and
installarions
1n regarded s the Station
as arigue.
Hẹ c
SECRET
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trained CLACKETI in radio controlled mobile surveillance.
SCANTLING also has rendered valuable support to the LITACIT
operation having gained entry to the target under a fabri-
cated cover. He has also cased and prepared reports on the
LITABBY target in preparation for future operations and per-
formed investigations of numerous other station targets of
opportunity. He investigated many leads from other audio-
surveillance operations enabling the Station to maintain
current data on various Soviet contacts and resulting
in' a
recruitment attemot which
while unsuccessful, is believed
co indicate future potential along this
ther
line.
He has fur-
been used to develop radio procedures
for the mobile
teams and to rent various propertles in
support of other
Station operations.
The, CERENDE segment, using three base
houses
for photography, produced upwards
of 12,000 photo-
graphs during the
year.
One base has recently begun taking
motion pictures of Soviet personnel in the course of conver-
sation which have been forwarded to FI/D for possible exploita-
tion by l1p reading analysis.
This segment also operates. the
mobile radio surveillance
vehicles.
A mobile photography
sur
veillance truck has been used auring the project year. for
coverage of various Station targets which
do not warrant the
establishment of permanent photographic bases.
CERENDE has
also served to rent
post office boxes, hotel
rooms, etc,
in
support
of other Station operations.
During
the past project
year OLACKETS, Who returned to Mexico in early April 1959
after Headquarters traintnin mobile survelllance techniques.
being trained by
SCANTLING
spent the following two months
He then undertook training of a four member team which was
judged ready for operational use toward
the end of the project
year.
Two additional
contract. arents.
Wilma j. FIORDALISI
Louise i. MAGRINO, performed
and
translation and
support functions.
Appropriate staff components concur
in recommending
renewal.
(a) GI Starf notes that the CI value of the project
is dirficult to judge since it appears that muen of the
material produced remains in the Station for exploita-
tion.
However, GI Stact remarks that the value of the
neto that the Seation be queried an to the presembros
direunstances undoe wich SCANTEEle Crequerbly visits
the ocubant or the prosentr
sofacent to the sortet installatio.
SECRET
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(b) FI/OPS notes that while the project review pre-
sents a
clear picture of the aims and objectives of the
various
segments, it does not provide, except in the
case of
scArLIid, detailed indication
of the value
or
usefulness of the other segments, particularly the photo-
graphic
activity.
Fi/ops requests that the Station pro-
vide such an appraisal during the first quarter
of. 1960:
"*FI/OPS
recommends strongly that the photo coverage be
reviewed from the standpoint of value and usefulness with
a view
to determining whether the LILYRIc
activity could
not be safely eliminated and the additional photographic
coverage conducted on a more
selective basis,
without
materially affecting overall usefulness. *nI/OPS notes
that,
in the absence of further proof of uséfulness, the
color photography and moving pictures appear
to be an
unnecessary
luxury.
FI/ops commends
the careful handling
of the
CLACKETT segment and requests that the next project
action include examples of the team's progress.
with
5.
I recommend renewal of Project LICHPTY as
presented
attention to the staff comments in paragraph 4 above.
Ш.
W.
I page
Chief
Foreign Intelligence
Approved:
COP
-DD/.
1M & 20
Date
Setachment:
Project Outline LIENPTI
Staff coordination:
For. C/FI/OPS: -s/R.
Brvant.
For CI Staff -s/
For C/COD
-s/P. Voungblond
SECRET
PA 23 03 .
COPE
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## Page 4
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SECRET
PROJECT
Case Officer
50÷6-74/1
SEOR
ES PORT
SECRET
Mexico City
STATION
Meland ECosta
Hillard C. CURTIS, Chief of Station
50-6-
7i4l1
SECRETA
US t
i 111n4-12357.
PACK 24 01 8.8
COPY: 10.
---
## Page 5
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I.
CURRENT, OBJRCTIVES AND PRODUCTION RELATED THEREFO
A. Oliver G. SCANTLING Segment. (in relation to project objectives.)
1.
"Io collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK. personnel
and physical facilities.
SCANTLING has continued to provide worthwhile in-
formation in support of this objective. (See previous project review forwarded
by HMMA-20052 of 18 October 1962.) During the past year SCANTLING was used to
follow up leads produced by both LIFEAT and LIENVOY in support of this objective..
In particular SCANTLING provided, in blueprint detail, casing reports on the
homes of two Soviet intelligence officers who are targets for Station technical
operations.
SCANTLING also is used to aid the Station in uaintaining current records
of the residences of Soviet personnel living in Mexiço.. This is accomplished by
SCANILING's FOllowup of LIENVOY leads which indicate Soviet interest in renting
specific properties.
2..
"To collect operational information pertaining to other targets of op-
portunity, foreign official installations and personnel of intelligence interest
operating
in Mexico."
SCANILING has proved successful in providing information
on other Station targets:
2..
SCANTLING obtained infornation on AFMIQUELEI-2, a suspect Soviet
support asent which was the basis of further Station operations
against this target.
b.
SCANTLING provided a casing of the former Yugoslav Commercial
Office against which the Station had planned a technical operation.
However, this site was evacuated by the target mission before
plans were completed for this attempt.
c.
SCANTLING has conducted detailed investigations in various cases
involving possible agents. or contacts of hostile intelligence ser
vices. These cases were of prime concern to Station Mexico but
frequently were undertaken at the request of Headquarters or other
Stations.
30
"To provide support to other Station operations as ray be requested by
the Station officers concerned:
" In the past scabiNg's activites in this area
were
concerned primarily with recruitments, acbrietings and suurvatilances.. During
the reporting period, however, the weiglit: of SCANiLING's support to otherStation:*
operations have taken other forms.
Examples from this area of activity
include
the most fruitful efforts on SCAITLING'e part:
SEERS:
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2-
3. 8.
Support of the sensitive AMROD operation, in which Raymond I.
GERENDE also played a vital role, was of singular importance
to.
the success of the operation,
SCANTLING's many fields of op
erational experience were drawn on fully and he thereby provided
a unique contribution to the operation..
Without the assistance
of SCANTLING and GERINDE with their unique qualifications, this
operation would have been difficult in the extreme if indeed at
all possible.
In support of the Station's harassment campaign against Juan Jose
AREVALO Bermejo, launched at the request of Headquarters,
SCANILING again provided the means for carrying out a large portion
of the action taken. SCANTLING's efforts ranged fron the mailing
of "poisoned" candy to the target to the placing of threatening
phone calls.
SCANTLING also made calls to various Mexican news-
papers and mailed "montage" pictures of ARIVALO and a Soviet in-
telligence officer to Guatemalan newspapers in the campaign to
discredit and discourage AREVATO in the Guatemalan Presidential
C ..
SCANTLING is used as the alternate contactin a sensitive LAURICLE
This is for the purpose of minimizing the danger of the
action agent in this project being recognized as being in contact
with an obvious PBPRIME citizen.
SCANTLING's contribution to this
operation has been noteworthy both from the stanâpoint of security
and agent handling.
SCANTLING continued to conduct numerous pretext and neighborhood
Invostigations.
As in the past many of these investigations were
in relation to highly sensitive cases.
4.
Although SCANTLING'S LIEMPTY project objectives can not be completely
fulfilled, it
the Station's opinion that SCANTLING continues to meke valuable
conüributions to the objectives of the project and to other Station activities.
SCANTLIIG's production, measured against monetary empenditure, case officer time
and other intensibles feetors, unquestionably justifies his contiming as an
integral part, of Project LIENPIY.
Raymond Hi. OmIDE Segment (in ralation to project objectives):
1":
"To collect operational information pertaining to TeaRIck nersonnel
and physical facilities thraigh use of botographic baschouses
graphic bases, LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA, contribute to these objectives:
Although SCANNING now acts as cutout with the LIMItED base,. CERENDE continues
to be responsible for the proceoning of all photo taie from the LImPTY operacion
including take
description
from LIMITED. To avoid repetition, the Station is onitting the
of the functions of these three bases and how they
contribute to the
above objective.
This ves fully described in the 1960 Request for Project Reneral
(НивA-15979) •
SEGRET
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COPY NO:
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## Page 7
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• II.
2.
"To collect operational inforation and identify operational leads
pertaining to Station targets of opportunity."
The LIENTRAP operation,
handled by GERENDE, is still the major contributor to this objective.
LIENIRAP operational emphasis continues to remain in the area
of photo stakeout
of prominent Mexican Communists and is presently vorking fulltime on providing
pictures of individual Conmunists, homes suspected of being meeting sites used
by the Cormunist Party and the Communist Party Headquarters itself.
LIENIRAP
has also recently. begun to be used on RINICK leads. It is expected that
activities of flENTRAP in that latter area will expand in the coming. year.
3. "To provide operational support to Station operations including the
renting of hotel rooms and safe apartments, renting and servicing of post office
boxes, and conducting counter-survetllances." CERENDE's contribution to the
AMROD operation was noted in paragraph I.A.3.a. above.
GERENDE's comprehensive
area knowledge and personal operational capabilities enable him to make a
valuable contribution in such operations as AMROD and also enable him to procure
the mosi desireable safe sites in support of the Station's operations.
project's assets, particularly GERANDE and LIEMPIY-10, presently provide 20
post office box mail drops for use of Mexico City Station and other Stations.
Although it is plarned to reduce this nmoer considerably during the next year,
(since other Station assets now can provide a numoer of live accommodation
addresses, a number of post office boxes will be retained for use in îuture
operations.
4. The quality and quantity of oparational information produced by the
photographic bases and other activities under GERENDE's control and supervision
is considered by the Station worthwhile and in sone cases unique.
It is con-
cluded, therefore, that this segment of the LIMPIY Project should be continued.
C. Relationship to the Relaüed. Mission Directive
As notes in the
examples given abore, Project LIMPIY has provided valuable
support to many Station operations and thereby has been a contributing factor to
the fulfillment of the Related Mission objectives of the Station. The project
has not produced any positive intelligence nor is it intended to do so.
project's sole purpose is to provide a nechanism for the development of opera-
• tional incormation.
CHANCES
The one major chanse nade in the LIMPTY Protect was the replacement of
GRINDEDY SCANTLING as cutout with the LIMITeD desencuses this was dranger
su as to provide: GRINDE Tith nore tine for rapie processing of the simema
phototake :
also makes for better rayport with the basehouse keeper (traMPT 6)
since SCANtLING is closer in age to aim than is CERaDE.
Louise J. NACRINO (os) puffered a recurrence of the heart condition which
noerly caused her death approvimately eight years ago.. Complete rest has been
6.8
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SECRET !
4-
ordered by her doctors and an operation may be necessary in early 1964.
It is therefore unlikely that she will be able to work during the coming
project rear. Station does not plan to request cancellation of her operational
clearance at this time, but has not included salery payments to her in the
estimated costs of the project for the coming year.
The unusual salary increase reflected for LIEMPTY-19 in the "Project Costs"
(below) sectionfor the coming year is due to this agent's new duties of LIFEAT
processing in addition to her old duties as translator. Agent's OA was amended
for this use on 2 January 1963.
IIT.
EFFECTIVENESS
The corments made concerning the project's effectiveness in the Project
Renewal of 1960 (HMMA 15979) remain valid.
Indeed the Station's need for the
type of services provided by the assets of this project are at least as great
today as they were when those comments were originally forvarded.
IV.
PROBLEMS
There are presently no known major problems facing the operation which would
affect either the security or the effectiveness of this
operation.
the security
problem facing the LICATIA portion of the operation and described in HMMA-15979
and subsequent renewal requests has 'beeh resolved by the Cuban Government's release
of three KURIOT personnel earlier this year.
As was noted previously, one of
this group had inowledge of the LICATIA operation.
Both SCANILING and GERANDE took the LOFLUTTER during the month of October
1963.
No security problems were revealed by this test.
V. PLANS
The Station considers that the project is operating at its optimum size and
does not plan to expand it during the coming year.
Efforts will be continued to
refine ana better utilize the existing project organization and to improve the
compartmentasion and security of the projact.
VI.
COSTS
A.
Past Project Year - Station recoras show thet. Project LEMPTY expended approx-
inately
sus 50,600.00 during Fy 1965 (1 December 1962 - 50 June 1963) end has
to date in FY 1964 (through 30 September 1963) expended sus 7,020e Aporoximatel:
is 10,300 will be epended dunths the last to monune or
the project year.
This trill make a
total expenaiture for the project year of about
sus 40,600 gi
sus 1,500 under that which was allotted fop this project.
B.
Net Project Year -
Of the total sus 19,700 budget, itemised below,
approxi
nately so 30,290 will be expended in bY 1904 and the reminder BUS 19,410 in
FY 1905-
SEGRET /
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AGENT SALARIES
(including X'mas bonuses)
Raymond. H. GERENDE
Oliver &. SCANTLING
Louise J. MACRINO
(at sus 2.02 per hour)
LIEMPTY- 5
(at US 1.75 per hour)
LIEMPTY-6
LIEMPTY-7
ITEMPTY-S
LIEMPTY-9
LIEMPTY-10
LIEMPTY-11
LIEMPTY-12
LIEMPTY-15
LIEMPTY-14
LIEMPTY-19
LIEMPTZ-24
SUB TORAL
DE PRATTONAL. EXPENSES
Transportation:
Mainsenance of MV-2279, My 2224,
MV 2236
SuS per year
FY 1964
6,000
5,500
no salary
2,400
1,000
3,700
no salary.
2,400
5,000.
4,400.
2,500
2,000
2, 000
2, 000
: 2,000
.. no salary
BuS 39,500
sus 24,340
FY 1965
SUS 15,150
2,000
220E
29.03
68
GORY 20.
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## Page 10
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VII.
VIII.
Operational Expenses.
Real Estete
Rent, utilities and maintenance
of basehouses -
JuS Per Year FY 1961
EX 1965
LIMITED"
LICATES*
3,300
1,700
1;200
LILYRIC
Procurement of safehouses, post
office boxes, and rental of
automobiles
500
Purchase of information, documents
and bribes
SUB TOTAL
500
9,200
5,390
3,610
Repair, maintenance and purchase of
replacement photographic equipment
and purchase of film
SUB TOTAI,
1,000
1,000
560
440
GRAND TOTAT,
sus 49,700
Sus 30,290
Sus 19,410
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
Energency recontact arrangements for Oliver G. SCANTLING and Raymond H.
GERENDE are on file in Headquarters (see HMM4 15982 of 25 November 1960 and
HMMA 15931 of 23 November 1960,)
For further information see project renewal
request. of 1900 forvarded by HIMA 15979;
PRAINDG
No trating, other than that withif the competency of SCANTLiNG or GRENDE
do cive, is anticipated for the coming project year.
NOTE:
LIMITED ind TICALLA rents are repured to Station by Intousnt and created
to LINESA escoence.
50-6-74/1
50-6-7411
CS.B0PY
6.8
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cf
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SEORET
REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY
(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)
COVER SHEET
CRYPTONYM
LIEMPTY
FIELD CASE OFFICER
Jeren
NARCO!
STATION
Mexico City
CHIEF OF STATION
Willard C.
CURTIS
The attached project action is presented for approval for the period
1 December 1962 through 30 November 1963.
tie Cle it itine it a 2. 163 2
CS COPY
G09CP 1
Excleded from astomalic
506-2411
PIcs 31 0f 68
COPY HO.
033/4
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## Page 12
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Review of Project LIEMPTY
(For the purpose of Project Renewal)
I. CURRENT OBJECTIVES AND PRODUCTION
A. Oliver G. SCANTLING Segment (discussed in relation to project
objectives):
1.
"To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK
personnel and physical facilities." SCANTLING has continued (see pre-
vious Project Reviews forwarded as attachments to HMMA-17999, 31
October 1961, HMMA-14093, 13 November 1959, and HMMA- 15979, 18
November 1960) to provide worthwhile information pertaining to this. ob-
jective.
During the past year SCANTLING has continued to be used ex-
tensively to follow up leads produced by LIFEAT and LIENVOY. An ex-
cellent example of this blending of various Station support assets was the
investigation and casing performed by SCANTLING after leads from both
LIENVOY ard LIFEAT indicated the possibility of launching a successful
technical operation against the residence of a high ranking LIMERICK
intelligence officer assigned to Mexico under diplomatic cover. With the
aid of the thorough casing report and neighborhood investigation completed
by SCANTLING, Station KURIOT personnel, supported by other Station
support assets, were successful in installing a technical device in the
target.
SCANTLING continues to be the Station's primary means of keeping
current records on the residences of the many Soviet personnel in Mexico
City. This is primarily accomplished through SCANTLING's follow up of
all LIENVOY leads which indicate interest by Soviets in specific quarters.
(See previous project renewal requests for additional details.)
"To collect operational information pertaining to other targets of
opportunity, foreign official installations and personnel of intelligence in-
terest operating: in Mexico": SCANTLING is very useful for collecting in-
formation on other Station targets:
On the basis of a lead from the ODACID installation in
Veracruz, the Station (with Headquarters support) mounted an
operation to unobtrusively sabotage a large unit of agricultural
machinery (ot U.S. origin) which was in transit to Cuba.
mount this operation, a precise and detailed casing ut the imple-
ment was essential.
This SCANTLING was able to accomplish in
one trip to Veracruz with resulis that contributed substangially to
the operation.
Excladed forg
50 -
2 05 88
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- 2 -
b. SCANTLING provided the Station a detailed investigation
of Harotun ("Harry") KOPOLAN, employee of American Communists
Albert and Margaret MALTZ, which
determined the residence
of KOPOLAN as well as his family status and connections.
c. In the Satellite area, SCANTLING completed a casing of
an otticial Yugoslav installation in conjunction with a projected
Station technical operation.
"To exploit operational leads through recruitments, debriefings,
and surveillances." SCANTLING has contributed to this objective both
directly and indirectly as noted in the following examples:
a. SCANTLING completed a detailed and secure interview of
the flancee of BESMOOTH to determine her connection with the
principals in the MCMAYFOWL case, particularly any connection
with procurement of documents used in the flight behind the Iron
This assignment was extremely sensitive (SCANTLING
was not told true reason for interview) and SCANTLING did an
admirable job while maintaining his cover for having the interview.
SCANTLING was called on for extensive initial spade work
in the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation,
usual competent performance despite the fact that the role assigned
him was unique to his experience.
c. SCANTLING performed one man surveillance of a sensitive
Station Soviet double agent which contributed significantly to that
operation.
d. SCANTLING was
used extensively during the visit of
GPIDEAL as part of the Station's effort in providing maximum
protection for the GPIDEAL party.
a..
In addition, SCANTLING performed numerous pretext and
neighborhood investigations, some of which were highly sensitive.
SCANTLING also does most of the local investigations requested by
ODACID and other ODYOKE components.
4. In addition to his contribucions to the above objectives, SCANTLING
is used for miscellaneous support requirements from the Station.
For example,
SCANTLING handled LIEMBROIL-2 until the return of LIMOTOR-14 in July
1962. SCANTLING is also used io spot and rent sate houses and apartments
for other Station operations.
SECIET
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5. As stated in the preceeding Requests for Project Renewal,
although SCANTLING's LIEMPTY Project objectives can never be com-
pletely fulfilled, it is the Station's opinion that SCANTLING has made
important and valuable contributions to LIEMPTY Project objectives
specifically and to other Station activities in general. SCANTLING's
production, measured against monetary expenditures, case officer time
and other intengible factors, unquestionably justifies his continuation
as an integral part of Project LIEMPTY.
B. Raymond H. GERENDE Segment (discussed in relation to project
objectives):
"To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK
personnel and physical facilities through use of photographic base houses."
Three photographic bases, LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA, contribute
to this objective.
To avoid repetition, the Station is omitting the usual
description of the functions of these three bases and how they contribute
to the above objective.
This was described in detail in the 1960 Request for
Project Renewal. (HMMA-15979)
"To collect operational information and identify operational
leads pertaining to Station targets of opportunity. " The LIENTRAP operation,
handled by GERENDE, is still the major contributor to this objective.
Among LIENTRAP's regular and extensive photographic assignments, was
the photo stakeout of prominent Mexican Communists (some of whom have
never been photographed previously by KUBARK) and Communist Party
Headquarters. During this assignment, LIENTRAP was able to cover
the recent move of PCM Headquarters (the first information Station had
of the move) and to continue photo surveillance at the new site.
"To provide operational support to Station operations,
rent hotel rooms and apartments, and conduct counter-surveillances.
GERENDE is used frequently to rent hotel rooms and apartments for other
Station operations and activities. GERENDE's comprehensive area
knowledge and personal operational capabilities combine to make him an
extremely valuable Sation asset for such support activities. GERENDE
also procures and services post office box letter drops for the many
Station operations requiring them.
SEGRET
690:P
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4. The quality and quantity of operational information produced
by the photographic bases and other activities under GERENDE s control
and supervision is considered worthwhile and in some cases unique.
Station concludes, therefore, that this segment of the LIEMPTY Project
should be continued.
C. Relationship to Related Mission Directive Objectives:
As stated in previous project renewals, it can readily be noted that
Project LIEMPTY has provided support to many Station operations and in
this manner has been a contributing factor to the furtherance of the Related
Mission Directive. The project has not produced any positive intelligence
nor has it been intended that it should do so. The project's sole purpose
• is to provide a mechanism for the development of operational information
in support of other Station operations.
IL. CHANGES
There have been no changes in the LIEMPTY Project during the
past project year affecting either objectives or personnel.
III. EFFECTIVENESS
There has been no change in Project LIEMPTY which would alter
the validity of the remarks made in Section III of 1960 project renewal re-
quest (HMMA 15979)
IV. PROBLEMS
The security problem in connection with the LICALLA operation,
which was described in 1960 renewal request, is still present but has
caused no known difficulty. At Headquarters suggestion in HMMW HMMW-9736, the
LICALLA base was reactivated on 29 May 1961.
The base operator Con-
tinues to be alert for any unusual incidents which might indicate that the
base has been compromised.
v.
PLANS
The Scation considers that the project is operating at its optimum
size and does not plan to expand it during the coming year. Efforts will
be continued to refine and better utilize the existing project organizational
arrangements.
As in the past, the Station will continue its efforts to
improve the compartmentation an security of the project.
Exclucar.tr.
CO217:
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VI. COSTS
A. Past Project Year - Station finance records indicate that Project
LIEMPTY expended approximately $26, 250 during Fiscal Year 1962
(1 December 1961 - 30 June 1962) and has thus far during Fiscal Year
1963 (through 30 September 1962) expended about $7, 000.00. It is
anticipated that about $8, 000. 00 will be expended during the last two
months (October and November 1962) of the project year.
This will
make a total expenditure during the project year of about $43, 250, or
$6, 250. 00 under the budget estimate of $49, 500. 00.
B. Next. Project Year - Of the total $49, 900.00 budget, itemized below,
• approximately $30, 400.00 should be expended during the remainder of
Fiscal Year 1963 and the balance, $19, 500. 00 should be expended during
Fiscal Year 1964. Normal accounting procedures will be used for all ex-
penditures.
AGENT SALARIES
$US Per Annum FY 1963
(Includes Christmas bonus
1962)
FY 1964
Raymond H, GERENDE
Oliver G. SCANTLING
Louise J. MACRINO
(at SUS 2,02 per hour)
LIEMPTY-4
LIEMPTY-5
(at $US 1.75 per hour)
LIEMPTY-6
LIEMPTY-7 (no salary)
LIEMPTY-8
LIEMPTY-9
LIEMPTY-10-
LIEMPTY-11
LIEMPTY-12
LIEMPTY- 13
LIENPTY-14
LIEMPTY- 19
LIEMPTY-24 (no salary)
$ 6, 000.00
5, 500. 00
500.00
2, 400. 00
1, 000. 00
3, 500.00
2, 200.00
3, 200.00
4, 200.00
2, 900. 00
2, 200.00
2, 200.00
2,
200.00
1, 000.00
SUB TOTAL
$39,000.00
$24, 000.00
$15, 000.00
GAUT
donagracie:
36
PAGE
COEX NO.
---
## Page 17
14-00000
- 6 -
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES
$US per annum
FY 1963
FY 1964
Transportation:
Maintenance of MV 2279,
MV 2284, and 2236
Real Estate:
Rent, utilities, and
maintenance safehouses
2, 000.00
*LIMITED
*LICALLA
LILYRIC
3, 300.00
1, 700. 00
1, 200.00
Procurement of safehouses,
post office boxes, and renting
of automobiles
1, 000.00
Purchase of information, iden-
tification documents, and bribes 500.00
SUB TOTAL $9,700.00
OPERATIONAL. EQUIPMENT
Repair, maintenance and pur-
chase of replacement photographic
equipment and purchase film
1, 200.00
SUB TOTAL $ 1, 200.00
GRAND TOTAL $49, 900.00
(per project year)
$5, 700.00
$4, 000.00
$ 700.00
$
500.00
$30, 400.00
$19, 500.00
(FY 1963)
(FY 1904)
NOTE: LIVITED and LICALLA rents are returned to Station by LIMOUSINE
and credited to miscellaneous receipts.)
5E0
# ON. 848.N4 - 2.000.1"2.
1S 0978
50-6-2411
canard dir
declessified..
6 8
PAGE
COPY
INDe
---
## Page 18
14-00000
-7.
VIL. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
Emergency recontact arrangements for Oliver G. SCANTLING and
Raymond H. GERENDE are on file in Headquarters (See HMMA 15982 of 23
November 1960 and HMMA 15981 of 23 November 1950.) For further infor-
mation see project renewal request of 1960 forwarded by HMMA 15979.
VIII.
TRAINING
No training, other than that within the competency of SCANTLING
or GERENDE to give, is anticipated for the coming project year.
2.572037
2a1
557-6.74/1
PACE 38 01 88
COFY NO.
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 104-10217-10172.pdf | 104-10217-10172 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 11/3/64 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | DIRECTOR | JMWAVE | SUBJECT: IMMINENT DEPARTURE OF PERSONNEL TO JOIN ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO AND POSSIBLE SCHEDULE OF NOVEMBER/DECEMBER ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES. | 3 | CIA | JFK | 03/16/2018 | JFK64-52 : F16 : 20040315-1058079 : | 3 | ## Page 1
104-10217-10172
REFC... NO.
REPORT COVER SHEET
SP_CRET
UFG
DATE OF REPORT
3 November 1964
JHWAVE
REPORTING OFFICER
Charles
REPORTS OFFICER
ME IS RCER, Francis De
RD. NO.
RACHFIELD
largaret Re
NANA E*/29p
Visit for
ICE CR.
Andrew
K.
BACKGROUNU DATA AND COMMENTS:
TYPIC
Source:
AMRAZZ-1 (paras. 1 - 3) and AMLAMs-1 (paras. 4 - 6) •
RID: Please inde%®
GROUP I: EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
TUNI
REPORTS
NOV 3 - 19610
MICROFILMED
NOV 1 6 1964
DOC, MICRO. SER.
Guesty
OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANTING REPORT
DISTRIBUTION
DITRA-AGENCY
INTRA-AGENCY
• • Has.
00/C
JHIBARR
Miami Reps:
1
• State
1
— FBI
IT oUT Poluck
COUNTRY
NO. OF ENCLOSURIS
70S RA COPY
RIFERENCES
PADA
DOI
SECRET
но. плак
1467
PRIMOUS
CONTIOP.
CS CCPY
201-269349
(80)
25-775
---
## Page 2
FIELD INFORMATION REPORT
GRADING OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable
#. Usually raliable.
to sources of doublut henauty de loyaly, regardless of mom compeierce!.
& Fairly relable.
lesied sourcesi.
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT
talso
6: Cannor be fudged.
1. Controd by aster independent and reliabio sourcen 2. Probably tras. 3. Possibly trud, 8. Doubiful, 3, Probably
CONPIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEN
REPORT N59
DATE OF REPORT 3 lovember 1964
NO. PAGES
₴
REFERENCES
20
COUNTRYCuba
SUBECT OIanizent Departure of Personnel to
Join Eloy Gutlertez Menoyo and
Possible Schedle of Novemberl
Docember Ant1-Castro Activitien 7P
DATE Of 8 - 21 Detober 1964
PLACE &
-M 6131
THIS IS UVEVALUATES
"FCINAT ON SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEF.NIT.Vi. AFPFA SAL OF COSTELY iS TESTATICE
SOURCE:
See below.
Bource of Paras. 1 - 3: A Cuban exile with excellent contacts
Movement of the People).
than & your on the activities of this organization and 1t8
nI11l1ates and on exile politienl developmente in general.
R201-245÷1
1. On 20 October 1984,
Y Aurollo Nazarlo Sargent,
leading official of
the Segundo Frente Facional del Iscumbray (SYNT, Second National
Bront of the Racambray, said that a written message had been
received that morning froi Eloyl untierrer
Honoyo, SINg allitary
each vere soon to join him.
Two of these mon would be Orlando
Martiner and lector Gallardo, both members of the Moviaiento
Revolucionario del Pueblo (IRP, Revolutiomary Morement of the People)
residing in Hlant.
Gutierrez said that he had to face sone unexpected
problens such as
the sinking of one of his boats and the high coat
of operations, but that he hoped to be in Cuba shortly.
Inzario said that he ms sure that Gutierrez was not in Santo
Domingo, but he did not deny that Gutierrez night be on a small
key near the Dominican Repabl lose, 201
On 21 October ReinaldovAbreufPores said that he had received the
message iron cutierres on the previong day and that he us sure
that Gutterres had already been inside Cub, paving the way for a
future uprising
According to Abreu, Gutierres will make no definite
nove until aiter the United States elections becnuse he does not
unt to embarrass the present adinistration in Washington. Abren
said that Gutierrez is sure that the United States will help the
people inside Cuba wen the uprising begins.
CONPIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSE
Eachested theres antonest
DISTRIBUTION
GS COPY
NOS NI COPY
201-269349
....
---
## Page 3
• CONTIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEN
80. . 463)
Bource of Paras. 4 - 6: An educated Cuban exile who is active
In soveral emigre political organizations, source is a fairly
rellable reporter of political naneuvers among Cuban exiles.
The Infornation was obtained from Aurello Nazario Sargent.
4• As of 6 October Nazario said that the SFHE had received some bad
news about the activitios of Gutierrez.
ke said that the infiltra-
tion into Cuba of the second group of trained men, which ms to
include the guerrilla chiefs, had been paralyzed bocause of accidents
to the boats.
Gutterrez suffered the loss of two boats during the
last hurricane, a snall boat and a largo one which had cost more
than $10,000.
According to Nazario, Gutierroz had to suspend the
purchase
of weapons in order to apply that mone, to the repair of
the boats and to the needs of the men at the keys and other places.
Several brondcast centers had also suffered damage because of the
bad wonther.
So lazarto sald that the colloction of money had been smaller, but
that efforts were being made to maintain their operations
wore scheduled to take place in Cuba in November and December
during the sugar season.
7201 _ 254188
General of the SINk, had been considered successful
publicity, but unsuccessful in rogard to linances and official
relations with representatives of the foreign governments.
IS C0zt
ONPIDENTIAI
ONTROLLED DISSE
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 104-10178-10117.pdf | 104-10178-10117 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 04/22/1968 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | WITHHELD | WITHHELD | CABLE- LOCAL PANAMANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE DETAINED TWO AMERICANS WHO TRAVELLED FROM SAN JOSE TO PANAMA CITY. | 3 | CIA | JFK | 03/16/2018 | JFK64-14 : F21 : 1998.03.07.11:25:49:920108 : OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP ATTACHED. | 3 | ## Page 1
104-10178-10117
TO
SENTER WILL CHECK CLAS
NELESIFIED
COSFIDETIL
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
SECRET
INITIALS
1N-95853
I ACTION
APPROvAL
COMMENT
CONCURRENCE
DIRECT REPLY
DISPATEN
file
INFORMATION
"PREPARE REPLY
RSCOMMENDATION
RETURN
SIGNATURE
Hemarks:
Passed by seeive
phone to FBI
Dity Office by 1580
at 1830 m 22 Apn168
at request of 7.030
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SERGER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PIONE NO
DATE
1076 a 237
UNCLASSIFIED
Be previous editiens
COXFIDESTIAL
SECRET
(40)
---
## Page 2
14-00000
CARLE SECRETARIA" DISSENINATION
ADVAACA COM
TOTes COmes 3 1
15.31
SBC+8
профе, pa
(Whanf.lled Ins
HEFHOQUCTION DE TAIS CONY PROM-BITEO
CLASHION TO PILE NO
#-HE® TO PILE 1O.-
DISEEN 8Y
PROCEDENCE
•a 1412. (35A
BRANCHO
orernor One.
I no com
ADE DDI, CSDO,
66150
6158
SE GRE I 2222142 APR 68 CITE
22 / Sô L S5353
INMEDIATE
INFO PRIORITY DIRECtOR
Lo LOCAL PANAMAVIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE WETAINED TWO AMERICANS WHO
TRAVELLED FROM SAN JOSE TO PANAMA CITY VIA PANAMERICAN HIGHWAY
ACCORDING TO PANAMANIAN AUTHORITIES THEY WERE TIPPEU OFF BY COSTA
RICAN AUTHORITIES THAT THE INO AMERICANS MERE IOUVE IN THE ASSASSE-!
NATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING. PAVAMANIAN AUPIDRITIES DO NOF KNOW
BASES FOR COSIA RICAN SUSPICIONS, AND LATTER HAVE NOT ANSWERED QUERIES.
CAN YOU INGUIRE FROM YOUR LIAISON CONTACIS AS REASON"WHY COSTA
RICÄNS
SUSPECT THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS? ANSWER BY INNEDIATE PRECEDENCE CABLE®
2. AMERICANS ARE MR
DPOS; 17 JULY 1944, NEW YORK.
PASSPORT J085474 ISSUED 29 JANUARY 1968. HOME ADDRESS: 30 LARRY'S
LANE, PLEASANTVILLE, NEW YORK, SPASSPORT PICTUR SHOWS NO RESENALANCE
TO KING ASSASSIN®›
DOUGLAS HARRY HULBARD, PASSPORT NO. 330926• ACCORDING 7O
PANAMANIAN
WOLMAN IS JUST A XIU AND HULBARD IS A FORNER SOLDIER
STATIONED IN PANAÑA WHO WAS RETURNING TO PANAMA TO MARRY A GIRL HE
MET HERE. THE PAIR WERE TRAVELING IN A CHEVROLET LICENSE PLATE 23GM19S
MOTOR NO. 13-387-13-113711. NEITHER THE YEAR OF THS AUTO NOR THE STATE
OF ISSUANCE OF THE LICENSE PLATE WERE NOTED IN THE
REPORI®
16-15
RECORD COPY
2200: 4810-95402
SB0S.7
101-0832132
'RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
6IBR
---
## Page 3
14-00000
CARLE SECRETARIAT DIASESIN
PESTOS SSOOTUTOTNOTPI6O
CLA$SI6.dO N'ESEAGE
S3e.
20.21
1 (When filadA)
REPROOUCTOS DE THIS COM ARTIR "IS
BLOTPEO
ATI
CHROSITO TO FILE NO.
A-REA TO FUE AO.
mo.com
P06.R.
vos.
PAGE TWO PANAMA CITY GISO SE CRET
ACCORDING TO WOLMAN°S PASSPORI HE ENTERED AND DEPARTED EL SALVADOR
AND HONDURAS ON 17 APRIL, NICARAGUA IS APRIL AND PASO DE CANDA PANAMA.
10 APRIL. NO EVIDENCE FROM PASSPORT TRIT WOLMAN TRANSIITED
COSTA RICA.
SECRET
BT
100, 209
8. 109
N5 10
FOR TANG
2a Copie. 68
51- 0532932
23en8
'':"
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32307988.pdf | 124-10293-10346 | 12/15/2017 | In Part | FBI | 9/11/67 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-6054-2110 | DIRECTOR, FBI | DOERNER, FRED W. JR. | 33 | FBI | HQ | 11/30/2017 | RPT, TABLE OF CONTENT PAGE 2, INDEX PAGES 22-25 | null | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
5/19/201
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER:
124-10293-10346
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
92-6054-2110
"wer
ORIGINATOR:
FBI
FROM:
DOERNER, FRED W. JR.
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
Released andes bre dear
Kennes:
222503228 203 25 4332
144 T80 2007 K23e1.
=-20-2015
Document Information
DATE: 09/11/1967
'PAGES:
33
SUBJECTS :
LCN, MEMBERS, ASSOC, MM, OPEN CITY, ORGANIZATION,
LEADERSHIP, CRIMINAL ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 4; 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/21/1999
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF IRS
COMMENTS:
RPT, TABLE OF CONTENT PAGE 2, INDEX PAGES 22-25
v9.1
NW 45839 DocId: 32307988 Page 1
17
---
## Page 2
MM 92-853
One copy each of this report is being furnished
the Jacksonville and Tampa Offices
for information in view
of their proximity to the Miami Office.
MIAMI
AT MIAMI, FLORIDA
Will continue to follow the activities of ICN
members
and their associates in the Miami territory.
ADMINISTRATIVE :
This report represents the joint efforts of the
following Special Agents:!'
SAS H, WAYNE SWINNEY, Supervisor; BENJAMIN O. CANTEY,
PETER C. CLEMENTE, ROBERT A, COOK, FRED " DIETAM I. HEIST,
PATRICK E, FARRELL, WENDELL W. HALL, JR..
RALPH R. HILL, JR.,
EDWIN. J. SHARP,
"FRANK J. SMITH, and
ALLAN M. TRANKLEY.
INFORMANTS:
IDENTITY
MM T-6 is MM 509-C-TE
MM T-13 is NY 204-C
MM T-15 is MM 725-C
MM T-33 is DE 370-C-TE
MM T-88 is NY 3864-C-TE
MM T-89 is NY 3461-C-TE
MM T-90 is CV 421-C-TE
LOCATION OF INFORMATION
IN MIAMI FILES
92-417-127, 139, 256
92-853-11, page 102
92-404-663, page 2
92-122-756
92-417-54, page 18
92-1093-13, page 8
92-1014-58, page 2
92-403-417
92-466-21, page 56; 74
92-466-30,
page 7
92-1572-16, page 8 and 9
B
COVER PAGE
NW 45839 DooId: 32307988
Page 2
---
## Page 3
MM 92-853
IDENTITY
LOCATION OF. INFORMATION
IN MIAMI FILES
MM T-91 is CV. 553-C-TE
92-466-21
92-1572-8,
,92-403-417
10
MM T-98 is MM 984-C-TE
MM T-119 is NY 5042-C-TE
MM T-120 is AL 2919-C-TE
MM T-121 is MM 1091-PC
MM T-122 is NY 5542-C-TE
MM T-134 is MM 1153-PC
MM T-135 is MM 1231-C-TE
92-1056-39,
48,
53,
92-1354-93
92-1547-27; 29
92-98-488, page 5
92-1354-84, page 11
92-417-181
137-3774-7
MM T-136 is MM 1231-C-TE
92-1547-229
137-4138-9
(Same)
(Same)
MM T-137 is MM 1231-C-TE
This sensitive informant has been assigned three
temporary symbol numbers in order to protect better the
identity.
of this extremely valuable informant - source
MM T-138 is MM 867-C
137-2690-311
MM T-139 is PCI
MM T-140 is MM 1203-C
92-417-252
92-1093-331, page 3;
345, page 2
MM T-141 is WILLIAM KLEPPIC.
Intelligence Agent,
Internal
Revenue Service,
Miami, Florida
(Nature
of position)
92-648-924, page B
REVIEWED BY FEWJFK TASY, FORCE
ON
D
1/22/98 9m
RELEASE IN FALL
PELEASE IN PART
TOTAL DEANAL
C
COVER PAGE
JFK Act 6 (4)
62, 67
45839 DocId: 32307988
Page 3
---
## Page 4
/JEK Act 6 (4)
MM 92-853
IDENTITY
MM T-142 is PCI
MM T-143
is MM 1209-C
MM T-144 is NY 4609-C-TE
LOCATION OF INFORMATION
IN MIAMI FILES
92-404-663, page 2
92-1056-85
92-1056-83
D*
COVER PAGE
NW 45839 DocId: 32307988 Page 4
---
## Page 5
MM 92-853
VINCENT PALMISANO is presently confined in the
Federal Prison Camp at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. He
was convicted in 1966 for violating the Hobbs Act and was
sentenced to serve 18 months.
Prior to his incarceration,
PALMISANO was reported to be
involved in extortion and
gambling activities in the Miami area.
THOMAS LUCHESE FAMILY
MM T-98 advised on May 1, 1966, that he had
heard that PHILIP FALCO and ETTORE COCO are acting
together in the handling of lay off action for local
bookmakers.
On an earlier date, March 30, 1966, the
informant advised that he had been told that COCO was
taking sizable lay off action from some bookmakers,
On November 22, 1966, MM T-98 alleged that COCO
has one LOUIS NASH shylocking
some of his money for him.
On March 9, 1967, MM T-98 stated that COCO is
enjoying a good shylock business through various "fronts".
Coco allegedly supplies the money to his "fronts" and then
shares the profits obtained.
On July 31, 1967, the same informant stated that
COCo was continuing his shylocking activities.
VITO GENOVESE FAMILY
MM T-141 stated on. May. 4. 1967, that
'JEK Law 11(a)
It is recalled that ERRA was incarcerated from
March 4, 1966 to September 23, 1966, on an income tax
charge.
He acted as manager
and host at Dean Martin's
Restaurant, 79th Street Causeway,
Miami Beach, from December,
1966 to May, 1967•
he was forced
out of this employment by
the Florida
Beverage. Control Board because,
he, as a convicted
felon, was not permitted to hold employment ir
an establishment
which sold intoxicants.
-17-
92-6054-2110
NW 45839 DooId: 32307908 Page 5
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32241845.pdf | 180-10065-10379 | 10/26/2017 | In Full | HSCA | 05/15/1978 | SUMMARY | 008894 | 413 | USSS | NUMBERED FILES | 5/3/17 | Continues for two more folders after this one. Box 161. | 413 | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
10/14/20
AGENCY :
RECORD NUMBER :
HSCA
180-10065-10379
RECORD SERIES:
NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
008894
Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Recorde
Collection Act of 1992
144 USe 2107 Notel.
Cased:MM 54046 Date:
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
USSS
DATE: 05/15/1978
PAGES:
413
SUBJECTS :
USSS, FILES
DOCUMENT TYPE :
SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION :
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
5
CURRENT STATUS :
Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
04/29/1996
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS :
Continues for two more folders after this one. Box 161.
v9.1
HN 54046
DooId: 32241845
Page
---
## Page 2
MEMORANDUM FOR JEK TASK FORCE
008890
TO: Document file
FROM: Eileen Dinneen
DATE: 5/15/78
RE:
Secret Service Protective Cases
period covering March - December, 1963.
established for the
Upon Team IV's request for all files involving potential
threats
to President Kennedy's safety, 413 computer print outs
were released for review.
These print outs referred to files
established for the months March - December, 1963.
A form was
created to best summarize. the material found in the print outs.
The following 413 sheets are a compendium of the computer
materials.
14 54046
DocId: 32241845
Page 2
---
## Page 3
MEMORANDUM
TO:: Lee Matthews
FROM:
DATE:
Eileen
Dinneen
June
21, 1978
RE :
Secret Service cases established in 1963 involving assassinations
In reviewing the 413 computer print outs on Protective Research
cases set up during the time period between March and December, 1963,
it became evident that the Secret Service paid some attention to
foreign assassinations.
Case #401 on Thelma Estella King was refer-
red to the Service by the CIA on 3/8/63. Ms. King was alleged to be
involved in an assassination plot against JFK and the President of
Panama during a meeting in that country. She was reportedly involved
in the assassination of former President Ramon of Panama and in a
plot to overthrow the government of Panama under President Robles.
Case #407
pertains to Chy Song, a military bodyguard to the Laotian
foreign minister in 1963. On 4/1/64, Song assassinated Quinim
Pholsena with 18 shots from his machine gun. Apparently the assas-
sination was well planned
as the other bodyguards did not react to
the firing.
The assassin's fate was listed as unknown. Case #409
involves Mohamed Khalifa, who on 4/11/63 mortally wounded his long
time friend, foreign minister of Algeria, by shooting him in the
The chauffer captured the subject but his final disposition
was given as unknown.
The above three cases show definite Secret Service interest in
foreign affairs.
However, it is questionable as to why the Diem
brothers' assassination was not given a case number.
files showed no mention, whatsoever, of the assassination occurring
in Viet Nam prior to the planned Chicago trip of Kennedy on November
2, 1963.
74 54046 DooId:32241845
Page
3
---
## Page 4
1
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
PEREZ-VEGA, VIRGILIO
Reason for PRS interest: _FBI referred subject to USSS in 1963 de
scribing him as
a pro-castro Puerto Rican, in possession of an auto-
matic pistol and a knowledge of how to make bombs. Admits to being
Secretary in July 26 movement. Left 1961 since he did not like mem-
bers:
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Puerto Rican Nationalists PRN
Member of July 26 Movement in Washington, D. C
Nationalistic group: - Puerto Rican
•Date called to Secret Service attention: 12-16-63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
F.B.1.
Action taken:
Put under observation. Showed no interest in President during in-
augural, 1965. SA interviewed subject during surveillance on 1/19/65
and subject vioced no animosities toward President. Considered not
dangerous 2/24/67. Has continued writing letters to political figures.
PrisentLocation: Silver Spring, Md.
Washington
Field Office:
Last UPD: 3/4/77
54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 4
---
## Page 5
2
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DIAZ-DIAZ, ANGEL RAMON
Reason for
• PRS interest: Subject known to S.S. since 1950 because
of his involvement in the revolt on 10/30/50 at Arecibe. PR where
four police officers were killed. Rec'd Governor's pardon 12/68.
Committed to mental hospital 1969 after arrested for auto theft.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
Puerto Rican Nationalist
_ PRN
Joined NPPR & Maniqua, 1948. Manigua was "suicide squad" for NPPR
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
1950/ 12/23/63 report
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
SA opinion subject is of protective interest due to mental condi-
tion and propensity for violence together with association with
independence seeking groups. OIs discont. 1970.
Location of subject: Puerto Rico
Field office:
San
Juan
Last UPD: 3/8/75
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 5
---
## Page 6
3
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
RENTAS-RODRIGUEZ, Genaro
Reason for PRS interest: _FBI report 4/30/62 id subject as member
of board of directors of the March 21 Partido Socialista Puertor-
riqueno (PSP) Mission. Subject denied favoring use of force to
obtain PR independence. in 1963 stated "we are awaiting an inare-
dient which is needed to make time bombs explode". In 1968, not
considered to be of PRS interest. Discarded from PSP in 2/77 due
to mishandling 76 election campaign.
Knowledge of explosives.
"Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
PSP - shown above
Nationalistic group:
- Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/19/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
FBI kept check, informed S.S. Determined to be not of pRs interest
177
Subject's location: Ponce, Puerto Rico
Field office: San Juan
Last UPD: 1-18-78
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 6
---
## Page 7
4
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual: PIETRI-CASTELLON, NORMAN
Reason for PRS interest: Of record since 4/59 when President of
Federacion de Universitarios pro Independencia (FUPI). In 1963,
Secretary of PSP. 1/64 Secretary of Propaganda.
Degree
of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
FUPI, Partido Socialista Puertorriqueno (PSP), Partido Indepen-
dentista Puertorriqueno (PIP), member of "Comite Timon" of Movi-
mento socialista Popular (MSP), and delegate to World Peace Council
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/59
- 12/19/63 report
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Put on file in 1963. No action shown until 1974 when last UPD
subject's location: Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico
Field Office:
San
Juan
Last UPD: 12/13/74
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 7
---
## Page 8
5
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_PEREZ-MENDEZ, JUAN BAUTISTA
Reason for PRS interest: Subject of record since 7/52; active in
the Partido Comunista Puertorriqueno (PCP) since 1946. In 4/60
subject was in Cuba. In 1961, subject active in Partido socialista
Puertorriqueno (PSP)
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which irdividual. belongs:
3
PCP - Communist; PSP - socialist; and POL (Partido Obrero Liberador)
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
•Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by
other agency?
NO
YES
'Action taken:
general up dating
Entered hospital in Moscow 2173 for several months
7/52
-12/17/63 report
non mentioned
subject's location:
Field Office: San Juan
Last UPD: 3/22/75
'68
Santurce, Puerto Rico
NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 8
---
## Page 9
6
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name
of individual:
GUZMAN-COLON, JOSE
Reason for PRS interest: On 12/12/63 told VA psychiatrist that
"if you do something bad like assassination you gotta do it bia.
Oswald's name will go down in history." Has two rifles and wants
telescopic sight. Has urges to harm people. Feelings of perse-
cution.
Degree of threat:
1
2
organizations to which individual belongs:
Puerto Rican Nationalist
3
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/24/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
?
VA hospital?
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/29/64; considered potentially dangerous by SA.
QI's conducted from 1/6/64 to 10/29/65.
Diagnosed schizophrenic paranoid. Considered dangerous by doctor.
subject's last location:
Field Office: NY
Last UPD: 11/5/71
Freeport, NY
HW 54046 DocId: 3224184) Page 9
---
## Page 10
7
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual: Rabell-Martinez, Narciso
Reason for PRS interest: In 1960 wrote letter to President pra-
testing "interference in Puerto Rican internal affairs." Traveled
to Cuba, Russia, Communist China, North Vietnam and Algiers.
Urged Puerto Ricans "to take to the streets with violence on 7/23,
the day of the plebiscite."
•Degree of threat:
1
3
¡Oiganizations to which individual belongs:
PSP - socialist; FUPI (Federation of Universities for Indep)
MIRA (Movimiento Independentista Revolucionario en Armas; PSO
PSR and
established Frente Unido Anti-Represive (FUAR)
Nationalistic group: - Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention: 1960 - 12/19/63 report
Refered by other agency?. NO
YES
'Action taken:
Close check on movements kept. Noted for use of explosives.
Trained in firearms. Lived in Czech from 1961-65
Last location: Bayamon, Puerto Rica
Field Office: San Juan
Last UPD: 11/19/75
'75
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 10
---
## Page 11
8
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_RUA-RULLAN, PEDRO JUAN
Reason for PRS interest: Member of Puerto Rican nationalistic
groups.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations
to which individual belorgs:
3
PSP - socialist; FUPI (Federation of Universities for Independence)
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
1962?
- 12/20/63 report
Refered by other agency?
_NO
YES
Action taken:
Check kept of his movements; noted that on 6/3/67 in a protest
demonstration in NY against LBJ, subject reportedly stated:
"Johnson should be executed." s.s. investigation revealed subject
was. potentially dangerous though not known to have been violent.
QI's initiated 9119/67. & discont. 2125/70
Last location:
Rio Piedras, PR
Field Office:
San Juan
Last UPD: 3/28/75
NH: 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 11•
---
## Page 12
9
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
AGUDO-HERNANDEZ, ANGEL LUIS?
Reason for PRS interest: Sübject participated in pickets against
JFK in 1961. Allegedly trained in guerrilla tactics & sabotage.
Considered very dangerous by those who know him. Has visited USA
& Cuba. Considered armed and dangerous.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
President of Partido Socialista Puertorriqueno (PSP) in 12/74
PRN
MPIPR
BOMB (Listed as seen)
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
1961
12/12/63 report
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
QI's initiated 11/24/67; discont. 11/24/71
'75
Last location:
Aguado, PR
Field Office: San Juan
Last UPD: 8/6/75
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 12
---
## Page 13
10
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
GONZALEZ-CLAUDIO AVELINO
Reason for
• PRS interest:
Member of Federacion de Universitarios
Pro Independincia (FUPI) since 1963. FUPI VP in 1964. 2/12/64
participated in Anti-Dominican Rep. demonstration. Also attended
PSP meetings in 1965. In 1970 subject reportedly head of NY. City
cell of Movimiento Independencia Revolucionario en Armas (MIRA):
and believed responsible for several bombings in the area.
'Degree
of threat: 1
2
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
MIRA
NPPR
FUPI
3
PSP
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Field office kept tabs
12-27-63
76
Last location: unknown
Field Office: San Juan
Last UPD: 4/2175
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Paue 13
---
## Page 14
11
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
OJEDA-REYES, FELIX
Reason for PRS interest: -
1961 member of Federacion de Univer-
sitarios Pro Independencia (FUPI); also attended meetings of Par-
tido Socialista Puertorriqueno (PSP) and Accion Patriotica
Unitaria (APU). In 1962 FUPI Secretary General. Participated
in 12/15/61 picket of La Fortaleza during visit of JFK. Traveled
to Czech and Cuba 11/63. Resigned from FUPI in 1963.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
FUPI
PSP
APU
3
Nationalistic group: - Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
1961?/ 12/19/63 report
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
•Action taken:
Field office kept tabs. Noted that subject suffered nervous
breakdown in 8/63 and confined for psychiatric care.
• 75
Last location:
San Juan
Field Office: San Juan
Last UPD: 7/24/74
-HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 14
---
## Page 15
12
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
JACA-HERNANDEZ, JUAN
Reason for PRS interest: -
Active member of Partido Nacionalista
Puertorriqueno (NPPR) since 1947; leader in 10-50 Puerto Rican
revolt. Sentenced to total of 4 life sentences for involvement.
Has had guns in the past.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individal belongs:
NPPR
3- (due to jail)
Nationalistic group:_ black Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/23/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Following pardon subject reassociated self with NPPR. DI's
initiated 2/5/69; discont. 2/25/70.
'70
Last location:
Rio Piedras, PR
Field Office: San Juan
Last UPD: 4/2/75
NW 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 15
---
## Page 16
13
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
TRILLA-MARTINEZ, REYNALDO
Reason for PRS interest:
12/24/63 referred by FBI as subject
has been described as staunch inherent of the Nationalist Party
of Puerto Rico (NPPR) since 1945.
subject advocated overthrow of
PR govt. and complete break with US. Extensive arrest record; in
1955 arrested by Mex. authorities prior to visit of VP Nixon. FBI
reports 1/11/63-1122165 id subject as supporter of Partido Nacion-
alista Puertorriqueno (NPPR) and now resides in Havanna, Cuba.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
PRN
NPPR
Nationalistic group: Puerto Rican
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/24/63
Refered by
other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
subject never interviewed by S.S. and has not made any threatening
or derogatory remarks directed to protectees öf s.s. File consists
of 3 FBI reports, last dated 2/22/65.
File destroyed 7/26/74.
NO Secret Service investigation.
subj. had been arrested for carrying dangerous weapons by PR in 1948-
1952.
Last location:
65
Havana, Cuba
Field Office: Prot. Intel
Last UPD: 7126/74
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 16
---
## Page 17
14
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MELENDEZ-PEREZ, GERTRUDIS
Member of Partido Comunista Puertor-
Reason for PRS interest:
riqueno. (PCP) since 4/50. In 6/60 subj. was Treasurer of PCP.
In 1962-3 subject attended meetings of Partido Socialista Puertor-
riqueno (PSP). In 12/64 she was financial secretary of Partido
Obrero Liberador (POL) and attended POL meeting in Helsinki, 1965.
Degree of threat:
1
2
organizations to which individral belongs:
P.C.P :
POL. iS PCP
3
Nationalistic group: - Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
Action taken:
Tabs kept by S.S.
YES
12/19/63
'75
Last location:
santurce, PR
Field office: San Juan
Last UPD: 8/6/75
NN 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 17
---
## Page 18
15
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
RODRIGUEZ-SANTIAGO, JOSE NEFTALI
Reason for PRS interest:
Member of Partido Socialista Puertor-
riqueno (PSP); Director of Mission in Mayaguez. 6/64 participated
in demonstration at White House.
In 1960 subject picketed Eisen-
hower. Described as fanatic capable of violence, advocated use:
of firearms to obtain independence; has been reported as providing
arms to other members in PSP.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
3
PSP
Nationalistic group: Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
1960? /
12/20/63 report
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
5/68 subject became very active in Anti-American and Independendist
activities. QI's were initiated on 8/1/67 and discont. 2/25/70.
Is still active in Mayaguez PSP.
'75
Last location:
Ponce, PR
Field Office: San Juan
Last UPD: 4/4/75
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 18
---
## Page 19
16
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DIAZ-DIAZ, BERNARDO
Reason for PRS interest: -
Since 1930 subject admitted member of
Partido Nacionalista Puertorriqueno (NPPR); arrested in connection
with 10-30-50 uprising; sentence of life imprisónment. Pardoned
1972.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
NPPR
3. (in jail)
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
S.S. Kept tabs
12-20-63
Last location: unknown
Field office: San Juan
Last UPD: 4/7/75
76
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 19
---
## Page 20
17
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
RODRIGUEZ-NUNEZ, MANUEL
Reason for PRS interest: -
Since 1940 member of Partido Nacionalista
Puertorriqueno (NPPR). Allegedly. in 1950 uprising, possessed 2
pistols at time of arrest. In 1960 allegedly sellina firearms to
NPPR members. In 1962 attended leadership seminar of Partido
Socialista Puertorriqueno (PSP).
"Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
NPPR
3
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/20/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES?
FBI
Action taken:
In 1965 reportedly planned to set time bombs during election in PR.
QI's initiated 3/10/66; discont. 7120/68
Last location: San Sebastian, PR
1973
Field Office: San Juan
Last UPD: 4/7/75
WH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 20
---
## Page 21
18
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name
of individual:
VIVES-VAZQUEZ, JULIO
Reason for PRS interest: 6/13/63 FBI reported subject was
president of Partido Socialista Puertorriqueno (PSP). Elected
to PSP National Council 12/1/63. Traveled to Cuba in 1971.
Traveled to Cuba, Chile, and Korea in 1972. Possibly in Com-
munist China at time of Presidential visited 2/72.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
PSP
3
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
FBI and S.S. kept tabs 'on various movements of subject.
6/13/63? / 12/20/63 report
FBI
Last location: Cayey, PR 74
Field Office:
San Juan
Last UPD: 12/15/77
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 21
---
## Page 22
19
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HERNANDEZ- RIVERA, GREGORIO
Reason for PRS interest: Subject involved in 10/30/50 attack
on La Fortaleza; allegedly possessed a weapon & was sole survivar.
of attack after being shot 17 times.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individua?
belongs:
PRN
(NPPR should have been listed)
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
?
6/6/63
Refered by other agency?
YES
'Action taken:
Subject released 2/11/60 on parole. File: established 6/6/63.
QI's initiated 6/15/64 and discont: 4/9/65.
Appointed
Treasurer of Brooklyn sub-junta of Partido Nationalista Puertor-
riqueno (NPPR) in 7/74.
Last location: New York 74
Field office: San Juan
Last UPD: 4/21/75
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 22
---
## Page 23
20
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
OTERO-MARTINEZ, MANUEL
Reason for PRS interest: In 1940 subject was member of Liberating
Army of the Republic which vowed to overthrow US govt. Member of
Partido Nacionalista Puertorriqueno (NPPR) until 1950, when he
withdrew because of his opposition to the use of violence.
1961
elected Secretary to Board of Directors of Partido Socialista
Puertorriqueno (PSP). 1964 organized Federacion Estudiantil Pro
Independencia (FEPI).
Degree of threat:
2
organizations to which individual belongs:
NPPR
FUPI
PSP
Nationalistic group: _ Puerto Rican black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/19/63
Refered by other agency?
YES
Action taken:
S.S. Kept tabs on whereabouts.
On 5/13/66 SA interviewed subject
who showed violent independentist attitudes and was considered of
Protective Interest. QI's initiated 5/18/66. Subject left PSP
10/68 after. disagreement. Ql's discont. 7122/69. (It is possible
that SA interview was result of report that subject threw box con-
taining explosives in a river believing himself pursued by police.)
Last location: Arecibo, PR 69
Field office: San Juan
Last UPD: 4/24/75
HH 54046 DocId:32241845
Page 23
---
## Page 24
21
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MELENDEZ-COLON, ARTURO
Reason for PRS interest: -
In 1960, Secretary of FUPI and APU:
Treasurer of Movimiento Armado Puertorriqueno Autentico (MAPA) .
Interviewed 11/9/60 by Puerto Rican National Guard and denied
he was a subversive - just believer in PR independence and non-
violent. 1/16/65 arrested with 4 rifles and 7 pistols in posses-
sion.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
FUPI
APU
MAPA
3
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/18/63
‚Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
After subject's arrest in '65, Ol's initiated 1/12/66. Discant.
9/8/67.
Last location: Santurce, PR
Field office: San Juan
Last UPD: 4/23/75
'67
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 24
---
## Page 25
22
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
MOLINA - CENTENO, RAFAEL
Reason for PRS interest:
Active in NPPR until arrest 11/5/50
in connection with NPPR uprising 10/50. Made bombs for rev.
Charged with lst degree murder.. Pardoned 11/23/72.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Orgarizations to which inäividual belongs:
NPPR
3 (in jail)
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered
by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
S.S. kept tabs
12/18/63
Last location: Arecibo, PR
Field office: San Juan
Last UPD: 4/24/75
'72
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 25
---
## Page 26
23
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_ALVAREZ-ARCHILLA, LUIS DEGRACIA
Reason for PRS interest: FBI 1/31/63 report id subject as a
Marxist and strong supporter of cuban Revolutionary Govt.
Subject involved in plot to conduct acts of violence and sabotage on
10/30/63. Active in Liga Socialista Puertorriqueno (LSP).
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
LSP
3
Nationalistic group: _ Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/13/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
- YES
FBI
Action taken:
QI's initiated 2/8/68 and discont. 1/6/70. Following subject's
return from Dominican Republic, l's reinstated 8/12/70, discont
6/3/74.
Last location: Rio Piedras,
Field office:
San Juan
Last UPD: 4/25/75
PR
'74
WH 54046 DocId:32241845
Page 26
---
## Page 27
24
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
PARALITICCI-RIVERA, CARLOS MANUEL
•Reason for PRS interest: Of record since 10/54. President
of sociedad de Amigos de la Nueva Cuba (SANC) in 1961. Active
in APU in 1960's. Became active in PSP in 1966.
Degree of threat: 1
2
organizations to which individual belongs:
3
PSP
Nationalistic group: _ Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention: 10/54??
12/13/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES??
FBI
Action taken:
10/31/75 review of file indicated it consisted of several FBI
reoirts, last dated 9/19/75 and that subject was never investi
gated by U.S.S.S.; file destroyed.
Last location: unknown: '75
Field office: San Juan
Last UPD: 11/4/75
H# 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 27
---
## Page 28
25
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
•Name of individual:
ORTIZ-BELAVAL, JOSE BENJAMIN
Reason. for PRS interest:
1961 subject attended Federacion de
Universitarios Pro Independencia (FUPI) meetings. In 1963•
subject reportedly stated "that if a Puerto Rican had assassinated
President of the U.S., JFK, it would have been a 'perfect act'
and one worthy of praise". In 1964, picketed the White House &.
Us mission to the UN. On 11/2/65, subject struck and killed a
pedestrian in PR and became emotionally disturbed over mishap.
Degree of threat:
• 1
2
3
Orgarizations to which individual belongs:
PRN
Nationalistic group: Puerto Rican American
Date called to Secret Service attention: 11/20/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
subject continuously involved in nationalist picketing in 1960'5.
QI's initiated 7/16/65 & discont. 7/20/68.
Last location: NY '75
Field office: Newark
Last UPD: 4/28/75
HHH
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 28
---
## Page 29
26
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY
PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ARBONZ-MARTINEZ, RAMON
Reason
for. PRS interest: 1960 subject traveled to Cuba, Europe,
and Asia as representative to Joventud Independentista Puertor-
riqueno (JIP): 6/62 elected to FUPI Board of Directors. Elected
to Partido Socialista Puertorriqueno (PSP) National Council 12/63.
Elected to Partido Independentista Puertorriqueno (PIP) in 1961.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
PIP
PSP FUPI
(JIP should have been included)
CFJ - Crusade for Justice rally in Denver, 1974.
Nationalistic group: -
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/16/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
S.S. kept tabs
Last location: Rio Piedras, PR
'76
Field office: San Juam
Last UPD: 6/2/77
WW 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 29
---
## Page 30
27
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SUAREZ-BERMUDEZ, ANDRES
Reason for PRS interest: -
Joined Accion Patriotica Unitaria
(APU) 2/63; stated ready to participate in any action necessary
for Puerto Rican independence. Elected Secretary of APU Bronx-
sub junta 2/10/63. On 3/22/63 purchases a mauser rifle and ammo.
Subject stated he purchased the rifle to travel to PR to partici-
pate in revolution he felt was imminent.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
NPPR
APU
FNP
MLPR
MP I
WWP
DOR (1965 - Directorio Obrero Revolucionario de PRL
Nationalistic group: -
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
6/13/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Quarterly investigation initiated in 7/65.
Discont. 2/13/70
Described as mentally unbalanced. Has suffered from seizures.
Last location: Bronz, NY '70
Field Office: NY
Last UPD: 4/29/75
IN 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 30
---
## Page 31
28
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
TRIPP, LUKE SAMUEL (JR.)
Reason for
PRS interest: -
1y63 subject member of small militant
organization called Uhuru in Detroit. Active in demonstrations
against alleged discrimination against Negroes. 1964 went to cuba
and made remark "U.S. must be destroyed". Filed with draft board
as CO and was denied. Critical of whites and govt.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Uhuru (now RAM)
SWP
BPP associated, not actual
member
Nationalistic group:
Black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
8/22/63
Refered by other agency?
NO:
YES
More likely Fel referral.
'Action taken:
S.S. kept close tabs. 12/5/69 subject was considered of protective
interest and QI's were discontinued. As of 1/31/73, subject
reportedly no longer active in any group.
Last location: Detroit
Field office: Detroit
Last UPD: 10/29/73
'73
NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 31
---
## Page 32
29
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
¡Name of individual:
WATSON, KENNETH JOHN
Reason
for PRS interest:
subject, black militant member of
Uhuru. Established by USSS MR dated 8/22/63. Last USSS investi-
gation dated 1/16/64 re membership in Uhuru. No further USSS
investigation.. File consisted of 46 FBI reported last dated
6/25/73. File destroyed 3/1/75.
Degree of
threat:
1
₴
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Uhuru (now RAM). IBWC
3
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
8/14/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES??
FBI
Action taken:
S.S. investigated subject in '63-64. From
'65-168 subject was
active member of Rev. Action Movement but no s.S: involvement:
8/8/68 chgd by LA PD with intent to commit murder:
Last location: Highland Park, Michigan
Field office: Detroit
Last UPD: 3/7/75
'73
17H 54046 DocId: 32241845 Pade 32
---
## Page 33
30
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:.
FEATHERSTON, ALFRED DWIGHT AMOS
Reason for PRS
interest: FBI referral 12/63 due to subject's
subversive affiliations. Arrested 7/59 Guatemala City for
assassination plot against Pres. Ydigocas. 10/10/64 subject.
stated to informant he would be involved in assassination of
Governor's. Connally and Wallace & it would be to advantage of CP
if something happened to LBJ.
'Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
CP
NOI
CORE
BOMB
3
Nationalistic group: _ black
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/24/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
•Action taken:
Not interviewed. QI's initiated 10/30/64. During 2/71 speech,
subj. referred to pres as pig. Was interviewed 12/6/71, 5/24/73,
8/27/73, 3/14/74 (still anti-establishment), 9/25/74 (cooperative)
12/26/74, 3/19/75; 7/22/75 (still believes in black rev) etc.
1962 - assault with intent to murder.
5/23/72 sentenced 6 years
for arson. Released 4/12/77. Subject is still of interest to S.S.
Last interview was 1/6/78 - shows no interest in protectees.
Last location: Miami,: '73
Field office: Miami
Last UPD: 1/16/78
Connally, wallace,
Rockefeller. (Nelson)
WH 54046 DocId: 32241845
Page 33
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## Page 34
31
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BAKER, GENERAL GORDON (JR.)
•Reason
fOr PRS interest: Subject has been a member of the Rey-
olutionary Action Movement organization and 1966 was its leader
in Detroit. 1964 visited Cuba. 1964 meeting of RAM discussed
plans for assassination USA. Colonels and guerilla warfare. Active
in demonstrations in Detroit. Associated with two rifle clubs.
FBI reported as having access to firearms and explosives. Has
carried weapons & assaulted policeman.
*Degree of threat:
1
2
3
organizations
to which individual belongs:
RAM
CL
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Never interviewed by S.S. QI's were discont: 12/5/69.
8/27/63
not stated but looks like
FBI may have referred.
Last location: Detroit
Field office: Detroit
Last UPD: 5/23/73
'73
N4 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 34
---
## Page 35
32
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SMITH, LONNIE (UR.)
Reason
for PRS interest:
Member of ISLAM and Fruit of Islam
since 1950's. Came to attention of s.S. due to making statements
in the early '60s advocating violence; no remarks directed
against protectees.
Degree
of threat:
1
2
Crganizations to which individual. belongs:
NOI
3
Nationalistic group:
black
•Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
YES
Action taken:
S.S. Kept tabs
12/12/63
Last location: Washington, D.C.
Field office: Washington
Last UPD: 3/13/78
'75
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 35
---
## Page 36
33
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HAYES, ODELL
Reason for PRS interest: -
Not clear - In 3/15/71 subject sent
letter to Pres. re JFK and RFK assassinations.
"Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
NO 1
Associated with Hanafi Muslims in Washington, D.C.
Nationalistic group:_ black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/15/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
s.S. established a file in 1963 but no reason is aiven. In '71
subject lettersto Pres. caused him to be interviewed 5/6/71
Drank throughout interview. Said JFK would be alive today if
Rockefeller had been pres: No hostility toward any USSS protectee.
Deemed not of protective interest.
Probably alcoholic.
Last location: Washington, D.C. '73
Field Office: Washington
Last UPD: 8/21/74
Nixon, Rockefeller
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845
Page 36
---
## Page 37
34
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
GRIFFITHS, ARTHUR JENNINGS
Reason for
PRS interest:
7/16/63 statement that Negroes
should handle civil rights demonstrations the way PR demonstrated
at the Blair House. Ships machinery to Cuba. Pro-Castro.
Advocate of violence and once reportedly said US needed a rev.
Degree of threat:
1
2
crganizations to which individual belongs:
NOI
3
Nationalistic group:- black
Date called to Secret Service attention: 7/18/63
Refered by other agency?
NO ?
YES
Action taken:
Never interviewed by S.S. Activity and presence at civil rights
demonstrations has dropped off. Mother reportedly Cuban. Lived
in Cuba from age 2 - 18.
Last location: unknown '66
Field office:
washington
Last UPD: 4/19/68
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 37
---
## Page 38
35
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
CZAPECZKA, LOTTIE ARDA
Reason for PRS interest:
9/4/63 letter to Pres. indicating
that she was sending explosives. Disgruntled over Negro:
integration.
„Degree of
threat:
1
2
organizations to which individual belongs:
Schizophrenic paranoid with catatonic tendencies.
3
(in a home)
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to secret service attention: 914/63 filen
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
'Action taken:
SA interviewed her and deemed her not dangerous:
Last location: Rochester, NY '65
Field office: Buffalo
Last UPD: 7/10/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 38
---
## Page 39
36
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
OUZIEL, MATILDA
Reason for
PRS interest:
3/13/53 innocuous letter to Pres.
4/25/63 sent suicide tenor letter to pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
organizations to which individual belongs:
chronic paranoid
Nationalistic group: -
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
3/20/63 file
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
•Action taken:
5/15/63 interview by SA & considered not dangerous. Became in-
censed and wrote SA and Pres: abusive letters stating "You and
Kennedy are yellow cowards.. I shall bring house down on your
heads with more violence and bloodshed." Last letter 11/63
Last location: Bronx '66
Field office: NY
Last UPD: 7/18/67
•HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 39
---
## Page 40
37
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
RAINEY, CATHERINE VICTORIA
Reason for PRS interest:
12/18/63 abusive letter to Philadelphia
paper maligning JFK. 5/65 letter to Pres. saying "You deserve
firing squad". 714/64 picketed the WH.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizatiors to which individual belongs:
paranoid schiz chronic with guarded prognosis, not dangerous
Americans for Constitutional Action
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to secret Service attention:
12/18/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
5/13/65 interview. Kept writing abusive letters to many political
figures.
s.S. keeps tabs.
Last location: Philadelphia, Pa.
Field office: Phila.
Last UPD: 11/12/75
' 75
Kennedy, LBJ, Sen.
Baker &
Erwin, Ford,
McGovern
HW 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 40
---
## Page 41
38
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS
interest:
FRANKEL, WILLIAM
5/24/54 letter to Pres. Friendly.
Degree of threat:
1
2
organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
•Date
called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
None - in and out of institutions since 1944.
11/23/63 file established
Last location: Brooklyn '69
Field office: NY
Last UPD: 7/26/67
Nixon
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 41
---
## Page 42
39
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS interest:
JONES, HENRY PRIMUS
10-5-55 to 11-2-65 written 4 letters
of bizarre and religious nature. 9/17/63 appeared at the Treas.
building to see sec. of Treas.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
No?
YES
•Action taken:
9/17/63 SA interviewed him. He appeared disturbed.
9/17/63
maybe Treasury
Last location: NY. '73
Field office: NY
Last UPD: 1/24/73
Nixon
NH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 42
---
## Page 43
40
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual: -
ABRAHAM, THOMAS JOSEPH
Reason for PRS interest: REferred by FBI as being a member of
the KKK serving as Florida State Grand Klakann. Sources state
subject potentially violent and was arrested in 1957 in connection
with shotgun blast into car containing white and negro baseball
players. Not prosecuted. Rabid segregationist and considered.
an internal security risk. No indication of Presidential interest.
• Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
KKK
3
Nationalistic group:
WASP
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/30/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
"Action taken:
Not interviewed by S.S. Apparently the FBI keeps tabs on subject
and informs s.s.
Last location: Belle Glade, Fl '66
Field office: Miami
Last UPD: 5/10/68
17H 54046 DocId: 32241845. Page 43
---
## Page 44
79
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
REESE, CAROL JOANNE
4/23/63 letter to JFK.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Schiz-para
Confined short time - emotional problem with hysterical features.
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to secret service attention:
4/30/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 5/6/63; friendly toward Pres. Wanted to clear up matter
of income tax.. Since 1973 letter to Nixon she appeared mentally jll.
Location of subject last: Baltimore, Md.
Field Office reporting:
Baltimore
Last update: 12/2/76
'76
Nixon, Ford, Carter
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 44
---
## Page 45
80
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DONOVAN, JOHN LAWRENCE (JR.)
Reason
for PRS interest:
4/29/63 letter to JFK stating, "Upon
my release I feel compelled to execute my plans to assassinate."
organizations to which individual belongs:
Organizations to which individual belongs:
3
none
schizophrenic reaction of paranoid type
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
5/1/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed as result of letter on 5/1/63. Told SA Pres. was lead-
ing country to brink of nuclear destruction. On 5/1/67 subj. was
sentenced to 5 years in prison on burglary charges. 10/16/67 SA
interviewed him and he showed no animosity to protectees. SA
determined subj. no longer of protective interest.
Location of subject last: Lewisburg, Pa. '67
Field Office reporting: _ Scranton
Last update:
12/1/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 45
---
## Page 46
41
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ADAMS, KENNETH LAMAR
Reason for PRS interest:
Past history of violence: transporting
moonshine,
aslt., D & D, shooting gun into house & church, inter-
v.—
ferring with an officer receiving stol: en govt. property, CCW,
1956 attack against Nat King Cole, 6-66 aslt of Negro causing
him to lose sight of oneeve. Considered dangerous & armed by FBI
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
NSRP KKK (Past Grand Dragon & Exalted Cyclops)
3
None
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?.. No??
YES
Action taken:
Believe: that FBI kept S.S. informed
11/12/63
none indicated but may
have been FBI referral.
Last location: Anniston, Al
'71
Field office: Birmingham
Last UPD: 3/1/71
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 46
---
## Page 47
42
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
LASSITER, JAMES WATSON
•Reason for PRs interest:
11/29/63 subject was reported to FBI
as having made derogatory remarks concerning the assassination.
& overheard to say someone should shoot the Pres. and VP.
Outspoken extreme right winger. Was reported attempting to gain
iñfo embarrassing to the Pres.
Degree of threat:
1
organizations
to which individual belongs:
John Birch Society, Anti-Communist League
3
Nationalistic group: _
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/05/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Not interviewed by S.S.; exhibited no behavior of late the repre-
sents a security threat. 1/6/69 interviewed - no animosity toward
protectees. SA does not consider subject of further protective
interest. QI's conducted 1/18/65 to 1/7/69.
Last location: Austin, Tx.
Field office: Austin
Last UPD: 1/14/69
' 69
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 47
---
## Page 48
43
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DRENNAN, STANLEY L.
Reason for PRS interest:
Subject reportedly made statements
that he hates dem. Party and leaders and intended doing something
about it. Reportedly discussed with others plans for assassinations
(JFK, RFK, Members of Cong.)
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
John Birch Society
3
Nationalistic group:
None
Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/23/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Not interviewed by s.S. Apparently s.S. just kept tabs on where-
abouts.
Last location: North Hollywood, CA
' 63
Field Office: LA
Last UPD: 5/7/68
NW 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page
48
---
## Page 49
44
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
FIELDS, EDWARD REED
Reason for PRS interest: Est. by FBI report dated 11/15/63; rec'd
in ID 12/27/63. Arrested in '63 for parading without a permit
and arrested same year for conspiracy to obstruct compliance with
federal court order. Has encouraged mob violence in handling
racial problems.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
NSRP- National information Director, organizer, and. Secretary
Paranoid personality, one step removed from beina insane
Nationalistic group: WASP
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
S.S. apparently keeps tabs with FBI assistance
Last location: Marietta, Ga
Field office: Atlanta
Last UPD: 1/20/75
'73
Nixon, Ford
HW 54046 DocId: 32241845
• Page 49
---
## Page 50
45
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
POTITO, OREN FENTON
Reason for PRS interest:
Not given - noted that on 11/1/62
he was detained at Oxford, Miss. for having weapons. On 1/20/66
referred to the S.S. by FBI due to his participation with the
NSRP, KKK and the U.S. Rangers.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
NSRP (National States Rights Party) KKK
3
Am. Nazi Party
Nationalistic group: _ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
10/8/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Not interviewed. S.S. may use FBI to keep informed
Last location: Salt Springs, Fl.
Field office:
Jacksonville
Last UPD: 4/16/68
'70
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 50
---
## Page 51
46
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
GOFF, OLIVER KENNETH
Reason for PRS interest:
Attended a convention of the constitu-
tion Party at Indianapolis, Ind. in October, 1963 where known
associates of his discussed the possibility of assassinating.JFK.
subject claimed membership to the Communist Party 1936-69 but
since that time has become anti-Communist. Presented Truman a
petition in 1957 to outlaw CP. Outspoken critic of JFK.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individal belongs:
NSRP
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/12/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Check-ups never made and subject not interviewed.
Last location: Englewood, colo.
Field office: Denver
Last UPD: 5/6/68
' 63
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 51
---
## Page 52
47
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
VIDNJEVICH, CHRISTOPHER
Reason for PRS interest:
11/27/63 FBI advised subject had attended
60 meetings of American Nazi Party in Chicago since 1962.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
A NP
National Socialist White Peoples Party (dismissed in
6/72 for insubordination. reinstated but quit himself in 1974
Nationalistic group: - none
born: Zagreb, Yo.
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/27/63 1 12/23/63 file
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
s.S. is aware of present activities. Has been arrested several
times in last few years for demonstrations with violence. Has
access to several type of weapons at ANP HO.
Last location: McLean, Va.
Field office: Washington
Last UPF: 7/23/70
'74
NH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 52
---
## Page 53
48
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
LUTHARDT, CHARLES JESSE (SR.)
Reason for PRs interest: Active in State's Rights and white
supremist causes since early 1950s. Apparently interest stems
as result of assassination check on right winders)
4/27/64, telephoned WH. to speak to LBJ about civil rights issues.
Candidate for Governor of Md. in 1966 with most supporters KKK.
6/30/64 letter to LBJ re disappearance of 3 civil. rights workers
in Miss. More letters to the Pres. in the 1970s/
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
ANP KKK NSRP Member of Baltimore States Rights; National
Assoc. for the Advancement of White People.
Nationalistic group: _ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
S.S. kept tabs
Last location: Glen Burnie, Md. 4/7/72
Field office: Baltimore
Last UPD: 7/15/76
Nixon, LBJ
I7-51046 DocId: 32241845 Page 53
---
## Page 54
49
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
KING, GEORGE JOSEPH (JR.)
Reason for
PRS interest:
UPI reporter advised FBI in San Fran-
cisco on 11/22/63 that an anonymous person had contacted him and
furnished information that during August 1963 the subject with
other individuals, had discussed assassination of the President.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations
to which
individual belongs:
ANP
NSRP
John Birch Society
Formed own group - SHRIKE (Society to Harass Reds & Intimidate Kikes
everywhere)
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/23/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Subject interviewed by S.S. 2/5/64. Extreme right wing. Does
not believe in violence, way to rid a president is to vote him out.
No apparent mental illness, no protective interest.
(August 1963 arrested to ATTU, Treas. Dept. for sale of sten
machine gun. Pleaded guilty. Arrested 2/29/68 for CCW; released.)
Subject left National Socialist White Peoples Party and affiliated
with the New Christian Crusade Church in 1974.
Last location: Long Beach, Ca.
'75
Field office: LA
Last UPD: 5/7/68
(Yet organizational affiliations was dated
7/14/75 as was his criminal
history)
H 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 54
---
## Page 55
50
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
LLOYD, ROBERT ALLISON
Reason
for PRS interest: Not given - may be from his association
with the ANP in 1962.
1/4/65 broke into the House of Rep. shouting that he was: a member
of the Miss. delegation and wanted to be seated. 10/11/65 subject.
stated he would be happy to kill LBy legally.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
crganizations to which individual belongs:
Am. Nazi Party
National Youth Alliance
Mental treatment in 1961
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
5/24/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Initial interview 10/11/65 - considered dangerous by the SA.
Last interviewed 3/25/68 no derogatory remarks. 2/26/71 intr
remarks against Nixon. QI's discont. 3/9/71.
Extensive knowledge of firearms
Last location: Arlington, va..
Field office: Washington
Last UPD: 3/29/71
'71
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 55
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## Page 56
51
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
HODGE, RICHARD RANDOLPH
Reason for PRS interest: 7/30/63 subject purchased ll Browning
light assault rifles and 4000 rounds of ammo from gun dealer.
12/63 purchased semi-automatic rifles which could be converted
to auto:
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Leader and organizer of the Loyal Order of Mountainmen.:
John Birch society MM :
Nationalistic group: none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/30/63
Refered by other agency? No?
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/28/64; obsessed that communists will take over USA
Stated that he wrote several letters to JFK about taking firm
stand against communism in Cuba. Considered dangerous by SA.
Knowledge of firearms and explosives.
Last location: Derby, Kansas'
Field office: Kansas City
Last UPD: 4/22/68
67
NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 56
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## Page 57
52
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
JOHNSON, GEORGE FRANK
Reason for PRS interest:
1963 SUBJECT ALLEGEDLY STATED "We'll
shoot that shanty Irish
Pres. some day." SA interviewed 2/4/64
and found subject sane but fanatical in rightist beliefs. Opposes
violence. Writes frequently to news media with intent to insult
not threaten.
Degree of threat:
Organizations to which individual belongs:
MM
JBS
3
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/31/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
"Action taken:
Interviewed. Found to be against most leading Democrats.
Not
believed to be of protective interest.
Last location: Upper Darby, Pa.
'72
Field office: Phila
Last UPD: 3/15/72
Wallace, Muskie, HHH,
Hugh Scott, J. Lindsay
MY 54016 DocId: 32211845 Page 57
---
## Page 58
53
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DINBERG, MARIA
Reason
for PRs interest:
2/7/58 wrote letter to Pres.
Appeared at VP office 5/1/63 and was interviewed. 5/26/71 letter
to pres requesting return of her citizenship and social security.
Degree of threat:
1
2
organirations to
which individual belongs:
Brother felt she had mental problem due to WWIl imprisonment
JEW?
Nationalistic group:
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
5/1/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed and committed to D.C. General from VP's office
Not dangerous.
Last location: Washington, D.C.
Field office: Washington
Last UPD: 6/25/71
'71
Nixon
N4 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 58
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## Page 59
54
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MARTIN, LAWRENCE G.
Reason for PRS interest:.
Not given for 1963.
Since 1964 subject has sent letters to Johnson & Nixon as well as
other high ranking officials. Letters occasionally obscene.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group: — none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
- 11/6/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
¡Action taken:
7/65 interviewed and subject did not seem hostile toward president.
Said he would continue to write. Deemed
not of protective interest
Last location: Illinois (Chicago?)
Field office:
Washington
Last
UPD: 4/9/76
HHH,
Nixon, Rockefeller
Hart, Ed Kennedy:
WW 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 59
---
## Page 60
55
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
STERLING, SYLVIA J.
'Reason for PRS interest:
2/14/63 telephoned WH advising she
was in possession of White House keys. Interviewed and said
husband had worked in WH and she still had the keys but did not
know where they were.
•Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Previously held for mental observation '49,
'52, '59.
Nationalistic group: none
Date called to Secret Service attention: 2/14/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 2/21/63 - not considered dangerous:
3/18/63 file
Last location: Washington,:D.c. (St. Elizabeth's Hosp) '65
Field office: Washington
Last UPD: 8/14/65
HH 54016 DocId: 32241845 Page 60
---
## Page 61
56
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HERRELL, KENNETH FRANKLIN
Reason
for PRS interest: 2/28/63 letter to Pres. complaining
he isn't allowed to enlist in Army, stating in part "Just remem-
ber if I would start shooting at you". 3/15/63 intry said he was
unfairly rejected from Army and only Pres. could help. No ill
feelings toward. Pres. Several letters since 1964.
Degree of threat:
1
2
• Organizations
to which individual belongs:
Committed 4 times between 11/62 and 9/28/72 - schizo paranoid
'alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
3/6/63 file
Refered by other agency?
_NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 3/15/63 first time; after other letters was interviewed.
Threatened Nixon and S.S. tried to get him arrested but prosecution
declined since subject was intoxicated at time of threat.
Knowledge of firearms and dynamite
Last location: Albuquerque, NM
Field office: Albuquerque
Last UPD: 12/16/76
'76
Nixon
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 61
---
## Page 62
57
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SPITZNAGLE, FREDERICK LARUE
Reason for PRS interest: 3/1/63 visited WH and reauested
appointment with pres to talk about world problems.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
schozophrenic reaction, acute depressive reaction.
Doctor reported
capable of doing great physical harm.
Nationalistic group: _ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
3/7/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
8/31/65 interviewed. File was set up as result of his visiting
WH. S.S. has not checked up on him since '65: (?)
Last location: Port Arthur, Tx.
Field office: Houston
Last UPD: 8/12/67
' 66
NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 62
---
## Page 63
58
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
HEMMING, GERALD. PATRICK
Reason for PRS interest:
Not given - looks like result of JFK
assassination and Hemmings associations with Cuban elements.
4/61 part in Anti-Castro rev. activity, est. anti-CP Legionnaires,
set up training camp in Fl. everglades. 7/61 headed Interpen.
In 1963 made derogatory remarks about US govt. and suspected of
being Cuban agent. 7/70 involved in plan to effect warfare between
Us-Cuba by having defecting Cuban military personnel fire missiles
USN
Degree
Base flantanamo, Bay getting us into military takeover.
Organizasions to which individual belongs:
mercenary
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/5/63
Refered by other agency?
NO ?
YES
Action taken:
It does not look like S.S. has taken any action.
Hemming is
under investigation by ATF and DEA for weapons and drug violations
since 1/77. Information on this subject has probably been abtained
from other agencies.
Last location: Opalocka, Fl. '77
Field office: Miami
Last UPD: 1/28/77
WH 54046 DocId: 32241845
Page 63
---
## Page 64
59
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual: _
ECHEVARRIA, HOMER S.
Reason for PRs interest: Nov. 1963, informant advised Chicago
office that subject was member of anti-casto Cuban group. Subject
allegedly approached informant to provide machine guns for Cuban
rev. 11/21/63 subject allegedly told informant "We now have plenty
of money -- our new backers are Jews-- as soon as 'we' or (they)
take care of Kennedy..." Subject expressed favorable attitude
toward LBJ.
Degree
of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
anti-Castro Cuban
Nationalistic group:
Cuban
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/26/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Investigation by Chicago office did not disclose any violation
under our jurisdiction and check-ups never initiated. Subject
not interviewed
Last location: Chicago, Il.
Field office: Chicago
Last UPD: 4/25/69
' 63
WH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 61
---
## Page 65
60
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
BOSCH-AVILA, ORLANDO
Reason for PRS interest:
subject head of MIRR in Miami reportedly
planned to picket Pres. 11/18/63 with Cuban fighter widows. Der.
1963 arrested possession of bombs - planning air raid on Castro.
Involved in bombings of homes of wealthy Cubans in Miami area for
extortion.. Extensive files on this man - most dealing with the
70's. No mention of his plan to attack Afl.
Kissinger plot is mentioned.
Degree of threat:
1
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
MIRR
• BOMB
RD
CCG
AC
CORU
Nationalistic group:
=≥Cuban
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
S.S. Kept tabs - considered him dangerous
12/30/63 Aragon's report
was known before
Last location: Caracas, Venezuela
Field office: San Juan
'78
Last UPD: 3/22/78
WH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 65
---
## Page 66
61
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH.
Name of
individual:
ISLAM, NURUL
Reason for PRS interest:
3/23/63 threat letter to Pres. Cont.
to write Pres. Interviewed 4/1/63 and told SA he gets messages
from God.
Threats have cont. in letters up to 1972.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which incividual belongs:
Member of Ahmaddiya, former member of the Nations of Islam
Schizophrenia, 1963.
Nationalistic group: _ black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
3/27/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed. S.S. kept tabs. Considered not of protective interest
in 1969. He was committed in 1963 at request of s.s.
Last location: Chicago, Il.
Field office: Chicago
Last UPD: 7128/72
'72
Wallace, Nixon
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 66
---
## Page 67
62
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
NEWBORN, WILEY
Reason for PRS interest:
3/23/63 threat letter of Pres. Was
interviewed and told SA that he receives messages from God and
transmits them to Nural Islam. Had no opinión about protectees.
Degree of threat:
2
3
organizations to which individual belongs:
Member of Ahmaddiya, former member of the Nation of Islam
Committed in 1961 and 1963 - schizophrenia
Nationalistic group:— black
•Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/1/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
"Action taken:
Interviewed and committed.
Last location: Chicago, Il.
Field office: Chicago
Last UPD: 7/28/72
'72
Nixon
MH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 67
---
## Page 68
63
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
ALEX, NICHOLAS H.
Reason for PRS interest:
1963 telegram to Pres. Attempted
to visit pres at hotel 10-30-63.
Degree of threat:
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
- mild mental case. No diagnosis
¡Nationalistic group:
_ unknown
Date called to Secret Service attention: 10/30/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 5/5/64.
Deemed not dangerous
Last location: Haverford, Pa.
Field office: Wilmington
Last UPD: 12/12/75
'75
JFK, Sargent Shriver
WW 54046 DocId: 3224184) Page 68
---
## Page 69
64
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name
of individual:
SHEETS, DONALD HUDSON
Reason for PRS interest:
3/14/63 WH visitor, Same date inter-
viewed. Wanted to talk to pres. about being brainwashed.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid schizophrenic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
3/14/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed from WH 3/14/63. QI's '63 through 12/65. In '76
appeared at USSS HQS with letter to s.S.. Subject does not
appear to present a danger to persons under S.s. protection
at that time. Letter to Carter.
Location of subject lasti-laural, Md. '77
Field Office reporting:
washington
Last update:
6/8/77
Nixon, Agnew, Rodino,
Carter
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 69
---
## Page 70
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECIIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
NORCIA, RALPH FRANCIS
Reason for PRS interest:
3/20/63 frequent visitor of WH.
Complains about being electronically controlled. and ordered to
commit immoral acts or murder.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
committed briefly in '63
and since 4/6/65 - schizo paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
3/20/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
4/6/65 committed from Washington Field office
•Complained in 1974 about being put in mental hospitals
by SS agents. S.S. Keeps tab.
Location of subject lasts- Washington, '71
Field Office reporting:.
Washington
Last update: 2127/71
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 70
---
## Page 71
66
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Nate' of individual:
DORN. CHARLES
Reason for PRS interest:
4/1/63 subject visited WH requested
to speak with pres. 12/20/65 again appeared. Friendly. Wanted
help with personal problems.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Diagnosed emotional unstable
Nationalistic group:
none
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
4/1/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Deemed mentally ill. QI's initiated 12/20/65. Discont. 9/5/72.
Location of subject lasts NY '76
Field Office reporting: .
NY
Last update:
1/10/75
..JFK, LBJ, Nixon, Ford
1H 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 71
---
## Page 72
67
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DREW, DONALD ANDREW
Reason for PRS interest: -
4/63 wrote letter to Pres. Last
letter 8/25/65 was anonymous. Friendly but obsessed with being
persecuted by subversives.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Schizophrenic, chronic. Some confinement in
mental hospital
Nationalistic group: ..
_ none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
4/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
File opened, determined friendly. Confined in '65
Iocation of subject last: Chicago
Field Office reporting:
Chicago
Last update:
8/14/67
' 65
ITH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 72
---
## Page 73
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECIIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BYRNE, JOHN ROLLINS
Reason for PRS interest: _ Not given - possibly nated due
to mental disorders beginning 1951 and arrests for disturbing
the peace.
Degree of threat:.
1
2
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
alcoholic
'64 diagnosis; schizophrenic reation, paranoid type, danderous maybe
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
3/30/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
File opened. 5/19/64 caused disturbance. 5/20/64 interviewed by
SA and he repeated threats he had previously made against his
former Treasury supervisor and said he intended to take complaints.
to WH if necessary. 7122/66 interviewed in confused state.
Location of subject last: Nashville, In. '67
Field Office reporting:
• Nashville
Last update:
10-19-67
HHH, Richard Fulton
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 73
---
## Page 74
69
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
LANIGAN, CHARLES BERNARD (JR.)
Reason for PRS interest:
3/31/63 letter to JFK complaining
about military officers. On 4/7/65 the FBI reported finding papers
signed by subject which are rambling and state that subjects sym-
pathies are with the killer of JFK. 517/65 subject wrote letter
to s.s. about JFK assassination and his urge to kill LBJ.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3 (in 1963)
organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type, active
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to
Secret Service attention:
4/4/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
EBI liaison, however
Action taken:
In 1965 SA's began interviews; on 11/3/67 SA determined subject.
no longer of protective interest.
Location of subject last:- Kansas City, Ma.
Field Office reporting:
Kansas City
Last update: _ 214/69
'68
HN 54046 DooId:32241845
Page 74
---
## Page 75
70
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ODENWALD, JOSEPH K. (JR.)
3/24/63 subject penetrated security
Reason for PRS interest:
at Ft. Knox bullion depository.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
mental confinement 3/63 to 12/63. No diagnosis.
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/2/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 3/24/68 = date of security penetration. Incoherent.
Complained of blackouts. Expressed no presidential interest.
Was confined to hospital.
Location of subject last:- Wauconda, Il. '64
Field Office reporting:
Chicago
Last update:
8/14/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 75
---
## Page 76
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECIIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SHEPHERD, LAWRENCE
Reason for PRS interest: -
subject interviewed 4/6/63 as WH
visitor demanding to see JFK and claiming to be Indian descen-
dent. Friendly toward Pres.
Degree
of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
None
Committed 4/6/63 from WH. No diagnosis
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed from WH
3
4/6/63
Location of
subject last:.
unknown
pittsburgh
Field Office reporting:
8/14/67
Last update:
'63
N4 54046 DocId:32241845
Page 76
---
## Page 77
72
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
VARNUM, HUGH DORSEY
Reason for PRS interest:
1963 subject wrote and phoned Atlanta
office asking about reproducing Mex currency. Proclaimed himself
a prophet.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Mentally deficient
3
Nationalistic group:
- hone
Date called to Secret
Service attention:
4/5/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Keeps writing letters so S.S. Keeps tabs. Not deemed of protective
interest. No threats in his letters.
Location of subject last:.::Flberton, Ga.
Field Office reporting: Atlanta
Last update:
3/8/77
177
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 77
Nixon, Rowley, H.S. Knight
---
## Page 78
74.
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SMITH, MARTIN UDELL
Reason
for PRs interest: -
subject wrote letter to JFK 4/17/63 in
which he threatened to kill Mrs. Kennedy and children.
Degree of threat:
•1
2
3
organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Periodic commitments 4/63 to present - paranoid schizophrenia
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/19/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
S.S. committed subject on 4/1963 for observation. SA who inter-
viewed him considered him dangerous and he is still hospitalized.
Location of subject lasts Tuscaloosa, Al. '68
Birmingham
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
4/17/68
Kennedy family
HH 54046. DooId:32241845 Page 78
---
## Page 79
73
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
getting govt. job.
MELTON, CHARLES E.
4/15/63 WH caller to see JFK about
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
÷
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
Hospitalized '61 and '62. No diagnosis.
none
Nationalistic group:
4/15/63
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
• Interviewed - exhibited confused thinking. Not referred for
investigation.
Iocation of subject last: Rockville, Md. '63
Field Office reporting:
Washington, D.C.
Last update:
8/14/65
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 79
---
## Page 80
75
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BELL, ROBERT CHESTER
Reason for PRS interest:
-4/18/63 info from FBI that he was at
their office and told them he had jumped the fence at the WH
that day.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
hospitalized 4/1863 to 4/49/63. No diagnosis.
Alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/18/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Hospitalized. Investigation disclosed no breach of WH security.
No contacts since 1963.
Iocation of subject last: unknown
'63
NY
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/15/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 80
---
## Page 81
76
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
JFK's wife.
OLIVERIO, HILDEGARD G.
4/24/63 two calls rec'd, said she was
Degree of
threat:
2
3
organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Catatonic schizophrenic
Nationalistic group:
none
German
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
4/24/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
5/9/63 interviewed at hospital. Denied calls and letters.
Exhibited lack of interest in Kennedy's. Husband surrendered
letters.
Location of subject lasts. Traverse City, MI
Field Office reporting:
Grand Rapid
Last update:
8/14/67
'67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 81
---
## Page 82
77
INDIVIDUALS LISTED
BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_TEMPLEMAN, GEORGE BRYAN (JR.)
Reason for PRs interest:
7/24/63 obscene post cards to pres.
Yet his file was opened months before. 2/17/64 threatening letters
to LBU mentioning assassination.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
Schizophrenia with homocidal tendencies
Mental history since '61 with hospitalizations '64. '65. '66.
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/29/64
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
3/20/64 interviewed. Claimed no intention to harm pres. but cont.
to write obscene letters and was arrested. At hospital spoke of
assassination, saying he would do it. Since release in :66 from
hospital, has improved. Last interview 1/25/68 SA reported as
coherent and no animosity shown. Checkups discont. 7/8/68 inter.
viewed. Not of protective interest.
Location of subject last:. Augusta, Ga.
'73
Field Office reporting:
Atlanta
Last update:
7/22/68
Nixon, Talmadge
NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 82
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## Page 83
78
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MATHE, ILONA
Reason for PRS interest:
Visitor and letter writer to WH since
1963. Telephones Cleveland office many times.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Paranoiac
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/29/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed from the WH 8/3/65. She kicked and spat upon interview-
ing agent. 8/24/66 interview appeared in good mental condition.
Deemed not of protective interest.
location of subject lasts. Youngstown, OH
'73
Cleveland
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
6/20/73
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 83
---
## Page 84
81
• INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
FRECHMAN, LILLIAN
WH visitor 5/1/63 and 5/2/63.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
confined '62 and '63 - paranoid reaction.
Nationalistic group: :
_ none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
5/1/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 5/2/63, uncooperative but no ill feelings toward JEK.
6/3/63 subj appeared at State Dept. to see high official about
complainst against govt.
Committed from the WH. 5/2/63.
Location of subject lasts. Long Island, NY '76
Field Office
reporting:
NY
Last update: 711/76
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 84
---
## Page 85
82
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
Kennedy.
OSTERDAY, BILLIE
1963 letter to JFK and 1964 to Mrs.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Mental case - undocumented
3
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
5/2/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 9/6/63 friendly to protectees but claimed persecuted
by FBI and law. In 1964 wanted to marry Mrs: Kennedy.
Location of subject last:.: Detroit, MI
'74
Field Office reporting:
Detroit
Last update:
7112/74
Nixon
H# 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 85
---
## Page 86
83
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BENTER, STANLEY JAMES
Reason for PRS interest: 5/5/63 phone call to WH to speak with
JFK saying he had pine casket for him.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
5/6/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 5/14/63 no animousity, said he'd been drinking. In
'64 he threatened LBJ ön phone. Has made several calls in intox-
¡cated state. Cont. to be 1970's caller with mental problem.
SA in '76 deemed him no threat to protectees:
Tried to prosecute for 871 in '63 but prosecution declined due
to subject's intoxicated condition.
Location of subject last; Kindston, NY '77
field office reporting:
White Plains
Last update:
3/13/78
Nixon, Kissinger,
Rockefeller, Ford.
Carter
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 86
---
## Page 87
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECIIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
FORTUNA, BENITA
5/63 WH visitor; wanted to talk to JFK
Reason for PRS interest:
about being fired from her jobs. Struggled with WH police.
Carried knife.
Degree of threat: . 1
2
3
organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Paranoid-schizophrenic with dellusions of persecution by police
black
Nationalistic group:
Date called
to Secret Service
attention:
5/6/63
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
Action. taken:
Committed from WH 5/63. Released as not being dangerous.
Location of subject lasts unknown
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
8/14/67
'64
1H 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 87
---
## Page 88
85
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS interest:
BENNETT, WILLIAM ROBERT
5763 obscene letter with implied
threat. Angry because IRS had disallowed tax deductions and
taken money. from VA compensation check. Friendly to JFK.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
5/7/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 5/63; subject was drunk when wrote letter. Friendly
to President. Prosecution declined.
Location of subject last:- Lajunta, Colorado '64
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Denver
8/14/67
MH 54046
DocId: 32241845 Page 88
---
## Page 89
86
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
TONE, JOHN
Reason for PRS interest: -
5/63 WH visitor who said he had no
friends in the world. President was only place he could det help.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
Schizophrenic-paranoid type
Nationalistic group:
_black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
5/10/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed from WH, 5/63 and confined until 2/64. Had been
arrested in the past for carrying a pistol and had cut a man
up badly.
Iocation of subject last: Dallas, Tx. '66
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Dallas
8/15/67
1N 54046 D0010:32241845 Page 89
---
## Page 90
87
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
pres.
Returned 9/63.
DELGROSSO, PIETRO
5/63 WH visitor. Believed he was
This time was not released: committed
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret
Service
attention:
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action
taken:
Committed from WH 9/63 but no diagnosis.
5/10/63
Location of subject last: Bronx, NY '65
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
8/15/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 90
---
## Page 91
88
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MCGURRIN, WILLIAM JOSEPH
Reason for PRS interest:
5/10/63 threat letter to JFK saying
he would put a bullet through pres. head.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to secret service attention: -
5/13/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed and arrested 5/13/63. Admitted threat but claimed no
intent. Wanted to be arrested to get medical attention. Has
threatened family. Violent temper. 6/1/67 threat to LBI written
from hospital. Interviewed but not considered dangerous.
1963 hospitalized - last report 1/8/68. Paranoid but not dangerous.
Knowledge of weapons and considered excellent shot.
Location of subject last:- Haymart, Pa. '67
Field Office reporting:
Scranton
Last update:
4/22/68
HHH
•HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 91
---
## Page 92
89
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
KNOX, JEFFERSON DALE
5/9/63 threatening telegram to Pres.
stating "I must have your blood, or you must have mine in time."
9/2/65 told police that JFK was unfair to blacks and he would have
to take care of JF.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
numerous commitments since '62; schizophrenic paranoid. chronia
Nationalistic group:
_ black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
5/13/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 5/22/63 and considered dangerous by SA. Interviewed
3/17/66; uttered threat; violent; considered extremely dangerous.
Prosecution authorized. Arrested. Determined incompetent to stand
trial, committed. 6/23/70 interviewed at state hospital. Not
interested in Pres. QI's discont. 6/23/70.
Military record shows assault with a deadly weapon.
Location of subject last:- Los Angeles '71
Field Office reporting:
LA
Last update:
1/28/71
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 92
---
## Page 93
90
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name
of individual:
WILSON, LILLY NORWOOD
Reason for PRS interest:
5/12/63 call to Joseph Kennedy
Imagines she is acquainted with Kennedy family
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Numerous confinements since '52.
Schizophrenic reaction, paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
5/12/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
5/28/63 interviewed; uncooperative.
No action taken.
Location of subject last: Staunton, Va
Field Office
reporting:
Richmond
Last update:
8/14/67
• ' 66
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 93
---
## Page 94
91
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
to kill you".
HOLCOMB, ALEX LEWIS
5/11/63 letter stating, "I am goina
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
claims former membership in KKK
3
Nationalistic group:
- none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
5/15/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
6/5/63 interviewed. Said he wrote letter to get attention far.
his attempt to honorable discharge. SA reported subject friendly
toward President. Prior to interview, subject was arrested on
5/31/63 for 871. Given two year probation.
Location of subject last:- Atlanta, Ga
Field Office reporting:
Atlanta
Last update:
8/14/6Z
'66
HW 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 94
---
## Page 95
92
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
CASTONGUEY, NORMAN ROGER
4/11/63 subject phoned NY FBI office
while drunk and at one time threatened President.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
SA reported subject appears in need of psychiatric help
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/15/63
Refered by
other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 4/17/63; drunk and incoherent Frequent moods of
depression. Characterized by FBI as chronic complainant.
Us attorney declined prosecution 5/28/63.
Location of subject last:- Brooklyn. '63
Field Office reporting: NY
Last update:
8/15/67
H# 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 95
---
## Page 96
93
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
REEDY, HERBERT EMMETT
Reason for PRS interest:
Visited S.S. forgery section 5/63
claiming govt. owes him compensation for illness incurred working
on atom bomb. Visits to LBJ in '64 about money also. Claimed to
be FBI agent. By '68 was claiming to be s.s. agent.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
none noted other than the s.S. kept tabse
Said he owned magnum.
5/21/63
Location of subject last: Cleveland '68
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Washington
10/28/68
1A 54046
DooId:32241845 Page 96
---
## Page 97
94
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HORTON, ORMAN BRIGGS
Reason for PRS interest:
5/22/63 visited WH re violation of
civil rights.
In '64 threatened federal judge, expressed desire
to get auto weapon and mentioned LBJ. '66 hostile toward Pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Numerous commitments
since '62 - schizophrenic paranoid.
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
5/22/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
S.S. kept tabs, then in '68 gI's werejinitiated. 10/14/70 discont.
Iocation of subject last: San Antonio, Tx. '71
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Tampa
3/12/71
Nixon
NH 54046 DoOId:32241845 Page 97
---
## Page 98
95
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HALPECKA, RENEE
Reason for PRS interest:
5/21/63 telephoned VP three times.
Said that Russian tried to black mail her and she wanted Vp to
help. Telephoned in '64; feels she was mistreated in re to her
first calls.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Agent felt subject has mental problem. No diagnosis.
Nationalistic group: - none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
_6/4/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 6/20/63 and said she wanted VP help. She was checked
again before Brezhnew's visit. Deemed not of protective interest
Location of subject lasts- Vincentown, NU '73
Field Office reporting: - Phila
Last update:
6/20/13
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page
98
---
## Page 99
96
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WESSON, JOSEPH LINDBERGH POST
Reason for PRS interest:
5/23/63 threatening letter to Pres.
Signed neighbors. name to embarass neighbor.
Degree of threat:.
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Hospitalized periodically since '63 - paranoid schizophrenic.
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
5/28/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 5/28/63 and 5/8/64. Said he was just trying to embarass
neighbor. Wrote Pres. seeking help in '65. Interviewed again in
'69 and he blamed S.S. agents for mother's death. Said President
was good man but that several persons in his hospital where he is
confined threatened Pres. Doctors did not evaluate him as dangerous
but said subject is cunning. U.S. attorney declined prosecution 64.
Location of subject last: Phoenix '73
Field Office reporting:
Phoenix
Last update:
11/6/69
1N 54046 D0010:32241845 Page 99
---
## Page 100
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECIIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
COOK, WILLIAM
5/31/63 and 12/14/64 WH visitor.
Wanted money and car from President.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Hospitalized '60-'63 but escaped. Schizophrenic, paranoic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
5/31/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Regarded as possibly dangerous '64.
Committed from. WH. 12/14/64.
Location of subject last; Washington, D. C. '67
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
8/14/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 100
---
## Page 101
98
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
WALTZ, FRANK CLINTON
Letters 1963 to 1966. WH visitor
8/24/65. Wanted Pres. help in obtaining custody of his children.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
6/3/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 6/6/63. Made statement in Nov. '63 that he was alad
JFK was assassinated. Reinterviewed 12/6/63 - said he liked LBJ.
Has history of assault. but not jailed.
Location of subject lasts Cincinnati '69
• Field Office
reporting:
Cincinnati
Last update:
8/14/67
NIXON
NW 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 101
---
## Page 102
99
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
PERRY, ANDREW ANTHONY
Reason for PRS interest: -
6/63 wrote letter threatening JEKe
RFK, Police Commissioner of NY, and VP Johnson. Wrote name of
another person for the purposes of causina trouble.
Degree of threat: . 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizophrenic with mixed reaction, has attempted suicide
Nationalistic group: → none
Date called
I to secret Service attention: - 6/3/63
Refered by
other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 6/19/63, denied knowledge of letter. Handwriting
proved his authorship. Arrested. Considered vindictive &
dangerous. Nolle Prosse due to continued hospitalization in '67.
Subject kept on files and incoming anonymous notes compared to his:
Location of subject last;-Yonkers, NY '73
Field Office reporting: - NY
Last update: _ 2/15/75
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page
102
---
## Page 103
100
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name
of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
MILLER, COLUMBUS (JR.).
WH visitor 6/3/63. Claimed he was God.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Schizophrenic paranoid
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
6/3/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed from WH 6/3/63 and hospitalized to 9/4/63; again in '66.
Location of subject lasts Chicago
Field Office reporting:
Chicago
Last update:
8/15/67
'67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 103
---
## Page 104
• 101
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DOUGLAS, MARSHALL
Reason for PRS
interest:
WH visitor 6/4/63 and 6/5/63. Wanted
to see JFK about personal problem.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
hospitalized '42, '52, '58 and '63.
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed from WH 6/5/63
3.
Schizo
6/4/63
Location of subject last:- Brooklyn '65
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
8/15/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 104
---
## Page 105
102
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MAGDALENE, EMMANUEL
Reason for PRS interest: -
6/3/63 subject phoned FBI re JFK.
He was interviewed that date - incoherent, friendly, not of
interest.
10/17/66 phoned FBI and advised he had gun to kill
Pres. Subject claimed to be harassed by Negro group called "the
Johnson". Through the next three years claimed to be FBI and S.S.
agent.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Schizophrenic paranoid, chronic, nervousssystem syphilis, incompetent
Nationalistic group:
_black
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
6/3/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed in '63 and deemed not of interest tho' file was opened.
Following years his threat was stronger and he was arrested under
18 USC 871 on 11/2/66. '68 complaint was dismissed in favor of
state commitment. In 2/69 he was committed by USSS.
Had extensive criminal record with assault arrests.
Iocation of subject lasts San Antonio, Tx '69
Field Office reporting:
San Antonio
Last update:
11/30/70
N4 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 105
---
## Page 106
103
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
LOFFREDO, RAYMOND ANTHONY
Reason for. PRS interest:
6/4/63 subject committed from Ft. Myer
for rummaging through rooms and then setting fire. When committed
he told officials that he had visited WH 2 times on prévious night.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
committed periodically since '45; schizo-paranoid, chronic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
6/4/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES Army
Action taken:
Subjects
story not verified.
QI's from 6/63 to 10/57.
Location of subject last:- Brockton, Ma
Field Office reporting:
Boston
Last update:
9/16/74
'74
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 106
---
## Page 107
104
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
CRAWFORD, LLOYD BURRELL
FBI referral 6/1/63. Informant
Reason for PRS interest:
claimed
subject indicated he might shoot JFK during San Diego
visit 6/6/63. Informant not considered reliable - claimed
Robert Schlicht made similar statements.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service
Refered by
other agency?
NO
Action
taken:
subject interviewed 6/19/63.
reliable. End of case.
attention:
YES
6/3/63
FBI
Denied statement.
Informant not
Location of subject last: San Diego
Field Office reporting:
San Diego
Last update:
8/15/67
'63
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 107
---
## Page 108
105
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
SCHLICHT, ROBERT JOHN
FBI referral 6/1/63. Claimed informant
said Schlicht might shoot JFK while in san Diego. Informant,
Ralph Sandhaus, not reliable.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
6/3/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FB1
Action taken:
Interviewed 6/19/63. Denied statement. Informant not reliable.
Case ended.
Location of subject last: San Diego
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
San Diego
8/15/67
' 63
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 108
---
## Page 109
106
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SANDHAUS, RALPH CLINTON
Reason for PRS interest:
subject informed FBI 6/1/63 that
Schlicht and Crawford indicated they might shoot JFK while in
San Diego.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
appeared neurotic. No diagnosis. SA believed subj. mildly mentally ill
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to secret service attention:
6/3/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 6/19/63 and considered unreliable. Ten years later
he showed up at USSS HQ to ask if he could put on job applications.
that he'd lost earlier job due to cooperation with fed. agencies.
Location of subject last: LA '73
Field Office reporting:
LA
Last update:
8/6/73
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 109
---
## Page 110
107
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
STEADMAN, DAVID ALVIN
Reason for PRS interest: -
6/16/63 subject observed near WH
acting in suspicious manner, arrested twice in D.C. for CDW.
12/11/63 climbed fence at JFK's grave site.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
numerous commitments since: 62; schizo-paranoid; considered very dan-.
gerous if not kept on medication.
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
6/16/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:.
Interviewed 6/16/63, aggressive but not of interest to SA.
'67 involved in shooting with police. @I's from 3/17/64 - 12/3/68.
10/20/70 subject under 24 hour surveillance during presidential
visit of same date.
Location of subject Lasts
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
-Kingsport, Tn.
Nashville
11/5/70
'70
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 110
---
## Page 111
108
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DILLARD, WILLIAM LEE
Reason for PRS interest:
6/6/63 anon derogatory post card to
Pres. During '63-'64 subj wrote 125 obscene threatening letters
to various govt officials.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizoid personality
Nationalistic group:
— none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
6/21/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
9/8/64 arrest by SS & POI at Washington. D.C. for mailing obscene
matter. Indicted also for Sec 871. 9/11/64 interviewed and
complained of racial problems and unemployment. Considered not
dangerous. QI's from 9/16/64. to.2/12/69.
Iocation of subject last;- Bethesda '69
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Washington
2/26/69
Gov. Millard Tawes,
Jacob Javits, JFK
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 111
---
## Page 112
109
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
PATTERSON, MARCELLUS MOSS
Reason for PRS interest: -
6/26/63 while being arrested by NYPD
subj stated JFK should be killed for his economic policies. Later
could not account for his statement.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
numerous confinements; schizophrenic with persecution complex
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
7/2/63
Refered by other agency?
"NO
YES
NYPD
Action taken:
6/63 committed by USSS at Plattsburgh, NY. 8/26/63 subj permanently
committed to NY mental institution due to inability to care for him-
self. QI's initiated. 11/29/63 subj eloped. due to fear that he
would be connected to assassination - Pres. complex. 5/66 committed
by USSs in Chicago. Cont. letter writing to various people. NO
animosity for protectees and deemed not dangerous.
Location of subject
last:
NY. '77
NY
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
2/16/77
NIXON, ROCKFELLER
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 112
---
## Page 113
110
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DUDAS. ADAM
Reason for PRS interest: _ 7/4/63 came to WH to get help from Pres.
Delivered letter at this time. 9/14/63 incoherent call to s.s.
Felt he was being persecuted by communists.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
Czech
Date called to Secret Service attention:
7/4/63
Refered by other agency?
YES
Action taken:
7/4/63 interview, SA statedüsubject was friendly towards President.
6/73 attempt to locate subj in connection with Brezhnev's visit.
met with negative results. Began contact with WH again in '74.
Location of subject last; San Francisco
Field Office reporting:
San Fráncisco
Last update:
10/9/75
'75
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 113
---
## Page 114
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name
of individual:
FAILS, VIRGINIA LEE
Reason for PRS interest:
7/6/63 EOB visitor to see JFK. Would
not talk to any one else. Caused scene that day at bus cepot.
Arrested and stated he would kill Mrs. Kennedy and Caroline.
Degree of threat:
1
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
committed periodically since '53; schizo-paranoid, dangerous.
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
7/6/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 7/23/63 - thought dangerous. Does not look as though
any further investigation was done, however.
Location of subject last:- Detroit, Mi '67
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Detroit
8/17/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 114
---
## Page 115
112
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
ALEXY, JOHN CARL
Reason
for PRs interest:
7/63 wrote several letters to JFK.
8/63 called National Bureau of Standards and said he would direct
his voltage machine at the WH.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
mental history since '57; paranoid schizo
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
8/8/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
•YES
Nat'1 Bureau of Standards
Action taken:
When he came to the WH 5/10/67 he was committed. In '69 he was
interviewed and determined to be capable of violence. QI's were
discont. 4/27/71.
Location of subject last: Washington, D.C. '75 hosp.
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
7/8/74
1N 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 115
---
## Page 116
113
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
JOHNSON, JAMES ROBERT
Reason for PRS interest:
Info' rec'd 12/12/63 that subj reportedly
threatened to kill father and Kennedy children.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
chronic paranoid schizophrenic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/12/63
Refered by other agency? No?
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/13/63; denied threat. Appeared mentally ill.
In '68 wrote letter that implied threat against pres. QI's ini-
tiated 2/27/64 - 10/3/67 and again 6/12/68 - 4/16/69. Letters
in '72 caused his arrest 8/31/72 for violation of 18 Sec 871.
Charges dismissed in lieu of commitment. Ql's initiated again.
Location of subject last; iNY '77
Field Office reporting:
NY
Last update:
1/26/78
AT 54046
DocId: 32241845
Page 116
---
## Page 117
114
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MAJOR, MARVIN EDWARD
Reason
for PRS interest:
7/10/63 appeared at WH
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
confined '60-61 and '65 to '66. Schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic
group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
7/10/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
2/20/64 interviewed; subj continued writing letters becoming abu-
sive. SA reported subj dangerous 2/1/65 and he was committed by
USSS 3/12/65. '69 committed suicide
Location of subject lasts. Toulumne County, Ca. '69
Field Office
reporting:
Last update:
LA
10-14-69
NIXON
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 117
---
## Page 118
115
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
PITCHER, ETHEL
7/10/63 and 9/27/63 appeared at WH
Claimed communists are using her.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
7/10/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed on 9/27/63 from WH and released.
6/73 subj was investigated in connection with Brezhnev's visit.
Location of subject last: Jersey City, NJ
'73
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Newark
6/20/73
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 118
---
## Page 119
116
•INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HILL, COMER
10-4-63 subject appeared at WH with
Reason for PRS interest:
desire to work with the pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid schizo
Nationalistic group: _
→ black
Date called
to Secret Service attention::
10/4/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed and evaluated as not dangerous, nuisance type. No
protective interest. From '65 to '69 subi was letter writer to WH.
By '73 definitely mentally ill with phone calls to high officials
Has been hospitalized seven time since '62 and S.S. Keeps tabs..
Location of subject last:- Dallas. '17
Field Office reporting:.
Dallas
Last update:
4/22/77
NiXON, HHH, Kennedy (Ed)
Carter
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 119
---
## Page 120
117
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
CARMONY, GROVER CLEVELAND
Reason for PRS interest:
10-15-63 appeared at USSS forgery
section and interviewed. Wants to discuss personal problems
with pres. No hostility.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
VA hospitals '52-'64. Schizo-chronic paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed by USSS 10-15-63
3
7/16/63
Location of subject last: Middlesboro, KY
Field Office reporting:
Louisville, KY
Last update:
8/15/67
'67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 120
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## Page 121
118
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SHOEMAKER, SHIRLEY MONROE
Reason for PRS
interest:
7111/63 subj told cab driver he was
member of VP staff, also misused senate gallery pass.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
commitments in '63 '64 '65 '66 schizo-paranoid '67
none
Nationalistic. group:
Date called-to Secret Service attention:
7/11/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
7/20/63 interview; determined to be of protective interest. Tabs
were kept on subject. Letters and calls cont. along with commitments.
In '67 FBI arrested subj for impersonation of Air Force personnel.
Same year SA determined that subject was no longer of protective
interest. Letters cont.
Location of subject last:- Redlands, Ca
'71
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
11/21/75
Nixon, Agnew, Ford
1H 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 121
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## Page 122
119
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
THOMAS, MELVIN LLOYD
7/18/63 escapedifrom mental instituation
arrived in D.C. and said he was Treasury agent. He was here to
remove pres from office and take over govt.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid schiza - no history of violence
Nationalistic group: black
Date called to
Secret Service attention:
7/18/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interview 7/18/63, incoherent; no threats, Committed by USSS
Location of subject last:. Elgin, Il.
'67
Field Office reporting:
Chicago
Last update:
11/16/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 122
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## Page 123
120
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
to the pres.
OHLY, WILLIAM N.
7/63 and 6/66 wrote abusive letters
Degree of threat:
Organizations to which individual belongs:
John Birch Society, Let Freedom Ring Society
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Checked background. No history of violence.
protective interest.
7/19/63
Not considered of
Location of subject lasts Westerville, OH '66
Columbus
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/15/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 123
---
## Page 124
121
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ELLIS, WALTER BRUCE ( JR. )
Reason for PRS interest:
7/19/63 WH caller, friendly
Cont. to be visitor in '64 & '65.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
, none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
7/19/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed and did not appear to be of protective interest:
Location of subject lasti..:
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Austin.
'72
Austin
2/24/72
LBJ, Nixon, Ed Kennedy
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 124
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## Page 125
122
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HOWIE, PAULINE
Reason for PRS interest:
7123/63 and 5/27/65 caller at USSS.
Believes govt. owes her a trilliont dollars.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
hospitalized '51-'58. No diagnosis.
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
7/23/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
S.S. Keeps tabs but does not feel she presents a danger to any
persons under their protection at this time.
Location of subject lasts.::
Field Office
reporting:
Last update:
Detroit
9/23/77
Roseville, MI '77
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 125
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## Page 126
123
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BRADBURN, RAYMOND MARION JOSEPH
Reason for PRS interest:
7/19/63 letter to Pres in which subj
stated he would kill him and rape wife unless given 3 million $.
4/16/65 info rec'd that subject while in prison had planned to
assassinate JFK.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
psychotic deliquent
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
7/24/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 7/31/63 and said letter was joke & would like to apolo-
gize to pres. QI's initiated. He was arrested this day for vio-
lence 18-871 and served four year sentence. When interviewed in
'65 about assassination plot he denied statement. No problems
since his release. Q's discont. in '68. Subject does not appear
to present danger to protectees at this time.
Location of subject last: Everett, WA '78
Field Office reporting:
Seattle
Last update:
4/3/78
Nixon, Lloyd Meeds, Carter
14 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 126
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## Page 127
124
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HAWKINS, JAMES ARVILLE
Reason for PRS interest:
7/24/63 subj overheard making statement
that he was going to washingon to blow JFK's head off because he
believed Pres. was giving blacks jobs when he couldn't find one.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
epileptic and mentally retarded; schizo traits
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
7/26/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
7/26/63 arrested for threat and claimed he was only joking.
Repeated threat in s.C. before being arrest.. Numerous interviews
since conviction on threat and release. Last Interview 3/13/68•
subj showed no animosity. Check ups discont.
Location of subject
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
last;
Miami, Fl
'68
Miami
4/22/68
•H# 54046 . DocId:32241845 Page 127
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## Page 128
125
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
FISH, HAROLD BRADFORD
7/25/63 reported by Pres. naval aide
as possibly of protective interest. Has telephoned various
agency but no history of violence.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
confined '53 - '55 with one escape.
No diagnosis
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
7/25/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
USN
Action taken:
Not interviewed but given background checks..
protective interest.
Deemed not of
Location of subject lasti Kansas City, MO
'73
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Kansas City
4/12/73
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 128
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## Page 129
126
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
GORDON, RUDOLPH NATHANIEL (III)
Reason for PRS interest:
7/28/63 handed letter to Pres. after
church services. 10-27-64 stowed away on WH press planerenroute
to Pittsburch, Pa. from Boston.
Degree of threat: . 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
mental patient '62: manic depressive with grandiose ideas
Nationalistic group:
_ black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
7/30/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Not considered dangerous.
Location of subject last:::
Field Office
reporting:
Last update:
Boston '67
Boston
11/8/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 129
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## Page 130
128
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
ROBERTSON, JOHN FREDERICK
'63 subj sent incoherent letter to
pres.
8/11/63 appeared at Pentagon.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
hospitalized periodically since'59. No diagnosis
Nationalistic group:
black
•Date called to Secret Service attention:
8/23/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Not interviewed until 12/65 because subi believed that Pres. Kennedy
has made him a general. Doctors feel subi not dangerous.
Location of subject last: Stockton State Hosp. CA '67
Field Office reporting:
Sacramento
Last update:
8/15/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 130
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## Page 131
129
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
WOLFF, TADEUSZ GODOT
Since '63 subj has been writing JFK,
LBJ and U Thant complaining of injustices.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
SA states subj mentally disturbed
Nationalistic group:
_ German
Date called to Secret Service attention:
5/20/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed on many occasions. Last interview '67 and subject
is still bitter towards govt. No animosity toward Pres. not
of protective interest.
6/21/72 report states that subj is trying to get in East Berlin
and gave Polish authorities his permit to re-enter US issued by INs.
Location of subject last:- Nuernberg, Germany '72
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Paris
7118/12
1N 54046 D0010:32241645 Page 131
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## Page 132
130
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SMITH, JAMES F.
Reason for PRS interest: _
Subi apprehended on 8/15/63 inside
security area at Anacostia Naval Air Station where Pres. heli-
copters are based.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
8/15/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
USN
Action taken:
• Interviewed 8/15/63; no animosity towards Pres.
did not know where he was.
Was drunk and
Location of subject last: unknown
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
8/15/67
'63
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 132
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## Page 133
131
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
FULLER, MELVIN
Reason for PRS interest:
_Since 1963 letters to Pres. Friendly
in nature. '66 visited WH twice.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
hospitalized since '54. Paranoid, chronic, in remission.
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called
to Secret service attention:8/19/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
7/15/66 committed from WH. In '68 applied for gun permit. s.s.
kept tabs of whereabouts. QI's were finally discont. 5/7/69.
In '71 appeared at the WH again and was committed again. 5/12/71
QI's initiated and 5/19/71 discont.
Location of subject last: Washington, D.C. '73
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
9/1/71
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 133
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## Page 134
132
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
MULLEN, MILTON RALPH
8/17/63 WH visitor.
Admires Pres.
Wanted to be paid for invention used on carrier Enterprise
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
None
Committed since WH visit but no diagnosis
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed date of WH visit
3
8/19/63
Iocation of subject last: Myerstown, Pa '71
Field Office reporting:
Scranton
Last update:
5/27/71
HH 54046 DoOId:32241845 Page 134
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## Page 135
133
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS
interest:
Last contact 1/23/64
WINSTON, ELIZABETH BARBARA
Numerous letters and calls to WH
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
commited '59 and '63 paranoid - schizo
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
Interviewed 8/23/63; hostile towards agents.
pathic conversations with JFK.
3
8/21/63
Says she has tele-
Location of subject last: Poughkeepsie, NY (State Hospital) '69
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
6/17/69
NIXON
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 135
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## Page 136
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECIIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BRASWELL, HAROLD
Reason for PRS interest:
8/18/63 MAILED LETTER TO PRES. WITH
implied threat. Disturbed over court martial and plight of Negroes.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
8/26/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
9/11/63 committed by S.S. and family for having written implied
threatening letter. Interviewed several times since '63, last
being 4/3/68. No hostility shown. Up until '76 he had written
a few letters - friendly. 3/30/76 obscene letter to Betty Ford
but not threatening.
Location of subject last: Milledgeville, Ga.
'75 state hosp
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Nashville
3-30-76
Wallace
1N 34046
Doc1d: 32241545 Paye
136
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## Page 137
135
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
WH 8/63,
DORCH, JAMES ( JR)
8/63 and 2/66 WH visitor. Called
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
chronic brain syndrome with convulsive disorders with psychotic re
actrons
black
Nationalistic group:
Date called to
Secret Service attention:
8/27/63
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed from WH 8/27/63 and 2/21/66. Religous obsession.
Location of subject lasti. unknown
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
8/15/67
'67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 137
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## Page 138
136
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
RASIN, ARTHUR (MRS.)
Reason for PRS interest:
Since 1963, letter writer and caller,
religious fanatic with imagined devine revelations for solving
US problems... Has cont. to visit and write WH up to '73.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
'63 diagnosed schizo
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
. NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 8/63. S.S. kept tabs.
3
9/3/63 file opened
Location of subject last; Cedar Grove, NJ '73
Field Office
reporting:
Newark
Last update:
8/3/73
HHH, Nixon, Agnew
NN 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 138
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## Page 139
127
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SINCLAIR, WILLIAM HENRY
Reason
for PRs interest: -
8/5/63 referred by FBI after writing
abusive letter to RFK and because he stole weapons from a National
Guard armory and committed an armed robbery.
After JFK assassination he expressed no concern and said LBJ could
be next.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
behavior disorders
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to secret Service attention: 8/7/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES FBI
Action taken:
Apparently subj was incarcerated.
Not until 10/67 was subject
interviewed. Expressed no hostility toward USSS protectees and
not considered dangerous toward them.
Location of subject last:.::
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Syracuse
11/7/67
Schenectady, NY '67
H# 54046
DocId: 32241845 Page 139
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## Page 140
137
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WILSON, LLOYD JOHN
Reason for PRS interest: 9/9/63 info from FBI that subiect wrote
pres. (never mailed) saying "I'll destroy govt. along with you."
12/19/63 subj told Chicago FBI that he paid LHO $1000 to kill
JFK.
Degree of threat:
1
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
ANP sympathizer - not member
schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
9/9/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed day he told FBI he'd hired LHO and made threat to LBJ.
8/25/64 told police he was enroute to a. to offer ANP his ser-
vices in killing LBJ and RFK. Cannot control actions, extremely
dangerous. 3/19/69 intvd - claimed activities in '63 due to imma-
turity. No longer any feelings toward ANP. Determined no further
protective interest, QI's from 11/8/63 -3/19/69. 9/25/75 San Diego
Field Office advised
Location of subject
that subtedad, Ca. or San Diego
subject to be released from prison soon.
Field Office reporting: - San Francisco
Last update:
9125/75
Wilson was arrested at Chicago by USSS 12/20/63 on Sec 871 but
→dismissed.
Another warrant issued 9/64 but declined because of
arson conviction.
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 140
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## Page 141
138
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HICKSON, FLORIDELLA LOUISE
Reason for PRS interest: 9/16/63 subi ran auto against the
east gate of wH. Stated she owned the WH and wanted to look
around.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group:
black
Date
called to Secret Service
attention:
9/17/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
Interviewed 9/16/63 and again 12/28/65. Appeared sane.
was committed from White House on 9776/63.
She
Location of subject last: Washington, D.C.
'66
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
8/16/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 141
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## Page 142
139
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_JONSSON, HORDUR
Reason for PRS interest:
9/17/63 during VP visit to Iceland
subj was overheard to say, "many things could happen today."
Had rifle in possession. Claimed on way to gunsmith, stopped
to see VP.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
none
manio-depressive '63
Nationalistic group:
Icelandic
Date called
to Secret
service attention:
9/17/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Arrested 9/17/63 as suspicious person. Not considered dangerous.
Weapon was inoperable. Was kept under surveillance during '73
Presidential visit. by parents.
Location of subject lasti-Iceland '73
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Paris
6/27/73
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 142
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## Page 143
140
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
JOHNSON, KATIE LEE
Reason for PRS interest:
10-24-63 arrested by FBI for extortion.
Several confinements 11/4/63 to 2/5/65, continuous since 9/19/68.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
(Confined)
organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid - schizo
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
10-31-63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Not until '64 when subject wrote 6 abusive letters of threatening
tenor to President was she interviewed (12/7/64). She denied
making threats.. S.s. kept tabs during confinement.
Iocation of subject last: Baltimore
'77
Field Office reporting:
Baltimore
Last update:
3/15/77
Nixon
HH 54046
DocId: 32241845 Page 143
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## Page 144
141
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
prophet with message for Jfk.
SWEIGART, JOHN SAMUEL
WH visitor 9/23/63. Claimed to be
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
confined 3 times '63-'65
Nationalistic group: .
none
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action
taken:
Committed from WH 9/23/63.
9/23/63
Location of subject last: 'Allentown, Pa. '67
Field Office reporting:
Phila
Last update:
8/15/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 144
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## Page 145
142
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HICKS, DOYLE ALLEN
Reason for PRS interest: WH visitor 9/26/63. Released. At
noon same date, he returned to WH with truck and rammed through
NW gate. Demanded to see Pres. about communists takina over N.C.
Friendly to Pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
_3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid-schizo
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service
attention:
9/26/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed from WH 9/63..
Interviewed 11/13/67 & subsequent times
Showed no interest in Pres.. 3/3/69 determined no further protec-
tive interest. QI's 10-7-63 - 3-3-69.
Location of subject last:- Morganton, N.C. '69 (state hasp)
Field Office reporting:
Charlotte
Last update:
3/6/69
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 145
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## Page 146
143
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:.-
KKK authorized him to kill pres.
GAINEY, WAYNE L.
FBI referral 9/24/63. Subject claimed
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
KKK
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to
Secret Service attention:
9/26/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 10-23-63 admitted derogatory statements about JFK
but denied intent to harm. Prosecution declined 11/4/63.
Iocation of subject last; Troy, Al
Field Office reporting:
Mobile
Last update:
8/15/67
'67
1N 54046 D0010:32241045 Page
146
---
## Page 147
144
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
RIVERA-ORTIZ JOSE ANTONIO
9/28/63 and 9/25/64 WH visitor.
Said he had radio wave contact with pres. Letter writer also.
Degree of
threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called
Secret Service attention:
10/21/63 file opened
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed from WH 9/25/64. Had been committed in '63 - no diagnosis.
Location of subject lasti- Aibonito, PR
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
San Juan
8/16/67
'65
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 147
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## Page 148
145
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ZIEMAN, CARL FRED
Reason for PRS interest: DUrina 10/63 subject mailed postcard
to WH complaining of destruction of mind thru colors.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
depressive reaction
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
10/11/63
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 10-24-63 claimed Ford Motor Co. was trying to murder
him through use of colors. Wanted Pres. help.: Friendly.
Location of subject lasts.: Taylor, MI
Field Office reporting:
Detroit
Last update:
8/15/67
' 65
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 148
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## Page 149
146
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
PIERCE, CHARLES COOPER
9/63 letter to Nixon. Not clear why
file was opened sooner than this.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid schizo
drug addict
Nationalistic group:
none
Däte called
to Secret Service attention:
8/24/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
Interviewed 1/25/67 and subj was incoherent. Friendly towards
pres. SA reported subject not of protective interest. This
comes four years after file was opened.
Location of subject lasti.:: Atascadero, CA '67
Field Office reporting:
LA
Last update:
8/15/67
NIXON
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 149
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## Page 150
147
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
_LINDLEY, ROBERI WILLIS
Prolific writer dating back to 9/10/63.
Believes Hitler is alive and Germans are takina over.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
mental deficiency with psychotic reaction
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to secret
Service attention:
9/11/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Subject was not interviewed at doctors request.
He had been com-
mitted in '62. QI's discont. 12/13/68.
Location of subject last: Lansing, MI
'68
Field Office reporting:
Grand Rapid
Last update:
12-20-68
NH 54046 DoOId:32241845 Page 150
---
## Page 151
148
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
WH.
CINCIRIPINI, ROBERT
9/28/63 subj wrote suicide letter to
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
10-3-63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 10-8-63 subj depressed over failure to receive VA
comp. No animosity for Pres and deemed not of protective interest:
Sent LBJ and Nixon letters requesting help.
Location of subject last: Braddock, Pa.
Field Office reporting:
Pittsburgh
Last update:
12-07-72
'72
NIXON, LBJ
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 151
---
## Page 152
149
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
JOHNSON, ALDEN BERNARD
Reason for PRS interest:
10-3-63 visited WH. Appreared to be
mental case and was not detained. Wanted to be next pres.
8/5/64 subj's wife advised subj may be in D.C. to harm Pres.since
he had threatened her.
Degree of threat:
1
_2
3
Organizations to
which individual belongs:
none
schizo
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
10-3-63
Refered by other agency?
YES
Action taken:
Turned away in '63.
In
'64, Sept. 15, subj was interviewed and he
stated he had no desire to see pres. No ill feeling fór LBJ.
SA reported subj rational and seemed to be harmless.
3/2/67 check
ups discont.
(Trained with explosives and all types firearms.)
Location of subject last; Phila
Field Office reporting:
Phila
Last update:
4/22/68
'68
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 152
---
## Page 153
150
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
HILL, AFTON MARIE DARDEN
10-1-63 subj came to LA S.S. wanting
help from Pres. because architectural design had been stolen from
her.
In '70 she wrote letter to Nixon.. Not until '74. did
she become abusive in manner. In '76 threatened Pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
P.D. determined subj mentally unstable and incapable of carrying out
threat
Nationalistic group: black
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
10-1-63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
S.S. kept tabs, determined not a danger to persons under protection
of s.s.
Location of subject last: Seattle
Field Office reporting:
Seattle
Last update:
9-10-76
'76
Nixon, Ford
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 153
---
## Page 154
151
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
Machines were torturing her.
GORDON, HOPE
'63 wrote Pres. wanting help.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
10-6-63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Not until 5/20/65 was anything done. That day she was apprehended
with a pocketful of rocks in NYC hotel where VP was staying.
Committed that date at request of USss.
Location of subject lasti.::
Field Office
reporting:
Last update:
Orangeburg, NY
NY
' 65
8/15/67
IN 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 154
---
## Page 155
152
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
cucUZ, PETER SAVIN
10-10-63 FBI advised S.S. that subj
had made threat on life of Tito and planned to picket WH.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
slav
Date called to secret service attention: 10-10-63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES FBI
Action
taken:
Interviewed 10-14-63, admitted threat to SA but stated he made
it during heated discussion and had no intention of carrying
it out or picketing WH.
Owns .25 automatic
Location of subject Lasti
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
unknown '75
Indianapolis
12-17-70
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 155
---
## Page 156
153
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
•CICHOWICZ, JOHN JACOB
Reason for PRS interest:
10-9-63 letter to JFK, 8-13-65 appeared
at WH to discuss something important with pres. Unable to control
himself physically.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
mental hospl '59 to '65 intermittently. Schizo, chronic
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
_ 10-14-63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
8-13-65 committed from WHe committed from WH again in 3/69 when.
he visited and became hostile. QI's initiated 3/20/69 and
discont. 4/22/69.
Iocation of subject last:- Hartford '69
Field Office reporting:
New Haven
Last update:
4/28/69
Nixon
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 156
---
## Page 157
154
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
NIEMAN, BERTHA
Reason for PRS interest:
9/23/63 FBI advised S.S. that subj
requested appt. with pres. Subject had written several letters
to Pres. wanting help with personal problems.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
9/23/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 9/26/63 and SA stated subj was friendly toward Pres.
Location of subject last: Bonner, Mont.
Field Office reporting:
Spokane
Last update:
8/16/67.
'65
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 157
---
## Page 158
155
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
LEWIS, EMILY ANN
10-12-63 letter from Schoen that he was
acquainted with subj and she claimed to be a daughter of Joe Kennedy.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:10-12-63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/19/63 and subj claimed to be illegitimate daughter.
Investigation showed her to be imposter, possibly for extortion.
'64 letter to Ed Kennedy.
Location of subject last: unknown
Field Office reporting:
NY
Last update:
1/16/69
'76
Ed Kennedy.
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 158
---
## Page 159
156
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WARRINGTON, JOHN WILLIAM
Reason for PRS interest:
Oct. 15, 16, & 17 '63 subject wrote
JFK telling him to stop taking order from MLK or he would be
waiting in ambush in Florida.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
psychosis with numerous confinements
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
10-17-63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
Arrested 10-18-63 by FBI for extortion, interveiwed by SA 10-23-63
SA reported no ill feeling toward Pres. Later letter threatened
RFK. Interviewed 3/16/66 and subj stated he wanted to kill Bobby
Kennedy. SA reported subj is mentally ill and irrational.
Claims limited training with firearms.
Location of subject last; Biloxi, MIss '67
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Jackson
4/23/68
JFK, RFK
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 159
---
## Page 160
15.7
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
_ROSEN, SYLVIA GERALDINE
10-18-63 interviewed as Main Treasury
visitor who requested to see JFK. Said JFK had made mockery of
her and she should recieve $1 million.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
periodic mental confinement
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO?.
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed the 18th.
3
10-18-63
Ireasury
Location of subject lasti::
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
- Baltimore
8/16/67
Baltimore 164
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 160
---
## Page 161
158
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MOORE, GRACE FLORENCE
Reason for PRS interest:
10-20-63 called director of S.S. at
home about info re govt. checks. 10-20-63 interviewed by agents.
Evidenced no presidential complet. In '67 visited EOB and WH.
Degree of
threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
associates described her as showing paranoid behavior and not mentally
competent.
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
10-20-63 / 10-30 file
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed - not dangerous. In '67 when she visited WH she was
committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for mental observation.
Location of subject last: Washington, D.C.
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
6/15/67
'67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 161
---
## Page 162
159
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HOVLAND, ORVILLE MERLE LANGE
Reason for PRS interest:
11/29/63 letter to Pres. stated JFK
couldn't finish his term and neither would LBJ. Wrote many
derogatory things about LBJ, '65.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
John Birch Society
3
none
Nationalistic group:
11-29-63
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed in '65 and no opinion given as to protective interest
by SA. QI's were cont. until 3/20/69. S.S. kept tabs. In '76
when interviewed, he seemed to have complainst against Usss but
nothing against protectees.
Location of subject lasti-LA '77
Field Office reporting:
LA
Last update:
11/22/77
Reagan, Mondale
1N 54046 D0010:32241645 Page 162
---
## Page 163
160
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HARRIS, AARON CLYDE
Reason for PRS interest: Sent letter to Pres. 10-19-63
Said if he did not
receive some help, someone would be hurt.
Subj sent letters to VA officials and arrested by FBI.
Degree of threat:
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
alcoholic, schizo-paranoid
Nationagistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
10-28-63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
After FBI arrested him, SA interviewed him 12/4/63. Favored JFK
and knows nothing about LBJ. Wrote to pres in '65 complaining
about his imprisonment.
Location of subject last:.::
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Milligan, FL '67
Mobile
1126/70
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 163
---
## Page 164
161
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS
KAPLAN, JACOB
interest:
Letter writer since 9-30-63.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret
Service
attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Personal interview 10-28-65.
Religious man.
10-10-63 filë
No action
Location of subject last:-=
Long Beach, NY '71
NY
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/21/67
NIXON
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 164
---
## Page 165
162
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name
of individual:
SAVOY, NORMAN EUGENE
Reason for PRS interest:
Wh visitor 11/1/63 and 11/4/63. Said
God told him to come visit JFK and the Pres. owed him money.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid-schizo
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed from WH 11/4/63
Confined to 2/64
3
11/4/63
Location of subject last:- Washington, D.C. '65
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
8/16/67
HH 54046 DoOId:32241845 Page 165
---
## Page 166
163
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WETMORE, RICHARD OLIVER ( JR.)
Reason for PRS interest:
Climbed WH fence 11/5/63.
Wanted JFK
to authorize him to assassinate Kruschev. WH visitor 10-28-65.
Irrational.
"Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
- NO
YES
Action
taken:
Committed from WH 11/5/63 and 10-28-65
11-5-63
Was interviewed in connection with Brezhner's visit to us.
Last location: Silver Spring, Md.
Field Office: Washington
Last UPD: 6/20/73
'73
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 166
---
## Page 167
164
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
CANIZARES-GARCIA RODRIGO XAVIER
:Reason for PRS interest: -
Toured WH 11/5/63 and broke mirror
with vase. Suffering from delusions.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
3
Cuban
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/5/63
Refered by other agency? -No
YES
Action taken:
Committed to D.C. General after interview of 11/5/63. Released
10-20-64 in custody of brother; deported to México.
Last location: unknown
Field Office: San Antonio
Last UPD: 571-67
'76
H# 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 167
---
## Page 168
165
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
MAUP IN, ROBERT WARREN
Reason for PRS interest: .
'63 and '66 letter writer. '66 letter
says he is taking over the presidency.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
psychoneurotic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/7/63
Refered by other agency?
'NO'
YES
• Action taken:
Interviewed 9/23/66. Realizes he has mental problems. Not dangerous.
Last location: VA hosp in Tacoma, WA
Field office:
Spokane
Last UPD:
8/16/67
'71
WH 54046 DocId: 3224184) Page 168
---
## Page 169
166
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DUNLAP, WILLIAM SAMUEL
Reason for PRS interest:
Letter writer '63, '64, '65 to RFK,
Hoover, and LBJ. Feels mistreated by whites and draft board.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
11/1/63
Refered by other agency?
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed '65 early and 1/10/66.
Appears psychotic - not documented.
Last location: Charlotte, NC
Field office:
Charlotte
Last UPD:
8/16/67
'67
N4 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 169
---
## Page 170
167
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MELCHIONNO, ROBERT THOMAS
Reason for PRS interest: 1/8/63 call to WH re him killing his
wife's boyfriend. 12/66 call re wanting help to get children
returned.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
_none
paranoid reaction with anxiety delusions
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date
called to Secret Service attention: 11/8/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
11/18/63 interviewed. SA reported no animosity toward Pres
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Boston
' 7.3
Boston
10-2-73
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 170
---
## Page 171
168
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MCBRIDE, SARAH JANE
Reason for PRS interest:
11-4-63 letter containing implied threat
re you may be first pres. to be assassinated.
Degree of threat: 1
2
organizations to which individual belongs:
HOnE
3
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11-8-63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
12/5/63 interviewed. Subject did not think Pres. did a aood job
but did not wish him harm.
Last location: Hollis, NY
'72
Field office:
Last UPD:
NY
11/10/72
NIXON
HH 54016 DocId:32241845 Page 171
---
## Page 172
169
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SMITH, JACK. HERBERT
Reason for PRS interest: 11/2/63 subj tried to force way into
Col. Eisenhower residence. Preoccupied with persons of high pol-
itical stature. In '76 obsessed with idea of marrying Mamie
Eisenhower and sent obscene letters.
Degree of threat:
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid with strong sexual delusions. Schizo. Dangerous
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention: 11/3/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/4/63. considered dangerous.: 11/7/63 committed by
Us attorney for sanity hearing. 4/66 QI's initiated; discont.
1/5/76. No interest in protectees and was therefore requested
to leave a function where the Up was to attend in '76.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Alexandria, Va.
WAshington
1/28/76
'76
H# 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 172
---
## Page 173
170
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
VALLEE, THOMAS::-
ARTHUR
Reason for PRS interest:
10-30-63 subj was reported by confidential
source to have made critical remarks re JFK adm. Subj alleges to
be member of JBS and previously hospitalized in VA hosp as schizo.
Not considered dangerous. Owns rifle and member of gun club.
Interviewed'63 and '66. In '68 interview, spoke irrationally.
Degree of threat:
Organizations to which individual belongs:
John Birch Society
2 (by computer info)
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
10-30-63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
According to print out: SA interviewed him 10-30-63. No mention
of danger. Does show that he was arrested 11/2/63 for traffic and
CCW. Apparently from reports, Vallee was not dangerous. In 11/26/68
interview, SA did not considered him to be of further protective
interest. No interest in protectèes was shown. QI's '63 to '681
Attempt to locate him in re to Brezhnev's visit proved negative.
Last location:
Houston '71
Field office:
Houston
Last UPD:
3/5/76
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 173
---
## Page 174
171
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HAMER, HEINRICH RICHARD
Reason for PRS interest: 11/16/63 called WH wanting $10,000
loan. 11/17/63 observed in D.C. hotel making statement that he
wanted Pres. to co-sign loan..
Degree of threat:
1
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group:
German
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/16/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Confined 11/16/63 to 12/18/63 = Chow could this be if he was
observed in hotel on 17th?
Visited WH again in '69 to complain about his committment in '63
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Suitland, MD
Washington
10-22-69
' 69
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 174
---
## Page 175
172
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
MORGAN, MATTHEW C (JR)
11-20-63 climbed fence into WH grounds'
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/20/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/20/63; friendly toward the Pres. Wanted to talk to
JFK about reduction in pay checks.
Committed from WH 11/20/63
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Rialto, CA '67
LA
8/16/67
NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 175
---
## Page 176
17.3
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Parrott, James Milton
Reason for PRS interest: -
11/21/63 info rec'd that subj stated
in '61 "If I had a chance to kill him, I would" referring to JFK.
Since then appeared to various high officials about communism, etc.
Came to S.S. HQ complaining about ss.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
John Birch Society
Minuteman
Freedom in Action Society
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/21/63
Refered by other agency?
NQ
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/28/64 and subj denied above statemnt. QI's initiated;
discont.. 5/6/70. Deemed not of protective interest. S.S. kept
tabs of doings, however.
Last location: Jäcinto: City, TX.. '77
Field office:
Houston
Last UPD:
6/24/77
Hah, Nixon, Reagan, Archer,
Rockefeller
NN 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 176
---
## Page 177
174
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_NANCE, ERNEST ROSCOE
Reason for PRS interest: 11-19-63 Austin P.D. reported that
subject had called them and said he'd throw a bomb in LBJ's face.
Degree of threat:
}
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
- none
Date called to Secret Service attention: _11/21/63
Refered by other agency?. NO
YES Austin P.D:
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/25/63.
Cooperative. Dislikes the Pres. WAs drunk
when call was made.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Austin
Austin
10-8-68
.' 69
HH 54046
DocId: 32211845 Page 177
---
## Page 178
175
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MORRE, JOHN LOURENCO ( JR)
Reason for PRS interest: -
11/22/63 subject phoned WH from PR
to report an assassination plot by PR Nationals against lives
of JFK and Eisenhower.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
Puerto Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/22/63
Refered by other agency? No-
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/23/63, friendly toward protectees and claimed he
controled a large spy ring against communists. Expressed no
animosity and further investigation showed that info was unfounded.
Subject deemed not of protective interest. sis. cont. to keep tabs
on Morre with his references to spy rings and him beina an agent.
In "74 SA opined that subject was mental but not öf protective interest.
Last location: Fajardo, PR
Field office:
San Juan
'74
Last UPD:
1/23/74
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 178
---
## Page 179
176
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
11/22/63 killed JFK
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group: none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/22/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 179
---
## Page 180
177
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
Reason for
PRS interest: ASSASSINATED
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
3
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
1N 54046 DocId:32241845 Page .180
---
## Page 181
178
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
RUBY, JACK LEON
Reason for PRS interest: 11/24/63 subject killed JFK assassin
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
3
Nationalistic group:
Date called to secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action
taken:
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 181
---
## Page 182
179 - 186
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS interest:
sociati
_ OSWALD, MARGUERITE CLFAVERIE
_OSWALD. ROBERT LEE (JR)
PIC. JOHN EDWARD
DEMOHRENSCHILDT, GEORGE
DEMOHRENSCHILDT, JEANNE
PAINE, MICHAEL RALPH
PAINE, RUTH HYDE
LANE, MARK
2
3
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 182
---
## Page 183
187
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BERES, PATRICE E.
Reason
for PRS interest: 11/25/63 apprehended on unauthorized
building in area of ST. Mathews Church.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
11/25/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action
taken:
Interviewed and stated was there to see funeral procession. Not
felt of further protective interest
Last location: Washington
Field office:
Washington
Last UPD:
8/16/67
' 63
1N. 54046 D0010:32241645 Page
183
---
## Page 184
188
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MCADAMS, DONALD GRANT
Reason for PRS interest: 11/25/63 apprehended on unauthorized
building in area of St. Mathews Church.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/25/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed by SA and stated was there to see funeral procession.
Not felt of protective interest.
Last location: Washington '63
Field office:
Last UPD:
Washington
8/16/67
H4 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 184
---
## Page 185
189
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
. DONNALLAM. EDNA B
Reason for PRS interest:
11/26/63 WH call stating she would attempt
to see pres. to clear herself of husband's murder. 2/67 same
complaint.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
11/26/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/27/63. Not felt of protective interest.
Began letter writing again in '72.
Last location: Bakersfield, CA '73
Field office:
Last UPD:
LA
10-25-72
Nixon, Shriver,-Kennedy (Ed)
IW 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 185
---
## Page 186
190
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
STEELE, LLOYD WAYNE
Reason for PRS
interest: -
11/24/63 telegram to Pres - hated him
in life and hates him in death. Up should have joined his fate.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/27/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Personal interview 12/3/63; friendly. Opposed to adm. Meant
no harm
and did not intend as threat. Not a man of violence.
Interviewed again 9/15/67. No animosity. Not dangerous or of
protective interest. Prosecution declined by USA on 12/4/63.
Last location: Ashland,. TN ' 6.7
Field office:
Nashville
Last UPD:
10-17 - 67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 186
---
## Page 187
191
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
CONAWAY, RAYMOND KENDALL
Reason for PRS interest:
11/27/63 made statement that he had
shotgun in possession to shoot LBu.
Degree of threat: 1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/29/63 file
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
11/29/63 interview subject said above statement was joke.
I1
placed. Not felt of protective interest.
Last location: Myrtle Beach, S.C.
Field office:columbia
Last UPD:
8/16/67
'65
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 187
---
## Page 188
192
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SMITH, JAMES LEWIS
Reason for PRS interest:
12/5/63 FBI report that subj made 2
anonymous calls, 9/15/64 and 11/11/63 to local. TV station with
reference that he had promised his mother that he would kill JFk.
Also mentioned Ist lady.
Also written WH and visited local USSS.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/29/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES EBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 9/18/64 and had no hostility toward President
Periodically confined.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Columbia, s.c.
'67 (state hosp)
Columbia
9/27/67
Lady Bird Johnson
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 188
---
## Page 189
193
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
SIMPSON, JOHN GEORGE
11/63 prolific letter writer to present
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/30/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 10-20-66 by SA.
Friendly toward Pres. Not felt danger-
ous by the SA. Justs sends letters on various subjects including
love note to Tricia Nixon.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Berkeley, CA
San Francisco
8/.24/76.
i76
Nixon, Ford
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 189
---
## Page 190
194
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual: -
_ WEATHERINGTON, ROBERT ALFRED
Reason for PRS interest: 11/27/63 subi telephoned US.S.S. Wash.D.C.
stating. he had valuable info for this service. 11/29/63 interview
and considered dangerous. Believed himself discriminated against
by the Pres. Had threatened private citizens.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
psychotic but not dangerous '63-'64.
'68 schizo-paranoid
•Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/27/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed and arrested for 18-871 on 11/30/63. Case dismissed '64.
S.S. Kept up interviews to keep tabs on subject. By '75 was makina
bomb threats against NY Times building..
Last location: Catonsville, MD
'75
Field office:
Last UPD:
Washington
2/13/75
Kennedy. (Ed) , Hogan, Nixon.
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 190
---
## Page 191
195
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DEVORE, JAMES (UR)
11/29/63 referral to USSSifield office
Reason for PRS interest:
from
relative of subj that subj had made derogatory remarks re
assassination and toward pres.
Degree
of
threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
None
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/29/63
Refered by other agency? No?
YES
Action
taken:
11/30/63 subject was interviewed and alleged remarks could not be
verified. Friendly. No indication of serious mental problems.
No hostility toward Pres. or other dignitaries. SA did not feel
subject was of interest at this time.
Last location: Perry Point, Md. '67 mental hosp.
Field office:
Last UPD:
Bältimore
10-16-67
54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 191
---
## Page 192
196
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SPORTIELLO, ANN
Reason for PRS interest: CAse referred to Field. on 12/2/63 ad-
vising subject had telephoned WH. Claimed she had information
about assassination.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
hosp. periodically since '53.
Paranoid-schizo
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/2/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed on 12/2/63. Investigation revealed subject was a
mental case, had no assassination information.
Last location: Staten Island, NY
Field office:
NY
Last UPD:
10-1-74
'74
Nixon.,. Ford
1H 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 192
---
## Page 193
197
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BASSETT, WILLIAM NELSON ( SR
Reason for PRS interest: _
11/3/66 and 12/2/63 called WH.
Said he had information of plot to kill LBJ.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/2/63
Refered by other agency?
Na
YES
Action taken:
Investigation disclosed subject drinks to excess and then places
phone calls. Subj has been arrested for armed robbery.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Norfolk
'67
Norfolk
8/16/67
, IN 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 193
---
## Page 194
198
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BRETTNER, THOMAS C.
Reason for PRS interest: 11/29/63 wrote director of S.S. with
advice about assassination investigation.
'69 letter about CIA harassment and '73 letter to Pres. about
fuel processing.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to secret service
attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
11/29/63
12/12/63 SA stated subject was sincere and admitted gaining info
from news media.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Kensington,. CA
'77
San Fráncisco
1/18/77
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 194
---
## Page 195
199
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_ WEBB, RICHARD DOYLE
Reason
for PRS interest: 9/25/63 subject had sights put on 2
rifles and allegedly stated he wanted a silencer to use to kill
JFK. Said he overheard anti-Castro group offer 25-50 thousand
dollars to kill JFK
Degree of threat: . 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Some association with ANP and KKK in past
3
Nationalistic group: - none
Date called to Secret
service attention: 11/7/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken: . ...
Interviewed several times & considered protective interest even
though subject alleges no hostility toward president. QI's discont,
12/22/69.
Hospitalized. in
'63.
Acute psychotic reaction; destructive fantasies
Last location: Birmingham
Field office:
Mobile
Last UPD:
4/19/73
73
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 195
---
## Page 196
200
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_ODEGAARDEN, ARNOLD
Reason for PRS interest: - 11/22/63 sent postcard addressed dear
children: of God and mentioning death of JFK. '64 letter to associate
threatening PRES.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid schizo
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/4/63 file opened
Refered
by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Not interviewed until 6/9/64 - obsession he was under religious
forces.
Considered dangerous by SA: No directional interest
shown since, but following release from hospital in '65, began
deteriorating and interview of 5/18/69 considered dangerous.
No interest exhibited in protectees. QI's discont. 1/30/70.
6/10/64 committed by local authorities due to threat against Pres.
Last location: Houston, MN '70
Field office:
Minneapolis
Last UPD:
1/30/70
WW 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 196
---
## Page 197
201
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS
interest:
info about assassination.
MCCABE, WALTER S. (UR.)
Letter to director of s.S. 12/63 aivina
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
confined since '64, paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/5/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/29/64. No animosity toward President. No validity
to his information.
Many arrests since '53, shot father and charged with murder in '63
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Farnhurst, DE
'67 State Hosp.
Phila.
8/16/67
NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 197
---
## Page 198
•202
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BOOKMAN, RAMON MARTIN
Reason
FOr PRS interest: _ FBI reported 12/2/63 that subiect
allegedly said LBJ would not come back from Florida.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/2/63
Refered
by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/9/63, uncooperative. Said he thought Pres. was a
good man. Prosecution on 871 declined 12R1/67
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
unknown
RiChMORdXXXAX
'64
Richmond
8117/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 198
---
## Page 199
203
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
KING, RANDOLPH WILLIAM
Reason for PRS interest: Anonymous threatening letter in '63
to D.C. Chief of PD included remark about pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
Black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/5/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Washington PD
Action taken:
Interviewed '65 (!) denied writing letter. Positive handwriting
opinion. No animosity toward Pres.
Prosecution for threat declined 2128/64.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Washington, D.C.
washington
8/17/67
' 66
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 199
---
## Page 200
204
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WILLIAMS, PHILLIP A.
Reason for PRS interest:
DC Police reported that 12/20/63,
when subject was arrested he had. Mrs. Kennedy's address on his
person.
Planned to visit her.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
organizations to which individual belongs:
none
appeared to be mentally retarded
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to
Secret Service attention: 12/20/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
D:C. police
Action taken:
Interviewed 4/10/64 and expressed fondness for Mrs. Kennedy.
Got address from news paper. Check up maintained 4/64 to 12/64.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Washington, D.C.
Washington
5/31/75
'64
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 200
---
## Page 201
205
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
• Name of individual:.
WILSON, EDWARD NORMAN
Reason for PRS interest: 11/23/63 subject put up sian in front
of his business in re to being pleased of JFK's death.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
confined for mental treatment 2/11/53. Attempted murder arrest
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/6/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
local PD
Action taken:
Police report - subject apparent mental case. QI's begun; discont.
3/2/68.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Orlando, FL
Jacksonville
4/23/68
' 68
Goldwater
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 201
---
## Page 202
206
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
PIETTE, GERARD ERNEST
Reason for PRS interest: 9/10/63 letter requesting transportation
to Cuba. Supports communism. Visited Soviet embassy 10-10-61.
Considered possibly homicidal.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid personality
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/4/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
No QI's noted; S.S. Kept tabs because they knew of his '64 confine-
ment.
Last location: North Attleboro, MA /67
Field office:
Providence
Last UPD:
8/16/67
1H 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 202
---
## Page 203
207
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BOWERS, EDWARD BERT
Reason for PRS interest: 11/27/63 subject stated to officers
while in custody for burglary, "I think Oswald did the right thing
and I would have done the same thing if I had the chance."
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
11/27/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YEs NJ P.D.
. Action taken:
11/27/63 interview and subject said he made statement without
intent and in moment of anger. Admits he is incorrigible and
has no intention of following the law.
SA reported subject
appeared normal. Interviewed in '67 but still in jail.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Trenton
Newark
4/23/68
'67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 203
---
## Page 204
208
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
FUNARI, LOUIS
Reason for PRS interest: -
11/26/63 subj wrote incoherentiletter
to pres..
'64 threat to LBJ.
Degree of threat:. 1.
2
organizations to which indiviaval belongs:
none
3
schizo paranoid long hosp confinement
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/4/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Arrested 11/30/63 threatening life. Put in state hospital
12/15/65 interviewed and he mentioned LBJ. 12/6/67 QI's disconte
as subject showed no interest in pres. ; only God.
Last location:
Waymart, Pa
Field office: Scranton
Last UPD:
4/23/68
'67
H# 54046
DocId: 32241845 Page 204
---
## Page 205
209
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
FARKAS, EUGENE
Reason for PRS interest: -
12/63 subject published poster contain-
ing incoherent. letter re LBJ and JFK.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
Hungarian
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
12/16/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
• Action taken:
Interviewed 12/9/63. Conversation incoherent and not in fluent
English. Not considered dangerous.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
unknown
Dallas
8/17/67.
'65
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 205
---
## Page 206
210
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
PADILLA, OMAR FRANCISCO
Reason for PRS interest: 12/7/63 info that he was following in
LHO's footsteps.
Degree of threat: 1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
Cuban
•Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/17/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
12/7/63 interview; advised he remarked he was going to shoot tBu
subject had .22 rifle in pessession. Said he was joking lI's
cont. 12/19/63 to 4/13/66.
12/10/63 AUSA declined.
Last location: unknown
' 69
Field office:
Last UPD:
New Haven
2/2/71
HH 54046
DocId: 32241845 Page 206
---
## Page 207
211
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH.
Name of individual:
_MARIINe RANDY
Reason for PRS interest: : 12/9/63 suspicious person made inquiry
about president's presence at D.C. hospital.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret
Service
attention:
12/9/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
D.C. hospital
Action taken:
12/15/63 interview; subject stated wanted to shake Pres. hand and
ask for employment. No animosity towards pres. Subject has since
appeared at several presidential movements in D.C. Phoned and
wrote WH in '66.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
unknown:'66
washington, D..C
8/17/67
HH 54046 DooId:32211845 Page 207
---
## Page 208
:"
212
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
STEINMETZ, CHARLES HIRUM
Reason for PRS interest:
11/28/63 Subj called FBI and made
abusive remarks
about former Pres. while drunk.
'65 call to AUSA made threat about LBJ.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/28/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
FBI
Action taken:
12/4/63 interviewed; could not recall making statements due to
intoxication.
12/28/65 confined under 871. Charge dismissed
1/66 because of voluntary mental treatment.
'70 called WH collect and when charges refused, made threatening
statement. Interviewed re call and said he'd never call WH again.
Last location: Latonia,. Kr
Field office:
Louisville
Last UPD:
2/15/78
'78
Nixon
NH 54046 DoOId:32241845 Page 208
---
## Page 209
213
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
- FLORES, RAFAEL
Reason for PRS interest: While undergoing psychiatric examination
in 1963, subject threatend to kill LBU.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
Latin
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/9/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
by doctor
Action taken:
Not interviewed. Committed 11/63 - 5/64 for schizo-paranoidi
Subject was kept under surveillance. While under surveillance
during HHH visit to Chicago in '65, subject assaulted officers
observing him.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Kent, WA
Seattle
4/22/68
' 68
NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 209
---
## Page 210
214
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SPAIN, JAMES EARL
Reason for PRS interest: -
12/11/63 subject appeared at residence
of Mrs. Kennedy obsessed with idea he was close friend. Deemed not
dangerous.: '67 letters to S.S. '71 call to WH.. '75 letter to
Ford and recently letters to Jody Powell.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
suicidal, schizo-paranoid, not dangerous
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Committed 12/11/63 from #7 precinct M.P.D.
S.S. has kept tabs
12/12/63
Maryland P.D.
Last location: Harrisburg Pa
Field office:
Last UPD:
/gettysburg
2/27/78
' 7.8
Nixon, Ford, Carter
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 210
---
## Page 211
215
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
GARNER, CALVIN ELTON
Reason for PRS interest: **R8&& 11/27/63 letter to RFK re
threat to him. "I
would kill every damn Kennedy if I had half
a chance.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
- none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/11/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
12/15/63 SA interviewed subj who denied making any threatening
statement even though he did not like the president's policies.
No thought of harming Pres. or family. Appeared sane
Very experienced with firearms.
No follow up noted.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Rayville, La
New Orleans
8/17/67
' 63
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 211
---
## Page 212
216
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
COUSATTE, BUDDY FORREST
Reason for PRS interest:
12/4/63 info from FBI re their inves-
tigation on alleged threats to the Pres.
Degree of threat: 1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/4/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action
taken:
12/19/63 SA interviewed; denied making any statement. Emotionally
aggressive by nature. Under certain circumstances he could be
dangerous.
US attorney delined action 12/63.
Last location: Livermore, CA
Field office:
San Francisco
Last UPD:
8/17/67
'65
NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 212
---
## Page 213
217
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HARTSELLE, DOUGLAS ELLIOT
Reason for PRS
interest: 11/25/63 subject made abusive and threat-
ening calls to soviet embassy in D.C. Phoned WH. in '67 about VA
benefits.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/25/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Soviet Embassy
Action taken:
Investigating SA reported subject has drinking problem and should
not be considered dangerous or of protective interest.
Not interviewed.. As of '70 subject still calls the WH.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
4/6/63
Falls Church, Va
Washington, D.C.
Nixon, Ford
'74
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 213
---
## Page 214
218
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
RICH, VIORRA HELREN
Reason for PRS interest: Interviewed 12/6/63 as visitor. to
Detroit field office.
Incoherent re husband's involvement in
communist plot. '64 left revolver in Congressman's office.
Writes to Pres. about her obsession.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group: - none
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/6/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
No action taken in '63.
on 8/3/64 she was committed from the
Washington field office. S.S. Keeps tabs
Last location raverse City, MI
Field office:Detroit
Last UPD:
8/7/7.2
'72
Charles Diggs
HH 54046 DocId:32241845
Page 214
---
## Page 215
219
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BROWN, JOSEPH ROLLINS
Reason for PRS interest:
12/14/63 phoned USSS & gave information
about individual being derogatory to JFK and threatening LBJ.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/14/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
12/18/63 interviewed, did not remember making call. Background
showed reports of other unfounded incidents. Not felt of pro-
tective interest.
'72 called WH - friendly
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Washington, D.C.
Washington
1222/72
'72
1H 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 215
---
## Page 216
220
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual: .
SMITH. LAURA
Reason for PRS interest: 12/5/63 letter to Pres: claimina te
having seen LHO with Ruby in Atlanta.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
organizations to which individual belongs:
none
SA considered her mentally ill - no documentation
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/17/63 file opened
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
12/20/63 interviewed, obsessed that she can determine murders.
Not felt to be of protective interest. Friendly to LBu in 65
and '67. Letters to WH in the '7.0s.
Last location: Atlanta
Field office: Atlanta
Last UPD:
10-23-74
•'74
Nixon
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Pade 216
---
## Page 217
221
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual: -
_WHITE, HARRY WILLIAM
Reason for PRS interest: 11/25/63 FBI advised that subject
on 11/19/63 requested his church pastor to forward message to
JFK message warning of danger.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/25/63
Refered by
other agency? NO
YES FBI
Action taken:
No interview. Subject had irrational theories of science and
religion. Intermittent psychiatric care since youth. Last
committment 11/27/63.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Denver, Co:
' 64
Denver
8/17/67
H# 54046
DocId:32241845 Page 217
---
## Page 218
222
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BURNS, JAMES FRANCIS
Reason
for PRS interest:
12/17/63 subject at VA office re
not getting his undesirable discharge changed and stated he was
going to pull another Oswald.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/18/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Vet. adm.
Action taken:
12/27/63 interview and claimed that he was drunk at the time.
Arrested for violation 871 on that date. Later dismissed after
committment.
'66 repeat of incident... Check ups from 12/27/63
through 3/18/68. No interest shown in Pres. Not of further
protective interest.
Last location: New Britain, CT
Field office: New Haven
Last UPD:
5/10/68
'68
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 218
---
## Page 219
223
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
602-34396
Name of individual:
MCLARRY, RUSSELL WENCE
Reason for PRS interest: _ 11/21/63 prior to visit of JFK to
Dallas, subj said, "I will be waiting with my high powered rifle
to get the president."
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/22/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/17/63; said he probably did make such a statement; that
if he did it was a joke.
He was not sorry he said it and was glad
JFK was dead. Antagonistic. Arrested 12/19/63 under 871. Brought
before a Grand Jury. Last interviewed 9/67; expressed no dislike
for the president. Appeared rational.
Last location: Arlington, TX
Field office:
Dallas
Last UPD:
9/15/67
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 219
---
## Page 220
224
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
FROSTAD, LLOYD ARNOLD
Reason for
PRS intérest:
Threat letter President 12/18/63.
35
yes.
Degree of threat::
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
undifferentiated schizophrenic
Nationalistic group: -
none (born Canada)
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/18/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed by RCMP, said letter was bunch of words, would not
harm Pres. Committed provincial mental hospital in Canada
1/64 by RCMP charged with threat letter. 4/15/64 released to
parents. Re-committed in Oct. and later released.
Last location: Assiniboia Saskwn, Canada
Field office:
spokane
Last UPD:
5/16/67
'65
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 220
---
## Page 221
225
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
OSWALD, JAMES MICHAEL
Reason for PRS interest:
FBI referral, subj threatened wife and
family, then was going to D.C. to straighten things out. Committed
for examination.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group: none
Date called to Secret Service attention: 11/17/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/27/63. Unable to explain his statement. Apparently
mentally ill. First sign of mental illness '59 while in USAF.
Fact that last name was assassin's drove him over the brink.
Confined almost continuously since 11/63. RI's conducted 11/27/63
to 12/31/68.
Last location: Cincinnati (State hosp)
Field office:
columbus
Last UPD:
1/7/69
'76
N4: 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page
221
---
## Page 222
226
HOULIHAN, STEWART GEORGE
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HOUL THAN, STEWART GEORGE
Reason for PRS interest:
12/5/63 anonymous threatening call.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date
called to Secret Service
attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
12/16/63
Subject identified and interviewed 12/18/63. Drunk at time.
Can't recall making call. No animosity toward Pres.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Hartford, CT
New Haven
8/17/67
' 63
1H 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 222
---
## Page 223
227.
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Hale, Clyde Everett
Reason for PRS interest:
12/63 subject was brought to attention
of s.S. as he was employed at Washington Cathedral where LBJ
occasionally visited.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/19/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Investigated: Found that in WWII subj had killed officer and sen-
tenced to death but later paroled in '57. He wrote crank notes
consistently. All sources advised subj was not dangerous. Deemed
not of protective interest. Case was kept open due to his visits
at WH in '70's.
Last location: Washington, D.C.
Field office: Washington
Last UPD:
1/22/76
'75
Ford, Nixon
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 223
---
## Page 224
228
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
got idea from LHO.
MOSES, PETER J
12/63 subj threatened to kill family;
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
hospitalized in '62 and '63.
Alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/19/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Investigation disclosed he has threatened family often, wife
unconcerned. Local police aware of situation. Not of protective
interest.
Visited WH in '73.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Washingdon. D.C.
Washington
5/3/73
'73
Nixon
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 224
---
## Page 225
229
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS interest:
GRENERT, FRED ARON
Anonymous threat letter 12/17/63.
Degree of threat:
1
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
appeared mentally ill - no documentation
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to. Secret Service
attention:
12/19/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Identified and interviewed 1/14/64.
Claimed friendly attitude
and no intent to harm Pres. Prosecution declined 5/14/64 on 871.
173 incoherent letter to Ford.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Winter Haven, Fl.
174
Tampa
11/8/73
Nixon, Ford
НН 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 225
---
## Page 226
230
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
HEGGINS, ELSIE F.
11/22/63 letter to Dallas postmaster
claiming to govt. within postal union.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
appears mentally unbalanced - no documentation
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/19/63 file opened
Refered by other agency?. NO
YES
Postal authority
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/30/64 and 2/3/64 - gave information about disloyal
fellow employees. Not considered reliable informant.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Dallas
Dallas
8/17/67
'64
HH 54046
DocId: 32241845 Page 226
---
## Page 227
231
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
NAGELL, RICHARD CASE
Reason for PRS interest: -
11/21/63 subject wrote the FBI and
requested to speak to thes.S. about an urgent matter. Subject
was confined in jail after attempting to rob a bank and firing
shots.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
(in jail)
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/19/63
Refered
by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
1/3/64 SA interviewed subject whe claims he knew LHO and wife
socially and did not want to be associated with swald's crime.
6/9/64 subj sentenced 10 years for robbery. 11/8/67 SA determined:
subject no longer of protective interest. Check of file shows no
substantiation for his remark that he knew Oswalds. Marina was
shown his photo and claimed to have never seen him. In late 60's
went to Europe and caused scenes. Has Oswald fixation but not of
Läst location: Manhattan Beach, CA '74
protective interest.
Field office: Ny
Last UPD:
7/2/74
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 227
---
## Page 228
232
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
EISEN, RUTH
Reason for PRS interest: .
11/27/63 Bureau of Customs reported
that subject wanted to be contacted by USSS. Subj sent letter
10/21/64. Visited Phila S.S. Field office '64.
Degree of threat: .
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
mental problem since
'57 but no diagnosis.
Nationalistic group: -
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/27/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES Bureau of Customs, Phila
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/29/63. Friendly to Pres. Claimed she can see
future and knew that something bad would happen to JFK. In '64
she stated that she had feeling LBy would be killed.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Phila
Phila
8/17/67
' 64
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 228
---
## Page 229
233
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DIETZ, CHARLES
Reason for PRS interest:
2/17/63 NYPD reported subject made oral
threats against public officials and Pres. 12/20/64 visited WH/
Degree of threat:
1
2.
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/20/63 file opened
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
NYPD
Action
taken:
3/12/64 interviewed and denied making threate claimed no animosity
toward Pres. Not dangerous. S.S. kept close, tabs due to the many
visits to WH subj has made since '68, remoney owed, forged checks.
stolen salary checks, etc. 1/8/69 Committed from WH: 11/30/69
committed from VP residence.
'70 found mentally ill by jury trial.
Last location: NY
"76
Field office:
Last UPD:
NY
2/18/77
Nixons Agnew,
Ford, Rockefeller,
Church, Levi, and Mondale
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 229
---
## Page 230
234
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
"your doomed."
NORTON, BENJAMIN CHARLES
12/15/63 letter to Pres. stating,
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
Action
taken:
Interviewed 1/23/64; friendly.
Attending 5th grade.
YES
12/23/63 file opened
Said
letter was joke. Not dangerous.
Last location:
•Field office:
Last UPD:
Longview, WA
Seattle
8/17/67
'64
NW 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 230
---
## Page 231
235
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_ VAUGHN, HOMER DALLES
Reason for PRS interest: FBI reported 12/15/63 that subject
allegedly said he believed thet JfK and LBJ would be killed if
they came to Dallas in Nov. '63. Remark made prior to assassination.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none.
Nationalistic group:
none
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
12/18/63
Refered by other agency? NO
Action taken:
YES
FBI
Interviewed by FBI 12/12/63 and denied making the remark. No
investigation made by Secret Service.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Odonnell, Tx
Dallas
' 63
8/17/67
HW 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 231
---
## Page 232
236
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
FENNELL, ROBERT BEATY
Reason for PRS interest: -
12/63 letter threat to kill LBJ; parti-
cipant in demonstration critical of govt. policy.
'68 interviewed after complaining that rights were violated.
Mail ordered guns. Made threats against pres and future pres.
This behavior has cont. up to present.
In '77 he said he would
not write any more threats befcause of constant harassment by s.s.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
communist party sympathizer
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/20/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
QI's initiated in '68(?) and discont. 12/71• In march '69 AUSA
declined 871 but in October he was found guilty of violating 871.
Arrested again in '71 for same but charges dismissed three months
later, due to lack of intent and fact that subject had not past
history of violence.
S.S. Keeps constant tabs
Last location:
Colorado Springs
'77
Denver
Field office:
Last UPD:
4/11/77
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 232
---
## Page 233
237
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
PAVIA, LOUIS ANTHONY
Reason for PRS interest: -
FBI reported on 12/13/63 that subject
was believed to have prior knowledge of assassination due to
statements made to cab driver re getting LBJ and RFK next.
Degree of threat:.
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
12/20/63
FBI
Interviewed 12/13/63, denied making statements but said he had
been talking about the assassination.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Warren, TX '64
Houston
8/17/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 233
---
## Page 234
238
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
FIELDS, ELOUISE
Reason for PRS
interest: FBI reported on 12/10/63 of subject's
implied threat against Pres. life.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret service attention:
12/12/63 file opened
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/12/63. Friendly attitude toward Prea. Acknowledged
making statements but did not mean them as threats. Prosecution
declined on 871 12/16/63.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Jeffersontown, KY.
Louisville
' 63
8/17/67
WN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 234
---
## Page 235
239
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BAUCUM, GEORGE DEWEY
Reason for PRS interest:
12/14/63 wrote Dept. of Commerce re
communists behind JFK assassination.
Degree of threat:
1
2
organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group: -
none
Date called to secret Service attention:
12/20/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Dept. of Commerce
•Action taken:
Interviewed 6/11/64. SA felt subj was not dangerous.
'68 sent patriotic records to Navy Intel. so reinterviewed.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Augusta
Atlanta
4/1/68
'73
Nixon
HH 54046
DocId: 32241845 Page 235
---
## Page 236
240
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BURKE, CLARA M.
Reason for PRS interest:
12/17/63 letter to NSA advising of
possible kidnapping of Kennedy children.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/20/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
NSA
Action
taken:
No interview. Subject is obsessed with idea her mind is bugged.
Re the kidnapping: husband felt subject loves Kennedy's so much
that she fears something might happen. Last letter to NSA, '64
Last location: East Gadsen, AL
Field office:
Last UPD:
Birmingham
8/17/67
'67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 236
---
## Page 237
241
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
REYNOLDS, BARNEY HENRY
Reason for PRS interest:
12/21/62 phoned WH and said pres. would
be assassinated if he went to Texas. Subject was arrested while
making call by local police.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo, chronic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/26/63 file opened
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
local PD
Action taken:
12/26/63 interviewed; advised that he'd rec'd call while walking
down
street and offered job to kill pres. Said he didn't want to
do it and so helcalled to advise them.
Committed at request USSS 12/21/63.
subject had been charged with assault & intent to kill im March '63.
He'd been committed and escaped.
Last location: Pineville, La (state hosp) '68
Field office: Little Rock
Last UPD:
8/17/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 237
---
## Page 238
242
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS interest:
BEARD, WILLIAM HOWARD
12/20/63 FBI advised that unknown caller
was talking about getting RFK and LBJ.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/21/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/21/63 and denied making any statements.
Advised he was talking with possible unknown caller while both
were drunk and unknown caller claimed to have killed pres.
Caller never identified.
Location of subject last: New Orleans, La.
' 63
New Orleans
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/17/67
НН 54046 DoOId:32241845 Page 238
---
## Page 239
243
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WOODARD, ELVIN EARL
Reason for PRS interest:
12/21/63 Eugene Dougherty advised FBI
that subject said LBy should be dead and given the chance, he'd
do it.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/21/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YESFBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/31/63 denied making statement: Subject stated that
politics were mentioned but not threats. SA felt sane and embar-
assed about whole affair.
Location of subject lasti San Francisco '65
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
San Francisco
8/17/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 239
---
## Page 240
244
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
POTTER, HAROLD H.
Reason for PRS interest:
FBI advised 12/22/63 that they had
information that subject had said JFK got what was coming and LBJ
should get same.
Degree of threat:
1
2
organizations to which individual belongs:
none,
alcoholic
Nationalistic group: _
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/22/63
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/23/63, denied making statement. Subject said he
had alot of troubles and drank. Considered harmless. Informant
was subject's estranged wife. Not considered reliable.
Location of subject last: Pascoag, RI
Field Office
reporting:
Last update:
Providence
8/17/67
'64
HH 54046 - DocId:32241845 Page 240
---
## Page 241
245
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
TAPPER, BRUCE REED
12/20/63 info rec'd that subject
stated LBJ should get what JFK did and that Oswald was his hero.
Degree of threat:
•1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/20/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 3/1/65 (?) and admitted making statements, but said
if he were where he could prevent harm to anyone he would do it.
He disliked JFK. and LBJ but would not harm them.
Location of subject Last: Washington, D.C.
'65
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
8/17/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 241
---
## Page 242
246
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
about VA disability.
GHARIS, GEORGE MASON TUDERHORN
12/27/63 letter to Pres. complaint
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
12/22/63 (?) prior to letter
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/15/64; friendly toward LBJ. Has since sent several.
letters to Pres. friendly in nature.
Location of subject laste Dallas '75
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Dallas
5/76/75
Nixon, Rockefeller
NN 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 242
---
## Page 243
247
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MCCLURE, LEO EDWARD
Reason for PRS interest:
FBl reported 1/18/64 that subject had
talked about picking off leaders. Earlier 11/7/63, FBI had
interviewed subject who said statement was picking up leaders.
Dates must be wrong on first repört ('63 not '64)
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
FBI
Case was not referred by USSS for investigation.
12/2/63
Location of subject last::: Lauisville, KY 164
Field Office reporting:
Louisville
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 243
---
## Page 244
1
248
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
MINTER, FLOYD
12/63 subject claimed to have been in
Washington and attempted to see RFK about organized crime. Claimed
he'd visit pres. if necessary.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-paranoid - grossly delusional, psychotic, abusive & hostile
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/23/63
Refered by other
agency?.. No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/63. Apparently mentally ill. Friendly toward LBJ.
Check ups from 12/63 to 6/68.
Arrested in'66 for shooting wife to death but not brought to trial
due to incompetency.
Location of subject lasts Beacon, NY (state hosp) '68
Field Office reporting:
NY
Last update:
6/7/68
HH: 54046 • DooId:32241845 Page 244
---
## Page 245
249.
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DAVIS, BRUCE DEAN
Reason for PRS interest:
Subj sent 11/28/63 postcard to friend
re preserving page of magazine with klein's ad.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/18/63
Refered by other
agency?
NO (?)
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/8/64 and stated cardwas joke sent to friend. He said
both were against JFK politically. Friend substantiated story.
Iocation of subject lasts. Decatur, IL '64
Springfield
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
N4 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 245
---
## Page 246
-250 ..
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
YOCKSTICK, FRED F.
Reason for PRS interest:
Subject has written to pres since '63.
Said he was sending burro and horse.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Doctor advised subj is definitely mentally unbalanced.
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/23/63 file
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/21/64, friendly toward LBJ and apparently will be a
letter writer for long time.
Knowledged in use of explosives.
Location of subject lasts. Ft. Worth '68
Field Office reporting:
Dallas
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 246
---
## Page 247
251
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
FRANKLE, ELEANOR
Has written numerous letters to Pres.
since 12/63.
Constant visitor to Am. Embassy in Mexico.
Degree of threat:
1.
2
3
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
Agent feels subject is mental case. No documentation.
Nationalistic group: - none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/26/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 4/13/66. Agent does not feel she constitutes threat.
Location of subject last:- Mexico City. MX '66
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
San Antonio
9/20/67
1H 54046 • Do0Id:32241845 Page 247
---
## Page 248
-2:52
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WILHELM, WILLIAM
Reason for PRS interest:
Info rec'd in Houston S.S. Office
11/24/63 that subject had said back in Sept. '63 that he was
part of a group whose mission was to assassinate pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
- 3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
11/24/63
12/14/63 file
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Investigation disclosed that information rec'd by Houston office
was not true and there appeared to be a personal feud between infor-.
mant Henry Burrell and subject:
Location of subject lasts.::
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Houston
'63
Houston
_8/18/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 248
---
## Page 249
253
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WHATLEY, JULIAN C.
Reason for PRS interest:
9/63 subj is reported to have been
associated. with Wilhelm and Burrell and to have made the statement
that he "wanted to get Jack Ruby."
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to secret service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
12/14/63
His statement could not be confirmed. No further investigation.
See also report #252.
Location of subject last:. Unknown
Field Office
reporting:
Houston
Last update:
10-12-67
'63
NH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 249
---
## Page 250
*254
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BURRELL, HENRY BASCOM
Reason for PRS interest:
9/63 Burrell reported to have said that
Wilhelm (#252) had tried to enlist him in an organization whose
purpose was to asssassinate pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
-
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service
attention:
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Allegation entirely unfounded.
12/14/63
Location of subject last:..
-Houston
Houston
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
1012-67
/ 63
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 250
---
## Page 251
25.5
INDIVIDUALS
LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
KIRSCHT, ROLLIN W.
Reason for PRS interest:
FBI reported 12/17/63 that subject
has been heard to say it was good that JFK was assassinated.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group: _
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/16/63 (day before FBI
report?)
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Investigation developed that subiect is a local eccentric and
not of protective interest.
Location of subject last: Adams, WI '63
Field Office reporting:
Milwaukee
Last update:
8/17/67
1Н 54046 • DocId:32241845 Page 251
---
## Page 252
256
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
NICHOLAS, NINA GLADYS
Called WH. 12/23/63 claiming she had
vital info that she could not disclose over phone.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
delusional, paranoid schizophrenic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/23/63
Refered by other agency?
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/23/63, said she rec'd brain waves from people
and that several dead people were plotting to take over the
country.
12/31/63 re-committed by USSS
Location of subject last:.
:: Denver '66 (nursing home)
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Denver
8/17/67
WW 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 252
---
## Page 253
257
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
FERRARA, LOUIS E.
'63 and '64 numerous letters to Phila
radio stations.and papers with inflamatory remarks about pres.
One letter re LBu asaid his brains would be blown out.
Degree of threat:
• 3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
observation in '64 and judged competent
Nationalistic group:
→ none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/23/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 2/5/64 and denied authorship but typewriter specimens
proved positive....
9/67 subject doing well and no longer considered.
of protective interest.
Arrested on Sec. 871 3/18/64, pleaded quilty.
Location of subject Lasts. Audubon, NU '67
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Phila
10-5-67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 253
---
## Page 254
258
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DOWN, MARGY F •
Reason
for PRS interest:
Attempted to gain entrance to WH
with group of reporters 12/23/63.
Degree of threat: .
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/23/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/23/63; stated she knew she did wrong.
Location of subject lasts- Washington: '63
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Washington
8/17/67
N# 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 254
---
## Page 255
259
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WALLAHAN. HARRIEI
Reason for PRS interest: _
Letter to Miami USSS Field Office
12/27/63 and visited Chicago USSS field office 3/16/65. Claims
to be persecuted by radar waves.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Periodic confinements since '62
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
none noted
3
12/31/63
Iocation of subject last: Chicago
Chicago
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/17/67
' 65
HH 54046 • DocId:32241845 Page 255
---
## Page 256
260
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
TOMICEK, WILLIAM J.
Reason for PRS interest:
12/9/63 subject was reported to have
remarked, " I have 2 rifles and a pistol in car and I need a
place to shoot LBJ from."
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/12/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/19/63, stated he made remark in jest and had been
active supporter of the pres. since he was young senator.
Prosecution declined 1/3/64 on 871.
Location of subject lasts- Temple. Tx '64
Field Office reporting:
San Antonio
Last update:
8/17/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 256
---
## Page 257
-261
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
KAPLAN, TERRY
Reason
for PRS interest:
Letter to Santa 12/12/63 stating,
"please sent me a gun so I can kill the pres."
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/12/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/13/63, letter written as joke and sent contrary to
her wishes. She is 12 years old. Prosecution declined.
Location of subject lasts. iNY, NY '63
Field Office reporting:
NY
Last update:
8/17/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 257
---
## Page 258
262
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DOMER, KEMUEL
Reason for PRS interest:
Report from Social Security office,
Jacksonville on 12/16/63 subject made threat against LBU's life.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/20/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Soc. Sec.
Action taken:
Subject never located. Investigation determined that subject
had been temporarily distraught over financial and family problems
and not considered of protective interest.
Location of subject lasts unknown '64
Jacksonville
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/17/67
WH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 258
---
## Page 259
263
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
CARLTON, ROSS E
Reason for PRS interest:
FBI reported 12/4/63 that subject
might be suspect in assassination of JFK. Made derogatory state-
ments against LBJ.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Citizens Councils of America
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/4/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 10-1-65 (?); not considered of protective interest.
Location of subject last:. Dallas
/65
Dallas
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 - DocId:32241845 Page 259
---
## Page 260
264
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
NATHAN, CAROL
Reason for PRS interest:
FBI 12/11/63, advised that subject
rec'd message on Ouija board that LBJ would be assassinated on
Christmas day '63. The assassin would be Charles Kewal.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/11/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YEs FBI
Action
taken:
Interviewed 12/12/63, no other information obtained.
Location of subject last: Toledo, OH: /63
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Toledo
8/18/67
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 260
---
## Page 261
265
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
was glad JFK was murdered.
ROGERS, EDWARD (UR )
Letter 12/4/63 alleged that subj
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/7/64. No animosity toward Pres.
was too young.
12/20/63
FBI
Thinks J.Kennedy
Location of subject last: Steubenville, OH '64
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Columbus
8/18/67
H# 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 261
---
## Page 262
#• 266
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ALVARADO, PAUL DELAESPARZA
Reason for PRS interest:
Letter to Pres. 12/26/63 offering
services. to. construct bullet proof car.
Degree of threat: .
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
Mexican
Date called to
Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
12/23/63
Interviewed 1/16/64, holds Pres. in high regard. Felt it his
duty to offer suggestions.
Location of subject lasti San Jose, CA '64
Field Office
reporting:
San Francisco
Last update:
8/18/67
NH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 262
---
## Page 263
...267
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
NELSON, ELLEN
Reason for PRS interest:
Phoned Washing field office 11/24/63
requesting Dec. of Ind. be read at JFK's grave.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
11/24/63
Refered by other agency? No.
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 3/24/64 and determined not to be of protective interest
by SA.
Location of subject last::
Warren, OH
'64
Field Office reporting:
•Cleveland
Last update:
3/5/68
14 54046 • DooId:32241845 Page 263
---
## Page 264
268
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
PRADEL, JOHN
Reason for PRS interest:
Info from FBI 12/17/63 that on 12/15/63
subj asked Garcia family if they were related to Oswald
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called.to Secret Service attention:
12/17/63
12/23/63 file
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/10/64. No animosity toward Pres. Had been drinking
and talking about assassination. Made comment that Garcias talked
as if they were kin of Oswalds.
Location of subject lasts San Antonio
'64
Field Office reporting:
San Antonio
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 264
---
## Page 265
.269
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
UBERUAGA, JOSEPH H.
FBI on 12/11/63 reported that subject
had attempted to call Pres. 12/11/63.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
÷3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
12/10/63 (?) day before
FBI referral
FBI
Interviewed 12/16/63.
No animosity toward Pres. Just wanted to
call and talk.
Location of subject last: Phoenix '63 state hosp.
Field Office reporting:
• Last update:
Phoenix
8/18/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 265
---
## Page 266
270
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
8/25/65.
ROGERS, VIRGINIA
Letter writer since. '63. Last contact
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
periodic confinement since '54. Schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group: _ none
Date called to
Secret Service attention:
12/31/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 9/14/65. No animosity toward Pres. Just wanted help.
Location of subject last: Catonsville, MD '65 state hosp
Field Office reporting:
Baltimore
Last update:
8/18/67
54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 266
---
## Page 267
271
INDIVIDUALS LISTED
BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
WH .1/15/64.
HUSKINS, GEORGE WASHINGTON
Letter to Pres. 12/15/63; call to
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid psychosis
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/26/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/15/64; respects the Pres. '69 subj climbed water
tower and fired off shots harmlessly. Was committed after this
incident. He cont. to writes letters and S.S. Keeps tabs. Not
of protective interest.
Location of subject last: White, GA '76
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Atlanta
8/3/76
Nixon, Ford
HW 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 267
---
## Page 268
272
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
threat. Last contact 2/4/65.
GARDNER, MARVIN DALE
Letter 12/5/63 containing implied
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called
to secret service attention: 12/26163
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed several times, last interview 6/10/65. Denied any
intent to threaten or harm protectees. Each letter contains a
different topia. Writes to many officials
Location of subject lasts-liA '65
Field Office reporting:
_J.A
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 268
---
## Page 269
273
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
VEILLEUX, THOMAS L:
Reason for
PRS interest:
12/63/ juvenile arrested for intoxication.
Stated he was another Oswald and was going to shoot LBJ.
Degree of threat:
1
2
organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/9/63
Refered by other agency? No
PD
YES
Action taken:
12/63 interviewed, said he could not ermember events surrounding
his arrest. Claimed to be friendly to pres. Prosecution declined.
Location of subject lasts:
East Norwalk, CT
New Haven
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/17/67
' 63
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 269
---
## Page 270
274
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
KOPPER, JOHN S. (MRS )
11/63 letter stated she believed LHO
innocent and listed others she thought guilty - including LBJ.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/25/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/64. Did not admire LBJ but bore him no animosity.
Location of subject lasts:
-Guilford, CT
'64
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
New Haven
8/17/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 270
---
## Page 271
275
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
re JFK assassination.
RODLER, ANNA SCHNEPF
12/63 letter to Director in German
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
mental instituations
Nationalistic group:
German
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Determined to be harmless mental case by German authorities.
Believes she's clairvoyant.
Location of subject last: Muggenstrum, Ger.
'64
Paris
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
9/11/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 271
---
## Page 272
276
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SIEBER, WOODFORD SPRINGER
Reason for PRS interest:
1a/63 VISITED LBJ ranch to talk to
pres re dishonorable discharge. Friendly to LBj.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to
secret service
attention:
12/23/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
back ground check. expert with firearms.
'69 letter to Nixon.
Location of subject last:- Anchorage '69
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Seattle
2/28/75
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 272
---
## Page 273
277
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HEINE, ALBERT VICTOR
Reason for PRS interest:
'62 - '63 subject, a confined mental
patient, wrote anonymous letters to acquaintence containg pictures
of assassinated Presidents and nothing else with notations.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
committed since '53; chronic brain syndrome
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called. to Secret Service attention:
12/23/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Under confinement. Interviewed 12/17/63 and denied writing
letters. Expressed no animosity toward protectees. Walked out
of interview before completion.
Location of subject last; Clarks Summit, Pa '67 state hosp
Field Office reporting:
Scranton
Last update:
11/8/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 273
---
## Page 274
-278
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
PARKER, WILLIAM BONICELLI
10-63 info that subj planned to visit WH.
Degree of threat: .
2
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid schizo - confinements since '47.
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/23/63 file opened
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
40+1ф763aken:
10-11-63 two months before file.opened) interviewed: subjcom-
plained of discrimination. Friendly toward JEK. Ol's initiated
12/31/63 and discont 3/10/67. In !68 talked about blowing up hosp.
In '70 talked about assassinating Pres., VP, etc. at which point
QI's were re-initiated, 11/6/70 and discont. 2/24/71.
Location of subject last:-Milwaukee. WI '71
Field Office reporting:
Milwaukee
Last update:
3/4/71
Nixon, Agnew
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 274
---
## Page 275
279
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
strong hatred of JFK by subject.
HERNANDEZ, FELIX
12/63 anonymous letter alleging
Degree
of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
_Cuban
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/64. Denied animosity towards JEK or LBJ.
Location of subject last:- Bronx, NY
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
6/9/69
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 275
---
## Page 276
--280.-
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BOSCH, EDWIN S.
Reason for PRS interest:
11-22-63 while incarcerated for AWOL
he stated that JFK got what he deserved.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
12-31-63
US Army
Action taken:
Interviewed 1-64. Denied statement and claimed to be friendly
toward JFK and LBJ.
Location of subject lasts. Ft. Bragg, NC '64
Charlotte
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/13/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 276
---
## Page 277
281
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
knew JFK was to be assassinated.
DESMARAIS, GERARD ROLAND
10-63 informant claimed subj stated he
Degree of threat:
2
-3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/24/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/63, denied prior knowledge of assassination but
stated he predicted it on analysis of political situation as he
saw it.
Location of subject last: HArtford '64
New Haven
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 277
---
## Page 278
282
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
abusive remarks about JFK.
REED, JOHN H.
10-63 leeter to army officer containing
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
-3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/ 64; stated he did not mean to cast aspersions on
Pres. Friendly toward LBJ.
Location of subject last'.::
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Chicago '64
Chicago
8/19/67
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 278
---
## Page 279
283
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
JOHNSTON, ROBRET A
Reason for PRS interest:
11/63 called Washington field office
complaining she was being transferred against her will to another
govt. agency. 10-65 called again about employment. Did not
mention Pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
unknown
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
none noted
11/24/63
Location of subject lasts- Washington, D.C. '66
Field Office reporting:
Washington
Last update:
8/23/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 279
---
## Page 280
284.
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BUSHMAN, HAROLD E.
Reason for PRS interest:
11/63 called Washington field office
to complain about being transferred to another govt. agency.
'65 and '66 calls with similar complaints.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Did not mention protectees and no action noted.
Location of subject last: arrtanna, Pa
Scranton
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
'63
1H 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 280
---
## Page 281
285
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WELCH, DARYL EUGENE
Reason for PRS interest:
12/63 wrote Gov. of Colorado complaining
of violation of property rights and indicating visit to WH possible.
Degree of threat:.
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/20/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 2/7/64 and denied any animosity toward Pres. Appeared
sane.
Location of subject last:.::
Field Office
reporting:
Last update:
Colorado Springs '64
Denver
8/17/67
N4 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 281
---
## Page 282
286
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name. of
individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
Joseph Kennedy estate.
DUTCHER, JOHN THEODORE
Subj gained unauthorized entrance to
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
_3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/21/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
Interviewed 12/21/63. Alleged he had been sent by his supervisor
Daniel Quinn to check on TV trouble. Quinn denied sending him.
Quinn's reputation questionable.
Location of subject last Lantana, Fl.
'63
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Miami
8/17/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 282
---
## Page 283
287
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
QUINN, DANIEL
Reason for PRS interest:
One of his employees, Dutcher, gained
unauthorized entrance to Joseph Kennedy estate to check TV trouble.
Dutcher claimed he acted on Quinn's instruction.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
described as mental case, no documentation. addict and alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/21/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/21/63. Subj dnied sending employee to estate. Local
police described subject as alcoholic, mental case, antagonistic
to authority, radical and addict.
Location of subject lasts unknown
Field Office reporting:
Miami
Last update:
8/17/67
'64
HH 54046 . Do0Id:32241845 Page: 283
---
## Page 284
288
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DODGE, DONALD L.
Reason for PRS interest:
_ 11/63 call to USSS Washington field office
re dishonorable discharge. 12/63 call to LA field office stating
change on papers might prove executive branch is crooked.
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/24/63
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/64 and several occasions since. Arrested by local
PD 7/66 because of interest shown by USSS. Admitted to state
hospital. QI's cont. until 11/15/68.
Location of subject last; Glendale, Ca
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Reno
4/9/76
' 66
WH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 284
---
## Page 285
289
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HERMANN, RICHARD JACK
Reason
for PRS interest:
11/27/63 informant advised subject
stated he was glad JFK was killed.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret
Service attention:
12/24/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action
taken:
Interviewed 11/63 and apoligised for statement. Witnesses stated
that he has warped sense of hümor.
Iocation of subject last::: Houston
Field Office reporting:
Houston
"Last update:
8/23/67
'65
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 285
---
## Page 286
290-
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
Pres. 11/23/63.
GRICE, JOSEPH W.
Alleged to have verbally threatened
Degree of threat:
Organizations
none
1
2
to which individual belongs:
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/3/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action
taken:
Investigation disclosed he had not threatened. Interviewed 1/13/64
and subject was friendly toward pres.
Location of subject lasts. Grand Rapid, MI '64
Field Office reporting:
Grand Rapid
Last update:
8/18/67
NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 286
---
## Page 287
291
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WASHBURN, HARRY LEONARD
Reason for PRS interest:
subj convicted in '59 for killing his
mother-in-law. 12/12/63 told FBI agent that he'd overheard two
convicts state that bar owner in Dallas had contacted one of them
with proposition to find person to "wipe out" high govt. official
and that fee of $25,000 would be paid by Tx State Senator Dorsey
Hardeman.
Degree of threat:
1
2
" 3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
committed '62 as possible psychopatic personality
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/18/63
•Refered by other agency? NO
_YES
FBI
Action taken:
8/5/64 SA interviewed subject who restated above and then exhibited
persecution complex believing room bugged. 10-28-67 SA reinter-
viewed subject who showed no interest in protectees and was deter-
mined
no longer of protective interest.
Location of subject Last:i:
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Otey, Tx prison '67
Houston
12/1/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 287
---
## Page 288
292
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
JOHNSON, FREDERICK AUGUSTUS
Reason for PRS interest:
SUbj admitted that on 11/21/63 he'd
stated," I'd contribute $1000 to anyone who would kill JFk.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/2/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/4/63 re statement. apolegectic, stated remark was
made during heated political argument and that he'd been drinking.
Voluntary polygraph cleared subject of involvement in assassination.
Us attorney declined prosecution.
Location of subject last:..
Westchester, IL '64
Field Office reporting:
Chicago
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 288
---
## Page 289
293
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
NANCE, RUSSEL RICHERT
Reason for PRS interest:
12/26/63 subj stated in jost over
walkie-talkie, "I'm going to kill LBJ".
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/30/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 2/8/64 after citizen's band operator reported hearing
remark. Subject was remorseful and denied threat had serious intent.
Us attorney declined prosecution
Location of subject last; Shreveport, LA '64
Field Office reporting:
New Orleans
Last update:
8/18/67
1Н 54046 : DocId:32241845 Page 289
---
## Page 290
294
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
to Marina Oswald.
HART, WILLIAM W.
12/17/63 subj wrote anonymous letter
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/29/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 2/14/64; acknowledged letter but refused to elaborate.
said he is friendly toward pres. Described by police as harmless
mental case.. No diagnosis.
Location of subject last: Central Falls, RI '66
Field Office reporting:
Providence
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 290
---
## Page 291
295
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
COCHRAN, WILLIAM HORACE
Reason for PRS interest:
12/24/63 subj advised S.S. that John
Ferguson had told him he wished the bullet which killed JFK
had hit LBJ and that he could arrange to have anyone killed.
Also claimed that Ferguson was affiliated with Castro.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/24/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Investigation failed to substantiate allegations. Interviewed
again in '65 as visitor to New Haven field office offering ser-
vices as undercover agent against communism. Not of protective
interest.
Location of subject last;. East Bernard, TX '65
Houston
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
7/23/73
HH 54046 DocId:32211845 Page 291
---
## Page 292
296
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
FERGUSON, JOHN B.
information rec'd 12/24/63 that subj
had stated he wished bullet which hit JFK had hit LBJ and he
could arrange to have anyone killed. Is also alleged to have
Castro connections.
Degree of threat:.
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/24/63
Refered by other agency?. No
YES
Action taken:
Investigation failed to substantiate these allegations.
Location of subject last: Mackay, TX '65
Houston
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 292
---
## Page 293
297
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MASON, JAMES ROBERT WILSON
Reason for PRS interest:
12/30/63 information rec'd that subj
had orally threatened to kill pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
•Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
mental confinement '62 paranoid schizo; capable of dangerous acts.
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/30/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/10/64. Denied threat, exhibited persation complex.
Admired LBJ. In '68 he appeared at S.S. office to let office know
now he was getting along. S.S. keeps tabs: ex. Brezhnev's visit
subj was interviewed. Deemed not of protective interest.
•Location of subject lasti-Columbus, GA
Atlanta
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/6/73
'73
NH 54046 Do0Id:32241845 Page 293
---
## Page 294
298
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
JORDAN, DEWEY A.
Reason for PRS interest:
12/63 reported for having made statement
during summer '63 that if JFK visited Dallas he would be killed.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/17/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Background did not attach significance to statement.
1/20/64 interviewed and denied making any threats. Not felt to
be of protective interest.
Location of subject last: Dallas, TX '64
Field Office reporting:
Dallas
Last update:
:8/18/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 294
---
## Page 295
299
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Rosen, Daniel
Reason for PRS interest:
12/7/63 made statement that postal
employee was
going to hit Pres. with axe.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Hospitalized '58-60. No diagnosis
Nationalistic group: _ none
Date called
•to Secret Service attention:
12/7/63
Refered by other agency? -No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed same date, subj said he was going to be hit by axe.
Background showed hewas obsessed with this idea. Not felt of
protective interest.
Location of subject last; BRooklyn '64
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
8/18/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 295
---
## Page 296
3.00
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
JONES, RICHARD HAROLD
Reason for PRS interest:
12/30/64 visited Palm Beach to be
with Kennedy's.
Stated he'd rec'd meaaage on TV to go to Palm
Beach.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
hospitalized '57, no diagnosis
Nationalistic group: _ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/30/63
Refered by other agency?
NO.
YES
Action taken:
Held by local PD overnight and returned to Boston.
for investigation.
Not referred
Iocation of subject last: Melrose, MA
Field Office reporting:
Boston
Last update:
8/18/67
'63
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 296
---
## Page 297
301
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HUNT, MERLE GORDON
Reason for PRS interest:
12/30/63 attempted to sent telegrams
to Pres. 12/31/63 several attempts to place phone call to
Johnson City towarn Pres. of danger.
Degree of threat:
1
2
" 3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
former mental patient, diagnosis not given
Nationalistic group:
none
Date
called
to Secret Service attention:
12/31/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/30/65 (?) and his obsession was determined to be
a distortion of facts. Not felt to be of protective interest.
Location of subject lasts Sepulveda, CA: '63
Field Office reporting:
LA
Last update:
•8/18/67
H4 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 297
---
## Page 298
302
INDIVIDUALS LISTED
BY
PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS interest:
sinate the pres.
BELL, ALLEN
12/19/63 statement that he would assas-
Degree of threat: .
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
negro
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/31/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Statement could not be verified. 1/16/64 interviewed & denied
statements. Not felt to be of protective interest.
Location of subject last:.:
Brooklyn 64
NY
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845
Page 298
---
## Page 299
303
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HOWARD, JAMES C (III)
Reason for PRS interest:
12/3/63 letter to girl with obscene
remarks about JFK assassination.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/19/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/19/63 and said he was goofing off and expressed
regret. Subject 15 years old. Not felt of protective interest.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Atlanta
' 63
Atlanta
8/18/67
N# 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 299
---
## Page 300
304
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
TUCKER, HENRY RICHARD (JR)
Reason for PRS interest:
12/31/63 and 4/2/65, USSS visitor
trying to locate trunks of money taken from him.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
_3
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
12/31/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
Showed no protectee interest. Not referred for investigation.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Cowley, WY '65
Denver
8/18/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 300
---
## Page 301
305
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BENNETT, HARRIS M.
Reason for PRS interest: Informant John P. Carroll claimed subi
made statement prior to JFK assassination that he hoped to see
JFK killed.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 4/16/64. Denied statement.
reliable.
12/6/63
Informant not considered
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Houston
Houston
8/17/67.
' 64
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 301
---
## Page 302
306
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
CLINGER, HARMON T.
Reason for pRs interest: Subj is said to have expressed joy
when he learned of JFK death.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
12/9/63
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
Investigation did not verify he made any statement.
Not interviewed.
Last location:
Field office:
Last 9UPD:
Fort Wright,
KY
Louisville
8/17/67
'64
HH 54046
DooId:32241845 Page 302
---
## Page 303
307
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
FORSYTH, MILTON DEWEY THORNE
Reason
for PRS
interest:
Letter 12/27/63, potential WH visitor
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Psychiatric rest home '61 and '62 and one month '63
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/27/63, friendly, offered to assist LBJ in next
election.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Clayton, MO
St. LOUIS
'6.4
8/18/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 303
---
## Page 304
308
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ST. JOHN, JOHN ARTHUR
Reason for PRS interest:
Contacted FBI 12/23/63 and said he had
mialed threat to Pres. Letter never rec'd. Intended to bomb
aircraft carrying estranged wife.
Degree of threat:
3
Organizations to which individual
belongs:
none
paranoid schizo, periodic hosp
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
12/26/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 7/22/64.
couldn't remember incident.
Location of subject lasti San Francisco '66
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
San Francisco
8/18/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 304
---
## Page 305
i
309
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
NORRIS, THEODORE
Reason for PRS interest:
Visited Memphis S.S. office 12/26/63.
Said he wrote pres in '62 re compensation due him. Friendly.
Degree of threat:
• 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
appeared mentally ill - no documentation
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
No protective interest.
3
12/26/63
Location of subject last: Memphis /63
Memphis
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 305
---
## Page 306
310
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
obscene remarks about LBJ.
SHEPARD, GEORGE JAY
Letter to E. Roosevelt 11/25/63 with
Degree
of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
hosp '50 - '55. No diagnosis
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
12/19/63
Interviewed 12/23/63, claimed he was only trying to say he liked
JFK better.
prosecution declined.
Location of subject Last: Brooklyn
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
_8/18/67
' 63
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 306
---
## Page 307
311
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_CLINE, BEATRICE
Reason for PRS interest:
Anonymous caller to FBI: 11/22/63 said
that subj had said JFK shauld be shot.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/22/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/20/63 and denied statement. No protective interest.
Location of subject lasti.: Toledo
Field Office reporting:
Toledo
Last update:
8618/67
' 63
1N 54046 D0010:32241045 Page
301
---
## Page 308
312
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ANDERSON, OSCAR E:
Reason for PRS interest: Informant Wm. Boyd contacted FBI
12/13/63 and said subj had made oral threats and was willing to
killgovt. officials including pres. because he blames govt. for
death of friends in army.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
12/16/63
FBI
i. :
remembering
Interviewed 12/16/63, denied making statement due to drinking.
Location of subject lasts NY, NY '63
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
8/18/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 308
---
## Page 309
313
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS interest:
ARNOLD, RUSSELL X.
Fellow employees reported subj had pix
of LBJ with cannon pointed at it.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
-
Nationalistic group:
_ none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
12/26/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Investigation showed subi had bizarre sense of humor. No indi-
cation of disloyalty. Not interviewed.
Location of subject last:- Washington; D.C. '64
§deld Office reporting:
Last update:
Washington
11/6/70
H# 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 309
---
## Page 310
314
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MOJNAROWSKI, HELEN ROSE
Reason for PRS interest:
11/29/63 subj was informant against
neighbors who she claims killed JFK. 4/12/65 subject sent tele-
gram to WH saying her neighbors were going to kill LBJ.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/27/63 file opened.
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/29/63 and subject senile. Not reliable informant.
Location of subject lasti Toledo '67
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Toledo
8/18/67
1W 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 310
---
## Page 311
315
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS interest:
elation over JFK's death.
ETHRIDGE, RAYMOND ALLEN
12/27/63 information from FBI about
Degree of threat:
2
3
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
none
alcoholic
Nationalistic group: -
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/31/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES FBI
Action taken:
1/21/64 SA interviewed. Denied being elated but admitted he
opposed integration views. No hostility expressed. Not dangerous.
Location of subject last: lak Ridge, Tn '64
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Nashville
8/18/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 311
---
## Page 312
316
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
IDSVOOG, ORIS PHILIP
12/31/63 information from FBI of
threatening remarks to local postmaster.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to secret service attention: 12/31/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
2/13/64 SA interviewed. Denied making any remarks. May have
said something in heat of anger but would not harm the Pres.
Not dangerous.
Location of subject last: Stanley. WI '64
Field Office reporting:
Minneapolis
Last update:
8/18/67.
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 312
---
## Page 313
317
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
alleged threat.
GARDNER, HUBERT JUSTICE
12/24/63 information from FBI re
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
_YES
• FBI
Action taken:
No investigation by USSS.
statements. Not dangerous.
kidnapping.
12/30/63
1/7/64 FBl interview. Denied making
Owns guns. Arrested '61 for simple
Location of subject lasts. unknown '64
Houston
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
HH. 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 313
---
## Page 314
318
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BOWER, FRANKLIN A
Reason for PRS interest: Reported to FBI that subj said on
11/12/63 that he was going to washington and kill negroes.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/12/63
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
EBI
Action
taken:
No investigation bySS. FBI investigation indicates not danger
to protectees. Possibly a gun salesman.
Location of subject last:::
Jacksonville, Fl '63
Field Office reporting:
Jacksonville
Last update:
8/18/67
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 314
---
## Page 315
319
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS interest:
death.
GOOLSBY, JAMES CLARK
12/27/63 subj stated glad about JFK's
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/31/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
1/17/64 interviewed. Stated he had no personal animosity toward
Pres. although he disagreed with policies.
Location of subject lasts Miami, '64
Field Office
reporting:
Miami
Last update:
8/20/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 315
---
## Page 316
320
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ODELL, JOHNNY
Reason for PRS interest:
12/7/63 subj allegedly made statement
prior to assassination that he'd been practicing to shoot JFk.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
• none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/30/63
Refered by other agency?.
NO
YES
Action taken:
2/4/64 interviewed. Could not recall making any statements re
JFK assassination. SA reported subj was cooperative.
Location of subject last: Irving, Tx
'64
Field Office reporting:
Dallas
"Last update:
8/20/67
HH 54046 .DooId:32241845 Page 316
---
## Page 317
321
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual: .
DEVLIN, NEIL
Reason for PRS interest: 11/20/63 subj allegedly was intoxicated
and implied JFK would be assassinated.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
-3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
11/22/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
11/22/63 interviewed. Stated he was not against former Pres and
any comments should be considered because of his intoxication.
Location of subject last:- Northbrook, Il '63
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Chicago
8/19/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 317
---
## Page 318
322
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
"Thank God you did it."
STARLIN, MARTHA
11/22/63 telegram to uncle in Dallas:
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to:Secret Service attention:
12/26/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
4/14/65 (?) interviewed, regretted sending telegram and that she
was being facetious. SA reported not in agreement with JFK's
policies but holds no animosity.
Location of subject last:. El Campo, TX.
Houston
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/19/67
'65
HN 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 318
---
## Page 319
323
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BEARD. FRED L.
Reason for PRS interest: 12/4/63 information from FBI that subi
stated only way torid of Kennedy's is kill them.
Degree of threat:
1
2
•Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret
Service attention:
12/4/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Investigation revealed subj to be outstanding citizen and not
of protective interest.
Location of subject last::: Columbus, MS
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Jackson
8/19/67
*66
NH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 319
---
## Page 320
324
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WELLER, EDGAR STALEY
Reason for PRS interest: _ 12/28/63 to 1/3/64 investigation of
subject revealed he was undesirable for position as orderly for
Joseph P. Kennedy
Degree
of threat:
]
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to secret service attention:
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
investigation into background
12/28/63
Location of subject last: West Palm Beach '64
Field Office reporting:
Miami
Last update:
8/18/67
1H 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 320
---
## Page 321
3.25
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
WALKER, JOSEPH FRANKLIN
12/31/63 phoned FBI in attempt to reach
Pres. wanting help to get back in the Navy.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
1/20/64 interviewed. Admirer of Pres.
12/31/63
_FBI
SA reported subject sane but appeared immature and low IQ
..
Location of subject lasti-Phila '64
Field Office reporting:
Phila
Last update:
8/18/67
IW 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 321
---
## Page 322
326
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
VINYARD, RUTH
Reason for PRS interest:
12/27/67 State Dept. office of security,
advised USSS st. louis - that subj had called them claiming to
initiate impeachment of the Pres.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
confinement '61 or '62. SA stated subject is a mental case.
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
State Dept.
Action taken:
12/27/63 SA stated subject i not dangerous. Denied she would
initiate impeachment.
Location of subject last:. Webster Groves, MO '64
St. Louis
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 322
---
## Page 323
327
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DAHLBERG, KEITH WILLIAM
Reason for PRS interest:
12/16/63 Monrovia, CA P.D. advised S.S
that subj arrested for drunkeness and had stated how easily he
could get to LBJ.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo - chronic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/16/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YEs PD.
Action taken:
12/16/63 SA stated subject had no ill feeling for Pres. and had
only made statement to get attention. 12/20/63 committed
Location of subject last: Monrovia, CA '64
Field Office reporting:
LA
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 323
---
## Page 324
328
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SLAKEY, LARRY LEE
Reason for PRS interest:
12/2/63 Houston P.D. advised S.S. that
subject was potentially dangerous because of subversive activities.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
associated with Socialist Labor Party
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/2/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Houston P.D
Action
taken:
Not interviewed by USSS but subject has socialist tendencies.
Location of subject last:. Bak unknown '72
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Minneapolis
8/18/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 324
---
## Page 325
329
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
COX, THOMAS NEAL
12/4/63 FBI advised that subj called
and said he told LHO not to kill JFK but RK.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo-aaranoid; possible alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
12/4/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
No interview by USSS but subject denied statement to FBi.
Iocation of subject lasts. Washington, D.C. '64
washington
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 325
---
## Page 326
330
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
BROSHAR. WALTER H. (SR)
12/25/63 wrote FBI requestina he per-
sonally deliver religious message with implied threat.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
obsessed with religion
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/25/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
1/10/64 interview, no ill feelings toward Pres but is anti-catholic.
Has cont. to write letters with religious tones to Pres. and
agencies. Man is in his 80's. SA opined due to age, poor health,
and inability to travel, subject deemed not of protective interest
although he probably will continue to write in the future.
Location of subject lasts. Anderson, IN '72
Field Office reporting:
Indianapolis
Last update:
12/19/72
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page
326
---
## Page 327
331
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MARADIAGA, DORA
Reason for PRS interest:
12/13/63 FBI info that subj and husband
allegedly in country to kill some President.
Degree of threat:
organizations
to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
_ Nicaraguan
Date
called to Secret Service attention: 12/13/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
_FBI
Action taken:
Interviewing SA on 2/19/65 (?) stated info appeared false
Location of subject last:-saugus, CA '64
Field Office reporting: LA
Last update:
10-12-70
WH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 327
---
## Page 328
332
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of.
individual:
MARADIAGA, CARLOS
Reason for PRS interest:
see #331 re wife
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
3
Nationalistic group:
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Location of subject last:::
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 328
---
## Page 329
333
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason
for PRS
interest:
against Sen. Byrd.
ROBINSON, WALTER
12/7/63 subj allegedly made threat
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
• 3
Nationalistic group:
none black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/7/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
No investigation by USSS. No presidential interest shown. subj
may have made statement while drunk.
Location of subject lasts. Newport News, VA
'64
Norfolk
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/21/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 329
---
## Page 330
334
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
ARMSTRONG, NEWTON EELIS
11/26/63 FBI report that early in '63
subj stated that pres should be assassinated.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
mental problem
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/23/63
Refered by other agency?
.. NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
1/24/64 interview; denied making statement. Allegedly has aun
collection.
Location of subject last: Richardson, Tx '66
Dallas
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 330
---
## Page 331
335
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
KERR, LONNIE LEE
Reason for PRS interest: 11/63 informant advised that day before
assassination subj stated Pres. would be killed.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic
group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/28/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 4/64, stated he had no prior knowledge of assassination
but had made statement on basis that history repeats itself.
Location of subject last; Houston
Houston
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
* 64
N4 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 331
---
## Page 332
336
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
RITCHEY, FRANCIS D.
Reason for PRS interest: Informant advised that on 12/63 subject
claimed to have overheard plotters befôre assassination.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other agency?
YES
Action
taken:
Investigation disclosed subj mentally ill and there was no founda-
tion to his claims. Described as thoroughly mentally unbalanced -
no diagnosis.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Oklahoma City
OKC
1/13/77.
'64
Ford
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 332
---
## Page 333
337
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MCMASTER, JAMES DAVID
Reason for PRS interest: .
11/63 anonymous informant advised that
subject was overjoyed at JFK's death.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
11/28/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/63, denied he was overjoyed. Reinterviewed 11/66
Bore no animosity toward adm.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Houston
Houston
8/18/67
' 66
NN 54046 D0010:32241645 Page
333
---
## Page 334
338
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HARLAN, WILLIAM ELLIS (UR)
Reason for PRS interest: 12/63 informant claimed that in 9/63
subj stated he would pay someone to kill Pres:
Degree of threat:.
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to secret Service attention:
12/2/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
?
• YES
Action taken:
Interviewed by FBI. Denied statement.
reputation. Informant unreliable.
U.s. attorney declined prosecution
Former FBI agent, 900d
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Houston
Houston
8/19/67
'67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 334
---
## Page 335
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECIIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
NELSON, LAWRENCE ARTHUR
Reason for PRS interest:
Numerous letters since '64. No indi-
cation why file was begun '63.
Degree of threat: : 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
chronically disorganized
Nationalistic group: .
none
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12/31/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed in 1966; friendly to Pres.
Last location:
Field office:
Last UPD:
Houston
Houston
7623/74
'74
Nixon
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 335
---
## Page 336
340
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
FINN, JOAN
Reason for PRS interest: FBI reported 12/17/63 that at time of
assassination subj reportedly said it should have happened two
years ago.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to
which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/18/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/4/64. Denied making remark. Said she respected
the last pres:
Location of subject last:.:Devon, CT '64
New Haven
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/18/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 336
---
## Page 337
1.:
341
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
JOINER, BOBBY SAVELLE
Reason for PRS interest: _
Arrested with Gene Audra, Gary Dwayne
Joiner, Raymond Lee Joiner and Roy Eugene Joiner immediately
after the assassination while picketing the Trade Mart in Dallas.
FBI reported that he tried to get Roy Joiner to shoot JFK.
Degree of threat: 1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Indignant white Citizen's Council
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/21/63 (? Date ?)
Refered by other agency? No
YES,
Action taken:
Interviewed by FBI on 6/8/64. Feels strongly against integration.
Denied any involvement with assassination. Claimed he held Pres.
in high regard.
Has been arrested several times, once shot boy with pellet gun.
Location of subject last:
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
• Grand Prairie, Tx '65
Dallas
8/19/67
1N 54046 D0010:32241645 Page 337
---
## Page 338
342
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
JOINER, GARY DWAYNE
Reason for PRS interest:
Arrested 11/22/63 while picketing
Trade Mart in Dallas. After assassination.
In company of 4 others.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to
which individual belongs:
Indignant White Citizen's Council
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
none indicated
11/21/63
Location of subject lasti. Dallas
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Dallas
8/19/67
'63
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 338
---
## Page 339
343
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
JOINER. RAYMOND LEE
Reason for PRS interest:
See #341 & 342
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
3
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Location of subject lasti.
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
H# 54046
DooId: 32241845 Page 339
---
## Page 340
344
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
_GUINN, GENE AUDRA
See #341 & 342
Degree of threat:
Organizations
1
2
to which individual belongs:
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? • NO
YES
Action taken:
Location of subject last:.::
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 340
---
## Page 341
345
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS
interest:
JOINER, ROY EUGENE
See #341.
Degree of threat:
1
2
organizations
to which individual belongs:
IWCC
3
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/21/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Denied having been contacted by uncle and asked to shoot the
pres. in interview of 6/12/64 by FBI.
Location of subject last;
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
•Grand Prairie '63
Dallas
8/19/67
H4 54046 DooId: 32241845 Page 341
---
## Page 342
346
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WILHEAM, JACK
Reason for PRS interest:
12/19/63, Postal inspectors reported
that subject was overheard to say that a bomb will be placed on'
highway between Austin and LBJ ranch.
Degree of threat: .1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/19/63
Refered by other agency?
YES
Postal
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/26/63; denied making statment. Said he hoped
landing strip on ranch was well guarded. If not, someone might
put a bomb on it. A No animosity toward Pres.
Location of subject last: San Angelo, TX '63
Field Office reporting:
Dallas
Last update:
8/18/67
14 54046 DocId: 322418451
Page 342
---
## Page 343
347
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MCDONALD, JONATHAN COOK
Reason for PRS interest: -
Oral statements in '62 that his society
had $25,000 which was available to pay someone to assassinate the
pres.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none but affiliations with John Birch Society
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 3/4/65 (?) Denied statement
12/2/63
Location of subject last: Houston
Houston
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/21/67
' 65
1N 54046 D0010:32241645 Page
343
---
## Page 344
348
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
plans that threatened LBJ's life.
CARY, CLINTON BEVRIDGE
11/25/63 wrote letter to friend with
Degree of threat:
1
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/25/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
2/5/64 interviewed by SA, expressed no animosity toward Pres.
Did not know meaning. Had written letter in state of intoxication.
Not felt of protective interest.
Location of subject last:..
-San Diego '64
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
San Diego
8/19/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 344
---
## Page 345
- 1
349
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HODGE, GARY FEREL
Reason for PRS interest:
May '62 deserted USMC in Japan. Sought
political asylum with Cuban Embassy. In '57-'58 had worked in
IBJs office. Uses WH contacts for personal interests. Believed
sympathetic toward communists. While living in Mexico City,has
been observed contacting 2 members of Soviet Embassy who belona
to KGB.
Degree
of threat:
1
2
Organizations to
which
individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
7/22/63
Refered by other
agency?
No?
YES
Action
taken:
It is not clear what action has been taken. Looks as though s.s.
keeps tabs on this subject through use of other us agencies.
Iocation of subject lasts unknown '76
San Antonio
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
817170
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 345
---
## Page 346
350
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
MARCH, GLADYS STEVENS
Not clear
5/10/64 at WH, telephoned LBJ ranch, called FBI
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
neuro-psychiatric condition - no documentation
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
12/30/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 3/22/64. SA reported no animosity towards Pres.
Location of subject
Last:--M. Miami '64
Field Office reporting:
Miami
Last update:
8/21/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 346
---
## Page 347
357
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
relative to JFK's death.
TALLEY, EDITH DERBY
11/22/63 made defamatory statements
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
committed '39 and '50; continuous confinement since '63. schizo
Nationalistic group:
n are
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/5/63
Refered by other
agency?
YES
Action taken:
In mental hospital
Location of subject last: Steilacoom, WA '64
Field Office reporting:
Seattle
Last update:
8/21/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 347
---
## Page 348
352
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HARPER, JOSEPH BUNYAN
Reason for PRS interest:
11/30/63 subj advised he purchased
$1 bill from Frank Hamilton with notation, "who will be next ex-
pres."
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schizo
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to
Secret Service attention:
11/30/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
3/4/64 interviewed, convinced he was conned by Hamilton.
Location of subject last;
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
-Pineville, La
New Orleans
8/21/67
'64
1N 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 348
---
## Page 349
/
353
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
her.
CARTER, THOMAS H. W. (MRS .)
12/63 subj claimed Pres Johnson called
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
apparent mental case - no documentation
Nationalistic group:
none
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/63. Repeated claim.
Mental.
3
12/30/64
Location of subject last:.
Virginia Beach, Va
Norfolk
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/21/67
'64
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 349
---
## Page 350
354
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH.
Name of individual:
WILLIAMS, MORRIS LANE
Reason for PRS interest: 11/20/63 Houston field office rec'd
information that subject would shoot the pres.
Degree of threat:.
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
11/20/63
Refered by other agency? Ne
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/20/63; stated he recalled talking of president's
visit and made some remark about shooting but meant it only as a
joke. • Not considered dangerous.
Iocation of subject last: Houston
Field Office reporting:
Houston
Last update:
8/21/67
'64
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 350
---
## Page 351
355
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
TAYLOR, CLIFTON HUGHS
Reason for PRS interest: 11/22/63 interview with FBI.
11/28/63 FBI advised that information re the subject being involved
in JFK assassination is false. Subject denied knowledge of assas-
sination, only regret that LHO didn't finish off LBJ.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3.
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/28/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 10/13/64 and 6/25/65. First interview said he didn't
like LBJ and thought it time to clean out the birdcage. SA con-
sidered subject potential danger. Second interview subject com-
plained about being put under surveillance during pres. visit.
Stated best place to kill LBJ would be the lake. SA felt if mental
condition deteriorates, he would be considered extremely dangerous.
Check ups discont. 2119768.
Location of subject last;:: Houston
'68
Field Office reporting:
Houston
Last update:
4/23/68
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 351
---
## Page 352
356
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WILLIAMS, JAMES HERBERT
Reason for PRS interest: .
1214/63 Louisville field office rec'd
letter which contained info that subject was possible demonstrator.
FBI reported that subj was a radical student demonstrator.
Degree of threat: .
organizations
Communist Party
1
2
to which individual belongs:
Nationalistic group:
none
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
12/18/63 file opened
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
No other investigation. FBI report dated 3/29/74 indicated subj
was member of Communist Party, WDC Club.
Location of subject last:.
-Takoma Park, Md. '74
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
washington
4/16/74
1N 54046 D0010:32241845 Page
352
---
## Page 353
357
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WESTERLUND, DAVE
Reason for PRS interest: - 11/22/63 sent postcard to friend congra-
tulating him on Dallas trip and service performed. JOKE
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/23/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/23/63; refused to cooperate. Background investigation
revealed not of protective interest.
Location of subject lasts. Downers Grove, IL '64
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Chicago
8/21/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 353
---
## Page 354
358
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SHAIN, ELI
Reason for PRS interest:
11/29/63 telegram to USSS expressing
fear of atomic attack on political figures
at. JFK funeral.
Degree
of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
Jew
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/24/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/24/63. Felt of no further interest.
Location of subject last: Brooklyn '63
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
8/21/67
NN. 54046 D0011:32241045 Page 354
---
## Page 355
359
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ODUM, WILLIAM D.
12/63 informant advised subject stated
Reason for PRS interest:
he was pleased by assassination and desired other family members
to be killed.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations
to which
individual belongs:
none
-3
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/30/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 3/64. Did not agree with JFK or LBU policies
but not believer in assassination. Owns high powered rifle.
Location of subject last:: Atlanta
Field Office reporting:
Atlanta
Last update:
8/21/67
' 64
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 355
---
## Page 356
360
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
BELL, JAMES ROBERT
12/63 subj left incoherent letter with
acquaintance with reference to assassination plot.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/63, confused. Plot apparently only subjects
imagination Seemed mentally ill to SA.
Location of subject lasts. Baldwin Park, Ca
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
LA
8/22/67
'64
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 356
---
## Page 357
361.
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
PENDLETON, HELEN JACKSON
Reason for
PRS interest:
11/26/63 informant advised that subject
stated in 9/63, "we are going to kill JFK and RFK."
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
None
3
Nationalistic
group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/26/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/63. Denied statement. Afraid that civil riahts
legislation would make negro superior.
Friendly toward. pres.
Location of sübject Lasti-Sellersburg, IN '63
Field Office reporting:
_ Indianapolis
Last update:
8/22/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 357
---
## Page 358
362
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SANDIDGE, GEORGE LEE
12/30/63 report from FBI re alleged
Reason for PRS interest:
information on assassination from subject.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/21/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
1/9/64 interviewed, stated he had no information and his call to
FBI was made while drunk. Not dangerous. One arrest 20 years
before for CCW.
Location of subject last:.: Cincinnati, OH '64
Fiela office reporting:
Cincinnati
Last update:
8/21/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 358
---
## Page 359
363
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
DILLION, THOMAS J.
Reason for PRS interest:
11/25/63 FBI interviewed subject who
admitted sending telegram to himself which told him to go to
JFK's funeraland signed name of General Lemay. Said he was
drunk. No presidential complex.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual
belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
11/24/63
Refered by other agency? No?
YES
Action taken:
Looks like SS referred this to FBI and FBI investigated.
Location of subject lasts unknown '64
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Birmingham
8/22/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 359
---
## Page 360
364
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MILTEER, JOSEPH ADAMS
Reason for PRS interest:.
subject on 11/9/63 is alledged to have
said that plans were in the making to kill JFK, and further to
kill Martin Luther King. He was reportedly jubilant over the
death of the president, but on interview by FBI 11/27/63, he denied
all above statements or knowledge ofsame. Considered to be an
out spoken segregationist.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Affiliated with: Constitution party of the United States, KKK,
The White Citizen's Council and the Congress of Freedom
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency? No
YES
Prior. to this date
11/27/63 (?)*
reports were
written earlier.
not made clear but would
be FBI and Miami P.D.
Action taken:
SA's conducting background and Ol's do not feel that he is a
danger to protectees.
Location of subject last: Valdosta, Ga '67
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
_Atlanta
10/19/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 360
---
## Page 361
365
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HARRIOTT, ROBERT K
Reason for PRS interest:
11/29/63 informant reported that subj
made derogatory remark relative to JFK's death.
Degree of threat:. 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group: _
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/29/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
1/24/64 interviewed, denied killing Pres. but admitted he'd said
"That's about all for the SOB".
Location of
subject last;-:San Diego, '64
Field Office reporting:
San Diego
Last update:
8/21/67
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 361
---
## Page 362
366
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MCCALL, WILLIFRED COLUMBUS
Reason for PRS interest:
12/63 reported for stating on hearing
JFK death, "Good," and indicated that if he were attending jFk
, he would not have a chance.
(he is an M.D.)
Degree of threat: :1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/4/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/6/64, denied remarks. Stated he thought people
were joking on first assassination report. Not felt of protective
interest.
Location of subject last:.: Anaheim, CA '64
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
LA
8/22/67
1N 54046 D0010:32241645 Page 362
---
## Page 363
367
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BERRY, WILFORD LEE
Reason for PRS interest:
FBI 12/63, advised subj pro-Castro
and advocate of guerrilla warfare.
Degree of threat:
]
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Communist Party
schizo-paranoid, believes right wing groups plotting against him
Nationalistic group:
— none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/27/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES FBI
Action taken:
7/8/64 interview - cooperative. Said Pres. action on civil rights
was political, considered dangerous by SA. 10/5/67 interview -
hostile, stated would join any revolutionary force against Us govt.
and kill if necessary. Feels US govt murdered his wife and children.
Extensive knowledge firearms and explosives.
Location of subject last: Houston
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Houston
4/18/68
'70
NН 54046 DoOId:32241845 Page 363
---
## Page 364
368
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:.
DANIEL, LELAND MACK
12/11/63 subject allegedly made state-
ments about assassination. Informant could not recall any
threats.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
none
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service
attention:
12/11/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 2/4/64. SA reported no animosity toward protectees.
Location of subject last;
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
• Ft. Worth
'64
Dallas
8/23/67
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 364
---
## Page 365
369
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of
individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
over JFK's death.
BABCOCK, GRANT M
11/24/63 subject made renarks of elation
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/24/63
Refered by other
agency?
NQ
YES
Action taken:
3/25/64 subject admitted remarks and stated he regretted them.
SA stated subj appeared sane.
Location of subject last: - Phoenix '64
Field Office reporting:
Phoenix
Last update:
8/23/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 365
---
## Page 366
37.0
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SCHUCHARDT, HERBERT OTTO WILHELM
Reason for PRS interest:
12/16/63 FBI advised subject had made
violent statements toward Pres. in
'42 or '43
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
German
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/16/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
SA stated subject is an obvious eccentric. No diagnosis.
Location of subject last: Denver
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Denver
8/24/67
' 66
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 366
---
## Page 367
371
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
SKREBIS, TAMARA
4/14/64 wrote letter to Pres about
CIA harassment. Pentagon and WH visitor re CIA obsession.
No indication why she is filed in '63
Degree of threat:
1.
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
UR
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
4/14/63
Refered by other
agency?
YES
Action taken:
Committed 7/6/64 from
WH. No felt of protective interest.
Location of subject last;-.
• Astoria Queens, NY '66
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
8/24/67
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 367
---
## Page 368
372
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BARRETT, PRESTON EVERETT
Reason for PRS interest:
12/10/63 subj of FBI report as asking
for help in being revealed as new messiah. Said he would do what
LHo did if directed by God.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret service attention:
12/11/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Interviewed 3/7/64. Retained obsession of new messiah. Has written
letters to Pres. - latest '67. Paranoid Schizophrenic.
Iocation of subject last: Long Beach, CA '68
LA
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
8/25/67
HN 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 368
---
## Page 369
373
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HARTRICK , PEARL IRENE
Reason for PRS interest:
11/1/63 letter to JFK. 11/5/64 anony-
mous call to IRs mentionina the mailing of package for pres.
7./65 letter to Pres. mentioned grievance with medical profession
but satisfaction with LBJ.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoid-schizo
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/6/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
background check re mental history and file kept
Location of subject last:.
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Des. 'Moines '65
Omaha
8/29/6:7
HH 54046 DocId:32241845
Page 369
---
## Page 370
/
374
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MARSHALL-JIMENEZ, FRANCISCO JOSE
Reason for PRS interest: 3/16/63 referred by CAS re Pres. Kennedy's
visit to Costa Rica. Subject has been alleged to have been gun-
runner and dealer in illicit activities. Believed involved in
Costa Rica coup d'etat and assassination attempt on Pres. Somoza
of Nicaragua, and Teodoro Picado, former Costa Rican Pres.
Degree
of threat:
Organizations to
Pro-Nazi tendencies.
3
which individual belongs:
Nationalistic group:
Costa Rican
Date called to Secret Service attention:
3/18/63
Refered by other agency? No
YES
CAS
Action taken:
Not clear - investigation into subject but print out does not
mention if name was put on PRS list for Pres. visit.
Location of subject last: unknown '76
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
San Juan
1/20/12
1H 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 370
---
## Page 371
375
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
PERRY, GEORGE
Reason for PRS interest:
12/19/63 allegedly stated he would
take care of the pres. or knew someone who would. 11/24/64 he
telephoned Chicago field office and claimed he sent pres. a
telegram.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret
Service attention:
12/21/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 4/20/64; denied threat; not considered dangerous.
Location of subject lasts Chicago
Chicago
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
1/16/74
'74
HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Paue 371
---
## Page 372
376
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WEBSTER, DOUGLAS
Reason for PRS interest:
'63 - '66 wrote WH and govt. officials
re theories on assassination by slow-acting poison.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/20/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
7/20/64 interviewed; appeared angry he'd no response from letters.
Indicated concern over safety of LBU but no animosity toward Pres.
Deemed not of protective interest... Reappeared in '71 in San
Diego field office with same theories.
Location of subject last: Coronado, CA '73
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
San Diego
2/5/73
HH 54046. DocId: 32241845 Page 372
---
## Page 373
377
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
requesting appt to see Pres.
DAUGHERTY, EUGENE
Has called LA and Phoenix field offices
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
schize
Nationalistic group:
none
Date
called
to Secret Service attention:
10 - 10-63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 8/13/63 and 8/19/66. Subj stated he as havina personal
problems with VA and needed Pres. help. Friendly...
Location of subject last: "Pheenix '67
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Phoenix
9/1/67
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 373
---
## Page 374
378
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
• VOLPE, NICHOLAS MICHAEL
Reason for PRS interest: - 11/3/63 and 3/30/65 called WH.
Second call..re killing negroes and dynamiting the WH.
Degree of threat:
1
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
alcoholic
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/7/63 file
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
3/30/65 interviewed and subj was intoxicated. 11/2/66 last
reported to have terminal cancer and not expected to live much
longer.
Arrested by. NYPD and USSS charged with 871, charges later dismissed
after observation.
Location of
subject Last;.
: Mount Vernon, NY '66
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
9/13/67
1N 54046 . D0010:32241645 Page 374
---
## Page 375
/
379
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
_STARKEY, JAMES LEE (UR)
Reason for PRS interest: _ not clear what interest was in 1963.
FBI referral 1/64. Numerous letters to Pres. since '64. Letters
included. "supposed" info re JFK death, advise on world affairs,
warnings, religion, etc.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/2/63
Refered by other agency? NO.
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Subj had been
confined almost continuously since '52. Acutely
paranoid, schizo. A complaint was authorized in 3/66 but was
dismissed as subject was committed. QI's were initiated, never-
the less.
Location of subject last;-
-Boston
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Boston
11/2/77
'77
JFK, HHH, LBJ, Kennedys
Nixon, Ford, Carters
H4 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 375
---
## Page 376
380
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MILLIS, MONICA
Reason for PRS interest: Subject had phoned WH infrequently
since '57 and visited same year. Sent telegrams '61 and '64.
Called '66.
Degree of threat:
1
2
organizations
to which
individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:.
none
born in Lithuania
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
12/19/63 file
Refered by other agency?
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/64. Senile, not considered dangerous. Threatened
a Senator in '66 and was committed. Considered dangerous by
doctors - schizo paranoid. Subj is over 70 years old. Ol's were
discont. 5/1/69.
Location of subject last:.
Field Office
reporting:
Last update:
Washington '69 hosp
Washington
5/7/69
HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page
376
---
## Page 377
381
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
KELLY, WILLIAM CLARENCE
Reason for PRS interest:
6/30/63 FBI reported that subject said
JFK would be killed before '64 election.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
frequent companion of members of ANP and NSRP
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
7/3/63
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
11/7/55 interviewed; cooperative; could not recall making statement.
Expressed no animosity toward protectees.
Location of subject lasti-:Pinellas Park, FL '65
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Tampa
9/11/67
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 377
---
## Page 378
382
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
UNKNOWN
Reason for PRS interest:
5/13/63 letter to. US German: ambassador
upbraiding Pres. Kennedy on association with tyrants in Viet Nam
and Spain.. Informed of assault being planned against JFK during
visit to Germany.
Degree of threat:
1
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
?
3
Nationalistic group:
German?
Date called to
Secret Service attention:
5/28/63
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
Embassy
Action taken:
Investigation by German police. Writer never identified
Location of subject last: Stuttgart, Germany.
Paris
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
10-16-57
'65
NH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 378
---
## Page 379
383
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
C02 41928
Name of individual:
TRACY, ROBERT EARL
Reason for PRS interest: -
suicide letter to WH from Subject's
wife 9/7/63. Threat letter to Pres. 10/11/63.
Letters to WH in '67 complaint about being swindled by govt.
Degree
of threat: '1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
9/23/63
Refered by other
agency? No
YES
Action taken:
Arrest record since '62 for threat letters.
Referred to hospital
by USSs in '67 following WH calls. QI's initiated 6/12/67.
Hostile. Subj haa guns and rifle with scope.
S.S. has kept tabs
although QI's were discont. 3/18/77
Location of subject last: Goyle, OK 177
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Oklahoma City
3/31/77
Camp, Jarman, Steed,
carl Albert, Ford,
Nixon, Carter
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 379
---
## Page 380
384
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
UNKNOWN
Reason for PRS interest:
11/22/63 Lt. Verne Rivers, USAR,
reported to. FBI he overheard Kenneth Shand state that he'd had
conversation with unknown male who said that JFK would be killed
first time he set foot in Texas. Unknown said he was WWII pilot
employed as crop duster. Also claimed to be member of Minutemen.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations
to which
individual belongs:
Minutemen?
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
FBI
Investigation failed to identify the subject
11/29/63 file
Location of subject last: unknown '76
San Antonio
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
4/5/67
HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 380
---
## Page 381
385
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS
JFK assassination.
interest:
YARTZOFF, ANDREW GEORGE
11/27/63 called S.S. with theory re
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
nonE
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
11/27/63
Referld by other
agency?.
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed; advised theory came from radio and papers.
evaluation made on subject.
No
Location of subject last: unknown
'63
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Washington
9/18/67
1H 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 381
---
## Page 382
386
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
HUMMER, DONALD LESTER
Reason for
PRS interest: -
11/30/63 FBI said subj, while intoxi-
cated, said something about assassin.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/4/63
Refered by other
agency? No
YES FBI
Action taken:
No investigation by S.S. During interview subject could not recall
actions and showed no animosity toward Pres.
Location of subject last: unknown '63
Field Office reporting:
Detroit
Last update:
9/18/67
1N 54046 D0010:32241645 Page 362
---
## Page 383
387
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest: -
like to put bullet in JFK.
PAPPAS, ANDREW
11/16/63 alleged to have stated he'd
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual
belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention: 11/26/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Informant, Francis McGee, later recanted his story he'd told the
FBI. Not referred for investigation.
Location of subject lasti: Chicago
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Chicago
9/29/67
'63
NH 54046' DooId:32241845 Page 383
---
## Page 384
388
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
MCGEE, FRANCIS JOSEPH
see #387
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
_FBI
Location of subject last:::
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
17 54046 DooId:32241845 Page
384
---
## Page 385
389
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
REYES, MARGARITA
122/63 visited Milwaukee field office
and said she'd seen Ruby and LHO in her backyard in 9/63.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
12/3/63
Possible mental. No further investigation after interview.
Location of subject last; Milwaukee
Field Office reporting:
Milwaukee
Last update:
9/29/67
'66
HN 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 385
---
## Page 386
390
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ROSSI, JOSEPH P.
Reason for PRS interest: .
Referred by FBI 12/16/63: subj claimed
to have been associated with Ruby in Dallas
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/29/63
prior to FBI
referral above
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
??
Action
taken:
Not interviewed; was determined to be of no protective interest.
subject is suspected of involvement in criminal activities in
Dallas.
(subj is owner of JJ Coffee Shop in Dallas)
Location of subject
last;
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
- Dallas '64
Dallas
9/29/67
_HW..54046 DocId: 32241845. Page 386
---
## Page 387
391
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
ABBOTT, JOHN HUELMER
Reason for PRS interest:
11/30/63 subj alleged he cut LHO's
hair spring of that year. Stated further that LHO was blackmailing
a "Texas night club owner" and would buy a gun to settle score
with the Us.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none.
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
12/4/63
Refered
by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Investigation disclosed that subiect was known to tell tall tales
and his family had history of mental instability. No protective
interest on the part of the subject. No interview by s.s.
Location of subject last:::
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Milwaukee
11/4/67
Sparta, WI '63
AN 54046 DooId: 32241845 Page 387
---
## Page 388
392
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
RANDLE, WILLIAM EVERT
Reason for PRS interest:
11/63 subject claimed to have 2 or 3
doors from HO and knew Oswald personally. That is was rumored
if JFk came to Dallas, he would be killed.
Degree of threat:
• 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
11/23/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 11/28/63; denied knowing LHO and remarked only that
Oswald had lived somewhere in neighborhood. Information determined
groundless, deemed not of protective interest.
Location of subject Lasts
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
- Irving '66
Dallas
10-2-67
AH. 54046 DocId: 32211845 Page 388
---
## Page 389
393
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS
for Ruby.
interest:
PORTH, ROSE
Info rec'd that subj knew and worked
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/3/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
Interviened 1216/63 ard stated sha did not know Ruby and had no.
connections in Dallas, Deemed not of protective interest:
Location of subject lasts ny '66
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NV
10-2-57
- 1H. 54046. DocId:32241845 Page 389
---
## Page 390
394
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
NORRIS, ROBERT LEE
Reason for PRS interest:
y,63 subj satted to ü.R, salisbury,
"If urk comes to Daïlas he will get snot". Salisbury is of
opinion that subj was sent to lew orreans to hire Oswald.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/2/63
Refered by other
agency?.
NO
YES
Action taken:
investigation developed that salisbury disliked subj. 10/10/66
interviawed, denied making stacaments. Not of protective interest.
Location of subject last: Pasadena, Tx '66
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Houston
9/29/67
HH. 54046 DooId: 32241845 Page 390
---
## Page 391
395
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WEISSM4N BERNARD WILLIAM
Reason for PRS interest:
1122161 subj placed ad in Dallas morning
News, entitled "weicome Mr. Kennedy to Dallas" - criticisni or ifk
policies. Subj name at bottom of ad as Chairman of Am. Far: Findira
Degree of threat:
1
--
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Associated with John Birch Society
3
Nationalistic group: -
none (vew)
Date called to Secret Service attention:
11/30/53 tile
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
intervieved 12/11/63. Ad was for publicity of conservative cause
and had no connection with assassination. com. was merely a name
originated for ad. Subject expressed remorseover JEK's death
and respect for LBJ.
Location of subject lasti it. Vernon, My 53
Field Office reporting:
iNY
Last update:
16-2-67
•HH. 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 391
---
## Page 392
356
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BURLEY, WILLIAM MILTON (111!
Reason
for PRS interest:
Subj assciated with Weissman.
Sitated he went to Dallas with Weissman to seek employment
and continue his interest in conservative political matters.
He was aware of ad but not directly involved Subj expressed
extreme
remorse over assassination.
Degree Of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Associated with JBS
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 1/9/64 and above info given
11/30/63
Location of subject last:.: Denver '61
Field Office reporting:
Denver
Last update:
10-2-67
.17 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 392
---
## Page 393
397
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
Marina Oswald.
PHILLIPS, DOROTHY
.. 11/63 sent symathy telegram to
Degree of threat: .
1
2
Organizations to
which individual belongs:
None
Nationalistic group: none
Date called to secret Service attention:
11/29/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Interviewed 12/3/63. Said she felt sorry for Marina and
didn't think she should be blamed for LHO's behavior.
Expressed for LBJ. Not of protective interest.
Location of subject last:
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Norristown, PA '63
Phila
10-2-67
-HH 54046 DocId: 32241845. Page
393
---
## Page 394
398
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SHENKNER, CHARIE'S J.
Reason for PRS interest:
Subj alleged to FBI # that on 11/20,63
Rogers said JFK and Conally would be shot down in Dallas.
Rogers was supposed to know who would do it. That the
assassin has been to Russia and Cuba and not allowed to
stay.
Degree of threat:
2
***
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic' group:
none
Date
called to Secret Service attention:
12/5/63
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES _FBI
Action taken:
No investigation by S.S. Subj provided FBI with si gned
statement but admitted he was drunk when conversation
took place.
Location of subject last:.
Norman, OK
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
OKC
10-3-67
'63
_HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 394
---
## Page 395
399
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
assassin.
ROGERS, ERTIS
See #398. Supposed to know about
Degree of threat: 1
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called
to Secret Service
attention:
12-5-63
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
FBI
•Action taken:
FBI interviewed subject 11/23/63 and he denied allegations.
No investigation conducted by USSS.
Location of subject lasti.:: Dallas
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Dallas
10-3=67
163.
-NH. 54046. DocId:32241845 Page 395.
---
## Page 396
400
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
GALVAN-LORENZO, ANDRES
Reason for PRS
interest: -
Subj is anti-US. Has traveled to
Russia, Cuba, and China. '61 declared as covert communist leader
of radical and pro-Cuban USTOM (Union Sindical de Trabajadores
de Oficios Mixtos:) leftist labor organization. Train guerrillas
in Panama '63.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
CP of Panama, Van -Vanguardia de Accion Nationa (pro-Castro
rev. organization)
Nationalistic group: Panamanian
Date called to Secret Service attention:
3/4/63
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Background check and up dates of location
Location of subject lasti :: unknown '76
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
_ San Juan
6/19/74
..HH.54046 DooId:32241845 Page 396
---
## Page 397
401
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
KING, THELMA ESTELLA
Reason
for PRS interest: Referred by CIA 3/8/63. Travels to
Cuba, Mex., block countries, China, & USSR. Held high gott.
positions. 1963 involved in assassination phot against JFK &
Pres. of Panama during meeting in that country. Reportedly in-
volved in assassination of former Pres. Remon of Panama. In-
volved in plot to overthrow govt. of Panama under Pres. Robles.
Adherent of communism.
Degree of threat: 1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Associates with members of Peoples Party, MUR and Panamenista
Party (PD)
Nationalistic group:
Panamanian
Date called to Secret Service attention:
3/15/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
CIA
Action taken:
NOT clear - looks like ss uses CIA to sup date their files and
in that way can keep up with subjects location
Location of subject last::: Ecudador 176
Field Office reporting:
San Juan
Last update:
9/23/71
1M 54046 DooId:32241845 Page. 397
---
## Page 398
402
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
PORCELLO, MICHAEL LOUIS
Reason for PRS interest:
not clear. In '66 he wrote Pres.
re job and educational problems
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
9/9/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
6/7/65 interviewed by SA and deemed not of protective interest
Location of subject last: Newark NJ
'66
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Newark
10-12-67
NN 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 398
---
## Page 399
403
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
WANG, TOM TONG
Reason for PRS interest:
not clear - 3/18/64 subj former
holder of WH pass classified "do not admit" because of criminal
record. Passed numerous bad checks in '63 using this id.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
Chinese
Date called
to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? No
YES
Action taken:
not indicated
5/31/63
Location of subject last:
- Washington '72
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Washington
11/25/70
_HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 399
---
## Page 400
104
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
"Name of individual:
RUDIS, CHARLES JERUNE
Reason for PRS interest: ..
8/5/52 issuad a WH pass. Later dis.
closed associating with homusexuals.
1124/6o classified "Do
Not admit"
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
3
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to
Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
reclassified
3/6/63
Location of subject last:.:hashington :56
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
washington
11/13/67
-NH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 400
---
## Page 401
405
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
GREENWOCD, HELEN CROZIER
Reason
for PRS interest:
12/3/63 FBI report that sub had vision
of uf" assässination to months refore it happened. Predicted
kidrap ot kennedy children, and RiK would be killed if ran for
Pres:
Degree of threat:
]
2
Organizations to
which individual belongs:
попе
3
Nationalistic group: -
JONE
black
Date called to secret service attention: 12/26/63
Refered by other
agency? NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Not ot protective interest.
SA evaluated ner as menially ii!.
File updated que to ner continuad predictions of all pres. im-
pending nange:.
Location of subject last: LA '75
Field Office reporting:
LA
Last update:
9/23/75
AHH, Nixor, RFK, Rockefeller
Ford, kissinger
_HH. 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 401
---
## Page 402
406
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
TRACY: MILDRED VIOLA
Reason for PRS interest:
Since '02 orolific letter writer.
obscene and conolaining. wants legal heip because mother-in- iaw
stole her and husbands noney. 10-7-63 interviewed but Q's anot
initiated untii '65 letter with implied threat. conc. rambling
letters to present.
Degree of threat:
1
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
none
paranoia
Nationalistic group: _ nine
Date called to Secret Service attention:
9/23/63
Refered by other
agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Prosecution declined for 871 in '65 and AUSA declined prosecution
11/29/77. Sutis ices not appear to present a danger to protectees
at this time. Fericdic confirements. Access to guns. S.s. is
Keeping tabs.
Location of subject last:-: Coyle, OK '77
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
OKC
11/30/77
Nixon, Ford, Camp, Carter.
Albert, Boren, Mondale
WH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 402
---
## Page 403
407
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
SONG, CHY
Reason for PRS interest: -
4/1/63 subj, military bodyguard, killed
Lacs foreigr minister with l8 shots with nachine gur. Assassiration
we!! Elanned as other bodyguards did not react to firing. Victin
favored communism. Assassin was neuträlist.
Degree of threat:
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
assassin
3
Nationalistic group:
Vientiane
Date called to secret service attention: 4/1/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Assassin's fate unknown
Location of subject lasti vientiare, Laos
Field Office
reporting:
Last update:
Honslulu
8:13/68
.HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 403
---
## Page 404
4U8
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS
interest:
PHOLSENA, QUINIM
see #407 Assassinated victim
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations to which
individual belongs:
•3
Nationalistic group:
Date called to Secret Service attention:
Refered by other agency? NO
YES
Action taken:
Location of subject last:::
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
-HH 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 404
---
## Page 405
409
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
KHALIFA, MOHAMED
Reason for PRS
interest: -
4/11/63 subj mortally wounded long
tine friend, foreign minister of Algeria by snooting in face.
Victim had no security. Reason for assassination unknown.
Degree of threat: 1
2
Organizations to which individual belongs:
assassin
3
Nationalistic group:
Algerian
Date called to Secret Service attention:
4/11/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
Chauffer captures subj but firal disposition unknown
Location of subject last; Algiers i63
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
Paris
8/13/76
..HH 54046 DocId: 32241845 Page 405
---
## Page 406
410
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MORALES-AMADOR, JORGE BARTULOME
Reason for PRS interest:
FBI referral 12/26/03. 12/15/03 subj
wrote Hoover of hatred for us and Pres. Desired deportation to
Cuba. 1/11/64 letter in which he stated he mad plotted che JFk
assassination.
Degree of threat:
2.
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
nont:
mental nistory since '6l schizo-paranoid
Nationalistic group:
cuban
Date called
to Secret Service
attention:
12/27/83
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES FBI
Action taken:
SS interne 3164: Said hed grien V.S infó about Russian
missiles in Cubat hadnt been paid: No interest in Pres. -
ouly in being deported Cont elles to gout agencies.
12/67 55 interview, subj statial his letters urre pst to get attention
1 get deported. Not ol protectue interest at this time. 169 expressed
wish to see Rockefeles killed 6/2/T0 USA declined 18/811. S.S. Keepstabs.
Location of subject lest: Astona, NY 170
Field Office reporting:
NY
Last update:
6/10/70
Nixon, LBS, Rockedeller,
Reagan
.HH 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 406
---
## Page 407
411
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
BBIAN, GEORGE F.A.
Reason for
PRS interest:
12/16/63 referred by FBI - active in Romanian
community. '67 called utt. "To threatened to demonstrate, t did
Believes threatened by Rom secust ficers t has threatened to get
gun perinet.
Degree of threat:
1.
2
3
Organizations to which individual belongs:
Possible associate of ANP
Newvous break down
Nationalistic group: Romaman
Date called to Secret Service attention: 12 1663
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
FBI
Action taken:
Not clear- looks like 7R0 keeps up instigatia work t informs.
S. S.
Location of subject lasts NY '72
Field Office reporting: NY.
Last update:
811174
_HW 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 407
---
## Page 408
412
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
MCGHEE, TIMOTHY ERNEST
Reason for PRS interest: Not clear in '63. Illogical letter writer to WH
suice '64. Check copies el file - beliere letter untten to an USSS
ó bu reliarous means. Since 64
has been listing threatening letters but in '6T when he made no derogaton
remaules re protectees, he was denied not dangerous! In '77 as leader
Degree
I Hanafi Nuclin sect hetor Kidnapping + 21d degree murder
building causing death
- or pason.
of threat:
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
Prior to 1958 - N01
Hanafi Muslim
schizo
Nationalistic group:
black
Date called to Secret Service attention:
915|63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action taken:
See reports.in doe.room
Location of subject last:.
:Cucago "IS corection exter
Field Office reporting:
Chica
Last update: 914/77
-HH. 54046 DooId:32241845 Page 408
---
## Page 409
413
INDIVIDUALS LISTED BY PROTECTIVE RESEARCH
Name of individual:
Reason for PRS interest:
WOLF. ROBERT
Prolific letter writer since '52.
Degree of threat:
1
2
Organizations
to which individual belongs:
3
mental confinement '32-'34
Nationalistic group:
none
Date called to Secret Service attention:
12/2/63
Refered by other agency?
NO
YES
Action
taken:
3/6/64 interviewed, subj stated he'dwritten JFK and recd reply
and thus cont. writing to publis officiais. No hostile feeliras
toward LBJ. No longer of interest although he continues to write
Fresidents.
Location of subject Last:- Ny '77
Field Office reporting:
Last update:
NY
5/31177
N 54046 DocId:32241845 Page 409
--- |
|||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32322603.pdf | 124-10379-10394 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 3/2/99 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62C-HQ-1029205-4248 | DE | HQ | 1 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John E. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (11 USC
2107 Motel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
Identification Form
Agency Information
3/31/201
AGENCY:
RECORD NUMBER :
FBI
124-10379-10394
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62C-HQ-1029205-4248
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FBI
FROM: HQ
TO:
DE
TITLE :
DATE: 03/02/1999
'PAGES:
1
SUBJECTS :
JFKARCA OF 1992
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 3
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/22/1999
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
Docid: 32322603
Page
1
419
---
## Page 2
Released
under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC
2107 Hotel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
(01/26/1998)
TOP SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
375
Precedence: ROUTINE
To: Detroit
Date: 03/02/1999
Attn: Mireille D Vermeulen
From: Director's Office
JFK Task Force, Room 11144
Contact: Latricia D.
Grace, Ext. 0593
Approved Bys Keeley Carol Elm
Drafted By: Grace Latricia Dly
Case ID #: 62C-HQ-1029205
Title: (U) ASSASSINATION MATERIAL DISCLOSURE ACT
Synopsis: (U) JFK Task Force returning Detroit Field office file.
classified By Sp-1 eLK/deg
Reason: 1,5(c)
Declassify On: X+1)
3/2/99
Enclosure: Enclosed for Detroit is the following file which
includes Top Secret documents:
DE 92-914-Sub 3-A
Details: According to the Assassination Records Review Board
standards, these files are not assassination records and no
processing was necessary under the JFK Act.
cc 1- Carol I: Keeley, Room•11144
1 - LuAnn Wilkins,
Room 11144
O- JFK Field Office File Folder,
Room 11144
DECLASSIFED BY 5.64.8 SUD/Se
0x 5-12-49 (TEX,
G2# Ho 1029205-4248
TOP SECRET
THIS DOCUMENT IS
UNCLASSIFIED
UPON REMOVAL OF THE ENCLOSED CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
DocId: 32322603
Page
2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 180-10145-10280.pdf | 180-10145-10280 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | HSCA | 00/00/0000 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 54-08-05 | CIA | 3 | HSCA | CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION | 3/12/18 | Box 29 Sensitive Original Withheld by CIA | null | ## Page 1
180-10145-10280
Daniel A. Parsona
Genzhan 5412578
entered 1958
Ap 58
2d.762
fan.
63-4-80166
66-7
6>-7
62-71
172-4
cover.
JOT jus. off tearning
(SE)
Sept. 62-tenminatd
Trustinhip
SEDU
Moscow
Branch
rould han
coling
SE Covert Action'
He Dyes
15-21
015-1
14-2
-Cult. attaché (USIA)
0932
was supervisor
-sentor offices!
um. of 63
- furt caS
- Dear Rust, Edutand R Marrow
24
US/AL
24
(6)E1A max. at SIl
Johnson knew of as cult writer
Horengold -beneat
melter
utilijed am. press
sonallas dir. not utilized
Sangelle oly CA man when Left →1213
- succeeded Abidian in dune:
of 62, ong & mon. later (Perkously.
10145-10280
---
## Page 2
Genzman
5-12-78
66
Willian one, (ovison) 6
foe
- sonior man at
HQ
(0R9) on Penkosky
Winters probably not Cland ter on
Getige Kisselper -5R9-Pinkousky
same copter pared angle,
soldber
renald- didn't know
Mosby-UPI-knetof
No CiA Use
Joan Seberman-notstafi, may le coopter?.
LHO-no HO Maquest on info
---
## Page 3
Gonzman
5-12-78
Indes-star -sef #s → dodumnto or feles.
201 or operational
stuities file
name-grouping used for storage t
retrieval
name grouping tables
-alphabetical
matringnic search
pseud, - office assigns
manual file
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32322592.pdf | 124-10379-10383 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 2/9/99 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62C-HQ-1029205-4237 | CV | HQ | 1 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Aot of 1992 141 USC
2107 Motel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
Identification Form
Agency Information
3/31/201
AGENCY :
FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-10379-10383
RECORD SERIES :
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62C-HQ-1029205-4237
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
HQ
TO: CV
TITLE:
DATE:
'PAGES:
02/09/1999
SUBJECTS:
JFKARCA OF 1992
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 3
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/22/1999
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
DocTa: 32322592
Page
1
412
---
## Page 2
Released
under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC
2107 Motel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
(01/26/1998)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence:
ROUTINE
Date: 02/09/1999
To: Cleveland
Attn: Brenda J. Charlton
From: Director's Office
JFK Task Force,
Room 11144
Contact: Latricia
D.
Grace,
Ext. 0593
Approved By: Keeley Carol I COlla
Drafted By: Grace Latricia Dld&
Case ID #: 62C-HQ-1029205
Title: ASSASSINATION MATERIAL DISCLOSURE ACT
Synopsis: JFK Task Force returning file(s) to Cleveland.
Details: Enclosed for Cleveland are the following file(s) :
CV 92-167 Volumes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
CV 92-397 Volume 1
CV 92-397-Sub 1 Volume 2
CV 92-179 Volume 9, 10
CV 92-179-Sub 1 Volume 1, 2, 3
The originals removed from these files and replaced
with duplicate copies of the original were accessioned to the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) pursuant to
the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992. Provision of the JFK Act
allowed for certain information to be postponed from public
release until the year 2017; therefore, the pages have NOT
necessarily been released for public review in their entirety.
Under the JFK Act, originals to all material deemed
assassination records must be accessioned to NARA regardless of
57 At be
whether the material is open in full or released with information
postponed.
Therefore, any documents or pages from FBI files
accessioned to NARA pursuant to the JFK Act are no longer
considered the possession of the FBI. The duplicate pages have
been
inserted strictly for research purposes.
The copies contained within the previously mentioned
file(s) do not necessarily show the most up-to-date
classification.
42FHQ1029205-4237
cc 1- Carol L. Keeley, Room 11144
1- LuAnn Wilkins,
Room 11144
1- JFK Field Office File Folder, ROom 11144
DocId: 32322592
Page
2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 144-10001-10134.pdf | 144-10001-10134 | 11/3/17 | In Part | NSA | 1/5/78 | Memorandum | Siemer, G. C. | Inman, B. R. | Requests | 4 | 11/3/17 | 4 | ## Page 1
Doc Ref ID: A4268763
DATE: 03/24/97
PAGE: 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : NSA
RECORD NUMBER : 144-10001-10134
RECORDS SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : NSA
FROM
TO
INMAN
: SIEMER, G.
TITLE :
REQUESTS
DATE: 01/05/78
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE
CLASSIFICATION
: MEMORANDUM, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
RESTRICTIONS
CURRENT STATUS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW
1B
08/12/93
OPENING CRITERIA
ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED
COMMENTS
-CONTAINS SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
-ER]
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
Released on 10-26-2017 under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2017 Note)
---
## Page 2
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755
Serial: N0015
5 January 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DEANNE SIEMER, GENERAL COUNSEL,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
Pending Congressional. Requests
REFERENCES:
(a)
15 December 1977 letter from Senator George
McGovern to Secretary of Defense
(b)
Undated letter received on 20 December 1977
from Congressman Louis Stokes to Director, NSA
(c) 16 December 1977 letter from Mr. Ira Nordlicht
to the Honorable Deanne Siemer
1.
Referenced letters iterating requests for information
from the National Security Agency present two common issues:
how it is to be done.
NSA Charter legislation, now in draft form,
would obligate the Director to keep the Committees of the Congress,
having jurisdiction over the Agency, fully and currently informed
of the Agency's activities.
committees would be responsive to policy developed within the
community.
2.
We anticipate that requests for information, as illus-
trated by the three referenced letters, will continue to increase
and can present difficulties in maintaining good relations with
the Congress.
While this Agency has been fully responsive to
the needs of the Intelligence, Armed Services, and Appropriations
Committees, we have treated requests for
committees on a purely case-by-case basis. Several times during
the past two years, Committees of the Congress which do not have
jurisdiction for intelligence oversight have approached NSA
directly for foreign signals.
intelligence information.
In each
case it has been our understanding that the SIGINT information
NSA has provided to the requesting committee is being used as
background information in assisting that committee in formulating
U.s. policy matters. On these infrequent occasions, NSA has
responded directly to the requesting committee providing either
access to SIGINT product or briefings, as required.
Clarilled by DIRNSA/CHCSS (NSP./CSS:1 123•2)
ReDat lies GDS, EO 11652, Cct 2
Declessly Upsa Moulection by lbe Originalor
DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL
HVCCO UPON REMOVAL OF INCL
Released on 10-26-2017 under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2017 Note)
---
## Page 3
Dọc Ref ID: A4268763
Serial: N0015
Regarding these three specific requests, inclosed for
your information is a summary of NSA's contacts with Senator
McGovern's Subcommittee; on International Operations.
As indi-
cated in the summary and as discussed previously with Mr. Andrews
of your staff, we have not shown nor discussed any material with
Senator McGovern's staff representative pending the drafting of
an approved memorandum of understanding by your office and the
execution of such an MOU between the Executive Branch
Senator.
4 .
In his letter received by NSA on 20-December, Representa-
tive Louis Stokes, Chairman of the House Select. Committee on
Assassinations, requested certain information from NSA relating
to the Cuban intelligence network during the period 1959 - 1964.
Chairman Stokes also certified that access to any NSA material
would be restricted to those staff
members with a TOP SECRET
security clearance; access to NSA material, of course, requires
indoctrination for SI as well. No response has been made to
Chairman Stokes'
correspondence pending resolution of how NSA
should deal with non-oversight committees.
Once that decision
is made, we recommend that any SIGINT information selected for
the select Committee on Assassinations be provided only by the
JOD or Del as part of a larger submission of data and that the
SIGINT be properly sanitized.
5. Mr. Ira Noralicht's 16 December letter to you requested
information from NSA on the flow of oil to South Africa and
Rhodesia.
At the time. of his initial telephone call, MI. Nordlicht
had a TOP SECRET clearance.
It is our understanding that he has
since been indoctrinated for SI/IK by DIA.
While
any SIGINT
pertinent to Mi. Nordlicht's request may contain unique informa-
tion, it must be emphasized that SIGINT alone may be incomplete
unless it is examined in the context of all-source
intelligence information. In this instance, after the execution
suitable MOU, we recommend the requested information be
furnished by the DCI combining the SIGINT with other materials
available to him. You may recall that earlier this year the
Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy requested and was
provided information on Arab foreign investments and the lifting
and sale of Saudi
and Iranian oil.. This is the information which
was provided specifically to.Mr. Jerome Levinson, then counsel
of the Subcommittee, and which
subsequently formed the basis for
a 20 June 1977 letter from Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the
Subcommittee, to the Secretary of State citing
...a substantial
discrepancy between CIA and NSA estimates of Saudi crude oil
exports in the first quarter of 1977." This charge was repeated
2
TOP SECRET
A GOMET CHANELS GILE
---
## Page 4
Doc Ref ID: A4268763
or sterer o
Serial: N0015
by Mr. Levinson in an article by Seymour M. Hersh appearing
in the New York Times of December 25, 1977. Mr. Nordlicht
stated his present request is not related to the previous
inquiry.
6. The lack of an MOU or other agreed procedure for dealing
with requests for SIGINT from other than the three traditional
oversight committees mentioned above has severely hampered NSA's
ability to be responsive to the Congress.
He urgently recommend
that an agreed procedure be developed between the Executive and
Legislative Branches which would set forth the terms and condi-
tions on which sensitive cryptologic or other intelligence
information would be provided to the non-oversight comnittees.
In the absence of such an agreement with both the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and the House Select Committee on Assassina-
tions, we cannot respond to these queries.
We also recommand
that your office so advise Congressman Stokes and Mr. Noralicht
and also determine a proper response to Senator McGovern
consistent with the President's instructions.
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Director, MSA/Chief, CSS
Incl :
a/s
Copy Furnished:
Col. Stephen Harrick
OASD (LA)
TOP SECRET
MANDAL VIA GORAIT SACRES ONE
3
---
## Page 5
Doc Ref ID: A4268763
Serial: N0015
CC :
DIR
D./ DIR
DDO
Exec DDO
ADLA
Ul
U2
G
EX REG
L221
NCRDEF
34
M/R:
a.
On 17 May 1977, the Director proposed in a memorandum
to the DCI that the DCI assume responsibility for acting as the
focal point for requests for intelligence information from any
Committee of the Congress which does not have direct oversight
responsibilities.
on Cong tea hich
This proposal included the recommendation
that the channel of communications for such requests should
be through a designated individual on the IC Staff and that
responses to the Congress should flow back through the same
person, providing the DCI, on behalf of the President, the oppor-
tunity
to review what intelligence information is made available
to the Congress. The DCI has never responded to this memorandum.
b.
Instant meno recommends that an agreed procedure be
developed between the Executive and Legislative Branches wich
would set forth the terms and conditions on which sensitive
assume action on R/S 5507 and provides background information
on two Congressional requests (references a and c) for SIGINT
information. now pending in OSD.
c. Deadline on R/S 5507 response to Ms. Siemer extended
to 4 January per Col. Steve Harrick, ATSD (LA); and MI. BOb
Andrews, OSD (GC) •
Mr. Yeates, Exec DDO, and MI. Brady, GC, concur.
Classification reviewed by Mr. Michael Levin, D4.
slid Switzel
JULIA WETZEL,
U2, 31615, 4 Jan 78, bj
LAO
--- |
||||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32329074.pdf | 124-90084-10055 | 10/26/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/20/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 97-4110-188 | HQ | MM | 3 | FBI | HQ | 08/23/2017 | LHM | 3 | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
4/30/201
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90084-10055
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 97-4110-188
Released under the John
F. Kennedw
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
144 USC 2107 Notel.
Lase#:NO 54027 Date:
08-23-2017
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: MM
TO: HQ
TITLE :
DATE: 10/20/1967
PAGES:
3
SUBJECTS :
LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
4
CURRENT STATUS:
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/14/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
LHM
v9.1
HH 54027
DocId: 32329074
Page 1
18
---
## Page 2
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUS_ CE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
In Reply, Please Refer 1o
File No.
97 - 328
Miami,
Florida
October 20, 1967
SECRET
SONT
Re:
ON 5-25-94
MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO
DE CUBA (MDC)
(CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT)
REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA
The Movimiento Democrata Cristiano de Cuba (MDC)
an anti-Castro organization maintaining headquarters at
1732 N. W. Yth Street, Miami, Florida.
The MDC has engaged
in military and political activities against Cuba in the
past.
1032326
Classie
Decla
MM T-1, a Cuban exile engaged in Cuban revolu-
tionary activities for the past five
years, on September 5,
1967, advised that information had been received that there
are
between seven
and eight Cuban exiles in
the Dominican
Republic (DR) trying to set up some sort of a training base
in that country.
These exiles
reportedly under the
leadership of Laureano
Batista
Falla, one of the officers
of the MDC in Miami.
(ng
MM T-2, who has
been active in Cuban revolutionary
matters in Miami for the past ten years, advised on
October 10, 1967,
that the previous day he conferred with
Angel Vega, military leader of the MDC.
that ạt the
present time the MDC has no military plans
or activities, very little military equipment and the
organization is now involved in fund raising and political
propaganda.
Vega indicated that the MDC had no military
plans for the immediate future but was waiting for a change
in United States
government policy which would allow
MDC to again conduct military raids against Cuba.
2(4)
On October 13, 1967,
Laureand Batista
Falla,
545
Cadagua Street MiamI,
advised that the MDC continues
to
FLA
CONT
OFFICER - SURVECA
ORGANI TI
Group
Exclude, ron automatie
HE32N
ALi INODOLATTON CONTAINED
downgrading gna
DADR$ 110/33
dectessification
on
OTHERWISE
97-4110188 cons
ENCLOSURE
NW 54027 DooId: 32329074 Page 2
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32317782.pdf | 124-10354-10110 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/29/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | ELSUR 92-461-1-77 | HQ | LV | 7 | FBI | LV | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote) .
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/5/2015
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10354-10110
RECORD SERIES: LV
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ELSUR 92-461-1-77
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FBI
FROM: LV
TO: HQ
TITLE :
DATE:
04/29/1963
PAGES:
7
SUBJECTS :
MULTI SUBJECT: SGI, LST, JRO, CM
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/14/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
V9.1
DocId: 32317782
Page 1
2
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (41 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE
211-14-2017-
FD-36 (Rov: 12-13-56)
FBI
Date: 4/29/63
Transmit the following in -
DUSIN TEXT
(Type in plain pert or code)
Via.
AIRTEL
AIR MAIZ
(Priority or Meshod of Mailing)
TO :
DIRECIOR, 93Z (92-3008)
SAC, LAS VEGAS (92-461)
MORRIS BARNEY DALITZ, aka
AR
00: Las Vegas
SUMIARY
The f01loning infornation was furnishod by
IV 69-C= on the dates indicated:
Informant advised on 4/3/63 that on this date,
JACK DONNELLEY, executive vice-resident of the Desert Inn
Hotel, was at the hotel where be not previously with JoaN
DREW, who is an executive of the Stardust Motel and an
alleged representative os SAMUEL GIANCANA, head of Chicago
element.
Incornation iron LV S9-C*, 1f utilized, should
be carefully paraphrased in order to jurther protect tho"
identity or this source.
3
- Buzeau (P.M. )
1
- Chicago (In2o.) (R.M.)
I- Los Angeles (Ir8o.)
(В.И. )
10-Las Vegas (1 + 92-462)
1- 92-461 SuD 1)
162-10 CHONGE
CORDON)
92-493 BUSY MOLODY
92-363 WILDUR CLARK)
92-671 JACK DONNECLALO
92-21 TORN DREW
92-377 ALLARD FOIN-
92-707 DESZED CNN HONCE)
92-703 STARDUSE
92-1411l-1=22
SFAR
-
RET: bar
(15)
Approved:
Sent
-M.
Per
SpeciallAgent in Charge,
DocT
---
## Page 3
Released unter the For F. Kerredy Assassination Records Collection Art of 1992 141-050
DATE: 11-14-2017
Hipte).
IV. 92-461
He has circulated the story that he was kidnaped
by the 2Bl in New York City and was taken by then to
Washingion, D. C. for questioning.
DATITZ and DONNELLEY
both are in agreement that BRINSMADE iS a "G D LiaI,
and that he has fabricated the whole story to cover up for
1E858
the $10,000.
DONNELLEY, DALIEZ, ard ALLARD ROEN, a Desert Inn
hotel executive; are all in agreement that it is now becoming
fashionable ru,
rock, down on people who are operating in the
garbline industr
They
Mascanasd merious biils which were
introduced fr
Neroin Kegislature.
They
considered soreral of these bills deczinental to industry
and feel shet they were defected only through eiforis of
C30803
DudE, Executive Secretary of ins Vegas resort hotel
associartor.
203N
made the observation that many people
in the
industry are becoming fed up with Governor ChaNt
SAWYER, Governor of Nevada.
They feel that he is favoring
DEL WESS,
whon they feel is operating without restrictions in
the stase of Nevada,
and is creating a monopoly.
ROEN describad
SAWYER aS a
"jerk and a SOB."
it is noted in regard to
Governor. SAW73X,
that ke checked into the Desert Inn Hotel
4/22/63 102 indefinite stay and according
to IY 10-C,
instructions were issued that his entire account was to be
compilmented.)
One of the bills introduced in the legislature provided
that after a hotel hac filed their return, if gaming authorities
did not agree that the return represented a true account of
their business operations, that
the Board could then arbitrarily
set a figure on which they had to pay taxes..
DONNELLEY Stated
this bill was written with the ides that money was being taken
out of the state without being properly accounted for and yithout
taxes being paid on this money.
Neither ROEN or DALIT?
commented on DONNELLEY's observation.
DALITZ stated he had been contacted on the previous
day by a nan woo indicated he could furnish DALiTZ information
which would save $200,000.
In exchange for this information,
this unnaned individual vanted only $10,000 in cash.
DALITZ
stated he talked to this individual for sometime and made an
appointmant to talk to him the folloving day. In the neantine,
- 3. -
DocId:32317782 Page 3
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32315516.pdf | 124-10342-10234 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/16/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | ELSUR 92-228-853 | DE | SHIRLEY | 6 | FBI | DE | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/7/2015
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-10342-10234
RECORD SERIES:
DE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ELSUR 92-228-853
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: SHIRLEY
TO:
DE
TITLE :
DATE:
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
05/16/1963
6
ANTHONY GIACALONE (ELSUR)
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
12/02/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
DocId: 32315516
Page 1
26
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection' Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
ED-209 (Rev. 3-9-62)
•DITIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
: SAC
DATE:
DSZ203S (487-300)
FROM : SA
UPCI
0/36/69
SI
UPSI
SUBJECT: DIS
Dates of Contact
3/02/63,
4/0. 40. 110, 0/19, 01
Titles and File #s on
which contacted
METEOROST
reex
TALES ,
AMAS, A
MUS MON
Purpose and results of contact
NEGATIVE
E] POSITIVE
CORDADO,
AN
Soon Stat
22-000
Dam Sa
Magelesod
ANNIE TA
мао пинок
tAha0s (Assigned
B5I246Y1
10 400: 627422
90-418
(Assigned 3827122)
Informant certified that he has
Rating
furnished all information obtained
by him since last contact.
Person Paäyponna 6t tho pient and offace
Bistroso Llaen 80:9100p
100,
poseticalig daily basic.
Ale Alco
cosorves gonsvisies at the Canasa
cottee Shop in an elders
ond aconcisy
• Cos
to
detomine
AndivAcualo
appear g6
those
Coverage
Sas 92-228-853
SEARCH TH
MAY 5 1 1953
am!
rd,-
DocId: 32315516
Page 2
---
## Page 3
'Releäsed under 'the Jöhn F. 'Kënñedy ASSäSS1natfón Rëcörds Cô]lëctĩon'Aot of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note].
DATE: 11-14-2017
DE 137-186
ANTEONY GIACALONE
AR
DE 92-228
ANTRONY TOCCO
AR
DE 92-486
DOMINIC CORRADO
AR
DE
92-4.20
JACE W, TOCCO
AR
DE 92-574
On tarch 23, 1963, Source furnished the following
intomation:
Source advised
that he observed acslvities nt
Molrose
Lenen Service, Ino., (HLS)
Cafice end
Plant during
the Saturday morning of karch 9, 1963.
Ho stated that
the
only person tho appeared to be at the plant was one of the
voman enployees,
sho drives a Pontiac with
License AP 4767.
This car 19 regletored to f,
PAUL TOCCO of 18020. Llster,
East Detzolt.
varch 14, 1963, at 1:40 p.a.,
there
was parked
in the garage. of HIS a maroon Continental, AJ 4599.
is to be noted
this car is usually driven
It
by AUTHONY TOcCO.
It 1s
registered to WILLIAM TOCcO,
father
os ANINONY TOCSO.
ốn
the street
directly in tront of the office o1
uS, thore was parked a
late model car,
DN 4580-
"This car
ts rogistered. to ERNEST
FOREST, 18504 Last. Forest, Detrost,
tor à
198% ford two-door
Also on the street directly ia
iront
of tho IS orti ce uas e naite Cldsnobite,
EJ 8548,
nhích
is registered to Louts SIATHOs, B- Sproat, Dotzos*y
for a
• Z958 Aldenobile:
Source vas umable to deternine whother
these two automobiles had anything to do with activittes at
MLS.
March
22, 1963, thore wes parted on the parking
Gnace at
NS, tho marcon Contznentol;, AJ 4599 at 1:50 p.m.
On the
street directly in tront of the office o1 MiS at 2:00
2.M.:
there vas parked a maroon Cadillao, BE 9279,
The
Continentel, AJ 4599 wag
stall at
:the oftice of is until
2:00 p.D:
that day.
March
22,
1983, there wis aiso parked neaz the
0812 ce
the 1962 pink
Mercury, EJ 7283 which is registored
10309
"10098
DocId: 32315516
Page 3
---
## Page 4
/Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
DE
137-186
to EDWARD BORNER; 5070 Lakenood, Detroit.
Source
has
advised that this car is at the
MuS Orsice and Plent
practleally on a daily basis.
April S, 1903, source funished the following
information
3706
on maasy, larch au: 4963, a6 11150 a.M.g
there
parised in the garage ot lus the
black 1963 Pontiac, B
6977, usually driven by ANTHONY TOCCO.
On the parking space
1us at 2:50 pm. there nas a
• Phite
Desoto,
MV. 8326.
This
car 18
registered to MARY LEONE, 19465 Malvin, Roseville,
for a 1950 Buick two-door:
On April 1, 1963,
at 1:25 p.m.
the pink Horcury,
EJ. 7283, driven by EDWARD BORNER was on the Is parking
space ;
AD 9021 appeared.
Aor 7 4 1968, at
11:15 0.n.
& 1903
Chevrolet,
white
male,
age 35, 5'10", slender,
left this car carzying a brief case and
entered the MLs
ortice.
This car is registered to
ERNEST IN PIZZIENTI, 11168 Corbett,
Detroit, for a 1963 Chryster.
Co April 4, 1963, at 1:30 D.m. on the street vas
the white
over gray Continental, All 4533, which is usually
drivon by TONY CIUlI.
At the same
time there was driven into
the forage
≤ 1903 Chovrolet, Ar 4759. The driver vas an eldorly white
10322.
This l1cense
is registered to Jokh E. and
EVELYN
GAMBLE, 19733 Mansfield Avenue,
door.
Detroft, for a 1958 ford. two
There was parked in the alley at the rear of IS
plant o brova Cadillas,
CN 1660.
it was occupied by tuo
mon, que a white male,
20, Short,
and the other a white male,
and short.
Both vent into the office of Mus.
This car
1s
registered to the Hughes laundry Maohine Company, 14401
Ford Road, Dearbor, for a 1961 Cadillac.
On April 8, 1063, source furnished the following
intormation:
there was parked
in front of the us a
8441. -
It is to be noted this cor 10 registered to CALO
LICATA, the person no actually operates 1LS. :
On the parking
- 3-
10349. 1019
DocId: 32315516 Page 4
---
## Page 5
Released under the John F. Kennedy 'Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 444 USC 2107 Hotel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
DE 237-186
space of
uLS at
991501.
Beside
EL 6000.
tho
curb
was a
green Pord panel truck,
the
truck was parised
a late nodel Chevrolet,
April 8,
1963, at 11:45
• Dill.o
ago 40,
€*
tald, dark hasr,
lost
the
the
406 4026
to
corner o Yates and Crano and got into a black Oldamobile,
DN 1283÷
this person was
carxying a
tale box.
Thas
022
is rogietered to LES JONeS, 650 Alfred
Street, Detroit; for
& 2953
Ford.
information:
On ARx13 15, 1003, source furnished the following
At 3:00 p.m.
on April 9, 1903, source observed a
maroon Cadilae,
PE 1805, parised on the stroet directly in
front of the 1a Ortico,
Thas car is registered to ANTONY
GIACALONE,
701 Enitour,
Grosse Pointe Park, Michigan.
the treet beside this
car vas a late nodel brown Cadillas,
IG 8935.
There
is no listing for
this license,
the curb parting space of lie was the
Valiant, AJ 4014.
It is to be noted
red
this cor is resistered
to JOHN P. CLAMBROTE.
Source stated thie oar is at NIS
practically on a daily basis.
The pink: Mercury, EJ 7283 g
driven by
EDWARD KOCANER was also in the vicinity of Ms.
April 10, 1963, at 12 noon the rod Valiant,
AJ 4024 was the only car in
the area.
At 2:30 D.n., April 10, 1963, a Ford Galaxte
appeared, BK 4358,
This ear is registered to ANOINETra
GUITYRE, 9143 My Street, Detroit, for & 1981 Ford Convertibio.
At 1:00 D.2, April Il, 1908, a black Ford Falcon
was parked Alrectly
in front
of the lus attice. A white mate,
30 years old, Italian, one sitting in the car and aspenred
to be valting for soncono of MLS:
This cor 1e registersd
DONALD I.
BALON, 14959 Illbourne, for 1960 Ford Falcon.
The red Valiant, Ad 4014, was
: o2
the parting space of 1IS.
At 12 noon, April 12, 1900, there was parsed on
the street a 190a chite over pink Codillac with license FC
8093.
Souzce stated. this is the description of the car usually
driven by JACK M. TOCCO but it had a different license.
the car unally driven by JACK W. TOCCO has License AJ 8059.
DocId: 32315516 Page 5
---
## Page 6
Released under the John T. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (11 USC 2107 Mote)
DATE: 11-14-2017
DE 137-186
A rogistration for FG 8993 bag not been located.
At this
time, the red Vallant,
AJ 4011 was
MLS.
on the parking space of
Saturday,
April 13, 1963, at approrinately noon,
the Ford
cassase bi sos, was at the curice of 14a.
It is to
be noted
this car is registered to ANTOINITTE GULPERE, previCus
identitled.
On Apx43 150
1963, ot 12:15 p.m,,
thoreras pazked
in the
garago of MLS a 1963 black Pontine, ID 6937,
Tals
car 1s registered to ANTHONY TOCCO.
On April 19, 1863, source furnished the following
information :
On April 25, 3903, at 5:40 p.m., a gray 1962
Continental
convertible,
driven by DOMINIC CORRADO
appoared at MIS
It is
to be noted th2g car 19 rorstored
to PETRINA CORRADO, 701 Middleces, Crosse Pointe Park, Mchigan,
the mother of DOMINIC and TONY CORRADO.
Source checked this
place again at 6:00 p.n,
and this car was still at the is
there at 1:00 p.m.
At 8:10 p.m.y source
observed the car still it the office and noted
the lighte
went on in the office,
A few minutes later,
DOMINIC CORRADE
came fron the is office with an unknown woman. She
• Short girl and appoared to be Italian. Both got into All
4538 and 101t the axea.
On Arril 29, 2063, source furnished the following
information:
At 44:00 D.D.s Apie 29, 1903, tho 1904 Whate oven
pins cadstine, to 8950 again appeared at the MS Office.
Parted at the
rear of this car was a 1961 gray Cadillac,
EL
6192.
mis car is registered to costs e
SPEARAZZA, 782
Lakepolate,
Groase Pointe Park; Michigan.
No is a brother
12-law of SACK and TONY®
"nocco.
This car lost at 11:20 p.n.
The driver was a phite made, age 30,
5'10", siender build,
This ansvors
the description of
SPERRAZZA.
Cadillac convertiblo appeared at ILS office,
от весна , рта
27,
1963, 'at 11:00
a red
TE 7725,
This
cat as regiotered to CALO 3.
LICATA, 790 Middleses, Grosse
Pointe Park,
for a 1963 Cadillac convertible.
- 5-
10908. 45508
DocId: 32315516 Page 6
---
## Page 7
Released under the John F. Kennedy ASsassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
DE 137-136
At 1:30 p.M.
on April 26, 1003, e
Pontiac,
appeared and has parked on the lot
of MLS, ED 6910.
car as registered to PHILLIP BELLOTO, 5753 Marlborough, Detroit,
for a 1005 Pontiac. It ie to be
noted BELLGO 1s an assoclate
the
N6S оwnóгя
G
10345-80588
DocId: 32315516
Page 7
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32404074.pdf | 104-10330-10088 | 12/15/2017 | In Full | CIA | 07/20/1997 | PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | PROJFILES-CORRESPONDENCE | ARRB STAFF | BARRY HARRELSON JFK PROJECT OFFICER | NOTE TO: COVER | 6 | CIA | JFK | 11/30/2017 | JFK-M-15 : F4 : 2000.02.07.09:21:57:890035 : | null | ## Page 1
Date: 02/02/01
Page: 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: CIA
RECORD NUMBER
104-10330-10088
RECORD SERIES
ARRB-CIA,
1997
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PROJFILES-CORRESPONDENCE
DOCUMENT
INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR
: CIA
FROM
: BARRY HARRELSON JFK PROJECT OFFICER
TO : ARRB STAFF
TITLE
NOTE TO: COVER
DATE
07/20/97
PAGES
6
SUBJECTS
REFERENCED NOTE
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/07/00
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK-M-15:F4 2000.02.07.09:21:57:890035:
...=---
[R]
- ITEM IS RESTRICTED
N# 55157
Doold: 32404074
Page
1
---
## Page 2
SECRET
HRG Record
ID:
File Title:
Job Num:
Location:
Box Num:
Vol/Folder:
Title:
Print
Printed on: 2/2/2001
2000.02.07.09: 21:57: 890035
ARRB-CIA,
1997
PROJFILES-CORRESPONDENCE
HRG
JFK-M-15
F4
NOTE TO: COVER
Title Res:
Date of Document:
Status:
From:
From
Res:
To :
To Res:
Pages:
Orig. Classification:
Originator:
Last Reviewer:
Review Date:
Exemptions:
Medium:
Last Inputter:
NARA Comments:
Agency Comments:
Release:
Release
Date:
Doc Num:
Keywords:
Duplicate Document Of :
7/20/1997
BARRY HARRELSON JFK PROJECT OFFICER
N
ARRB STAFF
N
6
CIA
1A
1B
PAPER
knuppam
1C
5
31-Mar -2000
REFERENCED NOTE
Res:
Res:
N
COMPONENT DATE TASKED
Sent to NARA:
Agency Name:
Agency Number:
Disk Number:
Control Number
Component Review Info
DATE REVIEWED
Y
CIA
104
10330
10088
RESPONSE
APPEAL DATE
DECISION
NH 55157 DocId:32404074 Page 2
SECRET
2000.02.07.09:21:57:890035
---
## Page 3
SECRET/ NOFORN
20 July 1997
Note To:
Subject:
Reference:
ARRB Staff
Cover
Note to ARRB Staff dated 25 April 1997,
re document # 104-10065-10179
(CIA request that this note and its attachments be
returned once the ARRB staff has completed its deliberation
on this issue)
arry Harrels
JFK Project Officer
Attachment:
as
stated
CL BY:
611637
CL REASON: 1.5 (a)
DECL ON:
X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-87
JER Act 6 (1) (A)
JFK Act
(1) (B)
JFK
Act 6 (1) (C)
JEK Act
6 (2)
JFK
Act
6 (3)
JFK
Act 6 (4)
JFK
Act
(5)
SECRET, NOFORN
HH 55157 DocId:32404074 Page
3
---
## Page 4
¿ Act 67
(1) (A)
Act
(1) (B)
Act
6
(1) (C)
Act 6
(2)
Act 6
(3)
• Act 6
(4)
Act
(5)
HW 55157
DocId: 32404074
Page 4
---
## Page 5
JFK Act 6 (i) (A)
JEK
Act
(1) (B)
JEK
Act
(1) (C)
JEK
Act
JEK
Act
6
(2)
(3)
JEK
Act
JEK Act
6
(4)
(5)
71 55152
DooId:22101071 Page 5
---
## Page 6
JFK Act 6
(1) (A)
JEK Act 6
(1) (B)
JEK Act
(1) (C)
JFK Act
16
(2)
JFK Act 6
(3)
JFK Act 6
JFK Act
6
(4)
(5)
no.55157 bucti. 32401075
Fage 6
---
## Page 7
JER Act 6 (1) (A)
JEK Act 6
(1) (B)
JEK Act
6
(1) (C)
JEK
• Act
6
(2)
JEK
Act
6
(3)
JEK
Act
(4)
JEK
Act
(5)
HH 55157
DooId:32404074 Page 7
---
## Page 8
SECRET
25 April 1997
NOTE TO:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
ARRB Staff
Further Clarification
ARRB Record Number 104-10065-10179
Clarification:
JFK Act 6 (1) (A)
JFK Act
(1) (B)
JEK Act
6
(1) (C)
JFK Act
(2)
JEK Act
6
(3)
JFK Act
(4)
JFK Act
(5)
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA
CL BY: 611637
C1 Reason: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM:
AHB 70-9 MULTIPLE
HN 55157 DooId:32404074 Page 8
SECRET
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32282103.pdf | 157-10002-10263 | 07/24/2017 | In Part | SSCIA | 02/25/1976 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | R-2603 | JOHNSTON, JAMES | ELDER, WALTER | REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS | null | SSCIA | LETTER | 6/7/17 | Box 412Chron File | null | ## Page 1
Date: 10/05/93
Page: 1
AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10263
RECORDS SERIES :
LETTER
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-2603
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
$44 USC 2107 Notel.
Case#:NW 53244 Date:
06-13-2017
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : JOHNSTON, JAMES
TO : ELDER, WALTER
TITLE :
REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS
DATE : 02/25/76
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
AMLASH
CUBA
ASSASSINATIONS
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/04/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
Box 412
Chron File
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
HH 53244
Doc1d:32282103
Page 1
---
## Page 2
FRANK CHURCH, IDAMO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PhILIP A. HART. MICH.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN
LTER i. MUNDALE, MINN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
CHANLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY MART, COLO.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER. PA
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
R 2603
@nited States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, PATH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
February 25, 1976
Mr. Walter Elder
Review Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia
Dear Mr. Elder:
This
is to confirm our discussion of February 20
regarding the deposition of certain requests of the Select
Committee:
(1) With regard to the Committee's letter of February 6,
and CIA's letter response 76-0200/1 of February 11, I asked
that a
further attempt be made to identify the initials
"G.N.N."
Those initials follow handwritten comments on
March 1965 document in the AMLASH file which proposed giving
the Cuban government information which might compromise
AMLASH.
(2) With regard to the Committee's letter of January
12 and CIA's letter response 76-0062/1 of February 11, I
asked that CIA review its files on Osvaldo Dorticos, Presi-
dent of Cuba, to determine if the message received by Dr.
Portell-Villa was placed in those files.
(3) Dan Dwyer and I reviewed the list of CIA person-
nel at the Mexico City, station referenced in CIA's letter 76-
0083/3 of February Il and agreed the list should remain at
the Agency.
(4) I requested the Select Committee be provided, the
current address and telephone number of Mr. Jolm Whiteny, the
Desk Chief for Mexico in 1963.
(5) With regard to the Committee's letter of January
29, requesting that two current Agency employees be made
available for interviews, we agreed the Agency should provide
the Committee a letter stating whether or not these employees
were readily available for interviews.
E's
Hit it.
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
HH 53244 DocId:32282103 Page 2
---
## Page 3
Mr. Walter Elder
Page Two
(6) Dan Dwyer and I reviewed Agency originated
documents in CIA'
s 201 File on Gilberto Policarpo Lopez
It is our understanding you would reconsider CIA's decision to
deny the Committee's
request for a copy of these documents:.
(7) With regard to the Committee's letter of January 30,
we agreed:
(a) We would for the time being narrow the request
in Daragraph 1 to include only contacts of Director McCone;
(b) We would not alter the requests in paragraphs
2 and 3.
I trust this summary accords with your understanding of
our discussion, but please let me know if there is any
misunderstanding.
Sincerely,
James phnston
James H.
Johnstor
.:
WH 53244 DocId: 32282103 Page 3
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32319993.pdf | 124-10372-10325 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/19/1997 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62C-HQ-1029205-302 | ALL OFFICES | HQ | 4 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | INC LETTER | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote) .
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
3/31/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-10372-10325
RECORD SERIES :
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62C-HQ-1029205-302
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: HQ
TO: ALL OFFICES
TITLE:
DATE :
06/19/1997
PAGES:
4
SUBJECTS :
JFKARCA OF 1992
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 3
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/26/1999
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS:
INC LETTER
V9.1
DocId: 32319993
Page 1
24
---
## Page 2
Released under the John E. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act/of 1992 (44 USC Y2107 Note) .
DATE: 11-14-2017
(12/31/1995)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: DEADLINE 07/10/1997
Date: 06/19/1997
To:
All Field Offices
All Legats
From:
Office of Public and Congressional Affairs
JFK Task Force, Rm. 6362
Contact: Yvonne Brewer, Ext. 9238
Approved By: Keeley Carol All
Drafted By: Keeley Carol
Case ID #: 62-H0-102920-302
(Pending)
Title: John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992 (the Act)
Synopsis: The JFK Task Force (JFKTF) requests all offices and
legats to search for records and forward records to the JEKTF.
Enclosures:
Copy of the letter received from the Assassination
Records Review Board (the Board).
Details: In 1992, Congress signed the Act mandating federal
agencies to release all documents concerning the presidential
assassination or information related by conspiracy theory to the
assassination.
The Act narrowly defined the types of information
that agencies could still protect by postponement until the year
2017. The Act also established the Board as a separate
entity to
oversee the release of material from the federal agencies to the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
Beyond the
Board's oversight responsibilities, the Act charged the Board
with the duties of reviewing agencies' proposed postponements
with the agencies' evidence for approval or denial and
researching additional areas of information for new material
related to the assassination. I The FBI has been working with the
Board since its inception to meet the requirements of the Act.
On November 29, 1996, the Board wrote a letter to the
FBI setting forth a formal compliance program.
requested
the FBI's cooperation with the Board "in discharging its
responsibility of assuring Congress and the American people that
the goals of the JFK Act will be accomplished to the greatest
reasonable extent."
The compliance program is the Board's answer
to demonstrating "to the American public that a thorough, good-
faith, and diligent effort have been made to locate and release
all remaining assassination-related records within the control of
the United States Government (and that the Government is not
hiding any such materials from public disclosure)." With this
philosophy in mind, the Board has forwarded letters to the FBI
requesting additional information for their review and possible
DocId: 32319993 Page 2
---
## Page 3
Released
under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
• DATE: 11-14-2017
To: All Field Office
From: Office of Public
Congressional
Affairs
Re:
62-HQ-1029205, 06/19/1997
inclusion in the JFK collection.
On June 18, 1997, the JEKTF received a letter from the
Board requesting all files
and documents for Judith Campbell
DExner, a.k.a. Judith Immoor, Judith Campbell, Judith Eileer Vor
Immoor, Judy Campbell, and Judy Exner.
Ms. Campbell was born in
the state of New York with a possible birth year of 1934.
Each
office and legat should search all their systems (general
indices, confidential indices, ELSURS, etc.) for all information
(main files, see references, ELSUR logs, etc.) related to
Ms. Campbell. The original documents should be transferred to the
JEKTE at FBIHQ by JuLy 10, 1997.
The original documents are necessary to meet the
requirements of the Act.
Should the Board determine the
documents to be assassination records the originals will
eventually be transferred to NARA.
Therefore, any responsive
documents should be copied before
forwarding to the JFKTE.
If
the Board decides that the documents do not fall within the realm
of the Act, the documents will be returned to your office, but
not until the Board completes this project.
All offices and legats should respond even if the
search is negative.
The response is important for the FBI's
compliance with the Act. If you have any questions, please
contact Yvonne Brewer at extension 9238 or Carol Keeley on
extension 9494.
2
DocId: 32319993
Page
---
## Page 4
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Mote) .
DATE: 11-14-2017
'To: All Field Office
From: Office of Public
Affairs
Re :
62-HQ-1029205, 06/19/1997
Congressional
LEAD (s) :
Set Lead 1:
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
Each office and legat 1s, requested, to searcha
indices lie. general indices, confidentia indices
lichein
ELSUR, etc.)
or all files and references to Judith Campbell Ener. The
original documents should be forwarded to the JFKTE, FBIHQ, Attn.
Yvonne Brewer, Room 6362 by 7/10/1997.
1 - OPCA Front Office, Rm. 7240
1 - Ms. Brewer, Rm. 6362
1 - Ms. Wilkins, Rm. 6362
1 - Ms.
Keeley,
RM.
6362
3
DocId: 32319993
Page
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32298791.pdf | 124-10224-10071 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 3/12/64 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-128529-15 | LEG, PA | DIRECTOR, FBI | 2 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John 'F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
4/17/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-10224-10071
RECORD SERIES:
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
105-128529-15
Document Information
ORIGINATOR :
FBI
FROM:
DIRECTOR, FBI
TO:
LEG, PA
TITLE :
DATE:
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
03/12/1964
2
SOUETRE, JEAN, AKA, ASSOC, BKG, BUSS, TRA
DOCUMENT TYPE :
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :
Confidential
RESTRICTIONS :
1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
06/12/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
DocId: 32298791
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Aot of 1992 711 05€-
DATE: 11-14-2017
Note).
CARL RAN SOTTE, AT CHE, PARIS
MICHEL ROUX
MICHIN VARIZ
105-128529
CONFIDENTIAL
10109%
per
im pist
ROUX
ms
GACHMAN RICEIVED POST CARD FROM RUE FEBRUARY FIFTEEN LAST
GIVING RETURN ADDRESS AS MICHEL ROUS, FOUR SIX RUE DE BAUBEUGE,
PARIS, NINE, TRU, SIX THREE. FOUR ONE. ROUT DESCRIBEO BY GACHMAN
AS WHITE MALE, TWINTY-FIVE TO TWINTY-SIVEN, FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES,
ONE HUNDRED FORTY TO ONE HUNDRED FIFTY POUNDS, MEDIUV BUILD
BLACK HAIR, FAIR TO OLIVE COMPLESION.
INQUIRIES CONTIUING
(U)
M
NOTE:
Frent intelligence authorities requested we make
quiries
concerning subject, a militant member of an anti-DeGaulle terrorist
groun reportedly in U.S. for brief perlod in late 1963.
reportedly used names
at New York and departed 12/6/63 at Laredo, Texas,
for Mexico.
He listed U.S, address as Post Office Box 308, Fort Worth, Texas.'
Iron information furnished us by CIA, Jean Souetre doos not
appear identical with the Michel
Rous who was in the Us in
November and December, 1963.
NR..
439
ENG. -
CK.
APPROVED BY
TYPED BY
MORNINE
CONADETIAA
CONFIR
2
DocId: 32298791
Page 2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32160289.pdf | 124-10138-10061 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | FBI | 12/6/63 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 44-563-58 | DIRECTOR, FBI | CLEMENTS, MANNING C. | 302 | FBI | DE | 2/9/18 | 302 | ## Page 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10138-10061
RECORD_SERIES: DE
AGENCY FILE_ NUMBER: 44-563-58
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
CLEMENTS. MANNING C.
TO: DIRECTOR. FBI
TITLE:
DATE: 12/06/1963
PAGES: 302
SUBJECT:
SEE FBI 44-24016-658
DOCUMENT TYPE:
ORIGINAL
CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE:
STATUS
PAPER. TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Secret
09/09/1996
Redact
NEW
CLASSIFICATION:
UPDATE DATE:
01/25/2001
- RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (1)(B)
JFK Act 6 (1)(C)
JFK Act 6 (4)
COMMENTS:
NW 45124 DocId: 32160289
Page 1
---
## Page 2
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
REPORTING OFFICE
DALLAS
TITLE OF CASE
OFFICE OF ORIGIN
DALLAS
JACK L. RUBY, Aka.;
LEE HARVEY OSWALD, Aka.,
(DECEASED) • VICTIM
PATE:
INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
7276/63
11/25/63 - 12/4/63
REPORT.MADE BY
TYPE
SA MANNING C. CLEMENTS
1
CHARACTER OF CASE
CR
REFERENCE:
Report of SA MANNIND C. CLEMENIS dated 11/30/63
at Dallas.
8=11-24-92
Ceci
10035FK)
-Orly pages B,I, MO, U, Et were Reme
Pagel class per 5170-H83/mdc 10-23
урк)
LEADS
Al1 leads are
being set out by teletype and telephone.
Copies are furnished or this report to Chicago, Detroit,
New Orleans and New York for information in vdew of
Investiga
tion being condusted by those offices.
ADMINISTRATIVE
No. dissemination will be made outside the Bureau
except on Bureau Instructions.
This report contains no interviews with news media
or police representatives who were present at the shooting of
OSWALD Dy RUBY on 11/24/63. These will be incorporated in a
subsequent report.
APPROVED
SPECIAL AGENT
IN CHARGE
COPIES MADE:.
5 - Bureau (44-24016)
info)
] = DetroIt 44565) 14F0)
• New Orleans (44-2064) (1nfo)
• New York (44-974) (info
8 - Dallas (44-1639)
DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
44-563758
DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT
AGENCY..
REQUEST RECD.
DATE FWD.....
HOW FWD.
aY.
SLAtA,I7
Ribiches OR
NOTATIONS
(JFK)
426/96
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLO/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 076).
CRET
NW 45124 DocId:32160289 Page 2
---
## Page 3
IA 44-895
Stationi
EJK :mjg
2
RONNIE SCALIAR, TIMMY WELCH and NANCY SINATRA, daughter of
FRANK SINATRA.
on 9/19/63, LA 4429-C in discussing MAX WEINBERG,
designated as Top Jewel Theft subject, advised SAs DONALD
A. SCHLAEFER, and WILLIE R. WHITE and Supervisor CHESTER
E. ST. VINCENT, that WEINGERG's daughter is presently employe
as a secretary for Reprise Records owned by FRANK SINATRA.
She received this job through a distributor, MeL. (INU).
LA 4429-C further advised that he had heard that
people in the Reprise office were calling all over the
country and placing large bets.
No details or names
relative to this type of activity were available to LA 4429-c.
On 6/28/63, MICHAEL SHORE of Reprise Records,
1347 Cahuenga, Los Angeles, California, Telephone No.
HO 6-8211, advised SAA CHARLES E. STINE that he had seen
publicity
in the Los Angeles papers concerning the conviction
Of MARVIN R. COLE on Obstruction of Justice charges.
commented that he had known COLE for a long time and that
"MARVIN COLE IS DOC STACHER'S bOy"
SHORE stated that he
had been, in some measure, responsible for starting COLE
out in business in New York City a number of years ago.
He indicated that on one occasion he had loaned money to
COLE in order that COLE might buy points in the Fremont
Hotel and Gambling Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada.
On 10/18/63 MARVIN R. COLE was indicted by the
on 5/23/63 the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both
counts. On 6/12/63, a fine of $1,000 on each of the two
counts was imposed by the court.
filed by COLE's attorneys on 6/13/63.
The January, 1961 Agency List of the Standard
NW 45124
DocId: 32160289
Page
3
Page
---
## Page 4
DL 44-1639
Press Agency, in a conversation with BOHDAN LEWANOWSKI, Polish
Ambassador to the United States stated that he had information
indicating that the correspondent (name not-given), of the Indian
Publication "Blitz" was in Dallas the day of the attack, ( assassi-
1325
nation) and apparently obtained documents stating that police
Sheriff CURRY and RUBY were members of the "MB KESIDE" or
"MB SESILE" (phonetic)GORNICKL;was to verify this information
December 2, 1963, and GORNICKDalso indicated this information
States National Accredited as correspondents.and representatives of
information media by the United Nations as of October 31, 1963,
Lists RAMESH SANGHVI of Indian nationality as associated with
"BLITZ" XWIESLAW GORNICKI of Polish nationality was
• listed as
associated with the Polish Press Agency sIM)
Cover Page
HW 45124
DocId: 32160289
Page 4
---
## Page 5
DL 44-1639/BL
Sources at San Antonio, Austin, Waco, Temple and
Pharr, Texas, had no pertinent information.
The following sources were contacted negatively on
11/25/63 by the indicated Agents:
AT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS:
MEL
SOURCE
PCI J. C. STEPHENSON, Proprietor, S. P.
Drug Store and News Stand
SA 665-C
PCI VANCE F. BORDELON, gambler
PCI CAESAR J. FERRIS, cafe owner and
bartender
Former SA 560-0
PCI PHILLIP BORDONARO, Tavern keeper
PCI JACK PATRICK HANRATTY, gambler
PCI ROBERT S. YARRINGTON, retired gambler
Capt. ROBERT ALLEN, Vice Squad, SA PD
(including check of vice squad records)
PCI VINCENT L. LOCICERO
PCI WADE HANSEN
PCI
SA 660-C
CONTACTING AGENT
SA BRUNO F. DREYER
SA DREYER
SA DREYER
SA DREYER
SA DREYER
SA JOHN RUSSELL. GRAHAM
SA GRAHAM
SA GRAHAM
SA MORTON P. CHILES, JR.
SA CHILES
SA CHILES
SA CHILES
SA CHILES
OTHER 4
AT AUSTIN, TEXAS:
PCI MARY HALBOUTY, Manicurist
Former PCI MARION C. "SONNY" PEARSON,
gambler
X
COVER PAGE
-
SA Ho
SA BURK
T. BURK
SECRET
NH 45124 DocId:32160289 Page 5
---
## Page 6
SL 44-496
AT ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
SL 1285-C-TE advised SA CLARK S. SMITH on
November 27, 1963 that AL CHARLES, Proprietor
of the Stardust Club at St. Louis, Missouri, advised
him that he has known JACK RUBY for 15 years.
Informant stated that RUBY, according to CHARLES has
a business partner, name unknown, who is 70 years of
age and who formerly was in business in Dallas, Texas,
with an individual named JOE. BOND. Informant stated
that CHARLES advised that BOND and RUBY's present
partner operated a bar and burlesque house in Dallas,
• Texas,
which was in competition with a similar
establishment operated by an unnamed
individual who
had an "in"
with the Police Department.
Informant
advised that CHARLES related that subsequently a
rape charge was filed against BOND who then fled from
Dallas, Texas, to Washington, D.. C., where he opened
a similar business.
BOND according to CHARLES was
later
"fingered". and arrested at Washington, D. C.
However, no dates of
occurrance were given in relating
this story. Informant advised
I that CHARLES stated RUBY
then went into business in Dallas with JOE BOND's, former
partner, name unknown.
The indicies of the St. Louis Office failed to
reflect any derogatory information on AL CHARLES.
(COVER PAGE)
• Nunci
HW
45124
DocId: 32160289
• Page 6
---
## Page 7
DI 44-1639
-
winning!
On November 27, 1963, the St. Louis Office
advised that
SL 1285-C-TE advised SA CLARK S. SMITH on November 27, 1963, that
AL CHARLES, Proprietor of Stardust Club, St. Louis, Missouri,
has known JACK RUBY for fifteen years.
According to informant,
CHARLES stated RUBY has a business partner, name not mentioned,
70 years old, who formerly was in business in Dallas with an indi-
vidual named JOE BONDS.
Informant advised that BONDS and RUBY's
present partner operated a bar and burlesque house which wa in
competition with a similar establishment operated by an unnamed
individual who was friendly with the police department. As a re-
sult a rape charge was filed against BONDS, who then fled from
Dallas to Washington, D. C., where he opened
BONDS, according to CHARLES, was later arrested at Washington,
D. C.,
RUBY
a not dates sirens with amant
Informant stated according to CHARLES,
Proprietor of Stardust Club, St. Louss,
Missouri, featuring EVELYN WEST and other burlesque acts, was
personally contacted by SA CLARK S. SMITH on November 27, 1963.
CHARLES stated he is not personally acquainted with JACK RUBY;
did not know he originally came from Chicago, or that his name
was RUBENSTEIN:
However, CHARLES advised he
has known of JACK RUBY
as being in a similar business endeavor
as his in Dallas for the
past 15 years.
CHARLES stated he received a telephone call from RUBY
approximately two years ago on occasion RUBY made an inquiry re-
garding night club acts.
CHARLES further advised in April of
this year he paid a visit to Dallas and patronized the three
burlesque
houses in Dallas, including that of JACK RUBY.
CHARLES
maintained he has other knowledge of RUBY or his associates.
BB
COVER
PAGE
w...
NW 45124
DocId: 32160289
Page
7
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10217-10063.pdf | 104-10217-10063 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 10/13/1961 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | JMWAVE | DIRECTOR | CABLE: ODURGE HQS HAS BEEN ADVISED OF KUBARK INTEREST IN REINOL | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-52 : F12B : 1998.04.28.18:41:04:543115 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10217-10063
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
201-275949
BOUTINO
UNIT +
5/3601t. 1686
DATE •
13 Octsber 1961 1
TO !
PROM, DRECTOR
COMP, BELL 10
enero, DO, COP, ADOP/A, VH 9, S/C 2
Ex Fling (check oae):
No C3 Recond Vaile. Desirog.
#I Ble this copy as indiesed
Branes copy Kied As Indicated
a Tabering
(Check one):
Markos !.
Hone required
10
PATTY WAVE
SNIP ADITN SECUR
RETA
WATY 0459 (IN 45096)
CITE dIR
softarin:
DEFLARED
ROUTINE
00157855
17876
DO OURA% HOS HAS BEEN AITINED OF SUBUR INTARAT IN PRINCE
•12N21LSZ NUNZALIZA DA APA, 2938, MANQUITO, MAZANIZAS, MEP COOEDINATOR,
A3 PROSED TY REA
RO IPT ARRIVAL, DONZARE WILL BE PLIGED IN
TITUS UNDER XUB/JE
C-STEROR, •HICH HILL AVOID COMPACT CITED PARA
MAD
FACILSTATE
S CHAS RETVAN PRIO
30
NO IDENTIPIABLE ROS TRACES ON P
TO OVIROR AS ALPERATE WITH SAR THEATRE REQUESTED.
BAD OF MESSAGE®
'IN CONKTI: Request
прот
diseuma
Matrent for Bolnoi Gonsalez, MEP Coselinatos.
be afriving black in Keye on 13 October 1961,
il quiet return to PBRUMS.
ZUz
C/H/W/PH
fre
P. Fe ARN SON
C/ER/STPP271
TOR* 1389 a
SPOIDIHATIMO OFFICERS
SEGRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
Cope Na
435)
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 104-10185-10252.pdf | 104-10185-10252 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 05/14/1964 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | LIBBY, WH/SA/CI | MEMORANDUM:SAFEHOUSE FOR AMMUG-1 | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-20 : F14 : 1998.05.04.14:33:09:153120 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10185-10252)
*...
1, May 196k
L'ecorandit for the Record: Safehouse for AMMUG-I
1. Per verbal agreement with froL
decided to use the following safehouse presently available for l
mediate use.
24
Recided
0/WH/SA/CI
2. This apartment was riewed by C/WHSA/CI jesterday and considered
Kronse.
adequate for AMNUG1, Undersigned and Mr.
will inventory
household equirment on 19 May 1964 (tentatively) and nove A-l into
the aboverentioned quarters a day or two thereafter, depending upon
that ke will infor fro
sarehouse Branch, X3683, that it
will no longer be necessary for the Branch to inquire re prospective
agartents for A-l in the NoW. section af Washiriton, per hi/SA 64-376
dated E Yay 1764
Libby
Wai/Sa/cI
128 201-749651/ support
57MN
144 MAY 1964
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32322712.pdf | 124-10380-10003 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | FBI | 04/17/1967 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 105-97459-210-424 | HQ | MM | 7 | FBI | HQ | 3/8/18 | 7 | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
5/29/201
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10380-10003
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 105-97459-210-424
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: MM
TO: HQ
TITLE :
DATE:
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
04/17/1967
7
CARLOS ZARRAGA MARTINEZ
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :
Confidential
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 11/10/1999
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS:
v9.l
HW 45858 DocId: 32322712 Page 1
---
## Page 2
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR $41 CFR) 101-11.6
• UNITED STATES
VERNMENT ONFIDENTAC
Memorandum
TO
DIRECTOR, FBI (105-97459-210)
FROM
SAC, MIAMI (105-4572) (P*)
DATE: . 4/17/67
ATT TNVORMATION CONTAINED
IBREIN IS WWOLASSTETED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
SUBJECT:
NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
9-2-97.
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SID/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/
(JEK)
AST
Re Miami
letter to Bureau dated 1/26/67.
Set forth below are the principal anti-CASTRO.
2 a arenation, des i ource na normante
Also included
identities of sources and informants who are in
a position to furnish information concerning the activities
of such organizations.
tions are set
forth where such data is known.
Membership figures of the organiza
13
N
SUARE
Miami is continuing efforts to increase the:
coverage within these organizations. We are attempting to
develop symbol informants within the principal organizations pa
and in some cases placing established symbol informants
within the membership of these groups.
Movimiento Revolucionaria Frank Pais (MRFP) (Inactive)
MT •
920
MM 974-S (member)
amus
41 cards
EUDALDO
/CC
Miami file
Bufile
97-462
105-137256
Source
Membership
30
1643
Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria Cubano
(MRRC) (Inactive)
Miami file
105-5650
• Sources
Bufile
105-108646
C) 517 non-member, '
974-5
10
Le hallen 6do for test
Bureau (RM)
56sSd)GAT
OND%
- Newark (134-2166)
(Info)
(FK)
-
New York (105-50443)
(Info) (RM)
-
San Juan (Info) (RM)
-
Miami (105-4572)
105-97459-218-424
LLS: VC
(1 - 65-297630
REC- 25
(7)
ST-100
198 APR 19 1967
_copies made
RECORDED
CAN
Monti
Se day
for review at FBIid by
LATIN-
19070
HSCA re 3/14/2% request,
MAY 1099675. Savings Bonds Regularly on she Payroll Savings Plan CONTiDENIMAD
HW
45858 DocId: 32322712 Page 2
---
## Page 3
CONFIDENTIAD
MM 105-4572
Asociacion Nacionalista Cubana (Cuban Nationalist Association)
(Active)
Miami file
Bufile
105-2481
97-4194
Sources
MM
639-S (non-member)
MM
974-S
1 1
11
MM
635-S
ARTURO PABLOJOTON
HEVIAXFOYO, PSI (member)
MEMBE
Membership
- :20
Second National Front of Escambray (SNPE) (Operation Alpha 66) A
Miami file
Bufile
105-6243
105-112098
Sources
Membership
(C)
MM 815+S
MM
847-,
non-member)
(member)
974-5- non-member)
(1115-S member)
Miami
Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU)
(Inactive)
Miami file
Bufile
97-223
100-336358
Sources
LiM (B15kS
(non-member)
847-S
11
MM 974-S
GUSTAVO RODRIGO (member)
8 - 10
"MEMBER
Membership
Movimienta Revolucionario del Pueblo_ (MRP)
Miami file
Bufile
105-3107
105-92704
Sources
(Inactive)
MM (815. Snon-member)
JOAQUIN, GODOY (member )
MM 847-S
(non-member)
MM 492-S
11
Unknown
FLA
• Membership
30th of November Revolutionary Movement (Inactive)
Miami file
Bufile
97-406
105-92196
Sources
C Lo isle non-member )
/MM 974-S
MM
635-S
(member) • ,
Membership
10 - 15
- 2
CO ADONDAi
NH 45858 DocId: 32322712 Page 3
---
## Page 4
CONFIDENTIAT
MM 105-4572
Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (ARD) (Revolutionary
Democratic Alliance) (Inactive)
Miami file
Bufile
105-9295
105-134875
Source
Membership
JESUS/DIEGUEZ.
FLA
LAMAZARES (member)
ALBERTO SUNE
(member)
25
LA
Junta Revolucionaria Cubana 4
(JURE) (Cuban Revolutionary Junta)
(Inactive)
Miami file
105-6661
Sarce
LORENZO RUIZ (officer.).
Bufile
105-114543
- CARLOS ZARRAGA MARTINEZ
Key Source,- Cuban
(non-member)
OSORIO DAVILA
(officer).
Membership
300 - 400
ELA
Directorio Revolucionaria Estudiantil
(DRE) (Cuban Student
Directorate)
'"(Inactive)""
OTHER
Miami file
105-1360
Source
Bufile
105-100081
ANTONIO/GONZALEZ
PSA USA (member) e
Imembery.
MM 635-S
Mèmbership
(non-member)
Less than. 100
Fronte Obrero Revolucionario Democrático Cubano (FORDC)
(Revolutionary Democratic Cuban Workers Front) (Inactive)
Miami file
97-437
Source
Bufile
MARIO MASIP (member)
105-10851
JUAN MACHADO M'EMBET
<MM 776-S
(non-member)
Less than 100
Membership
Movimiento-de-Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR) (Inactive)
Miami file
Bufile
97-327
97-4133
Source
—SIXTO
MESA, Treasurer
MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO NILO WESSER (member)
ARTE BU SO MANUEL
Membership
About 50
-- 3 -
CORTROETTRL
4
HH 45858 DocId: 32322712 Page 4
---
## Page 5
CONFIDENTIAL
MM 105-4572,
Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC) (Active)
Miami file
Bufile
97-328
97-4110
Sources
LAUREANO /BATISTA
/FALLA
member),
BENIGNO GALNERES
(member),
MM639-S Anon-member
CARLOS ZARRAGA MARTINEZ
Key Source - Cuban
(non-member)
-EUDALDO/ SUAREZ, PSI
(non-member).
About 200
Membership
Cuba Libre (DIAZ' BRULL Group) (Inactive)
Miami file
105-1870
Source
Membership
MM 635-S (member)
20ou
Cuba Libre (ZARRAGA Group) (Active)
Miami file
105-9501
Source
Membership
—CARLOS ZARRAGA MARTINEZ
Key Source - Cuban
• (member)
20
Movimiento Accion Patriotica Americana (NAPA) (Inactive)
Miami file
105-4136
Sources
ALDO VERA SERAFIN
(member)
NGUR DOTRES (member)
Membership
Alliance for_Liberty-Of Cuba/(Inactive)
Miami file
105-6290
Sources
Membership
ZACARIAS,
ACOSTA
(member)
MM 639-s (non-member)
Approximately 100
Comandos L (Active)
Miami file
105-7054
Source
MM 635-s (non-member)
MM
639-S
Умм 492-S
1t
-CARLOS ZARRAGA MARTINEZ-
Key Source - Cuban
(Non-Member)
-4 -
HH 45858 DocId: 32322712 Page 5
---
## Page 6
CONFIDENTIAD
MM • 105-4572
Comandos L (Active)
—EUDALDO SUAREZ, PSI
(non-member)
Membership
Association of Veterans of Bay of Pigs (Active)
105-7947
Source
105-121847
Approximately 100 FLA
Miami file
Buf ile
MM 974-S (non-member)
MM. 639-S
_MM 1119-S
+t
Membership
' RECE (Formerly Pro-Referendum Committee) (Active)
Miami file
105-8280
Source
Bufile
105-126039
About 200
MM 635-S (non-member)
CARLOS ZARRAGA MARTINEZ
(non-member) Key
- Cuban
MM 815-S non-member)
EUDALDO SUAREZ, PSI
(member)
Membership
Fuerzas Armadas de Cuba en el Exilio (FACE) (Inactive)
Sources
Approximately 6
Miami file
Bufile
2-297
2-1666
MM 635-S (non-member)
MM639-S
"t
tt
/ MM 492-S
1 1
Membership
Pro-Gobierno Constitucional de Cuba (Inactive)
Miami file
66-2652
Bufile
105-127552
Approximately 6
Sources
MM
C MM
632-S (member) f L/1
- JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALI
(member)
(Chief)
Membership
Approximately :25
Movimiento Insurrectional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR)
(Active).*
Miami file
Bufile
105-2355
97-4474
Sources
MM
635-S (non-member) ;
MM
639-S
1 1
MM
492-S
- 5 -
HH 45858 DocId: 32322712 Page 6
---
## Page 7
CONFIDENTIAL
MM 105-4572
Movimiento Insurrectional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR
(Active
Sources
EVELIO ALPIZAR
PEREZ,F L/
Key Source - Cuban,
(non-member)
- LAREDO RODRIGUEZ (former
member)
20
FLA
Membership
Fuerzas Armadas de Cuba en el Exilio (FACE) (Inactive)
Organization of RUBEN DE LEON)
Miami file
105-4039
Source
Bufile
2-1707
Membership
Accion Revolucionaria Social Democrata (ARSD) (Active)
105-6516
• Source
105-113959
MM 492-S ,(non-member)
-RUBEN DE/LEON (member)
Unknown
F.LA
Miami file
Bufile
EVELIO ALPIZAR PEREZ
Key Source - Cuban
(non-member) '
Membership
Approximately 10
Agrupacion Montecristi, also known as Montecristi Group (Inactive)
Miami file
105-4719
Source
MM 873-5 (member)
Bufile
105-106995
Membership
Unknown
Los Pinos Nuevos (LPN), also known as The New Pinos (Inactive)
Miami file
105-7479
Source
CARLOS ZARRAGA MARTINEZ
Bufile
2-1855
Key Source - Cuban
(non-member)
Membership
Movimiento Nationalista Cristiano (MNC) (Active)
Miami file
105-9958
Bufile
105-140309
Approximately 10
Source
-ADOLFO MERINO (Cuban
contact)
L A
-ALDO ROSADO (member)
Member'ship
Approximately 10
-6 -
CONFIDENTIAL
NN 45858 DocId: 32322712 Page 7
---
## Page 8
CONFIDENTIAL
MM 105-4572
MEMBER
Ejercito de Liberacion Cubano (ELC)
Miami file
105-11869
Bufile
105-160425
Source
FLA
FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ #E
TAMAYO (non-member)
FMM 1119-S *
tt
~ CARLOS ZARRAGA MARTINEZ
Key Source - Cuban
non-member)
CONFIDEMIAL
NH 45858 DocId: 32322712 Page 8
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32307899.pdf | 124-10293-10257 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 12/3/68 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-6054-2455 | SAC, SF | DIRECTOR, FBI | 1 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/20/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
RECORD NUMBER:
RECORD SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
FBI
124-10293-10257
HQ
92-6054-2455
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FROM:
TO :
TITLE :
FBI
DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, SF
DATE:
'PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
12/03/1968
1
LCN, RAB, FAMILY, PITTSTON, PA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/09/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
DocId: 32307899
Page 1
19
---
## Page 2
Settinu
John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1902 (11 USC 2107 Hot
DATE: 11-14-2917
1 - Mr. Benjamin, Room 1537
12-3-68
SAC, San Francisco (92-593)
Director, FBI
(92-6054)
LA COSA NOSTRA
AR - CONSPIRACY
NY 6436-C-TE, a member-informant in LCN, has advised
that Russell Bufalino is not a,member of the Luchese "family"
but has his own "family" which
on preston, one
numbers approximately 50
individuals. The informant stated that Bufalino operates out
of Pittston, Pennsylvania, and his "family" comes from the
neighboring
towns.
Pittsburgh Office interview PG 603-C-TE to deternine
if he has knowledge of the existence of a LCN "family" in
Pittston, Pennsylvania. San Francisco Office contact
SF 2689-C-TE concerning this matter.
Furnish results of these interviews to the New York
and Philadelphia Offices and the Bureau.
2 - Pittsburgh (92-599)
1 - New York (92-2339).
I - Philadelphia (92-1027)
REC-57
MAILED 3
DEC 3 - 1968
COMM-FBI
6'1: 2455
40 DEC 4 1968
JEK: Ike lle
DECID
7968
JAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
DocId: 32307899 Page 2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10510-10152.pdf | 104-10510-10152 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 6/8/64 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | DR. ANTONIO MACEO | SMITH. VOCAT. REHAB. | LETTER:COUNSELOR INTERVIEWED ( ) TODAY. | 1 | FLA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-64 : F7 : 1999.06.04.10:21:55:420128 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10510-10152
•Y
ZIN
S.C. ATTACIMENT F. TO
UFGA -26075
June B, 1960
Dro Antonio l'aceo
P•0s. Dox 1808
uluns, Florida 33101
Doar Dro la000g
Counselor Intorviewed
today.
Provious to hlo acring tore; councelor talked to the Coundia for the
Blind as thore ma nothing me could do for him ond notunlly 1t was
contrry to our rogulations to aocept hin since the modioal roport
Indiontod that he man Industrially blind. Tho Counoft for the B11nd
statod that if he oould break Inglish thoy would attrpt to work with
hing but,
of courne, with he clauoona, st mould be dirficult for him
to acute m
At the ond of the interler.
incisontod that bocause of hin
conorni debilitated ccadition, no ara nor actually wlah to cot into aly
training procram or sotuslly cot into any work situation an ho had jut
about onuch atrengh to alt up. of courno, clausond lo protty generally
donaidered to be progressive In nature and overything concernod and
a ntlonnd above lcaves thia counselor with the irpression that thia
Iidividual w111 be a llibility on dono one for the rout of hin 11fe and
1e not employable:
Thornforo, of ourse, be de not boing cocoptod into thia rehabilitation
procrame
It would be this counselor's roconnondation that 11 1t wore
ronalblo, that ho be droprod from the CrC progron and put on the Cuban
Forgoe progrum.
Thia reocamendation in In view of the Inot that thia
will be a lore Indefinito volfare anne and 1t 10 11kcly that tho Cuben
Rariçoo coneral progras «ill be going on long after the CFS 1e oloned
and vory likoly, men when the Cuban Refugee program le oloned, they
would continue on the State celfaro.
(s course, I an in no position to
linow whether this la lacally ponsible.
Sancerely yours
Cordon Do Suith, Counselor
Voontional Rehabilltation
Copy
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32338211.pdf | 124-90141-10007 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/21/1960 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-92413-1 | HQ | 1 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | SS | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (11 USC 2107 Hote)".™
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/27/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-90141-10007
RECORD SERIES :
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-92413-1
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FROM:
FBI
HQ
TO:
TITLE :
DATE :
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
10/21/1960
1
QUINTIN PINO MACHADO
DOCUMENT TYPE :
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION:
Secret
RESTRICTIONS:
1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
10/06/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
SS
v9.1
DocId: 32338211
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records ColLection Act of 1992 (41 USC 2107 Hote):
DATE: 11-14-2017/
4-22 (ReT 12-17-59)
Federal Bureau of.
¿gation
Records Bi
and see pai.
UCH 1
* 1959
Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
Service Unit - Room
24
orward to File
Return to
533
Supervisor
Room Ext.
Type of References Requested
]Regular Request (Analytical searen)
All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
Subversive References, Onlyi
Nonsubversive. References Agily
coRefRences Only
Type of Search Requested innouncon couraTe
Restricted to Locality of
Exact Name Only: (On the Nose) 3-6-91
BuildyPASSIFIED BINatibil 5LD/K5R
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X.
(JFK)
Subject
Birthdate & Place.
Address
Localities
ROU DIA 0-0
PFOG- IS GLASSE
A MEDALEN NLE NUMBER
Shitiche 310
- Initials .
SERIAL
227
ME META
109-12-222-915, 859, 945,
Pina
8.33, 908, 202, 012.
109012-723-2 Ta
2-14-00
Muncha lo, Serentine Pinan
SI
Mackado, Quintin Pino
(04-330 - 222-1953(5)
machrash, Pina
11713322-9237
64330229-2075
Spa mae se
193)
Cincified I a
602A 6CL
Declassify on:
SECRET
5-23qu
105-92413-1
DocId: 32338211
Page 2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32329165.pdf | 124-90085-10046 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/24/1965 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 165-1740-1 | HQ | DL | 9 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | RPT | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
6/1/2015
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-90085-10046
RECORD SERIES :
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
165-1740-1
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: DL
TO: HQ
TITLE :
DATE:
02/24/1965
PAGES:
9
SUBJECTS :
ALBERT MEADOWS
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/14/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
RPT
19.1
DocId: 32329165
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Reteased under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 747 USC 2107 Hote):
-- DATE: 11-14-2017
DL 165-199
contacted concerning the captioned subject's present charges
pending against him in the USDC, NDT, under the ITAR - GAMBLING
Statute.
TIMMINS indicated he plans
to try MEADOWS and his
associate EDWARD VINCENT DRISCOLL in the USDC, 3/29/65. TIMMINS
advised that if possible, it may be pertinent
to the prosecution
in this
matter if the Richardson PD could possibly raid the
subject's apartment a few days before the trial in an effort to
upset MEADOWS and the plans of his attorneys.
Information concerning the ITAR - GAMBLING Statue
covered in Dallas file 166-84, Bufile 166-491.
On 1/23/65, DL 181-C advised that he has no information
concerning MEADOWS operating as a bookmaker in the Dallas area.
On 2/3/65, DL 185-C and DL 197-C advised that they
had no information concerning MEADOWS present activities.
For
information of the Bureau, this investigation is predicated when
DL 208-PC furnished information on 12/11/64, that ALBERT MEADOWS
was operating a book from Richardson, Texas, using Dallas, Texas,
telephone Number AD 5-7167.
Informant advised that he had
received the information MEADOWS had set up his peation at the
beginning of the 1964 football season.
Informant stated that
he had not personally made a bet with
MEADOWS at the above
phone number nor did he know the location of the apartment.
It was subsequently ascertained from the Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company, Dallas, that telephone number AD 5-7167
is listed to ROY C. MANNING, Apartment 7, 108 s. Bowser,
*Richardson, Texas, and was connected on 9/24/65.
The information from Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company was furnished to SA IVAN D. LEE by MRS. BULA SUTTLE,
Secretary, Office of the Security Supervisor.
- Вж -
COVER PAGE
DocId: 32329165 Page 2
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | 104-10150-10136.pdf | 104-10150-10136 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 2/1/68 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR. | 433 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK62 : F9 : 20040301-1051510 : Document contains 416 text pages and 17 blank pages, total of 433 p.p. | 433 | ## Page 1
104-10150-10136
TOP SECREU
CLASSIFIED
hen blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Docuriéht- Automatically downgraded or declassi-
I when filledin form is detached from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
RCE
REGISTRY
CIA CONTROL NO
15191/24
1317a16
30C.
NO.
DOC. DATE
712
- 68
COPY NO.
NUMBER
OF PAGES
14447
NUMBER
OF. ATTACHMENTS
Top Secret document received b
the Central Intelligence Agency
ATTENTION: Thisijorm will be/placed on top of and attached to each
classifled Top
secret within; the
CIA and will
remain attached to the document until such time is it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside diCIA.
Access to Top Secret mätter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose oncial
duties relate to the matter.
Top Secret Control Oficers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
Each individual who sees the Top. secret document will sion and
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided.
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
RELEASED
REFERRÉD TO
OFFICE
RECEIVED
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
I SEEN BY
SIGNATURE!
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE:
P
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT:
When this form is
detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
DOWNGRADED:•
TO
TO
BY (Signature)
D'ATE
OFFICE
" FORIA
8-73
26
PREVIOUS
EDITIONG.
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
OFFICE
DATE
TOP SECRET
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
---
## Page 2
TOP SECRET DOCUMENI
HOUSE: SELECT COMITTEE: ON ASSASSIGATIONS STAFF MEIERS
LE TITLE NUMBER/VOLU:
The Examination of the
Bona Fides of a KGB Defector
1 Document - dated February: 1968
SCLUSIVE DATES:
STODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:
LETIONS,
IF AVY:
CI
ROOM:
DATE
ECFIVED
- 14-19
DATE
RETURNED
G327000
SIGNATURE OF
REVIEWING OFFICIAL
N0-7!
4,72.25
22 Aps 25
Hie Ma 18
REVIVED BY
(PRINT NNIE)
Lench Kein
Kennet
Klein
but Gen
Brett N
LEIN
Smitte
JOHANNA SMITT
Z. Roht Blahs.
Istem Sit.
Istania Smithe
G. ROBERT BLAKEY
Interne Sunti
SURELL BRADY
sundi Brag
MARGO E LACKSON!
Margi e achin
-066
---
## Page 3
Top Secret
The Examination of the Bona Fides
of a KGB Defector
Top Secret
Cy.110
TS No. 187124
Copy. Nº 10
---
## Page 4
TOP SECRET
1. Attached is copy number 10 of the February 1968
CIA study entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of
a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. Nosenko."
siaohsicia
2. Please note that the CIA finds this study to be
inaccurate in many important details and to contain the
results of faulty judgements leading to unfounded conclusions.
3. We have deleted certain portions of this study
containing information which bears on the security of
ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.
4. We request return of this study when it has served
your purposes.
TOP SECRET
6001266
---
## Page 5
20201726 216031GR2 MOSS CAMERE 3
The Examination of the Bona Fides
of a KGB Defector
Yuriy I. NOSENKO
February 1968
Top Secret
0001267
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
---
## Page 6
Top Secret
CONTENTS
Introduction
PAGE
1
Summary of Case
I
FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS
NOSENKO's Statements About limself
Soviet Officials' Statements
The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing
Positive Intelligence Information
Counterintelligence Information
Significant KGB Operations Not
Directly Related to NOSENKO's
Claimed Service
"The KGB Agent in Paris"
(Sgt."
"SASHA"
(Identity Unknown)
"The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty"
(William VASSALL)
The KGB Audio Attack on the West German
Embassy
"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)
Edward Ellis SMITlI
II
EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
Notes for the Reader
3
11
11
20
21
21
22
24
24
28
30
31
33
37
41
41
III PRE-KGB BIOGRAPIY
Birth to 1945
Moscow Institute of International Relations
(1945-ca. 1950)
Naval RU Service (Ca. 1951-ca. 1953)
Summary and Conclusion
45
45
48
49
58
0001268
( 1)
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy 10
---
## Page 7
8922292022228306t
Top Secret
CONTENTS
PAGE
VI SEVENTH! DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)
(Cont.)
VII
Operational Activities (1955-1958)
Entrapment of MALIA OG
Recruitment of BURGI l6
Attempted
recruitment of GEHRCKENS D
Contact with LANE and BIRSEl 06,06
Recruitment of SUNDAR Ob
Travel to London (1957 and 1958)
Operational Activities (1958-1960)
Recruitment of HARRIS Dc
Compromise of (KRAFT) 06
Recruitment of DREW 06
Recruitment of LuKís 06
Recruitment of WILBE 0b
Recruitment of TAYLOR 06
Recruitment of MERTENS 06
Compromise of BARRETT 06
Compromise of WILLERFORD CO
Recruitment of FRIPPEL UC
Lee Harvey OSWALD
Summary
Knowledge of other Seventh Department
American Tourist Operations
Seventh Department Counterintelligence
Operations (1955-1960)
NOSENKO's Information
Information Furnished
KGB by George BLAKE
KGB Tourist Study
Summary and Conclusion
AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(January 1960-January
1962)
Deputy Chief of Section
Transfer to Section
Predecessor as Deputy Chief
Responsibilities
Deputy and Occasional Acting
Chief
General Supervisory
Duties
113
114
115
121
122
123
124
127
128
129
130
131
131
132
133
134
136
137
143
144
145
146
146
148
149
150
(iii) .
Top Secret
151
151
152
153
154
156
159
0001263
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
15: 8R
---
## Page 8
A 28/4:00
Top Secret
CONTENTS
PAGE
VII AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(January 1960-January 1962) (Cont.)
Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications
Knowledge of CIA Personnel
within Embassy
Suspected CIA Officers
Unsuspected CIA Officers
Personal Handler of Agents
Temporary Assignments Abroad
Planned Travel to U.S.
Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960)
Travel to Bulgaria (April-May 1961)
Compromise of LUNT O6
Promotion and Transfer to
Seventh Department
(January 1962)
Summary and Conclusion
236
240
241
244
248
251
251
252
254
256
259
261
VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964)
Introductory Comment
Chief of the American-British Commonwealth
NOSENKO's Agents
Section (January 1962-July 1962)
Operational Activities
Entrapment of JOHNSONO6
Entrapment of JONES
06
Recruitment of BIENSTOCK DO
Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962)
Purpose of Trip
Investigation of SHAKHOV
Security Escort for Delegation
Visits
to KGB Legal Residency
KGB Officers within Soviet Delegation
Association
with Other Soviets
Supervising Case
Officer for BELITSKIY
Contact with CIA
Operational Activities
(continued)
Attempted Recruitment of BRAUNS 06
Summary and Conclusion
• 263
263
265
265
268
268
272
273
275
275
276
278
:279
279
280
282
286
288
288
290
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PAGE
VIII. SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-Januaty 1964)
(Cont.)
Deputy Chief of Seventh Department
(July 1962-January 1964)
KGB Operationg
Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY 06
Investigation of SLESINGER 06
Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN d6
GRU Agent SHUBIN 06
Arrest of BARGHOORN
Investigation of OSWALD
Residence in USSR
Request: to Return to USSR
Post-Assassination Review of KGB File
The CHEREPANOV Papers
Contents
NOSENKO's Travel Document
Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)
Purpose of Trip
Visits to KGB Legal Residency
Avallability for Meetings with CIA
NOSENKO's Written. Notes
NOSENKO's Defection
Take
Knowledge of Other Seventh Department
Operations
Operational Activities (July 1962-
January 1964)
KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among
American Tourists
Information Furnished the KGB by
George BLAKE
KGB Study of American Intelligence
• Tourist Operations
NOSENKO's Information
Summary
Summary and Conclusion
291
292
292
293
295
296
298:
303
303
305
307
309
314
315
316
317
318
318
319
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325
326
326
327
327
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IX • OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE
Relationship with General GRIBANOV
Communist Party Status
Knowledge of KGB Forms
and Procedures
Awards and Decorationg
Sourcing
Ranks
PAGE
335
335
338
342
345
349
350
& PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT
•355
XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
357
Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined In Text
399
Index of Personalities
437
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Introduction
The judgment of NOSENKO's bona fides entailed
the
distillation of the huge volume of counterintelligence
information assembled in connection with his case, including
the product of his lengthy interrogations, the analysis of
KGB
operations
which he related, the results of file checks
of thousands
of
individuals involved,
comparison of his
assertions against collateral information from all sources
and with counterintelligence
records on the KGB and related
matters-
The examination herein reduces
this volume
of
material to manageable proportions, to essential elements
of NOSENKO's claims, in order to permit comparison of his
statements with matters of known fact and to permit appli-
cation of reasonable judgment...Conclusions are drawn from
the examination of each major
period in his claimed
biography. The final conclusions represent the aggregate
of conclusions independently drawn from the examination of
each major period in his. claimed biography.
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CONTENTS
IV KGB ENTRY (ca. 1953)
Date of Entry
Role of General KOBULOV
Eligibility
Processing
for Entry
Initial Service
Other Aspects Relevant to KGB Service
Summary and Conclusion
PAGE
61
62
64
67
68
70
72
74
V AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(ca: 1953-June 1955)
Operations Against American Correspondents
KGB Files
NOSENKO's Agents
Operations Against U.S: Army Attache Personnel
Custody of Case Files
NOSENKO's Ägents
NOSENKO's Targets
MICKELSON OL
MEARNS. 06
RICHARDS 06
FELCHLIND6
[BENSON D6
STROUD D6:
MULE 06
BENSON, MULE and STROUD
06,06,06
Expulsion
CARDELLA D6
VAN LAETHEM D6
Additional Reporting
Summary and Conclusion
VI SEVENTE DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)
Introductory Comment
NOSENKO's Agents
Soviet Citizen Agents
Homosexual Agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV
Summary
75
:75
77
7.8
81
83
84
87
87
88
89
90
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CONTENTS
Introduction
Summary of Case
PAGE
1
3
11
11
20
21
21
22
I FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS
NOSENKO's Statements About Himself
Soviet Officials' Statements
The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing
Positive Intelligence Information
Counterintelligence Information
Significant KGB Operations Not
Directly Related to NOSENKO's
Claimed Service
in Paris"
(Sgt.
"SASHA" (Identity Unknown)
"The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty"
(William VASSALL)
The KGB Audio Attack on the West German
Embassy
"ANDREY" (Dayle W. 'SMITH)
Edward Ellis SMITHI
24
24
28
30
31
33
37
II EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
Notes for the Reader
41
41
III:: PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY
Birth to 1945
Moscow Institute of International Relations
(1945-ca.
1950)
Naval RU
Service (Ca. 1951-ca. 1953)
Summary: and Conclusion
45
45
48
49
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The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors
of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations
Disarmament Conference.
A Soviet official approached an
American diplomat
with the suggestion that they get together
for a talk the following day.
The diplomat advised CIA of
appointment, explaining
that he thought the approach so
unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection.
He said he believed the Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO,
a member of
the Soviet Disarmament Delegation.
Later meeting with the American diplomat, the
Soviet
official identified himself as NOSENKO and stated he was
a
KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the:
security of the Soviet delegation.
He knew that the American
had previously served, in Moscow and erroneously believed that
he was the
"American Rezident" in Geneva.
NOSENKO stated
that he needed
approximately 900. Swiss francs immediately to
cover. KGB
operational funds which he had squandered
liquor and a prostitute in Geneva..
He offered for this
amount
to sell two items of information to American: Intelligence.
These were the identity of a
former American
Embassy employee
in Moscow who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washington
area, and the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although.
ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually controlled by the KGB.
In reply, the American explained that he was
not an intelli
gence officer, but
that he
could place NOSENKO in contact
with an appropriate U.S. official in Geneva later that same
day.
That evening NOSENKO was met by
a CIA officer
and a three-
hour meeting followed
at a CIA safehouse in Geneva.
Describing
himself as a
KGB major experienced in operations against the
American Embassy in
Moscow and against tourists and other
travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA officer
of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell
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the two items
of information. He said that the need for money
was his
immediate
morive for
contaiting CIA, although in the
ensuing discussion he aiso expressed dissatisfa:cion with the
Communist regime in the Soviet Union.
NOSENKO met ClA representatives
fout more rimes
in Geneva
in June 1962.
With the second
meeting on il June, his earlier
expressed reservarions disappeared almost entirely. He
answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and
operations.
His knowledgeability was almost exciusively
limited to the KGB Second Chief Directorate (responsible for
counterintelligence and security
within the USSR):
NOSENKO
seemed
to be what he claimed
to be:
a KGB officer in a
sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.
NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised
to do everything within certain limits to coller information
on matters indicated to be of interest
tO CIA.
The only
restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute
refusal
to permit operarional contact with him inside the
USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be
communicated to the American Embassy in Moscow.
He promised
to notify CIA via an acconmodation address when he came to
the West again.
NOSENKO again accompanied the Soviet delegation to the
Disarmament Conference in Geneva in January 1964.
Since last
meeting with CIA he had been promoted to the rank of lieu-
tenant colonel and had become
the Deputy Chief of the largest
department in the Second Chief Directorate.
At the first
of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced
that he had decided to defect to the United States.
He
cited as reasons his continuing dissatisfaction with the
Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would have no
further opportunities to travel to the west in the foresee-
able future.
Although he implied that he wanted
to defect
as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva
while arrangements
for his
reception were being made in
Washington.
NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new
information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB opera-
tional activity which he had collected in the 18 months
since his last meeting with CIA:
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On 4 February,
four
days before the date tentatively
selected
for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that he had
received a cable from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate
return to Moscow to participate in a KGB conference on
foreign tourism to the Soviet Union.: That night exfiltration
plans were implemented and NOSENKO was driven across the
border to Germany where his debriefing was resumed
Frankfurt safehouse.
The decision was reached: on l1 February
to bring NOSENKO to
the United States, and in the early
evening of 12. February he and his CIA escorts arrived in
Washington via commercial aircraft, thence to a safehouse
in the Washington
At the request
of the Swiss' and Soviet Governments,
NOSENKO met on 14 February with representatives of their
respective Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
He told both
that
he had defected on his own free will after careful consider-
ation and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet
Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet represen
tatives, he orally renounced his status and rights as
citizen of the
..USSR.
CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on
18 February, and on 24 February he was introduced to:
representatives of the FBI for questioning.
At about the
same
time,
there was a marked change In NOSENKO's comport-
ment?
While outwardly cooperative during most debriefing
sessions, it became increasingly difficult to get him
respond to specific questioning: His free time in Washington
and
nearby cities was punctuated'by drinking bouts, crude
behavior, and disputes with his security escort. He explained
his behavior by saying that he was under great tension as
a result of his defection, abandonment of his wife and
children, and the disgrace that he had brought
name, and on this basis CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for
a vacation. On 12 March, NOSENKO left Washington with a
and two CIA security guards for a two-week
visit to Hawaii.: There his behavior deterioriated still
further. He drank heavily and almost constantly; he
consorted with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude
in public places; and he spent money extravagantly and
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During NOSENKO's absence from Washington, consultations
were held with the FBI regarding steps to be taken
to restric.
his movements and activities.
This Agency was concerned
that his behavior would attract undesirable atiention and
publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his
bona fides, which were becoming known to a widening group
in the U,S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to
NOSENKO himself.
The
FBI on 1 April indicated
ie would
"not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's
freedom of movement, and the Acting Attorney General, the
Department of State, and the White House were advised.
On 4 April NOSENKO was
driven to a new safehouse in a
Washingion suburb, and told that this safehouse thenceforward
would be his regular place of residence.
Since that time
NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been
under full-time guard, and has not been permitied
access to
news media.
Intensive interrogation of NOSENKO, including a polygraphic
examination, was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain
information
which he had been reluctant to divulge earlier,
and to clarify contradictions
polygraph
examination results were inconclusive.
phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.
Despite the searching nature of the questions and the
implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity,
NOSENKO asserted that he was willing to answer, or to try to
answer all questions put to him.
Because more information
pertinent to the question of his bora fides was needed, a
new series of interrogations was begun in mid-May 1964.
Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was
resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of
neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964.
After further consultations with the FBI, a round of
hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. Between
then and 5 March, NOSENKO was questioned
for a total of
about 140 hours by individual interrogators and interrogation
teams, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous
assertions.
He admitted that certain of his earlier statements
had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions
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in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had
been basically truthful, and
that he had come to the United
States solely
for the reasons he had originally given.
These interrogations were suspended on 5 March 1965:
Questioning of NOSENKO during the
summer and
autumn of
1964
and the interrogations of January and February 1965
concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the
American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB
Second Chief Directorate, from January. 1960 to January 1962c%
Among the reasons
for selecting this particular period were
the comparatively large amount of collateral information
available against which NOSENKO's
statements. could be checked;
the importance of the Embassy and its personnel as critical
KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from
the standpoint of American security; and the extent of
NOSENKO's
claimed knowledge of the
activities of the Embassy
Section, of which he claimed to have been Deputy Chief.
I n
keeping with a Soviet practice with which NOSENKO was
familiar, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series
of interrogation reports, so-called "
protocols"
• most of
which cöncerned
the period of his claimed service in the
American Department, These were written by the CIA interro
gators, and they were designed to set forth NOSENKO's exact
statements and meaning on various specific subjects. The
protocols
were
In no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary
portions of a:
"confession"
, but rather as distilled and final
statements of what he did and did not know concerning
particular
topics. NOSENKO was
asked to read each page.of
each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom
to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents;
he was allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted
to
ask any questions and make any changes that he wished.
(Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were
initialed by NOSENKO,)
NOSENKO was asked, after reading
each page
and after completing the entire protocol, whether
he understood what was written there and whether there were
any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to
"..y
sign and
date the statement,
"I have read and undersiood
this report and certify it as correct"
at the end of the
final page.
With one exception, he did so calmly and without
objections.
In one or two
instances he remarked chat his
statements
were presented in such
a manner as to make
them
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look foolish, but he was not able to suggest any changes of
fait or presentation which would make them more accurate:
Commenting on the
use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said
on 4. March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct.
Anything I have signed is absolutely correct.
I absolutely
understand what I am doing when
I am signing any paper.
This is an official document, and I fully understand
I'm doing when I sign it as being absolutely correct."
Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until
14 August 1965 with the participation of Petr DERYABIN, a
former KGB officer. These interrogations, held in Russian,
were for the purpose of using DERYABIN'S KGB experience to
obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's claimed personal
and professional background.
During
the period 19-25. October 1966, NOSENKO was
questioned for seven
days on specific aspects of selected
copics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and
boch Russian and English. Although the interrogations
identified topics and time periods in NOSENKO's accounts
which contained the greatest number of contradictions and
discrepancies, neither the contradictions nor the discrep-
ancies could
be resolved.
Because of the
incidence of deranged persons CIA has
encountered among would-be defectors, the question of
NOSENKO's mental stability was
a matter considered early
after his defection in Geneva.
From his arrival in the
United States in 1964 NOSENKO has been under psychiatric
observation. A CIA psychiatrist and a CIA psychologist,
both with extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors,
monitored many of NOSENKO's interrogations. In May 1965
questioned NOSENKO on his
life from birth until 1953, when NOSENKO claimed he joined
accounts.
The psychiatrist has continued his periodic
observations of NOSENKO to the present time. The psychiatrist
and
the psychologist concluded independently, on the basis
of their observations, that NOSENKO was mentally stable.
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NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966.
The period since has been devoted to the examination and
review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts
and other materials, and in the preparation of the present
paper:
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CHAPTER I
FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS
Evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides is
comprised of his own
statements, the corroborating statements of Soviet officials,
and the counterintelligence information he has provided.
NOSENKO's Statements About Himself
In his meetings in 1962 and 1964 with CIA abroad
and in
the course of the interrogations since, NOSENKO has made
numerous
statements about himself. More than any other,
however, a statement written in July 1964 (after the initial
hostile interrogation was concluded) is a thoughtful and
well-expressed
exposition of how he wished CIA to regard
him. It is quoted here in its entirety.
My life, my childhood and youth passed in very
comfortable circumstances since the position of
my father gave us the opportunity to live without
lacking for anything. And the only difficult
periods of my life before the death of my father
were at the naval schools attended in Kuybyshev,
Baku and Leningrad, and at the beginning of my
working life, when I was in the Far East in 1950-
1952.
The opportunity. to be always well-dressed,.
to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my
own car, to be able to use the car given me by my
family and also my father's car, the opportunity
to travel to the South and
to vacation in the best
sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all
this
unquestionably Teft its mark on me and became
something of a habit. After the death of my father,
my successful progress in my work gave me a higher
salary, and although I did not have all that which
I had
while my father was alive, still I did not
experience any serious difficulties. But already
I
wanted to live still better.
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Úp to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at
school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the
family--it was always pounded into my head that
Stalin was a great genius, that he was good, keen,
etco s
and the thought never occurred:to me to
question his
words or his deeds because everything
that he said, and everything he did, were completely
axiomatic. The arrests. and trials
only involved
traitors
and it was considered and explained that
the betrayor of the people was Yecher, the head of
the NKVD. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the
name of Stalin.
Soon after Stalin's death in 1953
I read a certain document given me by my father.:
This was 'a secret letter of the Central Committee
of the CPSU on the 'case of the doctors;' it was
not addressed to.all communists but only to members
and candidate
members of the Central Committee.
I was deeply shaken by this letter which described
in detail how these people, important specialists
in the field of medicine, were brought to such a
condition that they
condemned themselves; that is,
they confessed to things which had never happened,
to things which they' had never. done.
They were
simply forced to
give the evidence which was needed
by the investigators.
The secret letters on the
cult of Stalin and
much that: I heard in the KGB
about the reign of Stalin, all this left its mark
and forced me to think deeply about the real truth
and to: look at everything more critically.
I no
longer had faith in all those ideas which for years
had been pressed into my head.
The new leaders (Khrushchev
and Company) used the
same methods but already diluted with the
water' of
democracy; with playing up to the people and attempts
to convince them that a new
era would arise, a new
and better life; and that now the Party was always
going to concern itself with the welfare of the
people...In
fact, it was a struggle for power and
the use of all means in this struggle,
even micro-
phones. (they listened to the conversations of
Beriya and his friends; later they listened to the
conversations of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and
others).:: Khrushchev's endless blabbing about
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successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the
figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in
the production of butter and milk, when in the
stores they were available only infrequently.
endless promises of a better life when in fact
The
nothing of the sort is taking place.
similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the
events which were taking place in the country, but
already the entire ideology of the Party, its
external and internal course.
The events in Novocherkassk where 20,000 to
25,000 people rose up and the way in which this
popular indignation was suppressed by troops with
many casualties.
This also made a deep impression
When I was resting in the summer of 1961
in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's
brothers--I understood well the real relation of
the workers both to the leadership and to the .
Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the
workers really lived, how they eat, what they have
and
what they can buy with their wages.
I heard a great deal from my father about the
domestic policies of Khrushchev in regard to the
development and the course of construction in
industry, about his complete illiteracy in
engineering technology and industrial economics,
about incorrect decisions in regard to many
industries, and this was not only the opinion of
my father, but also of other important leaders in
various fields of industry. But no one dared to
open his mouth and when in
tried, as an engineer,
to prove that a certain
decision would be incorrect, he received such a
rebuff from Khrushchev that
he was profoundly
shaken
and in
the opinion of my mother
this brought
him to his illness and
death in August 1956.
The events in Germany and
especially in Hungary
showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of
communist ideology.
What was especially important
for me was the fact that in these countries it was
protest not of individuals or groups, but of the
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entire people who could no longer endure a regime
imposed
on them by force.: Here it is
necessary. to
emphasize that the life of the people in these
countries was much better than that of the people
in the USSR. (I saw for myself how people live in
Czechoslovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt
they live better than the entire people of the
Soviet Union):
The split of the international Communist move-
ment became for me a clear fact and confirmed my
opinion that the theory of Communism is a theory
built on sand and that it is practiced according to
the needs of the leadership. of the Party at a given
stage of life and that in reality: full material.
welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but
only by the leadership and the Party and the
government.
Working in the KGB I came to understand much and
became conscious of the contradiction between the
internal and external course of the USSR.: Such
questions-as disarmament, the ban of atomic weapons
the: position.of the USSR in the United Nations--all
these are used only in the interest of propaganda
and
aS
a screen for carrying out of the policies
needed by the communist party... (I was myself
Present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the
politics of the
Soviet delegation.)
My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true
reality.'
With my own eyes, I saw how people live,
how much they earn, how they can dress and live on
their
wages, and I paid special attention.,to the
life
of ordinary people and not to that of scientists,
engineers,
etc.: And all the propaganda about the
enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of
the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the
'unbelievably difficult life! was immediately
dispelled.'. And what I met in my own work, how
which
. Soviet citizens get sent where abroad--this
finally debunked this propaganda.
Many of my KGB
acquaintances think back with great pleasure about
life abroad.
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I entered the Komsomol completely without thinking
about it.
The time came, the right age, and
I
became a Komsomol member like all the others. It
was different in regards to the Party: I joined
the Party in- 1956 after the death of Stalin and
while I was working in the KGB and already at that
time there was
a lack of faith and indecisiveness
in me.
My father continually insisted on this,
saying that without the Party I would never move
ahead and would not have success in life. But I
myself understood and saw that I would not be able
to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the
Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would
truly never move ahead in my career unless I entered
the Party.
But from the very beginning of my entry
into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism
and dogmatism.
All the Party meetings were literally
a torture.
Especially when I became the Deputy
Chief and then Chief of a section, and then Deputy
Chief of a department, because then I had to speak
at these meetings.
Because this meant to lie, to
twist my
soul, and to attempt to show myself as
deeply dediçated to the Party and its course:
In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became
worse.
The question of a change of climate was
raised. At that time the Second Chief Directorate
needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to
three years to conduct counterintelligence work
among the Soviet specialists there.
It cost me a
great deal of effort to personally talk Second Chief
Directorate Chief General GRIBANOV into letting me
go.
The Party and work references had been confirmed,
all the questionnaires were already filled out, the
photos had been submitted; that is, all the formal-
ities had been accomplished. But at the very last
moment the Central Personnel Office of the KGB began
to protest against my going with my family to
Ethiopia.
The reason for this was
that from the
house check made at my place of residence they
received information that I
sometimes
came home
in
a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels
with my wife.
A tour abroad with my family was
necessary because of the health of my daughter
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(since 1963 the illness has become better)
and also
it would have been advantageous from the financial
point of view.
From this time on I understood that
Personnel would
not let
me go abroad with my family:
Knowing many officers in the First (Foreign
Intelligence): Chief Directorate,'I began to under-
stand that being sent abroad is entirely
determined,
not by knowledge, experience in work and success,
but only by the absolute 'cleanliness" of the
person's autobiography and complete assurance as to
his limitless dedication to the Party and the
government,
But not only being sent abroad but the
assignment of personnel in the First and Second
Chief Directorates,and the
entire KGB depends on
the reasons indicated by me and
also on good relations
with the leadership and good connections with workers
in. Central Personnel:
I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life
was not a hell.. It is true that there were quarrels
and basically they boiled down to the fact that she
took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my
delays at work and also when I would be delayed with
some of my friends and acquaintances after work and
would come home with a few drinks under my belt. of
course, I
löved and love my children and only the
tact
that
they are taken care of financially until
they grow up and have received an education to some
extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave
the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of
financial security? After the death of my father,
the family received a
a large monetary allowance, Plus
the money that my mother had saved and valuable
property,. etc. My mother many
times offered to
divide all this in three parts; for me, my brother,
and for her, but I
suggested that we not do this
before her death. And, of course, my mother will
not leave my children without attention,
and my
share of
the property and the money will be given to
my children.
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If the defections of [former KGB officers] PETROV,
RASTVOROV
and DERYABIN passed without evoking any
particular thoughts, the defection to the United
States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an
intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly
caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus,
it is necessary to have not only boldness and
decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And
already I put to
myself the question, will I be able
to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and
disillusionments
which had accumulated inside of me?
Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my
departure I myself of my own desire entered into
contact with you.
The reason for this was the loss
of money received by me for operational expenses.
I would have been unable to accumulate such a
SunD
of
money before my departure and there was nobody
to borrow from.
To tell the truth about the loss
of the money would have meant that it would be
necessary to explain where and in what circumstances
It had been lost. This would have risked expulsion
from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party.
Not to tell the truth,
to think up some sort of
story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they
might think that I had appropriated the money, that
is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst
of
all and I
would, of course, in such event have
told the truth.
To tell the truth, it was only after my return
home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not
immediately, began full to realize all the seriousness
of my contact with you and its full meaning. And
although I did not give you any promises or assurances
about our continued contact in the future, I under-
stood that you sooner or later would set yourself
the task of continuing our contact.
And here it was
that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I
have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself
•the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity
and that I started to work towards being sent on
trip abroad.
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Of course, I wanted to come abroad with söme sort'
of "baggage'
, that
is, with materials which could
be useful and
necessary for you.
In this entire
period up to. January 1964 I tried to collect: infor
mation which would be of the maximum value for you.
My assignment to the position of Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department: in July 1962 gave me a greater
opportunity than
before.
But at the same time this
assignment
almost
excluded the possibility of a trip
abroad and it was only with great difficulty that I
was able to get away for the trip in January 1964.
It was necessary to convince my superior CHELNOKOV
and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince others., In
chis I advanced many reasons:
that I had not spent
all the money (in foreign currency); that the
medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven
very successiul and that I needed to buy
some more
medicine to carry out one more series of treatments;
that this trip would not be a long one and
that
Since
I was already the Deputy Chief of the Department I:
would not be able to. travel abroad any more and
SOg
therefore; this trip would probably be my last.
Of
course, all this was said
at convenient moments and
outside of work.
Things were easier with the
Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad)
because I was on good terms with the KGB officer:
who covered Switzerland,: besides which when I came
back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number
of presents:
The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of
the VASSALL case put me on my guard since
In the
newspaper Times it said outright that the English
learned about him thanks to the Americans who
learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962.
Fortunately, the leadership of the First Chief
Directorate,
as I learned from my colleagues, came
tó the conclusion that here the Americans had been
helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the :
First Chief Directorate was not completely sure of
this.
But the publication in the American press of
Alsop's articles on the CIA
alarmed me extremely.
This article in one spot said plainly that as far
asis known the KGB does not have any sources in the
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CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the
KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact,
I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow
learn of my
contact with you. This article deeply
'Interested' the KGB.
During the closed
trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a
pass from the Second
Department and went, in order
For sometimes it is enough
to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself
and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort
of an initial opinion of him.
Personally, I liked
how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial;
I liked
his appearance and I understood that everything
which had been
said in the KGB about him and the
sort of person
they were trying to make him out to
be (that he was
morally degraded, that he had
descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this
was
nonsense, bluff, and chatter.
And PENKOVSKIY, the
same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater
confidence in the correctness of the decision taken
by me to leave the Soviet Union.
26 July 1964
Signed: Yu. NOSENKO •
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Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO
The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet
officials!
statements about: him since his defection coln-
cides markedly wich NOSENKO's
self-description. According
to the comments of Soviet officlals, principally intelli-
gence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively,
defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased
Minister, he
served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings
were overcome
through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV,
and
In connection with operations against Americans he
occupied positions of progressively greater trust änd
responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the
largest department in the key
Second (Counterintelligence)
Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection
wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB
because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American
targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and
disgrace of numerous
senior KGB personnel, the recall of
many others
"from
abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB
operations in the United States,
and extraordinary plans to
assassinate him.
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The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing
Positive Intelligence Information
At his first meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO asserted
that he was acquainted
with Ministers of the Soviet Govern-
ment, who were friends of his father, and he heard what
was said in their circles.
His debriefing and interroga-
tions did not bear out his
assertion that he was informed
of the attitudes and
aims of the Soviet leaders. His
responses to questions about the viability of the then
Soviet Government, for example, were couched in vague and
general terms and
did not reflect any specific knowledge.
From his debriefing it emerged that NOSENKO had spent his
entire adult life either
as a student or as a state
security
official, and he stressed
that since the early 1950's he
had had few interests
and "no real contacts"
outside of the
KGB itself.
Questioned on a wide range of topics, including
various aspects of nuclear weaponry, missiles, electronics,
communications; unconventional weapons, military industry,
military units and equipment, and research and development,
NOSENKO repeatedly said that
he had no knowledge of such
matters and
that his responses reflected only personal
opinions.
Because of his two assignments to Geneva with
the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, questions
were put to NOSENKO about Soviet underground
testing, Soviet
efforts in the fields of chemical and biological warfare,
Soviet disarmament aims and Soviet views of the corresponding
attitudes and intentions of the United States. Because
his assignments to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation were
for cover purposes only, NOSENKO disclaimed any special
knowledge.
He explained that he took no part in the
substantive work of the Delegation nor did he have any
connection in the USSR with officials or organizations
concerned with arms control or disarmament policies.
NOSENKO's
failure to provide any
useful positive
intelligence information was not unique, although previous
KGB defectors did not have NOSENKO's claimed access, either
on the basis of his family ties or on the basis of his KGB
counterintelligence position within the Soviet Union. KGB
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officers who defected earlier to Western services provided
no significant military, economic or scientific information
on the USSR, and the political information provided by a
few (usually relating to the personalities and relationships
In the ruling group of the Communist Party) was of marginal
value.
Counterintelligence Information
NOSENKO's knowledge of KGB foreign intelligence operations
was limited, for his whole career had been spent in the
Second Chief (Counterintelligence) Directorate concerned
with KGB operations within the Soviet Union.: His information
on Second Chief Directorate operations, however, was
apparently a counterintelligence windfall, because most of
his KGB assignments involved operations against American:
targets, either visitors to the Soviet Union or members of
che Embassy
staff in Moscow. From this circumstance he
represents himselfas an authoritative source on KGB success
and failure in recruiting Americans in the USSR during the
years 1953-1963
NOSENKO has described scores of KGB operations
mounted
against American Embassy personnel during that ten year
period.
Because of lasting relationships he established
with KGB colleagues, NOSENKO kept abreast of KGB operations
against the Embassy, even while serving elsewhere than in
the Embassy Section. NOSENKO has
stated that he would
know if the
facts were otherwise,
and he has asserted
unequivocally: that no American
stationed
permanently at
the Embassy was recruited between the early 1950's and his
defection in 1964. NOSENKO named six members
staff who rejected RGB
of the Embassy
recruitment overtures, and all have
confirmed his assertions. He provided information on the
vulnerability of a significant
number of Embassy personnel;
in particular, two Foreign Service Officers were consequently
withdrawn
Physical search has confirmed the
Informali from Monaded regarding the KGB audio survetilance:
installations in the Embassy.
Among Americans other than Embassy personnel whom NOSENKO
described as KGB targets, he provided information leading
to the identification of 51 KGB agents, including seven
correspondents in Moscow, the Moscow representative of the
Express Company, the former code clerk "ANDREY"
(Dayle SMITH, see p. 33), and Sgt:. Robert Lee JOHNSON,
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Mrs. JOHNSON, and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH. Twenty-five of
this number acknowledged KGB recruitment before or after
NOSENKO's information was received.
In fifteen other
instances NOSENKO's information has been corroborated
part by the individuals' admissions of contact with (1f
not recruitment by) the KGB, or by other sources' reports
of their recruitment.
Besides these 51, NOSENKO provided
leads to four other American KGB agents, including
an
officer in an American military intelligence organization,
none of whom has: yet been identified.
Lastly, NOSENKO
identified 22 Americans whom the KGB knew or suspected to
FrOm NOSENKO's information 68 non-American KGB agents
have been identified.
Although investigations are still
incomplete, in 39 of
these cases the individual's KGB
recruitment has been reported by other sources, or the
individuals were suspect for other reasons... Among these
68 individuals were al
l'and a Canadian Ambassador to
MOSCOW, an Austrian and an
Director and a Deputy Secretary of thel
Foreignil
Ministry, and
a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL,
see below). In addition, NOSENKO provided leads on 22 other
KEs foreign agents, yet to be identified. NOSENKO's infor
mation about the KGB
electronic attack on thel
_Embassyll
in Moscow was confirmed by subsequent technical and physical
search.
With respect to
the KGB Itself, NOSENKO named (if not
completely identified) approximately 1,000 Soviet citizens
who are or have been affiliated with. Soviet intelligence
and security organizations. These included over seven
hundred active KGB staff officers, of whom 435 were serving
In the Second Chief Directorate:
of the 165 KGB officers
he named
as belonging to the
First Chief (Foreign Intell1-
gence) Directorate, over
one hundred had been previously
reported to be KGB
personnel, as reflected in CIA files.
NOSENKO's Information
permitted updating CIA holdings on
previously received reports of the 1959 KGB
reorganization,
particularly as it affected the Second Chief Directorate,
He described further refinement of responsibilities, the
Second Chief Directorate's absorption of previously
pendent directorates, the creation of new units from elements
crates on new sate at alonento
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formerly belonging to other numbered directorates, and
individual officers prominent in each. NOSENKO was not as
productive with respect to KGB operational methods and
Headquarters procedures, although he furnished numerous
examples, particularly regarding operations mounted against
Embassy personnel, which provided useful insight on these
topics.
Significant KGB Operations Not Directly Related to
NOSENKO's Claimed Service
All of the KGB operations which NOSENKO has described
are favorable evidence of his bona fides, but they break
down into two qualitatively different groups. Operations
which NOSENKO related to specific KGB positions he held at
particular times are described 'in the following section in
connection with an examination of his KGB career..
The
remaining operations are those which NOSENKO said he learned
of informally, or by accident, or even despite (not because
of): the KGB position he held at the time.
Since these are
not material to his claimed positions at various times in
the KGB, they are summarized in Annex B.
(NOSENKO's leads
to most non-American KGB agents belong in this latter group,
but for reasons.of brevity they are omitted from this paper.)
Among the items of information which NOSENKO provided
but which do not relate to specific KGB positions he held
at particular times,
there are several: which merit special
note here.
These, which
are among the most significant of
his revelations, are the leads to Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON,
"the KGB agent
in the British Admiralty" (William VASSALL) ,
"SASHA" (the KGB agent in American Military Intelligence),
"ANDREY" (Embassy military code clerk Dayle W. SMITH),
Edward
SMITH (CIA officer) and the KGB electronic attack
on the
Embassy in Moscow.
"The KGB Agent in
Paris" (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON)
The first item of information given by NOSENKO
upon meeting CIA in Geneva in 1964 was a lead to a KGB
agent who was an American serviceman stationed at a sensitive
U.S. military installation in the Paris area: The agent had
been the source of documentary intelligence which had been
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shown to Premier Khrushchev personally. Although still
active, the agent had lost access to classified documents.
some months earlier, in 1963. NOSENKO characterized the
lead as the most important
that he acquired during the year and a half he was a CIA
collaborator at KGB Headquarters in Moscow.
NOSENKO's Information
Shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962,
NOSENKO first learned of a KGB agent's successful penetra-
tion of a classified documents
vault at an
"important
American military installation" in the Paris area. Because
the documents included information on strategic targets in
as well as in the Soviet Union,
he assumed that it
a "strategic planning installation".
The installation
had its own airfield
there were "procedures for
bringing Top
documents in and for taking them out".
There had been six successful entries of the vault, four
in 1962 and two in 1963.
On each occasion Special Section
technicíans travelled IDY to Paris under diplomatic courier
to assist the local KGB case officer in the technical
details of the operation.
Their function was to advise the
case officer concerning the entry to the vault and later
surreptitiously to unwrap and re-seal the documents.
case officer, on this basis, would give appropriate instruc-
tions to his
agent, and the technicians probably
never met
"the American.
Although this was a First Chief Directorate operation,
officers of the Special Section of the Second Chief
Directorate were used. . The. Special Section was comprised
of technicians transferred from the KGB Operational-
Technical Directorate, and usually it handled surreptitious
entries
to Western embassies in Moscow.
Among these officers
were S.A. IONOV, L.A. LEBEDEV, S.D. ILYIN, V.V. SINITSYN,
V.Z. KARETNIKOV, M.I. PREOBRAZHENSKIY and Fedor FOFANOV.
IONOV, LEBEDEV and ILYIN took part in this operation, and
FOFANOV was later involved.
The specialists were not the ones that carried out the
It was carried out by the
case officers of the
Paris Legal Residency. The specialists just opened and then
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resealed the packages... LEBEDEV said that they also placed
some radioactive substance, with the help of the American
agent, in the lock of the vault door; when the substance was
removed, they could pick the lock.
They did the same thing
lused some radioactive substance] to the
safe in the vault.
Before everything was finally ready,. the Special Section
technicians had to visit Paris several times.
The first
time
was the beginning of 1962.
The Paris Residency couldn't
have launched the operation before 1962, because they
couldn't do it without the help of Special Section techni-
cians and the latter did not travel to Paris in 1960 or 1961.
Entry into the vault area was first achieved after the
agent used some radioactive substance to determine the
combination. The agent also photographed the lock for KGB
study.
Subsequent:
entries were always made between two and
five
o'clock in the morning.. The agent removed documents
from
the vault and delivered them to his KGB case officer,
who in turn passed them to Special Section technicians.
The envelopes were then opened, photographs were made,
the
documents were repackaged, and the envelopes were given.
back to the case officer for return
to
the vault.
There
after, the Paris. Legal Residency pouched the films to Moscow,
and the technicians themselves left Paris until the next:
opportunity for entry.
The KGB officers were able to complete the whole operation
during the agent's night duty. During this time, they had
to pick up the
materials, drive some
place ("maybe the
Soviet Embassy") open the documents, photograph them, close
them again just
as they were, and return them to
the agent.
The KGB
could not specify which documents the agent was
to
bring out; the fact that all the documents had to be opened
shows that they were sealed when they were received from
the agent:
Since he heard that almost all of the material obtained
was of interest to the Ministry of Defense, NOSENKO concluded
that it came from a military installation. The agent couldn't
bring out a great deal of material, only what he could hide
on his person.:' From what the KGB technicians
said, NOSENKO
thought the agent was not alone on duty. The technicians
said that "the agent explained lto
co-workers] that he is
going out for coffee or a sandwich", and that "he is gone
for only 5 or 10 minutes"
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The last time the vault was entered
was in the fall of
1963.
At about that time the agent, a military man,
received a promotion and was relieved of his night watch
duties. (The agent was scheduled for rotation to the
United
States but, with his promotion, he had obtained
an
extension until May 1964.) Although the agent was still
active in January 1964 and was still
assigned to the same
military post,
he had lost access to the classified
documents. The information obtained from the agent's vault
was highly sensitive and so valuable to the KGB that the
Paris Legal Rezident as well as several case officers there
had been rewarded
for their part in the operation.
Before leaving Moscow
for Geneva in January 1964,
NOSENKO had
been told that the technician FOFANOV had been
sent to Paris in the KGB hope that the agent would be able
to re-enter the vault again before his transfer to the
United States in May.
When NOSENKO visited the Soviet
Embassy in Paris on 19 January 1964 while en route to
Geneva, FOFANOV was on duty at the entrance and NOSENKO
chatted
with him.
FOFANOV said he "was not doing good"
and he
"would
probably be sitting there until May", but
he
had hopes "that something might happen":
The American agent was getting paid by the KGB and he
was recruited with the promise of a substantial sum of
money.
NOSENKO didn't know if he was recruited in Paris
or if it was even a formal recruitment, nor what plans the
KGB had for him
after he left Paris.
NOSENKO learned of the case "in little pieces"
.at
separate times from various members of the Second Chief
Directorate Special Section who participated in it,
principally LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV In Moscow, and FOFANOV
later in Paris.
[Under intensive questioning, NOSENKO has
also alleged he learned of the case
fIom IONOV, the Chief
of the Special Section.] NOSENKO explained that he knew
LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV
from their visit to his office to
discuss technical installations at new tourist hotels, when
NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
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Comment:
NOSENKO's lead was
identified as Army Sergeant
Robert Lee JOHNSON, who served in the period
1962-1963 at a military courier station at Orly
Field, Paris.
JOHNSON confessed to KGB
recruitment of himself and his wife, his
recruitment of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH, and
the latter's subsequent collaboration with the
KGB .
Mrs: JOHNSON
and MINTKENBAUGH have
corroborated JOHNSON's statements.
NOSENKO is apparently unaware of JOHNSON's
earlier (since 1952) involvement with the KGB
in Berlin,
the United States, and in Orleans,
France.
With respect to the
1962-1963
surreptitious entires of the
courier station
vault, however, JOHNSON!s admissions coincide
with the information provided by NOSENKO, with
no significant differences.
"SASHA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)
When NOSENKO announced in Geneva in 1964 that he
was going to defect, he was told that as a consequence
additional persons in CIA would be informed of his case
and he was asked to search his recollection for any
evidence of a KGB penetration of CIA.
NOSENKO. knew.of
none in CIA, but he recalled a KGB agent;
an American
known as "SASHA"
, who was a member of a U.S, military
Intelligence organization.
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO learned of
"SASHA" from M.A. SHALYAPIN, the KGB
officer who, while assigned to the Flist Chief Directorate
and working in Berlin; recruited the agent in 1955-1957.
"SASHA"
who had been recruited by financial inducements,
had officer status; he wore civilian clothes to his meetings
with his KGB handler and he could have been either a
civilian or military intelligence officer.
"SASHA"
returned
to the United States
"in' the 1960's" or "in 1962".
"SASHA"'
was stationed in
the United States at the time of the Cuban
missile crisis but had been unable to provide the KGB any
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relevant intelligence of any significance. NOSENKO thought
that "SASHA"
served as a department chief in intelligence
when he was re-assigned to Germany in November 1962 - early
NOSENKO met SHALYAPIN for the first time in September or
October 1962 lafter NOSENKO's first visit to Geneva and
Initial contact with CIA] through his friend, Yu. I. GUk.
GUK had known SHALYAPIN
when they had served
together in
the First Chief Directorate in Moscow. SHALYAPIN had
served in the United States, Uruguay, Berlin, and Cuba. In
to the Latin American Department
of the First Chief Directorate, as a case officer.
He
retired from the KGB and through NOSENKO's intervention with
Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV,
SHALYAPIN obtained a position with Inturist. Presumably
out of gratitude to NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN felt free to talk,
and over drinks he expressed his bitterness at his treat-
ment by the First Chief Directorate which, without him,
would
not have had the
agent
"SASHA"
in Germany
"at that
time"
• [1963]: NOSENKO heard
such details as he knew. of
"SASHA" in the course of several such talks with SHALYAPIN.
Under intensive questioning on the "SASHA" case NOSENKO
retracted his statement that he had first heard of the case
SHALYAPIN, though maintaining that he was sure he had
"at some time".
Pressed
to identify his first source, NOSENKO then cited
officers--some First Chief Directorate, some Second-who
could have told him about it because they were likely to
know of it though none of them was actually involved in the
operation.
Ultimately NOSENKO refused to commit himself
on this point,
saying
he did not remember from
whom
he
first
learned
"SASHA".
Comment:
"SASHA" has not been
identified.
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William VASSALL ("KGB Agent in the British Admiralty")
Asked in the June 1962 meetings with CIA if he
was
familiar with the case of George BLAKE, the former KGB
agent in MI-6, NOSENKO replied that he knew of another, more
important, KGB
agent who was employed in the British
Admiralty:
NOSENKO's Information
The KGB has now (in 1962) an
agent in a high government
position in London
who provides most valuable information,
some from NATO intelligence services' conferences.
The
agent was recruited in Moscow in 1956 or 1957 on the basis
of a homosexual compromise. In Moscow he was "a First
Secretary! or "chief of protocol" of the British Embassy.
After leaving Moscow he became an assistant to the Minister;
or "something like that" in the Admiralty.
"He may be an
assistant, chief of the secretariat, but he's close to the
Minister:
All papers for the Minister go through him
He's
not an intelligence officer.: He is
meeting with the KGB
nỢW.
Several KGB officers received
the Order of Lenin for
their part in the operation, including the London Rezident
RODIN: NOSENKO. learned
of the agent's existence, but not
of his identity, from his friend and colleague in the Second
Chief Directorate, VA. CHURANOV, who had made the recruit-
ment while chief of a section in the British Department.
Comment:
GOLITSYN had earlier provided a lead to a KGB
agent who was
the source of Admiralty documents
which
GOLITSYN had
reviewed in KGB Headquarters
On the basis of that lead, British security
authorities on 11 June 1962 passed to CIA a
list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL.
On 17 June CIA gave the British authorities
preliminary report on NOSENKO's information,
on the basis of which the twenty-man list was
reduced.to
VASSALL and one other suspect. Full
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Comment:
(Continued)
details of NOSENKO's information were passed to
British authorities on 20 August, and on 12
September 1962 VASSALL was arrested. He promptly
confessed.
VASSALL's confession confirmed what NOSENKO
had reported. He had been recruited in Moscow
in 1955, after a homosexual entrapment, by two
KGB officers, one of whom he identified as
CHURANOV. He continued to collaborate with
the KGB after returning to London,
first in
his job in the Admiralty Naval Intelligence
Division,
as clerical officer assistant to the
Civil Lord's private secretary, and finally,
as an employee in the secretariat of the Naval
staff.
In London he was met by KGB officer
"KOROVIN" who has been identified as London
Rezident RODIN. VASSALL's last meeting with
the KGB in London was on 17 August 1962.
At
the time of his arrest in September he had, in
preparation for his next meeting on 30 October,
fifteen rolls of film containing 140 photo-
graphs of classified Admiralty documents.
KGB Audio Attack on the
Embassy:
In 1962 and 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB microphones
concealed in several Western embassies in Moscow.
Aside
from the American Embassy (see p. 25), he furnished the
greatest detail
• on the microphones in the
Embassy.
11
NOSENKO's Information
The KGB was able to enter surreptitiously every embassy
in Moscow, with the exception of the American and British
Embassies.
It had been particularly successful with respect
to the
Embassy.
KGB microphones monitored the
Ambassador as
he dictated his reports or held
discussions
with diplomatic colleagues, including American
Ambassador Thompson.
The microphones
were operative during
the period 1959 through 1961, and the KGB monitored then-
Ambassador
dictation
of cables, dispatches and
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conversations
on the Soviet Union.
as well as passages. of a book he was writing
NOSENKO learned. of the KGB microphones either from
O.S. BUBNOV, Deputy. Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's
Third (Austria and Germany) Department, or Mikhail SKORIK,
Chief of that Third Department's First Section. In 1960-
1961 Tatyana GRISHNYAT brought from the Operational
Technical Directorate to NOSENKO in the American Embassy
Section daily monitoring reports from microphones in the
American Embassy®
volume of material addressed to the Third Department, fiom
which NOSENKO
concluded that the KGB was even more successful
in monitoring the
Embassy than it was the
American
Embassy.
Comment:
NOSENRO's information was substantially correct.
Independent of that information, however,l
lauthörities learned in 1963 that their
technical security officer in Moscow had been
recruited by the KGB.: They surmised that the
recruitment may have taken place as early as
1956.
In August 1964 the leader of
a technical
search
team: was
seriously disabled by mustard
gas poisoning, presumably at the hands of the
•KGB.
completed 1965 tear ally another search team
of the
Embassy, in the
course of which two separate
audio systems with 24 microphones were
found,
well as 27 microphones
in the residence of
the Ambassador. In addition, evidence was
found indicating that the Embassy had been the
target of a sophisticated electronic attack
against its cipher machines and its acoustíc
NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB microphones
were operative in 1959 and his
sourcing of his
information to the periodic visits of Iatyana
GRISHNYAT to the American Section, are contra-
dictory..: NOSENKO claims he was not in the"
American Section until 1960.
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"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)
When
contacting CIA in 1962 NOSENKO offered to sell
information about two KGB operaulphs, one of which he knew
only under the KGB cryptonym
", a KGB agent recruited
in Moscow in 1949 or 1950 who in 1962 was working in
Washington "near ciphers"
NOSENKO's Information-1962
"ANDREY" was a U.S. Army sergeant who was
spotted
for the
KGB by "QUEBEC" (Roy RHODES) .
RHODES served in Moscow
from April 1951 to July 1953. He dated his own recruitment
by the KGB as January 1952.] RHODES was still in Moscow..
when
"ANDREY" was
recruited by the Second Chief Directorate,
although RHODES was
not aware of "ANDREY's" recruitment.
The KGB approach to
"ANDREY" was based on "women and money".
"ANDREY"
worked satisfactorily in Moscow for the KGB,
providing "materials"
and information on ciphers.
promised that he would cooperate with the KGB in future
assignments abroad, but would not work with them in the
United States as he did
not want to "sit in the electric
chair". He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow.
The KGB wanted to pay him more but he refused; he said he
could not plausibly explain the possession. of too much
money. When the KGB offered him diamonds and other gems for
later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers
that possession could arouse the attention of the American
police.
In 1950. the agent left Moscow for the United
States®.
The KGB waited for him to reappear in some other
country, but he did
not.
Finally, in 1955, the KGB
sent
V.M. KOVSHUK, the then-Chief of the American Embassy Section
of the Second Chief Directorate, and a participant in
"ANDREY's" recruitment in Moscow, to the United States to
find the agent.
KOVSHUK travelled under the alias "KOMAROV",
under the cover of either Second or Third Secretary of the
Soviet Embassy in Washington.
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KOVSHUK, with the help of the KGB Legal Residency in
Washington, learned where the agent was living,
identified
his automobile, and contacted him
at the end. of 1955 or
the beginning of 1956.
KOVSHUK had looked for him a long
He found where
"ANDREY" parked his car, but "ANDREY"
lived in
a place where there were
was difficult to get close to him.
frightened and refused to work, but when at the third
contact he was offered $1,000;
the agent accepted the
from KOVSHUK because, due
to his gambling, he was again in
financial straits.: From that point on he worked well with
the KGB. He again provided good Information, information
considered important by
the KGB.
When KOVSHUK found him,
"ANDREY" was working in the Pentagon and he was still
working there in 1962.
In reference to his modus operandi for meetings
with
"ANDREY"
• KOVSHUK. knew he was under surveillance by the
FBI:: His meetings always took place in cars.
would lose his surveillance the day before the meeting and
travel outside of Washington where he would wait by the
highway;
"ANDREY" would drive by and stop, KOVSHUK would
sit with him in the car, receive "ANDREY'S" information,
and givet him the money. Then KOVSHUK would get out, and
the American would drive on.
The KGB officer who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich
[Reino HAYHANEN, who defected in Paris in May 1957]
provided the information leading to the arrest of Roy
RHODES. When RHODES was under investigation,.
"ANDREY"
was called as a witness because he had worked with RHODES
in Moscow.
"ANDREY" was the only
such witness called,
and he was called upon several times to tell how RHODES
had behaved In Moscow. "ANDREY" could be identified as
the only person who testified at the trial.
During this
investigation of RHODES,
"ANDREY" stopped meeting KGB
officers, because he was afraid he too would be exposed and
arrested.
"ANDREY"
may have feared that RHODES was involved
in his own recruitment, or he may merely have been panicky
because he knew
he could be accused of the same thing as
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RHODES. Little by little, however, "ANDREY" resumed
his
meetings with
the KGB, "having little other choice"
KOVSHUK turned "ANDREY" over to a member of the Washington
Legal Residency and returned to Moscow. NOSENKO did not
know who succeeded KOVSHUK as the handler, but KOVSHUK's
successor eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV,
who concluded his tour in Washington in 1961• NOSENKO did
not know BAGRICHEV's successor, but asserted that there
must have been one since. "ANDREY" was still working with
the KGB in 1962.
NOSENKO's Information-1964
While continuing to associate "ANDREY's" recruitment
with RHODES' presence in Moscow, NOSENKO in different
discussions of
the case asserted that "ANDREY" was
recruited
1n
"1948-1949", "in
1952 or earlier", or "in 1953".
"ANDREY" had been recruited by KOVSHUK and N.M. BORODIN.
After returning to the United States, "ANDREY" worked at
the Pentagon,
"in codes", but by the time KOVSHUK recontacted
him in the United States he was nearing
the end of his
enlistment, and he was working in an Army recruiting office.
He was still working in the recruiting office when BAGRICHEV
took over the case from KOVSHUK.
was not RHODES' trial at which "ANDREY" appeared, but
he was among persons called during the pre-trial investigation.
"ANDREY" was called just once, and he was scared to death.
"ANDREY" did not testify at the
RHODES trial.
In Moscow, "ANDREY" had
explained to the KGB how the code
machines in the Embassy worked and may have given the KGB
parts of code machines
as "discs
Isic,
meaning
rotors].
Aleksandr SELEZNEV, a deputy
department chief in the
Communications Directorate of the KGB, had been involved in
the "ANDREY" case:
NOSENKO first saw
him in 1953 during the
period that "ANDREY" was working for the KGB In Moscow.
SELEZNEV came to meetings in the American Department to
discuss and plan KGB meetings with "ANDREY".
The
reason for
SELEZNEV's presence was that the case officers were not
technical specialists, and SELEZNEV would supply them with
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questions to be asked of "ANDREy"
• Since SELEZNEV came to
these
meetings in civilian clothes, whereas NOSENKO later
saw him in uniform
in his visits to the American Department,
NOSENKO speculated that SELEZNEV may have attended
some of
the meetings with "ANDREY". Although NOSENKO did not know
how the KGB exploited him, he repeatedly emphasized "ANDREY's"
great importance to the KGB during the time he worked for
them in Moscow.:
"Thanks to his help. they were able to read
your: State Department codes... To date we have never been
able to read your military codes...
"ANDREY" brought no
military code material to the KGB, only State Department
material. Mainly, he described the operation of code machines
and
what daily or other periodic
settings were made.
"ANDREY" supplied valuable material from the time that
the first recontact was made in the United' States until he
ceased meeting the KGB because of the RHODES trial.
Again,
after the trial, he was able to furnish good material.
This
was true both while KOVSHUK was handling him and while
BAGRICHEV was the case officer.
Between June 1962 and
January 1964, while NOSENKO was in Moscow, he heard that
"something is going wrong with this operation".
Comment:
"ANDREY"
was identified as former U.S. Army
Sergeant Dayle W. SMITH, who served as a code
machine mechanic while, assigned to the office
of the U.S. Military Attache in the
Embassy in
Moscow from April 1952 to. April 1954.
NOSENKO's information has been confirmed as
substantially. correct by admissions of Roy
RHODES and Dayle W. SMITH
informed
("ANDREY"): RHODES
the FBI In a 1963 interview that
among other American enlisted personnel.of
the
Embassy in Moscow, he reported on SMITH to
the KGB. After denying involvement with the
KGB in interviews with the FBI in 1964 and
1965, SMITH admitted that he had been approached
by the KGB in Moscow
in late 1953, that he had
been
offered a large
sum of cash and gems in
exchange: for classified information concerning
Embassy.
cipher systems, and that he had provided
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Comment:
(Continued)
the KGB with
mock code machine rotor. He
further acknowledged that he had been
recon
tacted by the KGB in the United States in
1957, where he met KGB officers regularly
until September 1962. He identified by photo-
graph all of the KGB officers
described by
NOSENKO as having taken part in the operation.
NOSENKO "cannot
be certain"
that he did not
know about "ANDREY" while he served in the
Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and when pressed
to describe specifically the source of his
information, he invariably indicated that he
learned of
the American agent later, informally
from KGB colleagues.
Edward Ellis SMITH
NOSENKO's Information
In the context of a 1962 discussion of KGB operations
against the American Embassy
in Moscow, NOSENKO was asked
whether he knew "about SMITH". He answered:
"SMITH?. The
red-head. Listen, he headed the FBI, he was a colonel and
headed counterintelligence." NOSENKO went on to describe
the mounting of a blackmail operation, of which he was
the case officer, against SMITH (whose KGB cryptonym was
"RYZHIY"
"REDHEAD").
SMITH had been sleeping,with his Russian housemaid, who
was
an agent planted on him by the KGB. When the KGB was
unable to obtain actual incriminating photographs,
she was
instructed to take photographs of herself on SMITH's bed.
These were then combined with photographs of SMITH to
produce photomontages, copies of which were delivered to
SMITH together with a letter inviting him to a meeting with
the KGB.
SMITH came.
The KGB was represented at. the
meeting by GRIBANOV, NOSENKO and one other officer. At
this initial meeting SMITH was not interrogated nor asked
for classified information. SMITH agreed to come to further
meetings.
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When SMITH did not come to the next scheduled meeting
with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO sought out the
maid
to find
out what
had happened.
She reported
that SMITH was in a state of
desperate indecision; he had paced his room all night as
if his mood was alternating between despair and defiance.
To increase the pressure on him, the KGB sent him threatening
the succeeding three days.
Finally, on
the third day, instead of meeting the KGB,
SMITH went
to
Ambassador BOHLEN and reported the blackmail attempt.
SMITH
was immediately withdrawn from Moscow and (as of 1962) he
was
"still in intelligence work".
In 1964 and afterwards NOSENKO denied that he had played
any personal role in the case.
He explained that as
junior officer in the American Embassy Section at the time,
working on correspondents, he would not have taken part in
so important an operation.
He said that he had heard
the operation from V. M. KOVSHUK, SMITH's case officer.
(On a later occasion NOSENKO said
that his only personal
role was being assigned to a phone-watch
to receive
surveillance reports connected with the initial KGB approach
to SMITH.)
GOLITSYN's Information
In February 1962 GOLITSYN reported that in 1957 he had
read a two-volume KGB study which gave examples of successful
operations against the Embassy in Moscow.
One case concerned
an American, probably single, who was either the Security.
Officer or the counterintelligence representative in the
Embassy.. He had a dog, and lived in an apartment in the
city or a country house outside Moscow.
His Russian maid
or cleaning woman was his mistress.
The KGB concluded that
the American would not succumb'
to ordinary blackmail and
consequently the maid,
a KGB agent, was instructed to confess
that she
recruited
by the KGB against her
will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB
tasks. The American agreed
to help her, and GOLITSYN believed
that he did not report
GOLITSYN also recalled
only misinformation to the
the che
to his
Washington headquarters.
that the American first supplied
KGB, but when the KGB complained,
he provided
a
mixture of truth
and misinformation.
said the case
GOLITSYN
study he read was based on a true incident
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which took place between 1953 and 1957, but he was not sure
that the operation
actually resulted in a successful recruit-
ment, as
was alleged in the study.
Comment:
Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead), Embassy
Security Officer (and CIA employee) from
July 1954 to June 1956, reported to the
Ambassador on 5 June 1956 that he had received
four letters from the KGB. The first,
received on 2 June 1956, enclosed incriminating
Led er 2
photographs of himself and his Russian maid and
requested him to come to a personal meeting
with KGB representatives outside the Embassy.
received three threatening letters.
In
reporting the matter to the Ambassador, SMITH
admitted having been intimate with his
maid.
Russian
SMITH was recalled from Moscow on
8 June 1956, and he left CIA employment a year
later.
When interviewed in March 1962 on
the
basis of the GOLITSYN information, SMITH
admitted that he had maintained his affair
with the Russian maid during most of the time
of his Moscow
assignment, 20 July 1954 to
confirmed that to help her
he had in fact passed unclassified information
through her to the KGB for many months.
NOSENKO clearly
ascribed the SMITH operation
to the period when NOSENKO was in the
American
Embassy Section, in 1953-1955. SMITH's state-
ment that he reported the blackmail attempt to
the Ambassador in June 1956 is
confirmed.
If
NOSENKO was, as he says, transferred to the
Seventh Department in 1955, he could not have
played
any role
in the KGB approach to SMITH.
If he played such a role, he was in the Embassy
Section in 1956, not in the Seventh Department
as
he claims.
If he played
a role in 'the SMITH
case as well
asin the Seventh Department
recruitment of BURGI (see p. 115), it remains O
possible that he was neither
an
officer in the
Embassy Section nor Seventh Department
and
was
acting in some other KGB capacity.
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CHAPTER II
EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
What NOSENKO has said about himself, the information
about the KGB which he has provided, and the apparently
corroborative statements
which Soviet officials have made
since his defection represent prima facie evidence that
NOSENKO is a former senior KGB officer.
To permit a
conclusive judgment that he is a bona fide defector, the
information NOSENKO provides about his life and related
persons and events must be coherent, and his accounts of
important events must be consistent.
Allowing for personal
vagaries such as lapses of memory and so forth, as
well
as for factors of accident and coincidence, the information
he relates must conform within reasonable limits with that
which is known from independent and reliable sources to
the United States Government about Soviet realities and
about the events, topics and individuals NOSENKO describes.
Lastly, the information NOSENKO provides must plausibly
relate primarily to the KGB positions he held, and his
account of how he functioned in these positions must be
substantiated by verisimilar detail.
The following portions of this paper, organized in
chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this
examination of the significant aspects of
NOSENKO's claims.
Notes for the Reader
In order to follow the examination as presented the
reader should note the following:
The examination tests the validity of the presumptive
evidence favoring NOSENKO in terms of coherence,
consistency,
and compatibility with fact and plausibility.
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(EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES)
Notes for the Reader (Continued)
NOSENKO's claims are judged in the light of his own
assertions and in comparison with collateral information.
It is not the function of the examination
to speculate
about possibly credible alternative explanations for
the
paradoxes reflected in NOSENKO's statements, except when
such explanations are advanced by NOSENKO himself.
If there is no immediate explanatory note pointing out
the relevance or significance of some item in the text, the
reader may expect that the item's relevance or significance
usually will be developed in the immediately-following text.
Otherwise seemingly minor points
are included because of
their
aggregative significance:
they will be a matter of
comment in the Summary and Conclusions section following
each major portion of the examination.
Direct questions and NOSENKO's replies about his
contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, retractions,
omissions and the like, are reflected in the
text. Where,
during his interrogations, it was not possible to
direct questions without furnishing NOSENKO information of
insight into the interrogators'
purposes, the topic was
covered exhaustively, if indirectly, and NOSENKO was
question.
not asked about a particular matter, or that
"didn't comment" or "didn't indicate awareness"
so forth, the reader properly may assume that the
matter was covered
extensively.
In instances in which NOSENKO contradicts or retracts
earlier assertions, no more weight is necessarily given
to his final assertion
as opposed to earlier contrary claims.
To assist the reader in following what are sometimes
lengthy and complex accounts of events, NOSENKO's narrative
is broken from time to time by a clearly identified
editorial comment which seeks to draw the reader's attention
to the relevance or significance of NOSENKO's assertions,
or to what conclusion is drawn.
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Notes for the Reader (Continued)
At the end of each episode in NOSENKO's biography
there appears a conclusion resulting from the examination
of NOSENKO's claims with respect to that period of his
life:
The judgment of whether NOSENKO is a bona fide
defector is the sum of these independently drawn conclusions.
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CHAPTER III
PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY
NOSENKO's biography from birth to entry into the KGB is
relevant to his bona fides insofar as it is material to
establishing his true identity, his general veracity, and.
his eventual eligibility for KGB service.
Below are
summarized pertinent events in his early life, his study
at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and
his RU service, as reconstructed from statements he
volunteered as well as from the accounts obtained in
repeated interrogations.
Birth to 1945 - NOSENKO's Account
NOSENKO was born on. 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, in the
Ukraine.
At, the time of his birth, his father, Ivan
Isidorovich NOSENKO, was a shipyard mechanic and an evening
student at the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute.
Shortly
after NOSENKO began kindergarten in Nikolayev, in September
1934, his father graduated from the Shipbuilding Institute
and the family moved to Leningrad, where NOSENKO started
the First Class of school in September 1935. From 1935 to
1937 NOSENKO lived in Leningrad where his father was director
of a shipyard. In 1938 the elder NOSENKO became Deputy
People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and the
family moved to Moscow, where NOSENKO completed the Sixth
Class in June 1941 just as the war broke out.
NOSENKO has given two versions of his whereabouts for
the next two years.
In one, he said that on the outbreak
of hostilities he was enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval
School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev where he finished
the Seventh Class; thereafter he transferred to the Lenin
grad Naval Preparatory School (which had been evacuated
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(PRE-KGB. BIOGRAPHY)
Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.
In a
second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow
Special Naval School required prior completion of the
Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he
and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he
completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942.
They returned
to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled
in the
Moscow Special Naval
School (then in Kuybyshev) where he
completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943
NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
School (then in Baku) •
After just six months in Baku, without completing the
Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to
MoscOW.
Comment: • NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran
away and fought
on the front
• at Tuapse, and
that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku
and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the
Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of
Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.
NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the
Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval
Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he
resumed his studies there.
Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO
received a gunshot wound in the hand, and
after being
hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.
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the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to
the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.
Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on
his early life.
However, this portion of his claimed
biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-
as publicized in press accounts at the time of his
father's death in 1956, and with the existence
of the
schools he claims to have attended.
Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics
(fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and
formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of
which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation; NOSENKO's
claimed identity
are accepted as true.
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Attendance at the Moscow Institute
of International Relations (1945 - ca. 1950)
In all of his accounts, NOSENKO has stated that he entered
the Institute's Faculty of International Law and English in
September 1945. He completed his first year in spring 1946.
In 1947, on completion of his second year at the Institute,
NOSENKO claims he received a commission as a junior lieutenant
"in the reserves"; he does not recall in what arm he received
a commission, other than
being sure that it was not in the
Navy •
Comment:
Soviet students completing their second year of
higher institutions are commissioned, but in
an arm (Army, Navy, Air Force) of Soviet defense
forces.
At that time they receive their voyennyy
bilet (military booklet) which reflects their
assigned MOS and category. (sostav.) • CIA interro-
gators were unable to resolve why NOSENKO
pleaded ignorance on this matter, and concluded
it may relate in some manner to his claims to
subsequent commissioned service in the Navy.
In 1947, also, NOSENKO married the daughter of a Soviet Army
Lieutenant General, Augustina K. TELEGINA "just after" her
father had been arrested in connection with Stalin's campaign
against Marshal Zhukov's associates.
NOSENKO recalls neither
the date of that marriage, in what season of the year it
occurred, nor how long after her father's arrest.
[The
significance of this first marriage lies in NOSENKO's contra-
dictory statements about when and how he obtained his divorce.
See below. ]
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NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute
course was of four years'
duration and that he entered
Naval RU on graduation
the
in 1949; that it was four years'
duration and that because he failed a state examination
he
was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years'
duration and he graduated In 1950, on schedule; and that it
was of five,years' duration but he failed an examination
which delayed his graduation for
three months.
Comment: See p. 367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB
upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.
The duration of the Institute course and
the
date of NOSENKO's completion are material to
the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service,
which he said followed almost immediately upon
his departure from the Institute.
Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)
NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at
the Institute of International Relations he entered the
Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post,
finally successfully. "transferring" to the KGB through the
intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.
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The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact
that he claims it launched his intelligence career and
served as the means through which he secured appointment
to the KGB after once having been rejected... The two or
more
years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a
significant period of his adult life for which he should
have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his
actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to
determining the time from which his claims about KGB service
can be judged credible.
NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU
service
at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his
1964 defection; it was the topic on which he made one of
his initial retractions
and his first admission that he had
earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU
service was consequently prominent in interrogations
. in
1964, 1965 and 1966.
However, throughout these interrogations,
challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted
adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from
the
Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as
challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state-
ments with respect to his RU service.
The extent of the
still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in
NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison
of his statements
made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.
NOSENKO's Information-1962
NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations
in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU.
[He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment. In
September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad,:
Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so
no one would think he would take advantage of his father's
assigned to a radio signals interception
unit 'in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite.
Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by
monitoring the communications of American units operating in
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Korea.
In spring 1952 NOSENKO suddenly fell ill. Returned
to Moscow and given a medical examination, he was diagnosed
to have "a small spot on a blood vessel under his collarbone"
and he was confined to the Hertzen Sanitorium outside Moscow
for two months.
In summer 1952, again eligible for duty,
NOSENKO was offered an assignment to the Military-Diplomatic
Academy, but he rejected the opportunity because the
curriculum was almost identical to that of the Institute
from which he was graduated.
In summer 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Baltic city of
Primorsk, "the former German city of Pillau". (Baltiysk, a
larger city close by Primorsk; is the former German city of
Pillau.]
There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of
"agent-observation posts", in which candidates from among
Soviet seamen were formed into three-man teams and trained
as stay-behind agents in the event of war.
In early 1953,
after less than six months in the Baltic assignment, NOSENKO
returned on leave to Moscow where he met at his father's
dacha KGB General KOBULOV, First Deputy to then-MGB [KGB]
Chairman Beria.
KOBULOV, on finding that NOSENKO did not
care for his RU assignment, invited him to consider joining
the KGB.
NOSENKO's Information-1964
Prior to NOSENKO's graduation he had been tentatively
assigned by the Institute's military commission to the RU
and on the instructions of the Institute's
"secret unit", he
was interviewed by a RU Colonel KALOSHIN at the RU Personnel
Department. After passing the state examination on the
second try, NOSENKO entered the Navy in September 1950, when
he received orders calling him to active duty as a junior
lieutenant. He also received orders assigning him to the
Intelligence Staff of the Seventh (Far East) Fleet. He
left Moscow approximately 1 October 1950, travelling for
ten days by train to his unit, which was
stationed near
Sovetskaya Gavan'. He was there assigned to a Reports
Section with duties which included translating American
naval publications and making summaries of Order of Battle
information of American naval forces in the Far East.
radio signals intercept unit was connected with NOSENKO's
unit, but [contrary to what he
asserted in 1962 and 1965] he
was not personally concerned with that unit's activities.
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In spring 1951 NOSENKO was promoted to the rank of
lieutenant®
At the end of 1951 NOSENKO was assigned as an
"apprentice" in the Agent-Intelligence Section near
Sovetskaya Gavan', an assignment which involved subchaser
delivery and pickup of agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin.
In early, 1952 NOSENKO filed by mail for divorce from
TELEGINA in a Moscow court. In April 1952 he returned to :
Moscow on leave, where he visited the Naval RU Headquarters
personnel officer, Col. KALOSHIN, and requested
..a transier
from the Far East. During May and June 1952 he was on
leave accrued during his two years' service in the Far
East:
Following his leave, in summer 1952, NOSENKO was
ordered to proceed to Rostock but he refused and took
unauthorized leave
(He could not learn what his actual
assignment
was to be in Rostock, and he heard that the Naval
Intelligence Points in Germany were being closed down.) He
subsequently was assigned to the Baltic city of Baltiysk,
where he reported for duty with the Intelligence Staff of
the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet.
He was assigned to a Naval
Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk (sic, see p. 57),
a small town
"in Primorskiy Kray" near Baltiysk.
Comment:
Primorskiy Kray is in the Far East, as NOSENKO's
interrogators pointed out to him at the time.
NOSENKO subsequently claimed it was his earlier
post, Sovetskaya Gavan', which was in Primorskiy
Kray, a fact known to him from the way his
letters were addressed. This is also an error.
See below
In Sovetsk NOSENKO prepared training materials for agents.
Comment::
NOSENKO also said that after refusing to go to
Rostock he himself had received training in
Moscow and then was sent to Rostock and Sassnitz,.
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Comment: (Continued)
in East Germany, before going to Baltiysk.
In
retracting that claim, he explained that he
knew his CIA interrogators would not believe
that he had successfully refused the assignment
in Germany-
In August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow
for 7 to 10 days to complete the divorce proceedings which
he had initiated in the Far East.
This was not regarded
as leave,
but official business.
He afterwards returned
to Sovetsk, but he did not like his work there, and in late
1952. he requested leave to return to Moscow to seek a transfer.
When his unit commander refused him leave, NOSENKO appealed
to. Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk, and because of the elder
NOSENKO's influence, was able to return to Moscow for a month's
leave in January 1953.
At the end of January NOSENKO visited
the RU Personnel Officer, KALOSHIN, and stated his distaste
for his work.
told him to
"look around", and
NOSENKO spent February 1953 "at the disposal of the Personnel
Department", not doing anything. Since he wasn't working,
he didn't receive his pay, and he lived with his parents.
Comment:
Just before giving this account of his January
1953 leave, NOSENKO claimed that he spent
January and a part of February at the Kubinka
Sanitorium. He has never reconciled these two
statements.
NOSENKO's Information-1965
Prior to his graduation from the Institute, a military
commission tentatively assigned NOSENKO to the Navy, after
which he visited a special section at the Naval Ministry
to file special forms for a security check. Although nothing
was said at the time, NOSENKO believed then that he was slated
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to join Naval Intelligence.
After passing all of his
examinations, in the fall of 1950 NOSENKO received orders
calling him to active duty Offered a choice of assignments;
NOSENKO chose the Far East "to prove that he was now ready
to make a man of himself"." Arriving in Sovetskaya Gavan' in
Primorskiy Kray (sic), NOSENKO was assigned to a Reports:
Section.
Comment: Questioned in 1965 on the location of Sovetskaya
Gavan', NOSENKO insisted that it was located in
Primorskiy Kray•
Shown contemporary Soviet maps
clearly locating it in Khabarovskiy Kray!
NOSENKO angrily asserted that the map had been
falsified by his interrogators to confuse him.
NOSENKO's contention is somewhat analogous to
being stationed in Oregon for an extended:
period and thinking oneself to be in California.
In Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO liked the work and did a
good job despite rigorous working and living conditions,
and during his service there he was commended as an out-
standing officer. NOSENKO and his officer colleagues
analyzed the product of some 300 radio intercept operators
as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok.
In spring, 1951,
after about seven months' service,
NOSENKO was promoted to lieutenant, the normally required
duce to guire is
time in grade of one year having been reduced to six months
for Far East service.
In early 1952 NOSENKO published in a local newspaper his
intent to divorce his wife, and he forwarded the necessary
legal papers to Moscow.
NOSENKO's two-year tour would not end until October of
November 1952, nor was he entitled to any leave before that
time.
An understanding superior, however, arranged for him
to take leave in April 1952 so that he could return to
Moscow in time for his father's birthday on 1 May. On ? May
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he reported to the Naval Ministry and was told to return
for reassignment at the end of his leave.
NOSENKO was on
leave in May and June 1952, and he remained "at the disposal
of the Naval Ministry".
[According to his 1962 and 1966
versions, he was hospitalized during this period.]
In the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to
the
RU Military-Diplomatic Academy, to a special Naval
espionage school, and to a post in Germany, but he turned
them all down.
He rejected the opportunity to attend the
academy, because he had had almost all of the courses
earlier at the Institute of International Relations.
"Sometime after his return to Moscow from Sovetskaya
Gavan'
•" NOSENKO completed the formalities to secure his
divorce from TELEGINA.
[According to his 1964 account,
NOSENKO visited Moscow later, from his Baltic assignment,
to complete divorce proceedings.]
In August 1952 NOSENKO received an assignment to Sovetsk,
in the Baltic, where he arrived in early September 1952.
His assignment there was as a political officer, in which
capacity he was involved with sailors being trained for
wartime sabotage missions. His main task was to prepare the
training plan for the agents, to instruct them in such
subjects as
"The Foreign Policy of the USSR", and generally
to see to their needs. NOSENKO did not care for his
assignment in Sovetsk and in December. 1952 he obtained leave
to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow.. In January
1953 NOSENKO and his parents visited KGB General KOBULOV
at the latter's dacha and KOBULOV, learning of NOSENKO's
dissatisfaction with the RU, suggested he consider working
for the KGB.
After New Years in 1953 NOSENKO went "to rest for several
days" at the Hertzen "House of Rest", located 65-70 Kilo-
meters from Moscow near Kubinka.
There
he met his second
[In 1964 and 1966
wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOV"resting" but was
statements NOSENKO claimed he was not
hospitalized with tuberculosis for several weeks in January
and
February.]
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NOSENKO's Information-1966 (Apri])
At an interview with the military placement commission
at the Institute before graduation, NOSENKO indicated that
he wanted to work in "some sort of a military organization"
Soon
thereafter the chief of the Institute's special section
gave him a telephone number to call. NOSENKO recognized the
number as one belonging to the MGB [the predecessor of, and
hereafter referred to as, the KGB]. NOSENKO was invited to
an interview with KGB officials who queried him about his
background and his knowledge of English.
Later, however,
the chief of the Institute's special section informed
NOSENKO that his qualifications were unsuitable for assign-
ment to the KGB.
During the summer of 1950 "while state
examinations were underway" [in earlier versions NOSENKO
claimed
the examinations were over
in Junel, NOSENKO began
to process for entry into the Naval RU, through Colonel
KALOSHIN, the Chief of the RU Personnel Department. He
filled out questionnaires in duplicate, wrote two auto-
biographies and, in August or September, submitted copies
of his diploma.
Note that this version of events omits
any reference to delayed graduation caused by his having
to take a state examination a second time.]. For the next
nine months, until March 1951, NOSENKO awaited being called
to RU service:
[In earlier versions, NOSENKO claims he
entered the RU in 1949
or 1950.1
On 12 March 1951 NOSENKO received two orders from the...
Naval Ministry, one calling him to active Naval service and
the other assigning him as a translator to the Intelligence
Unit of the Seventh Fleet in the Far East.
On 13 March,
on KALOSHIN's instruction, NOSENKO reported to the Moscow
City Military Commission and was issued his travel documents,
and NOSENKO departed Moscow for
his post on 16 or 17 March.
At the end of March NOSENKO arrived at his post near
Sovetskaya Gavan' and began work in the Reports Section of
the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Unit.
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At the end of April 1952 NOSENKO left Sovetskaya Gavan'
on
leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April. (Note earlier
versions in which he was transferred because of illness.
and that he was permitted to return to Moscow because of
his father's birthday.] While on leave he became ill with
tuberculosis and spent almost two months in May and June.
1952 in a sanitorium near Moscow.
During the month of July 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to
the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet
in Sovetsk, in Kaliningradskaya Oblast (at the head of the
Bay of Gdansk).
Sovetsk was
' a small village located on
the spit of land between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk.
[The
only Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast is located many
miles inland from Kaliningrad, in the opposite direction
from Baltiysk.
When NOSENKO was shown their locations on
contemporary Soviet maps, he insisted that he was correct,
although Primorsk, where
NOSENKO had said in 1962 that he
was
assigned while in the Baltic, is located on a spit of
land between
Kaliningrad and
Baltiysk.] NOSENKO remained
in "Sovetsk" but a short time, and he
returned to Moscow
at the end of 1952 to seek another assignment.
Before
his departure he was promoted to the
rank of lieutenant
of the Administrative Service.
[In previous versions he
claimed to have become eligible for promotion and was
promoted while in the Far East, after less then a year's
service.l
On 1 January 1953 NOSENKO and his parents were guests at
the KOBULOV dacha. NOSENKO indicated his dissatisfaction
with his RU assignment and KOBULOV promised to find him a
place in the KGB.
From the middle of January to the middle of March 1953
NOSENKO was under treatment at the sanitorium near Moscow
where he had been hospitalized in 1952, and there he became
acquainted with his second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna
KOZHEVNIKOVA.
INOSENKO's earlier accounts either omitted
reference to this period of hospitalization, or indicated
that it was of considerably shorter duration.]
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NOSENKO's Information-1966 (October)
In his most recent account, in October 1966, NOSENKO
said that before graduation from the Institute the military
placement commission sent him to the KGB, but there he was
told that he was not qualified as a candidate because of
mediocre academic record and drinking habits. NOSENKO said
he did not mention this rejection earlier, because his
interrogators would not have believed that he ever became
a KGB officer after once being rejected.
NOSENKO also volunteered that he had "lied" when he
claimed to have entered the Naval RU in 1950.
In fact;
he said, he entered the Ru in March 1951 and was on active
duty in the Far East from 1951 until 1953.
Comment: This latest assertion discredits almost all
of his earlier claims regarding entry into
the RU, including the date of his graduation
Irom the Institute, the timing if not the
fact of his promotion, the number, sequence,
and purposes of his visits to Moscow, his
hospitalization with tuberculosis, and his
assignment to the Baltic Fleet.
Naval RU Service: Summary and Conclusion:
According to NOSENKO's contradictory statements, which
are still unresolved after interrogations over a three-
year period, he graduated from the Institute of International
Relations in
either 1949 or 1950, Before graduation, he
(a) was selected for Naval assignment, (b) sought a Naval
assignment,.or (c).
was selected for and rejected by the
KGB and then he sought an assignment to the RU; or,
immediately following graduation, or three months or nine
months later (in the following year), he was called to
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active Naval service and assigned to the RU.
With neither
training nor indoctrination he was assigned initially to
the Far East for nine months or three years; there he
participated in agents' operational training, or reports
work.
In the latter capacity he was or was not involved
in RU radio signals intercept operations.
He either never
served in the Baltic. or, if he did, it was for three
months or six months, during which
he either participated
in agent training or
was an administrative or political
officer. He was promoted to lieutenant in the Far East
or in the Baltic, after either seven months' or thirteen
months' RU service.
Despite his claimed active commissioned service in the
Navy, NOSENKO knows nothing of Soviet Navy tradition,
doctrine, organization, or procedures. He disctaims
know
ledge of
RU organization other than at the posts where he
served, "because of his junior rank". However, even at
those posts he describes neither the staff, the functions
nor the personnel intelligibly nor does he describe the
posts"
actual
locations.
The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was
the personnel chief, Colonel KALOSHIN..: He identified no
ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East intelli-
gence staffs.
Some thirty GRU officers he did identify,
by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU
service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow,
or through his visits to Geneva.
Conclusion
NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the
capacities at the places and times he claimed:
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CHAPTER IV
KGB ENTRY
Comment:
Stalin died in March 1953, an event which was
accompanied by extraordinary repercussions
The Ministries of Internal Affairs (MVD) and
State Security (MGB) merged under the MVD, Of
which Beriya became Minister. There followed
a period of widespread reorganization entailing
the transfer or dismissal of many personnel:
Beriya's arrest just four months later in June
1953 was followed by another extensive (if
bloodless) purge and reorganization, which
culminated in the creation of the Committee for
State Security (KGB) in March 1954. Vladimir
and Evdokia PETROV, Yuri RASTVOROV, and Petr
DERYABIN, among others, defected in the wake
of these events. From information they pro-
vided, as well as from
l that acquired from other
sources, CIA has a substantial amount of infor-
mation against which NOSENKO's accounts of this
period may be weighed.
For the convenience of the reader, the term
"KGB" is used hereafter to refer as
well to its
predecessor organizations in 1953-1954.
In statements volunteered in his early meetings with CIA
in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO mentioned that he had joined the
MVD/KGB in 1953. In a biographic statement written immediately
after his defection, however, he asserted his KGB service
began in 1952, a date he insisted was correct even after
reminded he had earlier said 1953.
Repeated interrogations
produced a variety of dates of claimed KGB entry, ranging
"the beginning of 1952" to April 1953, all of which
were accompanied by modified accounts of the circumstances
of his entry (as well as of his earlier period of service.
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in the Naval RU and of his date of graduation from the
Institute of International Relations) •
To the extent to
which he has been consistent at all, he has cited March 1953
as the time of his entry to the KGB.
Date of Entry
NOSENKo at his first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962,
volunteered how and when he joined the KGB. NOSENKO hac
just returned from his Naval RU assignment in the Baltic,
he
nate Naval
said, when he met KGB General KOBULOV and KOBULOV urged
him to join the KGB. NOSENKO stated that after completing
his processing, he reported for
duty in the Embassy Section
of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in
March 1953, "just after Stalin died". (Stalin died on
5 March 1953.)
Comment:
According to KGB defectors, the precise date
of entry. to the KGB would not likely to be
forgotten by a kGB officer.
The date is the
basis for computing length of service and is
a common entry on KGB administrative forms
periodically filled out by KGB officers in the
course of their service.
According to NOSENKO in January 1964, he transferred to
the KGB from the Naval RU "in something like 1952"; "just
after Yu. I. GUK transferred from the Second Chief Directo-
rate".
Comment:
GOLITSYN had reported that GUK was transferred
out of the Second Chief Directorate in January
1952.
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(KGB ENTRY)
In February 1964 NOSENKO wrote a biographic statement in
which he noted that he entered the KGB in 1952, and in which
he back-dated by one year his 1962 account of his activities
in the period 1945-1955. Although he was then reminded of:
his 1962 statement and the contradiction was discussed with
him, after study he indicated his approval by signing an
official biographic statement (for the Intelligence Community)
which indicated that he entered on duty with the KGB in
about May 1952:
At the first hostile interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO
was
confronted with his contradictory claims. In response,
NOSENKO Stated that he returned to Moscow from the Baltic in
August 1952 by most of his other accounts, NOSENKO returned
in January 1953] and entered the KGB on 5-7 September 1952•
By March 1953, NOSENKO stated, he had already worked in the
Embassy Section for some months against American correspon-
dents, and it was "just after Stalin's death, after the
reorganization" that he
assumed responsibility for operations
against American Army Attache personnel.
INOSENKO ultimately
settled on June or July 1954 as the time of this reassignment.
See p. 84.]
Challenged in April 1964 to resolve the contradictions of
his eaxlier claims that he joined the KGB variously in
January 1952, September 1952, or March 1953, NOSENKO
asserted that the truth was that his
service dated from March
1953, after Stalin's death.: He
went on to explain that he
finished his Institute studies in 1949 (sic.),
"defended his
diploma" and then failed one of the four required State
examinations.
All four examinations, he said, he had to
take over again, and as a result he didn't receive his diploma
until 1950 although he "officially" graduated in 1949.
NOSENKO said that to avoid admitting
"this unpleasant thing"
he claimed he joined the KGB in 1952 and after claiming that
again"a fact, "did not want to correct it, to twist it around
NOSENKO went on to say that the actual date of entry
was while Stalin was still alive, on "12 or 15 March 1953"
or about 15 March 1953.
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Comment:
NOSENKO's explanation takes no account -= ==
fact that he had already said (in 1962) =-a=
he joined the KGB in March 1953.
KGB defectors
describe the period irec-azely
following Stalin's death in the KGB as che
==
extensive reorganization and uncertaint: --
which new candidates were not being acces==:.
Other evidence of the improbability of icsO's
entering the KGB in
1 March 1953 is discusses
below.
NOSENKO repeated during 1965 interrogations the cate
13-15 March 1953•
In 1966, however, in a written statement,
he said he entered the KGB
on 2 April 1953, but a week later,
in another signed statement, he said it was the "micale of
March 1953".
In his final interrogation in October 1966 NOSENKO said
he entered the KGB in March 1953 and he acknowledgee ta=
he had lied, and had known at the time he was lying, whe
he had said he joined in 1952.
Asked by his interrogaicas
why he had lied, NOSENKO said, "There was no sense.
Be
went on to explain that because he was only an average
student and a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitabie
by the KGB. entry commission when he first applied in 1-50;
he had tried to conceal this by adjusting his accou? ?!
one year, since his interrogators would not have beliered
that he was eventually accepted by the KGB after an es-tier
rejection.
The Role Of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV
In all of his accounts NOSENKO has
attributed to General
KOBULOV's initiative and intervention his entry to tre Ics..
In the account which he volunteered in Geneva to CIA ==
1962, NOSENKO said KOBULOV was a
friend of the elder sENTo
whom he met when the KGB General "dropped by" the HaSENio
dacha outside of Moscow, and KOBULOV at the time ("ear-:
1953") was First Deputy
' to Beriya, the Minister of =re
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then-MVD. NOSENKO said that when KOBULOV learned of NOSENKO's
dissatisfaction with the Naval RU, KOBULOV encouraged him
to enter counterintelligence and invited him to visit the
General's office. : NOSENKO said he did not, but nevertheless
received a wéek later a telephone call from the KGB Personnel
ang him to a
Office asking him to appear at the secretariat of General
KOBULOV and informing him that General KOBULOV had already
arranged for a building pass.
in April 1964.
friend of the NOSENKO family, in February 1953. NOSENKO said
KOBULOV had visited his father in the latter's office, and
that evening the elder NOSENKO brought him to the NOSENKO
dacha to spend the weekend. [NOSENKO had just before been
Informed by his interrogators that KOBULOV was at that time
posted
in Germany, not in Moscow.] According to NOSENKO.,
ROBULOV was in Moscow on a short visit from Germany. : "My
father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday...On
Sunday we were playing billiards
and KOBULOV asked me what
I was doing, and I told him I was at the disposal of the
(Naval RU) Personnel Department and that I didn't want to
return to the Baltic."
NOSENKO said that KOBULOV offered
to call the KGB Personnel Office and have them "look
NOSENKO over", and NOSENKO assented, after which he twice
visited the Personnel Office where he filed completed forms.
NOSENKO asserted that KOBULOV did not forget, because "just
as STALIN died; KOBULOV immediately returned from
Germany" after being "summoned by Beriya or someone", and
on "maybe the
l0th of March" NOSENKO received a call from
KOBULOV's assistant.
NOSENKO claimed he reported to KOBULOV's
office:
although he waited two hours to see the General,
the latter was busy elsewhere. Instead of seeing KOBULOV,
however, NOSENKO said he was finally taken to the office
of Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief SHUBNYAKOV, who
assigned him forthwith to the Embassy Section of the American
Department.:
In April 1964 NOSENKO introduced a new variant. He said
that he met KOBULOV while accompanying his parents on a
visit in January to KOBULOV's dacha [NOSENKO had previously
graphically described KOBULOV's weekend visit at the elder
NOSENKO 's], KOBULOV intervened in his behalf, and he was
called to the KGB Personnel Office to be interviewed and
to
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receive necessary forms. NOSENKO stated that he heard
notning further until after Stalin's funeral, when he was
sunmoned to KOBULOV's office and afterwards assigned to
the Second Chief Directorate.
During the July 1965 interrogations NOSENKO retracted
his earlier claim that KOBULOV and his father had been close
personal friends. He stated that his father's relationship
witi KOBULOV was not personal, and that KOBULOV had never
visited the NOSENKOS.
In a biographic statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO
said that he had met KOBULOV but twice, once on 1 January
1953 at the latter's dacha, and the second and last time in
the elder NOSENKO's office as NOSENKO's father and KOBULOV
were departing to attend Stalin's funeral.
On that latter
occasion, NOSENKO claimed, KOBULOV promised to concern him-
self with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB and it was several
days later that NOSENKO was summoned to KOBULOV's office
and told ne was appointed to the KGB.
Comment:
General. Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV was a career
security official, but from the immediate post-
war period until after Stalin's death he was
not assigned to KGB Headquarters. As of 1952,
he was posted to Germany with the Chief
Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad, then
directly subordinate not to the MVD but to the
Council of Ministers and latterly to the
Ministry of Foreign Trade.
Until he returned
from Germany in March 1953 to assume the
position of Beriya's deputy, he had no office
In KGB Headquarters. KOBULOV was arrested
with Beriya in June 1953, and also later executed.
In light of the foregoing, it is improbable
that
KOBULOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's
appointment to the KGB at the times NOSENKO
claimed.
If KOBULOV ever interceded in
NOSENKO's behalf, it is probable that NOSENKO
would later have
been purged after KOBULOV's
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(Continued)
and Beriya's arrest and execution.
NOSENKO's
eventual retraction of his assertion that his
father and KOBULOV were intimate acquaintances
makes it the more unlikely that KOBULOV played
any role at any time in NOSENKO's appointment
to the KGB:
Eligibility
Throughout the various versions NOSENKO has provided
about his entry to the KGB, he has emphasized how influen-
tial was his father's prominent position in the Soviet
Government:
Comment: In the period 1953-1954, during which NOSENKO
claimed he entered the KGB, it was KGB policy
to avoid recruiting the children of senior
Soviet officials.
NOSENKO asserts that he was rejected for KGB appointment
upon graduation from the Institute of International Relations.
Comment:
Other than claiming to have completed an
undistinguished period of service with the Naval
RU, NOSENKO acknowledges thät he was no more
eligible in 1953 for KGB appointment than he
was at the time of his rejection.
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NOSENKO states that in March 1953 he was already twenty-
five and a half years old, a member of only the Komsomol,
and that he had not been recommended for Party membership.
He further claimed that on entry to the KGB he became
secretary of
the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organi-
zation.
Comment: Eligibility for Party membership, if not
membership itself, is a requisite for KGB
appointment. By Komsomol statutes of that time,
twenty-five was at that time the maximum age.
Thus, at the time of NOSENKO's claimed KGB
appointment, he was within six months of being
dropped by the Komsomol as well as still
ungualified for Party membership. He could
not have been secretary of the second Chief
Directorate Komsomol organization, as discussed
on p. 338.
NOSENKO has referred frequently to having contracted
tuberculosis for which he was periodically hospitalized.
Comment:
According to KGB defectors
familiar with the
standards in force at the time, no candidate
was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis.
KGB Processing for Entry
NOSENKO has stated (in chronological order) that at his
Initial interview with a KGB personnel, it was not necessary
for him to complete any forms or questionnalres since the
KGB had his Naval RU file; that he was told that the KGB
would request the Naval RU file and meanwhile he was given
three copies of a four to six-page biographic form to complete
at home; and (at his last interrogation in 1966) that he
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never spoke to any KGB personnel officers nor visited the
personnel office land thus completed no forms provided by
them) •
Comment:
The most important document filled out by
prospective KGB officers was a detailed 16-page
personal history questionnaire, Anketa
sotrudnika KGB, which
even when blank, the form was not permitted to
be taken home.:
KGB defectörs have described
completion of
the form "as an experience not
Iikely to be forgotten".
NOSENKO omits in all
accounts reference to other documents which are
known to have been required in connection with
a KGB officer's processing for duty•
NOSENKO insisted that he took no physical examination in
connection with processing for KGB entry:
Comment:
A medical examination was a routine and mandatory
part of a KGB
candidate's processing. Former
KGB defectors could think of no instance in.
which the examination could be waived, parti-
cularly for a candidate with a recorded history
of tuberculosis.
NOSENKO claims in all of his accounts: that he entered the
KGB building and, with a pass obtained at the Pass Office,
was permitted to proceed without escort. NOSENKO specifically
asserted that the name of the interviewer did not appear on
the pass.
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Comment:
Persons not holding a valid KGB identity
document were not permitted entry to or move-
ment in the building without escort.
The
interviewer's name did
appear on the building
pass.
The interviewer's name was essential
to the issuance of the pass: the interviewer
had complete responsibility
for the visitor's
custody while on KGB premises.
Initial Service in KGB (1953)
NOSENKO stated that in the period of Beriya, in March-
June 1953, the two existing directorates were the First
Chief Directorate, which was the foreign intelligence
directorate, and the Second Chief Directorate, the counter-
intelligence directorate.
The designations were later
reversed for a few months, he said, by Kruglov, Beriya's
successor.
Comment:
Beriya reversed the designations of the First
and Second Chief Directorates in March 1953,
and they were not changed back until March 1954.
NOSENKO does not know how his own directorate
was designated either at the time he allegedly
.-
entered on duty or during his entire first
year of KGB service.
NOSENKO described the KGB identity document of the period,
but in spite of repeated questioning could not recall any-
thing unusual aböut it.
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Comment:
Iwice, following Stalin's death in March 1953
and again following Beriya's arrest in June
recalled for revalidation." On both occasions
new stamps were placed on the document, lacking
which the bearer could no longer enter the KGB
installation. KGB defectors state that the
events were the topic of numerous anecdotes at
the time.
NOSENKO claims he received no training in the KGB, but
was assigned operations responsibilities immediately upon
reporting for duty.
He had explained that training was
unnecessary because of his Naval RU experience.
Comment:
NOSENKO's lack of training is unlike that of
any other KGB defector. His Naval RU service,
by NOSENKO's own account, provided little if
any preparation for his subsequent KGB duties.
NOSENKO
stated
rubles as a case
that his
initial KGB basic pay was 1700
officer, plus
secrecy, language and
longevity pay, plus 500 rubles "rank pay" as a lieutenant.
He recalled that there was one year, 1954, when KGB officers
did not receive the pay for rank.
Comment:
KGB officers! rank pay was abolished in
September 1952 and not restored until April
1954, a period which covers NOSENKO's first
year of claimed service in the KGB.
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NOSENKO claimed that he was promoted to the rank of senior
lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB:
Comment: All promotions in the KGB were frozen from the
time Beriya became Minister in March 1953
until late 1953. NOSENKO's actual sequence of
promotions
has never been established.
He has
also claimed this promotion occurred in 1952
and in 1954. See p. 351.
NOSENKO acknowledged that his qualifications for continued
KGB service were probably reviewed in connection with the
purges following both Stalin's death and Beriya's arrest,
during which reviews numerous negative factors in his back-
ground would have come to light.
He stated,
however, that
he could only assume that the important and
influential
position of his own father outweighed the negative factors.
Comment: NOSENKO has never mentioned any influence his
father had on his KGB service aside from that
exercised through KOBULOV, who was himself
arrested and executed.
Other Aspects Relevant to 1953 KGB Service
NOSENKO insisted that the KGB was organized from components
of the MVD not earlier than late 1954 or early 1955.
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Comment:
The KGB was organized in March 1954, in a final
reform of Beriya's organization of Soviet
security agencies.
Preceded by a series of
purges, the inception of the KGB would presumably
be memorable to a KGB officer
serving in Moscow
Headquarters at the time.
NOSENKO stated that the MVD Intelligence Directorate
(subsequently to become the KGB First Chief Directorate)
was located in 1953 in four buildings, including the
Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI (Committee of Infor-
mation) Building".
Comment:
The Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI
Building" were one and the same.
From his
statement, NOSENKO is unaware that the KI
(a combined foreign intelligence agency)
ceased to exist in 1951, a matter perhaps
unfamiliar to a KGB officer serving at a
substantially later time, but one which
other KGB officers serving in Moscow in
1953 recalled easily.
NOSENKO did not know where the Chief Directorate of the
Militia was located in 1953-1954.
Comment:
According to KGB defectors, a staff officer in
the Counterintelligence Directorate at the time
would have had frequent occasion to deal with
the Chief Directorate of the Militia.
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KGB Entry: Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO's assertions regarding the KGB in the 1953-1954
period throw
no more light on the actual date of his KGB
entry than did his claims of when
he transferred from the
Naval RU; the contradictions and
inconsistencies are
interrelated.
It is possible that a former KGB officer, relating the
truth as he recalls it about events occurring ten years
earlier, could be inconsistent; that he could forget his
date of entry, not remember what administrative procedures
were, fail to recall the circumstances of the organization
he joined were, be inaccurate about what his pay was, and
be vague on what his KGB identification document looked
like.
Recognizing that administrative regulations and
procedures are on occasion honored in the breach, it is
also possible that NOSENKO was accepted by the KGB despite
the fact that he was the son of a senior official, that he
had
tuberculosis, that he was unqualified for Party member-
ship, that he had been previously rejected and all at a
time when the KGB was not accepting new recruits.
The probability of these events being coincident, however,
is remote.
On examination, NOSENKO's latest admission, that
he
"actually" entered the
KGB in March 1953, is no better
substantiated than earlier accounts citing other dates.
Conclusion
NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner nor at the
time he claimed:
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CHAPTER V
AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(ca. 1953-June 1955)
NOSENKO claims to have served in the American Embassy
Section of the American Department (Second Chief Directorate)
from his entry in the KGB until June 1955. His targets
this period were at first American correspondents
residing in Moscow and later Army Attache personnel of the
American Embassy in Moscow.
His assignment involving
American correspondents lasted anywhere from six to eighteen
months (depending on the various dates he claimed he entered
the KGB) •
His involvement with the Army Attaches lasted
from sometime in 1954 until his transfer to the Seventh
Department in June 1955.
NOSENKO has sought to
avoid discussion of his own or
other KGB activities during this entire period which he
characterized on occasion as "not relevant" or "of no
consequence"
He has repeatedly stated that he "found
himself" only after this initial KGB service in the American
Embassy Section.
Until thep, he asserted, he was a wastrel
and "did not pay attention to the work".
(He has variously
dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955 when he
transferred to the Seventh Department; in June 1956 in
connection with his participation in and award for the BURGI_06
case; and alter August 1956 when the death of his father
forced him to pull himself together.)
Operations Against American Correspondents
NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB
work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow
in 1953-1954 by saying that, as a new, very junior employee
he had no access to operational files and did not partici-
pate
personally in the handling of any of the correspondents.
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Although able to identify correspondents in Moscow who were
then recruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information
either in conversations with his superior [V.A.] KOZLOV Or
at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer
was working against these targets.
NOSENKO made clear that
he was not the case officer responsible for the more important
correspondents:
wife. I also know that KOZLOV was working with [VITNEX)56
chief of the section himself--with GuAPIRO/owith HAPTROls d6
"KOZLOV himself was working with them,
and with (Andrew J.) STEIGER." For each of these
there was an operational file which I did not see. „persons
According
06
to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved with §TEIGER andO6
Edmund STEVENS, American correspondents who he alleged were
recruited agents of the KGB.
Comment:
06
SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by
GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received
from NOSENKO US SHAPIRO! KGB agent cryptonym,
known to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN, appears in the
CHEREPANOV papers (see p. 309) •
The KGB
defector Nikolay, KHOKHLOV in April 1954
C6
identified the Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as
a KGB agent, an allegation which she denied.
NOSENKO said his early months in the job were spent
reading personality (not operational) files on a number of
the correspondents in Moscow, (none of which indicated the
individual's developmental or agent status) and familiarizing
himself with KGB methods.
Later NOSENKO was assigned the
"agent network" of drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics
surrounding four of the correspondents, [SHAPIRO, GILMORE, 06,06,06
SALISBURY and WHITNEY.U He met with his agents periodically
to determine whether they had developed any important infor-
mation.
His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings
with NOSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and
afterward whenever something interesting would begin to
develop.
accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents
when there was even a hint that something of interest might
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develop.
NOSENKO has descrived some of these agents in
general terms, but for all but a few he recalled neither
their names nor personalia concerning them.
06
WHITNEY.
on the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO
stated that he was taken airectly to the offices of the
American Embassy Section.
There he met the section chief.
V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO that he would take over the
work of the departing case officer, Captain Anatoliy
TORMOZOV, in operations against American correspondents in
MOSCOW.
Then NOSENKO reported for work the following day, he
found a desk in Room 615 and, "There were, three other guys
sitting there. At first I was running traces, and at the
same time I was reading the files on journalists. I think
there were seven files in all, and I didn't see any other.
NOSENKO listed these files
GILMORE'S HenKy SHAPIRO, Eddy 06, 06
GILMORE (as well as ones on GILMORE's wife (SEREBRYANKOVA) 06
and her sister (CHERNYSHEVA) Harrison SALISBURY)and Thomas
WHITNEY. 06
and gave us some material, but he refused to work for us
when he left the country" D GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an
active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO
did not know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did
not know the status of SALISBURY as of 1953.
- 06
NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read
during the early period of his KGB service were develop-
mental files (delo formulyar) rather than the operational
files of the agents.
The developmental files were less
sensitive, and from them "you would never be able to figure
not whether he
the subject of the file) is an agent
NOSENKO explained that, once a person became an agent,
another file is set up, and these agent files were hela by
the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he
read the
files on the seven persons "slowly and made some
extracts for myself in my personal log--such things as
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notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not
remember".
He was also given the files on the agents.
surrounding these correspondents, their drivers, maids,
and cooks.
Agents Reporting on Correspondents
NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents
who were reporting off SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURg band the
06 GILMORES and met them regularly to learn whether" "anything
was new, whom did (SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting
in his behavior, what might be suspicious in his behavior,
whom he is contacting, etc"
He then reported to KOZLOV and
would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations
with the agents.: Asked to describe these meetings, NOSENKO
replied:
"Iet us take the same case of SHAPIRO. I would
meet drivers about three times a month or even two
times. OAt the meeting I would ask the driver what
in (SHAPIRO's behavior since our last meeting,
wAS nEGHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with forei
gners, about his meetings with Russians, were they
conducted openly or, perhaps, was (SHAPIRO walking 06
behind the person he met. And then the man [agent]
mee tape chap and"
would begin his report.
Of course, if he spots
anything suspicious he calls immediately, and I
would see him the next morning. Otherwise, I would
tell him at the meeting that I would see him again
in about ten days or in two weeks, but if there was
something interesting he should call immediately.
"It was the same with the maid and the cook.
returning to the office I would have to report to
KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally or in
writing.
If,. for example, IV.M.] KOVSHUK lalso of
the American Embassy Sectionl had a meeting with his
agents, he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV.
If the meetings were taking place late in the day
and lasted until midnight or later and there were
no written materials submitted at the meeting, I
could go home and then report the
next morning."
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KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various
agents surrounding the correspondents.
"At first he was
teaching me.
Then he would go in cases when something
interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't
yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint
in a case of some other case officer.
NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and
clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and
their families. Asked to describe them, he said:
"My first agent Was a woman agent, a cook, who
was working at GILMOR's place.
She also worked
at the Associated Press later.
Her. codename was
'AGLODINA', a funny one."
(While reviewing a list
of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow, NOSENKO
in the fall of 1965 identified one Yelena s.
KOSIENKO as his former agent "AGLODINA". At that
time he told CIA that he had taken over KOSIENKO
from TORMOZOV upon entering the American Embassy
Section
for and In 1953, and that she subsequently worked
reported of GrIMORE's successor, Richard 06
KASISCHKE. NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never
provided any interesting information.)."my second
agent was a chauffeur whose cryptonym, I think, was
"SERGEY'
I think he was driving for WHITNEY: 06
Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little
fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs, this
was my agentura (agent network].".
Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this net-
work in terms of the numver and type of agents targetted:
against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true
names and could not provide personality information on any:
of them. He explained: "I
don't remember now.
They all
passed by like a river because they were turned over often."
NOSENKO did recall that it was he who
the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO Dotect dearted:
this agent had earlier worked in the offices of Moscow News,
an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.
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NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling
ten to twelve agents in operations against the correspon-
This, he said, 'was a normal load, although more
eeperienced case officers might have as many as fifteen.
NOSENKO described his agentura as follows:
Target
Fady GILMORE C6
Agents
Two agents, the cook and the
driver; one operational contact,
a part-time cleaning girl; and
a girlfriend of GILMOR's sister-üb
in-law and GILMORE'S
Russian] wife.
06,11
Thomas HITNEY
Henry SHAPIRO U6
One agent, his driver, "SERGEY".
Three agents! SHAPIRO"s secretary
and his chauffeur, plus an ola
woman who was a relative of
O6 [SHAPIRO's wife and lived with
The SHAPIROS In Moscow.
(The
secretary and chauffeur later
worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and
reported: on him to NOSENKO;
C6 BRODNEY temporarily took SHAPIRO's 06
06
Harrison SALISBURY
place in Moscow-06
Two agents; (SALISBURY's driver.
and a part-time cleaning girl.
NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral",
in that they did not have specific
targets on whom to report.
The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-
language training program for foreigners in Moscow.. His
cryptonym was
"RAKETA", but. NOSENKO could not recall his true
name.
The
second "VOLODINA", was a female teacher in this
same program who instructed some of
the correspondents, and
Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the
true name of "VOLODINA".
Then NOSENKO was relieved of his
responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over.
whom he continued to handle in his work with Army Attaches.
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Operations Against U.S. Army Attache Personnel
NOSENKO claimed specific responsibility for work against
American Army Attaches during twenty months of 1954-55, a
period in which NOSENKO claimed no supervisory responsibility
to divert his attention from personal operational duties.
(NOSENKO, explaining why he did not know more details about
the Embassy, Section's targets while he was its deputy chief
in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy
overseeing subordinates.
Hence, NOSENKO continued, he could
not be expected to remember as many such details as would
be possible had he been a case officer working daily on only
four or five targets. Elsewhere, he contrasted operations
against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a
few days, with the work against the service attaches and
diplomats permanently stationed in Moscow, who could be
NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the
American Department case officer responsible for operations
against Army Attaches he received and was responsible for
assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the
individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned infor
mation received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelli
gence)
Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; and
the microphones which were emplaced about a year before
NOSENKO entered the American Department.
Comment:
NOSENKO has said variously that the microphones
in the Army Attache offices were his most
valuable source of information on his targets
of 1954-1955; that he knew nothing of these
microphones until he re-entered the Embassy
Section in 1960; and that he learned of their
existence during 1953-1955 but not where any
were located.
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Information was also received according to NOSENKO from the
network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors,
other agents in the Embassy; permanent and roving
surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; fixed observation
posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance
notification of intent to travel by the attaches and their
itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including
surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military.
The point of collecting and assimilating this information,
NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the military
attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their
intelligence collection activities. Far less important was
the goal of recruiting military attaches; NOSENKO knew of
only a few instances when this was attempted, and all of
these efforts allegedly failed.
The KGB's principal interest in control rather than
recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation
for knowing little
about the backgrounds
and personal lives of his targets--such
information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the
primary mission of
control.
He has also used this explana-
tion to support his assertion that there were no recruitments
of American military personnel during this period.
: Comment:
0001352
NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB's mission was
to control rather than to recruit American
military attaches is contradicted by the
emphasis KGB tradition and doctrine place on
conducting operations against the United
States, the "main enemy", in the KGB parlance,
in this case American officials with access to
classified information, who were residing in
the Soviet Union.
In the USSR, especially in the early 1950's
prior to the U-2 reconnaissance, the Service
Attache travel program was the primary means
by which the U.S. Armed Forces acquired intelli-
gence information on the soviet Union's
military-industrial complex.
The prevention
or inhibition of this collection activity fell
consequently to KGB components concerned with
the security of military-industrial installations,
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Comment:
(Continued)
with transportation facilities, and with the
geographic regions to which the Service:
Attaches travelled.
Approval of Service
Attache travel itineraries was not within the
competence of a case officer within the Embassy
Section; the determination would have to have
been
made by officials concerned with the
USSR's military and
industrial security and
aware of reciprocal privileges being extended
to Soviet Service Attaches in the United
States, matters involving the GRU as well as
the KGB.
An Embassy Section case officer
would have as a matter of course monitored
reports of Service Attaches' travel, searching
for personal vulnerabilities among his targets,
and
assisted local KGB elements in setting up
provocations outside of Moscow.
NOSENKO,
however, has included neither of these latter
functions as having been among his responsi-
bilities.
Custody of Case Files on Army Attache Personnel
"Sometime in the first half of 1954" NOSENKO said, he
was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent
cases, and from then until his transfer from the American
Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations
against the officer personnel of the Army Attache's office.
NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files
to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files
is presented below.
-8 April 1964: "I took over the Army Attache cases from:
Nikolay KHRENOV...
When I was leaving in 1955, I turned
the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN.":
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-10. April 1964: "I made a mistake (when] I said I
accepted the cases from KHRENOV....
I accepted the cases
from Pavel Fedorovich PAUKRATOV.
This was in the beginning
of 1954."
-15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned
over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned
to the USSR from Australia in May 1954) • HOSENKO asked
when the PETROVs defected in Australia; he explained that
he was not sure about KISLITSY and could have given them
to another officer.
"If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia)
in 1953, then it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was some-
one else."
-18: June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the Embassy Section
in 1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents.
BUDYLDIN also joined the section this year and took the
files on the Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV.
BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over
to: me.....
Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and
gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants."
NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed
responsibilities for the Attaches.
As noted above, he said
on
10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning
of 1954. Ile had earlier said that he worked on the corres-
pondents "only avout six months".
If the date of March 1953,
which he most often gave for his
entry into the KGB, is
correct, this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953.
On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned
over the correspondent cases and began work against the
Attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred
in May 1954.
In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could
not remember when he changed assignments.
Agents. Reporting on Army Attaches
Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network
(agentura) at his disposal in operations
against Army
Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO
replied:
"There were two maids, a cook, drivers...about ten
persons, plus the agent. 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the
cryptonym 'DMITRIYEV'....
These additional two agents,
about 12 or 13 agents altogether." with one exception, this
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networl: remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from
the American Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent
about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met
three times
a month in a safehouse or
on the street.. The
Assistant Army Attaches used a pool of five drivers at
random, all of whom were his agents, NOSENKO saià..
Apart
from the permanent driver for the senior Attache, none
was targetted against specific members of the attache
office.
Comment:
As noted earlier, NOSENKO named "VOLODINA" and
"RAKETA"
...as agents he used against correspondents
and against Army Attache targets, but he never
again referred to them and, in describing his
own activities, he never indicated how or in
what cases they were used:
According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting
agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source
of information on the Army Attaches being the microphones in
their offices
Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this
position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache
06
BarI L. MICKELSON] and his successor Fillmore K. MEARNS, 06
Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA: She. was an
English-speaking university graduate but "hid her
• knowledge
of English in order to overhear conversations or read
letters without taking them outside"
" and she
RICHARDS. He descrived NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin
woman,"
from whom he never obtained anything of interest.
They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.
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Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO named
Nikolay SHINYRYEV, who was used by various
attaches.
"He
reported where they went, what they said, whether they took
notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages
with them, and so on."
When viewing photographs (see below) in September 1964,
NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as his former agent
"SERVIZNIY". He had been working in the Embassy since its
establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in
NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no
direct connection with the Army Attaches,.
and NOSENKO said
he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to
handle in 1954.
The main function of this agent was
delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone
listings of the Embassy, Issued monthly.
"DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV;
NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but
was not sure, that this was his agent.
An electrician who
worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and
elevator,
"DMITRIYEV"
reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires
and other wires he had ouserved on the top floors.
Like
VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEY" had no direct connection with the
Army Attaches.
Comment:
Elsewhere HOSENKO described an electrician who
provided some technical information on the
Embassy, but he related him to his second tour
in the American Embassy Section in 1960-1962
and did not then claim that the electrician was
his agent.
In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260
biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American
Embassy in Moscow.
Each card contained a photograph of
person involved and short biographic notes, including his
name and job in the Embassy.
The first time he went through
these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photo-
graphs; NOSENKO diù not identify the photograpis of SHNYRYEV
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and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VOROBYFV was familiar,
adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. "Then shown
the Embassy biographic cards on SHNVRYEV and KUKOLEV, he
identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955
period in the American Department and equated them to the
cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when
shown the biogtaphic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as
"chauffeur for the military attache," NOSENKO exclaimed:
"Oh my God,
this is my own agent."
He later said it was
good photograph of SHNYRYEV.
NOSENKO's Targets
Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel
for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955,
NOSENKO orally listed the following names: "MICKELSON,
MEARNS, -
_RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE,
• STROUD, and
CARDELLA."
06,06,06;06,06,06, 06, 06
Comment:
In the order as given by NOSENKO; the list
comprises two generations of Army Attaches in
MOSCOW:
It is neither in alphabetical order
nor chronological according to date or service
in Moscow. It is, however, in descending
order of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through 06
Captains MULE and SPRouD to Chief tarrant
Officer CARDELLA.
06
06
MICKELSON)
06
NOSENKO correctly identified Earl I. MICKELSON)as a
08
[colonel and the Army Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955.
PANKRATOV. was the case officer originally handling (MICKELSON, 06
and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When aske
who might
about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, Ob
NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational
contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, 06
whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA:.
In addition to
these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was 06
his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember.
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NOSENKO said that the KGß learned nothing interesting about
06 MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, ox
surveillance, and that no operational
approach or recruit-
ment was attempted.
There was, in fact, no interesting of
derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source.
Comment:
06
MICKELSON) was
involved in at least two
incidents inside the Soviet Union which
NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was
arrested in Thilisi on the (false) charge of:
having photographed a bridge.
In August 1954
C6 MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photo-
graphy south of Kharkov; on this occasion he
was held for two hours before being released.
It is judged that such events, particularly
those staged by the KGB, would be known to the
KGB case officer responsible for the attache
officer concerned.
06
06
MEARNS
C6
NOSENKO accurately identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as
MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsi-
Ble case officer.
There were two agents and one operational
contact working against MEARNS.I6 Of these, IOSENKO could
recall the name onlv
of NOVIKOVA; the same maid who reported
earlier on MICKELSON! Besides being told to attempt to over-
do hear MEARNS" conversations, NOVIKOVA was instructed to
search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find,
but she never overheard or found anything öf interest to
the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects 06
were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to
Moscow from the United States, and that all his service
records had been discovered and photographed. (NOSENKO
been and said that information from concealed microphönes
showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest
concerning him was received from these microphones or from
telephone taps.
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06
RICHARDS
06
NOSENKO correctly identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a
lieutenant colonel who served as an Assistant Army Attachel. D8
in Moscow:
The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO 06
could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym
"SHVEDOVA"
but she had never provided any worthwhile
information about RICHARDS. In addition, some soviet drivers
reported on RICHARDS, Lut nothing useful was obtained from
them.
Comment:
06
RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to
July 1956.
There was a microphone in the office
which he shared first with MICKELSON and later
-06-
06 (RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA Wa:
his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman
who had a heart attack during the period she
was employed by him, an incident which was
not recalled by NOSENKO.
For about four months of his Moscow tour,
06 RICHARDS, took Russian-language lessons from
Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment:
During
Ob these lessons, (RICHARDS) often discussed labor
conditions and wages in the United States and,
on one occasion, had her record her speech on
his tape recorder.
GROMAKOVA was pregnant and
unmarried at the time. In another context,
NOSENKO named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent during
1960-1962 but did not relate her to RICHARDS 06
or to the 1953-1955 period.
OL RICHARDS identified one
"Volodya" (the
diminutive of Vladimir) as his principal
driver. Avout 62 years old in 1954, Volodya's
father was a rich jeweler in Moscow
at the time
of the Revolution. Volodya himself was well
educated and, on one occasion while picnicking
outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with
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Comment:
(Continued)
06 RICIARDS about the Revolution, propaganda, anc
news media.
NOSENKO did not know of Volodya
who, as RICHARDS% driver, was NOSENKO's agent
Ly NOSENKO's own account.
06
FELCHLIN
06
NOSENKO correctly identified Howard L. FELCHLINas a
lieutenant colonel who served
as Assistant Army Attache in 08
Moscow.
By far the most aggressive of his targets and hence
the object of special interest, NOSENKO said FELCHLIN servedoX
in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until
being declared persona non grata.
NOSENKO did not recall
the names. of any agents specifically targetted against
EELCHLIN, although he thought FELCHIIN must have had a maid U8
who would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO
08 said, the Assistant Army Attache? shared a pool of cars and
drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the
08 precise
date of FELCHILIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to
some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States
for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind..
NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel
DO FELCHLIN, but said the action was based on information which
had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents.
O For example, FELCHLIN| had been caught taking some photo-
graphs and a report had been written; along with other
Osimilar indications of [FELCHLIN's activities and reports of
for possible future use.
FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations.. He said
then that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata;
February
and that no other
attaches had been involved. NOSENKC
explained his having but few details concerning this action
by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred
from the American Department to the Seventh Department in
June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN's background.
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Comment:
FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman
and a diplomatic courier before arriving in
July 1953 as an Assistant Army Attache, 08He
served in the Latter capacity. tor one
year!
until July 1954, when he was expelled. He had
previously served in Austria and West Germany
and had been in official contact with known
GRU officers
at both posts, as well as in the
United States. During his entire tour in
Moscow he was the object of intense KGB
surveillance.
•& Shortly äfter his arrival in September 1953
FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant Army Attache 08
Martin J. MANHOFF and Ewo Air Force Attaches, 08
a train trip to siberia, the first trip
permitted such Americans in many years. Six
months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet
newspaper Trud carried an article falsely
O alleging that FELCHLIN and his companions had
lost some "spy documents" on the train. On
another occasion, while travelling with a
British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to08
his train compartment to find a scantily clad
Soviet female in his berth. NOSENKO recalled
neither of these incidents.
In June 1954, while in the company of
Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YAGER, an Assistant06,08,06
Army Attache,- FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev
by a Soviet Army: officer for photographing a
military target.
(NOSENKO has never mentioned
YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked
for an identification, NOSENKO said that he
08
had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was 06
the Air Attache.) A large crowd gathered and,
after some jostling, EELCHLIN and YEAGER were 06,06
taken to a Militia station where they were
ordered to sign a confession. They were held
eleven hours, and their arrest caused the
American Ambassador to deliver a strong protest
note 06 (FELCHLIN was told on 3 July 1954 to
depart the Soviet Union within 48 hours.
Major Walter A. MCKINNEX the [American Air 06
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Comment:
(Continued)
spy notes" were
allegedly lost, was declared persona pon grata
at the same time.
Ambassador Bohlen success-
fully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal,
that his personal plane be allowed into the
USSR to fly FELCHLIN
and (MCKINNEY, out. In 06,00
February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe
the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN 06
left.
NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch, as
he was no longer in the American Department
at the time.
Told that the expulsion took
place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the
correct date.
06
Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and
C6l
FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph
and name as one of the chauffeurs assigned to
the office of the Army Attache at the Moscow
Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip 06.
outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that
the Attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either
"Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or
"Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to
the sane: na ne
distinguish him from another chauffeur with
FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV O6
drove primarily for the Army Attache himself,
but sometimes drove for the Assistant Army
Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was
not well, suffered from war wounds, and had
continuing chest or lung trouble. Asked whether
SHNYRYEV had any medical problem, NOSENKO said
he was not aware of any.
06 FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOROVA was
in her 50's.
When she spoke with FELCHLIN] 06
about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a
month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN D6
offered 80. FEDOROVA refused
and Teft. Two
days later she returned and accepted.
She
spoke little English. Other maids came to
• the
back door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with06
her, and
suspecting that they were reporting to
FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her about it.
06
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Comment:
(Continued)
FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy
gave. her full name to columnist Drew Pearson
with a statement that she was
one of the chief
spies and the local "boss" of the Embassy net-
work. Pearson printed the allegation.
In the
summer of 1953 or 1954, according to (FEICHLIN, 06
the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, 06
waved it in his face, and accused him of being
Pearson's source.
NOSENKO did not recognize
FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or
reading of this incident.
BENSON
06
O NOSENKO correctly identified his target John
S.
as a major and Assistant Army Attachej in MoscoW.
Ob recall the
He
said that BENSON was with(MuLd]and/STROUD] (see below) Cin 06,06
J;Of Stalingrad In 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB
with electronic "spying" devices.
persona non
oct on 9n
names of any agents working against BENSON but06
They were declared
grata.
The KGB had
no other derogatory infor
mation on BENSON from any other source.
06-STROUD
06
NOSENKO correctly identified William R.
STROUD, as
captainand an Assistant Army Attache. OThe only agents
working against him were the Army Attache drivers.
•Erom
concealed microphones, the KGB learned before STROUDs 06
arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of
electronic spying apparatus:
He ease with BENSON and MULEl: 06;06
ID in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with
them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB
knew nothing unusual of interesting about sTROUD from any
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Comment:
06.
06
witin[BENSOrT and MULE,
was the victim
of the Soviets' seizure of technical equip-
ment in Stalingrad and was declared persona lU
non gratã on I May 1955) On 31 January 1955 04
he travelled to Kharkov from Moscow with First
Secretary Frank SISCONto interview an AmericanO
defector. living there.
According to NOSENKO,
Ob SISCOE was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA
officer. The visit ofTex-FBI agent SISCOE and 08,06
a military officer to an American defector is
judged to be an event in which the KGB would
have taken interest and one which the Attache's
KGB case officer would find memorable.
MULE] 06
06
NOSENKO correctly identified (alter MULEjas an
O& Assistant. Army Attache and
as such said that he was the case
officer responsible for him.
NOSENKO described an operational
06 approach to MULE,
in which he himself participated:
In 1953
or 1954 there had' been several defection approaches to
Soviets in the United States with the promise of money and
a new life.
After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided
to try the same measures, MULE was selected.OfHe was only a
08
(captain) despite his lengthy service in the Army and infor-
mation from concealed microphones indicated that he was often
disparaged by the other Attaches.
When MULE received lettersi
from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned
these over to the KGB. From this mail it was understood
did not have a house.in the United States but
lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two
Ochildren, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germany for
an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great
an economic burden.
appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American Depart-
ment, to attempt to defect MULIAO Together with BORODIN,
KOVSIUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's
special technical section), NOSEUKO travelled to Leningrad
for the operation.
LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a
concealed camera as well as microphones
in MULEl's hotel room,
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06
and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return.
When
O6 MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of BORODIN
and
tried to back out; 'but NOSENKO and KOVSHÜK closed the
door from the hall and prevented his escape. BORODIN
Obreviewed for Muld the facts the KGB had accumulated about
his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow
Attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a
job as a
"consultant".
BORODIN had either $5,000 or
$10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULEto accept.
Accordingb6
to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIM to get
out.
06
Comment:
MULE
reported this incident. He said that he
was locked in his hotel room and subjected to
a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling
himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000
for "work" on a long-range basis.
SIEGAL
emphasized that MULE would not be required to 06
procure documents from the Embassy, and
Obaccording to MULE,\ SIEGAL was aware of facts
Obconcerning MULD's personal life that could
have been obtained only from listening devices
Ob in MULE's apartment or office.
SIEGAL left
after about 20 minutes, having warned MULLI not 06
to report the incident. MULEidentified
STEGAL/BORODIN by photograph, but was unable to
identify NOSENKO.
KGB lack of interest in recruitments, which
NOSEIKO elsewhere cited to explain his ignorance
of the personal backgrounds of his Army Attache
targets, is belied by the MULE)case. 06
06,06
06
BENSON, MULE and STROUD
Expulsion from the Soviet Union
After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Seventh
Department in 1955. BENSON.
of a KGB operation
which resulted in
MULE and STROUD were the targets 06,0b
all three men being
06
declared persona non grata:
NOSENKO gave the following account
of this incident:
For some time the Second Chief Directorate
had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of
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electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers
were known to be using during their travels inside the
Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the
American Department had been given authorization
from the
Central Committee of the Communist Party to steal this
equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of
such
an operation was assured.
Before his transfer to the
Seventh Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped to
develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an
abortive attempt to seize the equipment from an Attache at
a railroad station outside Moscow.
O6 TROUD were on one of their trips (after NoSEsTol Muur and 06,06
s trânsfer)
It was learned that they had the equipment with them, and
the KGB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad.lD The
hotel rooms of (BENSON OSTROUD
fron a visual observation postond MuLE
were watched constantly
6 and it was noted that they
never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms.
It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a
pillow before they began to eat.
While they were seated at
the taule having ainner, therefore, the Kee officers suddenly
entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to
partially cover the illegality of
this act, it was decide
to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE] and STROUD from the 06
Soviet Union, and' this was done by having!the Foreign Ministry
declaring each persona non grata.
06
Comment:
The eguipment was seized from BENSON, MULE and
0f stRoudon 5 May 1955, and the three were declared
persona non grata on 7 May, a month before
NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to the
Seventh Department.
when the 7 May date was
given to NOSENKO during the February 1965
interrogations, he replied that the operation
was handled at
a higher level, that he did not
directly participate in it, but that he had
been involved in the earlier planning to seize
the equipment. It was pointed out to him that
he had always said he was in the Seventh
Department at the time of this operation, and
that he had consistently said that he transferred
from the American to the Seventh Department in
June 1955.
NOSENKO offered no comment.
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CARDELLA
06
NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was a
civilian administrative officer in the Embassy by the name
of James CARDELLA•U6 The KGB had no interesting or unusual
information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO
could say nothing more about him. 0b
Comment:
As a memier of the Army Attache's staff,
06 CARDELLA also would have been NOSENKO's target.
06
Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served in Moscow
from September 1953 until June 1955. In 1964
a microphone was discovered in the Embassy office
06 (CARDELLA had occupied. The microphone was
believed to have been emplaced in 1952
See
₽ .
227.
VAN LAETHEM
06
06
O&NOSENKO
incorrectly identified George VAIT LAETHEM as
an Assistant Air Attachelat
the Embassy against whom an
operation was attempted in 1953 or 1954.
He said that
during this period a Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was
placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the
mission of striking up an acquaintance with [VAN LAETHM 06
which could be followed up in Moscow. She succeeded in
ine sephone
meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number.
Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he
never did call her in Moscow.
NOSENKO said that he had
heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer
handling LARIONOVA.
He added that CHURAITOV was the case
officer responsible for VAN LAETHEM, along with other 06
members of the Air Attache's office at that time. NOSENKO OS
knew of no other KGB interest in or activity concerning
VAN LAETHEM.
06
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Comment:
TAN LATE Tran
LADiE: Iwas not an assistant Air Attacine 08
but an Assistant Army Attachedserving
Moscow fron Marci 1951 to March 1953.
When
06 VAN LAETrEil completed his two-year tour in
Moscow in Marcil 1953 when NOSENKO Said ne
entered tie KGB), ile was succeeded by Walter 06
JULE, for whom NOSENKO has claimed responsi-
vility.
The fact
to the responsible KGB case officer, in this
case, NOSENKO.
As cryptographic security u8
officer and officer in charge of the Embassy
обов
code room, VAN LAETHEiT had supervisory respon-
sibility for the military code clerks and
mecianics, including Dayle SiITH, and ie was
on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant
ROY RIODES until VAN LAETHElls departure from06
Moscow in March 1953. VAN LAETHEil's üuties 06
also included responsibility for sensitive
electronic activities in the Embassy.
VAN LAETHELl was again in Moscow from 19 larch
to 19 May 1955, wien NOSENKO claims to nave
been the KGB case officer for Army Attaches.
Altiough this visit was only a temporary as-
signment, it was represented to the Soviets
as a permanent assignment of an Assistant Army
Attache (and
tius, presumably NOSENKO's tar-
get) jecause of the sensitive nature of his
duties. He was project officer for the entire
signals collection program at the Embassy,
and ile
went to Moscow to review the program
including the planned use of tile new electronic
equipment which was seized from (BENSON, MULE] 06,06
and STRoUbin Stalingradlin May 1955 (whiled
D6 VAN LAETHE was still in iloscow). VAN LAETHEl U6
stated that no meeting such as the one iOSENKO
descrived witi LARIONOVA ever occurred.
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Additional Reporting
Knowledge of another KGB operation involving Americans
was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in
но емко en co aven
the
operations against E.E. SMITH in 1954-1955. The incidents
which NOSENKO described, however, occurred in June 1956,
by which time NOSENKO, by his own account, had been out of
invoted in the seven
the American Embassy Section for a year and when he was
Involved in the Seventh Department recruitment of Richardü6
BURGI,
His involvement in the BURGI case has been confirmed.
NOSENKO has also described the KGB recruitment of military
cipher machine mechanic "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33),
whose
true name he claimed not to have known.
He dated the
recruitment as occurring "in 1949-1950" and "before he
joined the KGB", although he said that he knew of the
existence of the agent during his first tour in the Embassy
However, NOSENKO also related that
"ANDREY" was recruited while Roy RHODES was in Moscow, that
RHODES
"ANDREY" and RHODES Over-
lapped in Moscow from April 1952 to July 1953.
"ANDREY"
fixes his own recruitment as occurring in December 1953,
until his departure in April 1954 he was responsible
for the entire Embassy code room. In that capacity "ANDREY"
was a direct subordinate of the Army Attache cryptographic
security officer, NOSENKO's target Army Captain Walter MULE 06
If NOSENKO served in the 'Embassy Section during 1953-1955
as he claimed, it is difficult to perceive how he could have
remained unaware of "ANDREY's" identity.
American Embassy Section - ca. 1953-June 1955:
Summary and Conclusion
According to NOSENKO, immediately upon entering on duty
with the KGB he was assigned without training to what he
describes as the most sensitive and important section of
the Second Chief Directorate.
agents covering American correspondents resident in Moscow,
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he was made the case officer solely responsible for opera-
tions against the commissioned officers of the Embassy's
Army Attache office, until his transfer to the Seventh
Department. Alleging complete knowledge of all service
attache operations, NOSENKO flatly asserts that there were
no KGB recruitments of American military personnel during
the period of his assignment to the Embassy Section.
Pertinent to the consideration of NOSENKO's statements
is his reluctance to discuss the 1953-1955 period, and his
inconsistent accounts of the dating and circumstances of
his entry into the Embassy Section, of his assumption of
responsibility as sole case officer for Army Attache tar-
gets, and of his transfer to the Seventh Department. : Al-
though NOSENKO could plausibly claim failing memory to ex-
plain some areas of ignorance, he does not do so.
Instead,
he is positive and insistent that his statements
• about his
targets are a factual and complete account of what was then
known to the KGB. His assertion that the KGB was not in-
terested in his targets'
vulnerability to recruitment is
belied by his own statements as
as he himself related it.
well as by the MULE] case, 06
He is uninformed about both At-
tache personnel and agent-informants who, by his own ac
count, were his targets and his agents..
Conclusion
NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section
throughout the March 1953-June 1955 period as he claimed.
Specifically, he neither entered the Section in March 1953
nor transferred from the Section in June 1955. In whatever
period he may have served, he was not the sole case officer
responsible for commissioned officers in the office of the
Army Attache. Unaware of many aspects of KGB activities
involving Army personnel and by his own account not involved
with either Air or Naval Attache personnel or diplomats,
NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB re-
cruited no American Embassy personnel during this period.
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CHAPTER VI
SEVENTIT DE PANINORIN' (June 1055-January 1960)
Corment:
MOStuTO's clained Sacond Chief Directorate
service during 1055-1960, in which he was
involved with seventh Department operations
against merican and British tourists, coin-
cides with the arowti of a suistantial
American and
Intelligence program!)
aimed at exploiting tourists visiting the
Soviet Union. Beginning in 1956, the growth
of tourism which followed the post-Stalin
thaw in the USSR had grown to the point
where it could be usefully exploited by CIA.
Initially, returning American tourists were
debriefed on their experiences in the Soviet
Union anc particularly with regard to their
acquaintances
there with Soviet citizens who
might be susceptille to eventual recruitment.
Gradually, leads were developed to Americans
planning to visit the USSR, and from among
these, agents were
selected, trained in
clandestine operational techniques, briefed
on intelligence requirements, and
instructed
how to icontify and develop potential agents
from arong their soviet contacts.
The
American agents performed a variety of clan
destine tasks including passive assessment
of Sovict candidates for recruitment, propa-
ganda activities, and infiltrating equipment,
loading deaddrops, or mailing letters bearing
secret writing, all destined for CIA agents
the
Soviet Union:
The
program reached its height in 1959,
by
tlie end of which over one hundred and
fifty agents under tourist cover from CIA
alone had performed missions in the USSR; by
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Comment:
(Continued)
then a substantial number of similar missions
had also been launched by American military
intelligence organizations and by the
and allied services.
It is a matter of fact, not of conjecture,
that as early as 1957 a large number of these
agents were coming to the attention of the KGB
within the Soviet Union.
Few were arrested.
Instead, all were surveilled, and some pro
voked or entrapped, as the
Second Chief
Directorate and its provincial KGB counter-
intelligence elements sought to identify the
Soviet citizens with whom the American
agents
were in contact, as well as the agents'
specific clandestine tasks. By the summer
of 1959 the KGB had obtained from its British
objectives and methods of CIA andl
Intelligence tourist programs, together with
a number of case examples.
It is within this context that one must
examine NOSENKO's claims to KGB service in
and consequent knowledge of Second Chief
Directorate counterintelligence operations
against American and British tourists in 1955-
1960 ₽
NOSENKO claimed he served with the Seventh Department
from June 1955 until January 1960.
According to him, the
Seventh Department exercised counterintelligence functions
involving foreigners then visiting the Soviet Union,
including businessmen,
seamen, foreign delegations
and some
tourists, as well as
the hotels and restaurants utilized by
these visitors.
He said that by 1958, however, the number
of foreign tourists visiting the Soviet Union had grown
appreciably, and in June 1958 the Seventh Department
Tourist Section was split, and two new sections were created.
NOSENKO explained that one
of the new sections became
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responsible for counterintelligence operations conducted
against American and British Commonwealth nationals, the
other section was charged with all other nationalities.
It is convenient to divide the examination of NOSENKO's
claims to service in the Seventh Department into two
periods. The first of these covers the years from June
1955 until June 1958, during which NOSENKO said he was a
case officer handling and recruiting agents of all nationa-
lities and planning and managing other operational activi-
ties.
second period covers HOSENKO's service from June
1958, when he claimed to have become Deputy Chief of the
newly-created American-British Commonwealth Section, to the
beginning of 1960.
ITOSINKO described his personal and direct participation
Seventh Department operations during this four and one-
years as including:
-Recruiting and handling Soviet citizen agents and
targetting them against American tourists.
ITOSENKO'S
agentura varied in number from eight to fourteen agents,
most of whom were employees of Inturist.
-Mounting operations against fifteen foreigners,
principally Americans, in the Soviet Union.
-Recruiting a pair of Soviet homosexuals as agents
to be utilized
against foreign homosexual targets. NOSINIKO
managed the pair from their recruitment in 1957 and 1958
until their retirement in 1962 or 1963.
"06
-Recruiting and handling (Arsene FRIPPEL, the American 08
Express Company representative
In Moscow.
(NOSENKO continued
0b to meet FRIPPELeven after the latter was transferred from
Moscow to New York and after NOSENKO was transferred from
the Seventh Department.)
From personal involvement or otherwise NOSEIKO claimed
that he learned of all the important operations conducted
against American tourists during this period of his Seventh
Department service.
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(SEVENTE DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
NOSENKO'S Soviet Agents
The Seventh Department Tourist Section, just established
when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent
network for operations against American and British tourists.
Consequently, NOSENKO said, he and
the other case officers
had to "start from the beginning".
As a first step NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow.
officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist.
These
were not agents, he explained, but "just persons a KGB man
could approach with questions
about somebody or something".
NOSENKO collected information on these and others with the
aim of formalizing their recruitments. By the end of 1955,
he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all
of them Inturist interpreters. During the following
years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied.
Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another,
some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing
all the time, back and forth". In 1956, NOSENKO said, he
had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about twelve, in
1958 about eight, and
at the end of 1959 (when he was
preparing to return to the American Department) he had
approximately twelve. The substance of MOSFNKO's descrip-
tion of his agents is as follows:
Larissa SOBOROVA
An Inturist English-language interpreter, SOBOROVA was
one of the first agents recruited in 1955 by NOSENKO within
Inturist.
She reported to him on all foreigners with whom
she worked as an interpreter.
She worked with NoseNko when
he served as a quide for British subjects BIRSE and LANE 1n Ub U6
the summer of 1957.
During 1957-1959 she was involved and
possibly sexually intimate with American travel writer
Horace SUTTON.
SOBOROVA was NOSEIIKO's agent until 1959,
08,06
when
she married and "retired".
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Comment:
SOBOROVA was an Inturist guide for a number
of American tourists, including CiA agents,
between 1957 and 1959. (SUTTON/has identified 06
between 15%g
In 1959 she was the head of all English-
language interpreters at Inturist headquarters
in the National Hotel, Moscow.
Vladimir MURONTSEV
MUROMISEV; KCB cryptonym
"LEDEDEV", was recruited by
LOSENKO from Inturist in 1955. He was HOSENKO's agent!
until called Into the army in about 1959, when he was sent
to a Soviet Air Force Academy in Central Asia to serve as
an
interpreter with Syrian students there.: During that
period his file was held by the KGB organization in Central
Asia.
Then he returned to Moscow he was re-employed by the
returned to
KGB
Second Directorate.
Comment:
NOSENKO has said elsewhere that MUROMTSEV had
been
a Second
Chief Directorate agent "since
1958", implying that someone else recruited
him and that he thus could not have been
NOSENKO's agent in 1955.
MUROMTSEV was
identified in 1957 as an Inturist guide by
two CIA sources.
Nikolay ROGOV
ROGOV, KGB cryptonym "OZERO"; was recruited in 1955;
He
had been formerly a "confidential contact" of the KGB.
He
worked in the central Inturist office which assigned inter-
preters to British and American citizens visiting the USSR.
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Comment: CIA records refer only to one Alexander ROGOV
who in 1960 was a senior official at the main
Inturist office in the Hotel National in Moscow.
Nataliya SHULGINA
SHULGINA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO
in 1955.
NOSENKO knew that double agent Boris BELITSKIY
[see p.282] "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY
against SHULGINA".
Comment:
KGB-controlled CIA source BELITSKIY reported
to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent: CIA did
not warn him.
SHULGINA was for two years the
secretary-interpreter of NBC correspondent
Irving R. LEVINE after his arrival in Moscow
in July 1955. She served as a guide for an
American musical troupe's visit in the Ussi
in 1956 and in 1956 and 1957 she served as a
guide for American tourists in Moscow. According
to BELITSKIY, she was involved in the sexual
entrapment and KGS recruitment of British MP O6
NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of
SHULGINA's Involvement with LEVINE and other
Americans, as well as with (DRIBERG, and of her
foreign travel, belies his claim that she was
his agent during the 1955-1958 period. Shown
her photograph in 1964, NOSENKO failed to
recognize it.
When he was then given her name,
he identified her not as his former agent but
just as a Second Chief Directorate agent once
involved with BELITSKIY.
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Tamara KUNGAROVA
KUNGAROVA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by
NOSENKO in 1955. In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a
KGB sexual entrapment operation of an American professor
06 John THOMPSOND,
but there was no attempt to recruit him.
Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was targetted against
American tourist and suspect CIA agent
(see p.420)• KUNGAROVA married
Tand emigrated to 08,03
England, and the KGB was still interested in
at 05
the time NOSENKO left the Seventh Department.
Comment:
Elsewhere NOSENKO has said KUNGAROVA was an
agent who came
to the Seventh Department from
the British Commonwealth Department in 1957
or early 1958. If true, he could not have
recruited her or have been her case officer in
the 1955-1957 period. In describing the
Jcase, NOSENKO indicated he himself was
not involved and, although he commented on
KUNGAROVA's role, he never mentioned that she
was or had been his agent. KUNGAROVA was
interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's
information and she confirmed that she had been
Ointimate with THOMPSON while serving as an
Inturist guide, as well as with other Americans.
She denied, however, that she had ever colla-
borated with the KGB. KUNGAROVA died in 1965.
Aleksandr A. DMITRIYEV
DMITRIYEV, KGB cryptonym "TOMO"; when NOSENKO recruited
him in 1958,
was a candidate member of the USSR Academy of
Sciences and a specialist on Japan and Thailand. He spoke
Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese Exhibition
in Moscow..:
He
"was used against British and American
nationals"
DMITRIYEV was also used
against
communications
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personnel at the Japanese
Exhibit, but while he telephoned
NOSENKO, he was meeting
with another KGB case officer.
DMITRIYEV accompanied a sports delegation to Norway and a
Soviet circus to Japan.
Comment:
DMITRIYEV's travel to Norway and Japan in
1958 is confirmed.. From NOSENKO's own
statement he was aware of DMITRIYEV'S
activities, but he was not his case officer.
(Enu) IVANOV
Once a recruited agent in the Baltic area, when IVANOV
moved to Moscow the provincial KGB suggested he might be
of some use in the capital. IVANOV was a lawyer employed
by the Institute of Foreign Trade when NOSENKO became his
case officer.
IVANOV was later turned over to the British
Commonwealth Department which "planted him in the British
Trade Mission or something like that"
Comment: CIA records contain no reference identifiable
with IVANOV.
Marina RYTOVA
RYTOVA, KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA", was turned over to
NOSENKO by another Seventh Department case officer, I.A.
KONSTANTINOV, in 1956 or 1957. She was educated at the
Military Institute of Foreign Languages, where she studied
military subjects as well as foreign languages. When
NOSENKO became her case
officer she was working as an
interpreter at the Russian
i Permanent Exhibit in Moscow.
She
continued this job until about 1960, when she became an
instructor in the Greek language at
the Institute of
International Relations. She reported to NOSENKO information
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which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists
who visited the Exhibit in Moscow, and on foreign delegates
attending meetings at the Ministry of Agriculture, where
she served as an interpreter in English and Greek.
RYTOVA
served several times as an interpreter for Khrushchev and
once participated in a conversation he had with the Iowa
In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as
an interpreter with a small delegation visiting GARST's
farm in the United States,.
and was used by the KGB Legal
Residency in Washington to report observations made enroute
and while there.
RYTOVA was married to a captain or major
who works in a military office in Moscow. She had one
daughter, approximately 14 years old.
Comment:
RYTOVA served as an interpreter for Roswell
GARST in the USSR in 1955, 1959 and 1963 and
ine tved
she visited the U.S. in 1958 and 1962. Her
biographic data is consistent. with the infor-
mation related by NOSENKO.
Yevgeniya ("Jane) DANKO
DANKO, KGB cryptonym "OKSANA", worked in the American
29
Express Company office in Moscow for Arsene FRIPPELU6
(NOSENKO's agent, see p.137)_ and later for FRIPPELlS 06
successor, Michael JELISAVCIC:06 NOSENKO took DANKO over
from Seventh Department case officer I.A. KONSTANTINOV in
1955-1957. She was used to report on JELISAVCiG
Comment:
DANKO was an Inturist guide in 1956, 1958 and
1959, and she was working for the American29
Express Company office in 196006 FRIPPELIeft
Moscow in 1961, by which time NOSENKO had
transferred from the Seventh Department.
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Soviet Homosexual Agents
The KGB operations which NOSENKO described commonly
involved sexual entrapment. Many of the operations in
which he claimed a personal role involved the use of homo-
sexual agents, KGB agents whose homosexuality was exploited
against susceptible male targets. While NOSENKO was
never
their official case officer, in specific recruitment-
entrapment operations he worked with "LUCH", "NIKOLAYEV".•
"SIBIYAK", "KOSHIKIN" and "STROYEV" (Victor BELANOVSKIY,
used in the compromise of Richard BURGI, VASSALL, and the O6
Canadian Ambassador WATKINS). He provided virtually no
personality information on them and usually could not recall
their true names.
Two such homosexuals, however, VOLKOV
and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO claimed were his own agents.
NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former
agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV
(cryptonym "GRIGORIY") and to have been their sole case
officer from the beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-
1958 until they were discharged in 1963 because they had
become too well known. He said he met them frequently,
and directed them in at least a dozen entrapment operations
or other homosexual encounters.
NOSENKO claimed he took
them with him when he transferred to the American Department
in 1960 and back again in early 1962 to the Seventh
Department.
YEFREMOV and VOLKOV
Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a
public toilet in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded
that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some
operational value.
To verify this possibility in 1957, a
homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations
Department provoked VOLKOV into a compromising situation.
Then VOLKOV, who had previously been a KGB agent but was
at this time inactive, was summoned by the KGB and, after
NOSENKO interrogated him, he admitted his homosexuality and
agreed to NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among
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homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to
recruit a homosexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not
recalled) YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked
as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in
addition to specific targets, they had the general assign-
ment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the
purpose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described
on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents:
"Although I am
a chief of section there I
have all sorts of agents.
I have a good agent
apparatus.
.. I have beautiful girls, whom I can
use as I like.
I have homosexuals, in particu-
lar, one special pair.
I am afraid they are
known to both you and the British... I permitted
this pair to work [without specific assignments]
on their own.
I give them money and tell them
to go lo0k around, but only Americans. Look for
American pederasts.
call me at night:
neury ryanayich;
There is a mister so-and-so
I say:
'Well, let him Ido what he
wants]. We'll talk about it tomorrow.'
So the
next day they go to a special hotel room.
make photographs. Then we think about what he
recommend that he be recruited or not--depending. i
on his position, what he can give, what he can
If he can give something, I say: 'Well,
let's have a go ligratl.'
After this, I speak
to these boys:
'Well, go with him again.
Do
whatever is wanted.'
All this is observed by
the KGB:
The (hotell administrator enters.
'What are you doing?' The administrator calls
the Militia. An akt is drawn up.
'well, you
are
a foreigner.
This is not our business. We
don't know what to do with you.'
Then the Chief
arrives and a conversation ensues:
'Listen,
what shall we do?
Pederasty is punishable by
three to five years and now, on the basis of
recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand,
if your friends find out that you are a pederast--
and how can they help but find out'
..."
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Then NOSENKO moved from
the Seventh Department to
the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in
January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him.
They
were never used against targets in the American Embassy
but, NOSENKO said, the Seventh Department "used to call
me on homosexual prospects". VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued
as active KGB agents until some time in 1960 or 1961.
man ed de that hey were to wei
known". NOSENKO claimed that the agents were retired and
that he himself sent their files to KGB Archives in 1962
or 1963.
08
03
NOSENKO's Soviet Agents: Summary
NOSENKO claims to have been these agents' case officer
for two to five years, during which he met each regularly,
assigned them operational tasks, and received their reports.
With the exception of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, however, NOSENKO
can cite few instances of their operational use, and he has
but superficial knowledge of their personal backgrounds.
It is unlikely that this is merely the result of failing
recollection.
He knows no more about the three whom he
claimed he took with him to the Embassy Section, where he
continued to be their case officer for two more years, than
he does about the others.
In the two instances where his
agents were involved in KGB operational activity, NOSENKO
is unaware of SHULGINA's work with LEVINE and DRIBERG, and
was not involved when KUNGAROVA was targetted against ano
married CIA agent Philip NIELSEN. NOSENKO's familiarity
with the nine agents he named appears to be that which
would be acquired second-hand, not through personal contact
as he claimed.
With respect to YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, the evidence does
not sustain NOSENKO's claim that he was their case officer
in every operation from their recruitment in 1957 until
their retirement in 1962-1963. He is unfamiliar with either
agent's background.
He cannot say where either of them
lived or, indeed, how he got in touch with them when he
required their services.
With the exception of the w.E. 06
JOHNSON compromise in 1962 (see p.268), all of VOLKOV's and
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(SEVENTHI DEPARTIENE - June 1955-January 1960):
YEFRIMOV's Jnown activities with respect to Americans took
place in the course of less than twelve months in 1959-
1960 •
It is probable that MOSENKO's claim that he was
their sole case officer during even this relatively brief
period is also false.:
In the period April-ilovember. 1959,
apparently unknown to MOSENKO; VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were
involved with one Dutch and five American visitors (including
three CIA agents)
in the Soviet Union. Further, in other
contexts NOSENKO has described their involvement with
D6 Americans (MATLAW)(see p.419) and/KARLOV in 1959, 0.
YDFREMOV's file in 1962-1963.
a swedish, not
an American, citizen.]
06:
Operational Activities (1955-1958)
Tourist Section Casc Officer
According to HOSINKO, he was among the first case officers
to arrive in the Seventh Department Tourist Section when it
was being formed. lle took part with other officers in the
acquisition of an agent network from within Inturist, in the
establishment of facilities and methods, and generally
"getting things going".
After several months, he partici-
pated in
mates an toatine says was bis Sit s bration heasnetean
(and hence unconfirmed) anc unsuccessful attempt to compro-
mise American student Martin MALIA,06 NOSFNKO's next case
(the first operation in
which his participation is confirmea)
Richard BURGI. Sometime in 1957, he said, he was personally
involved in the attempted recruitment of the Germanj business-l!
JO(GEIIRCKENS and in the sexual and blaclmarket entrapment ot
06 SUNDAR) á Norwegian journalist. : (Doth GEHRCKCNS,and SUNDAR 04
the object. of KGB. recruitment
attempts, the
former reluctantly in a private interview;
and
the latter publicly in the press. It ias been possible to
question neither in detail.] NOSENKO's presence in the
third "operation" in 1957 is confirmed: he accompanied the
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08,06
Rritish publisher Sir Allen LANE
and the latter's inter-
O6 preter BIRSE on a
tour of soviet publishing houses.
According to NOSENKQ, it was for the purpose of observing
O6 BIRSE,
a suspected British intelligence agent. 05
Attempted Entrapment Of MALIA
(1955)
06
NOSENKO's Information
Martin MALIA,
a graduate student, spent about four months
in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected by the KGB of having
contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual.
The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually
66 MALIÂt to a
KGB homosexual agent, and the latter enticed
06 MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow.
NOSENKO
was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) whenl
the introductions were made in a Moscow restaurant, and from
an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched
06 the KGB agent and MALIA in homosexual practices. MALIA! 06
insisted on the lights being turned off, however, and It was
impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did
not yet have infrared photographic equipment) and therefore
no recruitment approach was made to MALIA-Do During this and
a later
trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA]was
"very cautious", 06
and the
KGB never succeeded in exploiting MALIA'5 homo- 06
sexuality for a recruitment approach.
Comment:
06
MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence officer during
World War II, visited the Soviet Union in 1955
and twice in 1962.
While buying books for the
Library Of Congress and several universities
Ob in 1955, MALIA travelled over 10,000 miles
throughout the USSR, an event sufficiently
unusual at the time to be publicized in the
Soviet press.
On 1955 and 1962 trips he had
contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and
he smuggled to the West literature for publishing
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Comment:
(Continued)
06.
abroad. In December 1963 MArIA was the object
of an attack in the Soviet press which charged
that during 1962 he had "spent his time in
Mosocw looking for dissension in the ranks of
Young intellectuals at drunken debauches".
06
MALIA was then in periodic contact with CIA;
in the spring of 1963 he renied having had
any involvement with blackmarketeers, homo-
sexuals, or females Inside the soviet Union.
DO MALIAshas not been interviewer in connec-
tion with HOSEUKO's allegations.
06
Recruitment of BURGI
(1956):
At the first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO
gave a brief account of the recruitment of Richard BURGI, a 06
Yale professor) The recruitment was effected on the basis
of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow
and culminated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956.
This recruitment,
which occurred close
in time to the
death of HOSENKO's father, was by NOSINKO's later accounts
a turning point in his personal and professional life.
From it, NOSENKO said he acquired a sense of self-confidence
and responsibility and began to "grow" from a wastrel into
an effective and successful KGb officer.
As a result of
this operation, the first successful recruitment in the ther
short nistory of the Tourist Section, NOSENKO asserted he
first came into personal contact with General GRIBAITOV.
According to all accounts he gave prior to October 1966,
when he retracted the claim, NOSMIKO received the first of
a series of KGB awards for operational performance because
Obof the BURGIcase--a letter of commendation. within a month
of this operation, HOSENKO, said, he was promoted from the
rank of licutenant to captain.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
NOSENKO'S Information
NOSENKO stated that at the time of BURGI!'s arrival in
the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application
(anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a cable sent by the
Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had
been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGIls 06
anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the
Soviet Union, and the results of file checks of the KGB
main Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives.
NOSENKO himself ran the file checks, which proved to be
negative; there was no information on record concerning
86 BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the
material available on (BURGI, no other checks were made.
0b The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the
fact
•X that he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefore
had contact with students who might eventually work for the
U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and for other
target organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first
suggested an attempt to recruit him.
When BURGI] arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in
contact with a number of KGb agents, and their reports were
placed in an informal file maintained by NOSENKO. NOSENKO
could not recall how many such agents there may have been,
theis names, or what they might have reported concerning
O BURGI. 0 BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did
not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some source,
name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indications
that
06 BURGI]was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain
grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise. NOSENKO
axman and
therefore approachea Yu. A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the
British Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor
BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use BELANOVSKIY in
setting up the compromise.
Aftèr permission had been
received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and
NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed
I him to make
06
BURGI! 'acquaintance in a hotel dining room.
proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI,
fact of common homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was 06
invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts
took place and photographs were made.
adjoining room and directed the compromise, although he did
come ex ality was recognized, sexual ne
not meet BURGI at this time.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the compromising
A report of the
compromise and a request for permission to attempt recruitment
The request came
back with the approving signatures of O..M. GRIBANOV and A.S.
FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Department of the First
Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest in using (BURGI!06
in the United States BURGI's itinerary called for him to fly
from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and,
having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV
officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under
Inturist cover•
In accordance With the operational plan, the local KGB
officer told BURGI encoute to the city that all the hotels in
Kiev were full at the moment because of various conferences,
but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day
in a private apartment in the center of town; he would be
moved to a hotel as soon as possible... When the car arrived at
the apartment building in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV,: V.S.
PETRENKO, a local KGB officer,. and (fnu) RASTYKAITE, a woman
rousekeeper, were waiting for them. NOSENKO coUld not
remember how or whether he introduced himself to BURGI U6
recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-
NOSENKO", but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who said what:
"I don't remember what I talked about and I don't
remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things
were discussed. It started with how he liked his
stay in the Soviet Union... Then we slowly pro-
ceeded to say how unfortunate it was that informa-
tion had been received about his conduct in Moscow.
We told him that his homosexual activities were
known, that this was punishable under Soviet law
according to article so-and-so of the criminal code,
etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no
diplomatic
immunity, that he could be taken to court according
to the Soviet law...
upset, and. felt uncomfortable.
To at 2hc
Well, he was scared, confused,
Then we slowly
proceeded to say that everything could be smoothed
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
out, and the basis was prepared for the man to say:
'All right, I agree to help'...
We showed him the
pictures.
He was embarrassed of course--he was
naked
Then we prepared the basis:
'You have a
noble task..
You teach; you have students; the
students may vecome
future specialists on Russia or
may work as diplomats, etc., but many of these
students can be used by intelligence. They may be
sent somewhere with special tasks.
Maybe you will
tell us who among the students is preparing for
government service, how they are distributed, etc.'
During the first conversation everything was made
ng forte.
.. *
completely clear...
He was not at all willing to
help or work for soviet Intelligence.
He was told
that he must understand that in this case 'helping
Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I
remember that I told him:
'Understand, nobody is
going
to ask you that you help our friends. over
there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do
anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive
activities, that you organize explosions or murder.'
After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to
Italy) to visit the Russicum) of the Vatican, and 08 |
here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began Eo ask
questions about
this school.
He told us a bit about
the Russicum and we asked him to write about it anc
he wrote down some names of the professors who
teach Russian subjects...
06 from BURGI but
ater_he could not remember whether. it was
he or KOZLOV.)
BURGI was then taken to a hotel.
the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor above
06(BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGIl's stay in Kiev became 06
his constant companion and guide. An attempt was made "to
smooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up
during the recruitment talk". NOSENKO took BURGIl to an old 06
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cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a
kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in nearby Kaniv.
The subject of homosexuality was not raised again.
From
06 Kiev, BURGIDleft the Soviet Union without returning to
Moscow.
Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the
American Department of the First Chief Directorate and had
arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a recontact plan in
New York City should BURGI be recruited. BURGilwas 06 06
instructed how to use a recognition signal for a first
meeting in the New York Public Library.
About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO
turned over all his materials on the BURGI operation to 06
the First Chief Directorate:Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV,
Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section,
KOZLOV, and NOSENKO visited American Department Chief FEKLISOV
in the First Chief Directorate and expressed an interest in
further developments in the case.
FEKLISOV told them that
Ob BURGI had been observed to arrive for the first meeting but
the KGB refrained from establishing contact..
The first
actual meeting in New York City took place the second of third
06 time BURGI appeared, and a KGB officer of the New York Legal
Residency continued
to meet with him until the revolution in
Hungary in late (October] 1956, when BURGI refused to colla- 06
borate further. NOSENKO later heard from someone in the
American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case
was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment of
the Seventh Department; NOSENKO said he and KOZLOV received
letters of commendation and bonuses of one month's pay by
order of SEROV, Chairman of the KGB; PETRENKO was given a
letter of commendation and half a month's salary, and even
RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation.
In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his
superior, A.s. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-
ment, had
also taken part in this operation, but that he,
NOSENKO, was the responsible case officer.
'In August 1965,
when asked who had recruited BURGi, IOSENKO replied: 06
"KOZLOV and NOSENKO. "
Asked who Fecruited him first,
NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV; naturally.: Ile was the Deputy Chief
of the Department.: The collection of the materials lin
preparation
" for the approachl was in the hands of Case
Officer NOSENKO."
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Comment:
In a 22 November 1957 interview with the FBI,.
B6 BURG]] had recounted how he was compromised
and recruited by the KGBuhile in the USSR in
June 1956.
His version substantially confirmed
that provided eight years later by NosErko.
06 (BURGI asserted (contrary to NOSENKO's account)
that the KGB officers knew a good deal more
about him than what might have been acquired
to Brazil, his military service in Korea, and
his acquaintance with Alexander KERENSKY.
D6 On 25 May 1964 BURGI positively identified
NOSENKO (from a photograph) as being the
junior of the two KGB officers who recruited
The other KGB officer (KOZLOV) was 'the
controlling_figure and was in command".
06 The BURGI case is the earliest confirmed
instance of NOSENKO's participation in a KGB
operation. See p.39 for comment on the
, relevance of the BURGI case to the period of
NOSENKO's claimed service. in the Seventh
Department.
. 06
NOSENKO's claim that BURGI's compromise
and
recruitment was based only on information
routinely acquired from BURGI's visa appliça-O6
tion and from apparently chance meetings with
KGB agents on his arrival in Moscow, is
contradicted by BURGI's description of the 06
KGB's familiarity with his personal life.
NOSENKO cannot sustain his claim of having
personally traced BURGI through First Chief 06
(Foreign Intelligencel Directorate files (the
probable repository of information on BURGI] 06
which the KGB recruiting officers
used) .
NOSENKO, as described elsewhere, is unfamiliar
with the mechanics of KGB tracing procedures.
According to BURGI's statement and NOSENKO' s
own eventual
admission, NOSENKO lied when he
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Comment: (Continued)
06
first claimed to have recruited BURGI unaidea.
NOSENKO has subsequently retracted all claims.
regarding the effect of this case on his
career:
Contrary to his earlier assertions,
he now says it won him neither awards nor
promotion:
Attempted Recruitment of GEHRCKENS (1957)
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO made an unsuccessful recruitment approach in 1957
08,06 to Hamburg shipping executive Hans GEHRCKENS, on the basis
06.0f. GEHRCKENS? commercial ventures in the USSR. The responsi
ble case officer originally was A.I. VERENIKIN of the Sixth
Section of the Seventh Department; this section was then
responsible for operations against foreign seamen. Since
VERENIKIN spoke"no German and GTHRCKENS) was known to speak06
English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach because
"knew English a little". When asked why a German-l
speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered:
"The higher-ups said "go work on this case'" and that was
all." After being rebuffed by GEHRCKENS, NOSENKO saw him O
to the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refused to see him.
06:
Comment:
GERCKENS) was interviewed by CIA on 19 July
1965, and; while generally uncooperative,
described a "mild approach" in Moscow during
1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by
NOSENKO. (He
was not questioned on the
identities of the Soviets involved.) GEHRCKENS 06
continues to have extensive business contacts
with Soviet commercial representatives in@estll
Germany and was recently reported to have
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Comment:
(Continued)
08
negotiated a sizable shipping contract with the
Soviet Union shortlv äfter avisit to the
USSR.
His principal contact at the Soviet Trade
Mission in Cologne has been a GRU officer.
contact we ta 2nd grass 2957)
NOSENKO's Information
The British subject Sir Allen LANE] travelled in the
summer of 1957 to the Soviet Union to visit various publishing
houses and brought with him as an interpreter Arthur BIRSE. 06
The latter was of Russian extraction, having left petrograd
(Leningrad) before the Revolution, and he served in
during the Second orld War. The case was
handled by another section of the Seventh Department, but
section on
06 because of BIRSE's past, "some of our leaders decided that
It would be good if one of our workers could approach him,
would get in on the case under the cover of the Ministry of
Culture, who would take care of this person, who would help
him meet with all sorts of people representing our publishing
companies.
The choice fell to me. I was chosen for this
job."
Taking along the KGB agent Larissa SOBOROVA as an
interpreter and using the alias "NIKOLAYEV", NOSENKO
Ob laccompanied BIRSE] and [LANE] in Moscow and Leningrad during
their stay there?
The only object was to watch BIRSE 06
because he was suspected of having an intelligence mission,
and no approach was made or contemplated.
- NOSENKO explained
that the use of the NIKOLAYEV alias with BIRSE) and (LANE made Of 06
It necessary for him to use the same name when travelling
to Great Britain in 1957
and in 1958.
Comment:
06
LANE was interviewed subsequent to NOSENKO's
defection, and he was able to identify NOSENKO's
photograph as that of a "Russian official he
met in Moscow who was introduced to him as
"NIKOLAYEV".
(LANE) said that he could remember
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Comment:
(Continued)
nothing in particular about NIKOLAYEV except
that he appeared a "friendly, helpful man who
had opened up considerably towards the end of
my visit to Moscow in July 1957"
NOSENKO seems unaware of the probable basis
IOr KGB interest in BIRSE.06 Born of Scottish>O8
parents in pre-revolutionary Petrograd, BIRSENIO, 06
served with the British Military Mission in29
Moscow during World War II and was interpreter
06 for Churchilf during the latter's meeting
06 with (Stalin),™
He was the official interpreter08
for the Royal Commission investigating the
revelations of KGB officers Vladimir PETROV
returned on similar trips to Moscow in 1958.
and 1959 (while NOSENKO was still in the
Tourist Section) and that in the latter year
two KGB officers attempted to recruit him.
06
Recruitment of
Eqi] SUNDAR) 1957)
NOSENKO's Information
08,06
In 1957 or 1958 a Norwegian journalist, (nu) SUNDAR,
visited the Soviet Union and an attempt was made to recruit
A Second Chief Directorate officer, N.A. ARKHIPOV,
06 made SuNDARIs acquaintance and handled the entire operation
against him, but NOSENKO himself played a role. NOSENKO
presented himself to [SUNDAR;busing the name "SMIRNOV" or
"SERGEYEV" and posing as a painter, and told SUNDAR that he0b
could find women for him
A party was arranged with a KGB
Obagent as SUNDARIs date and a Second Chief Directorate secre-
tary as NOSENKO's. Late in the evening NOSENKO and his date
excused themselves, and SUNDAR had sexual relations with the 06
female agent.
Photographs of the scene were taken by the
KGB .
When NOSENKO and! SUNDAR saw. one another the next day, 06
JoSUNDAR)announced that he had some articles, cameras and the
like, that he wanted to sell on the blackmarket... NOSENKO
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06
offered to arrange the sale and took SUNDAR to a dingy
section of Moscow. As they arrived before a small house,
06 NOSENKO asked SUNDAR]to give him the things to be sold.
At
this moment a KGB officer posing as a militiaman approached
and arrested the two for blackmarketeering. At the Militia
06
station, SUNDAR,was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of
the Seventh Department, under threat of imprisonment.
was no further contact with|SuNDARlafter he left the ussr, 06
however, because on his return to Oslol he published an l0
article
in which he described his expériences, "but not all
of them".
Comment:
06,08,10
Egil SUNDAR, a journalist for Aftenposten in
Os10, travelled to the USSR in December I957
as a member of a press delegation in connection
with the
opening of a new SAS air route to 21
Moscow do SUNDAR wrote an article on his return
in which he described his arrest for blackmarket
activities and his subsequent recruitment; he
also reported this to Norwegian authorities.
06 According to SUNDAR, he was introduced to
Moscow blackmarketeers by an artist, whose
name he did not know, and was apprehended
Immediately afterwards. SUNDAR has
not been Us
interviewed on the basis of NOSỀNKO's infor-
mation.
Travel to London (1957-1958)
NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside
the Soviet Union was in 1957 when he was selected to
accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit
London.
As he explained, it was a KGB order that a security
officer accompany any such delegation. (NOSENKO elsewhere
cited
this KGB practice, but later denied any such order was
issuedl.
The Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Direct-
orate (responsible for designating Second Chief Directorate
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officers for this purpose) telephoned K.N. DUBAS, Chief of
the Seventh Department, to request an officer who spoke
English: DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to make the
trip. NOSENKO replied:
"why not? I have never been
abroad yet."
NOSENKO consequently travelled to London,
using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as
"the deputy chief" of the delegation. He was specifically
instructed to observe one member of the delegation, a woman
named MYARIMYAYE, whose father had been
killed in a Soviet
prison and whose political reliability was uncertain.
Additionally, he had the general task of watching all
members of the delegation for possibly suspicious contacts
with foreigners.
The delegation consisted of approximately
60 persons and to help him in carrying out these duties,
NOSENKO waS
assigned three or four agents and several
operational contacts among the delegation members. He was
the only KGB security Officer which accompanied the group.
The second trip to London took place a year later, in
the fall of 1958, again as a security escort. This time
he accompanied a delegation of eleven or twelve boxers, and
again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of'
deputy chief of the delegation.
NOSENKO said he was the
only security officer with the delegation, and he had two
ägents and two operational contacts among the boxers.
His
assignment was general; no one in particular was kept under
observation, and the KGB had no derogatory information
concerning any member of the delegation.
NOSENKO used the NIKOLAYEV alias for travel to London
because it was the alias used earlier with the British
subjects BIRSE, and (LANE: NOSENKO explained this situation
as follows:
06
06
"With BIRSE and (LANEJI used the name NIKOLAYEV,
Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry
of Culture. And
then when the question was raised
of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to
England, I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV.
Because
lof this] I went as the assistant head of
the delegation, again representing the Ministry of
Culture.
I didn't go under my own name because it
was decided that when these people (BIRSEjand LANE!
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went back to England, they would tell who they were
with [report their contacts in the USSRJ. They
would probably question BIRSE especially, as one 06
who used to work in intelligence...
BIRSE would Of
say:
'There was this man from the Ministry of
Culture, NIKOLAYEV.
He was with us all the time,
even went to Leningrad with us.' So they would
say:
'How does he look [what does he look likel?'
He would say:
'He looked so-and-so." I'd go there,
and they would look at me and say: 'How come this
name NIKOLAYEV.
Just a matter of conspiracy.
Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the
Britishers, this would be noticeable."
Comment:
That NOSENKO (as NIKOLAYEV) took the trips is
corroborated by British records?
• according to1
which, a Yurly Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV, born 30
October 1927, arrived at London from Brussels
on 20 August 1957. His visa application
described him as a member of a group invited
by the Light Athletics Association to partici-
pate in contests in London.
He left on 27
August 1957.
With the same name and date of
birth, NIKOLAYEV arrived again at London on
12 October 1958 with seventeen others, all
described as boxers.
His visa application
described him as an
"office worker"
, but on
his landing card, NIKOLAYEV was listed as :
boxer.
He left London on 19 October 1958.
On neither visit did NIKOLAYEV attract the
attention of anyl
While these trips are corroborated, they
are not material to NOSENKO's claims to have
served in the KGB positions he alleges he
held at the time.
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(SEVENTIL DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
Operational Activities (1958-1960)
Deputy Chief Of the American-British Commonwealth Section
to NOSENKO, the Seventh Department was reorgan-
ized in June 1958, and NOSENKO's section, which theretofore
had been concerned with operations against foreign tourists
from all countries, was split into two new sections, one
concerned with tourists from the United States and the
British Commonwealth and the other with tourists from Europe,
Latin America,
and all other countries. NOSENKO claimed
that at that time he was promoted to the position of Deputy
Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, "the
most important section of the Seventh Department"
In September 1958, he claimed to have personally recruited
J6 Gisella HARRIS. It was also in 1958, he said, that he super-
vised the sexual entrapment of Virgil KRAFT Oalthough Seventl
Department Chief DUBAS made the actual approach. Beginning
in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents YEFREMOV
06,0,06,l6 and voLrov in a series of successful entrapments DREW, LUKIS?
WILBY, TAYLOR,> and MERTINS. NOSENKO stated that he also
08,06,06.
used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two
American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLER-
FORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, he recruited the Moscow
representative of the American Express Company, FRIPPED. 29, U6
NOSENKO Claimed that his operational success during 1959
earned him a commendation from the KGB Chairman. [He has
since retracted all claims to any awards earned
during his
KGR service.] It was because of his position as Deputy
Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENNO
said, that he first became involved with lee Harvey OSWALD.
NOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of agents among
foreign
tourists was secondary to his department's principal
mission, the detection of Nestern intelligence officers and
agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the
Soviet Union.
In line with that counterintelligence mission,
on General GRIBANOV's order in the fall of 1959, NOSENIO
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
reviewed what the KGB knew through 1958 about the use of
courists and tourist cover by Western intelligence services.
It was from this task that NOSENKO claimed he learned of
all the important arrests and recruitments among American
tourists as recorded by the kGB at the time.
Recruitment of HARRIS (1958)
NOSENKO's Informatioß6
NOSENKO in 1958 recruited Gisella HARRIS, an employee of
29,10 was case one mantic see ate eat cemen eat t-
a Soviet citizen, who told HARRIS that he was in trouble 06
with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accompany him
to the police. (HARRIS agreed to meet and cooperate with 06
the KGB in[Salt Lake City!•
The case was turned over to thel
First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any
further contact with her.
Comment:
06,08
HARRIS, a
former German citizen, visited the
USSR on a tourist visa in 1958.
According to
statements made to the FBI in 1958, the purpose
of her visit was to contact her former lover,
a Soviet soldier who had fathered her child in
Germany] in 1953. She hoped to persuade him to
divorce his Soviet wife and marry her. She
described her recruitment by two men, one of
whom resembled NOSENKO. When shown a photo-
graph in 1964, she tentatively identified
NOSENKO as one of the men who recruited her
and said that, of the two involved, he "wa:
definitely the man in charge" while
"was merely present and listened".
O6 to HARRIS,
According
she has had no further contact with
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
Compromise Of) KRAFT] 06
NOSENKO's Information
VIgIL KRAFT, a clergyman from the Chicago areal with his
wite visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 195T or 1958,
and NOSENKO was assigned as the responsible case officer.
JoThe KGB learned (KRAFT had beer intimate with a Soviet woman
during an earlier trip to the USSR, and NOSENKO arranged for
her to come to Moscow from Leningrad,
where she was then
living, in order to compromise KRAFT 06 KRAFTand the Soviet Ol
woman were intimate in the latter's room in the Grand Hotel.
Photographs were taken, and then militiamen broke into the
06 room, finding KRAFT and the woman unclothed. NOSENKO was in
a nearby room.
supervising the operation.
The recruitment
approach was then made by DUSAS, the Chief of the Seventh
Department.
NOSENKO had been the case officer and had
handled the operation, but he took no part in the confronta-
tion or recruitment approach "because DUBAS wanted it for
himself"*)
ad a an the necruitment was not firm, (KRAFT) 06
and DUBAS "had an agreement" that nothing would be done
about the compromise if KRAFTaid not criticize the Soviet 06
Union in lectures about his trip which he was to give in
the United States.
DUBAS again contacted KRAFT]when he came 06
to Moscow in
1963,
and arterwards his file was turned over
to the First Chief Directorate.: NOSENKO recalled that the
First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFTwas not in a good06
region of the United States:
And also it smelled like he
had spoken of the approach made to him;" Therefore, NOSENKO
concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the United
States:
Comment:
According to
the FBI, some time before 1960
06 (KRAFT wrote a pamphlet in which he described
the KGB approach, omitting reference to his
sexual compromise. In a statement given to
the: FBI on 4 November 1964, KRAFT, who is an
06
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Comment:
(Continued)
08,10
Associate Pastor Of the Peoples Church in
Chicago, stated that he had visited the Soviet
Union in 1956, 1958, and 1963. He confirmed
NOSENKO's information in detail except that he
denied having been intimate with the Soviet
woman involved. He related that the "Chief"
who interviewed him had "several photographs
which portrayed him and the female in intimate
compromising positions and which appeared to
have been taken in her hotel room". ‹ KRAFT] said06
"Chief" that they could do
him no possible harm as "no one would believe
that they were valid photographs". (KRAFT)denied Ob
agreeing to collaborate with the KGB at any
time.
Recruitment of
DREW (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
06
George DREW,
an' American who visited the Soviet Union in
the spring of 1959, was
the responsibility of case officer
V.V. IVANOV. By chance, however, DREw became involved with 06
NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV and they
reported this to NOSENKO; then the Deputy Chief of the
section.
and possibly GUSKOV, the Section Chief, and WOSENKO flew
alone
to Leningrad to make the approach.
_(IVANOV was not.
judged qualified. NOSENKO arranged for DREMto be06
compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a
homosexual
agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer
PERELETOV. Using the alias "Mr. SERGEYEV", NOSENKO alone
0b recruited DREW in an office of the hote.:
The KGB First
Chief Directorate was interested in DREW's recruitment 06
because he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly
some in the U.S. Government.
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Comment:
DREW reported the approach in 1959, describing
a four-hour interrogation by "SERGEYEV' in
Leningrad and generally confirming NOSENKO's
account of the operation.: Re interviewed by
the FBI on 12 May 1964, (DREW)identified NOSENKO's 06
photograph as that of his interrogator and
said that, although NOSENKO was a young man,
from the way everyone reacted to him it was
clear that he was the man in charge. Another
man was present, DREW, said.
Recruitment of LUKIS (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited
a British subject, (fnu) LUKIS (Or LUCAS, in a room of the 06
Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after LUKIS. had been compromised 06
by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV: The case
was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief
of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate:
NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did
not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has
not been in contact with LUKIS subsequently:
Comment:
LUKIS has not yet been identified by the
29
06
Recruitment of WILBY (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
06
By himself NOSENKO recruited William Stanley WILBYjin a
hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after WILBY had been compro-O6
mised by either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, NOSENKO's homosexual
agents. WILBY is a British citizen and his case was also Cl
(like LUKIS, see above) turned over to TARABRIN.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
Comment:
06
WILBY reported the approach to British authori-
ties in 1959, saying that he was
"brought up
before SERGEYEV"
(an operational alias some-
times used by NOSENKO). He has not been
re-interviewed since NOSENKO,'s information
received.
was
Recruitment of TAYLOR (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow
representative of British European Airways], whose name 29
NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow
during the summer of 1959, possibly in August.
The approach
was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's
agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV.
NOSENKO explained that the Seventh Department in 1959
had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which
was responsible for the BEA man. That section had asked
NOSENKO's section for help 29
"They said they didn't have any agents or any-
thing and didn't know what to do."
So somebody said,
'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the
section?
He's a specialist
on homosexuals and can
arrange everything for you.'
So I wound up handling
the case, and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Direct-
orate) said I should report to him."
[In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although
he has always claimed he was Deputy chief of the section.]
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Comment:
06
-David TAYLOR
confessed homosexual, is
described by
Aas a neurotic 29
type who had been discharged from the B.A.FJ24
on grounds of mental instability.
In 1962
(before the NOSENKO lead was received) TAYLOR
admitted his recruitment to British authori=l
ties,> indicating that it took place in August
1959
on the basis of his homosexuality: He
reported in 1962 that the recruitment had
been effected by a "Colonel SERGEYEV"
', and
when re-interviewed in 1964, he "unhesitantly
identified NOSENKO as "Colonel SERGEYEV',."
adding that the mere sight of NOSENKO's photo-
graph
"sent shivers down his back".
TAYLOR
also identified a photograph of VOLKOV.
06
Recruitment of MERTENS) (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
Gerard MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or
August 1959. NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and
YEFREMOV, seeking out American homosexuals, accidentally
O6 met MERTENS] in Moscow
and reported their
suspicions to
NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and
requested authority to take compromising photographs in
preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his
chief, then assigned the case to him.
(MERTENS) had been 06
the responsibility of A.A. VETLITSKIY, another case officer.)
06 Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between
VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow.
06 When MERTENS later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested"
by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged
in relations with a KGB homosexual agent from Odessa, whom
NOSENKO had arranged by phone to bring to uzhgorod.
did not recall his name, and could only supply CIA with a
physical description.] MERTENS|was then brought before 06
NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting
approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with
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02 1025:
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
06
MERTENS when he visited Ivov and Minsk before leaving
USSR.
NOSENKO said that he had used the name
"George" with
MERTENS
but he could not recall what last name he had
given him.
When he related the case in 1962, NOSENKO could not
recall the American'
name. In 1964 he stated the name
was
MARTIN, OX MARTINS,
Comment: In a signed statement given to the FBI on
5 August 1964, MERIENS, an American professor, 06
generally confirmed NOSENKO's account.
names his recruiter as one "George PETERSON"
and stated that NOSENKO's photograph might be
that of a person whom he had met while
visiting the Soviet Union in 1959. MERTENS] CÓ
reported one KGB attempt to recontact him
after he returned to the United States. In
September 1959, according to arrangements
made at the time of his recruitment, he
received a letter signed "George PETERSON"
telling him to be at a rendezvous point in
New York. By the time he received the letter,
however, the date of the meeting had already
passed
and so he ignored it. (MERTENS claimed 06
that there were no further attempts by the
Soviets to contact him.
6
Compromise Of BARRETT (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
Robext BARET, a quide at the us, Echibition in MoscoNt
in I959, had become friendly with the homosexual agents
YOLKOV and YEFREMOV whom he met at the fairground.
SO ARE was not an active homosexual Voloduce ded hotel
a long period of development in involving him in homosexual
acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an
adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV,
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NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was
present when the photographs were taken, and he has described
the occasion in detail.
(There was much complaining among
the photographic technicians because of the amount of time
they spent waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and
NOSENKO recalled that he provided them with drinks and
treated them
well because they were a big help to him in
this operation.) The photographs were good, but the KGB
was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban
placed by the Central Committee on the recruitment ofli.s.
Of exhibition guides due to Eisenhower's planned visit to the
Soviet Union
06
NOSENKO reported that BARRET?was recruited on the basis
of the 1959 photography when he returned with another
exhibition in 1961.
The recruitment was carried out by
the First (Américan) Department
of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate, and NOSENKO was not involved.
Comment:
Immediately on his return to the United States
in January 1962, BARRETT confessed to the FBI 06
that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis
of photographs depicting him in a homosexual
act with VOLKOV, which had been taken during
his 1959 trip to Moscow. He claimed that the
photographs had been taken while he was
unconscious, after being drugged. BARRETT]was 06
contacted once by the KGB in New York City
following his admissions to the FBI., He was
contacted by KGB officers, including SKVORISOV
of the First Chief Directorate, during later
trips to the soviet Union in 1963, 1964, and
1965 and arrangements were made for meetings
in the United States. No Soviets appeared at
such scheduled meetings.
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Compromise of
06
WILLERFORD (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
06
Frederick WILLERFORD, an American Negro, was BARRETT's
Uroommate during the 1959 exhibition in Moscow.
Initially he
was a target of the Moscow City KGB Directorate which
Of believed WILLERFORD to be an FBI agent and had been collecting
information on him.
Unaware of the interest of the other
KGB element, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had made WILLERFORD' 5 06
acquaintance, and NOSENKO had arranged for compromising
photographs to be taken of WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow 06
hotel room.
NOSENKO watched /WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV through 06
a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in
detail.
It was only after these compromising photographs
had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the Moscow City
KGB Directorate's interest in WILLERFORD.06 NOSENKO! s own
department and the Moscow City Directoräte then made a joint
request for operational approval to recruit WILLERFORD, but 06
permission was refused because of the ban on recruitment
attempts at the time.
The case file was retained by the
Moscow KGB organization, and NOSENKO did not know whether
WILLERFORD was approached subsequently.
Comment:
06
WILLERFORD] was interviewed by the FBI in July
1964 and "advised emphatically that he had
never been compromised by anyone nor did he
feel that he ever could be compromised by
anyone except through the use of drugs, since
he felt that he was
"too smart' and most
36 that WILLERFORD had visited VOLKOV in his hotel
room and was friendly with him.06 BARRETT]said
that he had often wondered if WILLERFORDJwas a06
homosexual because of his manner and bearing.
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06
Recruitment of
TRIPPEL (1959-1963)
As a member of the American-British Commonwealth Section;
NOSENKO in 1959 personally participated in the recruitment
29 of the American
Express Company, representative in Moscow,
Arsene FRIPPE. He continued to be one of this agent's two
KGB handlers,
even after transferring to the American
Department in 1960.06FRIPPEL left Moscow in 1961 but
returned on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO
met him. The only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever
claimed to handle, FRIPPEL) confessed to his recruitment 06
when questioned by the FBI on the basis of the NOSENKO lead.
©balthough the FRIPPED case only started during NOSENKO's
first assignment to the Seventh Department (1955-1960), it
is described in its entirety through 1963, for the conven-
ience. of
the reader.
NOSENKO's Information
At his second meeting with CIA in Geneva on 11 June 1962,:
NOSENKO described the circumstances in which an unnamed
foreigner was compromised by a KGB female agent, Klara
Konstantinövna GORBACHEVA. He described the scene in detail
including the
attempt by: a KGB technician to take motion
pictures
through a two-way mirror, and the confrontation of
the foreigner by the militiamen, who broke into the room.
NOSENKO identified that foreigner as FRIPPELby name the 06
following day while discussing KGB successes in Moscow:
"There was another agent?"
(KGB cryptonym]''Artur'
He was not a correspondent. He knew me as George,
Yuriy Ivanovich, and my last name as NIKOLAYEV.
He
was a permanent
representative, not in the Embassy,
but of the American Express Company in Moscow: 2°
06-
/FRIPPEL
• Arthur FRIPPED*
He liked drinking, always
drank.
He was
also strongly attracted to women.
provided him with beautiful women.. well, we
decided to have a talk with him.
Why? What could
he give?
He now works in the American Express 29
Company main office in New York Cityl.
A new
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department has now been organized
for the Soviet
Union and the Peoples' Democracies.
And he is
chief of the department..•
He is no longer in
Moscow, but he was here two and a half or three
years.
We hope that he will return.
We are waiting
for him to come back. We know that
the company
wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian
language very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this
C FRIPPEl. And he also did a good and intelligent job
of establishing relations with Inturist.
He had very
good relationships with ANKUDINOV, the Chairman of
Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs and
the low-level workers...
But, why was FRIPPEL Of
• recruited? I was interested in knowing precisely
by whom, by name, and how approaches were being made
to our delegations lin the United States]. I was
interested in him from the point of view of counter-
intelligence, not intelligence.
What kinds of
approaches are taking place to our people in America
and by whom?
This is what interested me.
But he
didn't know anything. He provided only superficial
information, nothing
more."
NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEl would not have been
useful for coverage
He replied no, that of Americans visiting the Soviet Union:
the KGB had already had great success in
this by other means.
In Geneva in 1964 and during subseguent debriefings. and
interrogations, NOSENKO made additional statements concerning
the FRIPPED case.
06
NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPED
recruitment as follows:
"In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy
Chief of the section, my area of activity was
narrowed down.
at
that time.
section and I had my own little area--for example,
anything to do with Inturist and which
send tourists
to the USSR."
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(SEVENTH DEPARIMENT - June 1955-January. 1960)
do so alone. Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later
Chief) of the Seventh Department, was present, and he and
NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early
September 1959.
officer:
NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL's case
NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEDuntil January
1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with
00.
CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPEl's home, where 06
they met Mrs. FRIPPEL.0b(Odette FRIPPEL|was unaware of her
husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and
CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with
FRIPPER®
Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate
case
officers to visit agents in their homes with wives
ise man cape that he went because he
" and CHELNOKOV went "because he was also involved
in the recruitment"
As Deputy Chief of a Tourist section of the Seventh
Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of
the. American Embassy Section of the American Department,
NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPED in Moscow hotels and 06
restaurants.
Throughout this period, he was almost
invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I
O6met with FrIpPrilalone, otherwise it was always with
CHELNOKOV: "
06
UsuaLlY NOSENKO would arrange meetings with
FRIPPER at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued to
meet with ERIPPED despite his lack of production, because
they,
"kept hoping he would give something". (In a different
context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO explained that
GRIBANOV: insisted that even Department Chiefs of the Second
Chief Directorate must each have two or three agents.)
When NOSENKO began to work in the
American Embassy
Section of the. American Department in 1960; he took (FRIPPED06
Obwith him because FRIPPED was acquainted with some Americans
at the Embassy. NOSENKO questioned FRIPPEL about the Embassy
and about Embassy officers George WINTERS and Lewis W.
BOWDEN,
but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything useful.
06
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06
NOSENKO continued to act as FRIPPEDs case officer after
O6 FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union and after NOSENKO had been
transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy Chief
of the Seventh Department.
He met twice with FRIPPEN]during06
this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as 06
a guide with groups of foreign visitors.
Both of these
meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV.
The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after
NOSENKO returned to Moscow from Geneva. (FRIPPEL arrived 06
in the Soviet Union as a guide for some American journalists.
(NOSENKO was unable to give the composition of the journa-
gi ga che
de some arian.
list group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow and
where else they travelled in the Soviet Union.) NOSENKO
contacted him in Moscow. to. learn what questions the newsmen
intended to ask Khrushchev during a scheduled interview;
[subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice
required visiting journalists to submit their intended
questions for Khrushchev in writing to Soviet authorities
prior to interviews].
After the interview, he recontacted
06.
FRIPPEL to learn the reaction of the journalists to their
Ealk with the Soviet leader.
NOSENKO could not recall their
specific reaction to the Khrushchev interview but did
remember that they were "satisfied". Another reason
for
Ocontacting FRIPPEL, NOSENKO added in a later discussion,
was to learn whether any of the journalists might have
joined the group at the last moment in the United States,
which might suggest intelligence connections on their parti
NOSENKO met (FRIPPEL alone for the second and last time
during March 1963. Since FRIPPED was a guide for tourists 06
aboard the ship "Olympia", which stopped for a day in Yalta
and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Moscow and accosted
FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where the tourists were
Having dinner. Finally able to get away from his group,
give NOSENKO some whisky in return.
They drove in NOSENKO's
car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while
06 FRIPPEL went aboard for the whisky.
(He had invited NOSENKO
to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.)
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When FRIPPEL returned, he brought another American, so
NOSENKO had to invent
for himself a suitable cover (Inturist)
on the spot.. The three returned to the hotel and drank some
more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL] 06
reported "nothing of importance", 'and his most interesting
news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in
December 1963 as the American Express Company representative.c.
NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been 06
assigned elsewhere, and it was therefore unlikely that his
agent would return
to Moscow,.
This report was submitted by
V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal
Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City,
who was a
former Second Chief Directorate. colleague of
NOSENKO.
FRIPPER provided no interesting information during
06
NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when
FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide,
On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV
papers (see p.309) in
Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the
following passage dealing withERIPPED which appeared in O6
the KGB operational plan against BONDEN:
"He [BOWDEN] showed himself to be an indiscreet
person i
One
day, as though by chance, he
[BOWDEN] blurted out to. our
agent SHEDOVA [the
fact of) 'ARTUR's! affiliation with American
intelligence."
Asked who SHVEDOVA was, NOSENKO said she was "probably
a cleaning woman"
[Elsewhere NOSENKO described
SHEDOVA as his own agent working against American
Ahr my Attaches, see p. 85.-]
Asked what connection
06 FRIPPED had with
American intelligence, NOSENKO replied
that he could not say.
To the inquiry why not, since
he was (FRIPPED's case officer, NOSENKO was silent.
Spencer ROBERTS] [whose KGB recruitment is described
on
p.424] in August 1962 became friends with a young
Soviet male who acknowledged having been a KGB agent used
against French-speaking foreigners. Included among the
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06
06
latter, the Soviet told ROBERIS, was [FRIPPEl, whom the
KGB suspected of being an American intelligence agent.
(NOSENKO reported ROBERTS brecruitment but has never
indicated awareness of other KGB agents being targetted
against FRIPPEL. 06
06
06
FRIPPEL'S Informat.20
FRIPPEL, who uses the nickname "Arthur" was the American CY
Express Company representative in
Moscow from 7 April 1958
to 3 January 1961. He was first interviewed on the basis
Of NOSENKO's information on 30 April 1964, and when shown a
picture of NOSENKO, (FRIPPEL admitted his recruitment by the 06
KGB in 1959.
During this and subsequent interviews with
06 the FBI, FRIPPED has reported in detail on his association
exceptions:
06
FRIPPED asserts that at the time of his recruitment
the KGB wanted only general information on American
Embassy officials and American tourists travelling
Ao the Soviet Union/under American Express auspices) U8
According; to NOSENKO, (FRIPPED was originally
recruited to provide information on American intelli-
gence approaches to Soviets in the United States,
Since one os a nace,
and he claimed that FRIPPEL was not needed for Ol
coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union,
since the KGB had already "great success" by other
means. NOSENKO stated that later, when he trans-
ferred to the American Embassy Section, he took
O6his agent FRIPPEL with him to report on acquain-
tances_among the Embassy employees.
NOSENKO and
06/FRIPPEL agree that, with one exception (when
C6 FRIPPER was queried regarding BOWDEN and WINTERS) ,
06 FRIPPEL was not so used.
06-FRIPPEL, while acknowledging that NOSENKO partici-
pated in all meetings and on occasion met FRIPPED U6
alone, stated that CHELNOKOV "was in charge of the
entire operation"
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• (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT. - June 1955-January 1960)
-FRIPPEL claims that he saw NOSENKO on three occasions,
twice in Odessa, while visiting the USSR in 1962 and
1963..
NOSENKO insisted that he met ERIPPEL but once 06
in Odessa and önce in Moscow in that period.
Comment:
0.6
NOSENKO Volunteered his account of the FRIPPEL
case in Geneva in 1962 and 1964:
Ile freely
related the details of the summer 1962 and
February 1963 meetings with FRIPPED in the Ob
USSR.
His account of FRIPPEL's activities is 06
consistent with FRIPPED's version, except as
noted above.
Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-1960)
For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's
alleged involvement with OSWALD: in 1959-1960 and in 1963
are described elsewhere.
(See p.303.): According to NOSENKO,
he was involved with OSWALD in 1959 because he was then
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section
of the Seventh Department:
In that capacity he participabeû
in the decision that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB
and he should not be allowed to remain in the Soviet Union.
Comment:
NOSENKO's information on his involvement with
OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient to serve as
evidence confirming of refuting his claimed
service as Deputy Chief of the American Section
of the Seventh Department in 1959.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
Operational Activities - 1955-1960: Summary
According to NOSENKO, after an uneventful assignment iI
the American Department's Embassy Section, in 1955 he was
transferred to the newly-organized Seventh Department
Tourist Section as a case officer. Between 1955 and 1957
he assembled a network of agents and was involved in four
KGB attempts to recruit foreign tourists.
One of these
attempts, that against Richard BURGI, was the first recruit-uG
ment of the tourist section; it won NOSENKO a commendation,
brought him to the attention of General GRIBANOV, and turned
NOSENKO into an effective and successful KGB officer.
• In
1958 NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief
of the American-British Commonwealth Section. He then
recruited the second member of his two-man homosexual team
and, in 1958 and 1959, participated in ten KGB attempts to
recruit American and British visitors to the USSR and one
American resident of MOSCOW. NOSENKO's success in the
Seventh Department prompted
GRIBANOV to transfer him back
to the American Embassy Section as Deputy Chief with the
critical priority task of reviving KGB operations against
American Embassy code clerks.
It is worthy of note that of the fifteen cases in which
he personally participated, by his own admission, NOSENKO
became involved in nine not because they were operations of
his section, but because the targets were the victims of
homosexual or other entrapment.
In addition, three of the
fifteen operations were not directed by his section, but
According to his
bility of other Seventh Department sections of KGB elements
including the Foreign Seamen Section (GEHRCKENS) , Delega- Üb
06 Obtions Section [LANE and(BIRSE), Commercial Representatives
0606Section (TAYLOR), and WILLERFORD) (Moscow City KGB). FRIPPEL06
does not relate clearly to lOSENKO's claimed Seventh
Department service:
NOSENKO states he was also used as an
agent of the First Department Embassy Section. Even the
remaining case, that of HARRIS, was not necessarily a
06
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Seventh Department operation: by NOSENKO's other statements,
she was not a "tourist"
and she would have been the target
of the Moscow Oblast KGB because of her intention to marry
a Soviet citizen.
While NOSENKO's participation
in the attempted recruit-
ment of the targets lie describes, even where not confirmed,
is not disputed, the evidence suggest that he was an:
English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not
counterintelligence officer responsible for the identifi
cation of foreign agents among tourists or for the develop-
ment,
recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB.
Nothing NOSENKO has said indicates that there was any
material change in his duties and responsibilities after
he was allegedly promoted to Deputy Chief of the American-
British Commonwealth Section.
The evidence is that he was
more active, but not that he had any administrative. and
supervisory responsibilities.
Knowledge of other Seventh Department
American Tourist Operations
NOSENKO said that upon his return to the Seventh Depart-
ment in 1962 as Chief of the American British Commonwealth
Section, he reviewed the section's activities during his
two-year absence, e.g. January 1960 to January 1962. In
the course of that review he made written notes of the
section's operational targets during that period notes
which he brought to Geneva in 1964, (See P• 319.) NOSENKO
could not describe the operations other than to say that he
recorded the target's names and such details as he could
acquire at the time of his review.
Eleven of the operations
included in his notes were those against Bernard PECHTER, 06,06,06,06,06,06
Patrick PRESSHAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, 06,06
Enu KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KAITOR,
Michael GINSBERG, and William TARASKA:06 All were from the
period 1956-1959 and six of the eleven individuals were
identified by the KGB as homosexuals.
All of these
cases
are described in Annex B.
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•(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)
Comment:
NOSENKO has never resolved why these cases,
which predated the records he claimed he
reviewed, were included in his notes.
More
important, he never could explain why he was
unfamiliar with American tourist cases which
occurred at a time when he claimed that he
was Deputy Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section and was knowledgeable
of all such cases.
KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among Foreian Iourists, 1955-1960
Besides those operations in which NOSENKO claimed personal
involvement or about which he learned in his capacity of
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section,
NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB knew of the use
of tourists in the USSR by foreign intelligence services
throughout the 1955-1960 period.
Information from other
sources serves as'a basis for judging the validity of
NOSENKO's claim.
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO's Tourist Study
Sometime between May and October 1959, during the
tourist season, NOSENKO was ordered. to gather facts for
Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV concerning the use
of tourist cover by foreign intelligence services during
the period 1955 through 1958.
NOSENKO said he assembled
this material from the Seventh Department's annual reports
of the years 1955-1958, supplemented by information he
obtained from discussions with knowledgeable Seventh
Department case officers.
NOSENKO recalled only that the
study incorporated statistical data on the growth of
foreign tourism; he did not remember the content of the
study, any examples included in it, or what the study
concluded about American or British Intelligence tourist
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operations.
Nevertheless, based on his research for this
study as well as on his géneral and supervisory responsi-
bilities in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asserted that
he could accurately describe KGB counterintelligence
operations among tourists during the period 1955-1960.
Extent of KGB Knowledge
According to NOSENKO, operations against foreign tourists
were developing slowly during this period and very little:
was known by the KGB about the American Intelligence use
of tourism at the time, he wrote the study in 1959. No.
agents were definitely identified among American tourists,
and no tourists were "caught in the act"' mailing letters,
servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, with one exception.
06 MCGUIRE sic, see below.) The Seventh Department, NOSENKO
said, developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists:
because of their apparent interest in photography, or because
they were disseminating foreign literature.
The KGB never
established any firm intelligence connection, however,
despite various operational measures taken such as vyemka
(covert baggage search) and maneuvering KGB agents in
contact with the suspect tourists.
No American tourists
were definitely identified as American Intelligence agents,
NOSENKO concluded.
On related matters, NOSENKO asserted
that during his 1955-1960 service in the
Seventh Department
the
KGB acquired no information regarding American Intelli-
gence use of tourism; specifically, the KGB obtained no
documentary information on this topic from any agent source.
information on this
American Tourist Agents
The one exception in which an American tourist was
observed performing a clandestine task, NOSENKO said,
was
one whose name he recalled as MCGUIRE, and who mailed a 06
letter in Minsk in 1959.
NOSENKO said he never knew what
KGB operational activity led to the discovery of McGUIRE's
clandestine letter mailing.
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Comment:
06
NOSENKO here is apparently referring to Edward
1 a CIA tourist agent who was in fact
detected by the KGB while clandestinely maling
an operational letter in Minsk, but in Zugust
There was a [Robert Alan McGUIRE who visited
the Soviet Union during NOSENKO's Seventh
Department service, but he was not connected
with American Intelligence at the time and he
mailed no letter. MCGUIRE, however, was a 06
former CIA staff employee.
He visited the
Soviet Union as a tourist in April-May 1959,
during which period he was
the target of
numerous KGB provocations, including black-
market, females, and a Soviet citizens' request
for assistance in defecting to the Americans.
Also, a customs officer confiscated from
06. MCGUIRE a Radio Liberation Russian-language
06,
script, and (McGUIRE was compelled to sign an
acknowledgement of the event, although the
reasons were left blank.
Interrogation has
never resolved how NOSENKO knew the name of
06 McGUIRE, but not the background of the case,
or the background of McGOMAN's case, but not
his name.
06
MIBR
Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE
In 1959 the KGB obtained from its agent in MI-6,
April 1961] the complete details of the CIA-MI-6 program for
In early
June 1959 a three-day conference was held in London between
CIA and MI-6 representatives, at the conclusion of which a
nineteen-page document was drawn up which described opera-
tional doctrine on tourist operations, including agent
spotting, agent selection, agent assessment, agent training,
and agent tasks planned for the current (1959) tourist
season.
The document stressed CIA planned use of tourists
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fox spotting, contacting, and assessing and, eventually,
communicating with agents in the Soviet Union. BLAKE
confessed to passing the document
to the KGB as soon as it
came into his possession.
Comment:
It is not advanced that NOSENKO should neces-
sarily have known of BLAKE, although his
statements on the matter have been ambiguous.
Asked in 1962 whether he knew of BLAKE (whose
earlier arrest had been publicized), NOSENKO
affirmed that he did but indicated that BLAKE
was a less important source than the Canadian
Ambassador (WATKINS) or the agent in the
British Admiralty (VASSALL). When BLAKE was
mentioned in 1964, NOSENKO asked
"Who's BLAKE?"
The
significance of BLAKE is that his
confession established that the KGB was fully
aware of the status and character of American
and British Intelligence tourist operations
while NOSENKO alleges he was in the Seventh
Department It is judged, by
any measure as
well as by NOSENKO's statements about the kGB,
that the substance of the information if not
the document itself would be brought to the
attention of a key KGB counterintelligence
officer concerned, the Deputy Chief of the
American-British Commonwealth Section, which
NOSENKO claims was himself.
KGB Study Of American Intelligence Tourist Operations
In 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy KGB Top Secret study on
the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence
for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union.
The KGB study draws recognizably upon the information
supplied by BLAKE and, although concerned primarily with
American tourist operations in 1960, it also refers
American agents whom KGB counterintelligence elements
identified among tourists in the years 1958 and 1959, while
NOSENKO claims he was Deputy Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section and during which time he claims
the
KGB identified no American Intelligence agents.
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SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1955-1960: Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO's description of the activities of the Second
Chief Directorate Seventh Department in this period is
almost solely restricted to his account of these fifteen
KGB operations.
Other than to allege that certain KGB
officers he named were his subordinates, he provided no
information to substantiate his claim that he had any
supervisory or administrative responsibilities.
The common
feature of the operations do not relate to NOSENKO's own
description of the function of the Seventh Department's
Tourist Section or later, to the American-British Common-
wealth Section.
operations, and he acknowledges that several were operations
conducted by KGB elements other than his own section. In
a easoner air
Most were sexual or other entrapment
short, NOSENKO need not have been in the Seventh Department
sections, as he claims, to have learned of or participated
i to have
in the activities he describes.
Although NOSENKO gives a
graphic account of the Second Chief Directorate's (and his
own) counterintelligence mission, his knowledge is not of
counterintelligence operations among tourists; in the only
three such operations he describes, the counterintelligence
aspects were incidental.
Contrary to his claims, NOSENKO
is aware neither of all important KGB operations conducted
against American tourists during the period, nor what was
known to the KGB about American Intelligence and British
tourist operations.
Conclusion
While NOSENKO was associated with a KGB element conducting
operations against American and other foreign tourists
during the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case
officer nor Deputy Chief of
the Seventh Department American-
British Commonwealth Section.
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CHAPTER VII
AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(January 1960-January 1962)
Deputy Chief of the Section
NOSENKO Claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the
American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB
Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960
until the
first days of January 1962.
This section, in
his words, was working against "the most important counter-
intelligence target in the Soviet Union", the permanent
American representation in Moscow.
It regarded every
American stationed there a possible spy and, simultaneously,
as a target
for recruitment.
The functions
of the American Embassy Section were
described by NOSENKO as being to monitor all contacts by
Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens, to collect all
information possible on American Embassy employees, and
to use this information as a basis for planning and imple-
menting recruitments.
The Americans' personalities, jobs,
personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security
precautions, contacts
with Soviet citizens, and the major
and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis
for this work:
To gather such information, the section's
officers employed large numbers of agents and informants
among the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet
citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country
nationals with American contacts. The officers also
benefitted from the reports of numerous surveillance teams
at their disposal, as well as information obtained from
telephone taps and microphones in Americans' offices and
homes. Each officer had a limited number of American
targets with whom he attempted to become thoroughly familiar.
Annually, they submitted detailed operational plans for
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exploiting the knowledge they had gained of their targets.
During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, within the section
special emphasis was
placed on "identifying intelligence
officers in the Embassy and actively developing them,
acquiring ciphers, and painstakingly studying code clerks,
creating
the basis on which they can be recruited".
As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO said, he had
access to all information concerning its activities:
"Nothing was hidden" from him.
On this basis, he expressed
certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB recruited
Americans associated with the Embassy, there were no KGB
agents among Americans assigned to the Embassy in this
period and, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American
Embassy personnel since "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, recruited
ca. 1953, see p. 33).
From continuing friendships with
his fellow-officers of 1960-and 1961, who remained in the
section when NOSENKO transferred, NOSENKO has also claimed
certainty that there were no KGB
recruitments from the
time he left the section in January 1962 until his January
1964 departure in Geneva.
Transfer to the American Embassy Section
In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the
American Section of
the Seventh Department, NOSENKO learned
from the Department Chief DUBAS of plans to transfer him
back to the American Department's American Embassy Section,
as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said
he was opposed to the move
and wanted to remain in the Seventh Department:
"I was used to it there and wanted to continue.
I wanted to stay in the Seventh Department.
This
(the transfer] was no promotion.
Here I was the
Deputy Chief of section and would be the same
there. The American Department is, of course, the
most important.
But here I was working against
American tourists.
This is also important.
Furthermore, I showed [had proven] myself there in
'55, '56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to
be not a bad case officer. And there, in the
American Department, I must prove myself with new
people."
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NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS to try to retain him. DUBAS
later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief
Directorate Chief O. M.
GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no,
avail: In January 1960 the official orders transferring
NOSENKO were issued:
On the day NOSENKO reported to V.A. KLYPIN, Chief of
the American Department, to begin his
new job, he was told
to report to GRIBANOV's office. NOSENKO expressed his
misgivings about the change of assignment to GRIBANOV:
GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him but that he,
GRIBANOV, "had his own plans and that was all". GRIBANOV
told NOSENKO that he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air"
to the American Embassy Section's operations and that he
was to pay particular attention to operations against
American code clerks, the "number one target".
Predecessor as Deputy Chief
Asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting
for duty in the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO replied:
"No one." He assumed responsibility for the Embassy security
file from KOVSHUK.
Various case officers earlier had been
responsible for Embassy Security Officer Russell LANGELLE,
including MALYUGIN, then KUSKOV, KOVSHUK, and KLYPIN; but
LANGELLE had been expelled from the Soviet Union in October
1959 and his successor, John ABIDIAN, was not
to arrive
until March 1960.
On several occasions between January and June 1964 NOSENKO
had referred to. a KGB officer named Mikhail Fedorovich
BAKHVALOV-but never in connection with the American Embassy
Section. Thus, in January he first identified him as
Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV, the Deputy Chief of the Fifth
(Eastern Countries) Department:
In February he identified
a V.A. ALEKSEYEV as the alias of a Mikhail Fedorovich, last
name not recalled, who was Deputy Chief of the Fifth
Department:
In June, in listing KGB officers who had
received various awards for their service, NOSENKO included
the name of Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of "an unremem-
bered department". of the Second Chief Directorate!
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On 18 June 1964 NOSENKO was asked to list the names of
all officers who had either joined or departed the American
Embassy Section from the time NOSENKO was transferred to
the Seventh Department in 1955 to his return to the American
Embassy Section in 1960.
NOSENKO listed fourteen officers
as having joined the section, and five who had been trans-
ferred out. In neither list did NOSENKO mention BAKHVALOV.
A week later, however, on 24 June 1964 NOSENKO stated
that "in 1959 and possibly in 1958 Mikhail Fedorovich
BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the American Embassy
I replaced him in his position in 1960 and he
went to the Fifth Department as Deputy Chief". In September
1964 NOSENKO asserted that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief,
[not
the others he had identified earlierl had been LANGELLE'S
case officer. In 1965 NOSENKO first mentioned that
BAKHVALOV, not KOVSHUK, had been responsible for maintaining
the Embassy security file and
stated that BAKHVALOV had
shared with KOVSHUK responsibility for supervising code
clerk operations.
Comment:: Interrogation has never resolved contradictions
between NOSENKO's earlier accounts of what
the Section, and his belated assertions that
BAKHVALOV was his predecessor as Deputy Chief.
Responsibilities
Shortly after reporting for duty in the American Embassy
bilities and functions in the section.
Repeating what
GRIBANOV had said, KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most
important single responsibility in the section would be
supervision of all KGB operational activity against American
military and State Department code clerks stationed in
MOSCOW.
As for the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN
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suggested a division of labor under which KovSHUk would be
responsible for supervising operations against State
Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work
against the Army, Air Force, and Naval Attaches and their
assistants:
NOSENKO was also to be custodian of certain
sensitive files in the section.
NOSENKO has signed a protocol which listed his principal
responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It reads in part:
"During the entire period in the First [American
Embassyl Section, First (American] Department in
1960 and 196] my position was Deputy Chief of
Section. My responsibilities were the following:
-General Deputy to the Chief of the First
Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and
Acting Chief of Section in his absence:
-Immediate supervisor for the operational work
against American code clerks.
In this capacity I
closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy
GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV:
-Case officer for American Embassy Security
Officer, John ABIDIAN.
-For about the first six months of 1960, super-
visor of the work against the offices of the Army!
Naval, and Air attaches.
Comment::
attache targets. In October 1966 NOSENKO
for the first time claimed he was personally
responsible for (as contrasted to supervising)
operational activity against Naval and Marine
officers of the office of the Naval Attache.
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-I maintained the file on American Embassy
security.
-I maintained the log books
for the reports sent
to the First [American Embassy] Section by the
Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on
the information obtained from all
the microphones
installed in the American Embassy.
I read all
the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the
appropriate case officers in the section. . In my
absence this work was done by KOVSHUK Or GRYAZNOV.
-During this period I was the agent handler for
agents
'SHMELEV' , 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR'
and 'SARDAR' _[VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, (PREISFREUND), U6
FRIPPEL and WEISS respectively].
Ohhroughout this entire period I
sat in Room 618
of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzherzhinskiy
Square, Moscow.
GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this
office
with me throughout most of this period."
Comment:
NOSENKO's assertions with respect to each of
these claimed functions are examined in some
detail in the following pages.
Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief of Section
Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeated
interrogation that as general:deputy to KOVSHUK, with the
responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he had
access to and was obliged to keep current on all information
relating to the section's activities.
On this basis he
has assured his questioners that the
KGB was 'completely
unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans assigned
to the Embassy in these two years. NOSENKO has also said
at various times that his access to section files and his
association with section officers made it certain that
there were no such KGB successes even in the periods
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1955-1960 and 1962-1964, when he was assigned in the Seventh
Department. His statements
on this subject during February
1965 were distilled in a protocol which NOSENKO signed on
20 February::
"As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American
Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief
Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK,
Irom January 1960 to January 1962, one of my.
functions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy
and to assume the rights and responsibilities of
Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence.: In
order to perform this function I had the right and
the obligation of knowing the details about every
important activity of the section against the
American Embassy and its personnel.
No activity
of this nature was withheld from me.
"As Deputy Chief of the Section I know definitely
that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy, were
agents of the KGB ox reporting unofficially in any
way to the KGB during my service in the Section.
There were no approaches or recruitments made by
the Section during the period January 1960 to
January 1962 against personnel of the American
Embassy, including personnel of the Attaches
(Army, Navy, and Air), the Department of Agriculture
and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants,
State Department code clerks except against STORS-
BERG.) and KEYSERS? both unsuccessful approaches.
706
"There were no approaches or recruitments made
against any employees of the United States Govern-
ment who were assigned to the. American Embassy on
temporary duty during this period.
I have read and
understood this report and certify it as correct."
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In the two years of NOSENKO's service in the section
there were a total of over three months when he said KOVSHUK
was ill or on leave.
NOSENKO recalled that he was Acting
Chief during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and
1961, although he did not remember precisely in which months.
He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the
summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with
heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961, again
when KOVSHUK was ill: He recalled that KOVSHUK was also
absent for several days in connection with preparations for
President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in
1960.
As Acting Chief in KOVSHUK's absence, NOSENKO stated that
he was responsible for supervising the administrative work
and operational activity of the entire section and, in
particular, for assuming KOVSHUK's work in directing
operations
against diplomatic personnel assigned to the
American Embassy•
NOSENKO could recall no operational decisions that he
made as acting chief, nor any specific or unusual occurrences
during these times.
NOSENKO said that the only specific
responsibility of KOVSHUK's which he handled in the Chief's
absence was reporting to the Chief of the First Department
about all correspondence going out of the Embassy Section.
NOSENKO stated he met none of KOVSHUK's agents during his
absences, nor could he remember any of
them except GLAZUNOV
[whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own agent and later
said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's"]. and the American
06
correspondent STEVENS] [about whom NOSENKO had reported in
connection with his activities in 1953-55].
According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK had personal contact, under
Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with "some" American
Embassy officers, but the
only such Embassy officer he could
identify was WINTERS,
and he knew of no details about
KOVSHUK's relations with him.
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123
Comment:
NOSENKO knows neither that
was identified formally by the Embassy to the
Soviet Government to be a CIA employee, nor
that KOVSHUK (who was aware of this fact),
was in personal contact withl
General Supervisory Duties
In interrogations of January 1965 NOSENKO was questioned
in considerable detail about his supervisory duties as
Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. He didn't know what
major
"duties occupied most of his time, nor which were the
most important:
He stated that "everything" was important.
Ilis subordinates were
GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV (responsible
for code clerk operations), [Vladimirl DEMKIN assisted by
[Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY (residents of America House),
IN.A.] GAVRILENKO (Air Attaches personnel and the aircrews
of the Ambassador's aircraft): [I.Ya.] KURILENKO (Army
Attache personnel). and [Victor] BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attache
personnel) •
Except for "little questions" which the
officers decided, for themselves, NOSENKO said he directed
their activities, discussed with them various aspects of
work, and responded to their questions as required.
If he could not answer their questions, NOSENKO stated, or
if the problem was not within his authority, NOSENKO
discussed the matter with KOVSHUK.
If it was necessaryi
NOSENKO claimed he thereafter would discuss the matter with
American Department Chief KLYPIN or his successor, [s.M.]
FEDOSEYEV, and
on some occasions, with Second Chief
Directorate Chief GRIBANOV.
NOSENKO stated he accompanied his subordinates to some
meetings with their agents, not because he didn't trust
them, but to hear for himself what the agent was reporting.
He cited as hypothetical examples occasions when DEMKIN
might relay reports from Ella UMANETS or Inga VARLAMOVA
(agents working against America House residents), reports
which NOSENKO would want to hear for himself, personally:
NOSENKO would not estimate to his interrogators what percen-
tage of Embassy Section agents he met in this fashion.
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In addition to supervising his subordinates's direction
of agents, NOSENKO said he personally managed PREISFREUND 06
("PROKHOR") and WEISS) ("SARDAR") •
0b
Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations
NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for
supervising operations against American code clerks, he
found a very "difficult situation". Prior to the assignment
of KOSOLAPOV to the American Embassy Section in late 1959,
all operations against code clerks had been handled by
MALYUGIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort there
had been
no operational approaches and no successes.
When
NOSENKO took over there were no active developmental
operations against code clerks under way, he stated, and
the only agents or operational contacts being used against
them were poorly educated maids and waitresses none of
whom had accomplished anything of importance. No non-soviet
citizen agents were being used in operations against code-
room personnel.
According to NOSENKO, in January or February of 1960
GRYAZNOV was assigned to the American Embassy
Section as a
second assistant to NOSENKO in his code clerk activities.
From this point on, NOSENKO; KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV shared
the same KGB Headquarters office.
There, all KGB files on
American code clerks as well as the files on all agents
available for work against them, were stored in one large
NOSENKO supervised
all of the section's work along these lines, and no provo-
cations, compromises, recruitment attempts, or recruitments
could have been planned or carried out without his prior
knowledge and agreement when he was in Moscow. If NOSENKO
It ROSENRO
was absent on a trip, he would have been told about any such
activity upon his return.
NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of
GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing
their cases with them, taking part in operational planning,
and approving or disapproving all operational measures.
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When NOSENKO took over
responsibility for operations
against code clerks, he read files on targets and agents,
discussed the situation with MALYUGIN, DEMKIN (the American
Embassy Section case officer responsible for the residents
GRYAZNOV, and
his findings and
and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result, NOSENKO
asserted..
In introducing a new program for the work of
the section, NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country
nationals (neither American nor Soviet citizens) for agent
work against code clerks; in line with this suggestion, he
personally recruited a Syrlan military officer.
(see p. 181), and directed him against the America House.
Samih WEISS] 08,0 €
After his first few visits, WEISS was specifically targetted O6
against military code clerk Matthew_ ZUJUS.
another such 05,06
agent directly handled. by NOSENKO wasthe Finnish business- 0806
man Johan PREISFREUND, who figured in the case of the
military code clerk James STORSBERG (see p. 166) • NOSENKO
also suggested initiating activity against code clerks prior
to their arrival in the USSR and specifically proposed that
operational measures be undertaken or that operational
possibilities be studied in Helsinki, the city through which
most of the American code clerks passed on their way to
MOScoW:
Comment:
Questioned later on individual cases, NOSENKO
retracted his assertion that he read and
studied all the files on individual American
code clerks, stating instead that he did not
tea at at one an a in mason on.
code clerks received from microphones, agents
and the like, and routed the reports to the
case officer concerned.
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GOLITSYN's Information About KGB Operations Against Embassy
Code
Clerks in 1960-1961
The most significant collateral information about KGB
operations against American code clerks in this period,
with which to compare NOSENKO's assertions lon this topic),
is that provided by GOLITSYN after his defection in 1961.
GOLITSYN identified KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV by name and
from photograph as being two veteran KGB officers, personally
known to him, who were in 1960 "working against code clerks
in the American Embassy in Moscow."
With respect to the
priority attached to the recruitment of American code clerks
in 1960, GOLITSYN commented in 1961 that:
"The task of
strengthening of work against Americans had been a standing
requirement, both in the past and most particularly lin
19601°
This work was particularly intensified after the
appointment of SHELEPIN. to the KGB...
In 1960, it was
recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the
Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, and against American
colonies
in other, countries... This question of intensifying
work against the
Americans was up before the Collegium of
the KGB.
Thereafter there was a directive from SIIFLEPIN
regarding the intensification of work against the American
cipher-clerks."
GOLITSYN said that NOSENKO was not assigned to the Embassy
Section in 1960-1961, since if he had been GOLTTSYN would
have known about it.
Preparing for his assignment to llelsinki, GOLITSYN. in
the spring of 1960 visited the Embassy Section and learned
from GRYAZNOV that the latter had as an agent an Embassy
code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki.
The code clerk had already provided
the KGB with
some
infor-
mation and he was considered by the KGB to be a "real"
agent.
GOLITSYN was told by GRYAZNOV that if the code clerk's
transfer materialized, GOLITSYN might have him in Helsinki
as his agent.
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GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in spring of 1960
that the latter had developed an operation against an
Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per
cent, sure" that the target would be recruited:
GRYAZNOV informed GOLITSYN in April or May 1960 that an
American employee of the Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code
clerk, was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on
the basis of homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and
concluding in 1960. The KGB had photographed the American
in various homosexual acts but SHELEPIN, who had just become
Chairman of the KGB, at the time was stressing ideological
rather than blackmail recruitments.
SHELEPIN said that the
homosexual blackmail was in this instance "too dirty", and
the KGB should find another basis for recruitment.
SHELEPIN
did not exclude future use of the photographs, which the KGB
would hold in reserve:
While on a temporary assignment to Helsinki in November
1960, V.V. KOSOLAPOV told GOLITSYN that he had come to
Helsinki in order to accompany an Embassy code clerk back
to Moscow on the train.
KOSOLAPOV planned to strike
acquaintance with the code clerk which he could continue
to develop in Moscow. In September 1961 a friend of
KOSOLAPOV also visited Helsinki on temporary duty. GOLITSYN
tried to get him to talk about KOSOLAPOV's November train
operation, but KOSOLAPOV's friend would not discuss the
GOLITSYN reasoned that there would be no reluctance
to discuss the case if it had been unsuccessful, and that
therefore KOSOLAPOV must have been successful in developing
the code clerk on the train or afterwards.
GOLITSYN learned in January 1961 from V.M. KOVSHUK that
08fo the Finnish agent Johannes PREISFREUND had recently been
used in the successful recruitment of an American employee
of the Embassy:
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Comment:
TWO Of GOLITSYN's Leads may refer to STORSBERG U6
and GARLAND] (see below). The other leads, more
than one of which may refer to the
same
individual, have not resulted in an identifica-
tion of any code clerk target of the KGB.
Operations Against Military Code Clerks
Comment:
According to official U.S. Government records,
Service Attaches of the Embassy in Moscow as
of 1960 shared a single cryptographic center
and a single military code clerk (except when
two code clerks overlapped during periods of
turnover). The military code clerk was respon-
sible for enciphering and deciphering the
traffic of all three military services.
In
practice, at least one other member of the
Service Attaches' offices in Moscow held a
cryptographic clearance and was trained to
replace the regular military code clerk when
the latter was absent.
(James STORSBERG was the only military code06,C8
clerk assigned to the Moscow Embassy from
February 1960 to September 1961, when his
successor, Matthew ZUJUS, arrived. [STORSBERG 06
himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and
departed in November 1961.
During the period of STORSBERG's tour in
Moscow, back-up. cryptographic dutes were per-
formed by the Military Communications Officer, 0806
CIVO-2 HURLEY, HURLEX performed these duties OL
on a number of occasions, including the night
of the KGB approach to STORSBERG] and he could 06
be loosely termed a code clerk.
(Although
NOSENKO has distinguished between [STORSBERG'S U6
function as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's U6
duties as
"military code machine mechanic", he
considered both to be within the general category
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Comment:
(Continued)
of "military code clerks". NOSENKD reported
that there was no KGB opecation against
06 HURLEY) Additionally, HURLEY performed repair 06
work on the cryptographic machines and directed
certain other sensitive activities at the
Embassy D6 HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly
06 before STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he
served there until June or July 1962.
The only other person performing official
functions in the military code room during the
1960-61 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived 06
in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned
to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer.
As a concurrent secondary assignment, (KEYSERS 06
worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the
Air Attache. From February until mid-April
1961, as a collateral duty. KEYSERS worked in 06
the joint military code room where he was in
training to serve as back-up cryptographer.
He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for
reasons
aptitude and lack of interest;
in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because
of
reported homosexual activities.
The significance of the following cases,
particularly that of STORSBERG, is the extent06
to which collateral intormation corroborates
or contradicts NOSENKO's claims to have been
Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section,
to have supervised all KGB operations against
Embassy code clerks, and to have certain know
ledge that no Americans'in the Embassy were
recruited between "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH) in
1953 and NOSENKO's defection in 1964.
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ents arman
Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG 06
NOSENKO's Information-1962
NOSENKO first'alluded to a KGB attempt to recruit an
unnamed American military code clerk during his initial
meeting with CIA in 1962: He was describing a new technique
(which he later claimed to be his own idea) introduced in
the 1960-1961 period to overcome the reluctance of Americans
in Moscow to develop friendships with Soviet citizens.
Beginning in 1960 the KGB instructed "third-national"
agents
(Germans, Frenchmen; and Finns, for example) to visit the
American Club on Kropotkinskaya Naberezhnaya to cultivate
American enlisted men living there.
(GOLITSYN learned of
one such agent of NOSENKO and the KGB concluded that GOLITSYN
had reported the KGB practise to the Americans, because
foreigners no. longer were permitted to enter the America
House billets freely for dances, movies, and the like at
the club there.)
NOSENKO had recruited the agent known to
GOLITSYN in order to develop an American military code
clerk. Without identifying either the foreign agent or the
American target, NOSENKO provided further details on the
case in subsequent meetings.
Recruiting a military code clerk from the Embassy was the
American Embassy Section's "number one assignment"
, and for
a year NOSENKO was involved
in an operation against such a
target almost to the exclusion of all other duties.. The
case was considered to be the "number one" case, and KGB
Chairman SHELEPIN as well as Second Chief Directorate Chief
GRIBANOV impatiently inquired as to its progress.
was an American Army sergeant with about 20 years' service U8
who, the KGB learned, wanted to retire and take a position
as a code clerk with the State Department. For the purpose U8
of developing the target, NOSENKO recruited a foreigner who
visited the USSR frequently. The "third-national" agent was
placed in contact with the American, and they had several
drinking bouts together. After about two months, NOSENKO
instructed his agent to take the American to the
agent's
hotel room and introduce him there to a KGB female agent.
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Although the girl and the American were intimate, no photo-
graphs were taken, nor were photographs taken the next time
the agent provided the American with a girl.
On the third
such occasion, however, the KGB technicians did obtain
incriminating
photographs. The foreign agent also involved
the American in an illicit currency, transaction in which
the American contributed $300 as his share to. finance "the
purchase and subsequent sale of some jewels. The American
was allowed to believe that he earned a $5,000 profit:
the
money was actually furnished by the KGB.
After a year's development, GRIBANOV decided that a
recruitment
should be attempted, through another foreigner.
The original foreign agent was withdrawn from the operation,
and a KGB officer, Nikolay Semenovich SKVORTSOV, was
introduced to the American in the guise of wealthy French
businessman "Marcel MICHAUD": SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD met and
drank with the American several times, "even at America
House" It was SKVORTSOV's estimate that the American was
very careful, but that he might be susceptible to recruitment
while drunk
After meeting with the American at the club in
America House one evening. SKVORTSOV telephoned him and
invited him to SKVORTSOV's hotel room to meet "two Dutch
girls"
When he arrived, SKVORTSOV explained that the girls
had refused to come;.
but that he could call another girl for
the American. The girl lidentified by NOSENKO in 1964 as
Inga VARLAMOVA] was a KGB agent of GRYAZNOV's who was used
for such operations, and she and the American were intimate
in SKVORTSOV's hotel room. In an adjacent: room were GRIBANOV,
NOSENKO, KOVSHUK, and another KGB officer. In another
adjacent room were technicians of the Operational Technical
Directorate, who taped the American's conversations. when
the American left SKVORTSOV's room" at two o'clock in the
morning, he was "very tipsy".
NOSENKO and another officer
Ltercepted him in the hallway, escorted him into the adjacent
room, and locked the door. NÖSENKO himself solicited the
American's collaboration with the KGB in exchange for
$20,000 in cash (which was offered in two packages of $10
notes) and the promise of additional sums.
When the American
refused, the KGB officers disclosed their knowledge of his
plan to transfer to the State Department. They threatened
to inform the Embassy that he. had collaborated with the KGB,
in which case he would get neither the cash nor the job with
167
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the state a though he was
the State Department, The American was adamant in his
refusal, although he was held in the hotel room all night
At about six o'clock in the morning the KGB officers
had called America House to advise that the American was
needed at the Embassy because an enciphered telegram had
arrived.
The American was then released.
The KGB "knew" that the American did not report the
recruitment attempt.
Using that circumstance for blackmail
rather than the incriminating photographs, the KGB planned
another attempt to recruit him if he ever returned abroad.
When the non-Soviet agent used in the first year of
developing the American target had come to the attention of
GOLITSYN, GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section to see if he
could use him in First Chief Directorate operations abroad.
NOSENKO was on leave at the time, but GOLITSYN talked with
another Embassy Section officer.
GOLITSYN was told "Don't
touch him, he's ours". [The relevance of this incident is
discussed below.]
NOSENKO's Information-1964
At the second meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1964; NOSENKO
identified the American military code clerk as "Jim" J
STORSBERG.
The foreign agent NOSENKO recruited for the
case was (Johannes PREISFREUND (KGB cryptonym "PROKHOR"),
Finna! In repeating the suhstance of his 1962 account of
the KGB recruitment attempt, NOSENKO emphasized his personal
role in directing both PREISFREUND] and the KGB officer
SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD.
06
GRIBANOV and KOVSHUK, not NOSENKO, actually made the
recruitment attempt..
NOSENKO was not present; he waited
outside the room with GRYAZNOV.
Neither did NOSENKO recruit
C6 PREISFREUND.
The latter was recruited by KOVSHUK "who
needed credit for the recruitment" although NOSENKO hac
initially cultivated the Finn.!! Under KOVSHUK's orders,
NOSENKO served as PREISFREUND' # case officer, although
KOVSHUK accompanied him to operational meetings with the
agent.
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06
(PREISFREUND) was used in no KGB operation other than in
the development of(STORSBERGO His usefulness declined
because was suspected, particularly by his fellow Einnsyll
of having some relationship with the KGB.
Comment:
A report of the
security service
advised CIA in December 1960 that PREISFREUND] 06
"is a Soviet agent who calls at the America
Club in Moscow and develops Americans in an
attempt to penetrate Western circles".
After GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] NOSENKO (who
had by then transferred back to the Seventh Department) and
KOVSHUK concluded that PREISFREUND) thereby had been identi- 06
fied as a KGB agent to American Intelligence; and that
06 PREISFREUND should not be used again against American
Embassy personnel. NOSENKO was told to use the Fing in 11
Seventh Department operations, but he was unsuitable since
he knew only Finnishband Russian:
NOSENKO's Information-1965
In' the
February-March 1965 interrogations NOSENKO
provided some additions as well as further amendments to
what he had related earlier about (STORSBERG. 06 GRYAZNOV wrote
the initial operational plan, which NOSENKO read and
approved. The plan called for a detailed study of STORSBERG O6
and the creation of some basis on which to make an opera-
tional approach.
The case developed slowly in 1960. Fron
Ja female clerk named YAZHINSKAYA and other employees in the
Finnish Embassy, [FREISTREUND obtained background information OL
on (STORSBERG
who sometimes visited the sauna in the Finnish Of
PREISFREUND was directed to visit America House
in order to strike up an acquaintance with SToRsheRd, and of
when he was successfül, he managed to lure STORSBERG to his
hotel room,
where the KGB obtained incriminating photographs
0.6 of STORSBERg and the female agent Inga VARLAMOVA. (STORSBERG],06
visited PREISFREUND's rooms many times at different hotels
O in Moscow, but the KGB took incriminating photographs on
169
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06
only two occasions. (PREISFREUND introduced STORSBERG| to
SKVORTSOV, and when they had become acquainted, SKVORTSOV
O6 invited STORSBERG to his room at the Leningrad
Hotel on a
number of occasions; but STORSBERG always refused. On one Ot
evening in the middle of 1961, however, STORSBERG accepted 06
SKVORTSOV's invitation in the belief that he would meet
non-Soviet girls. NOSENKO was in the hotel and he had
made arrangements with the KGB Operational Technical
Directorate to call at once if audio coverage of the American
Embassy indicated anything which might affect the recruitment
attempt.
While NOSENKO waited outside the room; GRIBANOV attempted
Ob to recruit (STORSBERG) on ideological grounds; his proposal
was translated by KOVSHUKO6 STORSBERG, however, must have
given SKVORISOV's hotel room telephone number to someone at
the American Embassy, because while GRIBANOV was talking to
him someone called SKVORTSOV's room looking for the American.
When this happened; either GRYAZNOV Or NOSENKO knocked on
the door and advised KOVSHUK that the Embassy was searching
for [STORSBERG The recruitment attempt was thereupon
terminated, unsuccessfully.
NOSENKO "could not remember" if he had ever read the KGB
file on STORSBERG 06 [In describing KGB practice, NOSENKO
consistently equated custody of a case file with being the
responsible case officer.] He had no interest in "earlier
reporting", although he had read current materials concerning
O6 STORSBERG as they came into the Embassy Section.
Comment: NOSENKO at that time in 1965 was then confronted
with the substance of the 1962 meeting trans-
cripts in which he claimed to have run the
operation; to have been deeply involved in it,
and to have personally spoken to STORSBERG 07
during the recruitment attempt. NOSENKO
interrupted the reading of the transcript,
calling it "nonsense". He said he was drunk
at all the 1962 meetings in Geneva and
• was
nervous in the presence of CIA officers.
He
1 SR
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Comment:
(Continued)
admitted that
he had "painted himself" as being
somewhat more active and important than facts
justified, but said this reflected only
"white lies" which did not affect the otherwise
complete accuracy of his story with respect to
the position he occupied at the time nor the
events which then transpired.
NOSENKO's Information-1966
During the 1964 interrogations NOSENKO had been vague as
to the timing and sequence of events in the STORSBERG opera-O6
tion, and in 1965 he refused to specify dates for this or
any other operation he described, stating he could no longer
6
be sure when any particular incident occurred: Questioned
again about the STORSBERG case in October 1966, NOSENKO
insisted that he had directed the entire operation from
beginning to end, and that it was his most important case.
At his interrogator's insistence, he provided the following
chronology:
06
January 1960:
STORSBERG arrived in Moscow.
(NOSENKO
accepted the actual date as supplied
by the interrogator.)
Early 1960
or PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK.
miđ-1960:
NOSENKO, after retracting his claim
he recruited PREISFREUND said he 06
First met PREISFREUND " a
week or so 06
after his recruitment. (which occurred,
according to most accounts; in early
1960). In October 1966, however,
NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND U
first met "in the middle of 1960, in
the summer of 1960".
06
Summer 1960:
PREISFREUND first provided a woman to
STORSBERG.
06
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Early 1961:
Compromising photographs of [STORSBERG
and a Soviet female were first obtained
at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.
About May.
1961:
PREISFREUND was withdrawn from the
operation and SKVORTSOV was introduced
about three weeks before the approach
to STORSBERG.
June 1961:
Unsuccessful KGB approach to [STORSBERG
in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow.
(Earlier in the 1966 interrogations
NOSENKO had said that the approach was
made "a month of a month and
a half
06 before STORSBERG left Moscow".
Told
06 that STORSBERG was reassigned in
November 1961, NOSENKO said that the
approach was in June 1961, five months
Do before (STORSBERG's departure.)
Do. (STORSBERG) reported that the approach
was in October 1961. See below.]
STORSBERG's Information
06
STORSBERG did not report the KGB recruitment approach
until the NOSENKO lead prompted his being interviewea by
the FBI on 14 September 1964. His reasons, he said, were
that the KGB officers had warned him not do so and he
feared that by reporting the approach he would jeopardize
his chance for employment with the State Department. He
said that he provided no information to the Soviets during
or after the approach in October 1961. With the exception
of the timing of the recruitment attempt, STORSBERG's 06
account of the operation is fairly close to that provided by
NOSENKO, Including the roles of PREISFREUND and SKVORTSOV, U6
whom he
positively identified by their photographs.
He
was unable to identify
photographs of GRIBANOV, KOVSHUK, Or
NOSENKO.
first intimate
with a female procured by PREISFREUND "six months or
SO"
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[e.g., ca. Junel after arriving in Moscow, and it was not
until more than a year later, in September 1961, that he
first met SKVORTSOV, posing as the Frenchman "Marcel
MICHAUD" 86 STORSBERG was uncertain how he became acquainted
with SKVORISOV; stating variously that he met him through
State, Department code clerk Joseph MORONE through friends
at the Finnish Embassy, or that he became acquainted with
SKVORTSOV while he, STORSBERG was serving as bartender in
the America Club.
During September 1961 STORSBERG] was 06
intimate with female friends of SKVORTSOV on two occasions
in SKVORTSOV's hotel room.
In the middle of October 06
1961, on the evening of the KGB
recruitment attempt._STORSBERG. saw SKVORISOV, MORONE,Uand
an unidentified female sitting together in the America Club.
Comment:
STORSBERG. could not have met MORONE with
SKVORTSOV in October 1961! MORONE]was trans-
ferred to Lisbon the previous August after he
himself
was compromised by the KGB.
See p. 198
As far as CIA is aware, (MORONE) has never been Ut
questioned regarding his alleged association
with SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD or STORSBERG: 06
0b
06
While MORONEwas dancing with the unknown female, (STORSBERG
invited to visit SKVORTSOV's hotel for drinks.
(STORSBERG 06
and SKVORTSOV left the America Club, 'and STORSBERG was again Ok
intimate with a Soviet female in SKVORTSOV's hotel room.
It was immediately after leaving SKVORISOV's room on this
night when (STORSBERG was accosted by the KGB:
a signed statement which he gave a representative of
the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations on
29 July 19650 STORSBERG gave somewhat different details:
According to this account, three or four months after
arriving in the Soviet Union in November 1959 (sic), he met
16 PREISFREUND) through friends at the Finnish Embassy.
There"
after PREISFREUND became a frequent.
-visitor to the America
Club and a friendship developed between the two. On four
D6
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occasions [STORSBERG?
of September or the beginning of October 1961, when PREIS- 06
FREUND stopped coming to the America Club.
-ime, he first met SKVORTSOV through (MORONE Pat the Americ:
Club. Do MORONE] left Moscow the previous August.] ESTORSBERG06
was not sure of the exact circumstances of his
introduction
ob honorea the ene
do to SKVORISOV nor did he know the latter's relationship with
After meeting STORSBERG,)SKVORTSOV frequently
Visited the America Club and actively cultivated [STORSBERE's 06
friendship. This soon led to an invitation to visit
SKVORTSOV's apartment, where STORSBERG was intimate with alb
Soviet female acquaintance of SKVORTSOV. It was after a
second visit to the apartment; about a week after the first,
that the KGB made its recruitment approach. According to
Of this as well as STORSBERG's earlier account, the approach
occurred in the middle of toward the end of October 1961.
In connection with an OSI security interview on 5 August
19650 STORSBERG denied having furnished defense information
to any "Communist intelligence agency" or having ever agreed
to do so, that he had been contacted by a member of a foreign
intelligence agency since his return to the United States,
or that he knew of anyone at the American Embassy in Moscow
who had been contacted by a member of a "Communist intelli-
gence agency".
He also denied having agreed in any way with
06
PREISFREUND to buy diamonds. U6 STORSBERG's denial with
respect to the diamonds is in contradiction both with the
specific assertions of NOSENKO and with GOLITSYN's more
general allegation that the unnamed American was recruited
by the KGB after being compromised by FREISFREUND in illicit
speculation.1
PREISFREUND's Information
10
CIA interviewed PREISFREUND in July 1965 in Helsinki
[NOSENKO himself had suggested that (PREISFREUND would 06
confirm his story of the (§TORSBERG case. D6 While PREISFREUND]06
correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and
STORSBERGy he maintained initially that he had only a
business relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO, that he never
had anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not even
know what the initials "KGB" stood for.
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PREISFREUND finally admitted, however, that he had been
involved in a KGB operation against STORSBERG] and he agreed Ub
to tell "the entire truth". His version of the case, while
containing some internal contradictions, only partially
coincided with that provided by NOSENKO. (PREISFREUND 06
claimed to be hazy on the date of all events connected with
contacts with the KGB. The dates, however, could be
reconstructed from the known dates of otherwise related events
which he said occurred
about the time he was recruited or
0o first met STORSBERG or last visited the America House, and
so forth.] He described being recruited by KOVSHUK, first
dating the event as at the end of 1959 or the beginning of
1960, and later as March-April 1960. According to PREIS- U6
FREUND, he was
"cultivated" neither by NOSENKO or by KOVSHUk.
The first time he met either was when he was confronted and
recruited by KOVSHUK under threat of prosecution for black
market dealings.
[NOSENKO is unaware of that feature.of
PREISFREUND's recruitment.] On NOSENKO's and KOVSHUK'S
instructions, about six months after PREISFREUND's recruit-06
ment, he became acquainted with (STORSBERG, and In the summer 06
of 1960 on one occasion he lured STORSBERGlinto intimacy with 06
a female KGB agent (earlier identified by NOSENKO) in his
hotel room
He never saw STORSBERG|again; nor did he D
participate in any other KGB operations:
06
Referring to the night (STORSBERG was intimate with the
female KGB agent in PREISFREUNDs hotel room, PREISFREUND 06 06
said he slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and the 06
girl shared his bed. At one point during the evening he
glimpsed NOSENKO in the hallway, wearing a rubber apron:
He deduced from this that NÖSENKO had been involved in
surreptitious photography of(STORSBERG and the girl.
Comment:
NOSENKO stated that photographs were taken of
STORSBERG and a girl in PREISFREUND' s\ hote106
room. Hế
has never
said anything to suggest,
nowever, that he ever personally was involve
in photographing any of the compromises he
claims to have arranged, nor has he ever
claimed any competence in clandestine photo
graphy.
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06
Before his last meeting with CIA, PREISFREUND)mentioned
that he was planning to visit Leningrad with his family,
but that he had learned from business contacts in Moscow
that Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in
NOSENKO's defection.
He was apprehensive and particularly
concerned that the KGB might suspect that he had related.
nis role in the STORSBERG case to American Intelligence. 06
During his final meeting with CIA on 13 July 1965LPREIS- 06
FREUND asked his interviewers for advice as to whether he
should or should not travel to the USSR. He was told that
if the situation was as he described, it could be quite
dangerous for him to return. PREISFREUND stated then that06
he agreed, that he would not go to the USSR after all.
Comment:
PREISFREUND] did shortly thereafter visit the
Soviet Union as he planned, and according to
| (Finnish official travel records returned to
10 Helsinki on 24 July 1965.
From his apparent
immunity to KGB pressure, it is concluded that
06 [PREISFREUND] is to some degree still under KGB
control:
GOLITSYN'S Information
GOLITSYN,
who served as a KGB First Chief Directorate
counterintelligence officer in Helsinki until his defection
in December 1961, reported that he had met in Helsinki on
several occasions in 1960 fa Finn by the name of PREISEREUND 08, 06
whom he wished to use operationally. In December 1960
[GOLITSYN's passport showed that it took place in January
1961] GOLITSYN visited the Second Chief Directorate's
American Department in Moscow to request the permission of
KOVSHUK to use PREISFREUND against Americans in Finland. 06
KOVSHUK refused the request with the explanation
that
06
PREISFREUND) "helped in one recruitment now, and it is
necessary to be careful for about six months so as not to
arouse American_suspicions". GOLITSYN learned from KOVSHUK
that PREISFREUND
had met the target at America Club in
06
0001446
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Moscow and had involved him in speculatory activities. and
lured him into intimacy with various female KGB agents.
According to KOVSHUK, the recruitment was accomplished "in
1960, at the end of 1960"; PREISFREUND] "had helped to create06
the circumstances" and had been withdrawn from the operation
before the actual, approach, which was made by KGB officers.
The American target of PREISFREUND, from what KOVSHUk relatede6
to GOLITSYN, was either a code clerk'or diplomat.
(GOLITSYN
later expressed his personal belief that the individual
probably was unmarried and might have been a "military
man" .)
Comment:
06.
06
If GOLITSYN's lead is not to STORSBERG
* but to
some other_American code clerk against whom
PREISFREUND was used, NOSENKO's claim to have
supervised all such code clerk operations is
refuted®
06
Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG:
Summary and Conclusion
In the absence of contrary evidence, it is judged that
operation remains
in dispute, GOLITSYN's timing is judged to
be the most plausible because of the circumstances under
which he acquired his information.
These circumstances-
GOLITSYN's visit to and discussion with KOVSHUK in Moscow,
about the use of REISREUN
Tare confirmed by NOSENKO and Ob
the date, January 1961, is éstablished by passport informa-
tion. It follows that the operation against STORSBERG] thus U6
would have taken place more than six months prior to the time
NOSENKO and STORSBERG) claimed.
Such a significant inaccuracy 06
by NOSEnKo, about an event which he said took place less
than a year before he described it to CIA (in June 1962),
undermines his claim to the role he played in the case and
hence to his position as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy
Section and supervisor of
code clerk operations.
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06
Attempted Defection Of KEYSERS,
06
U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS served
in Moscow from 2l December 1960 as an assistant to Embassy
00
Medical Officer Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force Captain. 06,08
KEYSERS was the replacement of Staff Sgt. J.G. BRADLEY who 0b
had been earlier withdrawn from Moscow because he was a
homosexual. Besides his duties with the Medical Officer,
Ö (KEYSERS was assigned administrative functions in the office
of the Air Attache:@ KEYSERS was trained also to perform
back-up cryptographic duties under (James STORSBERGin the06
military code room; but he was relieved of this duty in
April 1961.
Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies,
O6 (KEYSERS) was removed from Moscow by his American superiors
on 16 June 1961.
NOSENKO first spoke of what turned. out to be the
KEYSERS case in Geneva in 1962; but without naming the KGB
target or identifying him as (STORSBERG's replacement.
The 06
KGB and Embassy officials almost simultaneously discovered
the American to be a homosexual, he said; and when the KGB
found out that the target was to withdraw from the Soviet
Union, a letter offering him asylum in the USSR was sent to
the American. NOSENKO himself followed up the letter by
personally repeating the KGB offer to the American at the
airport just before his departure.
06
On 24 January
1964 NOSENKO described the KGB attempt
to recruit STORSBERG and then proceeded to repeat his 1962
description
of the KGB action taken against STORSBERG's (L
ceplacement, whom he identified as: ZUJUS.0 Several days
later, NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse and requested
an urgent meeting
with CIA.
At the meeting he announced
the homosexual code clerk
whom he NOSENKO had personally
accosted at the airport.
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NOSENKO's Information
- 06
KEYSERS was STORBER's replacement as military code
clerk, and the KGB "sensed at once." that he was a homo
sexual, and the case preoccupied NOSENKO the exclusion of
everything else:
• NOSENKO and other KGB officers, for
example, chased KEYSERSyall over Moscow, attempting (without
success) to confront their target in compromising circum-
stances.
The American
ice ballet: (Ice Capades troupe). came
to Moscow, and KEYSERS! became involved at America House with
some of its male homosexual members. The Embassy Security
Officer learned of KEYSERS' activities at about the same time 06
but it learned
that he was to be withdrawn from the Soviet Union. The KGB
then sent a letter to KEYSERS at his room in America House,
pointing out the trouble he was in and offering him asylum
in the USSRUb KEYSERS did not respond to the letter. On the
Dbday of KEYSERS departure, KGB surveillants reported that he
had left America House for the airport, accompanied by an
Assistant Army Attache. NOSENKO sped to the airport and in
the terminal building found occasion to approach KEYSERS 06
alone, NOSENKO asked if(KEYSERS had thought about the offer 06
in the letter, but KEYSERS did not respond and immediately 06
reported the approach to the officer escorting him.
In the 1965 interrogations NOSENKO added only that at
the
time NOSENKO approached KEYSERS at the airport, the kGB0G
had concluded that@KEYSERS) had not reported receipt of the e
letter inviting him to defect, because no information to
this effect was obtained from microphones or telephone taps
in the Embassy®
06-
KEYSERSE Information
065
Prior to his departure from Moscow KEYSERS
acknowledged
to his superiors his homosexual tendencies and he admitted
involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at America
HOuSE
He was rebuffed by a Marine guard in March 1961,
and he twice engaged in homosexual acts with members of the
Ice Capades troupe in May.
He denied any public display of
his homosexuality but said he could not be sure that someone
had not entered his room at America House while he and a
homosexual partner were asleep.
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In a debriefing in west Germany on 26 June 1961,/KEYSERS}06
related the events leading to his withdrawal from Moscow.
On 15 June he had been called to the office of Army Attache
Colonel URBAN, who advised him that he was being transferred
From Moscow the following day for excessive drinking, and
cautioned him not to reveal the reasons for his transfer.
Comment:
NOSENKO's information generally coincides with
been discussed between Security Officer John
ABIDIAN and Army Attache, Colonel HOFFMAN!
so a Ub
conversation which HOFFMAN concludes was among
those sensitive matters compromised by micro-
phones later discovered in the Army Attache
offices.
Similarly, Colonel URBAN's conversa-Ub
Ob tion informing KEYSERS of his impending transfer
was concluded to have been monitored by the
same KGB microphones, from which the KGB would
nave learned, contrary to NOSENKO's assertion,
No that KEYSERS' did report the receipt of the
defection letter to his superiors.
Ob (KEYSERS) described the
Russian who approached
him at the airport as being 40 to 45 years old,
about 5 feet 8 inches tall, approximately 225
pounds, and having a dark complexion and light
hair.
NOSENKO was then 34 years old, and he is
several inches taller and not rotund.
When
[KEYSERS] was shown photographs of NOSENKO, he
did not recognize him.
According to NOSENKO, the KGB "sensed at
Doonce" that (KEYSERS)was a homosexual.
He is
unaware of
certain information relating to
06 (KEYSERS: homosexual activities, drinking, and
difficulties with his superiors, although that
information was available through KGB agents in
America House and had been widely discussed in
Embassy offices in which microphones had been
emplaced. No KGB officer directly connected
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Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
Comment:
(Continued)
06
06
with the case could regard KEYSERS as STORSBERG s:
replacement 06 KEYSERS arrived in Moscow almost
a year before STORSBERGs departure, and was 06
assigned to the Air Attache office.
ZUJUS.. 06
(STORSBERG's replacement, arrived in Moscow and
worked with STORSBERG about three months before
STORSBERG departed Moscow. KEYSERS stated
NOSENKO was not the person who approached him
at the airport. NOSENKO, in asserting that he
was, forgot the name of the single American
target whom
he ever personally confronted.
Developmental Operation Against ZuJus) 06
recruited and handled Syrian army officer Samih WEISS
In February 1964 NOSENKO reported that he had personil i
"main agent" in a KGB
developmental operation againstfu.s.:
06
Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS.l6 ZUJUSarrived in Moscow
in September 196l to assume the military code clerk duties
Db of STORSBERG and he remained there until January 1963.
NOSENKO did not recall the ZUJUS case until he was eminded O6
of it by a reference to Samin WEISS which was among his
notes which he brought to Geneva. 0l
NOSENKO's Information
06
0608
NOSENKO recruited WEISS, a Syrian from Damascus, in 1961.
wEISs was a captain or major in the Syrian Armylwho was
Studying at the Tank Academy.
He visited the America Club,
and when he identified ZUJUS by photograph as one of the oh
persons: he had met there, he was told to develop him, not
to pay any attention to anyone else. WEISS
and ZUJUS had Di
something in common
in that ZUJUS had been stationed In Ol
Lebanon and the Syrian was from Damascus, only a short
distance away.0/WEISS merely studied and developed ZUJUST 06
during conversations at the America Club.
On one occasion,
Jo when ZUJUS- agreed that it would be nice to have some Lebanese i/
vodka, the KGB arranged for some to be sent from the KGB Legal
Residency in Beirut, and veIsS presented it to ZuJus)as a
gift from friends 10
181
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
ZUJUS?'
case officer was GRYAZNOV, and besides handling the
06 "main agent" WEISS, NOSENKO supervised GRYAZNOV's activities
with respect to ZUJUS,06 NOSENKO read the Second Chief Directo-
rate file on the American, as well as all reports as they
came into the Embassy Section, and he discussed the case
with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible
for America House), and his own superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote
06.
the operational plan, which called for thorough development
by WEISS) in order to learn everything about him and eventually
Obto Introduce an agent to ZUJUS through the Syrian, id Progress
Obwas slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often
stayed alone, even in America House. Although WEISS and 06
Ob ZUJUS became
_acquainted, they did not become good friends.
Ơó On the days WEISS)planned to visit America House, NOSENKO
met him in hotels or restaurants, never in safehouses.
occurred every week or two, depending on WEISS' availability 6
drinking heavily and who at America House was involved with
which girls from foreign embassies. Although wEISS visited 06
America House once or twice a month, and drank there with
Co ZuJuS he reported little of interest.
06
The KGB learned "something" about ZuJUS
family in the
United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall:
he was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or of
interest to the KGB about [LUJUS' family background. There 06
was no information on ZUJUS received from KGB microphones, Ub
telephone taps or surveillance, and the _KGB was unaware
NOSENKO did not know of any other KGB agents working against
any vices or vulnerabilities which [ZuJUS]may have had. Off
ZUJUS.. The KGB did not attempt to recruit ZUJUS while Ob
NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section. If there had been a
recruitment attempt later,
after he left the Section, NOSENKO
would certainly learned of :it from GRYAZNOV.
"Because no one else knew him", at the American Depart-
ment's request NOSENKO continued to manage WEISS' contact
06
with ZUJUS\after NOSENKO transferred to the Seventh Depart-
in January 1962•
In March or April 1962 it was planned
S6that WEISS would invite ZUJUS to a restaurant where he ob
a friend", but the meeting had not
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
1962, he was not turned over to the First Chief Directorate:
his file was sent to Second Chief Directorate archives.
ZUJUS". Information
During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities in
06 1963. ZUJUS confirmed an Embassy Security Office report,
that
in the summer of 1962(ZUJUS) had been intimate with an 06
Austrian woman, "Lillian" (last name unknown), who had
visited America House with someone from the United Arab
Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when
was picked up by zuJuSl.u, since ZUJUS,was a cryptographer, 06
the America House manager interviewed "Lillian" and learned
her employer, a Czech. When the Embassy Security Officer
learned from the Austrian Embassy that no Austrian passport
had been issued to "Lillian", he asked her for her passport.
She replied that she had forgotten it and then left, saying
returned to erica house. for the passport:
was going to her
She
never
Comment:
NOSENKO described this incident, but in
connection with KGB attempts to
entrap Joseph
MORONE in 1960, not ZUJUS in 1962 06 (See p. 194)
NOSENKO was not in the Embassy Section in 1962.
Interrogation of NOSENKO never resolved how he
knew of this incident.
Interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1965,
08 ZuJUS said that as manager of the America Club he had
frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS.06 ZUJÜS|often used her
an an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees
of America House and
was able to provide considerable back-
ground information about her.
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Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
Comment:
NOSENKO has in other contexts identified
UMANETS as a long-time KGB agent employed in
america House. He never zelated her to Zule
06
In that same interview with CIA ZUJUS described having
or a person from Beirutl'who had been
met in MoscoW a person from Damsewho hase melet
Ameried to se, cultures met him while acting as doorman at
they conversed only for about 15 minutes
Oband ZuJus could not recall what they had talked about.
have seen the man on several other occasions, but he
not know his name nor why he
was in Moscow,
and he could
provide no physical descriptiond ZuJuldid not
recall that
this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but he acknowledged he
favored the beverage. ZUJUS, confirmed to CIA that his
father, Matas,Dis secretary of the (Lithuanian Roman CatholicL
Allance of America, an emigre organization concerned with
the liberation of Lithuanialh ZUJUS)indicated that his father
often travels abroad in connection with his emigre activities.
Comment:
Emigre organizations, including the (Lithuanian)
have been traditional KGB targets and most have
been penetrated by KGB agents.
The fact of the
elder (ZUJUS)semigre activities is almost
certainly to have been known to the KGB, making
(ZUJUSa matter of KGB concern for reasons quite
separate from his cryptographic duties.
'rom NOSENKO's unfamilarity. with ZUJUS' U
ZUJUS' intimacy with KG
agent "Lillian" and relationship with
UMANETS, it is concluded that NOSENKO's role
In the case, if any, was limited to his rela-
Jotionship with WEISS and that NOSENKO exercisec
no supervisory function in the development of
ZUJUS. Uf
0001454
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
Operations Against State Department Code Clerks
KGB operations against code clerks, for which NOSENKO
claimed supervisory responsibility, included those directed
against State Department cryptographic personnel as well as
military cryptographers at the Embassy.
In several such
cases, NOSENKO's claimed subordinate, KOSOLAPOV, figures
prominently
Development of Paul JENNER 06
NOSENKO first mentioned the JENNER]case in a 1964
interview with the FbI, when he was asked whether he had
ever heard of a case within recent years in which KOSOLAPOV
had travelled to Helsinki to intercept and establish contact
with an American code clerk.
NOSENKO "immediately recalled"
such
an incident which happened in 1960-1961.
He explained
that because Embassy code clerks were not sufficiently
accessible to the KGB after they arrived in Moscow, it was
decided
to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki as part of an effort
to probe for a new way to get in touch with the code clerks.
According to NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV made but one trip to Helsinki
in this new effort, and it was not tried again by others.
NOSENKO identified KOSOLAPOV's target in this operation as
Paul
JENNER!
BC
NOSENKO's Information
A month before JENNERs arrival in Moscow the Embassy
Section received a copy of JENNERis anketa (visa application) O6
listing his diplomatic title as Secretary Archivist and
indicating when he was to enter the Soviet Union from
Finland by train "at the beginning of 1960, in the middle of
the month". Believing him to be a code clerk (he was
subsequently found to bela pouch clerk)y"the group" decided
to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with the mission of accompanying
JENNER on the train to Moscow to study JENIER's behavior. U6
JENNER and KOSOLAPOV were about the same age.
KOSOLAPOV was
to be accompanied by a female agent of GRYAZNOV'S, "SOLISTKA"
a Russian ballerina, who was
to board the train after
5 it
entered the USSR at Vyborg.
185
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10.
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## Page 194
Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
A proposal for the operation was prepared for the approvai
of the KGB Chairman which explained that code clerks were
assigned to Moscow usually only for one year (thus limiting
their accessibility to the KGB for development] and that it
was necessary to attempt to place an agent near them even
before they arrived in Moscow.
When the Chairman's approval
was granted, NOSENKO prepared the kharakteristika (official
form) on KOSOLAPOV for the trip and gave it to the Personnel
OffIce. KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable for Helsinki explaining that
he was coming for two or three days. NOSENKO didn't sign the
cable, but read it, and it was taken to KLYPIN for his signa-
ture and thereafter KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second (European)
Department of the First Chief Directorate for release.
There
was no other correspondence with the Helsinki rezidentura
concerning the operation before KOSOLAPOV departed Moscow.
NOSENKO discussed the plan with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV and
"maybe" they discussed it with KOVSHUK the day before
KOSOLAPOV left.
KOSOLAPOV had (JENNER's photograph and his06
name, and expected that the Helsinki residency could obtain
a ticket for KOSOLAPOV. on (JENNER's train.0 NOSENKO did not
recall precisely when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow or under what
name he travelled. KOSOLAPOV was gone for about a week and
he travelled both ways by train.
NOSENKO read KOSOLAPOV's otchet (official account) of.
his trip, and the report of the female agent, "SOLISTKA".
According to those reports, KOSOLAPOV became
acquainted on
O the train with JENNER as planned, as dia "SOLISTKA", whom
GRYAZNOV took to Vyborg and placed in (JENNER's car. 06
0001456
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Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
Although the KGB later discovered that JENNER) was not a
code clerk but a pouch clerk, he remained
a target for
development. Since he did not telephone "SOLISTKA" after
one or two months, the KGB arranged for her to encounter
him at the railroad station or airport when he went alone to
meet the couriers. JENNER/saw her but did not approach her,
turning away
0b JENNER, The
The KGB took no further steps to cultiväte
KGB
"had nothing on JENNER at all except a06
suspicion he may have been a homosexual, but there
was no
proof".
On: 26 Octöber 1966 NOSENKO confirmed the identification
of other CIA sources by identifying a photograph as
that of
Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV, [born in Perm, 19 February 1928]
his former subordinate of the Embassy Section. The photo-
graph shown NOSENKO was that of one Victor Dmitriyevich
KOLOSSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927, in Perm,
who arrived in Finland by train from the USSR on 3i March
061960 [the day JENNER left] and departed on 2 April: NOSENKO
acknowledged that that data accurately reflected KOSOLAPOV's
alias, cover, and itinerary during his trip to Helsinki
to
accompany JENNER back to Moscow in 1960.
On 26: October 1966 NOSENKO was confronted with the Finnish
train manifest showing that Paul JENNER]was the single Ob
passenger departing Helsinki for Moscow on 31 March 1960
and that KOSOLAPOV/KOLOSOV travelled on 2. April on a train
carrying no Americans.
Repeating the substance of the KGB
operation and citing his recollection from reading KOSOLAPOV!s
report of the trip. NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV travelled
or the same train with JENNERD and that the Finnish manifests
must be in error. (See
(see a nFormation
accompanying exhibits.]
06
After
arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960 JENNER)reported
that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two
young Russians, "a boy and a girl; probably university
Students"
The two Russians struck up a conversation and
baiting him on the question of racial discrimination
in the United States.
They said that they might see JENNEr 0b
in Moscow:
About three months later, on 29 June, JENNERJuG
was performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers
0001457
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Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the
Russian girl, "Yuliya", who acted surprised to see him and
asked
him to
go outside to talk.
"Yuliya" explained that
she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving
on a flight to Irkutsk JENNER had seen the Irkutsk flight 0b
depart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER that her male 06
companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returne
to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with "Yuliya's"
Obquestions concerning JENNER's impressions and personal
activities in Moscow were Öthers about how often he came to
06
the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy.
Then
JENNER said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number
In Moscow and insisted that he call her.
She advised JENNUR] 06
that "it would be better if you did not mention our conver-
sation to anyone".
06
Comment: As far as CIA is aware,
JENNER has never been
asked to identify KOSOLAPOV's photograph.
security officials about sexual advances made by his first
maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his
second maid.
Comment: Although IOSENKO has not identified either of
were KGB agents or informants.
0001458
188
Top Secret
TIBR
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## Page 197
Top Secret
EXHIBIT I - Complete Train Manifests, Helsinki-Moscow
Arrested end doin
sparadeado
incontines i dociate
Ar:105. 01b/17.07.23
u.9.Ain
Radate
0.9A - Losk: 18.
Pascintarkeato je
LAurien
Ho Seakkonon
NOTE:
0b
31 March 1960
JENNER
single international passenger on train.
(Soviet passengers who. may have boarded train in
USSR, including at Vyborg, would not be included.)
taflats, jorda
TOIDSEK0I0I
40.04, 08
Ernakes,
T10::20,00-E
Kroltan.
11710/10.08.27.72211103
Ferake 4503118667/1
Kolossor, Ditton
Ena kannazalsat:
Fosbones, Jouto desto Araca
Echo. - 1025.
Sa. 190a
BarT: /200
20.21.24
Soones.
Ail Helesa
105210, 0600 ALIAS V
Kank
Kaskopertaja.
02.00,22
23,07,02
118.0%09
29.09,28
109,06,10.
1p1n1tta1a 00,1E:27
Dol adett
MAsstralat 78.00.2a
050106. 19.29020
91011n
7011al
sato spal: 03.08.13
Hr0:114-00r1i
12,59797119
Ioh+2-79395090
(25P7-9113)
Ida - Host.
(2507.7120.)
PaunintartantaJe
-Hat-111k0801
E. Sauktonen
2 April 1960
NOTE: No Americans on train with KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV.
218R
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---
## Page 198
9323:
Top Secret
(AMERICAN ENDASSY SECTION - January 1960-Jaruary 1962)
Information From Other Sources
I. Ye. SERGEVEV, a KGB officer and the soviet Consul in
Helsinki, contacted
the chief of the Helsinki police on
1631 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an Americar
named (Paul F. JENNER, who was due to arrive in Helsink.
the day before.' SERGEYEV explained that he had some
"business" with JENNER) but he did not specify its nature.
Reportedly, this was the first time that SERGYEV had made
such a request of the police chief. GOLITSYN identified
the Helsinki police chief as a soviet intelligence agent
from "about 1945 on".
06
Development of JLNNER:
Summary and Conclusion
NOSENIO's version of the JENNER case in some degree
resembles less the facts about JINTER than IGR activities O
odirected against John GARLAND (see below), activities which
NOSENKO asserts never occurrea.)6 GARLAND, not JENNER 0e
travelled on the same train as KOSOLAPOV, and GARLAND not 06
Residency's query to the Helsinki police chief about (JENNER) U6
indicates that KOSOLAPOV's cable contained information about
06
JENNER, not just notice that KOSOLAPOV was coming to Helsinki.
It was at the airport in Moscow, not on the train, that
DO "SOLISIKA" gave JENNER]her telephone number, an event which
would be presumably memorable to NOSENKO (as supervisor of
all code clerk operations) if only because of his futile
Ob wait for JENNER to call. Finally, NOSENKO is unaware of the
actions of KGB agents who were employed as maids by JENNER. 06
From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO was neither
KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, nor in this instance, supervisor of
all KGB operations against American code clerks.
189
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10.
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## Page 199
Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
06
06
Development of john GARLAND
The GARLAND case is of particular significance to
judging the validity. of NOSENKO's claim to complete know-
ledge of all KGB operations against American code clerks.
NOSENKO is not merely unaware of KGB action taken with
respect to CARLAND he vehemently asserts no such action was
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified twenty Americans
employed by the American Embassy in Moscow who were of
interest for various reasons to the KGB. He gave a short
statement concerning each of the twenty, among which was
doing, about whom NOSENKO said, "Code clerk, but nothing
Later asked to review the list and supply any
additional information he might have, NOSENKO stated that
Obthe KGB was studying GARLAND like the other code clerks, to
gather enough incriminating material to make a recruitment.
he had read the KGB file on GARLAND, but he thought he must
have read reports concerning him as they came into the
Embassy Section.
There was no operational plan drawn up
Obfor GARLAND] because the KGB developed no derogatory infor-
mation concerning him; no recruitment thus was ever planned
or attempted.
NOSENKO could recall no background informa-
tion concerning GARLAND, such as his travels and acquain-
tances while stationed in Moscow.
Confronted in October 1966 with the evidence [see below!
Of KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki to accompany (GARLAND back U'0
to Moscow on 16 November 1960, NOSENKO was insistent that
there was no such trip, that KOSOLAPOV travelled but once
to Helsinki in connection with JENNER in early 1960, and O
that the KGB had taken no such
action with respect to
J° (GARLAND
(NOSENKO had earlier reiterated that he was
KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 until
January 1962 and he would have had to know and to approve
0001461
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## Page 200
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962!
in advance any operational travel performed by his sub
ordinate outside of the USSR.): Reminded that he transitted
Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba on 15 November 1960
(the day before KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki with (GARLAND): , Ob
NOSENKO stated that he would have learned of KOSOLAPOV's
travel in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow.
00
Ob GARLAND's Information
GARLAND was first interviewed on 17 July 1962 by the
Regional Security Officer in Moscow as a result of the
Gotten dead. see belowl:
having met any Soviet of
In this interview GARLAND denied 06
KOSOLAPOV's physical description
during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied
having been approached by soviet Intelligence.
On 30 July
16 1963 GARIAND was interviewed by the FBI and on 31 July he
was given a polygraph examination. The latter, according
06.
to the FBI, "disclosed no information indicating that
(GARLAND was deceptive in his statements to us denying any
association with Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV or denying ever
knowingly being contacted by any foreign intelligence agent"
06
GARLAND by his own statement, took the
train on 16 November
1960 from Helsinki to Moscow, to assume the duties as
supervisor of the state Departient code room in the Embassy.
GOLITSYN"S Information
GOLITSYN, who was
not posted to Helsinki until July 1960,
reported that "about the end of 1960,
about November or
possibly by the beginning of 1961", the KGB Second Chief
Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residence
advising that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki
in transit to Moscow®
The telegram stated that the respon
sible case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki
alias
and under Vneshtorg cover for the purpose of striking
up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in
MOSCOW.
The Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in
the American's compartment.
GOLITSYN himself went
to the
train to see off a Soviet delegation returning to Moscow,
and he talked with KOSOLAPOV.
Later in the summer or fall
of 1961, GOLITSYN met in Helsinki another Second Chief
Directorate officer from the Embassy Section, and he inquired
191
8181
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0001462
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---
## Page 201
Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. From the
Embassy Section officer's refusal to discuss the case
GOLITSYN concluded that
it must have resulted in
a success
ful recruitment; otherwise, the Embassy Section officer
would have begn willing to
talk to him about it.
Shown [GARLAND's photograph by the FBI on 13 March 1962,
GOLITSYN failed to identify it "as being that of the unknown
individual he had seen in the train compartment in Helsinki
with KOSOLAPOV".
Information From Other Sources
KOSOLAPOV arrived by train in Helsinki on 12 November 1960.
The Finnish railroad manifest of passengers travelling from
Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960, lists KOSOLAPOV (as
KOLOSSOV) among eight Soviets aboard the train, and John w.
Ob GARLAND, the only American. [See accompanying exhibit.l
As he had with regard to JENNER, (see above), SERGEYEV Of
the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 11 November 1960
asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to
GOLITSYN) for help in locating GARLAND? an American who would
arrive there on 14 November.
06
Development Öf CARLAND:
Summary and Conclusion
assertioninor not [GARLANDwas aware, and contrary to NOSENKO's
GARLAND clearly was the target of a KGB operation
entailing KOSOLAPOV's travel to Helsinki. NOSENKO denies
(with a vehemence which the foregoing summary cannot accurately
reflect) that KOSOLAPOV,
connection with JEnnERtravelled to Helsinki except in
and his assertion thus cannot be
) smissed as the product of faults recollection in which he
confuses the casescof (JENVER) and GARLAND.
NOSENKO's denial of the facts of the GARLAND]case is fatal
to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, and that
he supervised all KGB operations against American code clerks.
Moreover, the KGB action in the GARLAND case impugns NOSENKO' sO6
claim that, as one time Deputy Chief of the Section, he would
necessarily know of any operations mounted against Embassy
code clerks.
192
0001463
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## Page 202
Top Secret
EXHIBIT 2 - Complete Train Manifest, Helsinki-Moscow
Laettelo mathusta jisto, jorka ....
Junalle
3919547оn)
angonins Simnan.:
-Talalkkelen
fpail, hnikonak)
....Acate .Üf'--- 190
Asacone ani erra
Буткуісаватая
Kaneinkss
MeslrtInad
Deste Soasetin
Louravleve, Nonna
ParTe, Ralt
NbTosOT, Aloxandre
V.
.50D.MlN....
I1zJe1113a
aiphakIa
048)--
..1019.
a1pl.
Otohngvek1..Alesurdre
Cortslora, Laria4
roUYe
1922
Folontir, Viktor
VIX011110 19.05.27
A cac Janoy..
.1022
Lenla1a0, Potr
alscuntalt
÷ 2013
0680
JalI. jean Laptioto
aipl.kure
47:08•07
Coxlend, Jomn Jrg
aihtoort
B2.03.33
Tuybero, Henry Charles.
tato a1bt.
dipl:
Pantelelnon, Aata Ilmarl
kirvenmies
14,11,19
Oksenen, Traps Oakax
sahk. sdent
25.05.00
m0300,. 5eikk, Juhnnt_
Tam. V. 101207 - kend21,02.30
N:111ton
NaliItto
Fost1
Lhotyat&. Ikh.
N:111tto/N-8-7 ,Kouttolulku
N:1114tO
Ranskon
0S8 :9
Sucmas
souttakulks:
Vkoasteinniniatérig.
Kulmnko 801.85, 8k1.
4aL1n99,80.8.89: 861.
KITeltortoE- 23.G, Fk1.
Pesaintarçasraja:
- T.t. ifkonat.
Atinrienin
Seukkonen
NOTE:
16
November 1960
txain.
GArimo Jand XOSOLAPOY exoLossor travelled on sarue
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06
KGB/Polish UB Operations Against MORONE
At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO
made a passing reference
• to an operation in which he had
placed a female Polisi UB agent in contact with an unnamed
American from the Embassy while the latter was visiting
Warsaw and later brought the agent to Moscow to further
compromise the American.
On 11 June 1962 NOSENKO was asked
whether he had foreign (non-Russian) agents working against
the American Embassy, and he replied that he himself
introduced the idea
of using
such agents to develop
Americans afraid of becoming involved with Russian girls.
He had several such agents, he said, and he sometimes asked
the East German and Polish
security
with such agents.
services to supply him
As an example, NOSENKO cited the case
of a Marine guard and a code clerk from the Embassy who
travelled to Warsaw.
The code clerk was intimate with a
Polish female agent, whom NOSENKO had planted in their
train compartment, on the train to Warsaw, and later in
MOSCOW •
In an FBI'interview on 24 February 1964 NOSENKO
referred to the case again, and when the names of code
Joclerk (Joseph MORONE] and Embassy Marine guard Frank BEGGS DE
were mentioned, he immediately identified them as the men
involved.
NOSENKO's Information
(MORONE's case officer was NOSENKO's subordinate and
specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO read
Ob the file on MORONE, and saw his visa photograph, but never
saw him in person.
NOSENKO discussed the MORONE] case with
106
KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions. Several
Kas agents were employed against MORONE, including foreigner:
as well as Soviet citizens.
06
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Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or waltress at America House
reported to DEMKIN, her case officer, everything she saw or
heard concerning MORONE O6 KOSOLAPOV visited her several
times with DEMKIN to discuss MORONE Dand NOSENKO himself
met her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments that
DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any
specific information from IVANOVA on MORONE)which was
interesting or useful.
06
SARWAT EL SHAZLY, an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian
Embassy and an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries)
Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, VIsited
America House and met MORONE, but he reported nothing of
value that NOSENKO recalled. 06
Pietro CECCHI, an Italian cook at the American Embassy
and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw
about Americans to KOSOLAPOV, but NOSENKO recalled nothing
specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE.
In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two
German women who could be used against the residents of
America House.. One of these, Hanna, a blonde, was documented
as a West German. NOSENKO never met her but instructed
PREISFREUND) (see the (STORSBERG) Case) to take her to America
House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to
America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that
She may have reported on MORONEll The second East German
girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENKO never met her
but he recalled that she was asked
for her documents at
America House on her first or second visit there.
She
replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America
House, and never returned. (NOSENKO did not remember the
time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he
was still in the Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the
emoassy security officer at the time.)
From one of these agents, Or possibly in some other
Manner: the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to go or
Leave in Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupor
decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to
compromise him.
KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational
plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after
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some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK. KOSOLAPOV next met
with a POlish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Head-
quarters to discuss the plan.: The Pole was told that the
target was an American Embassy employee, but not that he
was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the
Poles:
PLEAS
As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained
by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train.
Upon her
arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her: to a Moscow
hotel where he gave her instructions concerning her role
in the operation. The girl was told to meet MORONE on the 06
train, flirt with him, have him fall in love with her,
continue the association, and study him.
She was to tell
him that she had been in Hoscow as a guest of her uncle, a
member of
the Polish Trade Representation in Moscow, and
that she could meet him again on her next visit.
Arrangements were made with the KGB Operational Technical
Directorate for a tecinician to be placed on the train in
the compartment next to that of MORONEland his companion, Ob
ObBEGGS, for audio and visual (but not protographic) coverage:
The Polish agent did, however, succeed in making MORONETs U!
acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Direc-
torate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train
reached Warsaw. The technician told NOSENKO the girl had
engaged in sexual intercourse witiMORONE during the trip ob
The tennician also reported that the tape recordings ob-
tained were of poor quality.
Comment:
At this juncture in NOSENKO's interrogation
he was reminded that he was en route to Cuba
on 15 November 1960 and did not return to
Moscow until mid-December, and that State
Department records indicated that MORoNE and 0b
BEGGS left Moscow on 13 November and arrived
on the following day..
NOSENKO responded that
instead of naving talked to the technician
personally, he may have read the technician's
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Comment: (Continued)
report and had seen "the film strips" after
his return from Cuba,
NOSENKO, it will be
noted, had said earlier that there was no
photographic coverage of MORONE's train
compartment,
06
Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials,
KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again
be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising
photography during her visit.
The requests were approved
by higher KGB authority.
When the girl arrived, KÖSOLAPOV
met her alone and took
her to the Hotel Peking, to a
specially equipped room.
The girl called MORONE] at America06
'House, and MORONE subsequently visited her in the hotel
room two of three times, during which photographs were taken.
These were placed in the KGB's file on (MORONE. Defe did not.
fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she
had no further contacts with him.
Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it
was felt that there were insufficiently incriminating to.
attempt to recruit MORONE. The KGB wanted to trap him in
the apartment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something
that was definitely prohibited.
for this purpose, Svetlana
IVANOVA (see
above) was. supposed to lure MORONE out of 0.
America House to somewhere in Moscow, but before anything
further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE] out o£06
Moscow before the end
of his tour, possibly because they
were concerned about his association with IVANOVA: There-
fore, NOSENKO said, the
KGB made no attempt to recruit
(MORONE. 06
NOSENKO has also explaihed
I (to the FBI) that no attempt
was made to recruit MORONE because Khrushchev instructed
the KGB to refrain from any action which might affect the
improvement in relations which the Soviets sought with the
United States.
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06
MORONE's Information
receive toe censolve formation aboo mas misst 06
interviewed about the allegation in May I961:
On 19 August
1961 he was transferred from Moscow.
In an October 1962
security interview, MORONE stated that he had travelled with Ob
D6 Frank BEGGS to Warsaw on I2 November 1960. On the train
he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her
what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment,
and when he tried to engage her in sexual relations, she
slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw,
tne girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room
na test a
where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, heUb
had sexual relations with at least two other women while in
Ob.rarsaw He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident:
on 6 February 1961, after MORONE had returned to Moscow. D
the
Polish girl from the train called him at America House,
and
the following day he visited her in her room at the
Peking Hotel, where they were again intimate. On either
this or an earlier occasion the girl told him that she had
an uncle in Moscowo MORONElhas denied being approached of
recruited by Soviet Intelligence.
Information From Other Sources
A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on
8 November 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-
speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where
She was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA". She
stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer,
apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second
Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1960 (sic) pointed MORONE] 06
out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under
IGB instructions, the Polish female met MORONE) and was Ob
intimate with him on the train to warsaw.
In "Tarsaw. on
12 November 1960 (sic) she was quite friendly with MORONE, Ub
but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to
engage in intimacies.:
The next day she took MORONEto a UG
suitably-prepared Polish UB safehouse where incriminating
photographs were clandestinely taken of MORONEand herself. 06
the female agent again travelled to Moscow on 5 February 1961
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and stayed at the Peking Hotel:
Further compromising Of
photographs were taken of ner and MORONE on this trip.
The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on
12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her
and MORONE• 06
The Marine quard BEGGS has confirmed that the Polish
911 and MORONE were intimate on the train to warsaw. and
Oothat MORONE, had been recontacted by the Polish girl in
Moscow in February 1961.
MORONEs fellow code clerks and residents of America
House described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and
a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that MORONE was 0b
involved in a currency-speculation ring operated Ly SARWAT
EL SHAZLY, the KGB agent mentioned by MOSENKO, and MORONE C
confirmed
that on at least one occasion SARWAT arranged the
be a close friend of the Embassy cook, and KGB agent Pietro
DoCECCHI, and MORONE had admitted that along with other
Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles
One report states that CECCHI asked
a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to MORONE] in theOl
State Department code room, (a restricted area to which
CECCHI had no access) •
A number of reports indicated that
MORONE had been sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA,
DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent
at America House identified by NOSENKO. 06 (MORONE) denied
having been intimate with IVANOVA. He said, however, that
he had told his friends that he had, that he knew both
IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA.
to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two
Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued,
The Army code clerk (STORSBERG has reported that (MORONE] D6
was acquainted with the KGB officer SKVORTSOV who, as
"MICHAUD"
O6 [STORSBERG was involved in the kes attempt to recruit
(See p. 173.)06 STORSBERG] recalled meeting MICHAUD
at America House; MICHAUD had frequented the bar there:
In
one version of his recruitment (STORSBERG said that MORONE was
06
06
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in SKVORISOV's company the night SKVORISOV lured STORSBERG 06
to the hotel where the KGB tried to recruit him.
06
Operation Against MORONE:
Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO relates but one aspect of the MORONE case,
the
use of the Polish UB. female agent.:
He is apparently unaware
of information known to KGB agents (and hence to the KGB) ,
Obsuch as MORONE's sexual involvements with IVANOVA's friends
and at SARWAT EL, SHAZLY's apartment, his illicit currency
dealings with CECCHI, and his relationship with UMANETS.
O'He errs in relating to MORONE, the East German female agent
sent to America House:
the incident occured, but later,
Obwhen MORONE was no longer in Moscow nor was NOSENKO himself
still in the Embassy Section..: (See p. 183.) The KGB did
not lack a sufficient basis for attempting to recruit
MORON. if it refrained from the attempt, it was for other
reasons.
KGB inaction did not relate to Khrushchev's concern
for Soviet-United States relations; this was the period
between
the U-? incident (May 1960) and the Berlin crisis
(August 1961) ..
Even with respect to the Polish UB agent, there is
persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV
played the roles NOSENKO described: NOSENKO was travelling
to Cuba and KOSOLAPOV was in Finland in connection with the
GARLAND case.
It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO, in this
instance, was not supervisor of all KGB operations against
American code clerks nor would he necessarily have known of
recruitments among Embassy personnel.
Other KGB Targets Among State Department Code Clerks
In connection with his responsibility for directing
KGB operations against American code clerks in 1960-1961,
NOSENKO has commented on five other State Department code
clerks who served in Moscow during that period.
Their brief
treatment in this paper reflects not their unimportance but
NOSENKO's limited comments
and the lack of collateral
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information. The significance of these cases is the extent
to which information provided by NOSENKO accurately ieflects
the KGB's knowledge of each target.
Maurice ZWANG 06
06
NOSENKO identified ZHANG as a State Department code
clerk who was "actively worked on"
during the 1960-1961
per10d, An Egyptian agent, name not recalled, introduced
O6 ZWANG to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain incrimi-
nating photographs, but the female did not like ZWANG] and Ub
refused his sexual
advances.
In January 1962 (when NOSENKO
claims he left the Embassy
• Section) the KGB was engaged in
no activity against ZWANG Do The KGB agents had no agents
in contact with him,
and had no information indicating
ZWANG]was vulnerable.
06
Comment:
In connection with a State Department security
interview conducted after ZWANG returned from D6
Moscow "AWANG related that in March or April
1961 an Egyptian introduced him to a Soviet
female whom he visited in her apartment on
" several occasions but with whom he was not
intimate.
Al though ZWANG]denied
it, a poly-06
graph examination indicated that he
was
intimate with his maid during visits to her
Do tANg's maid has been identified as a KGB
agent. Various Americans stationed in Moscow
have reported that ZWANG was active in currency Ok
speculation and blackmafketeering with the
Egyptian and KOSOLAPOV's agent, CECCHI.
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06
John TAYLOR
06:
NOSENKO identified TAYLORas a State Department
Oteste clerk and the target of KOSOTAPOV. The kee was inter-
in TAYLOR because of his intimacy with his Russian
maid (a KGB agent) and "his sympathy towards the Soviet
Ab Union and its people".
No attempt was made to recruit
TAYLOR because of the lack of compromising photographs of
O6 TAYLOR and the maid, and because the KGB did not want to.
Jeopardize the more important STORSBERG) case by risking a
scandal with TAYLOR 06
0f.
Comment:
TAYLOR has acknowledged that he was intimate
with his maid from about September 1960 until
his departure in early 1961, on one occasion
O6 in a "Friend's apartment" in Moscow, and that
maid had told TAYLORishe was pregnant and
TAYLOR offered her money for an abortion.
TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961 and the
KGB attempt to recruit (STORSBERG]did not occur 0b
until June 1961, according to NOSENKO, Or
October 1961, according to STORSBERG: D6
Frank DAY
0b
NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Department code
Clerk at the Embassy who was a target either of KOSOLAPOV
or GRYAZNOV..
The KGB knew nothing interesting about him
such as who his friends in Moscow were, or his travel in
or outside of the Soviet Union.
The KGB had no derogatory
information about him and was unaware of any vulnerabilities
he may have had. No operational measures were taken against
him.
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06
Comment: [DAY vas in MosCOW
DAY was in Moscow from May 1960 until October
1961. In July 1961 he travelled to the
Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIAUd, 06
employee, Agricultural Attache BROWN. The two
were under surveillance by five persons at
all times on this trip.
On one occasion they
found "repairmen" in their hotel room upon
returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and
on another an
"attractive and available Soviet
female" was believed to have been planted in
their train compartment.
06
Robert DWELLY
Reviewing an American Embassy telephone list in
September 1964, NOSENKO said that he "believed" DWELLY was lo
a code clerk during the 1960-1961 period. There was no
O6 approach to DWELLY and he knew no details of the opera-
O6 tional plan against DwELLY]nor the identity of any agent
who might have been used against him. DWELLY's case
officers were KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZITOV.
06
Under interrogation in February 1965, however,
NOSENKO said that the KGB was "100 percent sure" that he
was a homosexual on the basis of his "behavior when visiting
a public men's room".
There was a "big hunt" for DwELLY] and 06
on a number of evenings when DWELLY was known to be free 06
from work, NOSENKO himself, GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, and
NOSENKO's homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV waited in
ain in a KGB surveillance car in the hope that DWELLY|wouldU
risit downtown Moscow and they could establish contact witl
him.
No photographs of DWELLY were obtained:
there was no
approach and no recruitment. D6
NOSENKO later added that "perhaps". GRYAZNOV' s
homosexual agent "VOLODYA" had spoken with DWELLY) in a Ub
oublic toilet in a museum or a park and it was on this basis
that he concluded DWELL was a homosexual.
06
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Comment:
DWELLYwas assigned to Moscow as a code clerk
From April 1959 to July 1960. In. a Department
of State security interview in March 1966
(prompted by NOSENKO's information), he cate-
gorically denied being a homosexual. He
described two occasions in Moscow when, while
walking alone, two men, who by their general
appearance and
actions made him think they
were "queer", were trying to attract his
attention.
He recalled that, on one of the
two occasions, one asked him the way to the
toilet:
[Joseph GAFFEY
06
NOSENKO originally identified GAFFEXJas a military
enlisted man in Moscow during the 1960-1961 period, and an
operational target of DEMKIN. In February 1965, however,
he identified him as a State Department code clerk for whom
the responsible case officer was KOSOLAPOV, whom NOSENKO
supervised.
The KGB attempted to lure GAFFEY into downtown Ob
Moscow using Svetlana IVANOVA, the maid in America House
who was one of DEMKIN's agents, but GAFFEY rejected her D6
repeated invitations.
The KGB
was unaware of any vices
GAFFEY might have had and had no derogatory information
regarding him.
06
Comment:
(CAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961.
A fellow resident of America House, Fred
KADERA, reported during
a State Department Of
security interview that GAFFEY had told him 0b
that he had been intimate with a girl at
America House 06 GAFFEY] tola/KADERA]that he dia 06
not know she was Russian untl he was walking
her home and met IVANOVA, who identified her
as such.
America House
manager Peter BINDER U6
reported rumors in America House thät GAFFEX 06
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Comment:
(Continued)
was having an affair with IVANOVA in America
House. He described GAFFEY, as the heaviest Do
drinker in America House and said that occasion
O6 ally GAFFEY] could not report to work due to
his drinking: In describing the _KGB approach
took IVANOVA to BINDER's room in America House, 96
implying that he was intimate with her at that
time.
Ob GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the
summer of 1962, before the expiration of his
tour, because of drunkenness.
During a State
Department security interview, GAFFEY admitted 06
being intimate with IVANOVA at America House
and at her apartment 00 GAFFEY] reported that
IVANOVA had told him she was pregnant and had
asked for money for an abortion.
Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations:
Summary and Conclusion
According to 'NOSENKO, on transfer to the Embassy Section,
operations against the American code clerks were the Section's
priority task and thus his most important single responsibility
as Deputy Chief.
He asserts to be complete his awareness of
what was known to the KGB on this topic at the time, because
of his senior position, his personal review of relevant files
and correspondence, his personal direction of KOSOLAPOV and
GRYAZNOV, and his personal participation in their operations.
Nithout exception, in every one of the cases NOSENKO describes
there are facts substantially at variance with his account,
in direct proportion to the amount of collateral information
available.
Conclusion
From the foregoing it is concluded that he was neither
Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section nor supervisor of all
operations against American code clerks. Consequently,
he would not necessarily have known of recruitments among
other Embassy personnel.
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Case Officer for Embassy Security Officer
John ABIDIAN
Comment:
John V. ABIDIAN served as the Embassy Security
Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until
February 1962, approximately the same period as
NOSENKO's claimed service in the Embassy
Section of the American Department. The State
Department replacement for CIA officer Russell
LANGELLE, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform
a number of operational
tasks, including
performing clandestine letter mailings to CIA
agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing
deaddrop emergency communications from CIA
source GRU Colonel O.V.. PENKOVSKIY.
ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then
secured employment with the Department of State
as a clerk/typist.
He remained in Paris until
1954• After special training at the CIC school
at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service school,
ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for
Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State
Department's Office of Security.
A large part
of his work in this period was accompanying
foreign dignitaries visiting the United States,
including Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov in
November 1956, Mikoyan in the spring of 1959,
and khrushchev at the end of 1959:
These
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Comment:
(Continued)
duties brought ABIDIAN into contact with KGB
officers stationed in New York and Washington
as well as among the Soviet delegations.
One
of'the members of the Khrushchev entourage was
KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's subordinate in the Embassy
Section,
During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned
ABIDIAN in several instances, identifying him as the Embassy
Security Officer and as "a CIA officer" and describing his
letter-mailing activities. His knowledge of ABIDIAN was
- rà a stance cite knoce
attributed to his claimed
position of Deputy Chief of the
Embassy Section.
After recontacting CIA in Geneva in 1964 NOSENKO for the
first time explicitly claimed to have been the KGB case
officer responsible for ABIDIAN in Moscow and for the first
time described ABIDIAN's alleged servicing of a deaddrop in
1960. NOSENKO has described ABIDIAN since 1964 as the sole
American for whom NOSENKO was personally accountable during
his 1960-1961 Embassy Section service, and one of the most
important counterintelligence targets of the Embassy Section
and therefore of the entire Second Directorate•
Duties as a Case Officer
When he reported for duty in the Embassy Section NOSENKO
was told by KLYPIN and KOVSHUK that one of his duties would
be case officer for ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was
then expected in the near future. ABIDIAN was to be the
only American target for whom NOSENKO personally was officially
accountable while he served in this section. KOVSHUK gave
NOSENKO such information as the section had on ABIDIAN.
Included was ABIDIAN's visa application, the negative results
of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared
by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate.
According to that report, which was based on correspondence
from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN
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had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned
with the safety of Premier Khrushchey when he visited the
United States in 1959; from ABIDIAN's behavior at that time,
the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer.
probably with CIA.
That report and the fact that ABIDIAN was
replacing
the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security
officer, made ABIDIAN one of the most important counter-
intelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore
of the entire Second Chief Directorate.
NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and
later adopted for him the cryptonym "ARSEN" used earlier by
personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate of the
Second Chief Directorate.
NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more
about, the life and career of ABIDIAN.
He visited the Chief
of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate,
but that unit had no information not included in its original
report: NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in
the United States be asked for further details, but none were
received NOSENKO thus never learned of ABIDIAN'S
education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department
of State, promotions, personal rank, previous assignments,
military
service,
Or
foreign service status.
Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the KGB decided not
to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or
provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal
vulnerability.
It was considered better to concentrate on
surveillance coverage in the hope that, as LANGELLE'S
successor, he might lead "to another POPOV".
[POPOV,
GRU Lieutenant Colonel and CIA agent, according to KGB
sources, was apprehended in 1959]
Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he
was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of
his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by
at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour
a team was available to cover him if he left the Embassy.
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was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage
of British targets in connection with the PENKOVSKIY case.
As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the
surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational
possibilities offered by information from surveillance
reports.
In line with the emphasis on surveillance, the opera-
tional plan for ABIDIAN written by NOSENKO in October 1960
called for no direct action but specified that:
-ABIDIAN's maid Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an "operational
contact" of the Embassy Section, was to continue to apply
metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and
"NEPTUNE-80" to his shoes.
(According to NOSENKO, these are surveillance aids. Metka
is a "thief powder" applied to clothing pockets, leaving a
trace on anything with which it comes into contact.
primary purpose is to aid in the detection of operational
to anhich
Its
letters mailed by suspected foreign intelligence officers
and agents.
NEPTUNE-80, applied to a target's shoes,
leaves a trace on the ground which the KGB even long
after-
wards can follow with a dog.)
The only item of information
received from FEDOROVICH was that ABIDIAN was having an
affair with an Embassy female employee. FEDOROVICH was
unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's
apartment.
-Pietro CECCHI, Embassy employee and KOSOLAPOV' s
agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever
he learned concerning him. CECCHI never obtained any
significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life.
"ABIDIAN was developing CECCHI as an informant on American
personnel at the Embassy", but NOSENKO did not recall any
specific report CECCHI gave to ABIDIAN that was of interest
to the Embassy Section:
-Iwo Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to
the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if
necessary.
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-All other agents and operational contacts of the
section were to be instructed to report every detail about
ABIDIAN (see below).
-Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all
places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.
-Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.
Apart from those specified by the operational plan, two
other KGB
agents, Lyudmila GROMAKOVA and "KAMO" (a KGB
agent. = whose identity NOSENKO did not recall) were
involved with ABIDIAN, GROMAKOVA, a language instructor
for Embassy personnel, was an agent handled by Embassy Section
case officer GAVRILENKO. ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian
language lessons from GROMAKOVA and NOSENKO did not know
whether these were private or class lessons.:. He learned
nothing of operational significance from GROMAKOVA's contacts
with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular reporting from her.
Comment:
Although he had earlier identified GROMAROVA as
a KGB agent, NOSENKO never associated her with
ABIDIAN until told that ABIDIAN had been one of
her students.
In actuality ABIDIAN took
regular language lessons from GROMAKOVA, normally
three one-half hour lessons per week, from
shortly after his arrival until his departure
from Moscow.
The second KGB agent, "KAMO", was an agent of the Moscow.
City KGB organization who met ABIDIAN at the Baku Restaurant
by accident. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his
informed t
telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that "KAMO" try to
develop a relationship with ABIDIAN. After arguing that
this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or
provocative action against ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN
finally agreed, and
"KAMO" phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB
instructions.
ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet him, and
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no further action was taken. [See below for ABIDIAN'S
account of a similar incident, but one which occurred in
Armenia.]
NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office
in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but he could
have checked, if necessary, with a copy of the
Embassy tele-
phone list published monthly, since it contained the office
room number of each American employee. (The Embassy telephone
list contained apartment, but not office room numbers.]
ABIDIAN's office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e., secure
office areas). NOSENKO said that a report from an agent
(identity not recalled) indicated that there was a sign on
ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office". [There
was no. such sign.] • NOSENKO was unable to determine if
ABIDIAN had a
secretary. No dictation was monitored in
ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was installed
there.
[In 1964 a microphone, albeit then inoperative, was
found in the room occupied in
1960-1961 by ABIDIAN.] NOSENKO
recalled no particularly interesting or important information
about ABIDIAN obtained from other microphones in the Embassy.
NOSENKO did not know the location of ARIDIAN's apartment
in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished, since
"data of this nature was not operationally significant
unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under
active development".
Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three
times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to
which countries he went or the time of year when the trips
were made.
Such information would have been of interest to
him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier
trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for
operational purposes.
However, there was no possibility for
the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone; even if the
Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel,
nothing could be done about it because the foreign Legal
Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate "would not
accept a request for operational action against an American
diplomat coming from Moscow".
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With reference to whether the KGB could have photographed
ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO said
that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph pass-.
ports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union. While
this procedure would not be impossible, it was
not considered
so important as to justify the special effort involved.
Comment:
According to ABIDIAN, he openly discussed his
travel plans with Embassy language teacher
GROMAKOVA (GAVRILENKO's agent), and on at least
some occasions used international telephone
calls
to arrange for accommodations at his
destination in Europe.
Also, the Foreign
Ministry. UPDK (which office provides adminis-
trative services to foreign diplomats
in
Moscow), to which ABIDIAN sent his passport for
an exit visa for each departure, could have
noted from passport entries the whereabouts of
his earlier travel.
1
ABIDIAN took no trips in the Soviet Union outside of
Moscow, since if he had, NOSENKO would have known and
remembered them, as it was his responsibility as case
officer
to take certain actions
Among the latter he
listed:
-Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel
from the UPDK (the Soviet Foreign Ministry unit which
provides administrative services to the diplomatic
community in Moscow)
-Advising the UPDK Of KGB approval for the trip:
-Advising appropriate local KGB offices of ABIDIAN's
itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance
and any other necessary operational activity.
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-Receiving, reading, and filing all reports of
surveillance and other operational activity carried
out by various KGB units.
NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. Even
if he were absent when such a request for travel was made,
he would have seen all documents upon his return; he did
not recall seeing any such documents in ABIDIAN's file.
Comment: ABIDIAN who is of Armenian origin and speaks
the Armenian language with a high degree of
proficiency, made a trip to Armenia between 5
and 9 October 1960. While in Armenia ABIDIAN
visited with various churchmen, their parish-
ioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from
Greece in 1946.
ABIDIAN attended a service in
Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the
accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and also
visited some relatives of his in or near the
city of Yerevan.
After returning to Moscow,
an Armenian whom ABIDIAN met on that trip
tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but
ABIDIAN refused to see him.
After being told ABIDIAN had attended a
service celebrating the fifth anniversary of
the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO
recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin
and that an agent had reported a contact with
him there.
This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was
a priest or a monk, and the report concerned
had no
only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent
had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said
that this was his sole recollection concerning
ABIDIAN's trip.
With reference to ABIDIAN's travel to
Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO recalled
having been on leave at the time.
However,
NOSENKO's reconstruction of the timing of his
alleged leave still placed him in Moscow at
the time of ABIDIAN's trip.
In 1966, NOSENKO
• stated that he had lied, that his 1960 leave
was taken in January, not October.
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Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was
friends in Moscow nor his close
friends and professional contacts among foreigners there,
NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone
calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and
apartment via the Moscow city telephone system, but he
recalled none of their names nor nationalities, because
there was nothing of interest in the conversations.
At the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations
concerning ABIDIAN NOSENKO acknowledged that he knew little
about this important KGB target.
He was
"working badly" as
ABIDIAN's case officer, he said, because he had had to
concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks.
ABIDIAN'S Letter Mailings
During the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO in Geneva, he
reported KGB knowledge of ABIDIAN's mailing of at least
three clandestine letters, in each case to KGB-controlled
agents. According to NOSENKO, the KGB detected all the
letter's mailed by ABIDIAN through the use of metka.
He
cautioned the CIA representatives from further use of Embassy
employees for mailing letters to agents in
the Soviet
Union.
He noted that after LANGELLE, no such letters were
mailed for a year and a half, until ABIDIAN mailed several:
He explained that Embassy employees' servants applied an
odorless substance (metka) to clothing pockets, and traces
of the substance rubbed off on any thing it contacted, such
as a letter:
All the letters mailed in Moscow were passed
through a machine which identified letters bearing tracing
of metka, he said, and this was how letters ABIDIAN mailed
were intercepted.
INOSENKO said the machine was a fotoapparat,
literally a camera, but presumably he meant some sort of
light-sensitive device.]
NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had
malled a letter to someone in Odessa,
and. two
to. the Baltic
area, probably to Riga, and all were
detected by metka, not
by ABIDIAN's surveillants.
According to NOSENKO, no new
agents were discovered, however, since all of the
agents to
whom ABIDIAN mailed letters were already controlled by the
KGB.
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Comment:
NOSENKO's information is substantially correct,
that no letters were
mailed for one and a half
years after LANGELLE's expulsion, and that
ABIDIAN mailed two or three letters, including
ones to the Baltic area and to Odessa,
NO
letters were mailed from February 1960 until
ABIDIAN mailed one on 1 April 1961, and of the
three letters ABIDIAN mailed, one was
to Odessa
and one each to Latvia and Estonia.
CIA has conducted tests to determine whether
a substance such as metka was being used as a
KGB control device.
Ultra-violet, chemical
and microscopic analyses developed one possible
use of a metka like substance.
Analysis of an
article of clothing of a foreign diplomat in
Moscow who served as a CIA support agent
produced a sharply positive reaction.
NOSENKO later described how metka was applied to ABIDIAN'S
clothing by his maid and how, in particular, this led to
the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent in
Odessa and to his parents in the United States.
"ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH.
She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV.
She started to work. for ABIDIAN a few months after
his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than
six months after his arrival.
I met her shortly
after she began to work for ARIDIAN in order to get
acquainted with her,
in order to evaluate her and
give her general instructions about her work for
ABIDIAN.
I do not know the exact date of this
meeting but it was before the fall of 1960.
wrote
the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa
October 1960.
At this time FEDOROVICH was already
working for ABIDIAN.
This operational plan stated
that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly
on
ABIDIAN's clothing.
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"FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing during
the entire period that she worked for him. She did
this every two or three weeks except for a few times
when she was sick or on leave. No one else had
access to ABIDIAN's apartment and therefore no other
person had the possibility of putting metka on his
clothing:
"I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational
letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY' (in
Odessa) • He mailed it at the mailbox on Iverskaya
Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier.
Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter
but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to
'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to
ABIDIAN's parents.
Both of these letters had metka
on them, as I was told by SUMIN (a KGB secret
writing specialist) I cannot remember the date
thạt ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was
sometime in 1961."
Commert :
1
ABIDIAN had no maid in Moscow until sixteen
months after his arrival; FEDOROVICH worked
for
him part-time from July 1961 until he left
Moscow Thus FEDOROVICH could not have applied
the metka which as NOSENKO claimed resulted in
the interception of the letter ABIDIAN mailed
1 April 1961, and probably was not yet employed
by ABIDIAN even at the time the letter to
"ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed on 2 July 1961.
ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on I September
1961, while FEDOROVICH was working for him.
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Told that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka
regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the
"ARKHANGELSKIY" letter mailing, NOSENKO insisted that no
one but FEDOROVICH had access to ABIDIAN's apartment, that
he himself briefed her on the use of metka, that the
• letters
were intercepted'by use of metka, and that FEDOROVICH was
responsible.
ABIDIAN'S Servicing of the Pushkin Street Deaddrop Site
In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that in 1960
or in early 1961 the KGB had surveilled ABIDIAN visiting
what was believed to be a deaddrop site on Pushkin Street
in Moscow.
He provided additional details when questioned
again in
1965.
NOSENKO's Information
In 1960 or early 1961, while NOSENKO was his responsible
case officer, ABIDIAN was surveilled from the Embassy to a
residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A KGB
stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave
with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in
a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally
used.
ABIDIAN'S surveillance team followed the car to a
bookstore... Both Americans entered the bookstore, but
shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone and walked
around the
corner, where
he entered a residential building next to a
meat market on Pushkin Street.
The surveillance team saw
him go in but did not follow him. ABIDIAN emerged after a
few seconds.
This unusual incident was reported by the
surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Direct-
and the building was inspected that same day by KOZLOV,
the eniet of the First Department of the surveillance
Directorate, and MATVEYEV, the Deputy Chief of the Second
Chief Directorate's American Department. Taking into account
the character of the building and its
inhabitants, the
duration and circumstances of ABIDIAIl's visit, and the
suitability of the hallway - particularly the radiator in
it - for use as a deaddrop site, it was decided by the leader-
ship of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance
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Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should
immediately be set up to cover this location. Because of
the short time available, it was not possible to place this
post inside the building, so it was set up across the street.
In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if any-
thing, such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind
it. The post was manred around the clock for 30 days, after
which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another
two months.
If a package or magnetic container had been
found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning,
it was planned to attach to
'it very thin wires to trigger a
signal should someone remove the package. At the same time
a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the
landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from
the hallway below.
was
maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator
nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the
pathing vas
the three months that the post
building.
The post was then discontinued, but the address
was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily
by the Surveillance Directorate.
The true significance of
this location became known to the KGB only later, after the
arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.
NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected
deaddrop site on the day it occurred. He was sitting in
KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone: call from
MATVEYEV telling him of the incident
Although NOSENKO was
ABIDIAN's case officer and KÖVSHUK was Chief
of the Embassy
Section, the decision to place
the stationary surveillance
post at
the site was made at a higher level; neither of them
was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue
the post.
NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin
Street the following day or the day after, but he remained
no but out hen
only a few minutes and did not. recall any details of the
hallway, except that there was a radiator there.
As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled
receiving the
surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building
and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file.
(This case"file
NOSENKO turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV; about
28 December 1961, just before he transferred to the Seventh
Department.)
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NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the
stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter
with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month
of surveillance, and periodically after that.
These discus
sions took place
either by telephone, when KOZLOV was
visiting NOSENKO,'s office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's
office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone
else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued
after 90 days.
On the basis of these conversations with
KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred
during the period of the stationary surveillance.
NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section during all the period
that the stationary surveillance post was watching the
Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV
that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections.
NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on
the Pushkin Street deaddrop site to his CIA contacts in
Geneva in June 1962 because by that time the post had
already been discontinued without anything unusual or
suspicious having been noted, and he thought that this
incident would be of no particular interest to CIA.
When last asked whether he had visited the Pushkin Street
address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as
he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied:
"I dontt remember. I do not want to say that I
visited the deaddrop. I don't remember now whether
I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited
it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited
it with
1 KOZLOV, but I cannot say
'yes', and I cannot
say
'no'."
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Comment:
ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street deaddrop
site only once,
on 30 December 1961, a full
year after the time reported by NOSENKO:
As
NOSENKO reported, accompanied by an Embassy
•Economic Officer, ABIDIAN left the Embassy in
an official car with a Soviet driver and
proceeded in a bookstore on the corner of
Pushkin Street.
Leaving the bookstore, ABIDIAN
entered the building where. the site was located.
determined that the drop was empty, and left
one minute later, returning to the Embassy.
The deaddrop was proposed by PENKOVSKIY
August 1960 CIA officer
walked 03
by the site on 12 November and 4 December 1960;
on 21 January 1961/
Ibriefly entered the U3
building to confirm the site's precise location:
If the KGB had surveilled
visits and 03
had put the site under surveillance, NOSENKO
might be relating those events by mischance in
attributing the visit to ABIDIAN. In such a
circumstance, however, NOSENKO, as ABIDIAN's
case officer; would have known that his target
visited a site
which had been previously noted
in connection with the suspicious movements of
another Embassy official. Further, NOSENKO's
description of ABIDIAN's
route, companion, and
sequence of movements is so precise as to
refer
clearly to ABIDIAN. Lastly, NOSENKO disicaims
any knowledge off
lor his activities; he OS
asserts that
was neither the object of 0}
KGB suspicion or concern. For reasons no
combination of circumstances nor NOSENKO himself
can plausibly explain, NOSENKO can describe
ABIDIAN's deaddrop
•site visit although it
occurred at a time when MOSENKO was no longer
ABIDIAN'S case officer and when he was assigned
to another Second Chief Directorate department:
If he turned over ABIDIAN's file on 28
December 1962 to another Embassy Section officer,
as he claimed, NOSENKO could not have received
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Comment:
(Continued)
nor filed the initial surveillance report of
ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street site.
If
he transferred to the Seventh Department two
dáys after ABIDIAN's visit, as he claimed (and
NOSENKO's participation in the M.E. JOHNSON case 06
indicates that he was working against tourists
by 5 January 1962), he could neither have visited
the site as he described nor could he have
received thereafter the daily surveillance
He could not, of his own knowledge,
assert that the surveillance was terminated
after three months, since well before the three
months' surveillance ended he was abroad in
• Geneva.
Lastly, it cannot be for the reason
NOSENKO claimed
(that the surveillance
was
unsuccessfull that NOSENKO did not mention
ABIDIAN's activities to CIA in Geneva in 1962.
Case Officer for John ABIDIAN: Summary and Conclusion
If for no other reason than ABIDIAN's security functions
with the Khrushchev entourage, files of the First Chief
Directorate would record his name: If NOSENKO states to
the contrary, that traces were negative, NOSENKO did not run
the traces himself nor know the results. According to
NOSENKO, ABIDIAN was "one of
contrar himself no one
the Second Chief Directorate"; all KGB resources were
employed for two years, including 24-hour surveillance, the
exploitation of all agents with access to him, audio sur-
veillance, and technical aids, with amost absolutely negative
results.
The results. could not have been negative: for
NOSENKO to so assert can only mean that NOSENKO was not
informed of the results.
In the two instances NOSENKO cited
of Embassy agents' activities against ABIDIAN, he made
fundamental errors: ABIDIAN's maid was not employed by
ABIDIAN at the time NOSENKO insists she was applying the
metka, and GROMAKOVA taught ArIDIAN Russian throughout his
stay in Moscow, not just "several times". NOSENKO acknowledges
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that ABIDIAN's travel in the Soviet Union would have had to
been approved by the KGB, and that the responsible case
officer would have issued orders for his surveillance out-
side of Moscow and would have later received reports of the
target's activities.
NOSENKO acknowledged that he was.not
so involved, although he belatedly recalled one trip ABIDIAN
made.
Lastly, although NOSENKO claims to know, from his
Embassy Section assignment, details of ABIDIAN's visit to
the Pushkin Street deaddrop, the event occurred at a time
when NOSENKO by his own account could not have been physically
present in the Embassy Section.
I
1
1
Conclusion
It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO was not
case officer for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN.
Supervisor of Operations Against
American Service Attaches
Questioned in detail in 1964 on his responsibilities in
the :
Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed no personal role in
operations against American service attaches.
He said only
that when he arrived in the section, DRANOV was the respon
sible case officer for the Naval personnel, including the
Embassy Marine guards, and when DRANOV was transferred
shortly thereafter, his responsibilities were assumed by
BELOGLAZOV. Listing the names and functions of American
Department personnel, NOSENKO mentioned that Yevgeniy
Nikolayevich ALESHIN was Second Deputy to Department Chief
KLYPIN: ALESHIN had
the
special assignment of coordinating
Second Chief Directorate activities against all foreign
military intelligence personnel, including service attaches.
In January 1965" NOSENKO claimed for the first time that
he had among his other responsibilities as Deputy Chief that
of supervising operations
against American service attaches,
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14-00000
Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
and for the first time claimed case officer responsibilities
against American targets other than ABIDIAN. He related how,
at his meeting with KLYPIN and KOVSHUK on entering the section
in January 1960, KOVSHUK suggested that NOSENKO assume super-
visory responsibility for the service attaches while KOVSHUK
supervised operations against the civilian diplomatic staff
NOSENKO stated "supervising" meant that the
case Officers for the service attaches referred their ques
tions to him, not to KoVSHuK.
These included case officers
GAVRILENKO, responsible for Air Attaches, KURILENKO, for
Army Attaches, and DEMKIN, for enlisted personnel of all
services.
"While he was getting acquainted with the section
on DRANOV's retirement", NOSENKO himself took case officer
responsibility for the Naval Attache personnel.
This res-
ponsibility was subsequently assumed by DRANOV's former
assistant, BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO could not initially recall
how long he supervised service attache operations; he later
said
"several months" and finally "five of six months".
Neither could NOSENKO recall what other pressing duty or
duties caused him to be relieved of this function.
He said
this resulted from KOVSHUK's proposal that supervision of
the service attaches be assumed by ALESHIN who was Deputy
Chief of the Second Directorate's American Department and
coordinator for Second Directorate operations against
military intelligence officers of all nationalities.
Supervisor of Service Attache Operations:
Summary and Conclusion
Because of the tardiness of NOSENKO's claim to have been
responsible for operations against service attaches and
because he
was not able, when challenged, to substantiate
his claims
by providing any details of KGB activities against
these targets, it is concluded that this aspect of his
claimed KGB service is a fiction.
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Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
Custodian of KGB File on Embassy Security
As former Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the
American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of KGB
knowledge of its American Embassy target. Specifically!
NOSENKO claimed to have been custodian of the Second Chief
Directorate's file on Embassy security.
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO's knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy
derived both from his general supervisory functions during
1960-1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially
registered custodian of the KGB file on the Embassy security
He received the file from the Section Chief, kovsHuk, when
he arrived in January 1960.: As was permissible under KGB
procedures, as long as the custodian was still in the same
directorate, the
file was charged to BAKHVALOV. (See p. 153
for NOSENKO's various assertions with respect to BAKHVALOV.]
NOSENKO had custody of the file charged to himself, and from
January 1960 until NOSENKO was leaving the section on 25-28.
December 1961, only KOVSHUK; NOSENKO, and GRYAZNOV and
KOSOLAPOV (both of whom shared NOSENKO's Office and safe) had
access
to the file.
The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old
building on Mokhovaya Street and the second (about an inch
thick) on the new Embassy building occupied in 1953 on
The file contained detailed floor plans
and photographs of both buildings.
No operational
analysis or planning by NOSENKO or others
was done on the basis of this file during NOSENKO's two years
in the Embassy Section:
It was used only for reference
purposes
since the KGB had concluded that it was
impossible
for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure areas of thé
moassy because of the American security precautions in
effect,
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All Soviet employees of the Embassy who entered the
restricted areas, "the seventh through the tenth floors"
were carefully questioned because of the special KGB interest
in these offices, [The secure area barred to unescorted
local employees
is comprised of the eighth through tenth
floors.]
NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in
the Embassy security file, while he was custodian.
None of
the information was of interest or important or useful
enough for him to remember, and he recalled none of the KGB
agent sources.
[In another context NOSENKO cited an instance
in which an unrecalled KGB agent had reported (erroneouslyl
that ABIDIAN's office had a sign on the door reading
• "Security
Office".]
Nothing could be recovered from the Embassy classified
trash, which was always burned at an unrecalled location by
a non-commissioned officer or Marine guard accompanied by
an officer.
[At the Moscow Embassy the Marine guard detailed
for the purpose has always burned the classified trash alone.
NOSENKO may be unwittingly referring to a U.S. military
security procedure requiring a commissioned officer to witness
and to certify the destruction of classified documents.
If
NOSENKO is aware of any such procedure, he has never indicated
it in any context.]
In 1960-1961, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief, he either
knew the location of all offices and personnel
within the
Embassy or he could obtain them from the monthly Embassy
telephone lists which the KGB received regularly from agents.
The lists gave office numbers. [The Embassy telephone lists
contain names, apartment numbers
omits office room numbers.] :
on ember numbers and
and telephone numbers,
but
In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived
at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret
conversations.
None of the technical specifications of the
room were known, nor was its location.
An unrecalled source
reported only that meetings were held
in the room, which was
in the restricted area.
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962;
The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material
during 1960-1961,
and crumpled contents included a draft of a report of Naval
Attaches'
observation of ships and factories on a trip to
Leningrad. The report was only of routine interest to the
KGB.: The charwoman was granted a cash award.
Custodian of Embassy Security File: Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO cannot describe the location (even by floor) of
any of his own targets, such as ABIDIAN, the military code
IOOM g
of the State Department communications center.
In
fact,
he cannot describe the location of the office of any
individual or unit in the Embassy, even of the Ambassador.
When challenged to substantiate his claim to knowledge of
the Embassy security file, NOSENKO asserted that he had never
read it nor paid any
"special attention" to its content in
the two
years he was file custodian It is concluded that
¡NOSENKO's claim that he was custodian of the file is an
invention
Audio Operations Against the American Embassy
NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB microphone system in the
Embassy derived from his alleged responsibility as Deputy
Chief of
the Embassy Section for receiving and routing to
appropriate KGB personnel the reports of monitored conversa-
tions. Also, in his capacity as Deputy Chief and custodian
of the monitoring reports logbook NOSENKO claimed to have
attended a meeting
at the end of 1960 or the beginning of
1961 at which he learned details of the locations of specific
microphones hidden
¡ in the Embassy:
Lastly, NOSENKO claimed
he obtained information on the KGB audio operations against
the Embassy, even after he left the Embassy Section, from his
former
subordinate GRYAZNOV. NOSENKO regarded the information
about the KGB microphones, first mentioned in Geneva in
1962,
as the most important he provided CIA.
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NOSENKO's Information
Handling of Monitor Reports
According to NOSENKO, only a limited number of KGB
personnel, all in the American Department of the Second
Chief Directorate, had access to the monitor reports.
These
included Department Chief KLYPIN (but not his deputies),
KOVSHUK, NOSENKO himself, and GRIBANOV, to whom important
items were shown. The existence of the audio operation and
its product were concealed from personnel in other KGB
Departments.
The reports were produced by the Second Special
Department of the Operational Technical Directorate (OTU) •
The OTU Second Special Department has several sections, one
of which was the English Section under Colonel N. Ya. KUZMIN.
KUZMIN's monitors, fluent in English, listened to and
transcrived the tape recordings.
Their reports of the
preceding: day's product were
brought daily by Tatyana
GRISHNYAT
(of the Second Special Department) to the American
Department.
(In some accounts NOSENKO has said that he
received the reports first, at other times that they went
first to KLYPIN.) NOSENKO
reviewed the reports, marked
significant portions and usually within twenty-four hours
returned the reports to the Second Special Department.
In NOSENKO's absence either KOVSHUK. or GRYAZNOV reviewed the
reports. The Second Special Department prepared sterile
abstracts of the portions NOSENKO had marked, abstracts
which disguised the source of the information contained:
the abstracts were returned to the American Department for
the reference of individual case officers in the Embassy
Section and for filing in the delo-formular (developmental
file) kept on each American employee in the Embassy.
Location of the Microphones
In the 1962 Geneva meetings with CIA, NOSENKO emphasized
that the KGB was listening to all conversations of the
service attaches and particularly, to conversations held
in
the office of the Minister Counsellor. In addition, he
referred to "points"
[microphones] in the office of an
unnamed State Department employee,
in the Agricultural
Attache office shared by BROWN and HORBALY, and in the
Embassy code room.
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
In 1964, at the second meeting with CIA, NOSENKO produced
a
handwritten note which he asserted listed all the micro-
phones in the Embassy which were operative in the years
1960-19610
NOSENKO explained that at the end of 1960 or
the beginning of 1961, he and KOVSHUK met with Department:
Chief KLYPIN.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss
Embassy microphones so they could be assigned to Vladimir
PETROV, Chief of the American Department's Second Section
for use against non-Embassy targets:
(PETROV had earlier
requested English-language monitors from the Second Special
Section, but had been told that English linguists were
engaged on priority targets.) At the meeting, KOVSHUK and
KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the Embassy
chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little
value, so that the monitors for those microphones could be
released to PETROV's Second Section. ROVSHUK üsed NOSENKO's
notebook in which to list Embassy apartments and offices
then being covered on a full-time basis and to note those of
lesser importance. KOVSHUK
i decided to relinquish, tempor-
arily, monitoring of Embassy apartments.
He continued the
monitoring of the code room, despite the limited value of
the information obtained:
At the end of the meeting KOVSHUK
gave or NOSENKO took the list, and NOSENKO retained it in
his office safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964.
NOSENKO's list showed that
microphones were located in
the following offices of the noted occupants:
"Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;
"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
"Office of the Army Attache, URBAN;
"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
"Office of the Assistant Aii Ättaches, SENIO
and SACHANEN:
"Office of the Assistant Army Attaches, MASON;
REITZ and WILSON;
"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;
"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;
"Military Code Room;
"State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;
"Apartments of EREERS: HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines) "
06,06,06
06
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NOSENKO said that "many" microphones were installed in
the chancery building before the Americans occupied It, but
he did not know how many were installed in all, how many
were in any particular room on KOVSHUK's list, or where they
were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of
the microphones were emplaced in the outside wall, the wall
nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced
this street and microphones emplaced there were less vulner-
able to technical search and discovery.
According to NOSENKO, there were no fixed microphones in
America House, the Embassy quarters of enlisted military
personnel..
In 1960-1961 there had been a discussion of using
KGB agents
employed there to emplace temporary audio devices
for one or two days. at a time in the rooms of the Americans,
as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed,
however, because of the risk of discovery.
For the same
reason there was no attempt made in this period to emplace
a device temporarily in Spasso House, the Ambassador's
residence, or in the apartments of Embassy officers.
KGB was afraid that they would be detected and there would
be a scandal:
Performance Characteristics of the Microphones
According to NOSENKO in 1962, the audibility of the
microphones in 1960-1961 ranged
from very clear to zero,
but the microphone system was deteriorating.
The KGB could
do nothing about it because they could not gain access to
the inside of the Embassy.
Referring to the microphone in
the Minister Counsellor's office, NOSENKO said that it was
becoming increasingly difficult torwork with its product.
the microphone was fading, and the recording tape soundec
as if "somewhere far away,
somewhere in the cellar, someone
is speaking in a whisper"
KUZMIN, the KGB officer respon-
sible for the monitors, said that soon the KGB could recover
nothing. Of the microphones then (in
1962) in place, about
twenty no longer were operative.
In 1964 NOSENKO referred again to the microphone in the
Minister Counsellor's office.
NOSENKO learned from
DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of
OTU Second Special Department] how difficult it was to
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Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMDASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
monitor conversations in that office. Only very experienced
linguists were used, but even they had to listen "ten,
fifteen, even twenty
times" in order to understand portions
of the recording.
After NOSENKO left the Embassy Section,
on several occasions in 1962-1963 GRYAZNOV, his former sub-
ordinate and his successor, referred to the microphones'
decline.. GRYAZNOV said the microphones were picking up
only snatches of conversation, and that in a year of two
they would be completely inoperative. As a result, GRYAZNOV
told NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was insisting on the recruitment of
code clerks at all costs. Besides the fading quality of
the microphone's signäl, GRYAZNOV, KOVSHUK and FEDOSEYEV
attributed the diminishing. value of the audio operation to
the Embassy use of the
"room-in-a-room"
[NOSENKO said
that in 1960-1961 the KGB had information that, in prepara-
tion for President Eisenhower's visit, a "steel chamber"
had been constructed within the Embassy where secure conver-
sations could be held. ]
Microphones in the North Wing
According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio
devices were ever installed in the north wing las distinct
from the chancery) prior to the Embassy's occupancy of the
building in 1962.
In his first meetings with CIA in Geneva
he described how he knew. When it was decided to permit
the Embassy to construct the north wing, NOSENKO wrote a
proposal that audio equipment be installed. Approval
was
held up by KGB Chairman Shelepin, who had reservations
because: of the political consequences of discovery.
By
the time Shelepin approved the proposal two or three months
later, renovation was far advanced, and Embassy Security
Officer ABIDIAN was already inspecting the premises. The
opportunity was lost and the KGB installed no microphones.
Consequently, NOSENKO suggested to CIA that the Minister
Counsellor,
the service attaches, and others presently
occupying rooms in the chancery which had microphones, be
moved gradually to the north wing, where the KGB had neither
audio
eguipment nor the capability of installing any.
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
Amount, Type, and Value of Audio Surveillance Production
In 1962 while citing examples of the kind of information
the KGB obtained from monitoring, NOSENKO referred only to
the offices of the Minister Counsellor and of the service
attaches. According to NOSENKO, Counsellor FREERS dictated
Top Secret and Secret cables. If the content justified,
GRIBANOV was informed and he notified the KGB Chairman
immediately:
FREERS also dictated fitness reports on Embassy
personnel from which the KGB learned of various American
officers' personal weaknesses.
attaches, NOSENKO said that the KGB learned from microphones
where they intended to travel, and what they wanted to find
out:
In 1964 NOSENKO provided some additional details. He
said that audio reception was good from the military code
room, but that the occupants rarely spoke.
When one of them
was monitored, the monitor report was sent immediately to
the Eighth Directorate which was concerned with ciphers.
Nothing was obtained from the State Department code room and
teletype room because of the interference from the noise of
the teletype machines.
produced rarely anything of interest.
advance information obtained of a social affair, for which
- or not snea
The microphones in the apartments
An exception was
the English-language Section of the OTU Second Special
Department would
be asked to pay particular attention. There
was
a microphone with good
' reception in GLEYSTEEN's (a
political officer office, but no secret information was
obtained.
ormation wagn
Similarly, the conversations were overheard in
the Agricultural Attache office, but nothing significant
was obtained except "something"
which made the KGB suspect
HORBALY was connected with American Intelligence.
• In a protocol signed on 26 October 1965 NOSENKO summarized
his knowledge of the value of the information obtained by
the KGB via microphones
in the Embassy:
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
"I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from
microphones in the American Embassy for a period of
approximately two years,
1962.
from January 1960 to January
The following is
the only information which
I can remember as being important, interesting or
operationally
useful to the KGB:
"From the microphone in the office of the Minister
Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally
dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of
certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government
and advised the State Department on positions for
negotiations with the USSR.
This information was
of such importance that special reports were written
to the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, I
cannot remember any specific incidents or events
which these cables reported nor any specific
evaluations: of recommendations made in these cables.
"Also from the microphones in the Minister
Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated
fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve
officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any
of these officers were or any details from the
reports.
was of interest or useful to the KGB.
"From the microphone in the Army Attache's office
I remember that the service attaches regularly
discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the
targets that they wanted to cover. They also dis-
cussed the results of these trips after their return.
However, I cannot remember any information about
specific trips planned by
to cover or any specific operational activity taken
by: the organs
of the KGB against service attaches
on trips within the USSR which was based on infor-
mation obtained from this microphone. There was no
interesting, important,
or useful information
about
the personal or professional lives or about the.
vulnerabilities of anyone in the service attache
offices (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this
microphone.
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Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION. - January 1960-January 1962)
"I remember that from the microphones in the State
Department code room occasionally a code clerk would
read numbers; These numbers were only of interest
to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryp
tology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversa-
tions from this microphone. There was no information
from this microphone of any of the code clerks which
was interesting, important, or useful to the Embassy
Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate,
KGB .
"During the approximately two years in which I
daily reviewed the production from all the micro-
phones in the American Embassy I do not remember any
information on any American in the Embassy which was
interesting, important, or useful to me as the
Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points
noted in the above paragraphs.
Results of Technical and Physical Search
NOSENKO's information Ino action had been taken as a
result of GOLITSYN's earlier report that there was: a micro-
phone in the Embassy office occupied by the Minister
Counsellor] was, as far
of the Embassy chancery in spring 1964.
it wen't, confirmed by a search
According to the
USIB Security Committee damage report which followed, a
microphone and associated probe was first discovered
in the
outside wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the chancery.
(In 1960. this room had been the office of the Army Attache,
where NOSENKO reported a microphone was emplaced.]. The
microphone's cable was traced to a major cable which ran
horizontally (several inches) under the outside surface of
the east face of the chancery, to the roof area of the north
annex. A number of vertical cables were found to run to the
various microphone installations.
Fifty microphones were
positively identified [ultimately, fifty-four were foundl,
although the system apparently was devised for a considerably
greater number. The microphone system covered all outside
rooms on floors six through ten, with certain exceptions.
The USIB damage report concluded that the microphones were
installed before the Embassy took occupancy of the
chancery
in 1953.
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Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
The discoveries in the chancery led to the discovery of
other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing
Parallel to the audio cable running from the chancery to the
north wing roof, there were found three coaxial cables, all
terminating in the concrete floor of the north wing attic:
The coaxial
cables appeared to be of more recent installation,
probably prior to the Soviets' evacuation of the north wing.
in 1962:
Comment: While not definitely established, it is assumed
that the Soviets, before the Embassy occupied
the north wing, used it as a listening post for
monitoring microphones in the chancery. In
preparation for American occupancy the main cable
from the chancery was concealed and run from the
north wing roof to the basement, and presumably
from there to a listening post elsewhere.
The
three coaxial cables may have been either
installed at that time or earlier..
Their purpose
is still unknown, but they may have been a
feature of a highly sophisticated electronic
attack against the code room, the existence or
character of which NOSENKO did not know and need
not have known. When NOSENKO was informed.in
1965 by CIA that there had been a technical
discovery in the north wing, he offered his
personal assurances that nothing was installed
in the north wing and insisted that whatever
was found must be something. unrelated to an
äudio system.
Damage Estimates
With reference to the damage caused by the audio penetra-
tion, the previously-cited USIB damage report stated that "it
must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetra
tion; the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to
the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable
1
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Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations
within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache
collection program.
Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon
certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible
for them to identify priority intelligence and probably
Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement
specific counteractions.
The Soviets over the years must
have amassed considerable information concerning the personal
habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel
assigned
to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes
of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."
Col. Theodore F. HOFFMAIT, Army Attache in Moscow from
May 1959 to May 1961 (a period coinciding with some eighteen
months of NOSENKO's claimed two years' service in the Embassy
Section), has been more specific. Interviewed by CIA, Col.
HOFFMAN
recalled instances which the KGB, by monitoring just
the conversations held in his office, could have become aware
of the vulnerability of service attache personnel. As
examples, he cited the two occasions on which military code
do clerk STORSBERG was reprimanded for absenteeism
(unavailable
for cipher duties because he was elsewhere with "girl
friends"); HOFFMAN's conversations with America House manager
Oo Reter BINDER (the personality problems, drinking habits and
other incidents relating to America House residents and
visitors to the America Club), and the detailed circumstances
prompting the decision to remove substitute code clerk KEYSERS 06
from Moscow (homosexuality)..
[Besides his general duties as
Chief of the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claims special responsi
bilities for each of the persons mentioned. He supervised
the KGB officers operating against code clerks and residents
of America House, and asserts he was personally involved in
the KGB attempts to recruit STORSBERG] and (KEYSERS $6 VThe KGB
attempted later to recruit BINDER, as well.)l In summing up
his views, Col. HOFFMAN said: "To be perfectly frank, I
would assume that ... some of our modus operandi, some of
our targets, some of the results, and all of our
personal
weaknesses
were compromised."
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Audio Operations Against American Embassy:
Summary and Conclusion
Given that NOSENKO's information about microphones in the
i chancery has been confirmed, that information's significance
remains the extent to which
1t substantiates his claims
e.g. that his knowledge derived from his position as Deputy
Chief, and that he for two years reviewed the reports of
what the KGB monitored from microphones emplaced in the
chancery
NOSENKO's 'knowledge of the microphones' existence is not
proof that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, (or
even proof that he served in that unit).
KGB sources serving
elsewhere than in the Second Chief Directorate earlier.
reported the microphones'
identified one as being in the Minister Counsellor's offic
NOSEIKO! s
acquisition of the list of microphones in
"1960-1961" is singular (the more so
since he never hinted
of the list's existence while describing the microphones in
the chancery to CIA in 1962). He asserts that he had no
plan to defect in 1960-196], when the list was acquired,
that for no apparent purpose he risked keeping a highly
sensitive document in a safe he shared with two subördinates
(GRYAZNOV and KOSOALPOV), and keeping it even after he left
the Embassy Section for the Seventh Department NOSENKO
has never plausibly explained the circumstances which
prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he
produced it for CIA in Geneva.
According to NOSENKO, he reviewed what must have been
literally hundreds of monitor reports in the course of two
years, important ones of which
were forwarded to Second
Directorate Chief GRIBANOV, and others of such signi
ficance that they were the subjects of special reports sent
to the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Yet when challenged
he cites not a single example, despite the fact that this
period included such critical events affecting Soviet-United
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
States relations (and hence of priority interest to the KGB),
as the U-2 and President Eisenhower's visit, Of the micro-
phones which produced useful information, NOSENKO describes
those in the Minister Counsellor's office, the office of
the Army Attache,
and in the code room; when challenged to
cite examples
information obtained, he asserts that none
produced any information of interest to the Embassy Section.
Lastly, although he stresses the value of the chancery
microphones as sources of information on which he rdied
to
direct operations against code clerks and other Embassy
personnel, he again can describe no actual instance: In
the single case in which he asserted that he relied on
information procured from microphones: (KEYSERS' failure to 06
report receipt of the defection invitation), he was in error.
Conclusion
From the foregoing
it is concluded that,. NOSENKO's claims
to the contrary, his information on the chancery microphones
does not sustain his claim either to have been Deputy Chief
of the Embassy Section, or his claim that he personally
reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports.
Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications
As former Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section of the
American Department NOSENKO claimed to be knowledgeable of
the extent of KGB success in its cryptologic attack on
Embassy communications,
He has consistently asserted that
the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communica
tions of the service attaches [for which reason he claimed
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ary 1962)
AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
ist to the KGBle recruitment of a military code clerk was his priority
Of the micro-ask in 1960-1961].
He "knew", however, that the Eighth
NKO describesirectorate was reading at least some State Department
office of.
nbassy traffic,
hallenged to
its that none
NOSENKO's Information
bassy Section
chancery
At his second meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO expressed
he relied to oncern that the American Embassy in Moscow might be informed
I Embassy
f him, an event which would be fatal since the KGB was:
tance: "In
reading all the State Department ciphers".
He knew this
alied on
ecause he saw the clear-text messages every day....In a:
§' failure toubsequent meeting NOSENKO revised his earlier statement to
was in errorxplain that while no service attache traffic was being
ead, certain State Department codes had been broken..
He
ad only rarely seen the clear-text of deciphered cables,
t the most,
"ten or twelve times" during 1960 and 1961:
The Russian text of those deciphered State Department
essages was sent to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, who some -
imes forwarded it to GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief
ENKO's claimirectorate. GRIBANOV at times forwarded some of the
cersonally
aw such material on the desk of KLYPIN and later on
EDOSEYEV's desk, but was never permitted to read it.
Ikolay ZEMSKOV, from the Secretariat of the Second Chief
irectorate, brought a book containing the broken State
epartment messages to KLYPIN or FEDOSEYEV:
He would open
he book to certain pages which had red paper and permit
LYPIN Or FEDOSEYEV to see the material.
irectorate material, but NOSENKO did not know where or how
EMSKOV got it...
At times portions of this material were
ead aloud to NOSENKO by. KLYPIN, but they concerned the
osition of the American Ambassador or the U.S. Government
=ions:
n political questions and were of no significance to him.
frequently. there was mention of the expected arrival of
of the
mericans who were not permanently assigned to the Embassy,
ageable of nd NOSENKO remembered that one such item concerned the
ack on
-rival of a one-or two-man "commission"
to check the work
erted that i the Political Section.
The attitude of the Secretary of
a communica tate.
or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on
he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest
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in the information as it did not relate to agents or agent
activities.
NOSENKO noted, however, that the material
concerned messages from the Secretary of State to the American
Ambassador, Moscow.
All of this material was highly sensi
tive, and few people were permitted to see it or even to
know of its existence. NOSENKO stated that it was treated
more carefully than Top Secret information.
Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth
Directorate in breaking U.S. Department of State crypto-
graphic systems, NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate methods
as known to him.
One method, mentioned by NOSENKO on
12 June 1962, stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy
officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and McSWEENEY)
dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud. When the texts
were picked up on the KGB microphones,
the Eighth Directorate
compared them against enciphered traffic intercepted by
other means.
NOSENKO has referred to the Eighth Directorate's interest
in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversations
picked up by the microphones in the State Department and
military code rooms.
"Now, we also listened to the code room and the
teletype office, but we could never get anything out
of the teletype office because of interference
(equipment noises which drowned out conversations].
In the military code room--that was where (James H.106
STORSBERG and later
(Matthew P.] ZUJUS worked--we 0b
didn't get much.
We could hear (STORSBERG| swearingÜ6
on occasion, and then he would mention a group of
numbers.
This was, of course, all recorded and we
turned it over at once to the
Eighth Directorate,
dealing with coding and decoding.
Of course, all
Other intercepts were turned over to them also."
With respect to the use of code clerks by the American
Department, NOSENKO recalled that in 1948 or 1949 the KGB
was helped
a great deal by (James H.] MCMILLAN la military
code clerk of the Embassy
staff who defected in 19481, and
by "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 331. It was thanks
to
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"ANDREY's" help that the KGB were able to read State Depart-
ment and ciphers.
lAt. the time of SMITH's tour in Moscow
a single code room was shared by State Department and
military code clerks. As the only cryptographic machine
technician assigned to the Embassy, SMITH had
access to both
State and military cryptographic equipment.]
NOSENKO also named MARTIN and MICHELL INSA mathematicians
who defected to the USSR in July 1960] and "an American
code clerk brought to the USSR
from India" (unidentified,
but possibly John Discoe SMITH, State Department communica-
tions technician who defected to the USSR sometime between
1960-1967, when his presence in the USSR was publicizedi.
NOSENKO said the Eighth Directorate was submitting
regular
reports to Khrushchev and the Central Committee on
their intercepts until "the end of 1961 or the beginning
of 1962". He learned this from GRYAZNOV, his successor in
the Embassy Section.
At about the same time he learned
that various Embassy officers were less often överheard from
KGB microphones in their offices discussing significant
information.
This development GRYAZNOV and American Depart
ment Chief FEDOSEYEV attributed to. a "room-within-a-room"?
installed in the Embassy and other Embassy security measures.
(The acoustical
room was installed in December 1962] After
his own departure from the Embassy Section, NOSENKO also
learned of the KGB's loss of its code breaking capability
from Second Chief Directorate Chief, GRIBANOV: GRIBANOV
told him
that the Central Committee was exerting consider-
able pressure on: the KGB Chairman for continuation of the
information formerly obtained
in this manner;
the KGB Chairman was demanding maximum effort consequently
from all KGB
officers concerned with the recruitment of code clerks.
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Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications:
Summary and Conclusion
From USIR and NSA damage assessments following the
discovery of the microphones in the chancery, it has been
concluded that it was equally feasible for the Soviets to
have recovered plain text (by analysis of cipher machine
emissions) from enciphered service attache traffic of the
period 1952-1962, and from enciphered State Department
"ANDREY" (see p. 33), the code
machine mechanic the KGB
allegedly recruited in 1953,
serviced the cipher machines in a common State-service
attache code room; his access
was not limited, as NOSENKO
indicates, to State Department traffic.
On the basis of
these fundamental errors, it is concluded that NOSENKO
was not knowledgeable of
extent of KGB cryptologic
attack on Embassy communications,
and that such information
as he provided can not be related to his claim to have
been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section.
Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy
As Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the
American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed that he would
"necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a
CIA officer" under diplomatic cover within the Embassy.
Within the section, "special emphasis" was placed on the
identification and development of
American Intelligence.
personnel, with the objective of
an eventual recruitment.
The KGB believed that the Ambassador, code clerks, and
Marine guards would not be used to perform intelligence
missions: any diplomat, however, was noted as "suspect
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American Intelligence", the notation referring to CIA.
Reviewing lists of American personnel assigned to the
Embassy during 1960-1961 NOSENKO commented on those who
were known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers, and
on some officers who were not.
Embassy Personnel Suspected to be CIA Officers
BOriS KLOSSON
: Ob
ERLOSSON was considered to be CIA "Resident" in Moscow,
for reasons unknown to NOSENKO except that he replaced
06 David MARK, who had been regarded as
"Resident' because of
his behavior under surveillance and of his clandestine letter
mailing to KLOSSONs case officer was MIKHAYLOV. NOSENKO
recalled the names of none of the KGB agents working
any clandestine activity. NOSENKO was unaware of [KLOSSON'S 06
job in the Embassy, whether his family was in Moscow of
any other features of his personal life, of his travels
inside the Soviet Union, the identities of his close American
associates or any of his Soviet contacts. NOSENKO never
read KLOSSON's file,
Comment:
06
KLOSSON was not a CIA officer and had no
connection with CIA in Moscow.
John ABIDIAN
ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer on the basis
of his conduct as a Department of State security officer
during Premier Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States
and because he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE,
Surveillance confirmed that he clandestinely mailed opera-
tional
letters
and visited a deaddrop site in Moscow. (See
P.: 206)
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Comment:
ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted
by CIA. Although not a ClA stari employee, he
was for all intents the CIA "Resident"
in
Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961.
was identified as a CIA officer on the basis
of his mailing of one or two letters to KGB-controlled double
agents in the Baltic area.
Additionally, from a KGB micro-
phone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report
shortly after he returned from a field trip.
Comment:
_was a CIA employee detached from his
Washington overt assignment as an economic 08
analyst to be assigned to Moscow.
He was used
there for limited operational support activity,
including clandestine mailings.
He reverted to
overt CIA employment after his
Moscow assignment,
Lewis BOWDEN
BOWDEN was suspected of being a CIA officer for reasons
unknown to NOSENKO.
KOVSHUK was in contact with BOWDEN under
Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover.
Comment: BOWDEN had no
affiliation with CIA.
it /B.2
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Richard FUNKHAUSER
FUNKHÄUSER was suspected of being a CIA officer because.
he was a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly on
economic matters.
NOSENKO remembered the names of no KGB
agents working against PUNKHAUSEk, nor any information about
him which was regarded as derogatory by the KGB:
Comment:
FUNKHAUSER had no affiliation with CIA.
William HORBALY
HORBALY was suspected of being a CIA case officer or
cooptee because the KGB monitored through a microphone in
the Embassy his discussion or dictation of observations made
on a field trip. NOSENKO knew the names of no KGB agents
working against HORBALY, nor whether the agents ever obtained
any derogatory information about him The KGB did not try
to recruit HORBALY ®
Comment:
Like WASHENKO
HORBALY was
and economic analyst of CIA before being
an overt employee
appointed to a State Department position in
Moscow, where he openly discussed the fact
that he had formerly worked for CIA. In
January 1962 he accepted an appointment to the
Toreign Agricultural Service of the Department
of Agriculture.
While in Moscow HORBALY had no
connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine
activities.
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George WINTERS
WINTERS was known to be a CIA officer and was given
special attention because of his operational activity in the
POPOV case (see p.207 ). KOVSHUK was in personal contact
with WINTERS under the cover of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs.
In addition he was overheard from a KGB microphone
dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned
from a field trip.
Comment: WINTERS was a CIA officer.
CIA Personnel Not Suspected by the KGB
Stanley BROWN
NOSENKO did not recognize BROWN's name, whose name was
on a list which NOSENKO brougit to CIA in 1964, a list in-
dicating that BROWN shared an office with HORBALY. In that
office there was a KGB microphone providing good reception,
but insignificant production.
comment: Like HORBALY and|
BROWN was an overt
employee of CIA who was Eransferred to the De-
partment of Agriculture prior to being assigned
to the Embassy in. iloscow. He was engaged in
no clandestine activities during his tour:
In 1960-ne. visited:Leningrad with WINTERS, whom
NOSENKO correctly identified as a CIA officer.
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IY 1962)
Top Secret
'ERICAN EMBASSY
SECTION January 1960-January 1962)
as given
stivity in the
lad contact
Foreign Af-
3 microphone
he returned
william N.
MORELL
MORELy was not suspected of being a CIA officer.
Comment:
06
MORELI was an overt employee of CIA who was
identified as such to the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs prior to his assignment to
the Embassy as a Minister Counsellor: In
attempting to recruit Francis STEVENS (see p. 430) D6
a KGB officer allegedly commented to [STEVENS 06
06 that MORELD openly acknowledged himself to be
a CIA employee. KOVSHUK, under Ministry of
Foreign Affairs cover, was cultivaing MORELy. 06
A3
NOSENKO identified
nose name was the Administrative Section of the Embassy. Nothing was
name as that of an employee
a list in-
In that
Jesuch as his previous career, whether he
ew gestan, when he arrived or departed Moscow, or where
i reception, lived while there. The KGB did not suspect that he was
CIA officer.
vas an overt
ed to the De-
being assigne
engaged in
lis tour
WINTERS, waC
CIA officer.
bassy staff
luring a trif
Comment;
TS No. 1971
Copy
Swas a CIA officer who served in Moscow
from October 1960 until September 1961 as
- His
specitic CIA mission was to support communica-
tions with PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union.
From the start of his tour he was active in
attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow
and he frequently toured various areas of the
city on foot: 03
_went to the vicinity
of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site on two
occasions during. November and December 1960,
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Comment:
(Continued)
and
examined the site itself on 21 January
1961, See p. 219.)
Throughout his tour
was subjected to intense KGB surveillance.
On
25• October 1960 ABIDIAN commented that "I find
this type of coverage (five surveillants on a
recent trip to a barber shop) completely out
of character with that which
is usually given
a new arrival of similar rank. My only
inference is that the KGB has at least strong
suspicions of|
_ primary role as a CIA
officer." (ABIDIAN's own surveillance at the
time was occasional and extremely discreet.)
0S
03
DEMKIN was case officer and which NOSENKO had
described as thoroughly penetrated by KGB agents
among the local employees.0l
_I spoke
Russian, and his administrative tasks exposed
him more than most Americans to KGB agents and
informants among Embassy local employees.
Paul GARBLER
GARBLER was a naval officer in the office of the Naval
Attache and the target of BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO knew the
names of no agents working against GARBLER.
The KGB obtained
no interesting intormation concerning GARBLER from microphones,
telephone taps, or surveillance. NOSENKO "did not knOw"
whether or not he had read GARBLER's file. (It will be
recalled that in other contexts NOSENKO said that all Service
Attaches were considered by the KGB to be intelligence officers.)
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Comment:
1
The CIA Chief of Station while in Moscow,
GARBLER had been detailed to CIA by the Navy
in 1952r and he served CIA
from January 1953 until July 1955.
He resigned his naval commission in 1955, and
in 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to
2,10
He returned to active duty with the Navy in
June 1961 and on 31 August 1961 he was formally
proposed as a candidate for the position of
Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow.: In response
to a request from the Soviet Naval Attache
office in Washington, in September 1961 GARBLER
forwarded to the Soviet Embassy an official
biographic summary, followed by an official
call on the Soviet Naval Attache. GARBLER
arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961.
Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER
had served in Korea where he was acquainted
with George BLAKE. GARBLER was a participant
in the joint CIA/MI-6 discussions in Washington
in April 1960, minutes of which BLAKE ha
admitted passing to the Soviets.
(Seep
CIA thus assumed GARBLER to
have been identified
to the KGB as a CIA officer prior to his
arrival in Moscow.
This assumption was confirmed
by an article appearing in Izvestiya in October
1963 in which the author alleged that GARBLER
had earlier been involved in subversion and
espionage
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Knowledge of CIA Personnel in Embassy:
Summary and Conclusion
With the exception of ABIDIAN, there is a paradox
connected with each of NOSENKO's identifications, as is
most evident in the cases of MORELI) and GARBLER.
It is a 06
fact that both these individuals were known to the KGB as
CIA officers, a fact of which NOSENKO apparently is unaware.
His claim is
thus false, that he would necessarily know
whom the KGB believed was a CIA officer, and to the extent
he related it to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the
Embassy Section, that latter claim is unsubstantiated.
Personal Handler of KGB Agents
NOSENKO has named seven agents which he claimed to have
handled while Deputy Chief of the American Section during
1960-1961:
YEFREMOV and VOLKOV
NOSENKO continued to manage these two homosexual agents
whom he had recruited and managed during his assignment in
the Seventh Department, and brought with him when he trans-
ferred to the American Department (see p.Ill). They were
used in no operations during the period 1960-1961€
[NOSENKO
described the compromise of Robert BARRET] in 1959 and knew 06
of his later recruitment in I961. (See p. 134.) NOSENKO
does not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOVO6
in 1961, when he claims to have been their case officer.)
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FRIPPEL
NOSENKO continued to manage the Moscow manager of the
27 American Express Company during the 1960-1961 period, as
he had earlier during his assignment to the Seventh Depart-
ment. (See p. 13%. RIPPED was an uncooperative and
unproductive source reporting on his acquaintances in the
American Embassy.
DMITRIYEV
NOSENKO's English and Japanese-speaking agent during the
1955-1960 Seventh Department period was employed in the
Japanese Exhibition in Moscow.
(See p. 10%.) He was not
used operationally during 1960 or 1961.
Marina RYTOVA
NOSENKO's agent from 1956 or 1957 (see p. 108) at the
Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow, RYTOVA was not used
operationally during 1960-1961.
Maya LEVINA
LEVINA was a language teacher and librarian at the
Embassy used as an informant on her American language
students, among whom were a number of code clerks.
She
provided no worthwhile information on any American nor was
she ever used in operations.
At the end of 1960 or the
beginning of 1961 she was fired by Paul SMITH, and NOSENKO U6
turned her over to another Embassy Section officer.
The
British
Department planned later to use her in either the
British or Canadian Embassies.
(LEVINA was employed at the
Enbassy from January 1958 through January 1962. [Cultural, 08, 06
Affairs Officer SMITH left Moscow in September 1961, and
could not have been directly involved in LEVINA's termina-
cion.
LEVINA thus was employed at the Embassy throughout
HOSENKO's tour of dutywith the Embassy Section.]
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06
PREISFREUND
Recruited by KOVSHUK, PREISFREUND]was handled by NOSENKO
in the operation against STORSBERG (see p. 166) •
He was 0b
used in no other operation during 1960-1961.
(WEISS] 06
The (Syrian Army captain] studying in Moscow was first
targetted against America House occupants, then used in
06 the development of [ZUJUS, STORSBERG successor OThe
latter operation had not terminated when NOSENKO left the
Embassy Section in January 1962.
Personal Handler Of KGB Agents: Summary and Conclusion
Of the five agents NOSENKO claims to have brought with
him to the American Embassy Section from his previous Seventh
Department assignment, none was used operationally during
1960-1961. If NOSENKO handled LEVINA as he claimed, he
would presumably know that his single agent in the Embassy
served throughout his Embassy Section assignment and was
not fired earlier, as he asserted. 0 PREISFREUND) and WEISS] 06
are discussed in considerable detail in connection with
the KGB operations against (STORSBERG and (ZUJUS).U6 NOSENKO's
claims regarding the agents he handled during
the 1960-1961
period do not sustain his assertions that he was Deputy
Chief of the American Section, responsible for code clerk
operations, or provide conclusive evidence that he did or
did not serve in the Embassy Section.
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Temporary Assignments Abroad
NOSENKO claims that he was scheduled to travel to the
United States in November 1960 (a trip which was cancelled)
and that he travelled to Cuba in November-December 1960
and to Bulgaria in April-May 1961, on KGB assignments.
The significance of his travel is the extent to which it
relates to his claimed position and functions in the Embassy
section, and to operations in Moscow for which he claimed
supervisory responsibility.
Planned Travel to the United States
In one of the initial meetings in 1962 NOSENKO stated
that he had been in the United States. He later amended
this to explain that he had been scheduled to make a trip
to the United States, but that the trip had been cancelled.
He was to travel under true name, he said, to avoid beinc
connected
to the name NIKOLAYEV,
under which he travelled
to the United Kingdom in 1957 and 1958. In his early
account he claimed that the decision to use his true name
was his, personally, later he asserted that the decision
was made by "the people in charge of such operations"
NOSENKO stated that he was to travel under the cover of
an employee of the State Scientific-Technical Committee
IGNTK] and was to accompany an automotive delegation.
The visit, however, was part
of the Soviet-U.S: exchange
program, and when the visit was postponed in 1961, NOSENKO's
travel was cancelled.
Comment:
The name of NOSENKo appeared along with li
others
on a 20 October 1960 request to the
Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a
Soviet automotive exchange delegaion which
was scheduled to visit the United States in
November 1960. NOSENKO was listed as an
engineer employed by the State Scientific-
Technical Committee.
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Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960)
When NOSENKO first mentioned his travel to Cuba (in
1962, in Geneva), he claimed that he travelled under the
NIKOLAYEV alias, and he provided colorful details of his
activities in Havana in surveying the American Embassy
there for operational possibilities.
In subsequent versions
NOSENKO asserted that he travelled in true name, and that
his was a routine assignment to accompany a Soviet delegation
as a security officer.
NOSENKO's Information
In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was
preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a
special delegation
of nickel industry experts from Gosplan,
the Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for
departure for Cuba.
The delegation was a routine one,
consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of
the Soviet Union.
Since there was no one under any sort of
suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Depart-
ment of the Second Chiêf Directorate decided it was unnec
essary to include a security officer.
Two days prior to
the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee
of the Communist Party ordered that a Second Chief Direct-
orate officer accompany the group.
Because of the short
time remaining before the delegation's scheduled departure,
the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible
to find a suitable officer who could get his necessary
travel documents ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV
of the Eleventh Department suggested NOSENKO, who had been
supposed to go to the United States and ho had a valid
passport (in true name) •
The Cubans issued NOSENKO a visa
immediately as did The Netherlands a transit visa.
NOSENKO's functions with the delegation were purely of
a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in
October or November and spent about a month and a half
there. During this time he accompanied the delegation
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everywhere it went, to different plants, and to meet repre-
sentatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform
to discuss how to increase production. NOSENKO's cover
assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly
before departing Moscow he was introduced to the other
members as such.
He had one agent within the delegation:
and developed several
"confidential contacts" during the
trip. NOSENKO would not have accepted the assignment had
he known how long and uneventful the trip was to be; he
had really wanted to go only to the United States.
On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special
mission.
As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB
Legal Rezident in Cuba, A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package
with instructions to deliver it to Moscow: NOSENKO did not
know the contents of the package until he arrived in
Amsterdam en route home.
(it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO took the
opportunity to determine that it contained copies of "letters
between likoyan and Khrushchev concerning the prices of
sugar" and drafts of
agreements between the Soviet Union
and
East Germany,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.
On
arrival at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that
a message had been received from the Central Committee of
the Communist Party instructing that the package was to be
delivered "urgently" to Che Guevara, who was
touring Eastern
Europe and was then in Berlin.
While the delegation continued
on to Moscow, NOSENKO was driven to the Soviet Embassy in
The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The
Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin:
When he
arrived in Berlin Guévara was found
to have left Berlin for
Hungary, and NOSENKO delivered the papers to "Guevara's
deputy" in Berlin and continued on to Moscow.
Comment:
Travel records obtained by CIA, which include
photographs taken in both Amsterdam and Caracas
Of NOSENKO's true name service passport and
his passport photograph, confirm that NOSENKO,
a "minerals engineer", transitted Amsterdam en
route to Cuba on 15 November 1960, was in
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Comment:
(Continued)
Caracas on 17 November, and departed Caracas
for Havana on 19 November. According to flight
manifests, on 13 December NOSENKO arrived in
Amsterdam
from Havana en route to Moscow and
left Amsterdam via air for Moscow on 15 December.
NOSENKO was travelling on a service passport;
he did not enjoy diplomatic immunity: It is
thus highly unlikely that he did serve as a
courier, bearing documents of the nature he
described as he claimed.
NOSENKO's planned trip to the United States
and his confirmed travel to Cuba damages his
claim that he was supervising operations during
this period against Embassy code clerks in
Moscow.
The trip occurred at the time his
alleged target, State Department code clerk
to be entrapped on the train en
route to Warsaw (15 November) and while his
subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16
November in connection with another code clerk
target, John GARLAND®
Travel to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case (April-May 1961)
In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO reported that he had been sent
to Sofia as a KGB response to a Bulgarian Ministry of
Interior (MVR) request that the KCB provide a Second Chief
Directorate American Department officer to discuss opera-
tions with Bulgarian counterparts.
While in Sofia NOSENKO
asserted he played a key role in the compromise of American
protessor Horace G. LUNT.
06
NOSENKO's Information
Consultation with the MVR
NOSENKO first heard of the Bulgarian assignment from
S.I, YEGOROV, Chief of the KGB unit handling liaison with
Bloc counterintelligence representatives in Moscow.
YEGOROV
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as
light
in :
nd
cember:
sport:
1s:
ites
S
ring
6
Lerk
int
an
ROV
7124
Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
said that the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior had
reguested the KGB Chairman to provide an officer from the
American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for
consultation with the MVR American Department in Sofia.
American Department Chief KLYPIN subsequently instructed
NOSENKO to go.
NOSENKO was told that he was going for
"consultations" and that KGB advisors would discuss his
duties with him.: KLYPIN told NOSENKO only that he should
see how the MVR worked, and tell them how the KGB managed
Its operations...
NOSENKO had no meetings or discussions with
KVR representatives in Moscow before his
knew nothing about the size or responsibilities be he MR
American Department, the names of any MVR officers, or what
the MVR's particular problems were.
NOSENKO flew from Moscow to Sofia in early April 1961
and was
met at the airport by A.s. KOZLOV, a former Second
Chief Directorate officer whom he had known' in Moscow.
The following morning he was picked up in an official
vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian
NVR building. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of
him and was told that "they want to know about how to work
against: the American Legation, everything, right from
letter 'A'". NOSENKO was introduced to the Chief KGB
advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of the
MVR's American Department, after which he was assigned an
office: In the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he
discussed both general matters and particular cases with
on the principles of operations against foreign military
personnel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR
surveillance post opposite the American Legation.
He
discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists.
He also addressed the entire American Department for about
five hours to
tell them "what is necessary, what to pay
attention to, how to work". At the end of his visit, some
time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy
Minister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and
his recommendations for improving operations against Americans:
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
Comment:
NOSENKO doesn't know why he was selected to
consult with the MVR in Bulgaria,
As fai
as is known to CIA, such consultation was a
function of the KGB advisors in Sofia whom
NOSENKO himself described. The American
Legation (after a ten-year absence) reopened
in February 1960. By 1961 the MVR had demon-
strated that it had lost none of its earlier
demonstrated efficiency in controlling the
activities of resident foreigners and in
establishing the basis for mounting operations
There was no
apparent necessity for NOSENKO'S
• Sofia assign-
ment, and therefore his account is jüdged to
be untrue.
06
Compromise of LUNT
06
In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO described the compromise of
LUNT in graphic
terms, includina his own personal confron
tation of LUNil In his subsequent accounts he had statec
Obthat while he
never saw LUNT personally, he supervised the
activities of the MVR officers who dealt with gUNIy
About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the
end of April 1961, NOSENKO was reviewing MVR lists of
the name of Horace G. LUNT.06 NOSENKO recalled that a Slavic
officers confirmed that
records, for which purpose he telephoned Moscow.
_An almost
immediate reply confirmed that this was the same (LUNT] who 06
had visited Moscow previously,
and that he was a
Homosexual
(The KGB had never exploited its knowledge of LUNT's homo- 06
sexual activities and the MVR had not known that LUNT was
a homosexual.)
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January. 1962)
KOZLOV and the Chief of the MVR American Department
were very interested in NOSENKO's lead, and KOZLOV appealed
to NOSENKO for his help, since "the MVR had never recruited
an American".
The three discussed: the matter with General
DUMKOV, the Chief of the MVR Second Chief Directorate, and
NOSENKO suggested that a MVR homosexual agent should be
employed, an apartment prepared, and preparations made for
clandestine photography:
They then advised YEGOROV, the
senior KGB advisor to the MVR, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV
in MOSCOW.
was merely advising the MVR officers, "who didn't know what
to do"
NOSENKO suggested that the MVR officers get two
homosexual agents, since "maybe (LUNT wouldn't like one of 06
them"
, and he advised them to weigh the time element in •
deciding whether to entrap LUNT with a view to attempting 06
to recruit him at once, or merely to obtain evidence for
later blackmail. The MVR. American Department Chief and his
Tourist Section
chief were to attempt the recruitment.
NOSENKO remained in a MVR office where he could be reached
by telephone in the event the MVR officers needed further
assistance.
NOSENKO learned from
the MVR officers involved that
the recruitment had been successful, and that LUNT had 06
agreed to meet them again on the following day. NOSENKO
later was told that the MVR did not give (LUNTarrangements U
for a contact in the United States because he was expected
to return to Bulgaria for a slavic Language conference in
1962 or 1963.
06
LUNT's Information
LUNT
travelled directly from Sofia to Belgrade and there
on 9. May
1961 he reported to American Ambassador Geörge
Kenhan and
to CIA
that he had been recruited under duress
by the MVR in Sofia on 5 May. After being entrapped with
a homosexual and accepting recruitment, he was instructed
to meet clandestinely with a MVR officer in Paris en route
back to the United States.. He was given no other tasks.
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
06
LUNT]stated that while on an earlier trip to sofia in
November 1960 he became involved with one Georgi Velev
ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on
at least
five separate occasions, He had given ALEKSIEV
American travellers checks which the Bulgarian planned to
sell on the blackmarket.
Once, while in LUNt's company, Ob
ALEKSIEV had been recognized and questioned by the Bulgarian
civil police.CLUNT corresponded with ALEKSIEV after
departing from Bulgaria in 1960, and he had advised ALEKSIEV
of his planned return in April 1961 to Sofia.
06
Comment:
LUNT's account refutes NOSENKO's claims that
the MVR had no evidence of LUNT's vulnerability06
prior to receiving NOSENKO's information in
May 1961, and that NOSENKO*s personal partici-
pation in the MVR operation was such that he
knew that [LUNT) was given no MVR contact in the
United States. Ob
NOSENKO's involvement in the LUNT]case is
unrelated to the assignment he claims at the
time. Although NOSENKO cites the LUNT case in 06
connection with his Embassy Section duties,
it resembles most of all a Seventh Department
operation.
NOSENKO's presence in Sofia in May 1961
(when he claims his operation against STORSBERG O
was approaching a climax and when his subor-
dinates were apparently planning to exploit
KEYSERS' newly discovered vulnerability)
indicates that NOSENKO's presence in Moscow
regarding supervisory responsibility for all
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY
SECTION January 1960-January 1962)
Promotion and Transfer to
Seventh Department (January
the
1962)
NOSENKO stated that his return to the Seventh Department
resulted from GRIBANOV's wish to promote him from Deputy
Chief of the Embassy Section to Deputy Chief of the whole
American Department, However, according to NOSENKO, the
new American Department Chief, FEDOSEYEV, wanted as his
Under.the circumstances,
NOSENKO said he preferred to be transferred back to the
Seventh Department, in any capacity.
NOSENKO reported that
he spoke to Seventh Department Chief V.D. CHELNOKOV, and the
latter proposed that NOSENKO ask GRIBANOV. to be returned to
the Seventh Department as chief of the American Section,
with the understanding that he would be appointed Deputy
Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as the incumbent
deputy [B.A.] BALDIN retired in July 1962.
NOSENKO asserted
his proposal was
made and approved by GRIBANOV in September
or October 1961 GRIBANOV, according to NOSENKO, never
indicated his reasons for planning to appoint him Deputy
Chief of the American Department of for later promoting him
to Section Chief and then Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-
ment in 1962
In view of
his impending transfer, starting in December
1961 NOSENKO, said he spent several hours each day in the
Seventh Department, There he stated he talked with Depart-
ment Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain
files of the American
Tourist Section, and discussed current
operations and operational possibilities with the officers
assigned to this section. NOSENKO said the formal order
for
the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 December
1961, and within the next
few days NOSENKo officially signed
over the ABIDIAN case file
and the Embassy security file to
his successor as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section,
GRYAZNOV As he had when he transferred into the American
Department in 1960, NOSENKO said he took his active agents
with him when he returned to the Seventh Department.
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
Comment:
NOSENKO dates his transfer as occurring
"before
GOLITSYN's defection", which he insists
occurred in mid-January 1962 even after learning
from CIA that the correct date is 15 December
1961. Obliged to take the latter date into
account, NOSENKO reconstructed the foregoing
chronology of his departure from the Embassy
Section and his assumption of duties in the
Embassy Section and his assumption of duties
in the Seventh Department.
Repeated interro-
gation has never resolved
the reason NOSENKO
attached so much significance to the date on
which he believes GOLITSYN defected.
In claiming to have transferred from the
Embassy Section just prior to 5 January 1962
(when his participation in the Seventh Depart-
ment compromise of W.E. JOHNSON]is confirmed) .0b
NOSENKO's account makes it impossible for him
to have played the role he claimed in the events
connected with ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin
Street deaddrop. (See p. 216.)
NOSENKO's assertion that he was GRIBANOV'S
candidate over KOVSHUK for Deputy Chief of the
American Department is implausible. In contrast
to NOSENKO's self-admitted undistinguished
i rosEN Department
performance, KOVSHUK was a former Deputy Chief
of the American Department who had been personally
invoived in such American Department operations
of the previous decade as recruitments of Roy
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1950-January 1962)
DEPUTY CHIEF Of the AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - 1960-1962:
Summary and Conclusion
According to NOSENKO, between January 1960 and January
1962 he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section,
in which capacity he was occasional Acting Chief, super-
visor of all operations against code clerks and for some
months service attaches, case officer for priority KGB
target ABIDIAN, custodian of the Embassy security file, and
reviewer of all information obtained from microphones
emplaced in the Embassy.
From a comparison of NOSENKO's
assertions, amendments, and retractions with collateral
information, he was none of these.
Further, while he may
have been familiar with the activities of some agents of
the Embassy Section, his relationship with them was not in
the manner nor circumstances he claimed.
From his position as Deputy Chief NOSENKO claims complete
knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts among
Embassy personnel during the period 1960-1961 and thereafter,
of CIA
personnel identified by the KGB on the Embassy staff,
and of the status of the KGB. cryptologic attack on Embassy
communications His apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's rela-
tionship with MORELLO and KOSOLAPOV's connection with GARLAND O
refute his contention that he would have known of all KGB:
recruitment attempts; that he was seemingly unaware of such
events while Deputy Chief demolishes his claim that he would
necessarily have learned of them later, and while assigned
elsewhere. Contrary to his claim, NOSENKO does not know of:
CIA personnel on the Embassy staff who were identified by
the KGB •
NOSENKO's information on the KGB cryptologic
attack reflects no special knowledge; it is superficial and
in error.
Conclusion
NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy
Section nor a supervisor in that section.
215K
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CHAPTER VIII
SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962 to January 19641
Comment: By late 1959 or early 1960 the KGB had the
complete substance of the CIA and MI-6 tourist
agent program in the USSR:
The information ab-
tained from the KGB agent in MI-6, BLAKE, in=
cluded accurate details of the objectives and
targets of those operations, as well as the
practices employed for the selection, recruit-
ment, training and briefing of the agents in
volved.
As a probable consequence of reports
received from BLAKE as well as by the indepen-
dent confirmation of tourist agents identified
in the USSR, the KGB by 1961 was mobilizing all
of its resources to counter the threat.
KGB's tasks were made no easier by the increase
in bona fide tourists to the Soviet Union, the
numbers of which were increasing by thousands
Evidently uncertain of the success
of domestic measures it was taking, the KGB
extended responsibility for countermeasures to
KGB elements outside of the Second Chief Direc-
torate.
To that end, selected First Chief
Directorate residencies abroad were instructed
to exploit all of its facilities in developing
tourist agent countermeasures. In describing
the magnitude of its tourist agent problen,
KGB Headquarters cited the scores of American
tourist agents who had been identified in just
one year in the Soviet Union.
In fact, by the time
NOSENKO returned to
the Seventh Department in January 1962, the
threat against which the KGB was deploying had
passed.
By early 1961 the tourist agent pro-
gram was suspended when technical collection
programs and other agent operations made the
use of tourists unnecessary.
The statements of NOSENKO with respect to
Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department
counterintelligence operations among American
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
Comment:
(Continued)
tourists during this period must be examined
in light of the foregoing facts.
Since NOSENRO
claims to have held key KGB positions from
which vantage he asserts he was particularly
well informed about KGB operations against
American tourists, it is appropriate to hola
him closely accountable for his statements.
NOSENKO's claimed assignment to the Seventh Department.
first as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section
fection in Geneva in January 1964. By the time NOSENKO Ie-
turned to the Seventh Department for this assignment, the
KGB reorganization of 1959 had been completed, and according
to NOSENKO, the Department was divested of all of its former
functions unrelated to tourists.
A newly-created Service
(sluzhba), NOSENKO explained,
assumed responsibility for
foreign religious figures, emigres visiting the Soviet Union,
and persons: travelling to the USSR to visit relatives:
The
Seventh Department's former responsibilities
for operations
against foreign seamen, commercial delegations, and so forth
were similarly transferred elsewhere.
In addition to performing supervisory and
administrative
duties, NOSENKO asserted that in this period he personally
was involved with KGB operations launched against six Ameri-
can tourists and participated in investigations of Lee Harvey
Embassy Section, A.N. CHEREPANOV.
his Seventh Department duties:
Because of the senior position NOSENKO said he occupied
during his period of service in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO
claimed full awareness of
all significant KGB operations
against American tourists.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
06
Chief Of the American-British Commonwealth Section
(January. - July 1962)
As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section
NOSENKO said he was responsible for planning
and coordinating
all KGB activities against American land British and Canadian
tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operation-
al work of fifteen subordinate case officers.. He bad
no
deputy, and he did not indicate who assumed his duties in his
absence. He required several months at the beginning of 1962
to "get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments"
on his part in the initial period on this new job. In mid-
February 1962, within a few weeks of his transfer, he began
preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarma-
ment Delegation.
This involved discussions with the Eleventh
(Soviet Delegation) Department of the Second Chief Directorate,
as well as with case officers responsible for the investiga-
tion of one particular Soviet delegate to Geneva. SHAKHOV.
NOSENKO claimed that his preparations for his trip were only
part-time and in addition to his other regular duties. He
spent his early weeks talking to case officers, reviewing.
reports of the section's activities during the
previous two
years, and discussing plans for the coming tourist season.
He proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist.
firms in Moscow with an eye to their recruitment by the KGB,
a proposal which was accepted. INOSENKO elsewhere attributed
the proposal to his earlier assignment in the Tourist Depart-
ment in 1958-1960, which he alleged resulted in the recruit-
ment of FRIPPED. 1,06
NOSENKO 's Agents
NOSENKO claimed that when he transferred to the Seventh
Department he brought with him the agents which he had been
handling in the American Department Embassy Section:
Arsene FRIPPEL
29,06
American
Express manager FRIPPED departed from Moscow
in early 1961, but NOSENKO claimed he continued to be the
Second Chief Directorate case officer since FRIPPELhad no 06
contact with the KGB in New York City, and that he met
FRIPPED twice in the USSR
in'1963.
According to NOSENKO,
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
FRIPPED was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practi-
cally nothing."
NOSENKO said that although he had
recruited
him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGBOb
nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL]would be reassigned to Mos- 06
cow at some future date.
- (See p.137 for details of the
(FRIPPED
case.)
06
Comment:
06
FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice
In the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPED asserts 06
he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962,
which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPED is known 06
to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union
at that time, and there is no apparent reason
why he would make a false claim on this matter.
06
06
Johannes PREISFREUND
06
The KGB considered (PREISFREUND compromised to American
Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961! and
thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Em-
bassy in Moscow.
For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take
PREISEREUND with him when he transferred to
the Seventh Do-
partment.
As the agent spoke only Finnishand Russian, however.
ne was of no use against English-speaking tourists.
NOSENKO
met with (PREISFREUNDOn the latter's visits to Moscow in 1952,
but did not use him in any operations.
Comment:
06
PREISFREUND] asserts that he was no longer a KGB
agent after the STORSBER operation (see p.175, 06
and that although he saw NOSENKO on his freguent.
return visits to Moscow, it was only because
NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and
arinking.
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21222
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
VOLKOV and YEFREMOV
According to NOSENKO, he used the
two homosexual
agents in the entrapment of W.E: JOHNSON several days after 06
returning to the Seventh Department.
This was their first
operational activity since 1959, because they were employed
in no operations during the entire period he was their case
officer while assigned to the Embassy Section. After the
JOHNSON entrapment, these agents were not used again. NO
SENKO Claimed that in 1962 or 1963 they were retired, and he
personally dispatched their files to KGB Archives.
details of VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV'S activities see p.110 :!
Comment:
There is evidence that VOLKOV was involved in
a KGB entrapment operation directed against
American tourist William J. ZUBONJin July U6
1962 (while NOSENKO claims he was still his
case officer), an event of which NOSENKO ap-
parently is uninformed:
06
Samih WEISS
After his transfer to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO
claimed he was instructed also to continue directing Syrian 1,06
military officer WEISS, who was targetted against military
Obcode clerk ZuJUS] (see p. 161), NOSENKO continued to meet.
DO WEISS during the first months of 1962, and in February or
attempted
to have WEISS
D6with ZUJUS so that another KGB agent could be introduced to
the code clerk. Just before leaving for Geneva for the first
time, NOSENKO turned WEISS, over to GRYAZNOV, NOSENKO's suC-
cessor as Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy
Section D WEISS was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow
in May 1962, after which NOSENKO believed he returned to
Syria. Il
Comment: Because of the political climate in Syrial
there
has been no opportunity to query
NOSENKO's allegations.
WEISS] regarding
06
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
Marina RYTOVA
Until 1960 or 1961 a Greek language instructor at the
Institute
for International Relations, RYTOVA obtained a job
at a CPSU Central Committee
school and thereafter ceased all
agent work.
Nevertheless, NOSENKO asserted that he was offi-
cially registered. as her
case officer until his defection in
1964.
NOSENKO's Agents: Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO's claims with respect to these agents do not sus-
tain his claims to service in the Seventh Department in this
period, since none were utilized in Seventh Department opera-
tIons.
Operational Activities (January - June 1962)
As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of
the Seventh Department during the period January-July 1962
NOSENKO claimed he directed the compromise of W.E. JOHNSON Ob
in January, briefed himself on the Section's activities, and
prepared himself for his assignment as a security officer
with a delegation travelling to Geneva. During March and
June he visited Geneva and contacted CIA and, by his asser-
tion, supervised the case officer handling of KGB double
agent Boris BELITSKIY.
cass ottic
Shortly after his return to moscow
in June he claimed he recruited Horst BRAUNS. Of
Entrapment of W.E. JOHNSON 06
NOSENKO's Information
0b
NOSENKO first referred to JOHNSON in Geneva in 1962, when
he described how YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in January 1962 had been
X/young Baptist from California.
American was writing letters critical of the Soviet Union.
Although the American agreed to NOSENKO's demand that he work
with the KGB in the United States, the American immediately
reported the recruitment attempt to the Embassy.
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Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARIMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
In February 1964 NOSENKO produced among other notes which
he had brought with him to a meeting with CIA (see p.319)
one bearing the name of Everett Wallace (sic] JOHNSON and the Ot
date "5 January 1962":
nO Ever to wand
Questioned about the note, NOSENKO
recalled the significance of neither the name nor the date,
and stated that the case was not a recruitment but "some
sort of developmental operation"
06
NOSENKO next mentioned JOHNSON on 17 April 1964. Al-
though not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name, he eventually 06
remembered that it was something Tike [JOHNSON or JOHNSTON. and 06: 06
that he was a Baptist from the California coast. l NOSENKO:
placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his
return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered he
wore no overcoat at the time.6(JOHNSON, who had come to the
Soviet Union as
a tourist, was discovéred to be a homosexual,
and
on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered
him as a recruitment target.06 The Second Chief Directorate
was not interested in JOHNSON as
an agent because he had: no
access to important information and he lived too far from the
KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient con-
tact.
06
Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON
mailing some letters
in Moscow-
When read by the KGB they
were found to be
"so' bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry,
critical, that the. KGB decided something had to be done" to
prevent his writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements
on his return to the United States O"At about the
same time"
there was some sign that (JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was
decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to
halt JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR.
No recruitment was to
be attempted because neither the First nor the Second Chief
Directorate had any use for him as an agent and because the
KGB had concluded that he was unlikely to accept recruitment
-NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach
to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said' I should go."
(NOSENKO
said he had reported on duty in the Seventh Department only
the day before...F.D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second
Chief Directorate,
supervised the activities of the Seventh
/Department.)
NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV
were selected to compromise JOHNSON
06
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0b
JOHNSON became acquainted with_ VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the
MetTopol Hotel. They told JOHNSON"that they had recently ar-
Moscow and invited JOHNSON to visit their hotel room
b JoHNsoN agreed because "they understood each other right away.
They knew they were the same (i.e:, homosexuals)."
Under the
guise of the hotel administrator and a militiaman, KGB offi-
cers burst in on the trio.. Photographs of the incident had
been taken (but had yet not been developed) .
A report.
describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared and [JOHNSON 06
was then transferred to another room.
By this time NOSENKO
had arrived at the hotel from his office and he went into the
room where JOHNsON! was being held.
Ob The "militiaman" described what had happened to NOSENKO,
in JOHNSON's presence.
Addressing (JOHNSON NOSENKO said:
"How come?
How could you do such a thing? What are we going
to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and.. people
are given from five to eight years for such relations.
used to be
criticize the Soviet Union in the future.
The following day, after the incriminating photographs had
been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the t
Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his
promise.
When (JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO06
presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photo-
graphs and said. that they would be released to the foreiar
Dopress if JOHNSON were to break his promise.
The KGB later
Oblearned that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a
later version) the American Embassy and the KGB thus assumed
that he had reported the approach.
NOSENKO did not recall
what name, if any, he had used during this operation.
In 1965 NOSENKO dated the entrapment operation as having
occurred in summer in either 1962 or 1963. Reminded that his
notes paired JOHNSON' si name with the date of 5 January 1962,
NOSENKO insisted that the date had nothing to do with the
name, that he recalled the operation as having taken place
summertime. Ob [NOSENKO ultimately accepted 5 January 1962 as
the date of JOHNSON's entrapment, since it occurred
after his transfer back to the Seventh Department.]
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06
JOHNSON'S Information
According to a statement given to the FBI, prior to his
Of visit to the USSR (JOHNSON had written a church authority ir
Moscow requesting permission to preach there.
He was. 1n
formed that some official permission was needed. JOHNSON 06
subsequently travelled to Moscow as a tourist, and he did
preach on one occasion but he suspended further such activi-
ty on the advice of Russian Baptist colleagues.? During his
ten-day stay in Moscow JOHNSON) wrote and posted letters to
some twenty persons outside the USSR.
JOHNSON] reported to the Embassy in Moscow on 5 January
1962 that he had experienced an incident with Soviet plain-
clothesmen at the Hotel Metropol earlier that day JOHNSON, O6
who had arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, explained
that he was dining alone at the Metropol restaurant on the
evening of 4 January when he was joined by a Soviet citizen
who identified himself as "a doctor from Riga". The "doctor"
spoke English poorly, and JoHNSON agreed to visit the dcctor s06
room at the hotel on the following day, when the doctor would
have with him a student friend who spoke English well. Soon
Obafter JOHNSON arrived in the doctor's room on 5 January, the
"student" made homosexual advances.U6 JOHNSON protested and
started to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared
in the room and announced that all were under arrest. After
signing a statement in Russian, JOHNSON was taken to another 06
room where he was confronted with a man who identified him-
self as Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV. "the Chief of Police"
Ob After threatening JOHNSON, with imprisonment. "NIKOLOV" of-
в сади воинов
to the United States.
on 8 January JOHNSON telephoned the Embassy to report that
he had been recontacted by the "Police Chief" who reminded him
of his pledge and showed him incriminating photographs alleged-
ly taken of JOHNSON and
the "student" in the hotel room pre-
viously.
06
Shown photographs: of VOLKOV and NOSENKO, JOHNSON thought
VOLKOV. to be "familiar", but he could not identify NOSENKO as
the "Police Chief"
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Comment:
From
their modus operandi the "doctor fron
Riga" is undoubtedly VOLKOV and the "student"
YEFREMOV. NOSENKO frequently used the opera-
tional pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV
a though do son a ently confirmed
NOSENKO'S rOle, NOSENKO's version of the
case
is incompatible with what must have been the
actual time frame.
According to NOSENKO's
version, within five days of JOHNSON's arrival06
in Moscow the KGB had discovered thât he was
a homosexual, concluded from "two or three"
censored letters that he was a threat, and
ranged his entrapment.
The rapid pace of
events suggests that JOHNSON's homosexuality 06
was already known to the KGB (if not to NOSENKO;
Obignorance of JOHNSON's preaching probably the
actual cause of KGB concern) is further evi-
dence that NOSENKO did not know the complete
background of the KGB operation, and that his
tole was merely that of playing
the : "Police
Chief".
NOSENKO's participation in this case con-
tradicts his assertions about the timing of
his transfer from the American Department.
(See p. 260 .)
06
William Carroll JONES?
NOSENKO's Information
JONES, a wealthy Baptist layman, visited the USSR on six 27
or seven occasions, each time meeting with russian Baptists,
He is personally acquainted with President Johnson and knew
President Kennedy:
He was the target of Seventh Department
case officer Vitaliy DERA. While visiting the Soviet Union
Ob in 1962 JONES] became involved with a Soviet female.
Although
she was not a KGB agent, the KGB took conticl of her relation-
Ob ship with JONES and, on GONES' subsequent trips to the Soviet
Union, unsuccessfully sought to obtain incriminating photo-
graphs.
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Comment:
"prayer breakfast" in Washington) confirmed
the substance of NOSENKO's information but
denied sexual intimacies with any Soviet fe-
male U JONES claimed to have made 24 trips
to the Soviet Union and to have successfully
08
smuggled Bibles into the USSR on numerous
occasions.
According to JONES,Obin 1963
Pravaa publicized an incident in which a num.-
ber of Bibles were confiscated from his lug-
gage.
activities.
NOSENKO reported the (JONES case in 1962
in Geneva and stated that the Seventh De-
partment case officer, DERA, was NOSENKO'S
subordinate in the Section.
However, NO-
SENKO's ignorance of JONES' Bible] smuggling 06, 08
(the activity which most likely prompted KGB
action) and of the fact that JONES' activities
had been publicized in the Soviet press, in-
dicate that NOSENKO had no intimate connection
with the case:
06
Recruitment of Natalie BIENSTOCK
NOSENKO's Information
The KGB recruited BIENSTOCK during her 1962 visit to the
USSR. The Seventh Department case officers were K.G.
KRUPNOV and A.G. KOVALENKO, who were acting, in behalf of
the Leningrad KGB.: The latter had become interested in the
American tourist while she was staying with a
Soviet boy
friend in leningrad.
(NOSENKO himself would have attempted
the recruitment, but he was busy preparing to leave for
Geneva in April 1962)
During the recruitment, the KGB
officers did not disclose their knowledge that she was an
American Intelligence agent and that she had been involved
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in the American Intelligence attempt to deliver a written
message to a Soviet ballerina in the United States.
The
sallerina received the message, but passed it to the KGB
which concluded that BIENSTOCK was an agent either of CIA C
or of the FBI. After recruitment, BIENSTOCK was turned 06
over to First Chief Directorate officers of Department D
(Disinformation). If she returned to the USSR the KGB
planned to secure her confession of her relationship with
American Intelligence.
• Comment:
06
BIENSTOCK was employed as an interpreter with
a Bolshoi troupe touring the United States .
when she was asked by CIA to pass a letter to
the ballerina, a letter destined for the bal-
lerina's brother in the USSR. (BIENSTOCK re-06
fused, and the letter was delivered by other
means.
Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of
NOSENKO's information, BIENSTOCK] acknowledgedd
in July 1964 that she had been recruited. by
the KGB while visiting Moscow as a tourist in
1962, and that she had been intimidated by the
KGB accusation of her involvement with the
ballerina. (Note that NOSENKO stated the KGB
withheld_its knowledge of that involvement.)
d BIENSTOCK) also admitted having contact in the
United States through secret writing with KGB
officers, until the letters ceased at KGB in-
itiative in late 1962 or early 1963.
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Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962)
NOSENKO visited Geneva between 10 March and 15 June 1962
as
a security officer accompanying the Soviet delegation to
the Disarmament Conference.
In addition to performing that
function,: NOSENKO claimed he supervised the activities of
another KGB case officer's meetings with a KGB-controlled
stated viến
CIA agent, Visited the KGB rezidentura in
n Geneva and asso-
ciated with KGB officers in Switzerland during the period
Six days before his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO con-
tacted CIA:
Purpose of Trip to Geneva
NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 10. March 1962 listed offi-
cially as an "expert" of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs attached to the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament
Conference:
tion in Finland [in December 1961] an order was issued that-
legation a 1 Doeber
NOSENKO explained that after GOLITSYN's defec-
no delegation was to be permitted to depart the Soviet Union
without an accompanying KGB security officer.
INOSENKO has
since stated that he can recall no such order.]
Explaining in 1962 how he came to be designated, as the
security escort, NOSENKO said he argued that he was needed
to direct the fifteen case officers in his section, but
GRIBANOV stated that Foreign Minister Gromyko was leading
the delegation and that someone of an appropriate senior rank
should accompany the delegation, not just a senior case offi-
cer, but a section chief or a deputy chief or
a chief of a:
department.
NOSENKO was the most junior section chief. His
immediate superior in the Seventh Department approved the
trip on the basis that it would last only a month.
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In addition to his general security duties with the
delegation, NOSENKO said in 1962 that he was given a
special assignment to check on a senior delegation advisor,
Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV (see below).
During the 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO provided somewhat
varying accounts of the background of his 1962 trip to Geneva:
He said that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with his assignment,
but that [s.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second
Directorate who supervised the Soviet Delegations Abroad
Department, made the selection. The latter department was
Investigating SHAKHOV, and BANNIKOV was concerned with the
selection of a security officer because SHAKHOV, who was
suspected of being a Western agent, was to be in the delega-
tion.
Because of the seriousness attached to the case, the
Delegations Department wanted a chief of section as case
officer, and when a request was made to the Seventh
Depart-
ment Chief, CHELNOKOV, the latter agreed to NOSENKO's as-
signment.
NOSENKO stated that CHELNOKOV, his superior and
friend, let him go to Geneva as "a treat"
even though he
had just assumed his duties as Chief of the American-
British Commonwealth Section, he had no deputy,. and the trip
was occurring on the eve of the tourist season.
Investigation of SHAKHOV
According to NOSENKO, M.G. SITNIKOV, representing the
Soviet Delegations Department, conducted investigations of
SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but had been unable to resolve the
KGB suspicions about him.
Because of the
failure of these
early efforts, the KGB decided to send a "senior guy" to the
Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen
"to finish
things up". Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO
discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with LYALIN, the
Soviet Delegations Department case officer in charge of the
SHAKHOV case.
He also read various materials on the case,
including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN.
NOSENKO has said that SHAKHOV was under suspicion in 1962
because he was working with different delegations at different
conferences, and there was some evidence that in Geneva ear-
lier he was
somehow connected with American diplomat Davia MARK,
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who was
(erroneously) considered to be a ClA officer.
SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MAPKjin 1960 or 1951, 06
but rosanko did not know the substance of it.
•A counter-
intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M.
GOLUBEV,. had once been on'a delegation with SHAKHOV and he
had noted "little details".. While SHAKHOV was in the Unites
States, earlier, he had been terminated las an agent] by
KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV
liked life in the Unites States, American products, and
money.
In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good"
and
not wanting to work
as an agent'.
NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that
service he acted
as an agent-recruiter for the kGB.
SHAKHOV
was permitted to
travel abroad even though suspected of being
an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his
trips abroad'
"There was no proof, only suspicions, and
furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of
the head of
the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin."
According
to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.!
Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United
States since 1942, when he was assigned to the
Soviet Consulate General in New York.:
He at-
tended the :1945. Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-
tended a number of sessions of the UN General
Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned
to the U.s. in 1963
as a member of the Soviet
Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV iden-
tified him as an MVD. (KGB] officer whom he 1s
certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,
A KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN:
have reported that from a photograph, 'SHAKHOV's
face
"was familiar". An FBI source, however,
in 1964 said
that: SHAKHOV was a
"pure diplomat
and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engagea
in no Soviet intelligence activity until that
time.
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NOSENKO described the various ways he
had tested suspicitis
of SHAKHOV in Geneva.
He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then
watched for an indication that ne passed it on to his American
contacts.
SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance
tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent.
while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had
forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENRO
revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and
checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared
materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's
and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-
turned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.
Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation
NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-
man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as
such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the
entire delegation. (KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S.
TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left
Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.]
To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO
had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB
who were serving in the delegation.
[NOSENKO has never re-
ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates
in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants
provided him.
NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days
and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed
of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little
He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he
pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most.
of the delegation.
No one paid him any attention. It was
known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings
at any time.
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SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
Visits to the Geneva KGB Legal Residency
Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to
the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for
more than a day or two, Legal Rezident S.I. GAVRICHEV would
Invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.
GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated
him with deference,
and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962,
NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled
members of the Legal Residency.
This lecture was given at
for helping the Legal Residency to perform countersurveillance
on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed
by GAVRICHEV to have
the use of an
operational car and driver
to go shopping and carry out other private errands.
[NOSENKO
was not under CIA surveillance at any time in 1962 in Geneva
and his claims as to his activities there, aside from bis
meetings with CIA, can be neither confirmed nor refuted.]
KGB Officers within the Soviet Delegation
NOSENKO claimed that he would know of any others, and he
was the sole KGB officer within the Soviet Disarmament Dele-
gation in 1962. Among delegates he identified only Oleg
GRINEVSKIY as having any connection with the KGB.
GRINEVSKIY
was one of NOSENKO's own agents within the delegation: in
Moscow he was handled by KGB officers of the Intelligentsia
can Section of TASS and was. "a genuine correspondent"; "de-
finitely not an intelligence officer".
Comment: CIA had tentatively identified all three of
the delegates as KGB officers. 'KISLOV was ob
FILATOV served as
Georges PAQUES. British Intelligence]has re-ll
ported that GRINEVSKIY was a member of the per-
manent soviet delegation in Geneva who handled
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Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
Comment:
(Continued luble agent. NOSENKO was in Geneva
at the time.
Association with Other Soviets
According to NOSENKO, the Soviets he saw most often in
Geneva in 1962 were A.K. KISLOV (see above), Yu.I. GUK, and
M.S. TSYMBAL. (Both KISLOV and GUK were involved in the
"ANDREY" case:
see p. 33 .)
A.K. KISLOV
TASS correspondent KISLOV was one of the three other dele-
gates besides NOSENKO staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva.
NOSENKO said he arranged for KISLOV's name to be given as a
notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy
to KGB 'double agent BELITSKIY (see below). NOSENKO drank
and caroused with KISLOV while in Geneva, and KISLOV was
NOSENKO's companion in early June, when NOSENKO either
squandered or was robbed of KGB operational funds. [the loss
he asked CIA to make goodl, and on the night of 10 June, when
he squandered the 2000 Swiss francs CIA provided on wine and
women.
With reference to the threat posed his security by
KISLOV's knowledge of his profligacy, NOSENKO said that KISLOV
was "too drunk to know what was going on", and in any event
constituted no threat.
In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that KISLOV
had been a KGB operational contact while stationed in the
United States and that NOSENKO had been introduced to KISLOV
by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in
1962, so that he could use KISLOV at the conference.
On the
basis of NOSENKO's favorable report afterwards, he said,
KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return.
In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the
Ariane Hotel in 1962, but did not name KISLOV.
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Yu. I. GUK
Implying that their friendship was of long standing,
NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK
were together nearly
every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a
few drinks..
As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to
the residency and was ablé to elicit information about some
of GUK's operations in Geneva.
He described his
"big, big
friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the
only "strong officer" in the residency.
Comment:
In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access
to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to
GUK.
M.S. TSYMBAL
In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and
identified him
as Chief
. Of
the Illegals. Directorate of the
KGB First Chief Directorate.
He alluded to having spoken with
him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.
In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with
TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some
candidates for
recruitment and came across some whose back-
ground would have nade them suitable for the Special illegals!
Directorate.
NOSENKO met T'SYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head-
assigned
to the United States.
In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had
dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied
by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,
NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access: to the
residency
in 1962 and established
the precedent from which he was
granted access in 1964.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
Association with riel Female secretary
NOSENKO has described
his association with a British
secretary whom he met at a diplomatic reception in Geneva
as
. one of an amorous pursuit: he disclaimed any operational
interest in the girl.
After several dates: NOSENKO could
nO
longer reach her at her apartment, and he concluded that she
had told her superiors that he was a Russian and had pro-
bably believed him to be an intelligence officer.
Comment:
According to an
report, when
NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions
and the secretary reported the contact to her
superiors she was withdrawn immediately from
Switzerland and she later resigned from the
29
This same incident came to the attention of
the
J/which later reported it to
CIA, without details, as an attempt by NOSENKO
to recruit the girl. According to this report,
"after a time it became evident that NOSENKO's
interest in her was not only sexual, but also
in information to which she had access in the
course of her duties".
in 11
Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried
to recruit the secretary and that he attempted
to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.
BELITSKIY
Supervising Case Officer for KGB-Controlled CIA Agent
NOSENKO's Information
Among his other activities in Geneva NOSENKO supervised
a younger and less experienced KGB case officer's handling of
KGB double agent BELITSKIY. He first heard of the BELITSKIY
case under the code name
"BELKIN"
, when he was working in the
American Embassy Section of the American Department. He
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learned of the case through his friendship with the chief
of the Second ("Active Line") Section of the American Depart-
ment, V.I. PETROV. BELITSKIY wasia KGB agent whom American
Intelligence had recruited in London: he had never been met
by the Americans in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO did not know
the date of recruitment but knew the case was already in pro-
gress during his second
assignment with the Embassy Section
(January 1960-January 1962). BELITSKIY had been a KGB agent
for a "long, long" time and was a KGB agent when he first
went abroad (prior to his recruitment by American Intelli-
gence).
The KGB's purpose in running the BELITSKIY operation was
to lure American Intelligence into meeting the agent inside
the Soviet Union; to learn the channels and means through
which American Intelligence communicated with agents inside
the Soviet Union.
This was the "most important task" of the
Second Chief Directorate. Although BELITSKIY, in meeting
with his American case officers, continually pleaded fear of
contacts with American Intelligence in Moscow, this was a
ruse; the real KGB intent was to use BELITSKIY to lure Ameri-.
can Intelligence into contacting him in the Soviet Union.
After BELITSKIY was recruited in London, CIA "did not go on
with him.. didn't hold any meetings with him'. Nevertheless.
he said, the KGB "cherished the hope...to lead him in
what deeper" The KGB First Chief Directorate, with its own
responsibilities and objectives, was unaware of Second Chief
Directorate objectives in the BELITSKIY case.
The First
Chief Directorate, through Department D, provided dezinformat-
siya [disinformation]
at the Second: Chief Directorate's re-
quest, but in this case, as in other "games", it did not know
for what ultimate purpose the disinformation would be used.
(In such cases I.I. AGAYANTS, Chief of Department D, did not
even know in what country the disinformation was to be used;
let alone the identity of the agent.)
Comment:
According to GOLITSYN, Department D runs its
operations alone or in conjunction with (never
subordinate to) other KGB departments:
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NOSENKO did not actively participate in the case until he
received in Geneva a cable from Moscow directing him to give
advice to the young and inexperienced case officer V.L. ARTE-
MOV -
ARTEMOV had not worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow
either; he also had been
sent to Geneva to work on counter-
intelligence matters and only to direct BELITSKIY if the Ameri-
cans should contact the agent. BELITSKIY had been "inserted"
in a World Health Organization Delegation in the hope that CIA
would "find him".
As a result of that KGB instruction, NOSENKO joined with
ARTEMOV in directing BELITSKIY's meetings with the latter's
American case officers.
BELITSKIY was first met in Geneva by
American case officer "Bob"
was "called out from the states" and later by "Henry", who
name on the door of the apartment where he met his American
i of the aparna
• BELITSKIY noted that the
case officers was not the same as that of the person whose
apartment it was alleged to be, and that the apartment itself
had
an "un-lived-in" look.
When the American case
officers asked BELITSKIY whether he
could establish contact with a Russian on the Disarmament
Delegation, NOSENKO advised ARTEMOV not to use anyone from.
the Soviet Foreign Ministry. NOSENKO proposed instead that
BELITSKIY claim to get information from the head of the
American Department of TASS, A.K. KISLOV. The information,
of course, would be (disinformation) furnished by the KGB.
In case the Americans would check, NOSENKO and ARTEMOV ar-
ranged for BELITSKIY to be introduced to KISLOV.
The KGB believed that CIA had accepted BELITSKIY's bona
fides. From the KGB viewpoint, however, while BELITSKIY was
not a bad
matt and ada
he was apt to go too far sometimes, and "add
things on his own".
agent might say something which would cause CIA to sense that
he was a plant.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)
Comment:
NOSENKO's information about the BELITSKIY-CIA
relationship is substantially correct, except
for some inaccuracies about the origin of the
case.
BELITSKIY, a commentator for Radio. Mos-
cow, as NOSENKO described, in Geneva did meet
CIA officers using the aliases "Bob" and "Henry"
in a safe apartment.
NOSENKO's version
of his role in the case,
however, is implausible.
He asserts that BELIT-
SKIY, a prominent Russian with acquaintances
among influential officials of the Soviet Govern-
ment, an agent ostensibly under the control of
CIA for
several
years, was sent by. the KGB to
Geneva. to resume contact with cIA.
The KGB, ac-
cording to NOSENKO, sent neither the responsible
case officer nor an officer of the KGB section
responsible for the operation. NOSENKO states
that the KGB instead detailed a "young and in-
experienced" KGB officer who happened to be in
Geneva at the time, an officer who had no prior
connection with the BELlISKlY case nor even
knowledge.of operating conditions in Geneva.
NOSENKO further states that the KGB then instruc-
ted. NOSENKO, who had learned of the case unoffi-
celly, who had no experience of training in
double agent operations, and who was similarly
in Geneva for other reasons, to guide the
"inexperienced" *eB officer, NosENo can aire
no guidance provided by KGB Headquarters, al-
though he claims he exchanged messages with
Moscow about
the case.
ARTEMOV was not inexperienced.
He had hao
continuous service with the Second Chief Direc
torate at least since 1958, and had been involved
with a series of CIA American tourist agents in
the Soviet Union. Although allegedly familiar
with ARTEMOV, NOSENKO is unaware of the latter's
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 19641
Comment:
(Continued)
involvement with American tourist agents in
1958 and 1959, during a period when NOSENKO
claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department's American Section.
Under interrogation NOSENKO did not know
how, when, or where the BELITSKIY operation
started, did not know the nature of
involvement, did not know the operational đe-
tails and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had
with CIA, did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of
activity in Moscow or in Geneva, and did not
know the alleged objective of the KGB opera-
tion, e.g., the substance of the "disinformation"
which BELITSKIY was to provide CIA.
From the foregoing it is concluded that
NOSENKO did not exercise any supervisory func-
tion in the BELITSKIY case.
Contact with CIA
On 5 June 1962 U.S. Foreign Service Officer David MARK
reported to CIA in Geneva that he had been approached by a
Soviet citizen whom he believed to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO,
a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO had
merely suggested that they get together for a talk on the
following day.. In late afternoon on 6 June, NOSENKO told
06 MARK privately that he would like to talk to MARK as soon as Ub
possible. He was "not going to pump him for information", but
"simply wanted to tell him some things". A luncheon meeting
was arranged for 9 June, although NOSENO indicated that he
preferred an earlier date.l MARK advised CIA Of: the appoint-
ment and commented that the approach seemed so unusual that
it might be an offer of cooperation or defection.
06
At the 9 June luncheon with MARK, NOSENKO identified him-
selt as a counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure
the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that MARK had U6
previously served in Moscow and [erroneously] believed him to
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24
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
be an American intelligence officer.
NOSENKO said he needed
approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB opera-
tional funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prosti-
tute in Geneva, and offered for this amount to sell two items
of information to American Intelligence.
The first item was
the identity of an American, a former employee of the Embassy
in Moscow.
who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washing-
ton area.
The second item was the identity of a Soviet citi-
planted on CIA by
zen in Moscow who the kough ostensibly a CIA agent, had been
Although NOSENKO proposed a one-
time transaction, he acknowledged to MARK that he might be
unable to avoid deeper involvement with American Intelligence.
06
MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer the evening of
9 June and NOSENKO was taken to the first of five lengthy
meetings held in a CIA safehouse. At the initial meeting
NOSENKO described himself as a KGB major experienced in opera-
tions against the American Embassy in Moscow and against
American tourists and
other travellers to the Soviet Union.
He told of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer
to sell the two specified items of information. He said that
the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting
CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he asserted also that
he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet
Union.
NOSENKO emphasized that he had no intention of be-
coming an American agent and that after his proposed trans-
action, he would have no further contact with CIA. Despite
this
assertion, after describing the cases of "ANDREY"
(Dayle SMITH, see P• 33) and the KGB double agent BELIISKIY
(see p. 282), NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic infor-
mation about himself and also discussed in general terms cer-
tain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization
and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had
told MARK earlier, that CIA would want more information, and
he agreed to meet again two days later.
NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva.
With the second meeting on 11 June, his initially expressed
reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most
questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most
of his information being limited to the Second Chief Directo-
rate. Besides "ANDREY" and BELIISKIY, he provided leads to
more than a score of American citizens who had been compro-
mised or recruited by the KGB, and information on the KGB
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
audio surveillance operation against the Embassy in Moscow.
Among foreign agents of the KGB NOSENKO identified Canadian
Ambassador WATKINS (see p. 23 ) and described a British Ad-
miralty employee (William VASSALL, see p. 30 ).
He talked
freely of his activities in Geneva, including his association
with KGB officers there, his visits to the KGB residency
and his security duties with respect to the Soviet delega-
tion:
NOSENKO seemed to CIA to be what he claimed: a KGB
officer with personal knowledge of important and sensitive
KGB operations.
He described his education, his service in
the Naval GRU, his entry into the KGB and the general func-
tions and operating techniques of the various components of
the Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along
with the approximate dates of his service.
Ultimately the only restriction which NOSENKO placed on
his cooperation with CIA was his refusal to permit communica-
tion with him in the Soviet Union.
He was willing to meet
with CIA representatives during future trips outside the
Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once every other
year. He said he would not consider defecting except in cir-
cumstances in which his personal security was endangered,
citing as reasons his devotion to his wife and children (and
fear of KGB reprisäl against them if he fled), his widowed
mother's dependence on him, and his love of Russia and the
Russian people.
NOSENKO promised to contact CIA and arrangements were
made for him to do so, when he came to the West again.
Meanwhile, he expressed the intention to do everything within
limits imposed by concern for his own security to obtain in-
formation which he was informed was of interest to CIA.
Attempted Recruitment of Horst BRAUNS
Immediately after returning to Moscow from Geneva, NOSENKO
claimed he personally was involved in the attempt to recruit
American tourist BRAUNS.
06
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
JW.
lan
NOSENKO'S Information
BRAUNS was Russian born,
and he lived in Leningrad until
ed
ation
He eventually settled in the United States where the First
the Second World War when he fled when the Germans retreated) 06, 0f
Chief Directorate learned he had become a technician working
for an "interesting company making computers, adding machines,
and other instruments".
When BRAUNS) visited
the Soviet 06
Union, NOSENKO assigned his subordinate [K.G.] KRUPNOV. to
in
handle the case, and KRUPNOV arranged for Inturist to take
06BRAUNS).out of the Inturist hotel and assign him to a room in
of
another hotel where KRUPNOV met him. "KRUPNOV "couldn't get
Obanywhere" with (BRAUNS,0 and he called on NOSENKO for help.
NOSENKO joined him in BRAUNS' room, and eventually secured
O6 BRAUNS' agreement to cooperate with the KGB, under threat of
Imprisonment for treason (based on BRAUNS' wartime flight fromO8
inca
the Soviet Union) 06 BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Lenin-
grad, and because NOSENKO thought the recruitment was "shaky",
do he sent KRUPNOV to Leningrad to consolidate the recruitment.
very BRAUNS) refused to see KRUPNOV, and NOSENKO went to Leningrad
cir-
and again talked to BRAUNS. BRAUNS was so frightened, now.
ever, that NOSENKO concluded that he would never work for the
and
KGB; NOSENKO decided to terminate the case and BRAUNS]was sent
on his way.
06
NOSENKO did not know why (BRAUNS visited the Soviet Union,
nor was he able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS
met in the USSR.
06
thin
in-:
In 1964 NOSENKO asserted that he had mentioned the BRAUNS
case to CIA in 1962, but could not at that time recall his
name.
ENKO
uit
comment:
06
06
NOSENKO did not mention BRAUNS in 1962.
BRAUNS
arrived in the Soviet Union on 24 June 1962,
after NOSENKO had met with CIA in Geneva.
O BRAUNS'
identify NOSENKO by photograph.
In other con
texts NOSENKO has explained that the Seventh
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Comment:
(Continued)
Department was
not concerned with foreigners
visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet
expatriates,
both of which were the responsibi-
lity of other KGB elements.
NOSENKO acknowledges
that the KGB knew that BRAUNS was a former Soviet 06,08
citizen, BRAUNS' plan to visit relatives in
Leningrad was informationaalso available to the
KGB through his visa application 0 BRAUNS had
corresponded for a year before his visit with a
former girl friend in Leningrad.
She spent the
first week with him in Moscow (during which the
KGB recruitment attempt occurred).
The existence
of the girl friend was presumably known to the
KGB, if not through mail censorship, then from
surveillance connected with KRUPNOV's planned ap-
proach to BRAUNg in the hotel. NOSENKO was un-
aware of these facts.
"06
Chiéf of the American-British Commonwealth Section:
Summary and Conclusion
According to NOSENKO, he requested transfer to the Seventh
Department to avoid being named Deputy Chief of the American
Department over his then-superior, the experienced and highly
successful KGB officer KOVSHUK.
fer took place "before [the defection of] GOLITSYN", which he
asserts occulted in mid-January 1962.
Among his other functions
in the Seventh Department, he.cites directing five agents
whom he brought from the American Department.
In his initial
capacity as Chief of the American Section, NOSENKO claims in-
volvement only in the W.E. JOHNSON case, his time being spent Ob
either in "reading in" on his new job or preparing for his
initial trip to Geneva.
He alleges that he was directed to
accompany the Soviet delegation to Geneva for an extended
period, in behalf of another Second Directorate Department,
over his objections, when he had no deputy to assume his func-
tions in his absence, and on the eve of the tourist season.
5/SR
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st
nS:
24
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
In Geneva he said he supervised the KGB double-agent BELIT-
SKIY's meetings with CIA, before contacting CIA himself to
sell information for a relatively small sum. Back in Moscow,
inmediately after participating in the KGB approach to BRAUNS, Ob
he claims he became Deputy Chief of the entire 100-man
Seventh Department.
Besides the implausibility of NOSENKO's account of seeking
transfer "to avoid becoming Deputy Chief of the American De-
partment", his dating of the transfer impugns his claims.
GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. If NOSENKO transferred;
Seventh Department service. If he transferred just in time
06 for the [JOHNSON operation, he could not have played the role
he claimed in the Embassy Section (re ABIDIAN and the Pushkin
Street dead drop; see p. 216% In the period with one excep-
czon, none of his claimed agentura participated in a Seventh
Department operation. No change marked his claimed increased
responsibilities and new functions upon being promoted to
Section Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief
Directorate.
Of the five operations
NOSENKO described as
occurring during this period, all had aspects for which, by
NOSENKO's description of the Seventh Department's mission,
they could have been in the jurisdiction of another Second
Chief Directorate Department. NOSENKO's various explanations
for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 prompt scepticism be-
cause of tortuous contradictions.
In Geneva he neither
directed
the investigation of SHAKHOV nor supervised the BELIT-
SKIY case, as he claimed.
Deputy
In July 1962, in line with the personal wish of the Chief
• the KGB Second Chief Directorate, General GRIBANOV, NOSENKO
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief
of the entire Seventh Department.
A year later, he was made
First Deputy Chief, and thus
second-in-command to CHELNOKOV
and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist
operations.
The Seventh Department, which had a strength of
about 100 KGB officers, was
responsible for all operations
against tourists in the Soviet Union.
From this period NOSENKO
claimed to have learned, either by virtue of his position as
Deputy Chief of otherwise, of a number of KGB operations
against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, anā
investigations of a
suspected FBI agent and of Lee harvey
OSWALD.
NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KeB posi
tion during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent
and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy
Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO re-
turned to Geneva for the second time, and defected.
Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY
NOSENKO's Information
In September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate,
Seventh Department case, officer Ye. N. NOSKOV, the management
of KGB agent [Älexander SVENCHANSKIY) (cryptonym "ANOD") •
[SVENCHANSKIX was the president of L'Afton Tours", a travel 29,08
agency in New York City, and the owner of a[chicago Russian-il, &
language bookstore.
There was originally some suspicion
0b that EVENCHANSKIY might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was
Coalso concerned over SVENCHANSKIY's contacts with AMTORG per-
sonnel in New York City• ONOSKOV, the case officer at the
time,
"felt" that (SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and
recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for
Doskick cooperation wise secured agains vee promises that
visiting the Soviet Union. SvEnCHAN-
Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel
agency•
SVENCHANSKIY's task was to screen visa applications of
prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who
might be connected with American Intelligence.
If he suspected
such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph
on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick
or pencilled mark on the application form.
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SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
When NOSENKO took the case from NOSKOV in September
1963, NOSENKO's name as the handling officer was entered
in the single-volume case file, although NOSKOV ac-
companied NOSENKO to both subsequent meetings with
O6 SVENCHANSKIX in Moscow. (in September 1963 and at the end
of 1963).
06
Comment:
SVENCHANSKIY
American citizen, is president of lafton
a Russian-born naturalized 29,10, 2410
Tours of New York City and the Cross World
Books and Periodicals in Chicago. His
partner, and the actual operator of lAfton?
time Is Sonya SOKOLOW reportedly a one do
confidential secretary" of Jacob GOLOS. 08,06
Allegations of EVENCHANSKIY)'s Communist 0b
sympathies and probable involvement in Soviet
espionage date back to the Second World War:
His involvement in espionage has been pub-
licized in the press (notably in a 1953
New York Times account of Harry GOLD's 06
allegations)
Since SOKOLOW manages the Afton Tours 2ª
office, while SVENCHANSKIY usually. isa
occupied elsewhere with his other firm,
he
would be unlikely to review and mark
suspect visa applications. as NOSENKO
alleged Of SVENCHANSKIY's background is such
as to have prevented his being interviewed
on the basis of the information NOSENKO
provided.
Do NOSENKO did not refer to his association
with SVENCHANSKIY spontaneously, but described
it only after referring to the written notes
he brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319)
06
Suspected FBI Source Alfred SLESINGER
Ob On 8 July 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB interest in
an American named SLESINGER, a proprietor of a photographic...
shop in New York City, who was suspected by the KGB Of
"having connections with the FBI."
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NOSENKO'S Information
06
SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First
Chief Directorate because of his business transactions
with a number of soviets who visited his
store and in
whom he seemed to show more than casual interest.
The
First Chief Directorate
was of the opinion that
Co SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with
some soviets, to study them. (SLESINGER had visited the
Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned0b
another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that
"he
might make some contacts or do something interesting"
while visiting the Soviet Union. 06 The KGB wanted to
resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an
agent of operational contact of the FBI.
The KGB had
a file on SLESINGER ad a senior case officer in the
American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M.
DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer.
An agent
of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-
graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly
Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.
06 SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN
directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who
If there had been any indication
of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted
to recruit (SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,.
no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the
Soviet Union before, several times.
Comment:
NOSENKO's information was substantially
correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, 06
• reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his
June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.
In Odessa SLESINGER]was contacted by a 06
Soviet official who exhibited "intimate
knowledge" of his business In New York
City and had asked whether (SLESINGER had
"ever been bothered by the FBI."
06
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Comment:
(Continued) :
06
In 1966 (SLESINGER reported to the FBI that
he was in touch with a Moscow photographic
shop proprietor, and he described evidence
of
KGB interest in him during his visit to
odessa in 1962.
Previous to visiting the
Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in 06
contact with a number of Soviet officials
from the United Nations
NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned
of (SLESINGER, who may represent
• a First Chief. Directorate
case.
06
KOTEN'S Arrest
NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was
Involved
l in the arrest of an American tourist in the
USSR in the fall of 1963.
Almost at once, NOSENKO
identified the case as that of Bernard KOTENDa guide
for
29 Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of
06 (Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested
on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that (KOTEN) 06
was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific
and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the
agent's name,
NOSENKO's Information
Kotel, was a Longtime member of the American communist
Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War
to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among
dissident literary figures
and other Soviet citizens,
particularly among Russian Jews.
(NOSENKO explained in
another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts
with Soviet Jews because the Isiaeli Intelligence Service
has freguently inspired such contacts.] Because of these
many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second
Directorates had concluded that KOTEN) might be a "provocatio
agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the
06
Communist Party in the United States.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTHENT - January 1962-January 1964)
06
On the eve of KOTIN's arrival in 1963, the Seventh
Department learned from V.s. BARKOVSKIY Of the First.
Chief Directorate's S&t Department that KOTEN was. U6
carrying with him the address of relatives of an
important S&t agent of the New York residency, and. that
KOTEN intended to visit the agent's relatives. while.in
the USSR. The S&T agent had asked to be repatriated to.
the USSR, but when the KGB eventually assented, the
agent balked, arousing: KGB suspicions. When it was
Obfound that KOTEN was acquainted with the agent, the.
D6KGS concluded that KOTEN! "evidently received from
American Intelligence an assignment to visit Ithe
agent's relatives).": After KOTEN visited the relatives Do
in the Crimea, the decision was made to arrest him as
a suspect American Intelligence agent. ROTEN was en- 06
trapped with a KGB homosexual agent and arrested,
although he was released when the American Communist
Party and other organizations strongly protested.
C6 NOSENKO did not personally participate in the arrest
nor meet KOTEN, although he supervised the arrest from
KGB Headguarters..
06
Comment:
(KOTEN's arrest on charges
of homosexual
activities were publicized at the time in a
report datelined Moscow and quoting Inturist
which was carried in the New York Times. In
an interview with representatives of the
Department of State, KOTEN described how he 06
had been arrested by the KGB in Kiev on 28
August 1963, accused of being an American
Intelligence agent and interrogated for three
days, and held in jail for a month.
GRU Agent[John SHUBIN
The name of John Andrew SHUBIN] and his year of birth
were among
the notes which NOSENKO brought to the 1964
meetings with CIA in Geneva.
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NOSENKO's Information
06.
SHUBIN
was a native of California of Russian ex
traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor
in New York City-DUSHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet
Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958
or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of
duty in
the Severth Department. At that time, SUUBIN 06
was the target of Seventh Department case officer
A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that [SHUBIN]was 06
placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance.
observed [SHUBIN as a passenger in a llinistry of Defense
automobile, the GRU was asked about the American.
very furtively said that they were interested in him;
from which the kGb concluded that [SHUBINwas a GRU agent.
In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign
visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name u6
and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.
NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office
and informed SOKOLOV of (SHUBIN's presence (or, according06
to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by
others) •
SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized. for
having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's
interest in SHUBIN.
Comment:
06 SHUBIN had no valid u.s.
passport
between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited
the Soviet Union during that period it was
not as an American tourist under his true
name.
Consequently, he could not then have
been the tourist target of the Seventh
Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.
If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring
D6 to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further
contradiction: NOSENKO could not have
noticed his name while reviewing tourist
lists in the Seventh Department, because
he claims he was in the American Department
at: the time:
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Arrest of BARGHOOR
At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO
described the provocation and arrest of Yale University
Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963. NOSENKO's
most comprehensive statement, from which the following
paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964.
NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation
against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona
non grata
action taken against three Soviets in New. York City in
the case of John W. BUTENKO [in November 1963] and to
secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet (Igor
IVANOV) in the BUTENKO case who was jailed.
(NOSENKO
had asserted in Geneva, earlier, that the operation
against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests
such as that of IVANOV, not because of any special im-
portance of IVANOV himself.")
NOSENKO's Information
In 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers
assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in
operational
activity in the United States. Of the four,
three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur
and had only a service passport.
The three Soviet
diplomats were held three or four hours by the American
authorities and
then released.
IVANOV, the chauffeur,
was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity.
GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate,
learned of this arrest probably the next day and was
directed by KGB Chairman Semichastnyy to take "necessary
measures."
GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office
NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Seventh Department;
and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye. M. RASHCHEPOV from the
American Department.
After describing the arrest,
GRIBANOV asked what
information the Second Chief
Directorate Departments had on any American, Embassy
employee or tourist, that could serve as the victim of
an (retaliatory] arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said
that at that very moment there were three or four
American Service Attaches in Rostov and that, in the
opinion of the American Department, these officers might
be carrying electronic apparatus.
It was known that they
had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and
they had been-observed taking notes.
They could be
arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to
MOSCOW.
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GRIBANOV instructed the two representatives of the
American Department to write a report on what other
possibilities existed.
He also told them to request
permission to arrest and search the Service Attaches:
GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was
held by the
Seventh Department.
He was told that there
were relatively few. American tourists in the Soviet
Union at that time.
These included BARGHOORN, who was
mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not
recalled): NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however,
that the KGB had no "strong" materials to use against
them.
They were ordered to make an immediate study of
again t
the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon
as possible.
Returning to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO and
KOVALENKO gathered the entire American
Tourist Section
in their office.
In a general discussion, it was
decided that BARGHOORN was the only possible American
target.
All information on BARGHOORN was gathered,
and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took it to GRIBANOV.
GRIBANOV read it and
was pleased; he was sure that
BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence:
He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and
KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi
and that, in fact, Ye. N. NOSKOV (case officer,:
American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman
doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate
for the purpose of working against BARGHOOPN; the
doctor had some special substance which had been used
to make BARGHOORN so violently ill that he had to be
hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful
search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of
operational interest had been found. In addition, a
KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient;
he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN
"materials"
' but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait.
At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN
was
scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the fol-
lowing morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that
he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the 06
09 British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following
evening
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It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving
"materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow.
NOSENKO said that
this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that
this made no difference.
He instructed NOSENKO and
KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass
the compromising material to BARGHOORN and told them
to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with
proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him
"when he obtains materials which are of interest to
American Intelligence."
This was to be sent in letter
form to Semichastnyy over GRIBANOV's signature; the
letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive
the materials. (That the evidence was to be planted
was not to be mentioned.)
GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along
with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV
concerning the Service Attaches, to SemichastnyY. While
the four - NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV I.
were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return,
GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the Rostov KGB
organization informing. him that the Service Attaches
were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly
thereafter,. GRIBANOV returned with the news that the
Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the
Service Attaches as well as BARGHOORN.
Khrushchev was
absent from Moscow at the time, but Semichastnyy had
called BREZHNEV and
secured his approval.
When GRIBANOV. learned from GRYAZNOV that the Service
Attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he
became furious and sent. GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or
die."
Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the
"Department D" (the KGB element responsible for ais
information, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate).
to provide materials on missiles which could be passed
to BARGHOORN.
While these were being picked up, NOSENKO
and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the arrest.
BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance
upon his arrival in Moscow.
At 1810 hours a radio
message was received from one of the surveillance cars
that BARGHOORN had gone to the American Embassy, and it
was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25
to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon
as he came out.
The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appoint-
ment with ORCHARD of the British Embassy] at 1900 hours, 06, 21
but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN
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had left the American Embassy in the American
He was alone but for the
Soviet driver.
Nothing could be done while
BARGHOORN was in the moving car.
A check on
06 ORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs
hall of the hotel waiting:. It was therefore
decided to approach BARGHOORN wien he left the car
at the hotel
No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car
than the agent approached.
"You are an American?"
the agent asked.
"Yes."
"please taie it," the
agent said.
The agent put the packet containing the
materials on missiles in BARGHOORN's inside coat
pocket and then ran off.
BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he
was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case:
officer of the American Tourist Section, and told
he was under arrest.
A surveillance car pulled up
BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (on
GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in
the United States had received similar treatment):
and driven to
a Militia station where a room had been
prepared.
I.I. YEFPEMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American
Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station,
KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be
the interpreter.
When BARGHOORN was brought into the
station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and
a document was prepared requesting permission to hold
him 48 hours.
Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN
was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the
Seventh Department case officers were released with
instructions to report
for duty at 0930 hours.
NOSENKO and the others went höme
KRUPNOV began
the questioning in Russian at 1000
hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good
Russian,
YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed
to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times
during these sessions.
(Although NOSENKO did not
want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knew
BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told
• KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached
the point where BARGHOORN was to tel how ne obtained
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the missile documents.) The first sessions
concentrated on general matters,
such as
BARGHOORN's life history.
After one and one half hours of questioning
BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him
when he was
arrested, but he maintained that they had
been placed on his person.
He said
that he thought
they were "newspapers or something," that he did
not
know what they were.
The package was then opened and
shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages
of information on missiles.
"BARGHOORN was not, of
course, given a close look" at the materials.
Following BARGHOORN's admission, another declaration
was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV,
KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV.
NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then
took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where
the incident report, the first interrogation, and
the first and second declarations were reported to
MISHUTIN, the First Deputy Chief Prosecutor.
GRIBANOV
directed
that all materials on BARGHOORN, including
information from KGB Archives, be given to the KGB
Department of Prosecution so
that they could begin
legal
proceedings against BARGHOOR.
After this, all
interrogations were conducted by that department:
KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, although YEFREMOV
continued to act as interpreter.
Comment:
6001573
BARGHOORN's version of his entrapment,
arrest;
and interrogation coincide fairly
precisely with the version provided by
NOSENKO.
He identified NOSENKO from a
photograph as a KGB officer present at
one stage of the interrogation on the
second day of his arrest and said
NOSENKO took some part in the pro-
ceedings. He recalled NOSENKO as
being
"clever and quick-witted" and as "giving
the impression that he was not a dedicated
careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive:
he seemed not to care about what he was
doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."
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The OSWALD CASE
NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB's interest in
OSWALD stemmed
!. from his claimed Tourist Department
assignments. He asserted that while Deputy Chief
of the American Section in 1959 he participated in
the KGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational
interest.
In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy
Chief of the Tourist Department, he
was informed of
OSWALD's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to
apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following
President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO,
as
Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KGB
records of OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union including
the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD.
For continuity of presentation, both periods of
NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case
(1959-60 and 1963) are discussed here.
The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD
case is significant if it substantiates. NOSENKO'S
clained positions in the KGB and confirms the validity
of his claim that he knew the extent of KGB involvement
with: OSWALD:
"NOSENKO's Information
Residence in the USSR
Prior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, he was
completely unknown to the KGB:
Moreover,
upon
receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief
Directorate determined that he was not of sufficient
importance to justify any special interest by the
Seventh Department.
Not until about October 1959;
when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR
did he come to the attention of NOSENKO, who was, at
that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of
the Seventh Department.
All available materials on
him were
thereupon collected and examined - the visa
application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports,
reports from hotel agents,
and the results of a check
of KGB Archives.
NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV:
interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated
his wish to stay in the USSR.
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Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD
might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to
investigate this possibility because "this would be
done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet
Union."
Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after.
his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGs
in an attempt to establish his intentions.
KRUPNOV
sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information
which had been received concerning OSWALD. The memorandum
cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where
OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary
and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom
OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet
Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV
had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section.
From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded
that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB, and both agreed
that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal."
For this reason
NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the
Inturist interpreter that he would not be permitted to
remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on
the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry as a
permanent resident through normal channels at the Soviet
Embassy in Washington.
KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO.'s orders,
and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD
failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his
Inturist guide. This prompted a search, and after several
hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily
from self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this incident
from KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief
of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in
Directorate.
that the
KGB should not become involved with OSWALD and
that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.
There was no
attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was
not an interesting person and wasn't normal."
OSWALD was
never questioned on his
past nor asked to write an auto-
biography.
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NOSENKO did not know who eventually granted
OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR
or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit.
The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live
in the Moscow area: Either the Soviet Red Cross or the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
may have made this decision
to assign OSWALD to Minsk. The Seventh Department updated
his file, and it was sent, along with a cover letter pre-
pared by KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk.
KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically in-
serate soda exteritis there to take vo action ssively
to make sure that he was not an American Intelligence agent
on temporary "sleeper" status. NOSENKO read this letter,
and it was signed by DUBAS. On the basis of the instructions
contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could
be taken in Minsk without KGB Headquarters approval. It was
NOSENKO'S
opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during
his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his
place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and
associates, and coverage of his mail. : After OSWALD'S
threatened*
second suicide
attempt, the KGB
"washed its
hands of him" and that even though there was cönsidered
to be some
possibility that he was a "sleeper agent,"
KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk
was "practically. nil."
Request to Return to the USSR
The KGB Second Chief Directorate was not concerned
with OSWALD's return to the United States in June 1962,
by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department
No further word on him was received at KGB
Headquarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico City in September 1963 and requested a visa to
return to the Soviet Union. The Mexico Legal Residency
reported his visit to KGB Headquarters by cable, re-
questing information. The KGB First Chief Directorate
had no record on OSWALD. MI. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of
the First Chief Directorate's Service Number: Two (Counter-
intelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to
see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD,
The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department,
V.K. ALEKSEYEV, received the call and reported the in-
quiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO.
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NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV
was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt
and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was
told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should
not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV
relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate.
NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the
Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts
between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban
Government there or elsewhere.
Comment: Independent sources, however, reported on
visits by OSWALD to the Cuban. as well as
Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29
September and 3. October 1963 and on his
(apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer
under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy
there. NOSENKO originally said he knew
nothing of any such contact. In October 1966
he revised this to say that OSWALD did not
have contact with the KGB in Mexico City.
NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in
the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N.
DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Head-
quarters from the KGB Legal Residency in
Mexico.
The cable, which NOSENKO said he did
not personally see, reported that OSWALD had
visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City
requesting permission to return to the USSR
and that the cable specified that OSNALD had
dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel
only.
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Post-Assassination Review of KGB File
NOSENKO next learned of OSWALD's activities as a result
of President Kennedy's assassination.
About two hours after
President Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO was advised of this fact
in a telephone call to his home from KGB Headquarters. A
short while later he was told, again by telephone, that the
President had died.: About two hours later, NOSENKO was told
that OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officers
of the American Tourist Section were called in to determine
whether the KGB had any information concerning him. After
establishing OSWALD's identity from KGB files and learning
that his file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGB
office in Minsk on GRIBANOV's orders. The local KGB dictated
over the telephone a summary of its file on OSHALD.. This
summary concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk
had attempted "to influence OSWALD in the right direction"
GRIBANOV. had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB's
efforts because it had been given specific instructions to
carry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD
there•
He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to
OSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation of the
meaning of the statement about influencing OSWALD, be flown
immediately to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally
read
the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of
this statement and thoroughly reviewed OSWALD's file when
it arrived by plane. He then turned the file over to s.M.
FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department of the KGB
Second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary
memorandum for GRIBANOV This memorandum, which NOSENKO
read, was forwarded to KGB. Chairman Semichästnyy, and
Semichastnyy in turn reported to the CPSU Central Committee:
and to Khrushchev concerning it.
OSWALD's file from Minsk contained no information to
indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action with
respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Head-
quarters.
From the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR
until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with
him and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.
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OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assign-
ments.
If any other department of the KGB or the GRU had
wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure
permission from the Seventh Department, which originally
opened his case file.
In view of OStIALD's apparent mental
instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particu-
larly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotage)
Department, would have considered using him.
KGB Head-
quarters did not maintain a control file on him following
his settlement in Minsk,
as it would have done had OStiALD
been of any operational interest.
The only KGB record on
OSTALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his
name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a
file concerning him.
The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSTIALD;
all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file.
There
was no indication in OSWALD's
file that the KGB had had any
interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union
or after she left for the United States.
Comment:
NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he
"only skimmed the file" and on another that he
had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In
October 1966 he again said that he read the
file and that while doing so he saw a picture
of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added
that he never met OSWALD personally.
NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief
Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he
applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in
September 1963 is probably incorrect. The
consular file turned over to the U.S. Govern-
ment by the Soviet Embassy in Washington
after the assassination indicated that the KGB
First Chief Directorate would have known of
OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier.
That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter of
February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from
OSTALD, both of
FAES
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Comment:
• (Continued)
earlier requested permission
to return to the
Soviet Union.
In the last dated letter of the
file, one of 9: November 1963, OSWALD advised
the Soviet Embassy in
Washington of his travel
under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact
with an official (whom CIA identifies' as a
KGB officer) of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico
City, his contact there with the Cuban Consulate
and his efforts to reach Havana
in order to
visit the Soviet Embassy there.
without regard
to possible earlier correspondence, OSWALD's
request for a Soviet visa addressed to the
City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent
ignorance of OSWALD's communications with the
Soviet Embassy in Washington discredits his
claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of
the KGB relationship with OSWALD.
The CHEREPANOV Papers
Comment:
On 4 November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA
employee claiming to be one CHEREPANOV; passed
to an American book-buyer a package which he
requested the American to deliver to a trust-
worthy person at the American Embassy.
Embassy
officials found the package to contain a
bundle of typed or handwritten documents which
appeared to have originated in classified KGB
files. Fearing a Soviet provocation which
could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy
for possessing classified Soviet Government
documents, Embassy officials had the documents
photographed and on the next day, 5 November,
returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
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At his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 NOSENKO
related how a disaffected former KGB colleague, A.N.
CHEREPANOV, had stolen documents from the American Embassy
Section and in November 1963 sent them through an inter-
mediary to the American Embassy. CHEREPANOV's treason was
discovered, NOSENKO said, when the Embassy returned the
documents to Soviet authorities. CHEREPANOV fled Moscow,
and NOSENKO claimed to have taken part in the KGB search
for him. NOSENKO brought with him to Geneva the official
KGB document which authorized his travel in the search for
CHEREPANOV •
The significance of the CIEREPANOV incident is twofold.
The KGB documents which CHEREPANOV allegedly sent to the
Embassy appear to have originated in the American Depart-
ment's Embassy Section, and the documents relate to KGB
modus operandi, personnel, targets, and technical devices
employed in operations during 1958-1960, during part of
which time NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the
embassy Section.
The KGB document, the "temporary duty
authorization", is an item of physical evidence
NOSENKO
has offered to substantiate his claim to personal parti-
cipation in
CHEREPANOV case and to having held the rank
of KGB lieutenant colonel. (The document does not itself
refer to CHEREPANOV in any manner.]
NOSENKO's Information
The KGB officer, A.N. CHEREPANOV was born about 1920 or
1921,
During World War II he was a KGB officer working
with partisan groups behind the lines. Later he was in
Lugoslavia for four or five years, and was probably Deputy
Chief of the KGB Legal Residency in Belgrade.
Comment:
CIA records contain references to an Aleksandr.
Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a Soviet diplomat and
suspected intelligence officer in Belgrade in
1953.
CHEREPANOV left Belgrade in 1956.
Yugoslav intelligence officer who defected in
1957 confirmed that CHEREPANOV had been an
intelligence officer.
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When CHEREPANOV returned to Moscow, he had some (unspecified)
problem getting a job, but finally
the KGB Second Chief
Directorate took him into the American Embassy Section of the
American Department, working against State Department
personnel in the Administrative Section of the Embassy.
' He
worked in the same room as V.A. KUSKOV, and was case officer
for three KGB targets:
Richard SNYDER and John MCVICKAR,
counsular officers, and Marion ALBAMONTF, secretary to thell
personnel officer.
CHEREPANOV's work as
a case officer was
poor, and
as it grew worse, the KGB decided to retire him.
Because of his service in World War II, for which he
received three years' pension credit for each year of military
service, he had enough time to his credit to be eligible for
retirement. Also, he was just over the minimum age (40) for
retirement from the KGB.
Upon retiring in July or August 1961, CHERFPANOV got a
job with MEZHKNIGA.
Unhappy about his enforced retirement
and angry at the KGB, he became even more dissatisfied when
MEZHKNIGA turned down his several attempts to go abroad.
Prior to leaving the KGB, CHEREPANOV had stolen draft
copies of documents he had handled in the
Embassy Section.
In one case, he copied the contents of a report in his own
handwriting, evidently having been unable to steal the
document itself. All of the documents he had stolen were
intended for destruction.
In November 1963 Yu. I. GUK brought NOSENKO news about
"a catastrophe" in the KGB.
guk said he had the story from
B. D. MAKASHEV, a common friend of GUK and NOSENKO.
had been in Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's office when
MAKASHEV
the CHEREPANOV papers were brought there, after their delivery
by Thomas FAIN
of the Embassy. MAKASHEV saw the name of
(Second Chief Directorate Chief) GRIBANOV on some of the
papers and saw: that one of them was a plan for agent opera-
tions against an American. He noted that one of the documents
was at least an inch thick.
Gromyko immediately called KGB
Chairman Semichastnty, who notified GRIBANOV.
GRIDANOV"S.
depüty went to Gromyko's office and picked up the papers.
The KGB then began an investigation of all the personnel
assigned to the American Department during the time period
covered by the
papers, 1959 to 1960 or 1961.
0001582
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
When the American Embassy saw the CHEREPANOV documents,
they were afraid that the documents were part of a KGB
provocation, and they wondered what the Russians were
trying to do.
he Sambassa
The Embassy officials photographed the
documents and on the next day returned them to the Ministry
ot Foreign Affairs.
When the Americans gave the documents
to the Ministry, the KGB wondered why the Americans gave
them back.
The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB during
its investigation for 20 or 25 days.
When the KGB examined
the documents, some were found to be in CHEREPANOV's hand-
writing, but no documents were found which pertained to
CHEREPANOV's own case work, or that of the American Embassy
Section. The KGB found no documents dated later than
1961--none for 1962 or 1963--only 1959, 1960 and 1961. Thus
there were a number of indications pointing towards
CHEREPANOV, who had left the section in 1961.
not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him,
but instead mounted fixed surveillance posts at his home and
office. In order to provoke CHEREPANOV into some precipitous
action, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him who, in
the course of conversation, mentioned the great disturbance
in the KGB caused by someone passing stolen KGB documents
to the Americans. CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the
news and was quite cool about the matter.
The next day the
surveillance post observed him leaving his house in the
morning at his usual time, apparently on his way to work,
but the surveillance post
at his office soon reported that
he had not arrived at work. He had "simply dropped out of
sight".
An intensive search "all over the city of Moscow" ensued,
then spread throughout the Soviet Union: Border controls
were tightened, photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to
Republic and local KGB and
militia offices, and all means
of transport were covered.
Reports began coming in
from
various places that someone who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV'S
description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there.
Reports which came into KGB Headquarters from Gorkiy Oblast
strongly indicated
the possibility of CHEREPANOV's presence
there,
SO NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
NOSENKO wen't to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE-
PANOV's disappearance.
The arca was covered with very deep
woods, "where a person could lose himself for life".: On the
seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and
arrested in Baku,
where he was on his way to the Iranian border:
A special plane was immediately sent to Balu, carrying
S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi-
cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately lack to Moscow;
interrogating him on the plane.: He immediately confessed
to having given the documents to the Americans.
" When' asked
why; he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and
besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some
money in return for the documents.
He confessed that on
4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist
who was a librarian interested in Russian books.
He said he
had given the documents to the American in the entrance
hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also
housed.
Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two
fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the
Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism
for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock
surveillance.
CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB
that if he had detected his surveillants he would have
written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest
against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then
would
have committed
suicide, leaving the KGB without proof
of his guilt.
Comment:
NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the
CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to
his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department at the time.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
Contents of the CHERFPANOV Package
The KGB documents in the CHEREPANOV package totalled
103
pages in the original Russian version, divided almost
equally between typewritten reports in final form and hand-
written draft reports or notes, plus two copies of letters
written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy. The
longest single document was a 33-page Top Secret report,
dated 18 April 1959, entitled "Operational Conditions in
the U.S.A. and the Activities of American Counterintelligence
Organs against Soviet Installations and Soviet Citizens in
the U.S.A. in 1957-1958"
The report was signed by Colonel
A. FEKLISOV, lalias FOMIN, the former KGB rezident™ in
Washington] whose title is given as
"Chief, First (American)
Department, First Chief Directorate".
The rest of the
documents refer to KGB coverage of various American Embassy
and American diplomats in Moscow during the period August
1958 to 15 October 1960.
Most of the documents were prepared
by or for one senior case officer of the Embassy Section,
First Department, Second Chief Directorate, Major V. KUSKOV.
(NOSENKO has identified V.A. KUSKOV as an officer of the
Second Chief Directorate who shared an office with CHEREPANOV
from about 1958 to 1961.)
Two reports were on Americans who
had left the Soviet Union, Edward L. KILLHAM, Second Secretary
from July 1957 to July 1959, and Wallace L. LITTELL, Attache
from June 1956 to July 1958.
There were operational plans
for agent work against four American diplomats once stationed
In Moscow,
Richard HARMSTONE, Lewis W. BOWDEN, James A.
RAMSEY, and George WINTERS.
Other documents included were
an agent's report of her relationship with MINTERS, a summary
Of LANGELLE's activities while in the USSR, a list of Soviet
citizens whose letters to the Embassy had been intercepted
by the KGB, a handwritten summary
(signed by CHEREPANOV). of
derogatory
• information on
a Soviet youth who had been in
touch with American Consul Richard SNYDER, and various hand-
written drafts and notes on the foregoing
Americans.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January. 1964)
The operational plan on WINTERS, as an example, indicated
that WINTERS had already been identified as an intelligence
ofticer, and to ascertain the nature of his intelligence
activitles, the KGB was to employ round-the-clock surveil-
lance, technical aids metka and: "NEPTUNE-80", audio surveil-
lance, and investigation of his contacts among Soviet.
citizens.
The plan reflected that while the KGB judgment
was that WINTERS
"had a hostile attitude toward the USSR"
and that there "was no basis for recruitment"
i care should
be taken not to alarm him and cause him to leave the country
prematurely, since there still might arise an opportunity
to attempt to recruit him.
NOSENKO said that he had never seen the documents
CHEREPANOV passed to the Embassy, although he was familiar
with their substance.
Comment:
The information in the CHEREPANOV Papers was
substantially consistent with what NOSENKO had
said earlier in 1962 regarding WINTERS, LANGELLE,
HARMSTONE, and Embassy Section operational
techniques such as the use of metka.
NOSENKO's Travel Document
When NOSENKO first related to CIA in Geneva in 1964
his knowledge of the CHEREPANOV case, he produced a document
(see accompanying exhibit) which he said was his official
KGB "temporary duty authorization" to go to Gorkiy Oblast
te documenta
to search for CHEREPANOV. The document, signed by General
GRIBANOV, authorized Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO to travel to
Gorky during the period immediately before NÖSENKO's trip
to Geneva, 15-30 December 1963. NOSENKO acknowledged that
it was
"illegal" to have
kept the document and to have
brought it with him from
.. the. Soviet Union. He did it,
he
said, to show CIA.
0001586
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(SEVENTH DEPARTIENT. - January 1962-January 1964)
Comment:
NOSENKO has never provided
a satisfactory
explanation for his retention of the document
nox for bringing it to Geneva.
According to
an earlier KGB defector, the bearer of a
temporary duty authorization is held strictly
accountable for the document which has to be
turned in with the financial voucher.
What-
ever NOSENKO's purpose, the effect of presenting
the document to CIA was to corroborate his
statements about CHEREPANOV and substantiate
his claim that he was a KGB lieutenant colonel.
NOSENKO was not a lieutenant colonel (see p.350) •
When he eventually said in 1966 that he was
only a captain, NOSENKO was challenged to
explain how he came to possess an official KGB
document signed by General GRIBANOV and
identifying him as a lieutenant colonel.
NOSENKO asserted that it came about "by mistake".
Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)
NOSENKO was detailed a second time to perform security
escort duties with the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament
Conference, and he returned to Geneva in January 1964 where
he resumed contact with CIA and announced his intention to
defect.
He brought with him a considerable number of hand-
written notes to which he referred when describing to CIA
officers KGB. operations of which he claimed he learned at.
KGB Headquarters during 1962 and 1963. His delegation
security duties. were not onerous.
He visited the Geneva
Legal Residency daily and met with CIA almost as frequently
while awaiting approval of his defection and exfiltration
from Switzerland, tentatively scheduled for some three
weeks later. A little more than a week after his arrival,
however, NOSENKO declared that he had to defect at once,
because he had received cabled instructions to return to the
USSR immediately. On 4 February 1964 NOSENKO was
taken from
Switzerland to Germany, and on 12 February he was brought
to the United States.
0001587
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Top Secret
Exhibit 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for It. Colonel
Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963
FRONT
11933
привы весудостоверение, Ле,
Committee for State Security Under
the Council of Ministers, USSR
15. December 1963
Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel
NOSENKO
Yuriy Ivanovich
For duty to:
UKGB of Gor' kaya
Oblast!:
Length öf
temporary
assignment:
15 days
through:
30 December 1963
Authorization:
directive of Chief
Of a Chief Directorate
Effective on presentation of
identity document No.: NK-2513
Chief_s./GRIBANOV of Directorate
of Department
Committee for State Security Under
the Council of Ministers, USSR
0001588
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## Page 327
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
Purpose of Geneva Trip
NOSENKO explained that it was his personal wish that
had brought him to' Geneva, that he was allowed to travel as
"a treat" when it appeared to be the last occasion he might
have to travel to the West.
[NOSEIKO said in 1962 that when
he became Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, as he
expected to become, he would travel to the West every two
or three years.]
He had discussed the possibility of the
trip in 1963 with then-Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV,
and secured his agreement.
He also talked with officers
of the Soviet Delegations Department, but after it had been
decided that he should go, the Chief of that Department,
IN.T.I ZHARIKOV, suggested that it might be unnecessary
for
a security officer to accompany this particular delegation.
[A.G.] KOVALENKO,
the new Chief of the Seventh Department,
to neco chang
supported NOSENKO's assignment as a personal favor. 'Although
at one time NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV approved the trip, he
has later asserted that GRIBANOV was. not involved and that
if GRIBANOV had learned of NOSENKO's plans, he would: not
NOSENKO's only mission was to concern himself with the
general security of the delegation, as he häd done in 1962.
he sion
He had no specific tasks such as on his earlier assignment
(e.g., investigating STAKIDY or supervising the BELITSKIY
operation):
Comment: NOSENKO has never satisfactorily explained why
a Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department would
draw an unrelated assignment abroad which
would last many weeks if not months.
In
another context, NOSENKO had described a KGB
conference to take place about this time
• where
plans were to be drawn up for KGB operations
during the coming tourist
season: he acknow-
ledged that he was expected to attend, but
nevertheless went to Geneva.
317
Top Secret
0001590
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## Page 328
Top Secret
EXHIBIT 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for It. Colonel
Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963
REVERSE
Комдидированный не воздисе Здневного срока по
мавдировки обялао представить ававсовый
отест
nonapanes
•СВяЯВ С КОМОВДИрОВНОЙ СУМНАХ.
При полученни проевдного балета гредоявить в
• жел-дор, вассу хомаш
двровочнос удостоверевие для наложеная конпостерв-
ОТМЕТКИ О ОРЕБЫВАННА В ПУНКТАХ
Нач. Шахужскно гом
м-р миятуя
/бол из г. Шахуньи 177.
бесплатной квартирн
Вен Шо жу почто гом
КОМИТЕТА ГОСУ ДАРСТВЕНА
несплатный
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРО
•CEQP
Убыл из
Прибыл в Москву и-
1196:5
Нач. секретариата
Печать
•КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР
Выдано:
Ававе на расходы по конавдировко в сумно
Руб.
- Поревозочнмо требования 1646 005867,005870
Талоны на плацкарту NeNo
Ст. булатер
NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES OF
TEMPORARY DUTY
"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy
16 December 1963"
"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye
17 XII 1963 Did not use
free quarters"
s./Chief of Shakhun'ye
Chief Militia Section,
Militia Major
(Illegible)
"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63
Did not use free quarters"
s./Chief of Shakhun'ye
Chief Militia Section,
Militia Major_
(Illegible)
"Left Gor'kiy 1T December 1963
Did not use free quarters"
(Illegible)
0001589
Top Secret
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(SEVENTII DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
Visits to Legal Residency
As in 1962, NOSENKO said he visited the Legal Resi-
dency daily.
According to strict rules, he explained, an
officer in his status
Itemporary duty assignment which was
independent of Residency should not do so, but his case
was exceptional because he was a Deputy Chief of Department
and because of the relationship he established in 1962
through the intervention of M.S. TSYMBAL.
orate Chief TSYMBAL, NOSENKO related in 1964, was an old
reLation nectablishe
Illegals Direct-
friend; they had become acquainted in Moscow
before meeting
again in Geneva in 1962, when they dined together frequently.
TSYMBAL's wife once had
taught NOSENKO in school, and
TSYMBAL had once offered NOSENKO a job in the Illegals
Directorate. NOSENKO asserted that
TSYMBAL's introduction
of NOSENKO to Rezident GAVRICHEV in 1962 permitted NOSENKO
to frequent the Legal Residency in 1964.
Comment: In 1962 NOSENKO attributed his access to the
Residency to his
; "old friend Yuri GUK", not
TSYMBAL, He mentioned ISYMBAL's presence in
Geneva but claimed no close acquaintance.
Availability for Meetings with CIA
In 1964 NOSENKO behaved as if he had no official
responsibilities or any
demands on his time, and he was
willing to spend all of his time in meetings with CIA. . He
said that his absence from the Disarmament Delegation could
be explained as "security duties" since everyone on the
knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer.
From the first meeting on 24 January until 4 February,
NSOENKO met CIA officers thirteen times for meetings
usually
lasting for five or six hours. By mutual agreement, most
of the meetings started in the afternoon. On two occasions
NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours and several meetings
continued until past midnight.
0001591
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
NOSENKO's Written Notes
After returning to KGB Headquarters 'from Geneva in
1962, NOSENKO said, he had availed himself of various
opportunities to record what he learned of KGB operations
in order to inform CIA, and to pilfer appropriate KGB
documents to which he had access, when he could safely do
He brought to Geneva in 1964 three KGB documents and
a large number of handwritten notes. The latter reflected
items which he had. excerpted from various documents to which
he had access, principally the Seventh Department Chief's
special file containing periodic summaries of all Seventh
Department operations. He last had access to this special
file, he stated, in connection with his review of it in
December 1963 to confirm that it was intact after the
CHEREPANOV affair. While the file contained no true names,
he claimed he learned such true identities as were contained
in his notes by asking KGB colleagues.
For safekeeping,
NOSENKO said he kept
the notes and documents in a wall safe
of the office which he occupied alone, as Deputy Chief of
the Department.
Questioned
repeatedly about the KGB operations referred
to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand
on what: he had written:
He insisted he had written everything
he could discover, and knew no more.
Comment:
NOSENKO's sourcing for the notes does not
explain how he learned of the cases described
the notes dating from 1957-1959, a period
not covered by the documents NOSENKO Claimed he
reviewed. Neither can NOSENKO explain why he
was not knowledgeable, without the notes, of
operations which occurred while he was Deputy
Chief of the Seventh Department's American-
British Commonwealth Section. NOSENKO acknow-
ledges that his access to a personal safe in
319
Top Secret
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Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT -
January 1962-January 1964)
Comment:
(Continued)
which to keep the notes was just fortuitous,
since neither all offices had such
safes, nor
even all offices of Deputy Chiefs.
NOSENKO's Defection
On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the
second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that
after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting
series, he had decided to defect.
He explained that he had
recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief
of the Seventh Department, and that because of the stature
and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few if
any opportunities for him to visit the West in the future.
Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand
and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family.
behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children
being
years"permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty
NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part
with my family"'. He had, however, carefully considered their
fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he felt that,
because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm
would come to them.
NOSENKO was told that CIA accepted in principle his
decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for
him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all
his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA would
exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States.
He
wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the
CIA officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain
in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given
NOSENKO for this request were:
-The desire to obtain further information on the
local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to
the Disarmament Conference while he still had
access;
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(SEVENTI DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
-The value of having NOSENKO present when GRIBANOV.
made a visit to Geneva about 7 February, a visit known
to CIA only through NOSENKO;
-The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO'S
in-place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among
the
Soviet representation in Geneva;
-The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to
NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.
In a three-and-a-half hour meeting on 26 January
NOSENKO emphasized
that although he agreed that it was
necessary and useful for him to remain in place until
GRIBANOV visited Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as
possible thereafter.
On 28 January NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not
be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman SemichastnyY
was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond
Vienna:
NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite
information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.
On 30 January NOSENKO said that there appeared to be
little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.
[From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he
was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO
as a KGB counterintelligence officer.] Therefore, he wanted
to defect right away. He cited'as reasons the emotional
strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his
case officers were wasting their time working against the
local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or
promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could
be obtained from the Soviet delegation because:
"Tsarapkin
himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by
Moscow
the day before". CIA handlers, however, delayed the
defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement
to assist
listening
and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects
of the delegation buildings.
As the best time for the
defection, he suggested Saturday morning,
8 February,
because he probably would not be missed until the following
0001594
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..-•I.
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMINT - January 1962-January 1964)
Ilonday. This date was
tentatively scheduled, ard lOSFiKO
again repeated his desire simply to disappear without a
trace".
He also astied
about exfiltration plans.
On 31 January NOSENKO reported the results of his
transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he
had
accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building
used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the
scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain
in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers, (see
p. 309) which he was told were en route from lashington.
explained that he had been alarmed at the previous meeting
because the delegation was supposed to move from its hotel
to a Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappea-
rance would be noticed more quickly. This move, as he had
now learned has been postponed pending the arrival
housekeeping officer from Moscow.
., Of a
At NOSENKO's request on 1 February, it was firmly
States, and his case officers confirmed his assumption.
On 3
February NOSENKO reviewed the CHERFPANOV materials.
The defection was still scheduled for
saturday, 8 February.
NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel
room in the early afternoon of 4 February and said:
"I want
to come now and not go back." After arriving at the CIA
safehouse he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal
Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament
Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow
immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreian tourism
in the Soviet Union.
The residency was arranging for a
ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following
day and a replacement was being readied to assume
NOSENKO's
duties as
security officer for the Soviet delegation in
Geneva.
Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO
then related, the Soviet Government had been deliverating
the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had
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(SEVELTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
agreed to open a number of new. cities and tourist itineraries:
in this connection.
Semichastnyy had decided that it was
time to call a conference to discuss new
"tactics and
stra-
tegies" for handling the increased number of tourists
expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the
entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to
prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the
report would be
read to the conference either by himself or
by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief
Directorate.:
NOSENKO explained that he was the only one
who could do this job as
It: COl. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB
Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new
man in this line of operations, having been there only four
or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by
great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable
arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the
morning
of 5 February.
He had arranged for a Soviet chauf
feur to
bring a car
around at 0930 hours the next morning
for the move. His absence would be noted at that time, and
therefore
"the main thing is to cross the swiss border
before morning": NOSENKO felt, however, that there would
be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for
a time following his disappearance, and that there would be
no real concern until the evening.
To: foster Soviet
uncertainty, he had left his clothing lying around his hotel
room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safe
house
HOSENKO estimated the first soviet queries to Swiss
authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or
early on the oth:
NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February
and remained in a safehouse there until 1l February, when
press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for
an immediate interview with NOSEYKO dictated that he be
brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in
the United States on the evening of 12 February 1964•
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations
The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964
(see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other
' KGB
operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as
tourints during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited
in the description of these operations in Annex B, these
operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to
service
in 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the Amorican-British
Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department.
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(SEVENTH DIPARTMENT - January 1962-Jaruary, 1964)
Operational Activities: - July 1962-January 1964:
Summary
To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy
Chief of the Seventh Department during this perica, lOSENKO
describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of [SVENCHANSKI7,06
Othe arrests_of (KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations
06.0f (SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV,
O6 his discovery that SHUBIN)was a GRU agent, and his assignment.
to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as
he described and they were as he described (there are substan-
tial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB
elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical
with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Depart-
ment operations. They do not accurately characterize, as
: NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against
substantiate his Seventh Department
service.: NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to
Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier
assignment there in 1962.
NOSENKO has asserted that he was
not
a lieutenant
colonel as the temporary duty authorization
indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy
Chief
of Department and one from which he presumably would
have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions
which he claimed to have held.
KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963
Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENTO claimed
awareness of what the KGß posture was with respect to
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tourist operations, and, specifically, awareness of all
significant KGB operations against American tourists.
Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE
The KGB agent' in MI-6, George BLAKE, in 1959 furnished
the KGB with a documentary account of the joint CIA-MI-6
meeting in June of that year, (see p.148) and he was to
furnish other information by which the KGB could keep
current on such hostile operations. Another CIA-MI-6 meetinc
was held in Mashington in April 1960, of which a twenty-one
BLAKE also passed this document as
soon as it came into his possession to the KGB.
KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations
The lengthy 1961 KGB Top Secret study referred to earlier
(see p.149) reflects the detailed and accurate information
in possession of the KGB during the period of NOSENKO's
alleged service in the Seventh Department in 1962-1963.
Pertinent portions are quoted as follows:
"It has been established that the Intelligence
organs of the. USA are displaying special activity
in the utilization of legal channels, specifically,
in tourism, for the purpose of conducting subversive
work against the USSR. Numerous facts indicate that
American tourists and members of various US delega-
tions, in the USSR strive to visit areas and instal-
tary attaches have no access, establish contact with
tion.
In this regard, the channels of tourism to
the USSR are used
to dispatch experienced intelligence
agents
to develop individual Soviet citizens with
the objective of their eventual recruitment. In
line with the preparation and dispatch of such
agents, among
the tourists the Americans also make
extensive use
of persons not directly connected
with American Intelligence organs.
These latter
agents are given one-time assignments such as
collecting information leading to the ideological
development of soviet citizens.
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"With the objectives of accomplishing subversive
activities,.
a so-called
'Information Center; has
been established in the US with the participation
of the Department of State.:
The 'Center' officially
advertises that its purpose is to inform intending
American tourists to the Soviet Union about the
opportunities and restrictions existing there.
Actually, however, the 'Center' is involved in the
ideological preparation of American tourists, whom
it instructs regarding their conduct in the Soviet
Union and the methods to be used there for propag
andizing the American way of life.
The
"Center'
collects information about the Soviet Union from
returning American
tourists, including the political
attitudes of certain Soviet citizens, their addresses,
etc. The direction of the 'Center' is controlled
by experienced intelligence officers of CIA.
"Candidates for missions to the USSR are selected.
carefully.'
They ordinarily possess knowledge of
the Russian language, know the fundamentals of photo-
graphy, have specific technical training and must
look upon their mission as a responsible assignment
and not as a pleasure trip. American Intelligence
organs prefer to use persons who have previously
visited the USSR and person having relatives there.
"Once selected, the American tourist agent is
instructed as to his
intelligence assignment and
his route, and he is acquainted with the security
conditions in the USSR, including passport controls,
documentation and customs controls, the hazard of
both physical and technical surveillance, as well
as the possibility of provocations and
compromise
making
the agent vulnerable to blackmail.
"Among American Intelligence tourist agent tasks
there are included visual observation and clandestine
photography, the establishment of contact with Soviet
citizens, and spotting among such citizens persons
who may be developed as sources of information.
For
American Intelligence, any Soviet citizen, regardless
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of his social status or his personal access to important
information, is of interest, because of his ability to
travel to regions of the USSR which are of interest to
American Intelligence.
"American Intelligence tourist agents suspect as KGB
agents Soviet citizens who too openly
express anti-
government sentiments, who volunteer information about
friends or relatives who work in secret establishments,
who accept an invitation for a clandestine meeting but
display an awareness of security principles, who quickly
request aid or assistance in defecting, or who have a
good knowledge of foreign languages. "
Citing the increase in foreign tourists in the Soviet
Union from 35,000 in 1959 to over 50,000 in 1960, the docu-
ment instructs
a KGB First Chief Directorate Legal Residen-
cy abroad
"to utilize all its resources to expose among American
tourists persons suspected of belonging to the enemy in-
telligence or counterintelligence organs."
Promising
assistance, KGB Headguarters instructs the
Legal Residency
"to inform KGB Headquarters of foreigners temporarily
visiting the USSR
who are of operational interest in the
work against the main enemy (the U.S.]. With this aim,
the Legal Residency should intensify its work against local
services which are using tourism to conduct intelligence
work in the USSR; determine the role played by anti-
Soviet emigre organizations with respect to tourism; ex-
ploit tourist firms which organize tours in the USSR,
with the aim of obtaining information regarding the firms
being exploited by hostile intelligence services; and
telegraph timely and necessary information to KGB Head-
and nelle
quarters regarding tourists believed to be of operational
interest, including the individual's surname, name, pat-
ronymic, date of birth, profession, date to arrive in the
USSR, means of travel, itinerary, description of group
with whom tourist travelling, and any other pertinent
information available to the Legal
Residency about the
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tourist. The Legal Residency is further directed to
clude where possible among tourists groups
agents of in
the
Residency, informing KGB Headquarters in advance of their
presence and advising how the KGB could contact the
agents in the USSR if it should become necessary. Lastly,
the Legal Residency is instructed to provide all possible
aid, including financial assistance, so that persons
favorably disposed to the USSR can visit there, with the
objective of their recruitment in the Soviet Union for the
purpose of exposing enemy intelligence agents
among other
tourists."
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO insisted that the operations he described accurate-
ly reflected the extent of KGB counterintelligence operations
among American tourists during his 1962-1963 service in the
Seventh Department:
In response to questions during his in-
terrogation, NOSENKO asserted that the Seventh Department,
during his absence in 1960-1961, had only noted that "automo-
bile tourism had increased and that American Intelligence had
increased its use of multi-national tourist groups."
He stated
that the Seventh Department received no information during
1960-1961 regarding American Intelligence use of tourism as
cover for espionage
He was aware, he said, from the damage
survey conducted in the KGB after GOLIISYN's defection, that
American Intelligence had obtained a KGB document on tourist
operations, a document
which had been written in the seventh
Department.
Comment:
NOSENKO does not know the content of the docu-
ment, which he describes as a statistical sur
vey similar to the study he himself drafted in
1959 (see p. 146) •
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Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)
KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists: Summary
BLAKE's confession and evidence obtained from internal
KGB documents establish the KGB concern for the threat of
American tourist agent operations and the scope of KGB
actions to thwart that threat. The effect of NOSENKO's
statements is that the KGB did not know of the American
tourist agent program. He averred that the operations he
described accurately depicted the nature of KGB counter-
intelligence operations during the period.
SEVENTH DEPARIMENT - 1962-1964: Summary and Conclusion
According to NOSENKO, in January 1962, at the direction of
General GRIBANOV, he was appointed Chief
of the Seventh De-
partment American-British Commonwealth Section in the expec-
tancy that he soon would be named a Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Departnent. As a Section Chief, he personally handled agents
and supervised all Second Chief Directorate operations against
American and British Commonwealth tourists, of which he de-
scribes four. In this period NOSENKO alsO
was assigned the
unrelated duty of serving as a security escort officer with a
Soviet delegation travelling to Geneva in which capacity he in-
vestigated a delegate of suspected loyalty, SHAKHOV. While in
Geneva he drew also the assignment of supervising another KGB
case officer's management of the KGB double agent, BELITSKIY.
On that visit to Geneva NOSENKO first contacted CIA. In July
1962, NOSENKO claims that as GRIBANOV promised, he became one
of three Deputy Chiefs of the entire Seventh Department; in
this position he learned of all KGB operations against Ameri-
can tourists.
In this connection he described five operations,
as well as his accidental discovery of the identity of an
American GRU agent, and the investigation and search for a
disaffected former
•KGB colleague. In July 1963 NOSENKO states
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he became First Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department.
Again assigned to escort a delegation to Geneva in January
1964, NOSENKO met CIA representatives again and delivered
notes of KGB operations of which he had learned since his
last meeting with CIA in 1962.. He also presented at this
time a KGB travel document to substantiate his clained rank
of lieutenant colonel. Finally, he announced the receipt of
a telegram recalling nim to Moscow, an event which prompted
CIA to accept his immediate defection.
NOSENKO's. claimed date of transfer into the Seventh De-
partment is in dispute because of contradictory claims he made
regarding his Embassy Section activities.
He provides no in-
formation sustaining his claim to have become Chief of the
American-British Commonwealth Section; his description of
his functions does not differ materially from that given in
connection with his earlier claimed service in the same sec-
tion, as a case officer, and he describes no administrative
nor supervisory responsibilities. None of his claimed agents,
with one exception, was employed in Seventh Department opera-
tions he described.
Because. of contradictions and the con-
flicts in his varying accounts, neither of the reasons
NOSENKO cites for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 or 1964
is credible. In Geneva, it is implausible that he conducted
the investigation of SHAKHOV as he claims, and he clearly
did not supervise the management of the double
/agent, BELIT-
SKIY®
NOSENKO offers nine "tourist"
cases as evidence that he
served in the 1962-1964 period in the Seventh Department, part
of the time as Deputy Chief. These cases, which included two
religious figures, two American Communists, one emigre, one
suspected FBI agent, a First Chief Directorate target who in-
tended to marry a Soviet citizen, a hostage, and a permanent.
resident or former permanent resident of the Soviet Union, all
have aspects for which KGB elements other than the Seventh
Department may have been
responsible. This fact and
the
anomalies of NOSENKO's accounts of the cases aside, however,
the cases are evidence that NOSENKO did serve during the :
period in the Seventh Department, although they are not per-
suasive of his claim to have been Deputy Chief. A judgment of
that latter claim must
rest primarily on an appraisal of other
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aspects of his statements, including those relating to his
supervisory duties and to the nature of Second Chief Direc
torate operations against American and other foreign tourists.
NOSENKO has retracted his assertion that he was a lieuten-
ant colonel, a rank appropriate for a Second Chief Directorate
Deputy Chief of Department, and asserts that he was never
promoted beyond the rank of captain.
Most damaging to NOSENKO's claims that he was a supervisor
in the Seventh Department is his assertion that he accurately
describes KGB counterintelligence operations against foreign,
particularly American, tourists.
A senior Seventi Department
officer would be aware of the Second Chief Directorate's pre-
occupation with American tourists: If NOSENKO is unaware of
the extent of KGB activities in connection with American
tourists, he was not a Section Chief of Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department.
Conclusion
NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the
American-British Commonwealth Section and was
thereafter a
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.
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CHAPTER IX
OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSE!IKO'S KGB SERVICE
Most of NOSENKO's assertions can be examined in a chrono-
logical fashion, as has been done in the proceding sections.
Some can most easily be examined separately, since they
relate not to any particular period of his KGB service nor
to any specific position he claimed he occupied, but to his
entire KGB career.
The principal aspects in this category
of claims are those he made about his relationship with
Second Chief Directorate General GRIBANOV, his Party status,
his knowledge of certain KGB forms and procedures, his
sourcing of
KGB operations, awards he earned for KGB service,
and his KGB rank.
Relationship with General GRIBANOV
From his first meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO main-
tained that he had a close personal and professional rela-
tionship with Major General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second
NOSENKO described recruitment approaches
in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations
operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV
played in his promotions, awards and assignments, and their
after hours carrousing.
According to NOSENKO, GRIBAITOV was
wholly responsible, against NOSINKO's wishes, for his
appointment to the
position of Deputy Chief of the American
Department Emuassy
Section in 1960, and when NOSENKO later
rejected GRIBANOV's offer to make him Chief of the entire
American Department, it was GRIBANOV who arranged his return
to the Seventh Department as Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section and who shortly thereafter appointed
him a Deputy Chief and thereafter First Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department.
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NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964
Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to
refer to this special and personal relationship, which
touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service.
Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain
this claim..: The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted
or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by
other evidence, is seen
from the following examples excerpted
from the earlier chronological examination:
GRIBANOV wrote
the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given
(Retracted.
GRIBANOV. wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness
reports) ; NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carIoused together with women
provided
NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two
occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.);
recruited
Edward SMITH (see P• 3f) together with NOSENKO
(Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit-
played no acte
ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.);
NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in
1961
at. which the latter learned that Trench Ambassador 06
DeJean) was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted.
NOSINKO accompanied
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GRIDANOV on only one such occasion and learned from "friends"
In 1958-1959 about DeJean) ; GRIBANOV put NOSENKO in Embassy
Section in 1960 as Deputy Chief to supervise code clerk
200 с вера
operations (Contradicted.
NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief and
did not
supervise code clerk operations); GRIBANOV approved
NOSENKO's operátional plan for MORONE!'s recruitment (Retracted. 06
The plan was written by another KGB Öfficer.) ; GRIBANOV
ordered NOSENKO to prepare study on foreign intelligence
services use of tourism (Contradicted. NOSENKO could recall
no details of the study nor whether he ever discussed it
with GRIBANOV.); GRIBANOV promised to promote NOSENKO directly
to lieutenant colonel from the rank of captain and (subse-
quently) personally congratulated him on his promotion to
lieutenant colonel (Retracted
NOSENKO never was promoted
past the rank of captain.); GRIBANOV was instrumental in
NOSENKO's receiving personal commendations from the KGB
Chairman, the
Orders of the Red Banner, the Red Star, and
the Order of Lenin (Retracted.
NOSENKO received no such
awards.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO: to Geneva in 1962
(Retracted. NOSENKO went at the request of the Soviet
Delegations Abroad Department.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO
to assume charge of the BELITSKIY case (Contradicted.
NOSENKO did not supervise the BELITSKIY case.) ; GRIBANOV
allowed NOSENKO to go to Geneva in 1964, "as a personal
favor" (Retracted. GRIBANOV was not aware that NOSENKO
was to return to Geneva a second time.): and finally.
GRIBANOV was NOSENKO's patron (Retracted. Their relation-
ship was no closer than
their relative rank and position
indicated.)
Conclusion
NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to
his claimed relationship with GRIBANOV discredit his single
and most important unretracted claim, that NOSENKO, on
GRIBANOV's appointment was Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department.
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Communist Party Status
In addition to other stringent requirements, candidates
for the KGB must normally be Communist Party Or Komsomol
members.
The significance of NOSENKO's statements about
his Party status is the extent to which they are consistent
with what is known about Party activity in the KGB, and
consistent with NOSENKO's account of his KGB career.
NOSENKO said his formal participation in Communist Party
activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined
the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory in Baku. The step
was a casual one, he said, and he took it without much
thought, mainly because all of his friends were joining.
He continued his pro forma membership in the Komsomol while
in the Naval RU, and when he "transferred" to the KGB in
spring 1953, he transferred routinely to the KGB Komsomol
organization from his Naval RU Komsomol unit in the Baltic.
He was registered with the KGB Komsomol, he said, without
referring the matter to his former Daltic Komsomol unit:
Comment:
According to knowledgeable KGB defectors,
a.
member's acceptance in another Komsomol unit
is contingent upon the endorsement of the
individual's former unit; NOSENKO's acceptance
by the KGB Komsomol without referring the
matter to his Komsomol unit in the Baltic "is
impossible"
In the fall of 1953 NOSENKO claims he was elected
secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organi-
zation:
He was elected, he said, at a meeting of the
Komsomol membership.
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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)
Comment: The Komsomol membership elects only the
Komsomol Committee.
The latter elects the
secretary.
NOSENKO cannot describe the duties of a Komsomol secre-
tary in any specific manner. He does not know who was the
secretary of the KGB Komsomol organization, nor could he
describe his dealings with that official's office.
Comment:
The secretary of the Second Chief Directorate
Romsomol organization is directly subordinate
to the KGB Komsomol secretary and would have
occasion to deal with the latter frequently.
NOSENKO stated that he did not know whether there was
Komsomol Congress while he was Komsomol secretary of the
Second Chief Directorate, but that the Congresses were
ordinarily held yearly.
Comment:
The first Komsomol Congress since 1948 was
held in March 1954, entailing considerable
work by every Komsomol member and especially
by the unit secretaries.
As Komsomol secretary, NOSENKO collected the dues of the
members of his unit:
All members paid in the amount of two
percent of their monthly salaries.
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Comment:
Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding
scale in which members earning 500 rubles
monthly paid .5 percent, those earning 500 to
1500 rubles paid one percent, and those
earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent.
NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-1954 the maximum age for a
Komsomol member was 26 years of age, and that he was a
member until he became overage in October 1954, and that no
special privilege was extended to him
Comment:
According to Komsomol statutes at the time,
the maximum age was twenty-five, a fact which
would be known by a person who served as a
Komsomol
secretary at the time.
NOSENKO would
have thus been excluded from the Komsomol when
he became overage in 1953, not in 1954 as
he
claimed.
The March 1954 Komsomol Congress retained
the 25 year age limit, but provided for two-
year extensions in certain cases. Because of
age at the time, and because of his claimed
position
as. Komsomol secretary, the matter
would have been of vital interest to NOSENKO
if the facts he related were true.
From the time he was dropped from the Komsomol because
of age, until he was accepted as a candidate member of the
Communist Party in January 1956, NOSENKO claimed that he
was the only officer in the KGB who was a member of neither
organization.
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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)
Comment: NOSENKO is the only Soviet official known tc
CIA who claims to have occupied a position of
trust and who claims he was not a Party member
at the time.
In the period following, "to show his eagerness" and: "to
improve himself", NOSENKO asked for Party assignments.
For
more than a year he ran errands and collected newspapers and
performed other such tasks.
He stated that he applied for
Party membership in January 1956, was accepted as a candidate
member in 1956, and that he was
member in 1957.
accepted as a full Party
Conclusion
NOSENKO's claims about his Party activity do not sustain
his claims to KGB service, and they suffer from identical
discrepancies with respect to chronology, plausibility,
and contradiction by independent sources.
It is concluded
that NOSENKO was never a Komsomol secretary and, if a member
at all,
was no longer a member after reaching his twenty
sixth
birthday in October 1953.
The period in which he had
no Party status was twenty-eight months, not the fifteen he
claimed, and it covers the period of his first tour in the
Embassy Section as well as a portion of his initial Seventh
An officer unqualified for Party
membership is ineligible for KGB service
consequently, th
vidence provided by examination of NOSENKO's Party statu
indicates that he was not serving in the KGB through at
least a portion of the 1953-1956
period.
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Knowledge of Certain KGB Forms and Procedures
In the course of his various interrogations, NOSENKO had
occasion to. comment generally on various KGB forms and
procedures.
Interrogation on these points, however, developed
that while he was generally familiar with various aspects
unexpectedly there were some of which he was ignorant... Some
of these topics are described on page
in connection with
his KGB entry, and others which are described below.
KGB Forms
NOSENKO was familiar with the anketa, the KGB Personal
History: Statement, including its appearance, the nature
of
the questions included, and the purpose of the document.
However, he maintained that it was required to be completed
in two copies, that it could be completed outside of KGB
premises, and
that it consisted of four to six pages:
Comment:
The anketa is a detailed, sixteen page question-
naire.
As a sensitive document, it is not taken
from KGB premises.
Defectors'
describe its
completion as
"an experience not soon to be
forgotten".
If NOSENKO was a supervisor as he
claimed, he would recall the form from reviewing
personnel files in which the anketa is a.
prominent basic document.
NOSENKO maintained that he had never heard of the Communist:
files, but had never himself filled one out.
Asked in whose
personnel files he had seen the document, NOSENKO first said
those of civilians (interpreters, etc), and finally expressed
his belief that the KGB did not use the document.
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Comment: The form is completed by every KGB officer, and
while it is not of critical importance to the
KGB itself, a copy is filed in every officer':
personnel file, a fact known to any Komsomol
secretary or supervisor responsible for reviewing
KGB personnel files.
• NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the name of the KGB personnel
action form, and said he did not know of it. When its purpose
avd hother
was described to him, he gave a superficial description of
its content.
Comment:
A senior KGB officer would be familiar with the
form, which he would see on every occasion in
which one of his subordinates was promoted or
transferred.
NOSENKO was familiar with the Employment and Service
Record (Posluzhnoy Spisok), but he claimed he filled it out
only in "1958 or 1957".
Comment: The Employment and Service Record is completed
of 1958, NOSENKO With the ng that he completed
only four or five years after entering the
KGB:
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Visitor's Pass Procedures
NOSENKO has described procedures entailed in a non-KGB
visitor's gaining access to a KGB installation, but he
maintained that the interviewer's name did not appear on, the
visitor's pass.
(See p. 70.).
Comment::
The interviewer's name does appear on the pass,
a fact which a
senior officer of more than a
decade's KGB Headquarters service would recall,
since he would have frequent occasion to admit
visitors to KGB buildings.
Name Checks. of KGB Central Files
NOSENKO on many occasions claimed that in connection with
his direction of an operation he personally performed the
check of the target's name against KGB files: Prominent
among these cases.were BURGI (see p.115). and ABIDIAN (p•205) •
06
Comment:
NOSENKO could not describe specifically how he
performed the name checks he claimed, and his.
description contained numerous errors of fact.
Among these were assertions that the Militia
retained court records of all Soviet citizens,
and that the First Special Department holds its
criminal index
security card indices.
как с
separate from political and
NOSENKO was unfamiliar
with the KGB term spetsproverka, meaning a
clearance check.
Despite NOSENKO's claim that
he performed name checks of American Embassy
personnel, he pleaded ignorance of any aspect
of the files held by the First Chief Directo-
rate, where any KGB
recora on foreigners is
kept.
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Conclusion
NOSENKO's ignorance of the foregoing forms and procedures
he tunctions he claime du incupy the position nor perfor
tigerto,
Awards and Decorations
Since 1964 NOSENKO has claimed to have received various
awards, commendations, and decorations for his KGR service.
His
assertions are material to any judgment of his general
credibility and, as well of the validity of his claims to
having occupied various KGB positions.
In January 1964 NOSINKO mentioned that in 1962, shortly
after meeting with CIA in Geneva, he received the Order of
Lenin for ideas which he developed to "enlarge the experience
and
improve the quality" of Second Chief Directorate per-
sonnel in Moscow.
In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked about
his awards, and he first said he received the Order of the
Red Banner, then corrected himself to say he received first
the Order of the
Red Star.
He confirmed that he received
the Order of Lenin,
in 1963.
(Earlier he had said 1962,
"just following visiting Geneva"
•] He claimed he received
Department assignment, but when he was asked what recruit-
ments justified his receipt of the award, he said the main
task of the Seventh Department was not to make recruitments,
but to counter the hostile intelligence service operations.
[For his contradictory statements regarding the Seventh
Department's mission, see pages 103 and 326.] The Order
of Lenin was the highest decoration for which
a KGB officer
is eligible, NOSENKO said, and besides himself, the Chief
and former Chief of the Seventh Department received it.
NOSENKO said he received in 1962 the Order of the Red Star,
he "thought" for his service in the Embassy Section in 1960-
1961, not for Seventh Department service; no explanation
accompanied that decoration.
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The question of NOSENKO's awards, orders and decorations
were of some interest to the interrogators since they might
reflect the importance the KGB attached to particular
operational activities
in which NOSENKO engaged.
However,
before the April 1964 interrogations were suspended, NOSENKO
retracted his claim. that he received the Order of Lenin,
saying that it was just an idle boast. GRIBANOV; NOSENKO
explained, had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV,
and KOVALENKO would receive the. Order of Lenin "for creating
the Central Operational Communications System of the second
Chief Directorate" within the Seventh Department, but the
award had not materialized before NOSENKO left for Geneva in
January 1964.
Comment:
Earlier NOSENKO claimed
he received the Order
for ideas he developed "to enlarge the experi-
ence and improve the quality of Second Chiêt
Directorate personnel". Questioned, NOSENKO
reverted to the earlier claim.
In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked.
to
list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations,
and bonuses he had received in his KGB career..
He replied
that he received nothing from 1953 until 1956, when he
received a commendation and one month's pay for the recruit
06
ment of BURGI, [see p.115] by order of the KGB Chairman Serov •
GRIBANOV informed him of the commendation, NOSENKO said, and
NOSENKO saw his name on the list of recipients which was
circulated. No written certificate accompanied the commen-
dation, according to NOSENKO, but personnel recorded the
event in each KGB recipient's personnel file. Almost every
year after 1956, NOSENKO stated, he received something,
"perhaps on the KGB anniversary, or May Day; Or Army Day"
In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO did not recall exactly, he received
"something" from GRIBANOV, "maybe on the anniversary of the
Soviet Army": GRIBANOV!s
deputy; PERFILYEV, made the presen-
tation at an assembly of officers
. in the KGB Headquarters
auditorium. NOSENKO said he received in 1959 a second
commendation and one month's pay from KGB Chairman Shelepin
IIBR
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.06
06
for "several recruitments, including Americans MERTENS, DREW,
(FRIPPEL" and three British citizens whose names he could
not recall.
Along with a large group of KGB officers, NOSENKO
received a commendation from GRIBANOV in 1960, he said, "for
good work in general".
He received in 1961 the Order of the
Red Star, he stated, with a group of Second Chief Directorate
case officers "for general good work"; IVASHUTIN made the
presentation, which included a medal and a certificate which
the officer may retain.
Comment: A week later, NOSENKO said that he received this
award in December 1962. He said he recalled
that the presentation was planned for the KGB
Anniversary on 20 December, but the presentation
was delayed and not made until the end of the
month.
In 1962, NOSENKO claimed, he received another commendation
from GRIBANOV for "general good worl:", and he also received
the Unblemished Service Award for ten
years' service.
Comment: At this juncture his interrogators reminded
NOSENKO that his most recently claimed date
of entry to the KGB was March 1953, and that
in 1962 he would only have had nine years'
service. NOSENKO said that he could not under-
stand why, but he was certain he received the
service award after his return from Geneva in
1962. (The date is consistent with NOSENKO's
earlier retracted claim that he entered the
The following day NOSENKO
announced that he recalled why he received the
medal in 1962 rather than in 1963; the medal
as to KGB
officers, and prior military service is taken
into account in computing KGB officers' time
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Comment:
(Continued)
in service. NOSENKO entered the Naval RU in
1950, he said, and should have received the
medal in 1960, but did not because of some
administrative mixup.
(See p-56 for NOSENKO' s
eventual claim that he entered the RU in 1951.)
In 1963, NOSENKO said, he received another commendation from
inspiring the Seventh Department' on 20 December 1963, the
KGT anniversary®
NOSENKO said because he left for Geneva;
he did not actually receive the medal. (NOSENKO arrived
in Geneva on 19 January 1964.]
Interrogated in August 1965 regarding his claim to having
received a commendation from KGB Chairman Shelepin for his
recruitment of the three Americans and three British citizens
in 1959, NOSENKO said that he was nominated for the Order
of the Red Banner for these successful' recruitments, but he
did not
receive it, probably because he transferred to the
American Embassy Section at that time:
Comment:
NOSENKO apparently is referring to the KGB
practice of conferring decorations on KGB
anniversary, 20 December.
NOSENKO claims he
transferred
to the Embassy Section in January.
When NOSENKO's claims to various KGB awards was reviewed
with him during the October 1966 interrogations, he said
that during his KGB service he had received only the Red
Army anniversary medal and an award for satisfactory comple-
tion of ten years! service, and that he had received no KGB
award, decoration, or commendation for his operational work.
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Conclusion
NOSENKO's claims to having been the recipient of various
awards for KGB service are inextricably linked with his
claimed operational
successes, his rank, and GRIBANOV's
patronage, on all of which topics he had made virtually
categoric retractions.
NOSENKO's Sourcing
NOSENKO cited four general sources for KGB operations he
has related, and in all four there have been inconsistencies,
contradictions, and retractions.
Three of these categories,
each with an example typifying the difficulty of judging the
O6 JOHNSONY of his sourcing, are personal participation .F.
p. 268) cases
learned in the course of specific
Obofficial duties (SHUBIN, P. 296), and information obtained
informally from KGB colleagues (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON,
p.24 ).
The fourth category of sourcing relates to the
notes of KGB operations which he brought to CIA in Geneva
in 1964.
Regarding the notes, NOSENKO said he collected them at
various opportunities
in order to bring them to CIA.
He
kept them in a
wall safe in the: office which he occupied as
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
[In this connection,
NOSENKO admitted that not all offices had such wall safes,
and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but
asserted that his did.]
Most of the notes are in NOSENKO'S
handwriting:
Those that are not include the only copy of a
typed top secret summary report from one of the Seventh
Department section chiefs, a similar handwritten report by
another Seventh Department officer, and a carbon copy of a
KGB document which summarized the recruitment of an Austrian l|
businessman.
NOSENKO Said he copied the date for the
remaining notes from such sources as the "Special File",
which was held ordinarily by the Seventh Department Chief.
According to NOSENKO, he obtained access
to it for various
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reasons from time to time.
The "Special File" contained no
true names, however, and NOSFNKO said he obtained such true
names as were included in his notes by asking various case
officers for them. Questioned on case after case which
appeared in his notes, NOSENKO insisted that he had written
everything, he could learn, and could add nothing more.
Conclusion
NOSENKO's sourcing for many of the events he has related
is not credible:
NOSENKO'S KGB Rank
When he first met with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO
identified himself as a KGB officer holding the
rank of
major. He said at that time that he had served the requisite
time in grade and expected to be promoted shortly to the
rank of lieutenant
colonel
On defecting in 1964 NOSENKO
said that he was a lieutenant colonel:
In the course of his
career as he initially described it, his military rank pro-
motions had generally parallelled his assumption of
successively greater supervisory
responsibilities, culminating
in his becoming Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
Under interrogation, however, questioning about his rank
has evoked a series of inconsistent and contradictory state-
ments leading to his eventual assertion that he had never
advanced beyond the rank of captain.
The matter of NOSENKO's
statements about his rank is significant with respect. to his
general credibility, to the fact that he brought to Geneva
in 1964 a KGB document identifying him as a lieutenant
colonel, and to the paradox that as a company grade officer
he held supervisory positions in which KGB officers of
significantly senior rank were his subordinates.
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In June 1962 NOSENKO volunteered that he was then a major,
but that he would soon be promoted to lieutenant colonel.
In 1964, in Frankfurt awaiting transportation to the
United States, NOSENKO reviewed and approved a biographic
statement which included the claim that he had been a senior
lieutenant in the American Embassy Section from 1952 (sic)
until 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major
in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963.
In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO claimed that
at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954 [not in 1952].
he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant. When it
was pointed out to him that that was less than a year after
he. entered.the KGB, he asserted that his Naval RU service •
was taken into consideration.
Asked in June 1964 to list his promotions, chronologically,
NOSENKO asserted that he became a senior lieutenant in 1953,
in 1956 a captain, in 1959 a major and, in October lin
Geneva, just afterwards, he said November] 1963, he was
advised
by Personnel that he had been promoted to lieutenant
colonel and afterwards was personally congratulated by
General GRIBANOV.
NOSENKO did not recall the month of his
earlier promotions.
Comment: KGB defectors have commented that it would be
unusual for a KGB officer not to recall his
date of rank, from which he computes his
seniority and time in grade towards his next
promotion.
In January 1965, while discussing his role as case officer
for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volun-
teered out of context that he had never been a major nor was
he promoted to captain in 1956, as he had claimed earlier.
He explained that he became eligible for captain in 1956,
but his promotion was withheld as punishment because he had
obtained treatment for a venereal disease under an alias,
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with the use of KGB operational documents.
He stated that
thus he was a senior lieutenant still in 1959, and
although
GRIBANOV had promised him that he would be promoted directly
to major at that time, an administrative error was made in
the personnel office, and he was just promoted to captain.
Instead of rectifying
the mistake, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV.
persuaded him to remain a captain until (if a major) in 1963
he became eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel.
In October 1963, he concluded; he was promoted directly to
the rank of lieutenant colonel; he was never a major, and
he had served as senior lieutenant. from 1953 to 1959, and
a captain from 1959 to 1963.
Comment:
According to this chronology, NOSENKO was merely
a captain when he claimed to have been Deputy
Chief of the American Embassy Section, and
still a captain for much of the time that he
was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
In August 1965 interrogations NOSENKO still claimed that
he was proposed for advancement to captain in 1956, but he:
stated
that he was not promoted because of shortcomings in
his work. [He earlier had claimed he was being punished
for misuse of operational documents. 1
In response to his
interrogator's question, NOSENKO replied that he had claimed
earlier in 1962 and 1964 to have been a major because he
thought the truth would not have been believed.
In a voluntary statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO
alleged that he had been promoted to the rank of senior
lieutenant in 1956 [he earlier. claimed 19531, to captain in
December 1959 (he could not previously remember the monthl
and
that at the end of 1963 he was recommended for the rank
of major. Continuing, NOSENKO said he had never held the
rank of lieutenant
colonel, and the travel order [which he
brought to Geneva in 1964] indicating his rank as lieutenant
colonel, was filled out erroneously.
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NOSENKO said in October 1966 interrogations that he had
lied when he had claimed in 1964 to be a lieutenant colonel,
that actually he had been but a captain.
Asked why he had
claimed in 1962 that he had been a major, NOSENKO denied
that he had ever even mentioned his rank
to CIA in 1962.
Conclusion
NOSENKO has stated that he became a senior lieutenant in
the KGB in 1952, April 1953, 1954, Or. 1956.
He was promoted
to the rank of
captain in 1956 or September/October/December
1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant
colonel in October/November 1963. He brought to Geneva in
1964, an official KGB document dated November 1963 identifying
him as a KGB lieutenant colonel. In retracting his claim
that he was ever a major or lieutenant colonel, NOSENKO
asserts that nevertheless as a captain, he held the position
of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to
his KGB rank parallel and are apparently related to his
contradicted and
retracted claims regarding Naval RU
service, date of entry to the KGB, KGB assignments. and
positions held, and in short, to the totality of his claims
regarding KGB service, few of which are credible.
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CHAPTER X
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT
Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has
encountered among many would-be defectors, the question of
NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter considered early
after his defection in Geneva.
From the time of his arrival
the United States he has been under psychiatric observa-
tion. In addition, he has undergone psychological examina-
tion. The CIA psychiatrist and psychologist, besides being
highly-qualified professionals, have both had extensive
experience with Soviet Bloc defectors. Their findings were
reached independently.
Psychological Examination
In April 1964 NOSENKO was administered a series of
psychological tests by the CIA psychologist.
After monitoring
numerous interrogation sessions, the psychologist interviewed
NOSENKO for fourteen days during 321 April 1965, in an
attempt to develop sufficient insight into NOSENKO's persona-
lity to permit the obtaining of a truthful account of his
life.
Findings
NOSENKO is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive
person clearly capable of dissembling for personal reasons.
He is not a compulsive liar.. He
is inclined to relate what
he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the
truth as he knows it. He lies by design as well as for
effect, however, and
he does not always embroider just to
bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychotic, and
he suffers from no "delusions". NOSENKO's rationalizations
are not the product of derangement.
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Psychiatric Examination
Since April 1964 NOSENKO has been under the observation
of the CIA psychiatrist. Besides monitoring many of the
interrogation sessions,
the psychiatrist has visited
NOSENKO
weekly for the first year, monthly until
1967, and at some-
what less frequent intervals since.
Findings
NOSENKO is neither psychotic nor neurotic. Of above
average intelligence, he is shrewd, perceptive,
adaptable. His memory is not defective. Besides suffering
from ordinary lapses of memory, however, he sometimes
falsely claims lack of recall. NOSENKO's thought processes
are unimpaired; he is rational and fully capable of distin-
guishing fact from fiction.
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT: Conclusion
The findings of the psychologist and psychiatrist dispel
the notion that NOSENKO's behavior and his
statements are
other than willful.
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in
successively senior positions of authority from which he
derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and
results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet
Union in the period. 1953-1963.
To substantiate his claim,
he provides an impressive array of information about KGB
personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent
that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his
bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelli-
gence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's
claims.
The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known
facts and reasonable surmise.
The examination reflects
the test to which
his accounts
were put:
whether his
accounts are internally coherent and
consistent with known
fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has
from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held.
In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own
accounts?
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(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)
This examination had led to the following findings,
arrived at independently:
-NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the
capacities or at the places and times he claimed.
-NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at
the time he claimed.
-NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section
throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.
-During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior
case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Depart-
ment American-British Commonwealth Section.
-NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American
Embassy Section nor
a senior officer or supervisor in
the Section during the period 1961-1962.
-NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the
American-British Commonwealth Section and was
thereafter
a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.
-NOSENKO has no valid. claim to certainty that the KGB
recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and
his defection in 1964.
These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of
probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance
of available evidence in
each instance.
The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive
evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides.
The contradictions in
NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so
extensive as to make his claims
as a whole unacceptable.
While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be
established with certainty, it is evident that truth and
fact are not what NOSENKO relates.
By almost any test,
virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by
fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own
statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus
he is not a bona fide defector.
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(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)
Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide
defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true
motives for contacting American Intelligence and for.
providing the information he has given. Here, it must be
recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's
own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions:
Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored.
The character
of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some
of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet offi
cials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's
future all require that at least a provisional judgment be
made.
Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's
misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a
swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of
personal advantage;
that he suffers from a deranged person-
ality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated
his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply
personal reasons; Of, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB
agent.
The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That
NOSENKO is not
simply a swindder who falsely claims
for
personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident,
we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization,
personnel
and operations which he has provided and which
could only derive from within the KGB itself.
Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and
psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out
the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the
product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind.
It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB
officer who served in at least some of the components for
some or all of the
time periods that he claims, but who
greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to infor-
mation, and invented some matters outright, to achieve
greater status with American Intelligence.
This explanation,
however, fails to accommodate the fact that, several KGB
officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior
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positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with
respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall
telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own
invention, since these were the subject of comment by other
sources.
Because none' of the above explanations is consistent with
the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we
are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by
the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the
anomalies, none of them renders it untenable.
In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, Or
other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that
the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was
dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires
that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and
that his information should be assessed accordingly.
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Annex B
Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text
There follow NOSENKO's descriptions of KGB operations
involving Americans which do not clearly relate to specific
KGB positions he held at particular times and which thus
could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB
service.: The cases include, for example, Seventh Department
operations of which he said he learned while serving in the
American Department, and vice versa, as well as operations
conducted by KGB elements other than the Second. Chief Direct-
orate.
Unless otherwise specified, each entry reflects all
of the information NOSENKO provided;
-06
ACTOR PROCTOR
NOSENKO's Information
:06
An American known as ACTOR or PROCTOR is a valuable
First Chief Directorate agent who travelled overtly to
Western Europe and there obtained other documents with
which
to continue clandestinely to the USSR.
Comment:
The lead may refer to one Vernon w. PROCIOR,
who
visited the Soviet Union in the summer
•of 1963.
The investigation is not complete:
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in notes he brought to Geneva in
1964
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06
ALBINGER, Donald
NOSENKO's Information
C
FALBINGER,
an American
citizen born in 1937, visited the
USSR in 1963 and there was the target of a KGB investigation
in Sochi because he was believed to be an American Intelli-
gence agent.
In Sochi ALBINGER was in touch with a KGB
agent,
"TRAPEZUND".
06
By NOSENKO's account, the [ALBINGER case was directed
by a provincial KGB element while NOSENKO was assigned to
the Seventh Department in Moscow.
Comment: According to the FBI, Donald ALBINGER] visited
the Soviet Union in 1963 and while there, in
Sochi, was associated with one Gazarian
OHANNES (sic, probably Oganes GAZARYAN) ,
Lebanese national who repatriated to the USSR
in the 1920's.
OHANNES allegedly offered
D6 (ÄLBINGER] intelligence-type photos which
06 ALBINGER said he refused to accept.
ALLOYAN,
06
Lawrence
NOSENKO's Information
An American of Armenian background, ALLOYAN visited the
USSR in November 1963 and contacted the KGB.
He stated to
KGB officers that he had been asked by an American Army
captain and military intelligence officer, to inform the
KGB of American Intelligence use of the Monterey Language
School. The Army captain's name is possibly Hugo VAN KRAKOV 0(
O6 when AzoA lanned to contact him.
NOSENKO noted the case
a tourist, first contacted the KGB in Moscow
through a Seventh Department case officer.
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•(Annex B)
Comment:
Interviewed by the FBI in January 1965,
ObALLOYAN denied having been in the USSR
in 1963.
He stated that he was acquainted with a Hugò 06
_VAN KRAKOW who had a son of the same name,
but
disclaimed knowledge that the latter was an
Army captain.06 ALLOYAN] said he had not seen
the sen for twenty years. The younger VAN06
KRAKOW was interviewed by the FBI and said
that he was discharged from the Army in 1953
as a staff sergeant, and that he was not In
contact with ALLOYAN.. 06
NOSENKO's Information
was limited to that
contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964
APISSON, Henry] 06
NOSENKO's Information
06
An American citizen of Armenian origin, Henry EPISON
(sic) was recruited by the KGB of the ArmenIan SSR in
April 1963, on ideological grounds. The recruitment was
believed not to have been firm, however, and the: KGB
planned to renew it if EPISON returned to the USSR in 1964.06
06EPISON had access
to a military installation in the New
York suburbs:
Comment:
- 06
Henry APISSON
• a naturalized Anerican and the
owner of
a hotel and restaurant near West: 00
Point, N.Y, visited the USSR in 1963.
In
1964 he acknowledged having had contacts with
Soviet officials in 1963 in Armenia, where he
may have conveyed animpression of villingness
to
see them if they should later visit westo
Point. 06APISSON claimed he did not realize the
approach
was for intelligence purposes.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in notes brought to Geneva
in 1964.
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06
ARMSTRONG, Robert
NOSENKO's Information
06, 08
CARMS IRONG,
the American Ambassador's aide, is known by
the KGB to be.having a homosexual affair with
a code clerk 0X,U6
of the Danish Embassy, one Johannes BUHLE
ARMSTRONG is
a
close friend of another homosexual officer of the American
Embassy, Stephen HOFFMAN, (see below).
Comment:
Recalled from Moscow and interviewed on
the
basis of NOSENKO's allegation, [ARMSTRONG) 06
acknowledged the truth of the allegations.
Before resigning from the Department of State
in August 1964, he asserted that he had had no
contact with the KGB while serving in Moscow.
NOSENKO provided no source for his infor-
mation regarding (ARMSTRONG, which was a
06
Embassy Section case at a time when NOSENKO
claimed to be serving in the Seventh Depart-
ment.
06
BARTHELEMY, Thomas Franklin
NOSENKO's Information
06
[BARTHELEMY twice led American tourist groups to the USSR
in 1959, during which visits the KGB assessed him to be an
American Intelligence agent.
He was subsequently in contact with
one V-AU LA
LAINE, a Finn who was a KGB
agent.
NOSENKO only learned
of
the BARTHE
ELEMY case and of his
Do contact with LAINE while visiting the Leningrad KGB
in 1963.
ObBARTHELEMY's Seventh Department file indicated that he had
been under
surveillance in 1959 because the KGB had informa-
tion he had graduated from an intelligence school.
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(ANNEX B)
Comment:
06
BARTHELEMY) was a CIA contact whose
intelligence
connections were assumed to have been compromised
during his visits to
He reported his
contacts with LAINEd GIA. FARTHELENT's name O6
appeared in the KGB document on Western tourist
operations.which GOLITSYN provided CIA.
(See p. 149 .)
Ti.. -
06
BERMAN, Harold
NOSENKO's Information
While on one of his frequent visits to the Soviet Union,
American lawyer and prominent professor of law BERMAN was Ub
surrounded by KGB agents, but the KGB "could do nothing with
him'
Comment:
06
BERMAN 1s a professor at Harvard
University!
who is a specialist in the Soviet legal system.
He has visited
the USSR on several occasions
for study and research, and he had described
several incidents which occurred in Moscow
which appear to
have been KGB provocations.
NOSENKO: did not indicate the source of
his
Obinformation on BERMAN, nor did he provide the
date he acquired the information.
06
BINDER, Peter
NOSÉNKO's Information
The "top sergeant.
On charge of America House"
BINDER
was involved with a Soviet female employee at America House,
with whom at
various times he had been intimate in his room.
He obtained for her items of clothing from the United States.
Since the KGB had been unable to obtain compromising photo-
Do graphs of BINDERJand the soviet girl, it had no means to
exert pressure on him, and a recruitment attempt thus failed.
403
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(Annex B)
06
BINDER, Peter (Continued)
NOSENKO later identified the Soviet girl as Galya MORELLI,
a KGB agent employed at America
louse as a dishwasher.
Vladimir DEMKIN of the Embassy Section was the case officer
Obworking against BINDER, and
the Chief of the American
Department S.M. FEDOSEYEV participated in the recruitment
attempt, in 1962, by which time
NOSENKO had transferred to
the Seventh Department and thus
knew no further details.
Comment:
U.S. Army Master Sergeant Peter BINDER served
às manager of the America House frow i6 March 08,09
196T to 22 January 1963. On 15 January 1963 he
reported to Embassy officials that he had been
abducted off the street by Soviet plainclothes-
men, taken to a Militia station, and interro-
gated
on the substance of a letter alleged to
have been written by Galya MORELLI, which his
interrogators threatened to send to thé
The letter alleged that BINDERj06
had lived with MORELLI as "man and wife" from
25 November 1961, had warned Soviet employees
against Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN,
that MORELLI had told BINDER she was pregnant 06
)b and BINDER instructed her to get an abortion,
had
engaged in blackmarketing, BINDER] had 06
told ABIDIAN's replacement Hugh MONTGOMERY
about his affair with MORELLI and MONTGOMERY
06
had told him not to worry about it, and that
(BINDER]had told MORELLI that Embassy Officer
Richard C. JACOB was a "well-trained spy" and
that she and other Soviets should be wary of
him.
When BINDER denied the allegations
and 06
challenged the interrogators to send the
letter on to the Ambassador, he was allowed
to go free-06 BINDER] acknowledges that he was
intimate with MORELLI and that he gave her
gifts of money and clothing; and that she
said she thought she was pregnant in February
or March 1962; she never mentioned an abortion
and made no other demands of BINDER.
(BINDER
06
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Comment:
: (Continued)
states that MORELLI "disappeared" in June or
July 1962, while BINDER was
on leave. 06
Except for dating the recruitment attempt
in 1962 instead of 1963, NOSENKO's fragmentary
information coincides with BINDER's account. 06
NOSENKO asserts that the notes brought to
Geneva in 1964 contained all information he
was able to discover.
NOSENKO claims to have
been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section in:
1961, supervising BINDER's and MORELLI's case 06
officers, but he relates his knowledge of the
case neither.
to that period nor to the position
he then held.
BROCHES, Adam 06
NOSENKO's Information
BROCHES, born in 1896, visited the Soviet Union with a
tourist group in 1960. He has relatives in the USSR,
and
he was recruited in September 1960 by the KGB on ideological
grounds:
Comment:
BROCHES was born in 1890. His brother,
06
Alexander) was born in 1896. COLIISYN reported
that a Seventh Department officer told him in
061960 that Adam BROCHES had been a Soviet agent
in the 1920's and 1930's in Paris and that
when he visited the USSR as a tourist guide in
1959 or 1960 the KGB suspected that he might
be on an Amèrican Intelligence mission to
contact V.M. ZARURIN, his one-time Soviet
Intelligence superior in Paris. According to
GOLITSYN,
the KGB placed BROCHES under surveil-'Ot
lance, and, he
lance and the Chief of the Seventh Department
was planning to discuss with ZARUBIN what
the KGB should take.
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UX
Comment:
(Continued)
06
Interviewed by the FBI, BROCHES] said that
he escorted tours to the USSR three times
1960, and that on his last trip, in September
1960, he was approached by Soviet officials
for information on members of his tour group.
06 BROCHES claimed he refused to cooperate
and
O6 BROCHES said, however, that the allegation
that he had ever been a Soviet agent.
might refer to another of his brothers, Ignacy, 0b
now dead.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in his written notes which he brought
to Geneva in 1964.
NOSENKO claimed to have
been in the American Department when the
Seventh Department recruited BROCHES. 06
06
BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter
06
NOSENKO's Information
BUNDARIN, born in 1917, the son of a Russian emigre, and
"Four Winds Travel Agency" in New
York 29
the KGB in 1962 on ideological
grounds. He left the Four Winds agency and his case is >0
inactive because the KGB is waiting for him to open his own
Eravel bureau l BUNDARIN|was handled by Seventh Department
case officer V.G. DERA.
06
Comment:
[BUNDARIN, born 25 April 1917, the son of an
emigre and an employee of the Eour Winds 29
agency visited the Soviet Union for eighteen
days
In
in 1962 to travel abroad, and he now works
1962. He left the four Winds agener?
06
Travel of California. Interviewed by
the FBI, BUNDARIN denied ahy connection with
Soviet Intelligence.
FBI reports
indicate
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• (Annex B)
Comment:
_(Continued.)
06 BUNDARIN and parents associate with CPUSA
members and participate in CP front organiza-
tion activities..
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in his written notes which
he
brought to Geneva in 1964.
CHRISTNER,
06
Robert Charles
NOSENKO's Information
While reviewing after his defection in 1964 a list of
06.
Americans who had visited the Soviet Union, NOSENKO noted
that one (CHRISTNER] had been arrested while touring the
Soviet Union by automobile.
He did not indicate the source
or date of his
acquisition of the information.
Comment:
As described
in press
accounts of the period
and stated in a KGB document. on American
tourists which GOLITSYN provided, (CHRISTNER) 06
was arrested in the Soviet Union on
i charges
of espionage in the summer
of 1961.
He had
CIA
he had
mission at the time, but he reported that
managed to maintain his tourist cover
throughout his intensive interrogations.
In'
the summer of 1961 NOSENKO claims he was in the
Embassy Section of the American Department.
FAIN,
06
Thomas
06
NOSENKO's Information
FAIN,
visited
-an "American consul"
Moscow in 1959:
stationed in Yugoslavia, |
During that visit he encountered
NOSENKO's agent, VOLKOV, who reported his suspicion that
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Top Secret
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•O6
FAIN, Thomas
(Continued)
O6 [FAIN
a homosexual.
FAIN
visit to arrange
There was insufficient time during
entrapment.
Do PAINI was
KGB planned
assigned permanently later in Moscow, and the
at
that time
entrap him with
a homosexual.
Comment:
In a Department of State security interview
D6 FAIN has stated that he recalled no Soviets
whom he had met during his five-day visit to
Moscow in 1959, except a female Inturist
guide and the Hotel Ukraine receptionist.
He
reported no noteworthy incidents during his
later permanent assignment in Moscow.
06
FINK, David
NOSENKO's Information
06
frequent
FuN 8 an American
an American professor from Philadelphia and
visitor to the USSR whom the Leningrad KGB hoped
to recruit on an ideological basis and through the use of a.
female agent.. Because of his sister's love affair with a
Soviet he was refused a visa in 1963, but the KGB has
arranged so that he will be admitted to the USSR if he
applies again.
NOSENKO learned of the case when the
Leningrad KGB objected tolFINK's being denied a visa: 06
NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the
time.
08
Comment:
06
Interviewed by the FBI in September 1964,
FINK acknowledged that his sister was trying 08
to marry a Soviet citizen, but
that she had
been refused a visa to visit the USSR for the
purpose do EINK admitted involvement with
female in Leningrad, during his
a
visit to the
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(Annex B)
Comment:
(Continued)
USSR in 1961,
but denied recruitment
FINK 06
asserted that he had visited Europe every
summer
since 1957 (except in 1959; when he
went to Mexico), and that he
had only visited
the USSR once, in 1961.
06
FISK, Norman
06.
NOSENKO's Information
FISK visited the USSR
as a tourist in 1959, when he was
assessed to be a homosexual." The KGB planned to attempt to
recruit him if he returned to the Soviet Union.
NOSENKO
Obnoted FISK's name while reviewing files of YEFREMOV and
VOLKOV (see p• 145) in 1963=
06
Comment:
FIsK)visited the USSR with his wife and parents
in 1959.
In an interview with the FBI in
December 1964 he claimed that his only Soviet
contacts in the USSR were with Inturist
personnel and a spinster niece. NOSENKO has
never explained why he learned of the case
only..from
the files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in
1963, since he claims he was their case officer
at the time FISK visited the Soviet Union, in
1959•
06
'06
GINSBERG, Michael
NOSENKO's Information
A professor GINSBERG
visitéd the USSR in 1957 or 1958,
when
operational contact
established between him and
the KGB.
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Comment:
One Professor Michael GINSBERG reported to U.S.
officials in Helsinki in August 1956 that he
had been the target of a Soviet recruitment
attempt earlier in Moscow. His contact has
been identified by CIA as a KGB officer whom
06 GINSBERG,
according to the FBI, has met during
subsequent visits to the USSR.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in his written notes which he
brought to Geneva in 1964.
06
GROVER, Preston
NOSENKO's Information
06
08
GROVER,
currently (in 1964) Associated Press corres-
pondent in Moscow, is a
recruited KGB agent handled by the
Tenth Intelligensia and Correspondents) Department of the
Second Chief Directorate.
Comment:
06
(Preston GROVER,
retired in 1965 and now lives
In France with his wife. D GROVER's wife was
born in Russia and apparently emigrated
about the time of the 1917 Revolution. GROVER! 06
met her in Moscow, where she was a corres-
pondent for a French newspaper. According to
FBI reports, she associated with known
Communists in the United States. during an
earlier assignment here.
NOSENKO indicated
no source of his
information on GROVER. 06
q/BR
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06
HAMZAVI, Charles P.
NOSENKO's Information
An American, one Charles KHAMZAI) (sic) was the object of
considerable interest to the KGB during his 26 October-1
November 1963 visit to the USSR. A KGB officer under cover
was in contact
with him in Moscow and the KGB planned to
resume this contact in the United States.
The Seventh
Department action with respect to KHAMZAI was in response Of
to a request from the First Chief Directorate for assis-
tance in developing a contact with him in Moscow.
Comment:
NOSENKO's lead has been identified as Charles: 06
P. HAMZAVI, who has been noted in frequent
contact with Soviet officials from. 1955, when
he immigrated to the United States, until 1963.
According to the FBI, he was in Moscow in 1963,
when he was in contact with a Foreign Ministry
official which CIA identifies as. KGB officer
I.D. BORISOV.
HARMSTONE, Richard
NOSENKO's Information
In 1958 or
the American Department's Embassy Section
attempted to recruit dArMstoNe, a second of third Secretary 06,0F
at the Embassy. Both male
and
female agents were used?
against him, and photographs were obtained of HARMSTONE's, 06
homosexual as well as heterosexual activities. When confronted,
Obhowever, HARMSTONE refused to collaborate with the KGB:
OC HARMSTONE reported
the approach to American officials, but
asserted that he was involved just in heterosexual compromise.
NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV documents (see p. 309)
1964, including the KGB plan of operations against @ARMSION. 06
NOSENKO confirmed the substance and eventual success of the
plan, which
was to get HARMSTONE drunk and photograph him
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06
HARMSTONE, Richard] (Continued)
while in intimate relations
with a Soviet girl.
Because the
KGB concluded that (HARMSIONE had not reported the homo- 06
sexual compromise, it was planned to attempt to recruit him
again later, when
he was transferred
elsewhere abroad.
If
D6 HARMSTONE had reported the homosexual compromise, it would
have been
monitored by the KGB over the microphone in the
Minister Counselor's office.
In later questioning NOSENKO stated that he learned o
the HARMSTONE case from KOVSHUK. He could not recall wh
the KGB case officer was, but was certain that the latter
had left the Embassy Section. If HARMSIONE had reported 06
his compromise, he surmised,
he would have been withdrawn
immediately from Moscow, and HARMSTONE] did not leave the 06
Soviet Union prematurely.
Comment:
06
Richard C. HARMSIONE, who served in Moscow Erom
October 1957 to October 1959 as Second 0809
Secretary, reported to the Embassy Security
Officer on 23 May 1959 that a KGB officer had
tried to recruit him after threatening exposure
through doctored photographs purporting to
show ¡ARMSTONE's homosexual activities. HARM- Of
STONE subsequently identified from a visa
application photograph the KGB officer as
"KOMAROV", an overt contact of Embassy
colleague WINTERS. [HARMSTONE]ieft the soviet06
Union six months later, admitted homosexual
activities, and resigned from the Department
of State.
The relevant portions of the
CHEREPANOV Papers confirm HARMSTONE's admissions U6
with
respect to KGB
agents
with whom he was
involved.
"KOMAROV" has
been identified as
KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior in the Embassy
Section
and the source of what NOSENKO said he
learned
of the
case.
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HOFFMAN, E. Stephen 06
NOSENKO's Information
08,06
An American Embassy official and a friend of the
Ambassador's 'äide Robert ARMSTRONG (see above), (HOFFMAN/06
Is known to have
engaged in homosexual acts with an Armenian
in Yerevan.
The KGB
currently (in 1964) is planning.to
attempt to compromise and recruit HOFFMAN.
06
Comment:
Interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allega-
06 tion, HOFFMAN in a State Department security
interview denied homosexual activities.
Informed that the results of a polygraph
examination indicated he had practiced deception
on that question, HOFFMAN resigned from the 06
Department of State on 3I July 1964. (HOFFMAN O6
asserted that
he had no contact with the ger
while assigned in Moscow, an assertion.
supported by the polygraph examination.
NOSENKO claims he was assigned to the
Seventh Department at the time HOFFMAN was 06;
the target of the Embassy Section of the
American Department.
06
HOWARD, Herbert]
06, 08
NOSENKO's Information
HOWARD, a USIA employee, was assigned temporarily for
four months to the Embassy in Moscow in spring 1962 as a
publications procurement officer. He was recruited by the
KGB.. GI. GRYAZNOV, of the American Department Embassy
Section, requested NOSENKO's help in obtaining a hotel room
adjacent to HOWARD's, for a woman from Leningrad.
06
0001645
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Comment:
06
06
HOWARD
denied recruitment in an interview with
the FBI, although a polygraph examination
indicated he was disturbed on related questions.
HOWARD had earlier declared his intention to
divorce his American wife and marry a Soviet
national.
. His contract with [ÜSIAexpired in 29
December 1964 and was not renewed.
NOSENKO claims to have been serving in the
Seventh Department at the time HOWARD) was a
target of the Embassy Section.
06
06
HUSION, Hayden Henry
NOSENKO's Information
06
One(HUSION' (nu) travelled to the USSR on official U.S.
Governnent búsiness from his assignment in Belgrade. Inl0
06 Moscow HUSION was photographed making a blackmarket deal
in a taxi, but the KGB did not exploit the incident because
06 (HUSION] did not again visit the USsR.
Comment:
08,06
USIA employee Hayden Henry HUSTON was inter-
Viewed on 30 October 1963
regarding a report
that he had been arrested in (Yugoslavial in lI
1954 as a result of his sexual
activities.
06
HUSTON!
served in Yugoslavia for eight years-ll
Fxom I953 until January 1962. During that
interview he stated that during his tour in
1D Belgrade he made two trips to the USSR, and he
asserted
that there were no other incidents in
|/ (Yugoslavial or
elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc
which could be used to
compromise him.
06
¿Currently on a USIA assignment in Taiwan,
has not
been interviewed
with respect to
(HUSTON)
NOSENKO's
allegation.
0001646
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JAFFE, Sam] 06
NOSENKO's Information
08
JAFFE, an ABC correspondeng in Moscow,
'is an active KGB
agent who was cultivated and recruited by .V.A. KUSKOV. In
1963, while in the Seventh. Department, NOSENKO asked Ameri-
can Department Embassy Section officer GRYAZNOV for an agent
who could be used against a visiting American delegation,.
and CRYAZNOV suggested JATFY
Comment: Before NOSENKO's information
was received,
O6 JAFFE] reported
his recruitment by one
"Slava
KISLOV" in October 1962:
•In a CIA interview
06 In December 1966 JAFFEldid not recognize A.K.
KISLOV's photograph but identified
photo-
graph öf KUSKOV as being the KGB öfficer who
recruited him in 1962. JAFFE was expelled Ob
from the USSR in October 1965.: As far as CIA
is aware, he has not been interviewed
on the
basis of
NOSENKO's information
KANTOR, Marvin
NOSENKO's Information
Melvin (sic) KANTOR,.
a Harvard student, was recruited on
ideological grounds in 1961.
His case was turned over to
the First Chief Directorate.
Comment:
Marvin KANTOR,
a Slavic-language instructor
at the University of Michigan, visited the USSR
in 1958 or 1959. When interviewed by CIA in
1961 bé admitted having had contact with Soviet
Intelligence officers in the Soviet Union in
1959, but asserted that he then had flatly
refused to collaborate with Soviet Intelligence.
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Comment:
(Continued)
When interviewed in 1963, KANTOR said he had
not travelled to the USSR since 1959.
NOSENKO's information was limited to written
notes brought in 1964 to Geneva.
NOSENKO
claims he was in the Seventh Department in
1959, at the actual time of KANTOR's recruit-
ment, and does not explain why the KANTOR Case
was included among cases he noted as having
occurred while he was in the Embassy Section
In 1960-1961:
KAZAN-KOMAREK] 06
NOSENKO's Information
06
(KOMAREK, an American of Czech descent and somehow
connected with a tourist service in the United States, has
been identified by the Czech Secret Police as being in
contact with Western Intelligence and they have been trying
to locate him.
The Czechs have learned that [KOMAREK] mighto
possibly visit the Soviet Union and have requested [the KGB]
that he be arrestedion arrival and deported
to Czechoslovakia.
The Soviets have agreed and Inturist is currently attempting
to Induce KOMAREK into visiting the Soviet Union.
Comment:
The subject of NOSENKO's lead was Vladimir 06
Joseph KAZAN-KOMAREK, a naturalized. American
citizen and the operator of the Harvard Iravel 29,10
Tourist Agency in Cambridge, Massachusettsith
He has never had any covert
relationship
CIA or other U.S.
intelligence agencies. In
August 1963 the FBI was advised by another
source of the Soviet-Czech plan
KOMAREK to the
Soviet Union and
to lure KAZAN- 06
take him to
Czechoslovakia
where hewould be tried for
espionage.
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Comment: (Continued)
NOSENKO's information, which he
reported
only to the FBI, was substantially
accurate
In October 1966, after being warned of the
risk by the FBI,
. KAZAN-KOMAREK visited Moscow 06
for an Inturist travel agents: conference and,
en route back to Paris, was arrested in Prague
when his AEROFLOT flight was diverted.
NOSENKO's sourcing for this lead, which
presumably relates to his 1962-64 service in
the Seventh Department, had not been established.
CIA did not learn of NOSENKO's report on KAZAN= 06
KOMAREK until the latter was arrested in
Czechoslovakia in 1966, by which time NOSENKO's
interrogation had been suspended.
06
MATLAW, Ralph
06
NOSENKO's Information
One MATLO (sic) visited the USSR, in 1959, and the KGB
concluded that he was a homosexual and planned to attempt
to recruit him if he should return to the Soviet Union.:
NOSENKO noted
the information while reviewing YEFREMOV and
VOLKOV's file prior to their retirement.
Comment:
The identity of NOSENKO's lead has been
confirmed to be one Ralph MATLAW.O6The case
1s still under Investigation.
NOSENKO claims
to have been YEFREMOV's and VOLKOV's case
officer at the time one of them was in touch
with MATLAW in 1959, but learned of the case
only later when reviewing those agents' files.
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06
NIELSEN, Philip
NOSENKO's Information
06
NIELSEN visited the USSR the first time in 1957 or 1958.
Because he made the acquaintance of some "teddy boys" in
Moscow and tried to acquire from them a copy of the Moscow
Telephone Directory, the KGB suspected that he was connected
no nutre ence it
with CIA. 6 NIELSEN was kept under surveillance during this
and all subsequent
intelligence tasks. On one of his visits to Moscow, NIELSEN 06
trips, ne
trips, but was never observed in other
tell In love with KGB agent Tamara KUNGAROVAl, and the KGB 06
used her in the development of NIELSEN. D6 For purposes of
assessment, LEONOV, a Seventh Department officer, was
Obintroduced to NIELSEN in the role of KUNGAROVA's father, but U6
NOSENKO heard later
06 Ograd married and were living in London.
that (NIELSEN U6
NOSENKO was involved in the determination of NIELSEN's 06
possible intelligence status on his first trip.
himself and LEONOV, American Department case officer Viktor
KOPEYKIN was
also involved.
Comment:
NOSENKO has asserted variously that he recruited
06 RUNGAROVA] in 1955 and that she was his agent
until 1960, and that she was already an agent
in 1958 when she transferred into the Seventh
Department from the British Commonwealth Depart-
ment.
(NIELSEN, a CIA agent at the time, visited
the Soviet Union in April 1958. One of his
tasks ön this trip was to obtain a Soviet
telephone book 06 NIELSEN, met KUNGAROVA) on a
06
later trip, in January 1959.
Despite CIA
warnings that he was involved in what appeared
to be a KGB operation, NIELSEN returned to see 06
her in Moscow in January 1960, and there met a
person representing himself as KUNGAROVA's
080b
father. Do NIELSEN returned to Moscow in 1962,
married KUNGAROVA, and they moved
to France.
KUNGAROVA died in France in 1965. In January
0001650
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(Annex B)
Comment:
(Continued)
1960,
when NOSENKO claims personal knowledge
ObOf NIELSEN's meeting with [KUNGAROVA's "father", 06
he was not in the Seventh Department, but in
the American Embassy Section.
NIXON,
06.
Dmitrly,
NOSENKO's Information
An American tourist, NIXON was recruited by seventh
Department case officers in June 1963. NOSENKO was not in
Moscow at the time, and knew no further details.
Comment:
06
Interviewed by the FBl on the basis
of NOSENKO's
Dinformation, NIXON admitted having been
recruited while visiting the Soviet Union. He
was not contacted by the KGB in the United
States, although such arrangements had been
made at the time of his recruitment.:
On a visit
i Mascow In 1964, after NOSINKO's defection.
was again contacted by the KGB and he
agreed
to collaborate. for fear of
reprisals
against relatives in the USSR
11
06
OMELICH, Paulj
NOSENKO's: Information
06
Olympics
OMELICH was contacted by KGB officers during the Winter
at Squaw Valley, California.
Although he was not
recruited, he was to be recontacted by KGB officers later,
in Switzerland•D When OMELICH visited Moscow in August 1963,
Department American Section case officer K.G. KRUPNOV
arranged for First Chief Directorate officer (fnu) ZAYTSEV
to meet the American.
419
Top Secret
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Comment:
06
In 1963 OMELICH reported his earlier contacts
with Soviet officials at Squaw Valley.
He
denied that he had ever met KGB officers later,
or that any meeting
arrangements were
made for
Switzerland, although he admitted "he may have
given the impression of sympathy toward Soviets".
PECHTER,
06
Bernard
06
NOSENKO's Information
(PECHTER]
was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in 1959.
Comment:
06
In December 1959, a month after PECHTER's
return from the USSR, the FBI learned that he
had revealed his homosexual compromise and
recruitment by the KGB to
a member of his tour
group. NOSENKO cited the PECHTER cäse not DE
from memory, but from his
written
notes brought
to Geneva in 1964. Although presumably a
Seventh Department case, NOSENKO did not
relate
It to his service there in 1959, nor did he
indicate the source of his information.
06
PRESSMAN, Aron
NOSENKO's Information
Patrick (sic) PRESSMAN visited: the USSR in October 1957
with a delegation of American metallurgists and was recruited
at that time by the KGB.. The case was
afterwards turned
over to the First Chief Directorate.
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Top Secret
(Annex B)
Comment:
NOSENKO's lead is believed to relate to Aron 06
PRESSMAN,
a long-time Communist and a friend
06 of Bernard KOTEN (sèe p.295), whose sister
has resided in the Soviet Union since her 1945
marriage to a Soviet citizen who has been
identified as a courier for Soviet Intelligence.:
06 PRESSMAN accompanied
a delegation of metallur-
gists from NXU on
exchange visit to the
Moscow Mining Institute in 1957; he himself
surveyed Soviet
language training programs
during this visit.
He denied any recruitment
approach was made to him there or on subsequent
trips. to the USSR:
06
NOSENKO cited the PRESSMAN case from his
written notes brought
-to Geneva in 1964. He
did not relate it to his Seventh. Department
service nor did he indicate
the source of his
information
06
PROCTOR, fnü
see ACTOR. D6
RASK, Walter] 06
NOSENKO's Information
06,08
RASK,
the president of world wide Tours, was recruited in
the USSR in 1960€
He has
returned to-the USSR several times
since: He is used for spotting tourists suspected of having
intelligence affiliations. The KGB 'has received only one
open code message
from RASK) since recruitment. RASK/was Ob
recruited by Seventh Department case officer Ye.
while NOSENKO was assigned to the American Department. On
subsequent visits to the USSR. he was met by Seventh Depart-
ment case officers of the American-British Commonwealth
Section.
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(Annex B)
Comment:
06
[RASK,
a former CIA contact who visited the USSR
several times, reported the KGB recruitment
approach in 1961.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in written notes he brought to Geneva
in 1964.
He did not relate the case to his
1962-1964 Seventh Department service.
06
ROBERTS, Spencer
NOSENKO's Information
ROBERIS]was recruited at the end of 1962 after being
compromised with a homosexual in Sochi, USSR.
The case was
turned over to the KGB First Chief Directorate, and ROBERIS 06
was recontacted by a KGB officer in the United
Of teached confereed his recruitment to the Til, nee of which
the KGB, and his KGB case officer in
the United
States was hastily recalled to Moscow.
ROBERTS) was handled by the American Department because
was a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow.
case officers were V.M.. MIKHAYLOV,. V.A. KUSKOV, and V.M.
KOVSHUK.
NOSENKO learned of the events in the U.S. from
B.Á. SOLOMATIN, a First Chief Directorate American Depart-
ment case officer.
06
Comment: [ROBERIShad been coopted as a CIA represen-
tative in Moscow in 1950, while he was a State
Department officer assigned to
the Embassy in
Moscow.
He confessed his recruitment by the
KGB to the FBI in the fall of 1962. He
was
contacted by a Soviet official from the UN in
New York in mid-1963. That official apparently
suddenly departed the United States in December
1963.
NOSENKO did not indicate the original
source of his information on (ROBERIS).
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ROSS,
Johanna
06
NOSENKO's Information
The former governess to the American Ambassador's family
who
• now (in 1964) teaches at the American school in Moscow
08.
was. recruited
by the KGB on the basis "of sexual involvements.
The case was handled by the American Department at the time
NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department.
Comment:
NOSENKO's Information was limited to written
notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He does not
indicate the source of his information.
06 ROSS reported to the American Embassy of
arfest in Kiev in 1958 on charges of immoral
behavior with a soviet citizen.
In a May 1965
FBI interview she admitted contact in Moscow
in September 1963 with the KGB; which stemmed
from her continued relationship with the same
Soviet citizen, but she denied that the KGB
attempted to
recruit her or contact here
thereafter..
06
RUFE, John
NOSENKO's Information
06
The KGB discovered that RUFE was a homosexual during his
visit to the
. When he returned to the USSR in
The case was only
of.
marginal value to the KGB, and it was
terminated in 1963.
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comment:
06
RUFE,
a New York City attorney, has admitted
that he had been compromised
while visiting
the USSR in 1962 and that he was in contact
with KGB officers in the United States until
November 1963.
NOSENKO did not relate the RUFE] case
specifically to his Seventh Department service
when he cited it from writen notes brought to
Geneva in 1964, nor did he indicate the source
of his information.
His notes
state that RUFE 06
was recruited on homosexual grounds by the
American-British Commonwealth Section of the
Seventh Department, jointly with the UKGB of
Leningrad Oblast.
06
SCHWARZENBACH, Collette
06
NOSENKO's Information
SCHWARZENBACH
who was working in Moscow at the time,
felt in love with a male KGB agent and was the target of an
unsuccessful KGB recruitment attempt in 1958 or 1959. The
KGB had incriminating photography, but NOSENKO did not
believe it was used, the KGB appeal being based solely
On
her affection for the Soviet people. V.M. MIKHAYLOV of
the American Department Embassy Section directed the opera-
tion. NOSENKO never read the [SCHWARZENBACH file, but he
later saw it and the incriminating photographs.
06
06,08,09
Comment:
(SCHWARZENBACH was during 1955 and 1956 secre-
Zary
to Mrs. BOHLEN, the wife of the American
Ambassador, and director of the Anglo-American
School lin Moscow.
for Henry SHAPIRO, United Press
In 1956 and 1957 she worked
in Moscow (see p. 76).
06
While employed by
correspondent] 06,0f
SHAPIRO she became acquainted with one Viktor
I. SERGEYEV, a Soviet publishing functionary.
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(Annex B):
Comment:
(Continued)
In January 1959
she was
approached in Riga by
a KGB officer who confronted her with incrimi-
nating photographs and solicited her cooperation
in providing information on the U.S. Embassy.
She, immediately reported the event to [SHAPIRO, DG
who informed then-Ambassador THOMPSON,: and
0b SCHWARZENBACH left the USSR shortly: thereafter
in early 1959%
She provided details of
the
KGB recruitment attempt to a State Department
Regional Security Officer in Genevajon 4 June
1959
NOSENKO
Aid not recall from whom he learned
of the SCHWARZENBACH] case, which was directed
by the: American Department Embassy Section
while
he was assigned to the Seventh Department.
06
SEREBRENNIKOV, Eugene Sergey
NOSENKO's Information
06
29:
In 1955-1957, (SEREBRENNIKON,
an employee. of the Library
Congress, visited Moscow with
Congressional delegation.
06. [SEREBRENNIKOV had a brother who was a Soviet citizen,
doctor living in Sverdlovsk. Assigned to
'the Seventh
Department at the time, NOSENKO himself arranged for the
brother to be brought to Moscow and briefed him for a
Obmeeting at which SEREBRENNIKOV would be "felt. out" as
prospective collaborator with the KGB. The meeting took
place, but the brother told the KGB that he had had no
opportunity to discuss with SEREBRENNIKOV] the possibility 06
of his helping the Soviet Unton. [SEREBRENNIKOV was in
only for a few days, and there was no opportunity
for another meeting. The KGB concluded that (SEREBRENNIROV's 06
suspicions were aroused by his brother's behavior.
6001657
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(Annex B)
Comment:
According to his 1964 interview with the FBI,
Do LSEREBRENNIKOV visited
the Soviet Union in 1956
in the company of Senator Henry H. Jackson:
On his last night in Moscow he received in his
hotel room a telephone call from a person
claiming to be his brother from Sverdlovsk,
whom he had not seen since 1918. The "brother"
requested a meeting, but SEREBRENNIKOV was 06
convinced from the caller
Ts uneducated speech
and other signs that he was not in fact
06 SEREBRENNIKOV's brother, and he refused
to see
Him 06 SEREBRENNIKOV immediately advised
Senator Jackson of the incident, as well as
Embassy officials.
After SEREBRENNIKOV, 06
returned to the United States, the incident
was described in an article in Newsweek
magazine.
SEVERN,
Gerald
siciane
NOSENKO's Information
06
SEVERN
• KGB cryptonym "EDVIN" was
recruited in Moscow
by the Seventh Department in 1958 or 1959 on ideological
grounds. He is a valuable all-purpose agent. His case
officer was V.M. IVANOV.
06
Comment:
Russian-born parents.
enjoys special
residence arrangements in
Moscow, and prior
to receipt of the NOSENKO lead he was suspected
to be a KGB agent.06 SEVERN has not visited the
United States since I961, and he has not been
interviewed by the FBI..
NOSENKO's information was limited to that.
contained in his written notes which he brought
to Geneva in 1964.
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06
SHATTAUER, SofIa Gretal
NOSENKO'S Information
06
In September 1962 SHATTAUER]visited the Soviet Union and
was recruited by Seventh Department case officer D.A.
DITYATEV.
She'had originally been recruited in Poland in
1946-1947 but she was never contacted again because the KGB
believed her to be known to American Intelligence.
Comment:
06
In 1962 an FBI source reported that (SHATTAUER]
stated she was looking forward to her trip to
the USSR and "to being away from the imperia-
list policies of the United States"
and that
06 SHATTAUER] "appeared enthusiastic about Russian
ideology"
. In July 1964 SHATTAUER] admitted to 06
the FBI that she had had Intelligénce contact
with Soviet officers in Poland in 1947 and that
she was recontacted by the KGB in September
1962 in Moscow, after which she periodically
met a KGB officer in New York City until May
1964.
• NOSENKO's
information was limited to that
contained in his written notes brought to
Geneva in 1964. He did not indicate the source
of his information.
06
SOCHURER, Howard
NOSENKO's Information
08,06
The former
Time-Life correspondent in Moscow, SOCHUREK,
was probably
recruited by the KGB and was an agent of
Vadim BIRYUKOVO SOCHUREK returned briefly to Moscow in
1962 when Seventh Department
surveillance noted his associa
tion with BIRYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth (Intelli-
gensia and Correspondents) Department of the Second Chief
Directorate.
0001659
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Comment:
06
(SOCHUREK who was assigned to Moscow in 1958-
1960, réported to the Embassy a number of
instances in which Soviet officials attempted
to pressure him or in which he was in touch
with identified KGB officers. SOCHUREK] has 06
named BIRYUKOV as the guide and interpreter
who invariably accompanied him while he was
stationed in the USSR.
NOSENKO has not
indicated the source of his information on
SOCHURER.
0.6
06
STEVENS,
Francis
NOSENKO's Information
06
08
STEVENS,
an American correspondent, visited the soviet
Unión in 1961 as a
tourist.
He was the target of American
Department officers KOVSHUK and KLYPIN, who entrapped him
with a Soviet female, accused him of rape, and blackmailed
him into accepting recruitment. His
KGB cryptonym was
Ob "SERGEY". STEVENS, however, described the recruitment
attempt in a letter to his mother which he deposited at
the Embassy. The letter was opened and read by the
Minister Counsellor, who immediately dictated a cable
summarizing the events described in the letter to the
Department of State.
The KGB monitored the dictation
through the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office.
First Chief Directorate officers nevertheless planned
to
resume contact with STEVENS in New York City.
Although a tourist and a correspondent, STEVENS) was
courtes are
the
concern of the Embassy Section because he was a former
member of the Embassy staff.
08
6001660
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(Annex: B)
Comment:
06
STEVENS.,
after his compromise concerned for
his safety for the remainder of his 1961 visit
to Moscow,
did deposit with the Embassy a
letter to his mother. However, he also gave
Ambassador Thompson a written report of the KGB
entrapment, immediately after the incident,
and he was interviewed about the matter by the
Minister Counsellor the following
day. Inter
viewed periodicallyiby the FBI following his
return to the United States in 1961, [STEVENS] 0G
has denied any further contact with the KGB.
According to the notes which NOSENKO
brought to Geneva in 1964, on the basis of
which he reported the STEVENS ease, (STEVENS' 06
recruitment was accomplished jointly by the
American-British Commonwealth Section of the
Seventh Department and the American Depart-
ment'
s Embassy Section.
06
TIARASKA, WIlliam
06
08.
NOSENKO$s Information
(TARASKA,-
a New York City policeman, had been developed
by the KGB while visiting the Soviet Union in 1958.
Although considered in 1958 a "stupid and unpromising
target"
• the Ukrainian KGB was still interested in
attempting to recruit him while he was in the Soviet Union
in June 1963.
Comment:
06
JARASKA, who had visited the soviet Union in
1958,
was recruited by CIA for a mission in
1960. When he returned to the United States
he reported that the KGB had attempted to
recruit him on both visits. TARASKA returned UL
to the USSR in 1963
and later reported to the
FBI that the KGB had again attempted.to
recruit him during that visit.
429
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Comment:
(Continued)
NOSENKO does not indicate the source of his
INTOFNATION ONTARADE
06
THOMPSON, John]
NOSENKO's Information
06
American professor THOMPSON
a specialist in Russian
literature or Russian History, became involved with Tamara
KUNGAROVA, a KGB agent within Inturist.
He was intimate
with KUNGAROVA and incriminating photographs were taken.
The KGB did not attempt to recruit him, however, but
planned to continue his assessment and
establish additional
grounds for his recruitment if he returned to the USSR.
When he did not return, NOSENKO reviewed THOMPSON's file 06
and recommended that the case be retired to KGB Archives.
is diseas
Comment:
06
06,08
Dr. John M. THOMPSON, Associate Professor of
History at Indiana University, was interviewed
by the FBI in April 1965.. He identified
KUNGAROVA's photograph as that of his Inturist
guide during a trip outside Moscow in 1959,
and admitted having been intimate with her.
When he returned to Moscow in 1960 he had
sought out KUNGAROVA, who told him she had
been
demoted in Inturist because of her
hiLi NeeLSENi
Soviet Union In 196406 THOMPSON stated that
he was
unaware of any photographs the KGB
might have and
that
he
was never approached
by the KGB
on either trip.
0001662
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(Annex B)
Comment:
(Continued)
KUNGAROVA was interviewed by the FBI.in
June 1965. She confirmed that she had been
intimate
with THOMPSON in 1959 but denied
that 06
she had been instructed toccompromise him.
NOSENKO has claimed KUNGAROVA was his agent
in 1959, although he has not related that claim
to his description of her role in the THOMPSON 06
case:
06
TORREY, Carmen
NOSENKO's Information
06.
TORREY, who was
in love with a Soviet citizen, was
recruited
by Seventh Department case officers on that basis
in 1960 and türned over to the First Chief Directorate,
which helped her obtain employment at the UN (also given as
NATO):: NOSENKO. was in the. American Department at the time.
Comment:
06
In 1960 it was reported that
TORREY planned to
defect
to the USSR. because she was in love
with
Soviet citizen. In 1961 she married an
American.. In 1962 GOLITSYN reported KGB
O/attempts to recruit an American identifiable
•as TORREY during her October or November 1959
visit to Moscow 06 TORREY worked for the Pan 27
American Union in 1954-1959, but there is no
indication that she was ever employed by the
UN or by NATO.
NOSENKO has
not indicated the source of his
information on (TORREY. DIn 1959, when GOLITSYN
reported the KGB attempted to recruit (TORREY, 06
NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh Depart-
ment, not the
American Department.
0001663
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06
TWAROG, Leon
NOSENKO's Information
An American
protessor of Russian Literature and a tluen
ussian speaker 6 TWAROG visited the Soviet Union in 1962
or 1963.
The target of Seventh Department case officer
K.G. KRUPNOV@ TWAROG was lured into intimacy with a female
KGB agent, of which the KGB took incriminating photographs:
At one point Seventh Department case officer Yevgeniy NOSKOV
was placed in direct contact with WARO, but no recruitment 06
attempt was made because the KGB had concluded that the
incriminating photographs were not sufficient to ensure
successo
The KGB deferied further action pending IWAROG's 06
expected return to the Soviet Union in 1964 or 1965.
Comment:
In a 1965 interview with the FBI, @WAROG) said
he had visited
the USSR In 1957, 1960, 1962,
and 1964.
On his 1962 trip he had met and
befriended one Nina S. PETROVA, and on one
occasion they attended a party accompanied by
friends of hers, a Soviet couple.
The man's
name was Yevgeniy UbCWAROg stated that he
was later intimate with PETROVA, but was never
confronted by anyone about that fact.
In 1964
(after NOSENKO's defection), TWAROGstated, he 06
was approached in the USSR by Arthur HAMAN, an
Estonian whom he had met in Cambridge,
Massachusetts in 1962. HAMAN, who had defected
in sweden in 1955, redefected to the USSR in
1962.
According to IWAROG, HAMAN offered 06
$50,000 1£ TWAROG would provide background 0b
summaries of members of his tour group and
threatened him with the denial of future entry
Coto the USSR if TWAROG did not comply. TWAROG 06
stated
that he refused, and
no further pressure
applied.
NOSENKO
from notes, in Geneva in 1964.
provided the information on TWAROG] 06
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06
VOLKOV, Vasiliy Andreyevich
NOSENKO's Information
06
[VOLKOV
construction company
employee and an American,
was recruited by. a Seventh Department case officer in the
summer of 1962 while visiting the Soviet Union. He was to
be used in emigre operations..
06.
Comment: [volkov has been identified as a carpenter
living in California who travelled to the
Soviet Union In 1962, He 1s a religious
fanatic with a record of many arrests, and
he may be mentally disturbed.
In an FBI
Ofinterview VOLKOV denied that he had been
recruited by the KGB.
"NOSENKO does not indicate the source of
his information, which was contained in
notes brought to Geneva. in 1964e
06
VOLSKIY, BOris
NOSENKO's Information 08
06
The president of "American Travel Abroad' VOLSKIYwas
recruited by a Seventh Department case officer in 1962 on
ideological grounds. His mission is to advise the KGB by
open code of any tourist whom he suspected of having some
connection with American Intelligence.
Comment:
06
Interviewed by the
FBI in May 1964, VOLSKIY>
advised that he travelled annually to the USSR
on tourist business and has frequent contacts
with Inturist officials in the Soviet Union.
He denied having any intelligence contacts,
with one possible exception.
In about 1962
he was visited
in his Moscow
hotel room by a
433
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(Annex B)
Comment:
(Continued)
06
person represented
co be an Inturist official
ribution of Bibles
and
literature in the USSR. VOLSKIN asserted that 06
he was in no position to provide such assis-
tance, and
he was not contacted again.
NOSENKO's information is limited to that
contained in written notes brought to Geneva
in 1964.
06
WALLACE, William
NOSENKO's Information
10,06
A student at the University of Vienna, WALLACE was
recruited on ideological grounds while visiting the Soviet
Union in 1961.
The Seventh Department made the
recruitment,
O6 and turned WALLACE over to the First Chief Directorate,
which was still managing the case in 1964.
Comment: Interviewed in February 1965 in Vienna,
OGWALLACE admitted having been approached by an
unidentified Soviet during a visit
to the USSR
in 1961:
He claimed he refused to "help
them"
, and said there had been no further
attempts to contact him.
NOSENKO's information is limited
to that
contained in written notes brought to Geneva
in 1964; he has
his information. not indicated
the source of
0001666
434
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy .
2/8R
---
## Page 405
Top Secret
(Annex'B)
06,06
YOUNGER,
Ralph and Evelyn
06
NOSENKO's Information
The (YOUNGER) couple were identified as American Intelli-
gence agents
and arrested and recruited by the KGB while
they visited the USSR in 1961. However, later they failed
to meet their KGB case officer as planned, in Denmark. The
case was handled by the
American Department while NOSENKO
was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO's former subordinate,
V.V. KOSOLAPOV, was directly involved in the case.
Comment:
06
The YOUNGERs were on a mission for the u.s.
Army: at the time of their arrest, and they
reported their recruitment immediately upon
leaving the Soviet Union. KGB officer
KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen under alias
In 1961, at the time when the YOUNGERs were 06
scheduled to meet with the KGB: in Denmark..
NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his
information which he related
to CIA in Geneva
in 1962.
06
ZIRING, Stanley
NOSENKO's Information
06
ZIRING,
recruited by the RGB
a student who visited the USSR in 1960,
was
after being apprehended in blackmarket
dealings.
Comment:
Interviewed in London in 1964, (TRING] admitted
blackmarketeering but denied recruitment.!
British authorities concluded that he may have
given
"the impression of willingness to cooperate
without realizing the purpose of the Soviet
offer.
British authorities report no evidence
of subsequent contacts between ZIRING and
Soviet officials.
--06
NOSENKO claims he
was in the
American Depart-
ment at the time fIRINGwas recruited by the
Seventh Department.
435
0001667
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10
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9/BR
---
## Page 406
tyo dsg»te
Top Secret
Index of Personalities
ABEL, Col. Rudolf Ivanovich
ABIDIAN, John
V.
34
229, 241, 242, 246,
153, 155, 180, 194, 205-222, 224, 225,
259, 260,344, 351, 404
ACTOR, fnu (See PROCTOR)C!
399
AGAYANTS, Ivan Ivanovich
283
"AGLODINA" (KGB cryptonym
for Yelena S. KOSIENKO)
CÄLBAMONTE, Marion
79
3117
(ÄLBINGER, Donald
400}
ALEKSEYEV, Aleksandr Ivanovich
253
ALEKSEYEV, Vladimir Kuzmich
305, 306
ALEKSIEV, Georgi Velev
258
ALESEIN, Yevgenly Nikolayevich
221, 222, 390
ALLOYAN, Lawrence
400, 401J06
"ANDREY" (KGB cryptonym for Dayle Wallace SMITH)
99, 152, 165, 238, 239, 287
22, 33-37,
O6ANDREYEV, Igor Ivanovich
376, 3917
ANDRIANOV, VladimiI Nikolayevich
387, 395]Ü6
ANKUDINOV,
Vladimir Mikhaylovich
06
"ANOD" (KGB cryptonym for Älexander SVENCHANSKIY)
292
APISSON, Henry
"ARKHANGELSKIY"
215, 216
ARKHIPOV, Nikolay Alekseyevich
123
06 ARKHIPOV, Petr Mikhaylovich
372}
OL ARMSTRONG, Robert
402, 413]
"ARSEN" (KGB cryptonym for John
V. ABIDIAN)
207
ARTAMONOV, Nikolay Fedorovich (Defector)
47, 373
ARTEMOV, Vladimir L'vovich
"ARTUR"
214, 284,
285
(KGB cryptonym for Ärsene
FRIPPED)06
O6(AVDEYEV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich
389, 390]
137, 156
BAGRICHEV, Nikolay Grigoryevich
35, 36
BAKHVALOV, Mikhail Fedorovich
153, 154, 223
BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich
259
BANNIK, Maj. Gen. (See BANNIKOV)
BANNIKOV, Sergey Grigoryevich
389
276, 384, 390
BARGHOORN, Frederick
298-302, 326
BARKOVSKIY, Vladimir Borisovich
06 BARRETT, Robert
296
127, 134-136, 2487
437
Top Secret
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TS No. 197124
Copy
10
ISIBR
---
## Page 407
Top Secret
06 BARTHELEMY, Thomas EranklIn
- 402
403)
0.6
BEGGS, Frank
193, 195, 197. 198
BELANOVSKIY, Victor (KGB.
cryptonym
'"STROYEV")
110,
116
BELITSKIY, Boris Yefimovich
106, 268, 280, 282-287, 291
317, 331,:332, 337
"BELKIN"
(KGB
cryptonym for Boris BELITSKIY)
282
BELOGLAZOV, Viktor
159, 221,
222, 225, 246
BELOV, Ivan Andreyevich
•391
dibr
BENSON,
JohnS.
87, 93-96, 983
BENYAMINOV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich
50, 3631-
06
BERMAN, Harold
4031.
O6 BIENSTOCK, Natalie
273, 274J
BINDER, Peter
203, 204,234
403-403
BIRSE,
Arthur
104, 114, 122,
123,
125.
126, 144)
BIRYUKOV, Vadim Osipovich
4279. 428
BLAKE, George
30, 102, 148, 149, 247, 263, 327, 331
BOBKOV, Filip Denisovich
269
06 BOLSHAKOV.
Georgly Nikitovich (GRU)
398]
BORODIN, Nikolay. Mikhaylovich (aka Norman M.
BORODIN
35.
94,95
BORISOV,
Ivan Dmitriyevich
411
BORISOV,
Petr Pavlovich
377
20893
06-
BOWDEN, LEWiS W.
139, 141, 142, 242, 314
BRADLEY, Jerome G.
• 178)
BRAUNS, Horst
268, 288-2917
BROCHES, Adam
405, 406
FROCHES,
Alexander
405
Ignacy:
406]
BRODNEY, Kenneth
807
,08.
BROWN, G. Staniey
12020226,
227. 244
BUBNOV, Oleg Sergeyevich
32
BUDYLDIN, Valeriy
83, 84
0b
BUHLE. Johannes
402ji
BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter
406, 4073
: 0• BURGI..
Richard
99; 110;
113. 115-120, 144, 344. 346]
BUTENKO, John
298, 368
O6 CARDELLA, James
97
CECCHI,
Pletro
194,
84. 998
199, 200,
208
CHELNOKOV, Col. Vladimir Dnitriyevich
18,
29, 139, 140,
142, 259,
276, 292, 305,
346
CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr Nikolayevich
76,264, 309-313, 319,
0b
322, 326, 381. 411, 412
[CHERNYAVSKIY,
Viktor Petrovich
387, 390,
395]
CHERNY SHEVA,
fnu. (Eddy CILMORE's sister-in-law
72J
CHRISTNER,
Robert Charles 407.
CHUCHUKIN, Vladimir
Aleksandrovich
370, 372]
CHURANOV, Vladimir Aleksandrovich
30-31, 97
438°
Top Secret
0001669
TS No. 197124
Copy
2418R
---
## Page 408
14-00000
lop Secret
06
DANKO, Yevgeniya "Jane"
109
DAY,
Frank
201, 202)
DEMKIN, Vladimir (mnu)
DERA, Vitally Grigoryevich
159, 161, 182, 194, 203, 222, 246, 406
272,
273,
DEREVENSKOV, Gennadiy Georgiyevich
406
370
DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich (KGB defector 1954)
17: 61, 277,
380, 381, 396
DITYATEV,
DmitIly Alekseyevich
"DMITRIYEV"
84
427
DHITRIYEV, Aleksandr Anatolyevich
107, 108,249
DMITRIYEV, Sergey Georgiyevich
228
DRANOV, Vasilly (mnu)
O6DREW, George
221,
222
06
DRIBERG, Tom
126, 1321
, 131, 347)
DUBAS, Konstantin Nikitovich
152, 153, 304-306
124, 125, 127, 129, 130, 133,
DUMKOV, Gen. (Bulg: MVR)
DVORKIN, YuIly Mikhaylovich
257
294
DWELLY, Robert
202, 203
"EDvIN". (KGB cryptonym for'
06
Gerald
EL SHAZLY, Mohammed Sarwat
SEVERNP
426
ObÉPISON, Henry
194, 198,
199
(Seé llenry APISSON)
FAIN,
Thomas
407, 408)
06 FARMAKOVSKAYA, O1ga A.
392, 3937
FEDOROVA, DOIa
92,
93
FEDOROVICH, Tatyana
208, 214, 215,
216
FEDOSEYEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich
313, 406
159, 229, 237, 239, 259, 307,
FEDYANIN, Vladimir Petrovich
158
FEKLISOV, Aleksandr Semenovich
Ob FELCHLIN, Howard I.
117, 119, 314
87 .
90-93]
FILATOV, Vladimir Gerasimovich
OFINK, David
279, 294
O6 FISK, Norman
408,
409)
145, 409
FOFANOV,
Fedor (mnu)
25,
27
FOMIN (alias of A. FEKLISOV)
314,
368
ObFREERS, Edward L.
32 12230137-144,3229.
O6FRIFFEL, AreETe (MEs. Arsene PRIPPEL)
: 265, 266, 347
139)
FUNKHAUSER, Richard
O6[CABELKO, Sergey Stepanovich
376]
O6 [GAFFEY,
Joseph
203, 2041
GAMKRELIDZE, Revas Valeryanovich
386, 387
GARBLER, Paul
246-248
GARLAND, John
189-192, 199, 254)
GARST, Roswell.
109
GAVRICHEV, Sergey Ivanovich
279, 318
0001670
439
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
17'8R
---
## Page 409
Top Secret
GAVRILENKO, Nikolay Aleksandrovich
: 159, 211, 222
GAZARYAN, Oganes
400
06 GEURCKENS, Hang
113,
O6 GILMORE, Eddy.
12100
144
76,
77, 78,
79,
8.0
OGGINSBERG, Michael
145, 409, 410
GLAZUNOV, Ilya Sergeyevich
• 158
GLEYSTEEN, Culver
GOLD, Harry
293]
-227, 230-
GOLITSYN, Anatolly Mikhaylovich
17-19, 30, 38, 39, 62, 76.
162, 163, 166, 168;
169, 176, 189, 191,
192.,
• 232,
235,
266, 273;
283,
290, 330,
364, 376, 380, 381, 383;
396,
403, 405:
; 407,
431
O6 GOLOS,
Jacob
293.
GOLOVKO, Admiral Arseniy Grigoryevich
GOLUBEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich
GORBACHEVA, Klara Konstantinovna
53
277, 384, 385
•137
"GRAY"
392
GRIBANOV, General Oleg Mikhaylovich
15, 20,
37, 38, 115,
117, 127, 144
• 146, 153, 154, 159, 166,: 167,.
168, 170
172, 194, 235, 237, 239, 257, 259,
298-302, 304 • 307,
260,
275, 276,
291,
311, 315-317, 321,
331, 335-337,
346-349, 352, 360, 307;
368, 384, 385;
* 387-392;.
3941
"GRIGORIY" (KGB cryptonym for Aleksey YEFREMOV)
GRINEVSKIY, Oleg Alekseyevich
156
279
GRISHVYAT,
Tatyana (mnu)
32, 226.
GROMAKOVA, Ludmila
89, 209, 211, 220
GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgenly (mnu)
06
(GROVER, Preston
410
159.
GRYAZNOV, Gennadly
Ivanovich
155, 156, 159, 160-163, 168-170,
182, 185, 186, 193, 194, 202, 204, 217, 223, 225, 226, 229,
235, 239, 259, 267, 298, 300,
382, 413, 415
GUK;
Yurly Ivanovich
62,
280,
281,
311, 318, 383, 384, 387
GUSKOV, Sergey Mikhaylovich
119, 130
HAMAN, Arthur
: 432
HAMZAVI, Charles P.
411
Hanna"
• Inu
194
08
HARMSTONE, Richard
314,
3159/411, 412)
CARRIS, Gisella
127•128,144
HAYHANEN, Reino (KGB defector 1957)
Ob HOFFMAN,
F. Stephen
402,
4137-
34
O6 HOFFMAN, Col. Theodore E•
180,
06
HORBALY, W1111am
226;
234
227,
243,.
244
HOUGHTON, Captain J. C.
2273
HOWARD, Herbert
413,
414]
06.
HURLEY, William S.
164
165)
nUSTON, Hayden Henry
414)
44 4.0
Top Secret
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Copy
16/8R
---
## Page 410
1-00000
lop secret
ILYIN, Sergey Aleksandrovich
25
ISAKOV, Viktor Fedorovich
366
IVANOV, Enu
108
ObEVANOV, Boris Semenovich.
46, 50, 324, 362, 363, 366, 369,
370, 374, 3861
IVANOV, IgOI
Aleksandrovich
298
IVANOV, Vladimir Maksimovich
428
IVANOV, Vladimir Vladimirovich
130
IVANOVA, Svetlana N.
194, 196,
198, 199, 203, 204
IVASHUTIN, Petr Ivanovich
347
JACKSON, Henry H.
426
JACOB, Richard C.
404
DO JAFFE, Sam
4157
06 JELISAVCIC, Michael
109
06 JENNER, Paul
164, 185-190,
192
JOHNSON, Hedwig (Mrs. Robert Lee JOHNSON)
23, 28
JOHNSON, Robert Lee
22,
24-27, 349, 380
O6 JOHNSON, Wallace Everett
112,
220,
260, 267-272, 290, 291, 349
06 KADERA,
06 JONES,: FIed
William Carroll, III
272,2731
KALWINSA, Khariy Yanovich
385
KALOSHIN, Colonel (RU) (fnu)
51-53,
56, 59
06
KALUGIN, Oleg Daniilovich
372, 3737
"KAMO"
209
KANTOR, Marvin (or Melvin)
145, 415, 416
KARETNIKOV, Venyamin Zasimovich (or Venedikt Vasilyevich)
25, 27
OL KARLOV,
fnu
113, 145
Ob KASISCHKE, Richard
KAZAN-KOMAREK, Vladimir Joseph
416, 417
06 KEYSERS, James G.
157, 165, 178-181,
234,
236, 258
06
KHAMZAI, Charles
(See Charles P. HAMZAVI)
KHODAKOVSKIY, Enu
117
KHOKHLOV, Nikolay (KGB
defector 1954)
76
KHRENOV, Nikolay (mnu)
83,84
KILLHAM, Edward A.
314
06(KIPTENKO, Vadim A.
374
RISLIISYN, F1l1p Vasilyevich
84
KISLOV, Aleksandr Konstantinovich
279, 280, 284,
415
KISLOV, Slava (alias of and see V.A. KUSKOV)
415
C6/KLOSSON, Boris
241
KLYPIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich
153,
154, 159, 161, 186, 206,
209,222.
226, 227, 237, 255,
428
KOBULOV, General Rogdan
06
Zakharovich
49,51, 55, 57, 62, 64-66, 7
KOLOBASHKIN, Aleksey Mikhaylovich
380/
KOLOSOV, (allas of V.V. KOSOLAPOV)
KOLOSSOV, Viktor Dmitriyevich (allas of V. V. KOSOLAPOV)
187, 192
441
Top Secret
0001672
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
16/SR
---
## Page 411
8MN S54H6
O6.[KONAREK (See KAZAN-KOMAREK)
KOMAROV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich (allas of V.M. KOVSUUK) 233, 412
•KONSTANTINOV, Ivan Alekseyevich
108, 109
KOPEYKIN, VIktOr
418
KOROLEV, YuIly Dmitriycvich
396,
397
KORNIENKO, GeOrgly
"KOSHIKIN"
Markovich
110
366
KOSIENKO, Yelena S. (KGB cryptonym "AGLODINA")
7:9
KOSOLAPOV, Vadim
Viktorovich
155, 156,159, 160-163. 182,
185-196, 199-204, 206, 223, 235, 254, 261, 435
KOSTYRYA, Vladimir Viktorovich
141
66
KOTEN, Bernard
295, 296, 326, 4217
mainhsaise
32042
KOVALENKO, Anatolly, Grigoryevich
323, 346
273, 298-300, 302, 305, 317,
KOVALEV, Feliks
366
KOVSHUK, Vladislav Mikhaylovich
33-36, 78, 94, 95,153-159,
161, 163, 167, 168, 172, 174-177,
186, 195,
206, 209, 217,
222,
422, 428
223, 226-229, 242, 244,245, 250,259-261, 290, 412.
KOZHEVNIKOVA, Lyudmila Yulianovna
55,
57
KOZLOV, Anatoliy Sergeyevich
117-120,
255, 257
KOZLOV, Veniamin Alekseyevich
O6RRAFT, VirgI1
76-79, 216,
218
127, 129, 130
ObKROTKOV, Yurly Vasilyevich
372
KRUPNOV,
Kim Georgiyevich
"KRYMOVA" (See Marina RYTOVA)
273, 289, 290, 301, 303-305, 419, 432
KUKOLEV, Dmitrly
86, 87
06 KULEBYAKIN, Nikolay Panteleymonovich
RUNGAROVA,
Tamara
107,
112, 418,
KURILENKO, Ivan Yakovlevich
I59.,
370, 374,379,394, 3987
419706430, 431
22.2
ObKUROCHKIN, Enu
3727
KUSKOV, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich
KUZMIN, Nikolay Yakovlevich
153, 311, 314, 415, 422
226,
228
KUZNETSOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich
JOILAINE, V•A.
252
402, 403)
CUCLANE,
Sir Allen
104, 114, 122, 125, 144]
LANGELLE, Russell
153, 205, 207, 210, 213, 214, 241,
260,
314, 315
LARIONOVA; Alla
97, 98
"LEBEDEV"
(See Vladimir
MUROMTSEV)
06 LEBEDEV, Anatolly Aleksandrovich
LEBEDEV, LeV Aleksandrovich
25,
27,
3,234
LEONOV, Mikhail A.
418
LEONTIYEV, YuIly (mnu)
•. 84
LEVINA, Maya (mnu)
249, 250
LEVINE, Irving R.
106, 112
442
Top Secret
0001673
TS No. 197124
Copy
10BR
---
## Page 412
suy JecreL
"11111an"
183, 184
LITTELL, Walace
314
LOPUKHOV, Yurly Aleksandiovich
"LUCH"
116
110
O6[ZUKAS (See LUKIS)!
O6ZUKIS, Enu
127, 131]
Oo LUKYANOV, Pavel Pavlovich
06 LUNI, Horace G.
368]
LYALIN, Enu
254,256-2587
276
06 LYSOV, Yurly Vasilyevich
06 MAHONEY,
Eugene
219, 245,
32201
375)
246
06
MAKASHEV, Boris Dmitriyevich
311
MALIA, Martin
113-115)
MALYUGIN, Aleksandr Stepanovich
MANHOFF, Martin
J.
C6MARK, David
91
153, 160, 161
O6MARTIN,
241,276,
286]
Captain Donald C.
O6MASON,
MARTIN, William Hlamilton
178]
239
Major Anthony
UOMATLAW (also MAILO) , Ralph
227)
O6MATLO (See MATLAW)
MATVEYEV, Mikhail Georgiyevich
MAYOROV, Igor Sergeyevich
113, 145,4177
216, 217
278
MCGOWAN, Edward
06,
148
MCGUIRE, Robert Alan
06 MCKINNEY, Walter A.
147,
148)
91,
McMILLAN,
James H.
92]
Oo McSWEENEY, John M.
238
238)
MCVICKAR, John
OOMEARNS, FIllwore K.
311
85,
87,
MEDVEDEV, Viktor Sergeyevich
88,
89]
06 MERTENS, Gerard
383, 384
127,
133,
134, 347
MICHAUD, Marcel (alias
06
of N.S. SKVORTSOV)
MICKELSON, Earl I.
85,
MIKHAYLOV, Aleksey Mikhaylovich
87, 88, 89
241
MIKHAYLOV, Valentin Matveyevich
MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen
422, 424;
23,
28
MISHUTIN, fnu
302
MITCHELL,
Bernon
239
MONTGOMERY, Hugh
06 MORELL, WIIl1aw.N.,
404
JI•
MORELLI, Galya
06 MORONE,
404, 405
159, 245, 248, 260, 261}
Joseph
173,
174,
0b MULE, Walter
87, 94-96;
183, 193-199, 254, 337]
98-100
MUROMTSEV, Vladimir
(mnu)
105
MYARIMYAYE, fnu
125
167,
173,
198
426
443
Top Secret
0001674
TS No. 197124
1n
Copy
238R
---
## Page 413
Too secret
NEVEROVA,
* C
O6 NIELSEN, Me:::
06 NIELSEN,
Phe:
NIKOLAYEV (a1
NIKOLAYEV,
"a:
122, 123
NIKOLOV,
NIXON, Dol::!
NOSENKO, Ivas
: =
NOSKOV, YETEES!!
NOVIKOVA, !.e
OHANNES,
Gara:1es
"OKSANA"
(sce
06 OMELICH,
Teres
OSWALD,
Pau: J
Lee
OSWALD, Mari-A
06 ORCHARD, TheDi::.
"OZERO". (See
PANKRATOV,
Far.
PAQUES,
Georges
O6 PAVLOV,
Gleb
OLPECHTER,
PENKOVSKIY,
245,
3 ¢ 9
PERELETOV, 50:18
PERFILYEV,
SIacie:
PERFILYEV,
PETERSON,
Gecite
PETRENKO,
V184
'8::
PETROV,
Erdck'a
1$÷1
PETROV,
Vladi=!:
PETROV, Vladis::
84, 123.
PETROVA,
Nina
PETUKHOV, Ira:
POCHANKIN, V16&*:
POPOV,
Col. (Ger)
POPTSOV, Peir (es.
06PREISFREUND, 19119101
160,
101. 11:
PREOBRAZHENS!?!.
PRESSMAN, 1:0:
PROCTOR,
Verrea
"PROKHOR" (K5:
?: 7
"RAKETA"
RAMSEY,
Janes
KASHCHEPOV, !C
:::.
252
..... 01.$
dalian used by NOSENKO)
271
"**₴
44+44
*,:.
:91, 299, 301, 421; 432
В 8.* =
:9:, 161-309, 326
::.:
::]
**.
.=..d.
205, 208, 217, 219,
÷76
,.a.
.. ..
134
:1:.
114
• д÷
defecter 1954)
17, 61,
2 *#
J0J.
384
30%.
244
$ : $
egapionge "PROKHOR")
= 3
1987
•• FREISTREUND))
06
300
Top Sacrot
156, 160
0001675
TS No. 197124
Copy
HIBR
---
## Page 414
Top Secret
DoRASK, Walter
421.
RASIVOROV, YUILY (KGE
RASTYKAITE, EnU
coltele:
06
REITZ,
Janes I.
11÷
RESHETNYAK, Nikolay
22:]
RHODES, Roy
06
BICHARDS, Ira. B.
33-37,
0 i
ROBERTS,
65.
Spencer
06:
BOGOV, Nikolay (mnu)
!÷!
ROSS,
Ob RUPE,
Johanna
423)
John
145,
06
RYTOVA,
Marina L'vovna
380, 4:3.
SACHANEN,
Felix
icM.
SAGATELYAN, Mikha1l'
277
SALISBURY, Harrison
Rachyanerd
TSARDAR" (KGB cryptonym
76-75
SARWAT EL SHAZLY
O6 [SCHWARZENBACH,
(See
for Car::
Hoharte
Collette
:7.
61, 277, 396
• 359
. "
, 149, 265
06
156, 160
IL SHAZLY)
SENIO, Walter P.
22÷
SEREBRENNIKOV, Eugene SergeY
SEREBRYANKOVA, fnu
"SERGEY" (KGB cryptonym,
"SERGEY" (KGB cryptonyn
ideral:;
SERGEYEV OI COl. SERGEYEY (allAs
SERGEYEV, Ivan Yefimovich
SERGEYEV, Victor I.
154
4:3. 436j
unknown)
STEFENSD06
used be NOSENKO)
79,.
80
123, 130-133
06
"SERVIZNIY" (KGB cryptonyn for l'indialay YOROBYEV)
(SEVASIYANOV, Gennadiy (See Gera:d SEYERN)
843. 86
SEVERN, Gerald
SHAKHOV, Pavel
145, 426)
Fedorovich
260.
SHALYAPIN, Mikhall Aleksardrorich
276-278, 291, 317, 331, 332, 398
SHAPIRO,
Henty
D6 SHATTAUER, Sofia
10-80, 396,
424, 425]
145,
427
SACHERBAK,
Maj. Gen.
(SHUBIN, John Andrew
Fedor Aleksejerich
389
SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor Grigoryevich
296, 297. 326, 3493
SHULGINA, Nataliya
106, 112
SHUSTOV,
Vladimir Viktorovici
"SHMELEV" (KGB cryptonym for à.i.
364
SHNYRYEV, Nikolay (mnu)
156
86.
9:. 92
"SHVEDOVA" (KGB cryptonym for Mar!ya NEVEROVA)
"SIBIRYAK"
110
85,89,141
SIEGAL, Jack (alias
of
N.M. BURUDI!!
SISCOE, Frank
95
94)
06
Top Secret
0001676
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
2UER
---
## Page 415
Top Secret
SITNIKOV, Mikhail G.
276
SKVORISOV, Nikolay Semenovich
O6 SLESINGER, Alfred Lazarevich
SMIRNOV (allas used by
NOSENKO)
SMITH, Dayle W. (See
"ANDREY")
287
SMITH, Edward Ellis
135, 167, 170, 172-174
293-295,
326
123
33,
36, 98, 99, 238,239, 260,
37-39,99,336
198, 199
SMITH, John Discoe
239
06
SMITH, Paul
249]
SNYDER, Richard
311, 314
SOBOROVA, Larissa
104, 105,
06|SoCHUREk, Howard
427,
4281
122
06150KOLOW:
Gen. (GRU) Vsevolod Sergeyevich
Sonya
297
293J
"SOLISTKA" (KGB cryptonym, identity
SOLOMATIN, Boris Aleksandrovich
unknown
185-187, 189
422
06
SPRECHER, George Herman
377,
378
STEIGER,
Andrew J.
76]
JOSTEVENS,
Edmund
76, 158
JOSTEVENS, Francis
245,
428, 429
O6 STORSBERG, James
157, 161, 164,
201, 234,
238, 250,
260,
165, 166-179, 194, 198, 199,
06
266)
STROUD, William R.
87, 93-96,
98
"STROYEV" (KGB cryptonym for Victor BELANOVSKIY)
SUMIN, Aleksey Konstantinovich
215'
SUNDAR, Egil
113, 123, 124
SUTTON,
Horace
104, 105
SVENCHANSKIY, Alexander
292, 293, 295, 326}
SVIRIN, Vasilly, Grigoryevich
392
SYCHEV,
Aleksandr Anfimovich
390
C6
IARABRIN, Yevgenly Anatolyevich
131, 132, 391, 394
TARASKA, W1111am
C
145,
429,
430]
TAYLOR,
David
127, 132, 133, 144
TELEGINA, Augustina
Konstantinova
48,
55
ITOV, Col. Viktor Nikolayevich
THOMPSON,
John M.
107, 381, 430,431
381
"TOMO" (KGB cryptonym for
Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV)
KORMOZOV, Anatolly
"TRAPEZUND" (KGB erypEonym for Oganes GAZARYAN)
400
TSYMBAL, Mikhail Stepanovich
278,
280, 281,
318
TULAYEV, Vladimir Yevgenyevich
373
TURALIN, Mikhall
Ilich
305
06
TWAROG, Leon
432
UMANETS, Ella
159,
Ob.
183, 184,
URBAN, Peter
180,
198
06
222)
VAN KRAKOW, Hugo
400,
401
06
VAN LAETHEM, George
97, 98
00016777
446
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
22158
---
## Page 416
Top Secret
VARLAMOVA, Inga
159, 167, 169
VASSALL, Willian John C.
18, 23, 24, 30, 31, 110, 149
VERENIKIN, Aleksandr Ivanovich
121
VETLITSKIY, Arsenly Aleksandrovich
133, 297
VLADIMIROV, Vladimir Viktorovich (allas
of
V. V. KOSTYRYA)
141, 362-364, 369
VLASOV, Gennadiy N.
380
VLASOV, Ivan Pavlovich
372
VOLKOV, Anatolly Ivanovich
110-113, 127, 130-136, 202, 248
256, 267-271, 407,409, 417
06
VOLKOV, Vasilly Andreyevich
433]
*VOLODINA" (KGB, cryptonym, Identity unknown)
80, 85
Volodya,
Inu
89, 90
. "VOLODYA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)
202
Volodya, lnu (unidentified KGB officer)
197
06 (VOLSKIY, BOris
433, 434]
VOROBYEV, Vladislav (KGB cryptony "SERVIZNIY").
06/WALLACE, Willian
86, 87
434
O6 WASHENKO, Steven
242-2447
Об !
WATKINS, J. B.
110, 149
WEISS, Samih_ (KGB cryptonym
"SARDAR")
160, 161, 181-184,
250, 267
V6, WHITNEY, Thomas
76-80]
WILBY, William Stanley
LENTILERFORD, Frederick
127, 131, 132
127, 136, 144]
JaWILSON, Chardes
227]
WINDSOR, DAVId M.
227
WINTERS, George P.
ObIYAZHINSKAYA, Enu
16579, 142, 158, 244, 260, 324, 315, 412
O6 EAGER, F.J.
91)
YEFREMOV, Aleksey
(mnu)
110-113, 127, 130-136, 202, 248,
256, 267-270, 272, 409,417
YEFREMOV, Leonid Ivanovich
301,
302
YEGOROV, Mikhail (mnu)
255,
257
YEGOROV, Sergey Ivanovich
254
YEREMEYEVA, Nina Ivanovna
383
YERMAK, Yevgenly Ivanovich
372]
435]
, Inu
• Inu
ZARUBIN, Vasilly
Mikhaylovich
405
ZAYTSEV,
fnu
419
06 ZAYTSEV, Valentin Aleksandrovich
363, 364
ZEMSKOV, Nikolay
237
ZHARIKOV, Nikolay Timofeyevich
C6 ZIRING, Stanley
317
435°
O6 ZUBON, William J.
267}
06 ZUJUS,
Matas
184]
06
ZUJUS,
Matthew P.
161, 164, 178, 181-184, 238, 250, 267,
06 ZWANG, Maurice
2007
6001678
447
15 No. 197124
Top Secret
Copy
20182
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32248125.pdf | 180-10078-10183 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | HSCA | 04/20/1978 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 007375 | BELL, GRIFIN B. | BLAKEY, G. ROBERT | 1 | HSCA | NUMBERED FILES | 2/11/18 | Box 142. | 1 | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date:
9/23/201
Agency Information
AGENCY: HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :
180-10078-10183
RECORD SERIES: NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
007375
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: HSCA
FROM: BLAKEY, G. ROBERT
TO :
BELL, GRIFIN B
TITLE :
DATE :
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
04/20/1978
FBI; FILES
DOCUMENT TYPE: LETTER
CLASSIFICATION :
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
3
CURRENT STATUS:
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 12/17/1996
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
Box 142.
v9.1
74 50529
DooId: 32248125
Page 1
---
## Page 2
087375
JFK Routing Slip
NO.
DATE
4-24-28
Jocument I.D. OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
INDEX
Reee, Tuuffin
Oohn
Deugzafp Wtenn
Meadrdo
Miler Vsadose
easne, thoma
Percesa, Tectw
Team #2
Stene, Jahn Eli Tean 73
Team #4
Special Instructions:
Team#5
COPY TO
Robert Blakey.
Gary Cornwell
Kenneth Klein
Charlie Mathews
Jim Wolf
1Iny Hutto
Jackie Hless
Cliff Fenton
Mike Ewigg
Team #1
Form #2
JFK.
10
OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
20: Griffin Bell
Approved
Date
Fenton
Hess
in
Gay
Klein
Wolf
cornwell)
C.C.
NW 50529 DocId:sBlaksx
Page
1 20
4/21
4+ 2278
---
## Page 3
LOUIS STOKES, OHIO CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
WALTER'E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
STEWART B. MC KINNEY, CONN.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE. CALI.
CHARLES THONE, NEAR.
CAHISTO: HER . DODO, CONN.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
(202) 225-4624
Select Committee on Assassinationg
E.S. House of Representatines
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
April 20, 1978
007375
The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
In connection with its investigation into the death of
President John F. Kennedy, the Select Committee requests access
to all FBI files concerning or referring to the following
individuals:
1) GEIZZAFFI, JOHN M. Date of Birth: 8/7/27.
2) MEADOWS, ALBERT. FBI #856 929.
3) MILLER, ISADORE. FBI #261 801 A.
4) PEASNER, THOMAS R. Date of Birth: 10/19/29.
5)
PERIERA, VICTOR. FBI #2157 349. Social Security
#559-10-8990.
6)
7)
SMITH, HELEN KAY aka Pixie Lynn. Date of Birth:
1/7/1939.
Place of Birth: Fort Worth, Texas.
STONE, JOHN ELI. FBI #245 126.
Thank you for your continued cooperation.
Sincerely,
12. Rober Platy
'"i wiG. Robert Blakey
1001027
Chief Counsel and Director
GRB : dm
CC:
Danny Coulson
HH 50529
DooId: 32248125
Page 3
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32288789.pdf | 124-10200-10065 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 6/5/61 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-3182-231 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 3 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
6/12/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER:
124-10200-10065
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
92-3182-231
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: SAC, CG
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE: 06/05/1961
PAGES:
3
SUBJECTS :
GAL, MARRIAGE LICENSE APPLICATION, RES, ASSOC,
GAMBLING ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION:
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
04/22/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
DocId: 32288789
Page 1:
160
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44-U5C 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
PAGE THREE
RYAN LISTED HER RESIDENCE AS BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA. IT IS TO BE NOTED
THAT GENEVA COUNTY, ALABAMA, HAS A
REPUTATION OF HANDLING AN UNUSUAL
AMOUNT OF DIVORCE CASES AND IT IS ALSO TO BE NOTED THAT THE DIVORCE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA ARE VERY LAX AND ALL THAT IS REQUIRED
IS A SHORT RESIDENCE IN THE STATE OF ALABAMA AND APPARENTLY THIS
RESIDENCE IS NOT VERIFIED. CG SIX FOUR FOUR THREE C ADVISED THAT
THE BRASS RAIL TAVERN WHICH IS NOW CLOSED WAS FORMERLY OWNED BY
LOUIS TORNABENE AND THAT TORNABENE WAS PAYING TWENTY FOUR HUNDRED
DOLLARS MONTHLY RENT AND WAS RECEIVING ABOUT TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS
A WEEK CLEAR FROM THE OPERATION OF THE BRASS RAIL INFORMANT STATED
THAT TORNABENE WAS REQUIRED TO TURN OVER HALF OF THE PROFITS TO THE
QUOTE OUTFIT END QUOTE WHICH INCLUDED GUS ALEX. IT IS TO BE NOTED
THAT TORNABENE WHEN RECENTLY INTERVIEWED AT THE SANTA FE HOTEL, WHICH
HE OPERATES, AND WHERE IT IS ALLEGED THAT HE ALSO MAINTAINS A HORSE
BOOK, DENIED THAT HE EVEN KNEW ALEX OR THAT HE EVER OPERATED A BOOK
AT THE SANTA FE HOTEL.
ALEX ARMED AND DANGEROUS WITH SUICIDAL
TENDENCIES.
пій ₴
END AND ACK PLS
.і..
8-55 PM OK FBI WA NH
TU DISCO
DocId: 32288789 Page 2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10250-10280.pdf | 104-10250-10280 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 05/16/1960 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | MEMORANDUM: HIDALGO, BALMES (HANDWRITTEN) | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK43 : F12 : 20040322-1061498 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10250-10280
TO
fice
Gifice MemorandU: UNTED STATES GOVERANENE
9 1096:99
DATE:
FROBL
SEBJECT: HIDALGO, Balmes.
Ou scuptoftle setached checked Mu Trusts who said
it irs actuily wauled.
i Did. The later lath replice that they had arranged
atta than ratin
55/10/us, l Lied Ma Migrich co were chetics
state he hud already does frucha, Ma Preit
woe ane filistifying.
Irantaid (I Clus and it was ayed ther
it word he lust 5 et thin arauget
iscund, id. use him ni DCore.
315J
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32308675.pdf | 124-10296-10003 | 07/24/2017 | In Part | FBI | 02/14/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 105-117221-6 | SAC, DL | DIRECTOR, FBI | null | FBI | HQ | 05/23/2017 | INC LHM | null | ## Page 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10296-10003
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 105-117221-6
Released under the John
. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
144 USC 2107 Notel .
Case# :NW 53025 Date:
05-23-2017
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
SAC, DL
DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 02/14/1963
PAGES: 7
SUBJECT: LAR, DESCR, RES, ASSOC, KOMITAS QUARTET, TRA
DOCUMENT_TYPE:
ORIGINAL
CLASSIFICATION:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Unclassified
NEW
CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE:
STATUS
01/06/1998
Redact
UPDATE DATE:
RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (4)
COMMENTS:
INC LHM
HW 53025
DocId: 32308675
Page 1
---
## Page 2
HOW
FORW
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES G
ERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
DIRECTOR, FBI
logic.
SAC, DALLAS (105-1536) (RUC)
SUBJECT:
(VISIT OF KOMITAS QUARTET
TO UNITED STATES 1963
IS - R
00 - Washington Field
DATE: 2/14/63
Re Washington Field airtel to Bureau, 1/11/63 and
Seattle airtel to Bureau, 1/22/63. 4
Enclosed to the Bureau are five copies of a letterhead
memorandum, dated 2/14/63; also two copies to Washington Field
with three photographs of
the Komitas Quartet (taken by ZELMAN
BROUNOFF, Dallas
Texas, confidential source of the Dallas Office
identified below).
The confidential informant referred to in the enclosed
memorandum is identified as ZELMAN BROUNOFF, operator of Brounoff's
Orchestra Agency, 11851 Highmeadow Drive, Dallas, Texas, who is
also a member of
the Dallas Symphony Orchestra.
He is a confidential
source of the Dallas Office pertaining to security matters (Dallas
file 134-55) a
Contact with him as shown in the enclosed memorandum
on 1/28/63 was by SA JIMMY W. GEIGER and EDWIN D. KUYKENDALL.
Contact with him on 2/1/63 was by SAS RICHARD A. GRANDY and EDWIN
D. KUYKENDALL, U
In addition to the information shown in the enclosed
memorandum, Mr.
ZELMAN BROUNOFF, on 2/1/63, advised that some
persons in
Dallas were critical
of instant
quartet appearing in
Dallas and efforts to have them utilize the Highland Park Town
Hall Auditorium, Dallas, resulted in Highland Park authorities
declining their
use of that auditorium there.
Some persons
criticized members of
the Dallas Chamber Music Society for sponsor-
ing the Komitas Quartet's appearance in Dallas.
No difficulty
arose, however, at the time of the appearance of this group at
Fincher Auditori
SMU
Dallas. The Dallas Chamber Music Society.
in Dance of this buste at
had engaged ithe
#dest of the Greenville Avenue Patrol, Dallas,
a guard and
night
watchiservice, to furnish one or two officers to
to be present
as
feguard at
the concert.
No incident occurred.
It was noted, -Have
circulars entitled "Cultural Orchange"
were distributed
Bureau (encis-5) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (enc1s-5) (105-5191792 (PIN) 18 1963
2 - Dallas (1 - 134-55) (1 - 105-1536)
EDK: jeg
6(6) FEB 27-963
EX: 108
Yde flong
NH 53025
DooId: 32308675
Page 2
---
## Page 3
DL 105-1536
in automobiles.
These circulars reflected they were put out by
Life Line, 620 - 11th Street N.W.,
Washington, D. C. BROUNOFF
furnished one copy of the circular that was distributed. It bears
date of 6/18/62, Volume 4, No. 73, and stated it is an edition of
Life Lines, published three times
each week by that organization.
It is critical of the United States for its cultural exchange
program with Soviet Russia.
Life Line has as one of its sponsors
H. L. HUNT, a wealthy Dallas, Texas, oil man. U
• Mr. BROUNOFF, on 2/6/63, made available to SA KUYKENDALI
five photographs he took at the concert in Dallas given by the
Komitas Quartet on 1/30/63.
Three of the photographs were long
shot views in the auditorium of that quartet, one including the
composer (EDWARD MIRZOYAN) taking a bow.
One photograph was of
JOHN ROSENFIELD (Dallas, Texas, music critic and employee of the "
"Dallas Morning News," daily newspaper, Dallas, Texas) and LEV ARONSON,
músician, Dallas.
The other photograph was of Mrs. JOHN ROSENFIELD
and a Mrs.
BROWN. These photographs are retained in the
Dallas file except those enclosed
to Washington Field, described
above.
Mr.
BROUNOFF, on 2/1/63, advised SAS GRANDY and KUYKENDALL
that in his discussion with SERGAY ASLAMAZIAN, cellist, BROUNOFF
inquired about his uncle named PLATON BROUNOFF, his uncle who had
come to the United States years ago from Russia.
He also mentioned
to ASLAMAZIAN that PLATON BROUNOFF had another brother who may still
be in Russia.
ASLAMAZIAN replied that he does not know the name
PLATON BROUNOFF but the name BROUNOFF sounds familiar to him because
there is a famous actor in Russia with the last name of BROUNOFF.
BROUNOFF stated that he gave ASLAMAZIAN his and his wife's (RUTH G.
BROUNOFF) names and his address.'
BROUNOFF advised that if he should receive any correspon-
dence or otherwise hear from this person or anyone else from Russia,
he would notify the Dallas Office.
Dallas Office indices reflect no identifiable derogatory
Let once ing
BOB KILPATRICK, PLATON BROUNOFF, JOSEPH TALLAL and
LEV ARONSON.
Dallas files reflect some information concerning the person
named VIVIENNE TALLAL WINTERRY, who probably is
a sister of JOSEPH A.
TALLAL. Report of SA LAWRENCE
York; 9/17/46,
known to have corresponded with STEINBERG on several occasions.
Dallas report of SA E. McGUIRE TOWNSEND, 11/12/46, captioned "ARTHUR
GERALD STEINBERG, was, IS-R'', Dallas file 100-8032-2, contains some
- 2 -
18-10033
NW 53025 DooId: 32308675 Page 3
---
## Page 4
DL 105-1536
identifiable data concerning DAVID WINTERRY and his wife, VIVIENNE
TALLAL WINTERRY.
No investigation was conducted by the Dallas
Office concerning WINTERRY and his wife in 1946, except that/{hown
those two reports.. (This data is mentioned because Mr. ZELMAN
BROUNOFF, confidential source, Dallas Office, identified above, on
2/1/63 stated JOSEPH J. TALLAL, on 1/31/63 mentioned that he has
a sister named VIVIAN who lives in New York City and who planned
to visit him soon.
Dallas file 140-108 reflects that in 1954 a preliminary
investigation was made
concerning BARTRAM KELLEY, who is referred
to in the enclosed memorandum.
That preliminary
investigation in
1954 was under the caption of 'BARTRAM KELLEY, aka; Albert Bartram
Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics, Washington,
file reflects BARTRAM KELLEY'S
that time, BARTRAM KELLEY was Chef Engineer for the Helicoptor
Division
of Bell Aircraft Corporation,
Dallas, Texas. This appears
to be the same position he now holds.
That preliminary investigation
developed insufficient investigation
to warrant further inquiry.
The "Dallas Times Herald," and the "Dallas Morning News,"
daily newspapers,
Dallas, Texas, on 1/27, 30 and 31/63 carried
news articles about the appearance of the Komitas Quartet in Dallas.
The articles identified the composer that accompanied the quartet
as EDWARD MIRZOYAN.
-
700-16093
L -
HH 53025
DocId: 32308675
Page 4
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | 104-10216-10123.pdf | 104-10216-10123 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 4/7/64 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | MEXICO CITY | DIRECTOR | CABLE: WISH DEGRIP ATTEMPT DELIVERY ONLY IF CAN BE DONE | 2 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-51 : F2 : 20040315-1057862 : | 2 | ## Page 1
104-10216-10123
TeNN
ORiG
UNIT : HE/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
ПАТЕ : Ч/NANCH/1804
TO S MEXICO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONFA DE/WH/SA 5
TO
NOB
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
D INDEX
• NO INDEX
SS
SB
PATE
4 he
SEC
7 HeR 61
17 128
сві EN
I ROUTINE
PETY MEXI
INFO
RESENTED PBRUMEN DEGRIP AMLASH
RE: MEXI 0900 (IN 53943)
CITE DIg 2757
1. WISH DEGRIP ATTEMPT DELIVERY AGAIN ONLY IF CAN BE DONE
WITH MINIMUM RISK. DEFER TO DEGRIP JUDGEMENT. TELL DEGRIP
ALTHOUGH WE STILL DESIRE DELIVERY NEED HAS BEEN LESSENED BY
CIRCUMSTANCES.
2. PLS LEVY FOLL EQMS REQUESTING FULLEST POSSIBLE DETAILS:
A. ANY INDICATIONS MEDIUM, LONG RANGE MISSLES STILL ON
ISLAND? ( YOU MAY TELL DEGRIP THRRE SEVERAL UNCONFIRMED REPORTS
OF SUCH MISSLES AROUND OLD OCT 62 SITES IN PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE.)
B. ANY SIGNS LARGE SCALE SOV TROOP AND/OR EQUIPMENT
REMOVAL TAKING PLACE OR SCHEDULED THIS YEAR?
C. INFO ON EPPECTS OF BODRIGUEZ TRIAL INCLUDING SPLITS
FORMATION NEN
OR CLIQUES AMONG CURAN LBADERSHIP?
D. ARE ANY KEY GOVT FIGURES DUE BE REPIACED IN NEAR
FUTURE? WHO AND WHY?
E. KNOWLEDGE ANY AGREFMENTS OTHER THAN KNOWN ECONOMIC
ONES MADE DUBING RECENT CASTRO MEETING MOSCOW?
COORDIRATINE DEFICERS
CONT.....•
BELEASING OFFIGER
7-1
Excluded from salomate
somegradies and
AUTHENTCAIRE
REPRODUÇTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
: Copy No
201-2522546
---
## Page 2
14-00000
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
ORIG :
UNIT 3
EXT :
DATE :
то :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO&
12 62
ROUTING
DO INDEX
I NO INDEX
I FILE IN ES FILE NO.
2
3
DEFFERIN
ROUTINE
PAGE TO
PUBLIC REACTION TO RECAYTLY PROCLAIMED CONSCRIPTION 57
LAW ( IT KNOWN REGISTRATION WENT WELL) ONCE ACTUAL, DRAFTING STARTS.
G. ANY PLANS FOR REDUCTION I STRENGTH OF REGULAR REBEL
MILITARY FORCES?
FI. REACTIONS, REPERCUSSIONS IN VARIOUS CUBAN GOVT CIRCLES
AS RESULT BRAZILIAN REVOLUTION.
I. WHAT ARE GARRELIAS PRESENT VIEWS ON PARTY ORGANIZATION?
(LET &. SAY VEICH PARFY.)
END OF MESSAGE
WH/SA/SO/NS
SH/SA/BOB
інніз Дрів,
Thewer
DESMOND FITZAKRALD
HE/SA/INTRLI
COOR
DESERS!!!
Enchuted from automase
demaradisg ane
deriass-ecatron
REPRODUCTIC BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE PROMIBITED
aren
ми
BRUCE CHEEVER
*AR ATLASE
OFFICER
Comy Na
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32312376.pdf | 124-10324-10125 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 5/5/61 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-1792-1443 | HQ | NY | 73 | FBI | NY | 11/17/2017 | RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1A | null | ## Page 1
(Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (41 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date:
4/10/201
Agency Information
AGENCY:
FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10324-10125
RECORD SERIES: NY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 97-1792-1443
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: NY
TO: HQ
TITLE:
DATE: 05/05/1961
'PAGES:
73
SUBJECTS :
FPCC
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/15/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS:
RPT, TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1A
19.1
DocId: 32312376
3
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
Report Form
• FD-263 (Fev. 5-12-55)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
REPORTING OFFICE
NeW YORK
OFFICE OF ORIGIN
NEW YORK
TITLE OF CASE
CHANGED
THE FATR
PLAY FOR CUBA
COMMITTEE
OBL
THE INSTITUTE
FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF INNER-
AMERICAN RELATIONS INCORPORA-
TED aka The Fair Play for
Cuba Committee
(FPCC)
SYNOPSIS:
DATE
5/5/51
INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
3/14/51-5/1/61
REPORT MADE BY
JOHN FRANCIS CURRAN
CHARACTER OF CASE
TYPED BY
ejI
REGISTRATION ACT-CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY -CUBA
I' TERNAL SECURITY-C
The tiale of this report is being marked "Changed"
to reflect the full and correct title of the subject organ-
Ization the FPCC of the lustitute for the Improvement of Inter-
American Relations: Incorporated as reflected In the records
of the subject organization's bank account aù the Chase
Manhattan Bank and as reflected in literature contributed
in connection with the first anniversary banquet of the
subject organization which was to be held at the Brass Rail
Restaurant in New York Clüy on April 20, 1901.
REFERENCE:
ADMINISTRATIVE:
Report of SA JAIES J. CONWAY, dated 4/14/51.
-P-
Copies of this report are being furnished to all
offices who have FPCC chapters or activity in their divisions,
APPROVED
priv
COPIES MADE:
9-Bureau (97-4195) (RM)
1-G-2, NYC
I-ONI, NYC
1-O51, NYC
3- New York (97-1792)
COPIES CONTINUED
SPECIAL AGENT
IN CHARGE
ax6)
(TERS 619198
DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
971-17921-1443
1124
NTS:
04/74
PROPERTY OF FBI. -This report is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to whir
DocId: 32312376 Page 2
---
## Page 3
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hot-.
DATE: 11-14-2017
SECRET
NY 97-1792
ADMINISTRATIVE: (Cont'a)
desired to leave the impression that he was cooperating
but in fact he was not.
His answers were evasive,
indefinite and uninformative.
It was believed that his
attorney had Instructed him to respond in this manner
and it was felt that he may have been urged by ANGEL:
BOAN and his attorney to agree to interview without
counsel for the purpose of ascertaining the direction
and depth of the FBI investigation rather than chance
having the FBI dispense with the interview completely
if he insisted on counsel.
The sources used for documentation in the
Appendix are as follows:
SWP-NY Local
WWP
NY 1013-S and NY 711-S
NY 711-S
YSA
NY 711-S
=E
COVER PACE
DocId: 32312376 Page 3
---
## Page 4
•Released under the John F. Kennedy.
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Honey
DATE: 11-14-2017
SECRET
NY 97-1792
INFORMANTS:
Identity of Source
NY T-1
CG 6403-S
NY T-2
CG. 6131-S
NY T-3
NK 1934-S
NY T-4
PHIL COOPER, Investigator
Chase Manhattan Bank
NY T-5
ARTHUR CLARK, Manager
Chase Manhattan Bank
14th Street and Fifth Ave,
New York City
NY I-6-
NY 3042-5
NY T-7
NH 405-S
NY I-8
NY 3164-S
NY I-9
NY 2358-S#
NY T-10
NY 2362-5*
NY I-11
SF 1847-5*
File Number Where Located
97-1792-1241
97-1792-1203
97-1792-1278
Instant report
Instant report
109-81
97-1792
97-1792
COVER PAGE
SECREE:
DocId: 32312376 Page 4
---
## Page 5
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (11 USC 2107 Hoter
DATE: 11-14-2017
10..
SECRE
NY 97-1792
INFORMANTS: (Cont'd)
Identity of Source
NY I-12
LA 2932-S
NY
NY
T-13
711-S
NY T-14
CG 5926-5
NY T-15
NY 3059-5*
NY T-16
NY 1786-S
NY T-18
Mrs. JOSEPHINE WESTON
Receptionist,
Registrar's Office,
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
(By request)
NY T-19 •
NY 3144-S
File Number Where Located
97-1792
134-69-1370
97-1792-1242
100-97526
97-1792-1190
134-5574A-35
NY T-21
CLEMENCIA CAPABLANCA
Former PSI
97-1792-1222
- G
-
COVER PAGE
SECRet
DocId: 32312376 Page 5
---
## Page 6
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hotey.
DATE: 11-14-2017
NY 97-1792
INFORMANTS: (Cont'a)
Identity of Source
NY T-22
JUNE COBB
Apartment 311
116 East 58th Street
(By request)
NY T-23
NY 3037-5*
NY 7-24
SF 2231-S
NY T-25
NY 2963-5**](5)
NY
T-26
NY 3227-S#](5)
NY T-27
FRED WILHELM
Ass't. Chief Clerk
Chase Manhattan Bank
57th Street and Madison Ave.,
New York City
SECRET
File Number Where Located
97-1792-1174
100-55873-71
-1213
Instant report
- H
COVER PAGE
DocId: 32312376 Page 6
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32168697.pdf | 124-10167-10057 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 3/12/64 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 62-109060-2592 | DIRECTOR, FBI | LEG, BN | 1 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107
01-11-2017
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10167-10057
RECORD_ SERIES:
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-109060-2592
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
LEG, BN
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
DATE: 03/12/1964
PAGES: 1
SUBJECT: JFK, PERIODICAL, NEUES EUROPA
DOCUMENT TYPE:
ORIGINAL
CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE:
STATUS
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Secret
12/18/1998
Redact
NEW
CLASSIFICATION:
UPDATE DATE:
02/12/2001
RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (4)
COMMENTS:
DocId: 32168697
Page 1
---
## Page 2
"Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 744 USC 2107
"Hote):
DATE: 11-14-2017
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-106-03
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES G
ERNMENT
Memorandum SECRET
TO
: DIRECTOR, FBI
(62-109060)
: LEGAT, BONN
(62-36) (P)
DATE: 3/12/64
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
SUBJECT:
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY, 11/22/63 ,.
DALLAS, TEXAS
42648
Classified by
ReBuairtel 3/5/64.
Declassify on: DAD(SEK)
Enclosed are eight copies of an LHM in this matter
dated 3/12/640
The information therein was obtained on
8-22-9°
5668S4D
3/11/64.
T-I therein is Dr. GUENTHER NOLLAU, Chief of the
Left-Wing Radicalism Division of the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungs-
schutz - (BfV - West German Federal Agency for the Protection
of the Constitution) • Sthe LiM is not classified inasmuch as
.: 25X
the information does not warrant this Dr. NOLLAU is identified
by T symbol inasmuch as it is the desire of the BfV that its
officials not be named and identified in communications which
CLASSIFIFO RY
might become available to the public.
It is noted that the term
"GmbH" is an abbreviation
DATED DECLAS
for the German phrase meaning a Limited Liability Company.
In this way it is similar to the American abbreviation, of
"Incorporated" and is not peculiar to any particular firm.
The characterization of "Neues Europa" indicated
CLASSIFIEDD
in the enclosed would indicate that the article in question
was based on astrological conclusions, We are attempting to
obtain copies of this publication and particularly a copy
EC
,of the November 1, 1964 edition to further document the
do nature of the publication.
Unless examination of the
BRACILETS
PETE BONN
newspaper indicates that it carries allegedly factual materiall
and indicates that the article in question is presented as
such an article as distinguished from an astrological prediction,
no further, inquiries will be made in this matter UACB
ace each. At wear 1164 201
5 - Bureau
(FA*S 18)
(1-Liaison: enc. - 15 0a bH, li
116
1 - Bonn
(2-Dallas: 489-49/1/2104
62-109060-
GAV: eds
(6)
CLOSUNC
BECEIED
Classified by
61 28 1142 AR 286.1061
Category.
Exempt from
Date of Declass
PAR 1 8 19643
A SECRET
to fild
DocId: 32168697
Page 2
- -
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32287666.pdf | 124-10197-10442 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 1/5/62 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 159-757-20, 21, 22, 23 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, SJ | 52 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | INC 2 RGM, LHM, MEMO, RPT | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F: Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act Of 1992 (18 USC 2107
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10197-10442
RECORD SERIES :
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 159-757-20, 21, 22, 23
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
SAC, SJ
TO
DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE: 01/05/1962
PAGES:
52
SUBJECTS :
FCH, OFFICERS, LOCAL 901, PROSECUTION, FINANCIAL
RPT, NOT FILED, DOL
DOCUMENT TYPE :
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
4
CURRENT STATUS:
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS: INC 2 RGM, LHM, MEMO, RPT
DOCId: 32287666
Page 1
6
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Aot of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Hotel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
4-4'I (Rév. 6-2-61)
DECODED COPY
xx Radio
• Teletype
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr -
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans -
Malone
Rosen -
Sullivan
Tavel -
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy -
URGENT
2-14-62
TO
DIRECTOR
aw.
FROM SAC SAN JUAN
142205
UNSUBS;
IOCALDO1,
TEAMSTERS UNION, SAN JUAN, P. R.; LMRDA - IM.
REREP SA (A) JOSEPH F• CUNVINGHAM, JR.,
• FEBRUARY 2, 1962,
SAN JUAN. LT. RAFAEL ALVAREZ (NA), POPR, ADVISED SAN JUAN
OFFICE FEBRUARY 13, 1962 ME RECEIVED INFO FROM POPR CONFIDENITIAL
SOURCE "ACE", PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED, THAT THE TEAMSTERS
UNION PLANNED TO SET FIRE TO THEIR OFFICE AND RECORDS, IN
ORDER TO PREVENT RECORDS BEING INSPECTED BY FBI IN CONNECTION
WITH INVESTIGATION PRESENTLY BEING CONDUCTED BY SAN JUAN
OFFICE. AS BUREAU IS AWARE, INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED
IN CAPTIONED MATTER, AND CASE ENTITLED "CRIMINAL INFLUENCE
IN INTERNATIONAL TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL 901, SAN JUAN, P. R.;
AR;" BUFILE 95-5361. FOR INFO BUREAU, TEAUSTERS HAVE BEDE
ENGAGED IN PICKETING OF LA CONCHA HOTEL, SAN JUAN, FOR-
REC- 12
RECOGNITION BY THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT WORKERS UNION (HRWU)
--
OF 2030532 MAO ROOF RESENT ON MAN PENDING BE OTE 591959-22
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB), SANTURCE, P. R.
FIRE OCCURRED IN OFFICE OF HRWU, SANTURCE, P. R., EARLY GORRIAS 1962
HOURS, FEBRUARY 8, 1962, AND IMPRTANT UNION RECORDS ALLEGEBLY.
DESTROYED. LT. ALVAREZ, POPR, CONTACTED FEBRUARY 14, 1962,
TO DETERMINE IF POPR SOURCE "ACE" RECEIVED INFO RE PLAN OF
TEAMSTERS TO BURN OWN OFFICE AND RECORDS WAS DIVULGED TO
"ACE" DIRECTLY BY FRANK CHAVEZ, SECRETARY-TREASURER, LOCAL 901,
OR THROUGH THIRD PARTY, WITH THOUGHT THAT INFO FURNISHED TO
"ACE" MIGHT BE TRAP TO EXPOSE "ACE" AS POPR SOURCE, THEREBY
Bad to If
50 FEB 261962
2/15/62
JR ADANS
rem:
If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureck, it is suggested that it be suitably
paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.
DocId: 32287666 Page 2
---
## Page 3
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 ,
Hote)
DATE: <11-14-2017
-45 (Hév. '6-2-61)
DECODED COPY
xx Radio
• Teletype
Tolson -
Belmont
Mohr -
Callahan -
Conrad'_
DeLoach -
Evans t
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
• Ingram -
Gandy
PAGE TWO
FROM SAN JUAN
142205
PLACING SOURCE'S LIFE IN DANGER. LT. ALVAREZ ADVISED HIS
SOURCE RECEIVED ABOVE INFO FROM A THIRD PARTY, BUT POSSIBILITY
OF TRAP STILL PRESENT. ALVAREZ ALSO ADVISED THAT "ACE"
WAS INFORMED THAT THE FIRE AT HRWU OFFICE WAS CAUSED BY THE
TEAMSTERS, WITH PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING PRECEDENT OF FIRES
IN UNION OFFICES, AND IN THIS MANNER, BURN THEIR OWN OFFICE
TO PREVENT RECORDS OF TEAMSTERS BEING INSPECTED BY FBI.
SUPERINTENDENT RAMON TORRES BRASCHI, POPR, ADVISED TODAY
THAT HE CONSIDERS SITUATION OF "ACE" VERY DELICATE AND
BELIEVES THAT LEAK OF THIS INFORMATION FROM OFFICE OF ANY
FEDERAL AGENCY MIGHT RESULT IN SEVERE EMBARRASSMENTS AND IS
CONCERNED OVER PLACING OF SOURCE IN DANGER. USA, SAN JUAN,
NOT CONTACTED TO DATE RE ABOVE INFO
RE CAPTIONED CASE, HAS STATED THAT/ORDER TO OBTAIN SUBPOENA
BUT IN CONTINUING CONTACTS
FOR BOOKS AND RECORDS OF LOCAL 901, MORE SPECIFIC ITEMS
INDICATIVE OF EMBEZZZLEMENT SHOULD BE OBTAINED. BURNING OF
TEAMSTERS RECORDS WOULD APPEAR TO BE VIOLATION OF LMRDA
STATUTES RELATING TO RIGHT OF UNION MEMBERS TO INSPECT UNION'S
RECORDS. IN ADDITION, BUREAU OF LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTS
(BLMR), SANTURCE, PO Ro, HAS BEEN ADVISED BY SAN JUAN OFFICE
OF LOCAL DOM'S APPARENT VIOLATION OF TITLE 2, LURDA, FAILURE
TO FILE REQUIRED FINANCIAL REPORTS WITH DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
FOR YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 21, 1960. IT APPEARS THAT BLMR SHOULD
THEREFORE BE ABLE TO IMMEDIATELY OBTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA
TO PRESERVE BOOKS AND RECORDS OF LOCAL 901% IF SO WILLING.
BUREAU REQUESTED TO DISCUSS ABOVE MATTER WITH DEPARTMENT ON
CONFIDENTIAL BASIS TO DETERMINE IF THERE IS ANY POSSIBLE BASIS
FOR IMMEDIATELY MOVING TO OBTAIN BOOKS AND RECORDS OF TEAMSTERS
LOCAL 901EN IF DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTS USA, SAN JUAN, TO TAKE
ACTION, CARE MUST BE TAKEN NOT TO DISCLOSE BASIS FOR ACTION
LORE BUSING
TOE TEAMSTERS RECORDS eS
REVILED BY RENUFK TASK FORCE
RECEIVEDON
7398909 PM VLH
&N
6.30. 9 cas
127620
RELEASE IN FULL
RELEASE IN EART
#ELEASE IN PART
If the intelligence contained inthe, above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably
paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems..
DocId: 32287666
Page 3
---
## Page 4
"Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Mote).
• DATE: 11-14-2017
Repori Form
FD-263 (Hev. 5-12-55)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
REPORTING OFFICE
SAN JUAN
TITLE OF CASE
OFFICE OF ORIGIN
DATE
INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
SAN JUAN
12/4/61 - 1/37/62 TYPEDBY
UNSUBS; Local 901, Teamsters Union CHARACTER OF CASE
SA (A) JOSEPH E. CUNNINGHAN, Jr
San Juan, Puerto Rico
LMRDA - IM
SYNOPSIS:
REFERENCES
Report of SA ME, JOSEPH F. CUNNINGHAM
JR. at San Juan 11/24/61.
Washington Field airtel to Bureau 12/8/61.
San Juan radiogram to Bureau 1/5/62.
san Juan airtel to Miami 1/29/62.
-P-
LEADS
0-174 8J
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
"Be too?.
chalil be:
At Los Angeles, California
In come of
2) Will check approprtate public records to determine if
FRANK CHAVEZ has received a divorce from JUNE J. CHAVEZ, 1144 South
Concord, Los Angeles, California.
It is noted that information
has been received that JUNE CHAVEZ has been separated from FRANK
CHAVEZ, Secretary-Treasurer, Teamsters Local 901, San Juan;
investigation by Los Angeles verified that FRANK CHAVEZ and/or
APPROVED
PECIAL AGEN
NCHARG
DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
COPIES M
159-757-11
(159-757)
San
Juan
2-Los Angeles (159-81)
2-Miami
1-WFO (92-510) (Info)
2-San Juan (159-17)
• 1962
2/13/10z
TEC- 22
213G
0. 104
55,MM, CHE
3/15/02
PROPERTY OF FBI.-This report is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.
71 FEB 21 1962
GPO: 1958 0 - 454008
DooId: 32287666
Page 4
---
## Page 5
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Recorus Collection Act of 1992 (11 USt 2107
Mote).
SJ 150-17
(Above lead set forth in referenced San Juan airtel
to Miami 1/29/62)
SAN JUAN DIVISION
1) W1l1 maintain contact with Lieutenant RAFAEL ALVAREZ
(NA), POPR, for any pertinent information and additional details
if necessary concerning the possible embezzlement of funds of
Local 901 which Lieutenant ALVAREZ might receive from the
confidential source of the POPR with code name "Ace"
2) Will continue efforts to develop LUIS E. PAGAN
COLON, accountant for Local 901, as a PCI.
3) Will continue to review the checking accounts maintained
by Teamsters Local 901 in the San Juan area looking primarily
for new accounts identified as organizing funds or welfare funds
of Local 901.
4) Will follow progress of investigations and resulting
action by Bureau or Labor Management Reports, Santurce, of the
apparent non-filing of annual reports by Local 901, LM-I and
LM-2 forms, with U. S. Department of Labor.
INFORMANTS
Information obtained from banks as set forth in details
of this report was furnished to SA (A) JOSEPH F. CUNNIGHAN, JR.
py the lollowing individual who requested that their identity not
be disclosed:
Banco Popular De Puerto Rico - Mr. FRANK SANCHEZ VAHAMONDE,
Supervisor, Current Accounts
Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno - Mr. ANGEL VIGIL, Supervisor
Current Accounts
Banco de San Juan - Mr. CELSO DAVILA, Assistant Manager,
Santurce Branch, Banco
de San Juan
On January 4, 1962 SJ 437-C advised SA ARNOLD W. O'BRIEN
that DORIS VIERA was formerly employed by Caribair, sar
International Airport, for approximately six years prior to her
resigning in early 1961. Miss VIERA was a trusted and excellent
-C-
COVER PAGE
DocId: 32287666
Page 5
---
## Page 6
eleased under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107
DATE: 11-14-2017
SJ 159-1.7
employee. Just prior to her resignation it was ascertained that
she was associated with FRANK CHAVEZ, head of the Teamsters
San Juan and because of this,
this was brought to the
attention of the officials of Caribair who thought it best she
should resign her position due to the fact that the Teamsters
at that time were attempting to organize the employees at
Caribair.
SJ 437-C further advised that DORIS VIERA subsequently
married FRANK CHAVEZ and presently resides with him in the
Punta Las Marias area in San Juan, Puerto RIco.
wen, pete t2och
The first confidential source mentioned in the letterhead
memorandum is Lieutenant RAFAEL ALVAREZ, Central Field Operations,
The second confidential source mentioned in the letterhead
memorandum
confidential informant of the POPR who has the.
code name "Ace.
The third confidential source mentioned in the letterhead
memorandum 1s PCI FREDDIE CASTRO, a former organiser for Local 901.
The fourth confidential source mentioned in the letterhead
memorandum is a confidential informant of the POPR with the code
name
"X-3" whohas been identified as NELSON GOTAY, a current
organizer for Local 901.
ADMINISTRATIVE
One copy of this report is being furnished to the WFO
or Iniormation as that office covers the headquarters for the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) and may be calle
upon to conduct additional investigation in this matter at a
later date.
Lieutenant RAFAEL ALVAREZ (NA), POPR, advised on January
4, 1962 on a very confidential basis that the POPR Informant
"Ace" is Teamsters organizer and official FEDERICO VIRELLA.
For the information of the Bureau investigation is also
being conducted by the san Juan Division in the matter entitled,
-D-
COVER PAGE
DocId: 32287666
Page 6
---
## Page 7
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Hotel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
SJ 159-17
"Criminal Influence in International Teamsters Union - Local 901,
San Juan, Puerto Rico; AR"
• BufIle 92-5361, SJ 92-65. It has
been reported in this matter that So FOX, a millionaire and Puerto
co-owner of the san Juan Intercontinental Hotel,- San Juan, 1s.
an intimate friend of JAMES HOFEA and DICK KAVNER of the IBT.
FAce" further noted that PRANKICHAVEZ according to POPR surce
allegedly invested $4,000 together with SOL FOX and one
ELMER INU in an insurance business and lost this money, allegedly
funds of Local 901. The details of this report also set forth
that a $1,000 check of Local 901 was recently given to SOL FOX
and cashed by him.
puerto pico
-E*-
COVER PAGE
DocId: 32287666
Page 7
---
## Page 8
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (41 USC 2107
DATE: 11-11-2017/
".."
"..
SJ 159:17
(Above lead set forth in referenced San Juan airtel
to Miami 1/29/62)
SAN JUAN DIVISION
1) Will maintain contact with Lieutenant RAFAEL ALVAREZ
(NA), POPR, for any pertinent information and additional deta1ls
if necessary concerning the possible embezzlement of funds of
Local 901 which Lieutenant ALVAREZ might receive from the
confidential source of the POPR with code name "Ace"
2) W1ll continue efforts to develop LUIS E. PAGAN
COLON, accountant for Local 901, as a PCI.
3) Will continue to review the checking accounts maintained
by Teamsters Local 901 in the San Juan area looking primarily
for new accounts identified as organizing funds or welfare funds
of Local 901.
4) Will follow progress of investigations and resulting
action by Bureau or Labor Management Reports,
Santurce, of the
apparent non-filing of annual reports by Local 901, LM-1 and
IM-2 forms, with U. S. Department of Labor.
INFORMANTS
Information obtained from banks as set forth in details
of this report was furnished to SA (A) JOSEPH E. CUNNIGHAN, JR.
by the following individual who requested that their identity not
be disclosed:
Banco Popular De Puerto Rico - Mr. FRANK SANCHEZ VAHAMONDE,
Supervisor, Current Accounts
Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno - Mr. ANGEL VIGIL, Supervisor
Current Accounts
Banco de San Juan - Mr. CELSO DAVILA, Assistant Manager,
Santurce Branch, Banco
de San Juan
On January 4, 1962 SJ 437-C advised SA ARNOLD W. O'BRIEN
that DORIS VIERA was formerly employed by Caribair, San
Juan
International Airport,
for approximately six years
prior to her
resigning in early 1961. Miss VIERA was a trusted and excellent
-C-
COVER PAGE
DocId: 32287666 Page 8
---
## Page 9
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (11 USC 2107
DATE: 11-14-2017
{
SJ 159-17
employee. Just prior to her resignation it was ascertained that
she was associated with FRANK CHAVEZ, head of the Teamsters
Union, San Juan and because of this,
this was brought to the
attention of the officials of Caribair who thought it best she
should resign her position due to the fact that the Teamsters
at that time were attempting to organize the employees at
Caribair.
SJ 437-6 further advised that DORIS VIERA subsequently
married FRANK CHAVEZ and presently resides with him in the
Punta Las Marias area in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
The first confidential source mentioned in the letterhead
memorandum is Lieutenant RAFAEL ALVAREZ, Central Field Operations,
The second confidential source mentioned in the letterhead
memorandum is a
confidential informant of the POPR who has the
code name "Ace.
The third confidential source mentioned in the letterhead
memorandum 1s PCI FREDDIE CASTRO, a former organizer for Local 901.
The fourth confidential source mentioned in the letterhead
memorandum is a confidential informant of the POPR with the code
"X-3" whohas been identified as NELSON GOTAY, a current
organizer for Local 901.
ADMINISTRATIVE
One copy of this report is being furnished to the WFO
ser information as that office covers the headquarters for the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) and may be called
upon to conduct additional investigation in this matter at a
later date.
For the information of the Bureau investigation is also
being conducted by the dan Juan Division in the matter entitled,
-D-
COVER PAGE
DocId: 32287666
Page
---
## Page 10
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Aot of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Mote). DATE: 11-14-2017
... -=
SJ 159-17
"Criminal Influence in International Teamsters Union - Local 901,
, Bufile 92-5361, SJ 92-65. It has
been reported in this matter that SOL FOX, a millionaire and
co-owner of the San Juan Intercontinental Hotel, San Juan, 1s
IA lg further noted that FRANK CHAVEZ according to POPR sarce
ELMER INU in an insurance business
and lost this money, allegedly
funds of Local 901.
The details of this report also set forth
that a $1,000 check of Local 901 was recently given to SOL FOX
and cashed by him.
-EX-
COVER PAGE
DocId: 32287666
Page
10
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | 104-10110-10620.pdf | 104-10110-10620 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 01/01/0000 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | CARD:DANIEL LESTER CARSWELL | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK40 : F25A : 1998.03.07.11:04:10:170031 : DUPLICATE OF 104-100111-10048 | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10110-10620
DANIEL LESTER CARSVELI
AMERICAN ASSOCTATION OR RIGINEERS DURS PAID TO MÁRCH 3, 1963
SECRETARY
8 SOUTA MICHIGAN AVB., CHICAGO, ILI
CAPT DANIEL L. CARSWELL, USATR
U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVS
BELONGS TO CHAPTER
NEW YORK
DUES PATD UNFIT. JUNN 61
EXECULIVE DIRECTOR • WAS
ON D.O.
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32301296.pdf | 124-10278-10131 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | FBI | 7/10/62 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-86025-9TH NR 34 | DIRECTOR, FBI | DREW, WILLIAM MAYO JR. | 6 | FBI | HQ | 02/27/2018 | 6 | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
6/12/201
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER:
124-10278-10131
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-86025-9TH NR 34
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
DREW, WILLIAM MAYO JR.
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
DATE: 07/10/1962
PAGES:
6
SUBJECTS :
LCA, ACA, GROUP, CHRISTIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST FRONT,
DISBAND, MEDIA
DOCUMENT TYPE:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION:
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
4
CURRENT STATUS:
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
06/22/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
NW 45677
DocId: 32301296
Page 1
---
## Page 2
FEDERA. BUREAU OF IN ESTIGATION
REPORTING CFFICE
OFFICE OF ORIGIN
TITLE OF CASE
SECKET
DATE
7/10/62
REPORT MADE BY
AME X:20
CHARACTER OF CASE
INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
5/10 - 6/19/62
TYPED BY
FRONT
C
2-1295
Classifled
SP8
Declassity
IS - CULA
RA - OSSA
CoNTE
NEVERSNOSS :
AGUERO
Miami letcar to Buzeau dated 4/27/62.
New York Istcer to Bureau dated
5/21/62.
CIA VACATED ECHON TO
INPEQMATIN CONTANEO
208
REL AND CUTERMATION
IN This DecenT KP. 2-5-48
- ADMIX ISTRATIVE
HERE SHOW THE SEX ET
Referenced New York letter reflects information
Enon BRNESDO/ARAGON End JOSE MIRO CARDONA Of che Cuban
Revolutionary Comail (020) reflecting that WIS CONCE
AGUERO wichdrew Ero. the CaC
still operating Independently La
Zebruary, 1962, but 16
nd
that
his expenses
and
salary are being paid for by 01.
During intervian, CONCE advised
that the sponsor
of his radio
pogram is not koown to hi: but that he believes
it to ba CIA
He notec that the station
manager had told
him that his
progren was being sponsored by a scoup of
private individuals (intezested
i in combacing communism and
APPROVED
SPECIAL
AGENT
IN CHARGE
COPIES MADE:
10) - Bureau (9 - 105-92913) (221)
(1 - 105-86025)
1
1
- New York
(105-39606) (info) (R)
Tampa
(105-977) (Info) (RB1)
2 - Miami
11 -
10562796)
(1 -
105-24942
: 112"
DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
+ REC- 25
anitaren
- 12 1105-86025
NOT RECORDEN
152 JUL 20 1962
DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT
AGENCY...
REQUEST RECO.
SATE FID.
OV FWD.
AN 183.1622
Kill (alare)
NOTATIONS CLASSIFIED BY
5668 SLD./KSR
09 2-26-98
JFK)
ISE 1
JOL 20 /062
--L 2 31962
NW 45677 DocId: 32301296 Page 2
---
## Page 3
MM 105-3196
SHEGET
that it had originally been sponsored by some unknown
cultural : group.. In connection with CONTE's broadcast,
he mentioned the name of the station as "wRUL" and when
asked to repeat it, did so in the same manner.
noted, however, that he named
the station manager as Mx.
BRENT and that New York letter of June 15, 1962, (Bufile
109-584, New York file 105-35253), page 9, sets
infornation identifying a Ns. BRENT as the president of
radio station WvRL in New York City. Accordingly, it is
possible that CONTE is working for station WWRL rather than
WRUL, as he indicated.
During interview, CONIE stated that he has been in'
contact with CIA representatives in Miami for some time and
that he furnishes them with information which he receives
in letters from Cuba in response to his radio broadcasts.
He noted that the CIA representative has never acknowledged
to him that they are sponsoring his broadcasts. (S)(U)
AS CONTE has disbanded the subject organization
and is active in radio propaganda work, (apparently for GIA](SU)
no further investigation of this matter is believed
warranted at this time.
The confidential sources mentioned in the details
are as follows:
MM 639-S; contacted on May 23, 1962, by
SA ROBERT JAMES DWYER.
MM 635-S, contacted on May 10, 1962, by
SA GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR.
PSI
contacted on May 17,
1962,
by SA WILLIAM
MAYO DREW, JR.
PSI
contacted on June 11,
1962, DY SA WILLIAM MAYO DREW, JR.
-B-
COVER PAGE
SEBRET
OTHER 4
NW 45677 DocId: 32301296
Page 3
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32301107.pdf | 124-10277-10442 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 06/22/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 97-4474-127 | SULLIVAN, W. C. | WANNALL, W. R. | 2 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note) .
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
6/4/2015
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
RECORD NUMBER:
FBI
124-10277-10442
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 97-4474-127
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: WANNALL, W. R.
TO: SULLIVAN, W. C.
TITLE :
DATE: 06/22/1964
•PAGES:
2
SUBJECTS:
MIRR, ASSOC, OBA, LOPEL, LUIS DIAZ, ACA, BOMB, SUGAR
MILL, CESSNA, SHOT DOWN
DOCUMENT TYPE :
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION:
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
4
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/17/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS:
v9.1
DocId: 32301107
Page 1
15
---
## Page 2
[Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (11 USC 2107 Horey.
DATE : 11-14-2017
Reg.?" * EPTiONAL FORM NO. iO
MAY 1962 EDITION
OSA GEN. REO, NO.. 27
35010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
•Tolson
•Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan .
Memorandum
Mr: W. C. sultans
1 - Belmont
1
• Mohr
1 - Deloach
DATE: 6/22/64
culivan.
frid
FROM
• Tavel.
Mr. W. R.. Wannall
1 - Sullivan
Trotter
Tele. Room:
1
- Wannall
DR
Holmes
- LiaisoriEVIEWED BY #WJFK Y
ASK FORCE
1 - Nasca
SUBJECT: MOVIMIENEO INSURRECIONAL DE
RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR)
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
NEUTRALITY MATTERS
114/1 no
-RELEASE
WOLL
RELEASE IN PART
TOTAL DENIAL
The captioned organization 1s a militant Miami, Florida,
carrying out attacks, on Cuba.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
85
DAIE 913
We recently received information concerning plan of
MIRR to bomb Cuban sugar mill using base in Bahamas.
disseminated this data
to State; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ;
Army, Navy; Air Force; Defènse Intelligence Agency (DIA) ;
Voy. So
Immigration and Naturalization Service; Federal Aviation Agency;
Coast Guard;
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of
State,
British;
and Customs.
Customs in Miami had been conducting
actif investigation of previous MIRR plan to attack Cuban ship.
Customs advised it was taking steps to prevent attack on sugar
mill By letter dated 6/16/64 we furnished data to Assistant
Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley and advised him that in view
action being taken by Customs no investigation was being
onducted by Bureau.
Miami Office on 6/20/64 advised that press quoted
Havana Radio as stating that "pirate" plane which had bombed
sugar mill in Cuba had been shot down. Press reported that
Orlando Bosch, head of MIRR, stated he was afraid that this
plane was theirs.
On 6/20/64 Customs; Miami, which is conducting active
investigation of this matter
advised it was checking activities
ot oneltuls biaz who had recently rented single engine Cessna
aircraft from American Aviation in Miami and that Diaz was
supposed to have igone to West Palm Beach, Florida, but had
not yet returned the aircraft.
(It is noted that State
Department on 6/20/64 with reference to plane shot down in
Cuba advised its occupants, Luis Diaz Lopez; Luis Veraga;
and ines maragon had beet captured but that Diaz had died.)
REVIEVED SEY
OK TASK FORCE
97-4474
VHN: gC
(813
64 JUL 9 1964
ON 7.23.97
REG. 17
& REBECESO DISECLOS
92-4474127
RELEASE IN PART
TOTAL DENIAL
€ JUL 1 1964
DocId: 32301107
Page 2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10216-10063.pdf | 104-10216-10063 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 12/18/1967 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | DIRECTOR FBI | DD, FOR PLANS | SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLOT TO INVADE HAITI. | 5 | CIA | JFK | 03/16/2018 | JFK64-51 : F14 : 1998.04.25.15:58:17:030102 : | 5 | ## Page 1
104-10216-10063
50:
320%:
Litactar
Scond Tu6caі 02 1a200419tio.
Attentos:
3!T.
3.J. Iapiis
Icaliy Lircair for Fioro
2.
10006 (0140 10077Gл 1761126
C 101050.02 10T, Mol 10c0V60 & 10472026
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19 Clocida E tatica
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b.
shon mors prosccurd an interoce, t.o 2017023
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0С?74T TIONG 10003.
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sarain sua
д--.
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seausse cucura.
61 C0521 а 11974 29
SEGNET
ID M
CON M00E)
204-041581
157.56
ries masile.
SAGIRI
1S DEO 1967
---
## Page 2
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wicitiaes"ug1-n90_u.7t
---
## Page 3
14-00000
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Perions garruin arlitor as goid in 119 10:112093
to the ovarthan: of the procent toldian CH70ae2t.
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recent
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maneto VIan 12 10 torld croco to allo: froc clocloas
I. TIll C: 2 256904 Co 311 10 1102 TRICK
to participato."
1.G327
15 Mainia endid
---
## Page 4
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---
## Page 5
SECUZT
..
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w1ll lo formica morto.
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no boso dnassaudor do fort nu triaco
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cc:
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..
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matchblon and dacconlication deruber
WH/7/lisiti/R. Lohnau:beg
Distribution:
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1 - E/EC/UK
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- 201-041581
fand fond foul fond freal
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(7 December 1967)
BASIC:
2400
(IN 0-1851)
PROJECT:
200-9-28
CS agy filad a 201-78482231
00 70R833 BO2E37
201-041581
--- |
2,017 | /releases | docid-32304821.pdf | 124-10286-10451 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 10/23/1967 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 109-584-4600 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 9 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | REFERRED TO INS, INC LHM | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Note) .
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
4/14/201
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10286-10451
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 109-584-4600
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
SAC, LA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:
DATE: 10/23/1967
PAGES:
9
SUBJECTS :
CC, ACA, ASSOC, ARRESTED, WEAPON, FINANCES, RCK,
BKG, REL, DESCR, IDENT RECORD
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/09/1996
OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF INS
COMMENTS: REFERRED TO INS, INC LHM
DocId: 32304821
Page 1
8
---
## Page 2
Rel
Note).
the TahA-F
DATE :
11-14-2017
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-108
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVE
NMENT
- Memorandum
aly Assassination Resords
Collect
Đệ 1992 (44 USC 20
TO
: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-584)
DATE: 10/23/67
FROM
SUBJECT:
UPAC, LOS ANGELES (205-6516) (P)
ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS - CUBA
00: Miami
(428/94 9803 RAd/sel.JfK)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNO
LASSIFIED 21,30
DATE 10/3/85
BYSPERA GE
Re Los Angeles airtel to Bureau dated 9/9/67.
Enclosed for the Bureau are nine copies and for Miami
are two copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) captioned and
dated as above.
For the information of Miami, two copies eash of two
double mug shots of each of
the three arrestees, taken by the
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) on 9/3/67, are being
enclosed.
Copies of the LHM are being furnished the local
offices of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, United States
Secret Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
for their information.
Information contained in LHM was obtained by
SA RICHARD L. CROMWELL.
Investigator GENE B. PYEATT, INS, LOS
Angeles, advised on 9/20/67, that he had obtained the Alien
Registration files of OLIVERA and VIGO-VILLA from the Miami
2
office of INS, but as yet had been unable to obtain the file of
JOSE MIGUEL GOMEZ-MORRELL.
It does not now appear that there is any current
involvement in anti-CASTRO activities by the three individuals
arrested by the LAPD on, 9/8/07; for possession of a machine gun;
however, Los Angeles will review the INS file of GOMEZ if it is
Located, in order to complete this investigation, whereupon the
case will be Ruc'd by Los Angeles
Bureau (Enel.
ENCLOSU ALG72
109-584-4602
nX 101
2 - Miami (105-1742) (Encl
(1-105- New j ANGEL VIGO-VILIA
12 OCT 27 1967
2 - Los Angeles
RLC/ imb
(7)
State/cIA/socret Servico/RAO<ED(RiEre /ATTD
Army/Mavy/Air Fosse/DIA/Custone/
SERENA LATIAMERICAN
Coordinator o? Cuban Ateirs,
7 9
NOV 3 - 196% For Inro
Date 1/3/02
-BYWHILE
DocId: 32304821
Page 2
---
## Page 3
Released under the John F. Kennedy ASSassinatIon Records Collection Act o 1992 (HUSE 7107
Motel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTICATION
POSTPONEMENT INFORMATION SHEET (JFK MATERIALS)
8
_Page (s) withheld entirely at this location in the file.
One or more of the following statements, where indicated,
explain this deletion (these deletions) .
[] Deletions were made pursuant to the postponement
rationale indicated below with no segregable material
• available for disclosure. All references relate to
Section 6 of the "President John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992."
[] Subsection 1A (intelligence agent's identity)
[] Subsection 1B (intelligence source or method)
[] Subsection 1C (other matter relating to military
defense, intelligence operations or
the conduct of foreign relations)
(] Subsection 2
[]
Subsection 3
[] Subsection 4
[] Subsection 5
(living person who provided
confidential information)
(unwarranted invasion of privacy)
(cooperating individual or foreign
government, currently requiring
protection)
(security or protective procedure,
currently or expected to be utilized)
[] Information pertained to a matter unrelated to the JFK
assassination investigation."
M For your information:
efer 18 INS
The following number is to be used for reference
regarding this page (these pages) :
109-584-4600
XXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
xxxxxxxxxx
xXXxxxXXXXX
DocId: 32301821
Page 3
---
## Page 4
hoteased under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Callection Act at 1992 144 USE 2I0T m
DATE: 11-14-2017
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
October 20, 1967
ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
Information set out herein pertains to the three
Cubans who were arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) on September 8, 1967, for possession of a machine gun.
CAHE
advised that there was no
necora wallable concerning one of
the arrestees, Jose Miguel
The Latin-American
Subversive Index of INS, Los. Angeles, and the I-53 file (annual
address report cards for 1967) were checked for all three, and
no record could be found identical with any of them.
Investigator Pyeatt advised that on September 8, 1967,
he briefly interviewed the three: Gomez-Morell, Angel Alfredo
Vigo-Villa and Luis Alberto De La Olivera-Gonzalez, accompanied
by Anthony M. Veich
ment, at the North Hollywood Division,
they determined that the weapon in the possession of the above
three at the time of their arrest was not an automatic weapon.
There: was no indication of any organizational connection on
the part of the three men, although Olivera said that he had
been a member of Brigade 3506, which participated in the unsuc-
cessful invasion of Cuba in April 1961.
No further investigation
is being conducted by INS concerning this matter.
Investigator, Pyeatt stated that Vigo-Villa had in
his possession a receipt for the gu,plainfield Machine,
dated September 7, 1967,
which described it as a Caliber.30,
Dunellen, N. J. "--Serial No. 0741.
6718 Elmer Avenue,
"Surplus, 5262 Lankershim Boulevard. Also included on the receipt
were two boxes of ammunition and two clips, for a total cost of
$132.21.
Vigo told Investigator Pyeatt that Rose is a _Cuban,
and that they were going to buy the gun from him.
While he was
in jail, Vigo telephoned Mercedes Perez, telephone number 665-7286.
The purpose of this call was not khown.-hsA
¡ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 21,376
BY P6 PIT Ga
18/2894 9803 RAD/sel Ik
ENCLOSURE / 09-167-4600
DocId: 32304821 Page 4
---
## Page 5
Releazeit unter
the
TehR
flote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
rds Collection Act of 1992
444 USC
2107
ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
ANGEL VIGO
ANGEL ASSIGO
A. ALVIGO
CALLF,
was reviewed at INS, Los Angeles, on September 20, 1967:
file revealed that Vigo was born on April 29,1943v1n CamagueS,
Cuba, and entered the United States on March
25, 1961, at Miami,
Florida, via Pan American Airways Flight 432.
te was an 0-
1965, and Immigrant Visa No. 1541 issued on March
24, 1961, to
TERRACE N. MIAMi BEACH. FLA,
16R/945
In his application for Immigrant Visa and
• Foreign
Registration dated March 24, 1961, filed with the U. S. Consulate,
Kingston, Jamaica, Vigo gave his address
as 76 Hanover
and his occupation as a
student. He was
street,
described as:
Race
Sex
Marital Status
Height
Hair
Eyes
Destination
Relatives
White /
Male
Single
515
Brown
Brown
LOUIS/GATES
4131 Northeast 38th Street
Miami
Father:
ANGE COATOVE
Independencia .#I13
Mother:
_Independencia.
Sister:
ANGELICAU
Independencia #133
- Camaguey,
y, Cuba
In Vigo's file is a list of current status of known
Cuban burglars and robbers, supplement to the Sheriff's Daily
Bulletin, published on February 18, 1965 by the Dade County
Sheriff's
Office, Criminal Intelligence Section.
this, Angel
According to
Vigo
of robbery.
was in Dade County Jail, charged with one count
contained in the file:
Following is Vigo's FBI Identification Record,
-2 -
DocId: 32304821
Page 5
---
## Page 6
Released, under the. Jomn E
Hote) :
• DATE 11-14-2017
action hat of 19
MENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25. D.C. i
Dircetor
The following FBI record, NUMBER 318 220 E
CONTRISUTOS OF
FINGERPRINTS
NAME AND NUMBER
ARRESTED OF
RECEIVEI
is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
5 CHARGE
"DISPOSItION
PD Fort Myers
Fla
Angel
Alfredo
V1go' #10991
11-23-61
excessive speed
gu116y: 935
30: doys
PD Miami Fla
Angel Alfredo
•V1g0 130470
10-18-62
agg A & transp
explosives
20-19-62 res
Army
Angel Alfredo
Vigo-VIlla
HUC 50 302
497
10-25-62
Coral
Gables
Fla
PD Mian?
Tra.
AlEredo
Vigo: 180410
62/43
2056
automatia
7728*y
LErn
240780470
12-20-01
14÷29-55
V190 450470
agranted cult
SAR
SO Miani ria
PD Miani Ela
Angel Alfredo
Vigo
406273
Angel Alfredo
Vigo 790470
2-26-55
Stoler prop
2-18m 55
Coin Dod
67"2,00372
vastena
PD Miami Fla
Angel
A Vigo
#80170
2-25-65
burg lam
PD Miami Fla
Dade
Co J1
(Re Creone
stolen propozera
Angel Alfredo
Vigo
#80470
3-1-65
nel.
SO Miami Fia
Sagel VIgo
736373
5-12-65
cobbery:
057.4192
72020
2a
normation shown'on this identificotior Record roozesents Maid tarnished 720 by Eagerpor
contributom
Where Final dispositos is not shown or lurther explonation of chare la dostood
municate with agency contributing those fingerprints.
Notations indicated by
gativa lebde as belug possibly iduatiooi mith subject of
on fingerprints in 23l Sues but are listed only ou inacetr
this rocord
DooId: 32304821 Page 6
---
## Page 7
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
•
CALLIES
ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
In the file was a copy of the Sheriff's Daily Bulletin,
Dade County Sheriff's Office, dated July 13, 1905, containing
the following remarks under the caption,
'General Information":
Name
AD A. VIGO
Race
White
Nationality
Cuban
Birth Data
April 29, 1945
Height
Weight
5162"
120
Hair
Brown
Eyes
Brown
Peculiarity
Brace on right leg
Last known
Address
142 Northeast 56th Street
Miami, Florida
Modus Operandi
Characteristics
Burglar, Robber
VIGO frequents race tracks
and Jai Alai, Frontons
RICARDO DEL
RIO and GERMAN TRUJILLO
Associates
Dade County
Sheriff's Office
Number
86273
In an application for an Alien Registration Receipt
Card
Form I-151, on July 13, 1967, Vigo showed his residence
as 565 Northeast
160th Terrace, North Miami Beach
Florida
This application was approvea. LuIs ALBERTO
OLIVERAX GONZALELI
À review of the file of luis Alberto De L
Caridad
Olivere onzalez, Alien Registration Number 11-875=721-at-
INS, Los Angeles on September 20, 1967, showed that Oliver:
was born on July 10, 1936, in Cuba.
He entered the United States
at Charleston, South carotina on February 1, 1960, by jumping
ship.
He was ordered detained on board the
'Sula G"
(Liberian) through refusal of a D-l landing permit on arrival
at Wilmington, North Carolina, on January 17, 1960, and deserted
the ship at Charleston on February 1, 1960.
A notation in the
file shows that evidence indicated
headeserted the ship on a
previous trip to the U. S. and was apprehended and
returned to
the ship at Newark, New Jersey, in
• December 1959.
He had Cuban
Passport 33598, 'valid to December 12, 1964.
476 S.w. 48h
MIAmi, FLA
DooId: 32304821 Page 7
---
## Page 8
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Hotel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
As of October 26, 1961, Olivera's address was shown
as 476 Southwest Fourth Street,
Miami, Florida,
He was described
(as of February 10, 1960) as white, male; five
feet, seven
inches; 150 pounds; brown hair; green eyes.
A memorandum dated December 29, 1959, by Robert J.
Lynees, Investigator, INS, appears in the file.
This concerns
the desertion of Olivera on December 28, 1959, from the
On"a calendar in Olivera's
wIs theme teen we to Roosevelt Avenue, Carteret, -Carteret,N.J.
written in ink..
Mrs. Nievis was interviewed at above address,
Seestelephoned her husband who returned to vites usen
. He was located at latter address, with Teresa Guzman,
All said
Olivera would be killed for political activities if
returned to Cuba.
Olivera produced a letter alleging he was
elected councilman in his town in 1958.
He said he had joined
"Sula G" 15 days before in Santa Lucia, Cuba, ana that he
had paid $200 for a Cuban Passport and exit permit from the
Cuban Revolutionary Police.
Olivera was interviewed under oath by Robert H. Irish,
Investigator, INS, on February 10, 1960, at Miami.
He said he
last
entered
the U. S. ön
February 1, 1960, at Charleston, South
Carolina, by jumping a ship flying the Liberian flag.
captain knew he previously left the ship at Carteret, New
Jersey, about December 27, 1959. He said he was picked up and
was put back on the ship,
did not want to return to Cuba for fear he would be prosecuted.
en he cut the then
but jumped. ship at Charleston as he
He claimed he was president of the Anti-Communist Youth Move-
ment in Cuba, and said he had been arrested 10 or 12 times in
Cuba for fighting Communismg and was incarcerated two or three
days each time.
He said his father, Luis Olivera was dead, and
was living-at Luz Caballero
of political reasons.
As of February 10, 1860, Olivera lived at 421 North~
west Fifteenth Avenue, Miami, Florida.
At a hearing on April 4, 1960, at INS, Miami, Florida,
Olivera was released on conditional parole, to report the first
Monday of each month at INS; Miami.
On April 18, 1960, he was
ordered deported to Cuba, pursuant to Section 243, Immigration
and Nationality Act.
-4.
DocId: 32304821
Page 8
---
## Page 9
(Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Hotel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
On April 25, 1960, the Caribbean Sea Corporation,
c/o/Marinus, Incorporated, 29 Broadway, New York,6, New York,
was advised
of the deportation order against Olivera.
- A copy
of this was sent to Palmeto Shipping Company, Post Office
Box 842, Charleston, South Carolina.
By letter April 28, 1960, to INS, Marinus, Incorporated,
requested INS to arrange transportation for Olivera's deporta-
tion and said Marinus should be billed for the charges.
accordance with a memorandum dated April 12, 1960, of the
regarding Cuban Nationals) to change
his domicile from Miami
to Garden Grove, California, to work for the Rubber Corporation
of California,
Post Office Box 278, Garden Grove, California.
An order of Release on Recognizance for Olivera on
August 17, 1960, stated he should not travel outside Florida
without written
permission from INS, Miami, Florida.
On August 23, 1960, he was advised he was released
on conditional párole.
Olivera's departure from the U. S. on August 23, 1960,
was verified by Joseph E. Geary, Chief, Deportation Section,
INS, Washington, D. C. '
As of October 12, 1961, Olivera's address was 476 South-
west Fourth, Miami, Florida. His previous address was 3625 North-
west Eleventh, Miami. As of June 30, 1960, he lived at latter
address and showed a previous address of 1504 West Flagler
Street, Miami.
The Warrant of Deportation, dated April 18, 1960, in
Olivera's file shows the notation on the reverse side: "Subject's
departure from
the U. S., August 23, 1960, verified by G. E. of
Central Office.
Port of departure and destination unknown.
Mary F. Baily, Dep. Docket Clerk.
The following FBI Identification Record pertaining
to Olivera appears in the file:
-5 -
DocId: 32304821
Page 9
---
## Page 10
Released
under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107
Hotel.
DATE:
II-11-2017
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BEREAU OF INYESTIGATION
MAR?
1967 5 2 5
FASHINGTOY 25, D. C.
you shouie
Director.
The followieg FBI record, NUMBER
CONTRIÉUTOR
PHIGERPROR OF
RAME AND HUNDER
824 021 D
, is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
ARRESTED
OR
RECEIVED
CHARGE
DISPOSITION
USINs Miani Fla
PD Miami Fla
Luis Alberto
Olivera-Gonzalez
#A11875 721 MIA
Luis Alberto
Olivera $75772
3-24-60
dep
8-23-50
deported
5-11-61
worthless chacks
5-11-61 r01
SO Miami Fla
USM Miani Fla
Luis Alberto
Olivera
#102039
Luis Alberto
Olivera
#5093-4769
1-3-67
hold for USM
1-2-67
consy export
munitions of
war w/o lic
Notations indicated by * ARS NOT BASSD ON EINGERPRINTS IN FBI des. The notations ere basel on data
fomody furished this Bureau concoming indisiduals of de sane or aimilar names or
aliases
and ARE TISIED
ONEY AS INVESTIGATIYE LENIS
DocId: 32304821 Page 10
---
## Page 11
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Cullettiun Aot of 1992 (14 USe 2107-
-==
Hotel.
DATE: 11-14-2017
ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
The files of the Los Angeles Office of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation contain no other information identi-
fiable with Angel Alfredo Vigo-Villa, Luis Alberto De La
Caridad Olivera-Gonzalez or Jose Miguel Gomez-Morell.
This document contains neither recommendations nor
conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and
is loaned to your agèncy; it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.
- 6*-
DocId: 32304821
Page 11
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | 104-10161-10353.pdf | 104-10161-10353 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 10/12/61 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT DESK | OFFICE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD REGARDING THE PROPOSED USE OF SUBJECT. | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK45 : F17 : 1997.11.16.10:53:43:543108 : FILE ORIGINAL IS PREVIOUSLY REDACTED DOCUMENT. | 1 | ## Page 1
• 104-10161-10353
Unice Memoriaurn • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
For the Record
DATE: 12 October 1961
FROM : Chief, Cover Support Desk
SUBJECT:
RODRIGUEZ, End 110 Americo
#214 442
1. On Il October 1961 MI. Jeremiah Mullane, Wi 4 Security, con-.
tacted me regarding the proposed use of the Subject in Building $25
under the n0n-Official, IMWAVE cover. According to Mullans, the Subject
was to be used as a spotter and recruiter. He 1s & Type A contract
employee•
2. After review of Subject's covert Ille and discussing the matter
with the IRD operator who recently polygraphed the Subject, I advised
Mullane that It would appear to be undestrable at this time to use
the Subject In the capacity indicated. In view of the fact that while
the Subject was
\In approdmately 1960, 1t was
ascertained that
24
I agreed and advised him, however, that in the absence
of Information to the contrary, 1t would appear that the Subject's
assignment and use under JMWAVE cover would be an umarranted risk.
I suggested that the Subject might be able to conduct his duties
outside of the Building and that such an arrangement would be nore
secure, le. In the event that he recruited an individual who turned
sour, he sould not be linked with JMWAVE. I referred Mullane to -
IRD for further discussions with the polygraph operator concerned.
I plan to take no. further action on this matter in the absence of an
official request for his conversion and or assigment to JMWAVE.
"OS
:=5
1/201
KUHNKE/m.J1
12 October 1961
CLOSED
23
=$5,90
Giel Dien
2(1)
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32306924.pdf | 124-10291-10064 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/21/1963 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-3267-476 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, LA | 8 | FBI | HQ JUNE MAIL | 11/17/2017 | INC MEMO | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/6/2015
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER :
124-10291-10064
RECORD SERIES : HQ JUNE MAIL
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 92-3267-476
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: SAC, LA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE:
• PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
05/21/1963
8
JRO, MISUR, CONTIN, APT C, 1251 NORTH CRESCENT
HEIGHTS BLVD, LA
DOCUMENT TYPE:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
1B
CURRENT STATUS :
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: = 04/15/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
INC MEMO
v9.1
DocId: 32306924
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (41 USC 2107 Hotel•
DATE: 76-71-7948601
OPTONAL POAM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
: Director, FBI
(Bufile 92-3267
JUNE
DATE: 5/21/63
FROM
/SAC, Los Angeles (92-113 B)
SUBJECT: JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUATION OF TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE
RE: Title
JOHN ROSETTI, aka.
Character of Case
ANTI-RACKETEERING
Field Office
Los Angeles
Symbol Number
LA 4396-C*
Type of Surveillances XenialXor
Microphone / CONE. INFL
1. Name of person or organization on whom surveillance placed:
JOHN ROSELLI
2. Address where installation made. Also give exact room number or area
covered:
Apt. C, 1251 North Crescent Heights Blvd.
Los Angeles cALiF
3. Location of monitoring plant:
Central Technical Plant
'ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIE
4. Dates of initial authorization and installation:'
Authorization:
2/26/62
Installation:
4/10/62
JFK
5. Provious and other installations on the same subject (uith dates and plagan?
LV 39-0* - Diplomat Apartments, Las Vegas, Nevada
No longer active.
REG 9
92-3262-476
6. If installation is a technical surveillance, answer following questions:
a. Is a trunk line utilized?
NA
b. Is the surveillance on a switchboard?
11-MAY 24-1963
Ic. Is the surveillance on a public coin-operated
telephone?
Bureau (REGISTERED)
1 - Los Angeles
Registered Mail
RKS/se
(2)
DocId: 32306924 Page 2
---
## Page 3
Released under the John E. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (41 USC, 2107 Notel?
DATE: 11-14-2017
d. Is surveillance on a private line or a party line?
NA
7.
8.
e. If a party line, how many parties?
NA
If a microphone surveillance involved, state number of microphones actually
used and location of each: One MITE microphone is, installed in wall
Of ROSELLI's apartment - access gained by penetrating common !
wall in adjacent Apartment, "D",
11251 North Crescent Heights
Boulevara,
Los Angeles.
Is the installation part of a tel-mike? If so, give symbol of other side
of the combination:
•No.'
9. Specific examples of valuable information obtained since previous report
with indication of specific value of each item and the date information
received. State what use was made of each item involved: (Add insert pages.)
See insert
Could above
information have been obtained from other sources ánd by other
NO
11. Number of live informants (in field division) who cover same subject:
12:,
13.
14.
Has security factor changed since
installation?
No
Any request for the surveillance by. outside agency (give name, title and.
agency):
NO
Cost of Plant Premises:
None (Central Iechnical Plant)
a. Réntal costs for plant premises:
b. Give total number of other surveillances monitored at same plant.
÷2.÷
DocId: 32306924 Page 3
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32310333.pdf | 124-10302-10277 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 05/13/1960 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 2-1499-49 | DIRECTOR, FBI | WIGHTMAN, WILLIAM A. | 23 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Aot of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
4/3/2015
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY :
FBI
RECORD NUMBER:
124-10302-10277
RECORD SERIES :
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
2-1499-49
Document Information
ORIGINATOR :
FBI
FROM:
TO:
WIGHTMAN, WILLIAM A.
DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE :
05/13/1960
PAGES:
23
SUBJECTS :
FS, AKA, BKG, CITIZENSHIP, ASSOC, MIL, RECRUIT,
ANTI-CASTRO, TRAINING, CONSPR, AGAINST CUBA, TRA,
TESUR, INTV, SUGARMAN, JOSEPH, FREEMAN, JULES
DOCUMENT TYPÉ: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/20/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
DocId: 32310333
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under
the /To
1÷14-2017
ennetly
Assassination Records
Collection t
52411-159
2107 Rote).
MM 2-192
- SECRET
2.
Will maintain contact with U. S. Border
Patrol for further information regarding the proposed
expedition involving subject.
3. Will consider interview of PEDRO LUIS DIAZ
'LANZ for any information he may volunteer concerning
against Cuba.
subject'e involvet da she levying of an expedition
ADMINISTRATIVE
This report is being classified confidential
since disclosure of information contained therein could
reasonably result in the identification of a confidential
informant of continuing value and compromise future
effectiveness thereof and since this data involves coverage
of a foreign, diplomatic establishment]
Copies of this report are being
furnished to
Immigration and Naturalization Service, U. S. Border
Patrol and U. S. Customs locally in view of investigative
interest by those agencies in subject's activities.
INFORMANTS
IDENTITY
LOCATION OF ORIGINAL INFORMATION
MM T-1 is LAWRENCE G.
CONDON, 3789 Northwest
161st Street, Opa-locka,
Florida
TEM I-2 40/TAN 720-5*-1847(5)
Instant report, page 6.
REVIEWED BY LOWJFK TASK FORCE
ON 3/03./98 da
RELEASE IN FULL
-B-
J RELEASE IN PART
• TOTAL DENIAL
- COVER PAGE -
SERRET -
canetion
398.1051
DocId: 32310333 Page 2
---
## Page 3
Lease
DATE:
under the
11-14-2017
ohn F
Fine dy
Assassination Records
Collection 4ot of
992
144
USC
Tate) -
CAN IRFREE
MM 2-192
JUN IDENTAL
SECRET
SECRET
On May 5, 1960, MM T62
advised that an
unidentified wman Informed that ABELARDO LEON BLANCO,
Cuban Consul General in Miami, that her son is one (5)
of a group of approximately 100 men who are being
trained in firearms practice by PEDRO LUIS DIAZ IANZ.
According to MM I-2,
this woman told BlANCO that this
group was supposed to depart for Cuba on May 9,
1960.
However, BLANCO replied that the group would not (S)
ensla not
go to cuba, but Instead
camp in Guatemala
would be going to a concentration
CONTIDINTAL
197.
SECRET
DocId: 32310333 Page 3
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32328349.pdf | 124-90073-10053 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | FBI | 2/12/73 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-7599-35 | HQ | 28 | FBI | HQ | 3/9/18 | SUMMARY | 28 | ## Page 1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Date:
5/5/2015
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90073-10053
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 92-7599-35
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
HQ
TO:
TITLE:
DATE:
PAGES:
SUBJECTS:
02/12/1973
28
DAVE YARAS
DAVID YARAS
DOCUMENT TYPE:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS:
4
"CURRENT STATUS:
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/11/1999
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
SUMMARY
v9.1
NW 45992 DocId: 32328349 Page 1
---
## Page 2
Miami report dated 12/21/49 revealed that on 11/16/49, the
liquor license for the Tahiti Bax, 24 23D sta tram. The Tahiti
was transferred to Marilyn Yaras, wife of David Yaras.
Bar was known as a hangout for hoodlums. It was believed by the Miami
Beach PD that Marilyn Yaras was obviously a "front" for Yaras in the
operation of the Tahiti Bar since he could not obtain a license in
view of his
criminal record. The PD also believed that Yaras was
possibly a
"front" for Joe Massey, notorious hoodlum who migrateo
to Miami Beach from Detroit, Michigan, and had extensive property
interests in the Miami Beach area.
Add. info.
87-12825-31 p.8,9
181
CGII 3075 advised on 7/22/50 that Dave Yaras, a night-club
owner in Miami, handled all the transactions and dealings between
Leonard Patrick and Wally Block in their contacts with criminal
elements in Chicago.
Patrick and Block were regarded as possible
suspects in the murder of Abraham Davidian (72-472).
72-472-371 p. 95,2091
(20)
GO 5741 advised that he questioned Ben Tilley, Boston,
Massachusetts, about the Brinks Robbery (91-5535), Tilley freely
acknowledged that he had, in the past, engaged ir
large-scale robberies
and he mentioned having been involved in the past with Dave Yaras in
chicag° (chicago letter 10/25/51)
Tilley indicated that he had not been involved in the Brinks
Case.
91-5535-8031 p. 3
(28)
In connection with a request from the Federal Grand Jury
inquring into local crime at Miami regarding Miami racketeer David
Yaras, a summary of information dated 4/17/52 was prepared for
delivery to the Federal Grand Jury.
(continued)
-6-
NH 45992 DocId:32328349 Page 2
---
## Page 3
(continued)
REFERENCE
63-1106-1 ep.1; outg. p.1
-2 ep. 1
-3 p. 2; outg. p.2
SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
Joseph Vinson, associated with the National Board of Fire
Underwriters at Miami, advised that Max Caldwell, Miami Beach,
was
making plans to kidnap Sam Friedland, wealthy owner of the Food
mentioned as the man to be used in this kidnapping.
Yaras, Chicago PD# D-14360, was a well-known Chicago
resided in Miami Beach for the past several years.
He received much publicity a few years ago due to his having been
identified as one of the killers in a Chicago slaying.
He
also
Miami letter, 10/15/53
62-64279-2 p.1,3
(17)
Ernest Glaser, Special Agent, Southwestern Bell Telephone
Missour, furnished
co evergreen 2-7506 which belonged to John Joseph vitale, suspect
a list of extra toll charges
in the Bobbie Greenlease kidnapping (7-0920)•
On 1/5/56
a call was
nade from this number to Miami Beach-Mohawk 1-1394 to Davie Yaroz or
Jefferson 8-3255.
The Miami Office believed this person was possibly identical
with David Yaras, Chicago PD# D14360, a well-known Chicago torpedo,
who with two others tried to kill one James Ragen at Chicago when the
Capone group was taking over the Continental News Wire Service.
7.6920-6439 Do 1,20
On 5/10/56 PCIL
advised that Harry Brown
(143-132) formerly operated the American Amusement Company in
Chicago, and that his partner in this enterprise was Dave Yarros,
who was very closely associated with the old Capone mob in the
Chicago area.
(continued)
OTHER 4
-8-
NH 45992 DocId:32328349 Page 3
---
## Page 4
OTHER 4
a symbol informant of the Chicago Office,
advised on 2/28/62 and 3/31/62 that Frank Diecidue (92-4936) was
believed to be related to Santo Trafficante, who in turn was a leading
gambling figure in Miami, Florida, where he
had been associating in
the past with Dave Yaros, formerly from Chicago, Illinois.
92-4936÷17 p.5
(32)
MM 509-C advised that on 3/30/62, between 1:00 PM and
Councilman.
on 6/14/62 MM 675-C advised that John McGauran, a Miami
Beach PD Detective who was suspended from the PD after being accused
of being involved in some burglaries with the thieves, allegedly had
Yaras coming to his aid and defense.
Ada. info.
62-38824-972 p. 72,79,80,82,83,
(4,77)
103,105
The following references pertain to the investigations
and/or hearings of Congressional Committees.
the criminal activities of David Yaras from 1930 to 1963 in Chicago
was set out in testimonies of individuals and exhibits.
COMMITTEE
REFERENCE
Special Senate Committee
to Investigate Organized
Crime in Interstate
Commerce
Permanent Subcommiteee
on Investigations, US
Senate
62-91933-615 pt.5 ep.464,465
-692 ер.8г
-765X ер. 33
SEARCH SLIP
PAGE NUMBER
(95)
(30)
92-4282-169 ер.512
-15-
NN 45992 DocId: 32328349 Page 4
---
## Page 5
Harold Konigsberg (92-5177) advised that in 1963, he had
been requested by Seymour Flax
(not identified) to approach Teddy
Gleason, President of the International Longshoremen's Association,
and
for
Gleason, in turn, to contact Jimmy Hoffa, President of the
Teamster's Union, to secure a $900,000 loan for Frankie's Market,
Lodi, New Jersey.
Konigsberg did not know the ultimate outcome
of
this
deal,
but did know that subsequently Joseph Zicarelli (not
identified) went to Chicago where supposedly he spoke with Dave
Yaras who was then to see Hoffa or else use his influence in obtaining
the loan. The loan was to come out of the Teamster's Pension Fund.
92-5177-156 ep.2
(25)
The following references in the file captioned "Jack
Leon Ruby" pertain to David Yaras in Chicago and Miami from 9/26/63-
12/5/63. On 11/27/63 it was reported that there was a tie-in
between
Ruby in Dallas and Yaras in Miami in connection with shylocking
and girls.
Yaras was interviewed in Chicago on 12/5/63 and denied
having any relationship whatever with Ruby, business or otherwise,
subsequent to Ruby's departure from Chicago approximately fourteen
years ago. He did admit that he had known Ruby as "Sparky"
, a young
hustler and fight fan in Chicago.
Also, his brother) Sam Yaras had
been acquainted with Ruby in Dallas, but Sam had died seven years
Yaras had not been in Dallas
since 1945 when he and his brother
a "split"
The President's Commission requested information
regarding certain individuals! telephone calls during the period
9/26/63-11/22/63. One of these individuals, Robert Baker; 5900
North Sheridan, Chicago, RA 8-4031, placed a call to JE 8-3255,
Miami, listed to Yaras, 4410 Adams
Ave., Miami Beach, during this
period.
REFERENCE
44-24016-302 p.1,2
-482 p.1,2 (Interviewed, 12/5/63)
-490 p. 1
-804 p.29 (Interviewed, 12/5/63)
-1366 p.80
SEARCH SEIP PAGE NUMBER
(15)
15
(15)
(15.
8)
advised on 3/19/64 that several years ago
Govern the cantine top are on. ne got i hope 8a10n5
(continued)
OTHER 4
-16-
NW 45992 DocId: 32328349 Page 5
---
## Page 6
On 1/13/66 CG 6884-C-TE advised that in connection with the
operation of the Chicago sports lay-off center being operated by
Frank Aurelli and Dominic Cortina (165-1143), one Lennie Abram and L.
they reached out and contacted Dave Yaras for help.
Yaras called
Cortina and asked him to leave both Abram
time being.
165-1143-15 p. B
(287)
The 7/13/66 issue of the "Chicago Sun Times" carried an
article entitled
"Firm's Vast Gaming Output Related Here"
The
article revealed that the Illinois Crime Investigation Commission.
(ICIC) had uncovered evidence that organized crime syndicat
distributing gambling devices
During
the ICIC public hearings, Empire employees were asked if they had
seen David Marras at the plant.
The witnesses all stated that they
wouldn't be able to recognize Yarras.
166-1163-A-"Chicago Sun Times"
(37).
7/13/66
On 10/28/66 LV 285-PC advised that at that time there were
only three mob bookie operations going in the country. One was in
were described as
Chicago, Illinois, "Jews with the mob."
and was run by Lenny Patrick and Dave Yarras, who
162-1-65-169 p.2
(36)
The following references are reports dated from 12/2/53 to
$/22/67 furnished by Bureau Informants as set out below concernin
he hoodlum activities and associates of Davey Yaras in California
Florida, Illinois and Michigan.
(continued)
-18-
NH 45992 DocId:32328349 Page 6
---
## Page 7
(continued)
INFORMANT
NY 206-C
DE 370-C-TE
LA 4335-C-TE
MM 1003-C-TE
OM 148-C-TE
REFERENCE
66-18621-96 ep. 16,31
66-17867-33 p. 37,38
137-7378-68 p.1
137-7954-74 p.2
-82 p.7
137-9175-29 p.8,9
SEARCH SLIP
PAGE NUMBER
(30)
(32)
(29)
127
(87
(27,33}
on 6/21/67 MM 986-C-TE advised that several years ago
John Prokos (165-1790) operated a "bust out" crap game in Miami.
On one occasion "Doc"'
Robbins of the Fontainebleau Hotel lost $15,000.
Robbins was pushed for payment of his debt, and the matter was finally
settled by Robbins paying the amount of money owed to Dave Yaras.
165-1790-145 p. 4
(28)
On 10/16/67 Edwin L. Abercrombie, Vice President of the
Laundry, Drycleaning and Dye House Workers
International Union,
Local 218, Atlantag Georgia (159-2651), related several incidents which
had happened recently.
He believed the purpose of these incidents
was to scare him into allowing hoodlums into his union in Miami and
felt it was an attempt by "the Mafia" or a big-shot hoodlum, David
Yaras in Miami, to get a man into his union as a business agent in
for Yaras, had called Abercrombie
and asked for a job with his union as a business agent. When
Abercrombie told Husick he could not have the job because of his
police record, Husick told Abercrombie he hoped that he (Abercrombie)
was never in Miami when Yaras was in town.
After this conversation
Abercrombie received several messages to
, call David and he assumed
they might have been from Yaras.
He did not ever try to contact
Yaras.
159-2651-1 p. 1,4,6,7
(10>
-19-
N# 45992
DocId: 32328349
Page 7
---
## Page 8
LA 4711-C-TE advised that during|a trip between 10/5/70 and
10/19/70 to Tampa, Florida, he made contact with Davie Yarras in
Miami.
They discussed the fact that Lefty Rosenthal in Las Vegas
called a gambling operation in Los Angeles weekly to place large bets.
Yarras was aware of Rosenthal's activities and advised that Rosenthal
ya on the a 0 he parent sonal a not an a barneson
in its entirety, he was satisifed by taking a "chopper" which the
source described as layoff action.
165-42-263 p. C
(37)
The following references appear in the main files of the
individuals listed below.
and criminal associations and activities of these individuals and
Yaras' association and contacts with other members of the Chicago
and Miami criminal elements.
REFERENCE
SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
James Allegretti
92-3205-51 p.1,3
Thomas Altamura
92-5388-18 p.1,3
Peter Julian Arnstein
63-87-1 p.2
92-4168-3 p.2
Charles "Babe" Baron
92-4595-34 p. 1,2
Joseph Bommarito
63-144-1 p.8
(25)
(25%
(25)
(25)
133)
(continued)
-20 -
NW 45992 DocId: 32328349 Page 8
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32181275.pdf | 124-10233-10485 | 07/24/2017 | In Part | FBI | 03/13/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 105-7740-48 | ROTZ, J. STANLEY | SAC, BA | null | FBI | BA | 05/18/2017 | null | ## Page 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10233-10485
RECORD_ SERIES: BA
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 105-7740-48
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
ROTZ, J. STANLEY
TO:
SAC, BA
TITLE:
DATE: 03/13/1964
PAGES: 5
SUBJECT:
SEE FBI 89-30-160
DOCUMENT TYPE:
ORIGINAL
CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE:
STATUS
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Unclassified
09/17/1996
Redact
NEW
CLASSIFICATION:
UPDATE DATE:
RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6(4),
COMMENTS:
HH 53025
DocId:32181275
Page 1
Released
under the John
F. Kennedy
issassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Notel.
Case#:NT 53025 Date:
05-18-2017
02/14/2001
---
## Page 2
SAC, BALTIMORE (89-30) 44-410
(105-7740)
March 13, 1964
SA J. STANLEY ROTZ
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN P. KENNEDY
AFO
BA 89-30
JACK LEON RUBY
CIVIL RIGHTS
BA 44-410
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HE 7/6/880
-13: 2803 120/80
(FK).
LEE HARVEY OSWALD
IS - R - CUBA
BA 105-7740
This memo is being submitted to record in
one location rather than in numerous memoranda negative
contacts with informants in captioned matters.
Informant
Date of Contact
Contacting Agent
BA 1214-C
11/22, 23, 24/63
SA LOUIS S. LEAR
BA 1156-C
11/23, 24/63
SA TIMOTHY J. HYNES, JR.
BA 1236-C
12/6/63
SA JOHN J. GROGAN
BA 1252-C
11/24/63
SA HUGH M. BARNHARDT
BA 1237-C
11/23, 24/63
SA FRANCIS X. O'NEILL, JR.
BA 1253-C
11/22, 24/63
SA J. STANLEY ROTZ
BA 1188-C
11/23, 25/63
SA EDWARD J. BEASISY
BA 1259-C
11/22/63
SA MARION M. - WRIGHT
BA 1180-C
11/23, 25/63
SA GERARD R. LOWE
105-7740-4
Baltimore
SEARCHED
8 - 44-310
SERIALIZED
44-410)
JSR. Sen
105-7740
1 9 1904
FBI - BALTIMORE
ick
1N 33025 Do010:32181275 Page 2
---
## Page 3
BA 89-30
Informant
BA 1203-0
BA 1254 - C
BA 1093-C
BA 1239-C
-BA 1077-C
BA 992-6
BA 1154-C
BA 1247-C
BA 1262-PC
BA: 1252-c
BA 1175-C
PCI's
ORA W. YORSKEY
FRANCIS FINCH
CLAUDE SHELI
JOSEPH BERRY
CHARLES PAVLOS
JAMES RETTALIATA
DOMINICK SPECCA
LOUIS PRICE
IRENE NITZ
JOSEPH ESPOSITO
IN 53025 DocId:32161275 Page 3
Date of Contact
11/23/63
11/23/63
11/23/63
11/23/63
11/23/63
11/23/63
11/23, 24/63
12/23, 24/63
11/23, 24/63
11/24/63
11/25/63
Date of Contact
11/22/63
11/23/63
11/25/63
11/25/63
11/25/63
11/24/63
11/25/63
11/27/63
11/22/63
11/22/63
Contacting Agent
SA LOUIS: J. CHECAS
SA: LOUIS J. GHEÇAS
SA E. JACKSON SWAN
SA DONALD L. SCOTT:
SA MAURICE, D. duBOIS
SA WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL
SA JAMES W. SIBERT
SA JAMES W. SIBERT
SA JAMES W. SIBERT
SA HUGH M. BARNHARDT
SA JOHN J. GROGAN
Contacting Agent
SA PAUL D. EARNEST
SA FRANCIS X. O'NEILL, JR.
SA MAURICE D. duBOIS
SA MAURICE D. dUBOIS
SA J. THOMAS PASKIEWICZ
SA J. STANLEY ROTZ
SA HUGH M. BARNHARDT
SA JOSEPH W. SARGIS
SA ROBERT L. LANPHEAR
SA ROBERT L. LANPHEAR
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | docid-32322951.pdf | 124-90008-10017 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/27/1962 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | CR 63-5327-2384 | HQ | LA | 5 | FBI | HQ | 11/17/2017 | AT | null | ## Page 1
I Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/6/2015
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90008-10017
RECORD SERIES :
HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 63-5327-2384
Document Information
ORIGINATOR :
FBI
FROM:
LA
TO: HQ
TITLE:
DATE:
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
04/27/1962
5
JAMES RIDDLE HOFFA
RICHARD KAVNER
DOCUMENT TYPE :
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION:
Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 4
CURRENT STATUS:
Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/16/1997
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
AT
v9.1
DocId: 32322951
Page 1
---
## Page 2
| Reteased under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).
DAБE6 (11v.14-12067
• no
Transmit the following in
Via
AIRTEL
AIR MATL
FBI
Date:
4/27/62
(Type in plain text or code)
(Priority or Method of Mailing)
4/V,3
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DIRECTOR, FBI (63-5327)
SAC, LOS ANGELES (137-2561)
JAMES RIDDLE HOFFA
MISCELLANEOUS. - INFORMATION
CONCERNING
(ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD SECTION)
Re: Bureau airtel to New York and Los Angeles,
3/30/62.
on 4/26/62, LA 4350-C advised that at the present
time, informant has the following business interests in
Honolulu:
(1) Informant holds 30,000 shares of stock in
Waikiki Savings and Loan Assocation, which assocration was
Formed within the last nine months by PHILIP & MATHEW..
President and
Chairman of the Board of ailer noire corp.
which is a holding company located in Beverly Hills, California.
Informant and MATHEW are very close personal friends.
Waikiki Savings and Loan Association opened for
business in December, 1961, and has its office in the Unity
House, 1956 Ala Moana, Honolulu. This association is
chartered by the State of Hawaii, and with the exception
of MATHEW, all of the officers and directors of this
association are residents of Hawa11.
an
According to the informant
Unity House is a
building owned as a co-op by the local Teamsters Unions,
the local Culinary Unions,
and the local Plasterers Unions
in Hawaii.
Hereabourh
REC-20: 1160
Bureau
3-5327 -
Whe
2
1
- Honolulu
38.
1
- Los Angeles
IS APR
30 1962
AAH: gow
(5)
5010Y.9
1962 106
5,1
Special Agent
in Charge
Sent
XEROX
M
1962
Per
UNRECORDID COPY FILED IN
DocId: 32322951 Page 2
---
## Page 3
Released under the dor F. Kemedy ASSassination Records ColleCtion Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note):
DATE: 11-14-2017
LA 137-2561
According to Informant, in December, 1961, Walkiki
Savings and Loan Association entered into an agreement with
the various unions who are members of Unity House, where
Waikiki Savings and Loan Association issued one share of
stock of the association to each member of the various unions
at Unity House, and the Unions agreed to open a $5 account in
the name of each member of the unions.
Under the agreement,
the individual members had complete control of their share
of stock, and their $5 account.
Informant noted that many of
the members have either sold their stock, and/or closed out
their account since December, 1961. Informant does not know
exactly how many shares of Waikiki Savings and Loan stock are were
aisbursed in this manner, but believes the figure to total
between 6,500 shares and
8,500 shares.
Informant stated that prior to this distribution,
the legal problems connected with such disbursement was discussed
with various attorneys, and it was their opinion that the
disbursement was entirely legal.
Informant said that no Teamsters money was involved
in the setting up of Waikiki Savings and Loan Association, and
that the Teamsters Union has absolutely nothing to do with
the ownership and/or management of Walkiki Savings and Loan
Association.
Informant noted that some of the Teamsters
locals located in Honolulu might have deposits in this
association, however, he has no definite information on this
point.
Informant said the only Teamster official who
has any stock in Waikiki Savings and Loan Association is
RICHARD KANER, a Teamster international organizer from St.
KABNER was an original subscriber to 500
stock was sold at $1.50 per share.
Informant stated that
at the present time,
Waikiki Savings and Loan Association 1
a closed corporation; however, plans are under way to make &
public offering of stock which
will take place in approximately
one year.
-2-
DocId: 32322951 Page 3
---
## Page 4
Released unter the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Mote).
DATE: 11-14-2017
LA 137-2561
(2) Informant advised that some time ago, MATHEW
purchased a block of Ewa Plantation stock, and that informant
Joined MATHEW in this venture.
According to informant,
Castle and Cooke, one of the big five in Honolulu, presently
own 51 per cent of Ewa Plantation stock.
Informant said that
some
time ago, MATHEW made a complete study of wa Plantation
stock, and noted that the stockwas selling for approximately
$20 per share. It was MATHEW's opinion that the stock should
be selling at
on the Boar
the stock, they also had control of all of the Board of
Directors of Ewa Plantation, and according to MATHEW, were
able to run the company for their own benefit.
Subsequently, MATHEW began purchasing Ewa
Plantation stock, and
at the present
time, MATHEW and
his friends, who include the informant, own approximately
44 per cent
of the stock, and at the next meeting of the
stockholders, MATHEW's group intends to obtain two seats
on the Board
of Directors.
Informant stated that MATHEW hasbbeen having
and has offered to sell
share, or purchase all of the stock presently owned by Castle
and Cooke for $50 per share. Informant believes that this
situation will be cleared up within the next three months,
and that either Castle and Cooke will buy the stock controlled
by MATHEW, or MATHEW will buy Castle and Cooke's stock.
in this situation, and that MATHEW 1s a shrewd enough
operator to be able to see that Castle and Cooke was
deliberately depressing the 'Ewa Plantation stock, and is a
big enough man in the financial world to take advantage of
such
a situation.
(3) Informant stated that he maintains two
offices in the Unity House in Honolulu, out of which he 1s
engaged in an import business, buying merchandise from Japan.
Informant stated that he has just started this business
-3-
DocId: 32322951 Page 4
---
## Page 5
Released under the lohn E. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
. DATE: 11-14-2017
IA 137-2561
within the last two or three months, and that at the present
time,
he is not making any money from this operation.
Informant
plans to expand this business venture in the near future.
Informant stated that other than the above, he has
no other business interests in Hawail.
Inasmuch as the information furnished above
deals directly with the informant's business interests in
Hawaii, and none of the information indicates any possible
criminal violation, it is recommended that under no
circumstances should any of this information be disseminated
--
-4-
DocId: 32322951
Page 5
--- |
|
2,017 | /releases | docid-32288558.pdf | 124-10199-10334 | 11/17/2017 | In Part | FBI | 04/21/1964 | PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 92-3171-1379 | DIRECTOR, FBI | SAC, CG | 1 | FBI | HQ JUNE MAIL | 11/17/2017 | null | ## Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote).*
DATE: 11-14-2017
JFK Assassination System
Date:
5/7/2015
Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY:
RECORD NUMBER:
FBI
124-10199-10334
RECORD SERIES: HQ JUNE MAIL
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
92-3171-1379
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: SAC, CG
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :
DATE:
'PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
04/21/1964
1
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
SGI, ACT, ARMORY LOUNGE
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Unclassified
4
Redact
05/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :
v9.1
DocId: 32288558
199
Page 1
---
## Page 2
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Hote):
DATE: 11-14-2017
.. 4-3. (Rey. 1-17-63)
N
1 AIRGRAM.
DECODED
• CABLEGRAM
КОРУ
RADIO XX TELETYPE
Belmont
Mohr
-
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen -
Sullivan
Tavel -
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy =
2:14
ÁM CST DEFERRED 4-21-64 LUC
TO DIRECTOR
4-9
FRÓM CHICAGO 210604
SAMUEL M.
GIANCANA, AKA.
AR. JUNE
CG 6533-0 OBSERVED GIANCANA IN
CHTCAGO AREA APRIL 19,
LAST, FREQUENTING ARMORY LOUNGE. SAME INFORMANT OBSERVED
GIANCANA AT LOUNGE AGAIN THIS DATE. U)
NEW SOURCE LOCATED ARMORY LOUNGE FAILED TO FURNISH ANY
INFO CONCERNING GIANCANA'S ARRIVAL. SOURCE NOTED THAT SEVERAL
PERSONS AT LOUNGE, HOWEVER, DUE TO LIMITED ACTIVITY AT LOUNGE,
IDENTIFICATION NOT POSITIVE! U
CHICAGO ANTICIPATES RE-ENTRY TO FINALIZE RECEPTION OF
SOURCE, PLANS TO WAIT UNTIL APPROXIMATELY APRIL 26, NEXT, IN
ORDER TO FULLY DETERMINE POTENTIAL OF RECENT INSTALLATION
PRIOR TO MAKING ANY CHANGES. U)
BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF ALL PERTINENTODETAILS. (V)
RECEIVED: 3:26 AM EF.H
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
DATE 4•29.34
HEREIN IS ONSLASCIFIED
REC 30
92-3122-1379
APH 221904
801 X
1964
Notabus
in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably
paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.
DocId: 32288558
Page 2
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10123-10217.pdf | 104-10123-10217 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 08/17/1965 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION -- JAMES P. O'CONNELL. | 2 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK44 : F35 : 1994.04.07.15:25:09:680005 : | 2 | ## Page 1
104-10123-10217
1..?
Can beaut
REQUEST FOR PERSONNÉN ACTIONS Only
Do Not Reproduce
DATE PREPARED
17 August 1965
SERIAL NUMBER
2. NAME (Last Firs- Middle)
1009784
D'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED
S. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
MONTH
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
8
DAY
YEAR
1 15 1 65
V TO V
V TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGE.
6. FUNDS
ABLE
RECHILAR
3. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office e
ersonnel
CF TO V
6277-0300
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD/ INVESLIGATIONS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
OFFICE OF THE CHITT
WASHINGION, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE
12. POSITION NUMBER
TIS. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER
14. CGASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, L.B, elc.)
IS. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES
GS
0522
16. GRADE AND STEP
26
3
SS
17. SALARY OR RATE
$
18. REMARKS
1810.01
03
20,245
Telephonie Concurrence,
Date:
1 8 AUG 1965
Security Approval has been granted
the use contemplated by this request.
Chie, Personnel liy, Disions
DDP/TE Personnel 13 August 1965.
Ice C1. Er.
IBA. SIGMATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
DATE SIGNED
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED
Est
Emest In Hardt, Chief/PeraBr /ASTS
SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
18au65
OFFICE (001NG
22. STATICA
23. INTEGREE
24. MDOTRS. 25. DATE OF BIRTH
26. DATE OF GRADE
NUMERIC
AUPHABETIC
CODE
CODE
CODE
DA
YR.
то.
27.
DATE OF LEI
Da.
NO.
28.
ITE EXPIRES
MO.
DA.
Ya.
29. SPECIAL
REFERENCE
30.
RETIREMENT DATA
1-036
CODE
I FICA
S- HOME
36. SERV. COMP. DATE
no.
31. SEPARATION
DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/ CAMCELLATION DATA
TYPE
мо.
33. SECURITY
RFO. 10
34. SEX
EOD DATA
35. VET. PREFERENCE
coot
TO BONE
I-y PT.
2-10 PT.
41.
PREVIOUS GOVERMMENT SEIVICE DATA
CODE
A- NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
I- NO BREAR IN SERVICE
2- BREAN IN SERVICE (LESS THAN I TEARS)
2- AREAR IN SENCE (MORE THAN S YEARS)
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
37. LONG. COMP DATE
38.
CAREER CATEGORY
FECLI/HEALTA INSURANCE
CAR/BESY
CODE
HEALTH INS. CODE
PROV/TEMI
42. LEAVE CAT.
49.
CODE
FORM EXECUTED | CODE
FEDERAL TAX DATA
44.
TNO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
FORM EXECUTED
1-10
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
STATE TAX DATA
CODE ND:TAXI STATE CODE
46. O.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED
6-69 1152
USE PREVIOUS EDTION
SECRET
-
GROUP T
1s;
---
## Page 2
14-0000p
I RESIGN EFFECTIVE.
(W ben Filled In)
EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION
_ FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:
(Dese)
ickground das
, Do Not Reproduca
...l
MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE
DATE SIGNED
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Sirees, Cily, Slale. Zip Code)
Items 1 thru 7
Items 9 thru 18a
INSTRUCTIONS
The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru
18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current
status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.
Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:
Regular
Summer
Part Time
Detail Our
Temporary
Detail In
WAE
Consultant
Military
Temporary-Part Time
Hem 9 - ' the Location Deshe posin" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identify.-
Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
Office, Major Staff, etc.
oreign Field or U.S. Field (if pertinent
Division or Staff (subordinate so first line
Branch
Section
Unit
Items 11 and 1S - "Position Title" and "Occupational Series" should be the standard abbreviated ritle and
trol Register or Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization, explain under Item
18-Remarks.
Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which
lem 180 - he not operate other Core so a fold our to ten 15, ime Eate bit
the shop a belong the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.
If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaming Career Seri-
ROUTING- The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel brough the appropriate
Career Service official (s). In the case of requests specifed in HB 20-800-1, which require advance
approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only
will be sent to the Office (s) concerned.
SECRET
--- |
||
2,017 | /releases | 104-10100-10408.pdf | 104-10100-10408 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 12/23/1963 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | PARIS | DIRECTOR | SOVIET BLOC HAS MOVED INTO MEDIA FIELD IN EAST AFRICA | 2 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK33 : F9 : 1996.10.18.11:00:58:030092 : | 2 | ## Page 1
104-10100-10408
ACTIRRN. 1050
Alio idi i
7922
So OSC 1002
PARIS
KAIROR!
2.1 10 01E
S: cnt
n
BAR :
ДУВАТ
9080 4
KEIT
A SOVIST BLEC' MAN NO ED ATRONOLE INTO MEULA FILLD IN BAST
AFRICA RY ORTAINIVO SONGEONTS CG EROAIDE SOVIET IND CZECE N9S3
SERVICKS ECLCORINTON SOCPERE EORICIANS AO JGUEROT
TRATNING FOR NEALY CUSATIW IVYS UND TANGANYIKA NEVS AGENCTES
DATTORUI OF STATE CONTIA CNDA SERE ACONISITION AND DISTRIAITIC
IS CLEARLY FHERGING TUESE THO COINTRIES, MERE LEFTISTS IN GOOD
POSITION TO PROVIDS PRO SOVIET BLOC: ANTI-ODYOKE SLANT TO
COMTROLLED NEWS, REDON'IS INDICA:P NEPSPAPERS RILL BE UEGICO" EU
FURCHASE AND PRINT NETS FROA THESE BLOC SUPPORTED AGENCIES. NO BOTY
YET TO EXCLUDE WESTERN NETS SERVICES BUT THEY WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT
TO COMPETE WITH SUBSTDIZED GOVT FUN NEWS AGENCTES BACKED BY
POLITICAL PRESSURE. SONT: INDICATION OF BLOC INTEREST IN UGANDA
"EDIA ALSO.
INTERESTS CEVIOYSLY AFFECTED BY ABOVE DEVELOPYP*S
AND HE NO DOUBT AKARE ?
AS
EESULT HIS RECENT VISIT CAST AT17&
AT NEXT MEETING WITH
MOGUEBT OFFONBACH/ FLICIT LUPO 12US
SUBJECT AND ATTCUPT ASCESTAIN FIRT PLANS OR IDBAS
À MAY RAVE
.. *21/991
We4geneClIin
210183
233 32
orpenste
Go!
ac/ Ms
203S
icaimiat
naceis aorieieo.
'asoon:
com ??e.
#15725
---
## Page 2
1/A9/2
7922
PACE 19O
90304
"U COUVIDA UM ALUST TO TURED NONG SITUATION ME INALIEU
DORE IN FING RE RICHT DO ON 215 ORY AND IN THAT LA COULD DO PITH
KUBARK ASSISTANCE. RISCSSTON CA LANTER POINT SHOULD OF COURSO
E EXPLORATORY AND WITHOUT CONTACTOR UPOURASMENT:
ANO OF BESSAGO
26/30:1
T
#15725
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 104-10178-10146.pdf | 104-10178-10146 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 3/10/61 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | CHIEF OF BASE, JMWAVE | CHIEF OF STATION, BOGOTA | PRESS DECLARATION OF REINALDO PICO RAMON | 2 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-14 : F4 : 20040303-1053612 : | 2 | ## Page 1
104-10178-10146
ROSTING AND RECORD SHEET
TRSTRUCTICAS
Falt 1a 500
..DA
Detach back
Tap and
2 Destroy
front" cover
sheot.
unless 1t
record cheAticant action:
taken
of
sint prèse!
ROM;:
TO: ACTION BRANCH
I$ $110
And title aborn äse not
proper.
insort
propor file no. beloi
•asd sorward
RID?
TO! ALL'ADDRESSEES
PILL IN MECTION I ON E
ID APPROPRIATA
: TO
- П.
GH'A EZGISTRY
nOON
DATE
18 MÁN 1961
OFFICER'®
LUNHALEI
Josies?
4+7
Suggert forVirión
10
prio
RETURNTO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
RID/FI
1<9.
ONE NO ANd AS
261. 200658
NIPA: 00898
• 101
+9 68801 101
the landl
SECKET.
---
## Page 2
().
1O
DISPATCH
1484= 1
PET®
213s033
#47E
BO Inch 105
MARKED FOR INDEENG
NO INDOING REQUIRED
NODING CAN BE LEDGEO
IY QUANTED HO DESK ONL
REFERINCES
wAVE 1543
DO WAVE JITO
Attached Do al posedalo interest to deadquartera and JHAVE lO On
copy for ench addruarie of declarations of Biaferl, whieh appeared in.
11 S18jo, Bogori Comervative da12Y, Os 2% Peberaty 2961.
Manley V. Terall
10 March 1351
Attachant!
Distribation:
24/0I0, 0/1. atta
2 lles, vo/ste.
BECALT
Хаю
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 104-10217-10123.pdf | 104-10217-10123 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 03/15/1976 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | WITHHELD | DIRECTOR | REYNOL GONZALEZ MORERA REPORTED AS CUBAN EXILE TRYING TO BRING RELATIVES FROM CUBA TO COSTA RICA. | 1 | CIA | JFK | 3/12/18 | JFK64-52 : F13 : 20040315-1058058 : | 1 | ## Page 1
104-10217-10123
OUTGOING MESSAGE
onF 0
.0
- D
0
SECRET
946980081
ПРИЕЛНОЙ
STAFF
COMe: 4A5
INFO: FILE
DATE TONE Be
1623382
P/AN.,
DIRECTOR
MORE
NO MADAI
623544
DISSEN BY: 25
TO:
INFO
EMPYREX TRACE Y
=.
REF:
112218 lIN 856587|4
I FOR EMPYREX: DEC 6b REYNOL GONZALEZ MORERA !
REPORTED AS CUBAN EXILE TRYING TO BRING RELATIVES FROM CUBA TO COSTA
RICA. HE NOT IDENTICAL TO GONZALEZ WHO IN 59 WAS MBR OF CTC. THIS
PERSON IS REINOL GONZALEZ GONZALEZ- DOB 24 APR 320 !
• MANGUITO, CUBA• A PROMINENT CUBAN LABOR LEADER AND CATHOLIC ACTIVIST
WHO
ARRESTED IN CUBA OCT BI, AND ACCORDING TO OUR RECORDS, HE STILL
IN PRISON. ESTATION FYI: GONZALEZ GONZALEZ SUBJECT OF 201-
275949}-4
2. FILE: 22-5-3/b0 203-275949. EZ IMPDET-M
%.
*EMPYREX REQUESTS TRACES RETNOL GONZALEX MORERA, COSTA RICAN CITIZEN.
Э
JABSTEST
518 31
*EM (1n)
DATE:
ORIG:
EXT:
-MAR 7.
.. BLEVINS R
LA/CAR/DRH
1526
Kit righ
19E235
CROSS
FILE
201-275849
COPY FOR
DO NOT : LIBUY
SECRET
Sa mimer
BOOMMATE o
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUNG OFFIGG IS PROMIBITED
RECORD COPY
CALA/CAR
TWO CANCAN
E 2
IMPDET
CL BY: 012913
--- |
2,017 | /releases | 104-10054-10018.pdf | 104-10054-10018 | 04/26/2018 | Redact | CIA | 1/1/65 | PAPER-TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | 80T01357A | C/WH | WH/C/SP | ESPINOSA ALLEGATIONS. | 4 | CIA | JFK | 03/16/2018 | JFK7 : F5 : 20031203-1019668 : | 4 | ## Page 1
110470054-10018
EYES ONLY
SECRET
MERORANDUM FOR: Chief, WID for Cuba
SUBJECT
: Espinosa Allegations
1. Sensitivity: Regardlems of accuracy, they
prasented to other govorant areneless
present a problen because of their baving been
in view of matters touching on U.S. security,
ara delicate and could have unfavorable repercusaions
if repeated to newsmen by the complainant or his
associates (whose independent, previous threats were
of greater potential embarraament);
C.
personel at
onel the reputations and the security of our
and
2. Action: In view of the foregoing, the allegations
A.
should be put in proper perspactive - 1,e., not
ignored because of the potential embarrasament but
considered in the light of what ve already know
(Almost all of then are repetitions of previous
charges and reports, known well to both the
and
stations and to Hendquarters officers
concerned with the AMLASH group, whose members'
reliability, reputations and good faith are question-
Iwo of the charges - aboat L
and
"Tote"
and about AMWHIP-1 and CARRILIO - are new.);
should be treated so as to protect us against any
charge of larity and so as to establish the lacts but,
at the same time, treated so se to avoidattrlbuting
to then nore importance than they deserve;
C. should be kept in mind as examples of other
charges which my belandied about and reported by the
AMLASH group to other governmental agencies or to
other governments or to news nedia (In the last
connection recall the inplied threat of publishing
ODYOK? responsibility, as reported previously by
-3716, IN 38634.);
ONLY
SECRET
03360
---
## Page 2
14-00000
SO: ONLY
POET
-2-
D.
should be examined together with all the other
available reports so that we may
(1) clarily our own objectives and wishes with
respect to all the AlLASA group (and this includes
AMIHIR);
(2) sort out which people, if any, are worth our
time in the future;
(3) take appropriate measures, including inter-
rogation and polygraphing, to clarify doubts and
then, when necessary, terminate those who are
working for us but are not worthwhile;
(4)
tighten up our own operational and security
procedures in connection with the AHLASH group.
3.
Preliminary Analysis: As pointed out in a prellminary
analysis of the Allast complex, made in larch 1955 wher
proparing for travel tol
In connection with the Quiops-
...There is no convincing evidence that the group is
working either for or against the regise of Fidel CASTRO.
Reports on their contacts with us and their discussions
thensolves are at variance.
In 1962 Fidel CASTRO, reportedly
knowing that they were plotting against bin,
talked to AMLASH-1
and seven nembers of his group to enlist their support against
Anibal ESCALANTI Dellunde and the communists in Cuba.
Possibly
they are piaying both ends against the middle.
certainly
have been and are in contact with the two ende."
cranents are keyed to matters raised by ESPINOSA:
A. The AMLASH conspiracy - As detailed by
-3716
(IN 28634) on 6 April 1965, QUSPORT-I reporting on a meeting
od the AlLisH group, Including AWHIP-1 mentioned the following
sigaificant points:
KUBARK was criticized for "fooling around lo1
years" without helping and for jeopardizing the operation;
(2) the group was to be prepared to denounce
ODYOKE as responsible 1f the operation fails and believed that
the resulting scandal would make the Bay of Pigs seem insigni
ficant; and
(3)
AMLASH-3 was in touch with Cuban
• Intelligence
as estaglisted by coded messages which he exhibited.
As reported by
-1532 (IN 82939) 01 4
June 1965,
based on
neetings with ESPINOSA, the problem seen
is that
SCRET
---
## Page 3
14-00000
BYES ONLY
SACHET
"the AMLASH circle is wide and each new friend of whom we learn
seens to have knowledge
of the plan."
I believe that the
•problem is a nore serious and basic
As Indicated in
paragraph 3 of the present uenorandum,
Fidel CASTRO himself
reportedly knew as far back as 1962 that the
group was plotting
enlisted its support.
cannot rule out
the possibility of provocation.
Assassination,
obvioualy, is a dangerous game, not merely to the plotters in
a physical sense, but to a sponsoring governent which mar
suffer severe political repercussions at home and abroad 1f its
In the instant case, the Ilsks of
exposure of the ODYOKE hand would appear high, whether there is
a provocation or not.
Considering the individuals who are
involved directly, their contacts with KUBARI cificers, and their
reported plan to expose ODYOKE, persisting in the plan could
be highly embarrassing to KuBaRk.
This is even more the case
now that ESPINOSA has talked to ODENVY and ODURGE,
although
fortunately the tenor of his complaint was that KUBARK bad not
given adequate support to the plan.)
and the matters affecting
Station. - The
The contacts atrustsant" of Maurean had been the
subject of an exchange of cables between
and Headquarters
and of discussions at Headquarters between TH/C and VE (See
7-1071 (IN 66557) and DII-20955).
The annoying
thing 1n
this connection now is that ESPINOSA has talked about it to
ODENVY and ODURCE and the danger that,
11 he is
story anous this (and the other matters) could reach some
curious newspaperman.
(In this connection, it appears that the
questionable decision to put Maureen in touch
group was made without the knowledge of STOCKYOOD.) ESPINOSA
did not report any criticism of the KUBARkers at
is evident that the AMlASH group knows more about them than
What is new and of concern from ESPINOSA about
is his story of ANHIP 1 and UNSNAFU-19
matters 1ile questions raised about Awaip.1 are of mutual
dealings.
concers also to Headguarters which has been running hin and
which he has visited often.
(On the occasion of my
previous trip tol
on the QUiOPS-1 case, GROWERY had voiced
is doubts about the whole group and specifically about AWHIP-
und his connection with UNSNATI 19.
At issue are two basic
points, the knowledge on the part of UNSNAFU-19 about EUBARK'S
connection with AMHIP 1 and the charge that AWHIP-1 has been
defrauding KUBARK in the jewelry transaction. Also to be Lept
in mind is the fact that ODENVY has an offico inl
well might have been informed of the allegations and which might
have been asked for comments - although ODENVY policy always
has been to stay away from any Investigation of other government
agencies unless specifically directed by the Attorney General
to investigate.
BIES ONLY
SECRET
---
## Page 4
14-00000
SVER UNCY
SCORET
Criticism of the
Station - Criticisn
AMLASE -2
and - were in
The Station has
been involved indirectly because of reporting by its sources
about and involvement of Station targets with both the AlLiSH
and AMWORLD operations (both handled fron Headquarters).
(See
J2982 (IN 72256) and
-2998 (IN 73094) (both RYBAT) •
Meetings anong QUBPORT, QUSWIIT-1, ALWHIP-I and AMLASH figures
produced conflicting reports which prevously vere discussed at
and at Beadquarters.
Insofar as GROWERY himself 15
concerned, It must be kept i, mind that he is a natural target
on whom the AlIASH soup would be inclined to locus its cou
plaints.
with regard to the specific complaint about
"Tota"
GROWERY has Identified her as GUSWIFT-T and has reported that
no staffer fron the Station ever had contact with her.
*.
Further Involvenent of ESPINOSA:
On 10 June ODENVY
notified kunak at New York that AMLISH-2 had telephoned
ESPINOSA to ask whether he had succeeded in contacting
"the
proper people" - 1.8.,
responsible KUBARX representativos - and
to request notice of the regalting arrangements.
AXWHIP-1: Our plan calla for meting him next week
to obtain PRy Information and to obtain clarification of the
roles played by those involved with him in the ANLACH operation.
His dealings with UNSNATU-19 also will be covered. Following
this, an LCFLUTTER examination is planned.
This my heip to
determine whether he has been truthful in his reporting.
Harold I. Swenson
WH/C/SP
SIES ONLY
SECRET
--- |
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