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In determining fraud, courts have adopted a subjective standard and have considered the facts of the particular marriage. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where husband secretly intended not to live with his wife",
"sentence": "Wolfe, 19 Ill.Dec. at 311, 378 N.E.2d at 1186 (where husband concealed his prior marital history from Roman Catholic wife); Costello, 282 A.2d 432 (where husband omitted to tell wife of his heroin addiction); Lamberti v. Lamberti, 77 Cal.Rptr. 430, 432, 272 Cal.App.2d 482 (1969) (where husband’s secret intent in marrying was to acquire an advantageous alien status and where he falsely promised to go through a subsequent religious ceremony); Parks v. Parks, 418 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.1967) (where wife falsely represented at time of marriage that she was pregnant); Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 211 N.E.2d 817, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965) (where husband failed to disclose his extreme anti-Semitism to wife); Handley v. Handley, 179 Cal.App.2d 742, 3 Cal.Rptr. 910 (1960) (where wife secretly intended not to live with husband and not to adopt his name); Osborne v. Osborne, 134 A.2d 438 (D.C.1957) (where husband secretly intended not to live with his wife); Rathburn v. Rathburn, 138 Cal.App.2d 568, 292 P.2d 274, 277 (1956) (where wife secretly intended not to consummate the marriage); Vileta v. Vileta, 53 Cal. App.2d 794, 128 P.2d 376, 377 (1942) (where wife did not disclose her infertility); Rubman v. Rubman, 140 Misc. 658, 251 N.Y.S. 474 (1931) (where husband falsely told wife he loved her and did not disclose that real reason for marriage was to avoid deportation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where husband did not disclose he had tuberculosis and was a narcotics addict",
"sentence": "See also Leventhal v. Liberman, 262 N.Y. 209, 186 N.E. 675 (1933) (where husband did not disclose he had tuberculosis and was a narcotics addict)."
} | 10,382,507 | a |
In determining fraud, courts have adopted a subjective standard and have considered the facts of the particular marriage. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where husband did not disclose he had tuberculosis and was a narcotics addict",
"sentence": "See also Leventhal v. Liberman, 262 N.Y. 209, 186 N.E. 675 (1933) (where husband did not disclose he had tuberculosis and was a narcotics addict)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where husband falsely told wife he loved her and did not disclose that real reason for marriage was to avoid deportation",
"sentence": "Wolfe, 19 Ill.Dec. at 311, 378 N.E.2d at 1186 (where husband concealed his prior marital history from Roman Catholic wife); Costello, 282 A.2d 432 (where husband omitted to tell wife of his heroin addiction); Lamberti v. Lamberti, 77 Cal.Rptr. 430, 432, 272 Cal.App.2d 482 (1969) (where husband’s secret intent in marrying was to acquire an advantageous alien status and where he falsely promised to go through a subsequent religious ceremony); Parks v. Parks, 418 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.1967) (where wife falsely represented at time of marriage that she was pregnant); Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 211 N.E.2d 817, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965) (where husband failed to disclose his extreme anti-Semitism to wife); Handley v. Handley, 179 Cal.App.2d 742, 3 Cal.Rptr. 910 (1960) (where wife secretly intended not to live with husband and not to adopt his name); Osborne v. Osborne, 134 A.2d 438 (D.C.1957) (where husband secretly intended not to live with his wife); Rathburn v. Rathburn, 138 Cal.App.2d 568, 292 P.2d 274, 277 (1956) (where wife secretly intended not to consummate the marriage); Vileta v. Vileta, 53 Cal. App.2d 794, 128 P.2d 376, 377 (1942) (where wife did not disclose her infertility); Rubman v. Rubman, 140 Misc. 658, 251 N.Y.S. 474 (1931) (where husband falsely told wife he loved her and did not disclose that real reason for marriage was to avoid deportation)."
} | 10,382,507 | b |
In determining fraud, courts have adopted a subjective standard and have considered the facts of the particular marriage. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where husband did not disclose he had tuberculosis and was a narcotics addict",
"sentence": "See also Leventhal v. Liberman, 262 N.Y. 209, 186 N.E. 675 (1933) (where husband did not disclose he had tuberculosis and was a narcotics addict)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where husband falsely told wife he loved her and did not disclose that real reason for marriage was to avoid deportation",
"sentence": "Wolfe, 19 Ill.Dec. at 311, 378 N.E.2d at 1186 (where husband concealed his prior marital history from Roman Catholic wife); Costello, 282 A.2d 432 (where husband omitted to tell wife of his heroin addiction); Lamberti v. Lamberti, 77 Cal.Rptr. 430, 432, 272 Cal.App.2d 482 (1969) (where husband’s secret intent in marrying was to acquire an advantageous alien status and where he falsely promised to go through a subsequent religious ceremony); Parks v. Parks, 418 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.1967) (where wife falsely represented at time of marriage that she was pregnant); Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 211 N.E.2d 817, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965) (where husband failed to disclose his extreme anti-Semitism to wife); Handley v. Handley, 179 Cal.App.2d 742, 3 Cal.Rptr. 910 (1960) (where wife secretly intended not to live with husband and not to adopt his name); Osborne v. Osborne, 134 A.2d 438 (D.C.1957) (where husband secretly intended not to live with his wife); Rathburn v. Rathburn, 138 Cal.App.2d 568, 292 P.2d 274, 277 (1956) (where wife secretly intended not to consummate the marriage); Vileta v. Vileta, 53 Cal. App.2d 794, 128 P.2d 376, 377 (1942) (where wife did not disclose her infertility); Rubman v. Rubman, 140 Misc. 658, 251 N.Y.S. 474 (1931) (where husband falsely told wife he loved her and did not disclose that real reason for marriage was to avoid deportation)."
} | 10,382,507 | b |
In determining fraud, courts have adopted a subjective standard and have considered the facts of the particular marriage. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where husband did not disclose he had tuberculosis and was a narcotics addict",
"sentence": "See also Leventhal v. Liberman, 262 N.Y. 209, 186 N.E. 675 (1933) (where husband did not disclose he had tuberculosis and was a narcotics addict)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where husband falsely told wife he loved her and did not disclose that real reason for marriage was to avoid deportation",
"sentence": "Wolfe, 19 Ill.Dec. at 311, 378 N.E.2d at 1186 (where husband concealed his prior marital history from Roman Catholic wife); Costello, 282 A.2d 432 (where husband omitted to tell wife of his heroin addiction); Lamberti v. Lamberti, 77 Cal.Rptr. 430, 432, 272 Cal.App.2d 482 (1969) (where husband’s secret intent in marrying was to acquire an advantageous alien status and where he falsely promised to go through a subsequent religious ceremony); Parks v. Parks, 418 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.1967) (where wife falsely represented at time of marriage that she was pregnant); Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 211 N.E.2d 817, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965) (where husband failed to disclose his extreme anti-Semitism to wife); Handley v. Handley, 179 Cal.App.2d 742, 3 Cal.Rptr. 910 (1960) (where wife secretly intended not to live with husband and not to adopt his name); Osborne v. Osborne, 134 A.2d 438 (D.C.1957) (where husband secretly intended not to live with his wife); Rathburn v. Rathburn, 138 Cal.App.2d 568, 292 P.2d 274, 277 (1956) (where wife secretly intended not to consummate the marriage); Vileta v. Vileta, 53 Cal. App.2d 794, 128 P.2d 376, 377 (1942) (where wife did not disclose her infertility); Rubman v. Rubman, 140 Misc. 658, 251 N.Y.S. 474 (1931) (where husband falsely told wife he loved her and did not disclose that real reason for marriage was to avoid deportation)."
} | 10,382,507 | b |
In determining fraud, courts have adopted a subjective standard and have considered the facts of the particular marriage. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where husband did not disclose he had tuberculosis and was a narcotics addict",
"sentence": "See also Leventhal v. Liberman, 262 N.Y. 209, 186 N.E. 675 (1933) (where husband did not disclose he had tuberculosis and was a narcotics addict)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where husband falsely told wife he loved her and did not disclose that real reason for marriage was to avoid deportation",
"sentence": "Wolfe, 19 Ill.Dec. at 311, 378 N.E.2d at 1186 (where husband concealed his prior marital history from Roman Catholic wife); Costello, 282 A.2d 432 (where husband omitted to tell wife of his heroin addiction); Lamberti v. Lamberti, 77 Cal.Rptr. 430, 432, 272 Cal.App.2d 482 (1969) (where husband’s secret intent in marrying was to acquire an advantageous alien status and where he falsely promised to go through a subsequent religious ceremony); Parks v. Parks, 418 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.1967) (where wife falsely represented at time of marriage that she was pregnant); Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 211 N.E.2d 817, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965) (where husband failed to disclose his extreme anti-Semitism to wife); Handley v. Handley, 179 Cal.App.2d 742, 3 Cal.Rptr. 910 (1960) (where wife secretly intended not to live with husband and not to adopt his name); Osborne v. Osborne, 134 A.2d 438 (D.C.1957) (where husband secretly intended not to live with his wife); Rathburn v. Rathburn, 138 Cal.App.2d 568, 292 P.2d 274, 277 (1956) (where wife secretly intended not to consummate the marriage); Vileta v. Vileta, 53 Cal. App.2d 794, 128 P.2d 376, 377 (1942) (where wife did not disclose her infertility); Rubman v. Rubman, 140 Misc. 658, 251 N.Y.S. 474 (1931) (where husband falsely told wife he loved her and did not disclose that real reason for marriage was to avoid deportation)."
} | 10,382,507 | b |
Given these holdings, granting the defendant's request for review in this case would place us in the inconsistent position of being able to review the methodology and justifications for the degree of a downward departure, while leaving us unable to review a decision not to depart in the first instance. Thus, should we remand a downward departure decision to the trial court, the sentencing judge could easily resolve the methodology problem by providing for no departure at all -- a decision we would be unable to review, and one that would place a defendant such as Hazel in a worse position than that in which he presently finds himself. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "898 F.2d 3, 4",
"parenthetical": "\"the extent of a departure, like the decision to depart itself, is essentially discretionary, ... and the statute affords no grounds for the beneficiary of a departure decision to complain that the deviation should have been greater\"",
"sentence": "See Wright, 895 F.2d at 722 (“It would be illogical to insulate from review a harsher sentence that fell within the guidelines while permitting the court of appeals to order further downward departures from a sentence already less than that provided for by the guidelines.”) (citation omitted); cf. also United States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir.1990) (“the extent of a departure, like the decision to depart itself, is essentially discretionary, ... and the statute affords no grounds for the beneficiary of a departure decision to complain that the deviation should have been greater”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, the scope of our review over other sentencing decisions indicates that a narrow interpretation of § 3742 is in order."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 722, 722",
"parenthetical": "\"It would be illogical to insulate from review a harsher sentence that fell within the guidelines while permitting the court of appeals to order further downward departures from a sentence already less than that provided for by the guidelines.\"",
"sentence": "See Wright, 895 F.2d at 722 (“It would be illogical to insulate from review a harsher sentence that fell within the guidelines while permitting the court of appeals to order further downward departures from a sentence already less than that provided for by the guidelines.”) (citation omitted); cf. also United States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir.1990) (“the extent of a departure, like the decision to depart itself, is essentially discretionary, ... and the statute affords no grounds for the beneficiary of a departure decision to complain that the deviation should have been greater”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, the scope of our review over other sentencing decisions indicates that a narrow interpretation of § 3742 is in order."
} | 3,490,450 | b |
. To the extent Nelson also has argued that the court erred in dismissing his action because he was proceeding without counsel, "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." However, both the Supreme Court and this Court have concluded that a defendant's pro se status in civil litigation generally will not excuse mistakes he makes regarding procedural rules. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "197 F.3d 1098, 1104",
"parenthetical": "holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines",
"sentence": "See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (explaining that the Court \"never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,” because \"experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law”); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 106, 113",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the Court \"never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,\" because \"experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law\"",
"sentence": "See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (explaining that the Court \"never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,” because \"experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law”); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines)."
} | 1,226,449 | b |
. To the extent Nelson also has argued that the court erred in dismissing his action because he was proceeding without counsel, "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." However, both the Supreme Court and this Court have concluded that a defendant's pro se status in civil litigation generally will not excuse mistakes he makes regarding procedural rules. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the Court \"never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,\" because \"experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law\"",
"sentence": "See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (explaining that the Court \"never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,” because \"experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law”); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "197 F.3d 1098, 1104",
"parenthetical": "holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines",
"sentence": "See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (explaining that the Court \"never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,” because \"experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law”); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines)."
} | 1,226,449 | a |
. To the extent Nelson also has argued that the court erred in dismissing his action because he was proceeding without counsel, "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." However, both the Supreme Court and this Court have concluded that a defendant's pro se status in civil litigation generally will not excuse mistakes he makes regarding procedural rules. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "197 F.3d 1098, 1104",
"parenthetical": "holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines",
"sentence": "See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (explaining that the Court \"never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,” because \"experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law”); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that the Court \"never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,\" because \"experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law\"",
"sentence": "See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (explaining that the Court \"never [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation shall be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,” because \"experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law”); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines)."
} | 1,226,449 | b |
This Court concludes, further, that the flexible Title VII standards for establishing a hostile work environment claim apply to hostile learning environment claims brought under the federal statutes prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "68 F.3d 540, 540",
"parenthetical": "applying Title VII easelaw by analogy to a hostile learning environment claim brought under Title IX",
"sentence": "Brown, 68 F.3d at 540 (applying Title VII easelaw by analogy to a hostile learning environment claim brought under Title IX); but cf. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n. 11 (5th Cir.1996) (noting that “importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment context into a situation involving children is highly problematic”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 165, 136 L.Ed.2d 108 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment context into a situation involving children is highly problematic\"",
"sentence": "Brown, 68 F.3d at 540 (applying Title VII easelaw by analogy to a hostile learning environment claim brought under Title IX); but cf. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n. 11 (5th Cir.1996) (noting that “importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment context into a situation involving children is highly problematic”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 165, 136 L.Ed.2d 108 (1996)."
} | 11,922,533 | a |
This Court concludes, further, that the flexible Title VII standards for establishing a hostile work environment claim apply to hostile learning environment claims brought under the federal statutes prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment context into a situation involving children is highly problematic\"",
"sentence": "Brown, 68 F.3d at 540 (applying Title VII easelaw by analogy to a hostile learning environment claim brought under Title IX); but cf. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n. 11 (5th Cir.1996) (noting that “importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment context into a situation involving children is highly problematic”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 165, 136 L.Ed.2d 108 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "68 F.3d 540, 540",
"parenthetical": "applying Title VII easelaw by analogy to a hostile learning environment claim brought under Title IX",
"sentence": "Brown, 68 F.3d at 540 (applying Title VII easelaw by analogy to a hostile learning environment claim brought under Title IX); but cf. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n. 11 (5th Cir.1996) (noting that “importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment context into a situation involving children is highly problematic”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 165, 136 L.Ed.2d 108 (1996)."
} | 11,922,533 | b |
This Court concludes, further, that the flexible Title VII standards for establishing a hostile work environment claim apply to hostile learning environment claims brought under the federal statutes prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "68 F.3d 540, 540",
"parenthetical": "applying Title VII easelaw by analogy to a hostile learning environment claim brought under Title IX",
"sentence": "Brown, 68 F.3d at 540 (applying Title VII easelaw by analogy to a hostile learning environment claim brought under Title IX); but cf. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n. 11 (5th Cir.1996) (noting that “importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment context into a situation involving children is highly problematic”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 165, 136 L.Ed.2d 108 (1996)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment context into a situation involving children is highly problematic\"",
"sentence": "Brown, 68 F.3d at 540 (applying Title VII easelaw by analogy to a hostile learning environment claim brought under Title IX); but cf. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n. 11 (5th Cir.1996) (noting that “importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment context into a situation involving children is highly problematic”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 165, 136 L.Ed.2d 108 (1996)."
} | 11,922,533 | a |
The same logic applies to Maul-din's assertions of his rights to not speak and to privacy; he asserts these rights as they relate to his right to worship free of governmental restraint or compulsion. Mauldin is not being singled out for this requirement because of his religious beliefs. Nor is he required to pledge or proclaim support for the requirement or the government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 F.3d 874, 878",
"parenthetical": "\"The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir.1995) (“The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dicta that having \"In God We Trust\" on currency does not compel speech because it is not associated with individual and not publicly displayed",
"sentence": "Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (dicta that having “In God We Trust” on currency does not compel speech because it is not associated with individual and not publicly displayed), with Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428 (New Hampshire cannot compel citizens to display on their cars license plates with “Live Free or Die”) and West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because “the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind”).' Indeed, it is not clear that supplying a social-security number on an application is considered speech under the Constitution."
} | 9,332,651 | b |
The same logic applies to Maul-din's assertions of his rights to not speak and to privacy; he asserts these rights as they relate to his right to worship free of governmental restraint or compulsion. Mauldin is not being singled out for this requirement because of his religious beliefs. Nor is he required to pledge or proclaim support for the requirement or the government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 F.3d 874, 878",
"parenthetical": "\"The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir.1995) (“The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dicta that having \"In God We Trust\" on currency does not compel speech because it is not associated with individual and not publicly displayed",
"sentence": "Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (dicta that having “In God We Trust” on currency does not compel speech because it is not associated with individual and not publicly displayed), with Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428 (New Hampshire cannot compel citizens to display on their cars license plates with “Live Free or Die”) and West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because “the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind”).' Indeed, it is not clear that supplying a social-security number on an application is considered speech under the Constitution."
} | 9,332,651 | b |
The same logic applies to Maul-din's assertions of his rights to not speak and to privacy; he asserts these rights as they relate to his right to worship free of governmental restraint or compulsion. Mauldin is not being singled out for this requirement because of his religious beliefs. Nor is he required to pledge or proclaim support for the requirement or the government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 F.3d 874, 878",
"parenthetical": "\"The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir.1995) (“The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dicta that having \"In God We Trust\" on currency does not compel speech because it is not associated with individual and not publicly displayed",
"sentence": "Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (dicta that having “In God We Trust” on currency does not compel speech because it is not associated with individual and not publicly displayed), with Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428 (New Hampshire cannot compel citizens to display on their cars license plates with “Live Free or Die”) and West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because “the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind”).' Indeed, it is not clear that supplying a social-security number on an application is considered speech under the Constitution."
} | 9,332,651 | b |
The same logic applies to Maul-din's assertions of his rights to not speak and to privacy; he asserts these rights as they relate to his right to worship free of governmental restraint or compulsion. Mauldin is not being singled out for this requirement because of his religious beliefs. Nor is he required to pledge or proclaim support for the requirement or the government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 F.3d 874, 878",
"parenthetical": "\"The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir.1995) (“The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "319 U.S. 624, 642",
"parenthetical": "Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because \"the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind\"",
"sentence": "Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (dicta that having “In God We Trust” on currency does not compel speech because it is not associated with individual and not publicly displayed), with Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428 (New Hampshire cannot compel citizens to display on their cars license plates with “Live Free or Die”) and West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because “the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind”).' Indeed, it is not clear that supplying a social-security number on an application is considered speech under the Constitution."
} | 9,332,651 | b |
The same logic applies to Maul-din's assertions of his rights to not speak and to privacy; he asserts these rights as they relate to his right to worship free of governmental restraint or compulsion. Mauldin is not being singled out for this requirement because of his religious beliefs. Nor is he required to pledge or proclaim support for the requirement or the government. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because \"the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind\"",
"sentence": "Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (dicta that having “In God We Trust” on currency does not compel speech because it is not associated with individual and not publicly displayed), with Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428 (New Hampshire cannot compel citizens to display on their cars license plates with “Live Free or Die”) and West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because “the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind”).' Indeed, it is not clear that supplying a social-security number on an application is considered speech under the Constitution."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 F.3d 874, 878",
"parenthetical": "\"The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir.1995) (“The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.”)."
} | 9,332,651 | a |
The same logic applies to Maul-din's assertions of his rights to not speak and to privacy; he asserts these rights as they relate to his right to worship free of governmental restraint or compulsion. Mauldin is not being singled out for this requirement because of his religious beliefs. Nor is he required to pledge or proclaim support for the requirement or the government. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because \"the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind\"",
"sentence": "Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (dicta that having “In God We Trust” on currency does not compel speech because it is not associated with individual and not publicly displayed), with Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428 (New Hampshire cannot compel citizens to display on their cars license plates with “Live Free or Die”) and West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be compelled in school to recite Pledge of Allegiance against their beliefs because “the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind”).' Indeed, it is not clear that supplying a social-security number on an application is considered speech under the Constitution."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "53 F.3d 874, 878",
"parenthetical": "\"The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir.1995) (“The IRS summons requires Sindel only to provide the government with information which his clients have given him voluntarily, not to disseminate publicly a message with which he disagrees. Therefore, the First Amendment protection against compelled speech does not prevent enforcement of the summons.”)."
} | 9,332,651 | a |
The District Court properly applied the doctrine of judicial immunity to bar the claims against the judges, and properly rejected as time-barred the remaining claims. Our concerns regarding sua sponte dismissals are not at issue here, as Scott filed an amended complaint before the Magistrate Judge issued his report and any further attempt to amend would have been futile. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 229, 235-36",
"parenthetical": "stating that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal, a district court must first permit the plaintiff to file a curative amendment unless the dismissal is justified by bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir.2004) (stating that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal, a district court must first permit the plaintiff to file a curative amendment unless the dismissal is justified by bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility); see also Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006) (stating that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 based on an affirmative defense where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "435 F.3d 1252, 1258",
"parenthetical": "stating that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under 28 U.S.C. SS 1915 based on an affirmative defense where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required",
"sentence": "See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir.2004) (stating that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal, a district court must first permit the plaintiff to file a curative amendment unless the dismissal is justified by bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility); see also Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006) (stating that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 based on an affirmative defense where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required)."
} | 3,922,650 | a |
"[S]omeone who knows he is dealing in drugs" must "proceed at his peril with respect to the proximity of a school." Id. at 230. The same principle applies to the location of a qualifying school. "Although some schools are not clearly recognizable as such from all points within the 1000 foot radius, the dealers bear the burden of ascertaining where schools are located and removing their operations from those areas or face enhanced penalties." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 Mass. 647, 648",
"parenthetical": "conviction proper on showing that defendant possessed the drugs within the school zone even if he intended to distribute them outside zone",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647, 648 (1992) (conviction proper on showing that defendant possessed the drugs within the school zone even if he intended to distribute them outside zone)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "603 N.E.2d 1376, 1380",
"parenthetical": "one room in a community center used by school system as an alternative classroom",
"sentence": "Bailey v. State, 603 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (Ind. App. 1992) (one room in a community center used by school system as an alternative classroom)."
} | 123,931 | b |
Most of these courts, however, also take the view that there are limits on a plan proponent's classification freedom. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "800 F.2d 586, 586",
"parenthetical": "Bankruptcy courts have \"broad discretion to determine proper classification according to the factual circumstances of each individual case.\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 586 (Bankruptcy courts have “broad discretion to determine proper classification according to the factual circumstances of each individual case.”); see also Chateaugay, 89 F.3d at 949 (“[T]o warrant having separate classification of similar claims, the debtor must advance a legitimate reason supported by credible proof.”); see also In re Stratford Assocs."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "89 F.3d 949, 949",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]o warrant having separate classification of similar claims, the debtor must advance a legitimate reason supported by credible proof.\"",
"sentence": "See U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 586 (Bankruptcy courts have “broad discretion to determine proper classification according to the factual circumstances of each individual case.”); see also Chateaugay, 89 F.3d at 949 (“[T]o warrant having separate classification of similar claims, the debtor must advance a legitimate reason supported by credible proof.”); see also In re Stratford Assocs."
} | 11,490,566 | a |
In view of the scope of the defense efforts to establish some support for a mental status defense and to provide mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, it was not unreasonable or unfair for the prosecution to rebut those efforts with the questions to both Dr. Campbell and Dr. Brown about the prognosis for possible improvement in the antisocial personality disorder. The use of Dr. Brown's opinion was within the scope of the examination and its uses that defense counsel could reasonably have anticipated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "82 F.3d 593, 604-05",
"parenthetical": "Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of psychiatric evaluation requested by defense could be used to show future dangerousness",
"sentence": "See Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 604-05 (4th Cir.1996) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of psychiatric evaluation requested by defense could be used to show future dangerousness); Woomer v. Aiken, 856 F.2d 677, 682 (4th Cir.1988) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of sanity examination could be used to comment on potential future dangerousness; “When defense counsel consented to the sanity evaluation, he obviously anticipated that the evaluation and resulting psychiatric opinions might be beneficial to his client’s case, but he also must have been fully aware that if they were unfavorable they might be used for an adverse objective.”); Schneider v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir.1988) (after defendant offered evidence from counselors of his potential for rehabilitation, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 430 (Del.1988) (after defendant asserted mental status defense, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); cf. Delguidice v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir.1996) (under Sixth Amendment, notice to counsel that defendant would be examined to determine competency was not sufficient notice to permit State to use examination to address sanity at time of crime)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1359, 1362-63",
"parenthetical": "under Sixth Amendment, notice to counsel that defendant would be examined to determine competency was not sufficient notice to permit State to use examination to address sanity at time of crime",
"sentence": "See Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 604-05 (4th Cir.1996) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of psychiatric evaluation requested by defense could be used to show future dangerousness); Woomer v. Aiken, 856 F.2d 677, 682 (4th Cir.1988) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of sanity examination could be used to comment on potential future dangerousness; “When defense counsel consented to the sanity evaluation, he obviously anticipated that the evaluation and resulting psychiatric opinions might be beneficial to his client’s case, but he also must have been fully aware that if they were unfavorable they might be used for an adverse objective.”); Schneider v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir.1988) (after defendant offered evidence from counselors of his potential for rehabilitation, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 430 (Del.1988) (after defendant asserted mental status defense, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); cf. Delguidice v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir.1996) (under Sixth Amendment, notice to counsel that defendant would be examined to determine competency was not sufficient notice to permit State to use examination to address sanity at time of crime)."
} | 11,671,595 | a |
In view of the scope of the defense efforts to establish some support for a mental status defense and to provide mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, it was not unreasonable or unfair for the prosecution to rebut those efforts with the questions to both Dr. Campbell and Dr. Brown about the prognosis for possible improvement in the antisocial personality disorder. The use of Dr. Brown's opinion was within the scope of the examination and its uses that defense counsel could reasonably have anticipated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "835 F.2d 570, 577-78",
"parenthetical": "after defendant offered evidence from counselors of his potential for rehabilitation, prosecution's rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 604-05 (4th Cir.1996) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of psychiatric evaluation requested by defense could be used to show future dangerousness); Woomer v. Aiken, 856 F.2d 677, 682 (4th Cir.1988) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of sanity examination could be used to comment on potential future dangerousness; “When defense counsel consented to the sanity evaluation, he obviously anticipated that the evaluation and resulting psychiatric opinions might be beneficial to his client’s case, but he also must have been fully aware that if they were unfavorable they might be used for an adverse objective.”); Schneider v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir.1988) (after defendant offered evidence from counselors of his potential for rehabilitation, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 430 (Del.1988) (after defendant asserted mental status defense, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); cf. Delguidice v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir.1996) (under Sixth Amendment, notice to counsel that defendant would be examined to determine competency was not sufficient notice to permit State to use examination to address sanity at time of crime)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1359, 1362-63",
"parenthetical": "under Sixth Amendment, notice to counsel that defendant would be examined to determine competency was not sufficient notice to permit State to use examination to address sanity at time of crime",
"sentence": "See Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 604-05 (4th Cir.1996) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of psychiatric evaluation requested by defense could be used to show future dangerousness); Woomer v. Aiken, 856 F.2d 677, 682 (4th Cir.1988) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of sanity examination could be used to comment on potential future dangerousness; “When defense counsel consented to the sanity evaluation, he obviously anticipated that the evaluation and resulting psychiatric opinions might be beneficial to his client’s case, but he also must have been fully aware that if they were unfavorable they might be used for an adverse objective.”); Schneider v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir.1988) (after defendant offered evidence from counselors of his potential for rehabilitation, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 430 (Del.1988) (after defendant asserted mental status defense, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); cf. Delguidice v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir.1996) (under Sixth Amendment, notice to counsel that defendant would be examined to determine competency was not sufficient notice to permit State to use examination to address sanity at time of crime)."
} | 11,671,595 | a |
In view of the scope of the defense efforts to establish some support for a mental status defense and to provide mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, it was not unreasonable or unfair for the prosecution to rebut those efforts with the questions to both Dr. Campbell and Dr. Brown about the prognosis for possible improvement in the antisocial personality disorder. The use of Dr. Brown's opinion was within the scope of the examination and its uses that defense counsel could reasonably have anticipated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "540 A.2d 423, 430",
"parenthetical": "after defendant asserted mental status defense, prosecution's rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 604-05 (4th Cir.1996) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of psychiatric evaluation requested by defense could be used to show future dangerousness); Woomer v. Aiken, 856 F.2d 677, 682 (4th Cir.1988) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of sanity examination could be used to comment on potential future dangerousness; “When defense counsel consented to the sanity evaluation, he obviously anticipated that the evaluation and resulting psychiatric opinions might be beneficial to his client’s case, but he also must have been fully aware that if they were unfavorable they might be used for an adverse objective.”); Schneider v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir.1988) (after defendant offered evidence from counselors of his potential for rehabilitation, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 430 (Del.1988) (after defendant asserted mental status defense, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); cf. Delguidice v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir.1996) (under Sixth Amendment, notice to counsel that defendant would be examined to determine competency was not sufficient notice to permit State to use examination to address sanity at time of crime)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1359, 1362-63",
"parenthetical": "under Sixth Amendment, notice to counsel that defendant would be examined to determine competency was not sufficient notice to permit State to use examination to address sanity at time of crime",
"sentence": "See Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 604-05 (4th Cir.1996) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of psychiatric evaluation requested by defense could be used to show future dangerousness); Woomer v. Aiken, 856 F.2d 677, 682 (4th Cir.1988) (Sixth Amendment did not require specific warning that results of sanity examination could be used to comment on potential future dangerousness; “When defense counsel consented to the sanity evaluation, he obviously anticipated that the evaluation and resulting psychiatric opinions might be beneficial to his client’s case, but he also must have been fully aware that if they were unfavorable they might be used for an adverse objective.”); Schneider v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir.1988) (after defendant offered evidence from counselors of his potential for rehabilitation, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 430 (Del.1988) (after defendant asserted mental status defense, prosecution’s rebuttal use of opinion of psychiatrist who examined defendant for competency did not violate Sixth Amendment); cf. Delguidice v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir.1996) (under Sixth Amendment, notice to counsel that defendant would be examined to determine competency was not sufficient notice to permit State to use examination to address sanity at time of crime)."
} | 11,671,595 | a |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854",
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854",
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854",
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169",
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169",
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | a |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169",
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | a |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | a |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | b |
Third, the dissenters, apparently animated by their disagreement with current New York law, argue at length that the law used to be different. We think the purpose of certification is to ask the New York Court of Appeals that question, rather than to urge them to adopt our own interpretations of state law. We do respectfully point out, however, that New York judges have not necessarily agreed with the dissenters' views. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80",
"parenthetical": "upholding a trial court's refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly",
"sentence": "See People v. Gonzalez, 554 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 160 A.D.2d 502, 504 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citing Gallagher and concluding that “the record clearly establishes that if defendant was guilty of shooting [the victim], he was guilty of an intentional shooting or no other. Thus, the submission of depraved mind murder was improper and the conviction thereon is vacated, and the count dismissed.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); People ex rel. Parsons v. Walsh, 800 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854, 21 A.D.3d 1169, 1169 (3d Dep’t 2005) (stating that Payne did not declare a retroactive change in the law but, rather, applied existing case law), leave to appeal denied, 6 N.Y.3d 702, 843 N.E.2d 1156, 810 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2005); cf. People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 632-34, 644 N.E.2d 1331, 1335-36, 620 N.Y.S.2d 775, 779-80 (1994) (upholding a trial court’s refusal to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury and explaining that evidence of intoxication does not automatically entitle a jury to find that a defendant acted recklessly)."
} | 3,335,389 | a |
However, the critical factor about the location of the encounter is its nonpublic nature. "[A] reasonable innocent person who is alone when approached by law enforcement officers is more likely to feel that he or she was the specific object of the officers' inquiry." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 1423, 1424-26",
"parenthetical": "encounter between officers and defendant at door to private train compartment was not a seizure",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Tavolacci, 895 F.2d 1423, 1424-26 (D.C.Cir.1990) (encounter between officers and defendant at door to private train compartment was not a seizure)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "460 U.S. 502, 502-03",
"parenthetical": "removing person from public place to private room where he was alone with officers supported finding that encounter was no longer consensual",
"sentence": "Id. at 1531-32. See also Royer, 460 U.S. at 502-03, 103 S.Ct. at 1327-28 (plurality opinion) (removing person from public place to private room where he was alone with officers supported finding that encounter was no longer consensual)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
The WCA is one instance in which we have acknowledged that the Legislature abolished the common law and replaced it with a new, adequate, and fundamentally different remedy. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "469 N.W.2d 84, 85",
"parenthetical": "\"Section 176.82 is not a codification of the common law.\"",
"sentence": "Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 353-54; Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 436, 35 N.W.2d at 735 (“By the weight of authority, it is recognized that compulsory workmen’s compensation acts similar to ours do provide a remedy which is an adequate substitute for the common-law or statutory action for damages for injuries sustained by an employe[e] in his employment.”); see also McDaniel v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 469 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Minn.1991) (“Section 176.82 is not a codification of the common law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "227 Minn. 436, 436",
"parenthetical": "\"By the weight of authority, it is recognized that compulsory workmen's compensation acts similar to ours do provide a remedy which is an adequate substitute for the common-law or statutory action for damages for injuries sustained by an employe[e] in his employment.\"",
"sentence": "Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 353-54; Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 436, 35 N.W.2d at 735 (“By the weight of authority, it is recognized that compulsory workmen’s compensation acts similar to ours do provide a remedy which is an adequate substitute for the common-law or statutory action for damages for injuries sustained by an employe[e] in his employment.”); see also McDaniel v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 469 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Minn.1991) (“Section 176.82 is not a codification of the common law.”)."
} | 6,927,089 | b |
The WCA is one instance in which we have acknowledged that the Legislature abolished the common law and replaced it with a new, adequate, and fundamentally different remedy. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "35 N.W.2d 735, 735",
"parenthetical": "\"By the weight of authority, it is recognized that compulsory workmen's compensation acts similar to ours do provide a remedy which is an adequate substitute for the common-law or statutory action for damages for injuries sustained by an employe[e] in his employment.\"",
"sentence": "Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 353-54; Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 436, 35 N.W.2d at 735 (“By the weight of authority, it is recognized that compulsory workmen’s compensation acts similar to ours do provide a remedy which is an adequate substitute for the common-law or statutory action for damages for injuries sustained by an employe[e] in his employment.”); see also McDaniel v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 469 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Minn.1991) (“Section 176.82 is not a codification of the common law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "469 N.W.2d 84, 85",
"parenthetical": "\"Section 176.82 is not a codification of the common law.\"",
"sentence": "Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 353-54; Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 436, 35 N.W.2d at 735 (“By the weight of authority, it is recognized that compulsory workmen’s compensation acts similar to ours do provide a remedy which is an adequate substitute for the common-law or statutory action for damages for injuries sustained by an employe[e] in his employment.”); see also McDaniel v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 469 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Minn.1991) (“Section 176.82 is not a codification of the common law.”)."
} | 6,927,089 | a |
. Where the two acts diverge, however, courts do not defer to federal law to interpret state law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "8 A.3d 882, 882-83",
"parenthetical": "holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 882-83 (holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law); see also Foster v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 343, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (declining to apply the FLSA’s method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA); Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.”); cf. Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 328-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but “material differences” may exist between claims under each law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "285 F.R.D. 343, 345",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply the FLSA's method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 882-83 (holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law); see also Foster v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 343, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (declining to apply the FLSA’s method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA); Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.”); cf. Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 328-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but “material differences” may exist between claims under each law)."
} | 12,125,996 | a |
. Where the two acts diverge, however, courts do not defer to federal law to interpret state law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 2015126, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 882-83 (holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law); see also Foster v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 343, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (declining to apply the FLSA’s method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA); Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.”); cf. Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 328-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but “material differences” may exist between claims under each law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "8 A.3d 882, 882-83",
"parenthetical": "holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 882-83 (holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law); see also Foster v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 343, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (declining to apply the FLSA’s method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA); Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.”); cf. Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 328-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but “material differences” may exist between claims under each law)."
} | 12,125,996 | b |
. Where the two acts diverge, however, courts do not defer to federal law to interpret state law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but \"material differences\" may exist between claims under each law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 882-83 (holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law); see also Foster v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 343, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (declining to apply the FLSA’s method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA); Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.”); cf. Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 328-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but “material differences” may exist between claims under each law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "8 A.3d 882, 882-83",
"parenthetical": "holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 882-83 (holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law); see also Foster v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 343, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (declining to apply the FLSA’s method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA); Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.”); cf. Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 328-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but “material differences” may exist between claims under each law)."
} | 12,125,996 | b |
. Where the two acts diverge, however, courts do not defer to federal law to interpret state law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "285 F.R.D. 343, 345",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply the FLSA's method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 882-83 (holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law); see also Foster v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 343, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (declining to apply the FLSA’s method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA); Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.”); cf. Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 328-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but “material differences” may exist between claims under each law)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but \"material differences\" may exist between claims under each law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 882-83 (holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law); see also Foster v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 343, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (declining to apply the FLSA’s method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA); Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.”); cf. Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 328-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but “material differences” may exist between claims under each law)."
} | 12,125,996 | a |
. Where the two acts diverge, however, courts do not defer to federal law to interpret state law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 2015126, at *2",
"parenthetical": "\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 882-83 (holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law); see also Foster v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 343, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (declining to apply the FLSA’s method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA); Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.”); cf. Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 328-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but “material differences” may exist between claims under each law)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but \"material differences\" may exist between claims under each law",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bayada Nurses, Inc., 8 A.3d at 882-83 (holding that federal regulations pertaining to the domestic service exemption to the FLSA did not apply to the analogous but narrower PMWA exemption and that Pennsylvania may interpret its law in a manner more beneficial to employees than federal law); see also Foster v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 343, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (declining to apply the FLSA’s method for calculating overtime payments to the PMWA analysis where the federal method conflicted with the language of the PMWA); Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (\"In light of the FLSA's explicit recognition that states may offer greater protections to its employees than the FLSA, we are reluctant to find an unstated foreign-work exemption in the PMWA based solely on the fact that the FLSA contains such an exemption.”); cf. Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 325, 328-29 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and the FLSA have parallel remedies but “material differences” may exist between claims under each law)."
} | 12,125,996 | a |
8 U.S.T. at 908. We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this "limited waiver" "extends only to enterprises of Iran, not Iran itself" and "extends only to enterprises 'doing business' in the United States." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "539 F.Supp. 209, 211",
"parenthetical": "concluding that art. XI P 4 of the Treaty of Amity waives immunity of enterprises but not of Iran itself",
"sentence": "Berkovitz, 735 F.2d at 333; see also Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.Supp. 209, 211 (N.D. Ill.1982) (concluding that art. XI ¶ 4 of the Treaty of Amity waives immunity of enterprises but not of Iran itself); Mashayekhi v. Iran, 515 F.Supp. 41, 43 (D.D.C.1981) (finding limited waiver of immunity in Article XI); cf. Gibbons v. Republic of Ireland, 532 F.Supp. 668, 672 (D.D.C.1982) (concluding that virtually identical treaty provision waived immunity of “enterprises” including the sovereign’s instrumentalities but did not waive immunity of the sovereign itself)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "532 F.Supp. 668, 672",
"parenthetical": "concluding that virtually identical treaty provision waived immunity of \"enterprises\" including the sovereign's instrumentalities but did not waive immunity of the sovereign itself",
"sentence": "Berkovitz, 735 F.2d at 333; see also Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.Supp. 209, 211 (N.D. Ill.1982) (concluding that art. XI ¶ 4 of the Treaty of Amity waives immunity of enterprises but not of Iran itself); Mashayekhi v. Iran, 515 F.Supp. 41, 43 (D.D.C.1981) (finding limited waiver of immunity in Article XI); cf. Gibbons v. Republic of Ireland, 532 F.Supp. 668, 672 (D.D.C.1982) (concluding that virtually identical treaty provision waived immunity of “enterprises” including the sovereign’s instrumentalities but did not waive immunity of the sovereign itself)."
} | 3,481,940 | a |
. Similar fact evidence is evidence of an uncharged crime not linked or related circumstantially to the crime charged. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially",
"sentence": "See Gorham v. State, 454 So.2d 556 (Fla.1984) (distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially); see also Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) (using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design",
"sentence": "See Gorham v. State, 454 So.2d 556 (Fla.1984) (distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially); see also Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) (using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design)."
} | 11,084,879 | a |
. Similar fact evidence is evidence of an uncharged crime not linked or related circumstantially to the crime charged. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially",
"sentence": "See Gorham v. State, 454 So.2d 556 (Fla.1984) (distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially); see also Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) (using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design",
"sentence": "See Gorham v. State, 454 So.2d 556 (Fla.1984) (distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially); see also Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) (using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design)."
} | 11,084,879 | a |
. Similar fact evidence is evidence of an uncharged crime not linked or related circumstantially to the crime charged. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design",
"sentence": "See Gorham v. State, 454 So.2d 556 (Fla.1984) (distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially); see also Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) (using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially",
"sentence": "See Gorham v. State, 454 So.2d 556 (Fla.1984) (distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially); see also Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) (using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design)."
} | 11,084,879 | b |
. Similar fact evidence is evidence of an uncharged crime not linked or related circumstantially to the crime charged. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design",
"sentence": "See Gorham v. State, 454 So.2d 556 (Fla.1984) (distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially); see also Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) (using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially",
"sentence": "See Gorham v. State, 454 So.2d 556 (Fla.1984) (distinguishing similar fact evidence, as unrelated bad acts of defendant, from acts that link defendant to victim circumstantially); see also Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959) (using term \"similar fact evidence\" to describe act unrelated to crime on trial but offered to show identity, intent and plan of design)."
} | 11,084,879 | b |
The government met the mail- and wire-fraud statutes' intent requirements through proof that K. Kennedy was reckless in his disregard for the truth of the statements that he made to victims to obtain their money. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 Fed.Appx. 404, 410",
"parenthetical": "noting that the government's evidence in a mail-fraud case met the intent requirement because it supported a jury finding that the defendant \"deliberately ignored a high probability\" that the securities form he submitted contained material false information",
"sentence": "See United States v. DeSantis, 134 F.3d 760, 764 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that the prosecution may establish the intent element of mail fraud by proving that the defendant was reckless); see also United States v. Turner, 22 Fed.Appx. 404, 410 (6th Cir.2001) (noting that the government’s evidence in a mail-fraud case met the intent requirement because it supported a jury finding that the defendant “deliberately ignored a high probability” that the securities form he submitted contained material false information)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 F.3d 760, 764",
"parenthetical": "holding that the prosecution may establish the intent element of mail fraud by proving that the defendant was reckless",
"sentence": "See United States v. DeSantis, 134 F.3d 760, 764 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that the prosecution may establish the intent element of mail fraud by proving that the defendant was reckless); see also United States v. Turner, 22 Fed.Appx. 404, 410 (6th Cir.2001) (noting that the government’s evidence in a mail-fraud case met the intent requirement because it supported a jury finding that the defendant “deliberately ignored a high probability” that the securities form he submitted contained material false information)."
} | 5,865,502 | b |
Alternatively, much of the time after February 18,1998 is excluded for other reasons. For instance, Walter Whitehead filed various pretrial motions on June 9, 1998 which warrants an exclusion of thirty days while these motions are under the advisement of the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Burke, 673 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D.Ga.1986), affirmed 856 F.2d 1492, rehearing denied 867 F.2d 1431, certiorari denied 492 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3222, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 1252, 1254",
"parenthetical": "the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998",
"sentence": "See also U.S. v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.1991) (18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(l)(J) provides a thirty day limit on excludability for motions not requiring a hearing before a court but not to motions necessitating a hearing, such as suppression hearings, for which the entire time from filing to conclusion of hearing is excludable). Accordingly, the time between June 9, 1998 and July 9, 1998 should be excluded (the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998)."
} | 11,594,465 | a |
Alternatively, much of the time after February 18,1998 is excluded for other reasons. For instance, Walter Whitehead filed various pretrial motions on June 9, 1998 which warrants an exclusion of thirty days while these motions are under the advisement of the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 1252, 1254",
"parenthetical": "the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998",
"sentence": "See also U.S. v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.1991) (18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(l)(J) provides a thirty day limit on excludability for motions not requiring a hearing before a court but not to motions necessitating a hearing, such as suppression hearings, for which the entire time from filing to conclusion of hearing is excludable). Accordingly, the time between June 9, 1998 and July 9, 1998 should be excluded (the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Burke, 673 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D.Ga.1986), affirmed 856 F.2d 1492, rehearing denied 867 F.2d 1431, certiorari denied 492 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3222, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants)."
} | 11,594,465 | b |
Alternatively, much of the time after February 18,1998 is excluded for other reasons. For instance, Walter Whitehead filed various pretrial motions on June 9, 1998 which warrants an exclusion of thirty days while these motions are under the advisement of the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Burke, 673 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D.Ga.1986), affirmed 856 F.2d 1492, rehearing denied 867 F.2d 1431, certiorari denied 492 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3222, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 1252, 1254",
"parenthetical": "the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998",
"sentence": "See also U.S. v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.1991) (18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(l)(J) provides a thirty day limit on excludability for motions not requiring a hearing before a court but not to motions necessitating a hearing, such as suppression hearings, for which the entire time from filing to conclusion of hearing is excludable). Accordingly, the time between June 9, 1998 and July 9, 1998 should be excluded (the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998)."
} | 11,594,465 | a |
Alternatively, much of the time after February 18,1998 is excluded for other reasons. For instance, Walter Whitehead filed various pretrial motions on June 9, 1998 which warrants an exclusion of thirty days while these motions are under the advisement of the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Burke, 673 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D.Ga.1986), affirmed 856 F.2d 1492, rehearing denied 867 F.2d 1431, certiorari denied 492 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3222, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 1252, 1254",
"parenthetical": "the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998",
"sentence": "See also U.S. v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.1991) (18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(l)(J) provides a thirty day limit on excludability for motions not requiring a hearing before a court but not to motions necessitating a hearing, such as suppression hearings, for which the entire time from filing to conclusion of hearing is excludable). Accordingly, the time between June 9, 1998 and July 9, 1998 should be excluded (the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998)."
} | 11,594,465 | a |
Alternatively, much of the time after February 18,1998 is excluded for other reasons. For instance, Walter Whitehead filed various pretrial motions on June 9, 1998 which warrants an exclusion of thirty days while these motions are under the advisement of the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 1252, 1254",
"parenthetical": "the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998",
"sentence": "See also U.S. v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.1991) (18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(l)(J) provides a thirty day limit on excludability for motions not requiring a hearing before a court but not to motions necessitating a hearing, such as suppression hearings, for which the entire time from filing to conclusion of hearing is excludable). Accordingly, the time between June 9, 1998 and July 9, 1998 should be excluded (the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Burke, 673 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D.Ga.1986), affirmed 856 F.2d 1492, rehearing denied 867 F.2d 1431, certiorari denied 492 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3222, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants)."
} | 11,594,465 | b |
Alternatively, much of the time after February 18,1998 is excluded for other reasons. For instance, Walter Whitehead filed various pretrial motions on June 9, 1998 which warrants an exclusion of thirty days while these motions are under the advisement of the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "936 F.2d 1252, 1254",
"parenthetical": "the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998",
"sentence": "See also U.S. v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.1991) (18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(l)(J) provides a thirty day limit on excludability for motions not requiring a hearing before a court but not to motions necessitating a hearing, such as suppression hearings, for which the entire time from filing to conclusion of hearing is excludable). Accordingly, the time between June 9, 1998 and July 9, 1998 should be excluded (the Court ruled on these pretrial motions on July 14,1998)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants",
"sentence": "See U.S. v. Burke, 673 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D.Ga.1986), affirmed 856 F.2d 1492, rehearing denied 867 F.2d 1431, certiorari denied 492 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3222, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (Anything which stops the clock for purposes of Speedy Trial Act for one defendant also stops the clock for the same period as to all codefendants)."
} | 11,594,465 | b |
As to defendant's assertion that his term of life imprisonment mitigated the risk of future dangerousness, we merely reiterate that "[a] defendant's future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravating factor and must play no part in a jury's deliberations." The State, properly, did not raise future dangerousness as an aggravating factor. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 N.J. 454, 521",
"parenthetical": "concluding that prosecutor's discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error",
"sentence": "See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 371, 680 A.2d 677 (stating “[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors”); cf. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 521, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988) (concluding that prosecutor’s discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "146 N.J. 371, 371",
"parenthetical": "stating \"[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors\"",
"sentence": "See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 371, 680 A.2d 677 (stating “[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors”); cf. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 521, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988) (concluding that prosecutor’s discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error)."
} | 1,480,442 | b |
As to defendant's assertion that his term of life imprisonment mitigated the risk of future dangerousness, we merely reiterate that "[a] defendant's future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravating factor and must play no part in a jury's deliberations." The State, properly, did not raise future dangerousness as an aggravating factor. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "146 N.J. 371, 371",
"parenthetical": "stating \"[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors\"",
"sentence": "See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 371, 680 A.2d 677 (stating “[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors”); cf. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 521, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988) (concluding that prosecutor’s discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that prosecutor's discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error",
"sentence": "See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 371, 680 A.2d 677 (stating “[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors”); cf. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 521, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988) (concluding that prosecutor’s discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error)."
} | 1,480,442 | a |
As to defendant's assertion that his term of life imprisonment mitigated the risk of future dangerousness, we merely reiterate that "[a] defendant's future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravating factor and must play no part in a jury's deliberations." The State, properly, did not raise future dangerousness as an aggravating factor. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "112 N.J. 454, 521",
"parenthetical": "concluding that prosecutor's discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error",
"sentence": "See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 371, 680 A.2d 677 (stating “[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors”); cf. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 521, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988) (concluding that prosecutor’s discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating \"[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors\"",
"sentence": "See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 371, 680 A.2d 677 (stating “[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors”); cf. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 521, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988) (concluding that prosecutor’s discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error)."
} | 1,480,442 | b |
As to defendant's assertion that his term of life imprisonment mitigated the risk of future dangerousness, we merely reiterate that "[a] defendant's future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravating factor and must play no part in a jury's deliberations." The State, properly, did not raise future dangerousness as an aggravating factor. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that prosecutor's discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error",
"sentence": "See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 371, 680 A.2d 677 (stating “[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors”); cf. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 521, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988) (concluding that prosecutor’s discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating \"[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors\"",
"sentence": "See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 371, 680 A.2d 677 (stating “[fjuture dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors”); cf. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 521, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988) (concluding that prosecutor’s discussion of non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness was reversible error)."
} | 1,480,442 | b |
Illingsworth was paid on days when he was out due to injury, and he continued to be paid after he stopped working. A reasonable jury could find that the payments to Illingsworth were not made in the usual course of business and thus were not bona fide. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "361 F.3d 36, 36",
"parenthetical": "payments not bona fide \"if they were intentionally misapplied, as they were here via sham contracts that skirted conflict of interest rules and allowed [a corporation] to receive preferential treatment and other benefits\"",
"sentence": "Cornier-Ortiz, 361 F.3d at 36 (payments not bona fide “if they were intentionally misapplied, as they were here via sham contracts that skirted conflict of interest rules and allowed [a corporation] to receive preferential treatment and other benefits”); United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 431, 434 (4th Cir.1993) (bona fide wages exception inapplicable where employee “performed little work for the Sheriffs office” and did not “perform functions for the Sheriffs office on a regular basis”); cf. United States v. Mills, 140 F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir.1998) (bona fide wages exception applicable because there was no allegation that employees “did not responsibly fulfill the duties associated with their employment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "140 F.3d 630, 633",
"parenthetical": "bona fide wages exception applicable because there was no allegation that employees \"did not responsibly fulfill the duties associated with their employment\"",
"sentence": "Cornier-Ortiz, 361 F.3d at 36 (payments not bona fide “if they were intentionally misapplied, as they were here via sham contracts that skirted conflict of interest rules and allowed [a corporation] to receive preferential treatment and other benefits”); United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 431, 434 (4th Cir.1993) (bona fide wages exception inapplicable where employee “performed little work for the Sheriffs office” and did not “perform functions for the Sheriffs office on a regular basis”); cf. United States v. Mills, 140 F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir.1998) (bona fide wages exception applicable because there was no allegation that employees “did not responsibly fulfill the duties associated with their employment”)."
} | 3,703,869 | a |
Illingsworth was paid on days when he was out due to injury, and he continued to be paid after he stopped working. A reasonable jury could find that the payments to Illingsworth were not made in the usual course of business and thus were not bona fide. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "11 F.3d 426, 431, 434",
"parenthetical": "bona fide wages exception inapplicable where employee \"performed little work for the Sheriffs office\" and did not \"perform functions for the Sheriffs office on a regular basis\"",
"sentence": "Cornier-Ortiz, 361 F.3d at 36 (payments not bona fide “if they were intentionally misapplied, as they were here via sham contracts that skirted conflict of interest rules and allowed [a corporation] to receive preferential treatment and other benefits”); United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 431, 434 (4th Cir.1993) (bona fide wages exception inapplicable where employee “performed little work for the Sheriffs office” and did not “perform functions for the Sheriffs office on a regular basis”); cf. United States v. Mills, 140 F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir.1998) (bona fide wages exception applicable because there was no allegation that employees “did not responsibly fulfill the duties associated with their employment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "140 F.3d 630, 633",
"parenthetical": "bona fide wages exception applicable because there was no allegation that employees \"did not responsibly fulfill the duties associated with their employment\"",
"sentence": "Cornier-Ortiz, 361 F.3d at 36 (payments not bona fide “if they were intentionally misapplied, as they were here via sham contracts that skirted conflict of interest rules and allowed [a corporation] to receive preferential treatment and other benefits”); United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 431, 434 (4th Cir.1993) (bona fide wages exception inapplicable where employee “performed little work for the Sheriffs office” and did not “perform functions for the Sheriffs office on a regular basis”); cf. United States v. Mills, 140 F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir.1998) (bona fide wages exception applicable because there was no allegation that employees “did not responsibly fulfill the duties associated with their employment”)."
} | 3,703,869 | a |
On the other hand, the Husses reside in Mississippi, and Barbara has suffered harm chiefly in that state. On balance, we believe that the "center of gravity" in this case is in Tennessee, and that Mississippi does not have a more significant relationship to the case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "849 F.2d 639, 642-43",
"parenthetical": "applying Restatement and holding that where patient-physician relationship was based in Maryland, Maryland law applied to D.C. resident's medical malpractice claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 642-43 (D.C.Cir.1988) (applying Restatement and holding that where patient-physician relationship was based in Maryland, Maryland law applied to D.C. resident’s medical malpractice claim); cf. Denman, 131 F.3d at 549 (“Under Mississippi law, the substantive law of the place of injury controls unless another state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 F.3d 549, 549",
"parenthetical": "\"Under Mississippi law, the substantive law of the place of injury controls unless another state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 642-43 (D.C.Cir.1988) (applying Restatement and holding that where patient-physician relationship was based in Maryland, Maryland law applied to D.C. resident’s medical malpractice claim); cf. Denman, 131 F.3d at 549 (“Under Mississippi law, the substantive law of the place of injury controls unless another state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,668,897 | a |
A careful reading of our cases reveals that these elements of the statute establish two evidentiary requirements. First, they require proof of a "nexus ... between a particular drug offender and the firearm." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "905 F.2d 1577, 1577",
"parenthetical": "noting possibility of conspiring in or aiding or abetting another's use of a weapon",
"sentence": "Long, 905 F.2d at 1577. This connection may be shown vicariously, as when a defendant engages in a conspiracy. See id. at 1577 n. 8 (noting possibility of conspiring in or aiding or abetting another’s use of a weapon); United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 726-28 (D.C.Cir.1991) (discussing knowledge required for accomplice liability under § 924(c)). Second, they require evidence “that the guns facilitate[d] the predicate offense in some way.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 1128, 1141",
"parenthetical": "requiring \"evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the guns were an integral part of the drug trafficking operation\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128, 1141 (D.C.Cir. 1989) (requiring “evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the guns were an integral part of the drug trafficking operation”)."
} | 3,501,136 | a |
That is not to say that Wolf may not have recourse against Clark Hill directly. An attorney who represents a closely held corporation and a controlling shareholder may also have a fiduciary to the other shareholder(s). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 Mich.App. 515, 515, 516",
"parenthetical": "holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, \"this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],\" and observing that \"[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity\"",
"sentence": "See Fassihi, 107 Mich.App. at 515, 516, 309 N.W.2d at 648, 649 (holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, “this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],” and observing that “[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity”); see also Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 405 Mass. 506, 541 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1989) (“Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.”) (citing Fassihi)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.\"",
"sentence": "See Fassihi, 107 Mich.App. at 515, 516, 309 N.W.2d at 648, 649 (holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, “this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],” and observing that “[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity”); see also Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 405 Mass. 506, 541 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1989) (“Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.”) (citing Fassihi)."
} | 4,178,201 | a |
That is not to say that Wolf may not have recourse against Clark Hill directly. An attorney who represents a closely held corporation and a controlling shareholder may also have a fiduciary to the other shareholder(s). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 Mich.App. 515, 515, 516",
"parenthetical": "holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, \"this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],\" and observing that \"[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity\"",
"sentence": "See Fassihi, 107 Mich.App. at 515, 516, 309 N.W.2d at 648, 649 (holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, “this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],” and observing that “[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity”); see also Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 405 Mass. 506, 541 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1989) (“Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.”) (citing Fassihi)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "541 N.E.2d 997, 1002",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.\"",
"sentence": "See Fassihi, 107 Mich.App. at 515, 516, 309 N.W.2d at 648, 649 (holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, “this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],” and observing that “[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity”); see also Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 405 Mass. 506, 541 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1989) (“Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.”) (citing Fassihi)."
} | 4,178,201 | a |
That is not to say that Wolf may not have recourse against Clark Hill directly. An attorney who represents a closely held corporation and a controlling shareholder may also have a fiduciary to the other shareholder(s). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.\"",
"sentence": "See Fassihi, 107 Mich.App. at 515, 516, 309 N.W.2d at 648, 649 (holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, “this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],” and observing that “[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity”); see also Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 405 Mass. 506, 541 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1989) (“Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.”) (citing Fassihi)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "309 N.W.2d 648, 648, 649",
"parenthetical": "holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, \"this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],\" and observing that \"[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity\"",
"sentence": "See Fassihi, 107 Mich.App. at 515, 516, 309 N.W.2d at 648, 649 (holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, “this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],” and observing that “[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity”); see also Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 405 Mass. 506, 541 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1989) (“Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.”) (citing Fassihi)."
} | 4,178,201 | b |
That is not to say that Wolf may not have recourse against Clark Hill directly. An attorney who represents a closely held corporation and a controlling shareholder may also have a fiduciary to the other shareholder(s). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "541 N.E.2d 997, 1002",
"parenthetical": "\"Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.\"",
"sentence": "See Fassihi, 107 Mich.App. at 515, 516, 309 N.W.2d at 648, 649 (holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, “this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],” and observing that “[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity”); see also Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 405 Mass. 506, 541 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1989) (“Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.”) (citing Fassihi)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "309 N.W.2d 648, 648, 649",
"parenthetical": "holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, \"this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],\" and observing that \"[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity\"",
"sentence": "See Fassihi, 107 Mich.App. at 515, 516, 309 N.W.2d at 648, 649 (holding that even where no attorney-client relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney, “this does not necessarily mean that [the law firm] had no fiduciary duty to [the shareholder],” and observing that “[instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity”); see also Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 405 Mass. 506, 541 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1989) (“Indeed, there is logic in the proposition that, even though counsel for a closely held corporation does not by virtue of that relationship alone have an attorney-client relationship with the individual shareholders, counsel nevertheless owes each shareholder a fiduciary duty.”) (citing Fassihi)."
} | 4,178,201 | b |
T.M. is considered to have advance notice of any condition that is contemplated by the sentencing guidelines. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "98 F.3d 41, 43",
"parenthetical": "\"Here, the Magistrate Judge decided to sentence [the defendant] to the maximum possible term of imprisonment. Having made that decision, she could not also sentence him to home detention.\"",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(e)(2); see also United States v. Leaphart, 98 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir.1996) (“Here, the Magistrate Judge decided to sentence [the defendant] to the maximum possible term of imprisonment. Having made that decision, she could not also sentence him to home detention.”); but cf. United States v. Elkins, 176 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (7th Cir.1999) (upholding a sentence where the combined prison and community confinement time exceeded the maximum allowable sentence)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "176 F.3d 1016, 1020-21",
"parenthetical": "upholding a sentence where the combined prison and community confinement time exceeded the maximum allowable sentence",
"sentence": "See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(e)(2); see also United States v. Leaphart, 98 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir.1996) (“Here, the Magistrate Judge decided to sentence [the defendant] to the maximum possible term of imprisonment. Having made that decision, she could not also sentence him to home detention.”); but cf. United States v. Elkins, 176 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (7th Cir.1999) (upholding a sentence where the combined prison and community confinement time exceeded the maximum allowable sentence)."
} | 9,126,535 | a |
When assessing danger to the community, "danger may, at least in some cases, encompass pecuniary or economic harm." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 85, 95",
"parenthetical": "\"We ... hold that a defendant's propensity to commit crime generally, even if the resulting harm would not be solely physical, may constitute a sufficient risk of danger to come within the contemplation of the Act.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. R.G. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 192 (9th Cir.1992) (denying bail pending appeal to defendant convicted of mail fraud); see United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir.1979) (“We ... hold that a defendant’s propensity to commit crime generally, even if the resulting harm would not be solely physical, may constitute a sufficient risk of danger to come within the contemplation of the Act.”); United States v. Leonetti, No Crim. 88-003, 1988 WL 61738 at *2 (E.D.Pa. 9 June 1988) (Provenzano “instructed that community danger not only meant a crime of physical violence, but also included the commission of future economic crimes as well.”); United States v. Moss, 522 F.Supp. 1033, 1035 (E.D.Pa.1981) (same), aff'd, 688 F.2d 826 (3d Cir.1982); see also Strong, 775 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir.1985)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 192, 192",
"parenthetical": "denying bail pending appeal to defendant convicted of mail fraud",
"sentence": "United States v. R.G. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 192 (9th Cir.1992) (denying bail pending appeal to defendant convicted of mail fraud); see United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir.1979) (“We ... hold that a defendant’s propensity to commit crime generally, even if the resulting harm would not be solely physical, may constitute a sufficient risk of danger to come within the contemplation of the Act.”); United States v. Leonetti, No Crim. 88-003, 1988 WL 61738 at *2 (E.D.Pa. 9 June 1988) (Provenzano “instructed that community danger not only meant a crime of physical violence, but also included the commission of future economic crimes as well.”); United States v. Moss, 522 F.Supp. 1033, 1035 (E.D.Pa.1981) (same), aff'd, 688 F.2d 826 (3d Cir.1982); see also Strong, 775 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir.1985)."
} | 161,003 | b |
When assessing danger to the community, "danger may, at least in some cases, encompass pecuniary or economic harm." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1988 WL 61738, at *2",
"parenthetical": "Provenzano \"instructed that community danger not only meant a crime of physical violence, but also included the commission of future economic crimes as well.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. R.G. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 192 (9th Cir.1992) (denying bail pending appeal to defendant convicted of mail fraud); see United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir.1979) (“We ... hold that a defendant’s propensity to commit crime generally, even if the resulting harm would not be solely physical, may constitute a sufficient risk of danger to come within the contemplation of the Act.”); United States v. Leonetti, No Crim. 88-003, 1988 WL 61738 at *2 (E.D.Pa. 9 June 1988) (Provenzano “instructed that community danger not only meant a crime of physical violence, but also included the commission of future economic crimes as well.”); United States v. Moss, 522 F.Supp. 1033, 1035 (E.D.Pa.1981) (same), aff'd, 688 F.2d 826 (3d Cir.1982); see also Strong, 775 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir.1985)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 192, 192",
"parenthetical": "denying bail pending appeal to defendant convicted of mail fraud",
"sentence": "United States v. R.G. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 192 (9th Cir.1992) (denying bail pending appeal to defendant convicted of mail fraud); see United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir.1979) (“We ... hold that a defendant’s propensity to commit crime generally, even if the resulting harm would not be solely physical, may constitute a sufficient risk of danger to come within the contemplation of the Act.”); United States v. Leonetti, No Crim. 88-003, 1988 WL 61738 at *2 (E.D.Pa. 9 June 1988) (Provenzano “instructed that community danger not only meant a crime of physical violence, but also included the commission of future economic crimes as well.”); United States v. Moss, 522 F.Supp. 1033, 1035 (E.D.Pa.1981) (same), aff'd, 688 F.2d 826 (3d Cir.1982); see also Strong, 775 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir.1985)."
} | 161,003 | b |
We have previously recognized that in forma pauperis plaintiffs "must rely on the district court and the [USMS] to effect service," and should not be penalized for delay in service beyond their control. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "51 F.3d 710, 713",
"parenthetical": "\"The prisoner may rely on the Marshals Service to serve process, and the Marshals Service's failure to complete service is automatically 'good cause' to extend time for service under Rule 4(m).\"",
"sentence": "See Robinson, 602 F.3d at 608-09 (citing Graham v. Satkoski, 51 F.3d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The prisoner may rely on the Marshals Service to serve process, and the Marshals Service’s failure to complete service is automatically 'good cause’ to extend time for service under Rule 4(m).”)); see also Wright v. First Student, Inc., 710 F.3d 782, 783-84 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f the delay in service was the result of a delay by court staff or the USMS in fulfilling their obligations, [the plaintiffs] complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 4(m).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "710 F.3d 782, 783-84",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the delay in service was the result of a delay by court staff or the USMS in fulfilling their obligations, [the plaintiffs] complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 4(m).\"",
"sentence": "See Robinson, 602 F.3d at 608-09 (citing Graham v. Satkoski, 51 F.3d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The prisoner may rely on the Marshals Service to serve process, and the Marshals Service’s failure to complete service is automatically 'good cause’ to extend time for service under Rule 4(m).”)); see also Wright v. First Student, Inc., 710 F.3d 782, 783-84 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f the delay in service was the result of a delay by court staff or the USMS in fulfilling their obligations, [the plaintiffs] complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 4(m).”)."
} | 12,390,538 | a |
The proffered justification may derive from strongly-held religious or fundamentally traditional beliefs, but still does not provide a legally recognizable rational basis for sustaining a law that actively discriminates against legally married couples. The exclusion of same-sex couples from the federal definition of marriage does nothing to encourage or strengthen opposite-sex marriages. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "704 F.Supp.2d 972, 972",
"parenthetical": "\"Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex marriages\"",
"sentence": "See Perry II, 671 F.3d at 1089, 2012 WL 372713, at *23 (holding that “the argument that withdrawing the designation of ‘marriage’ from same-sex couples could on its own promote the strength or stability of opposite-sex marital relationships lacks any such footing in reality”); see also Perry, 704 F.Supp.2d at 972 (“Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex marriages”); In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 932 (this governmental interest “is largely irrelevant to the rational basis analysis here because the same-sex couples who seek the benefits are already married."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "671 F.3d 1089, 1089",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the argument that withdrawing the designation of 'marriage' from same-sex couples could on its own promote the strength or stability of opposite-sex marital relationships lacks any such footing in reality\"",
"sentence": "See Perry II, 671 F.3d at 1089, 2012 WL 372713, at *23 (holding that “the argument that withdrawing the designation of ‘marriage’ from same-sex couples could on its own promote the strength or stability of opposite-sex marital relationships lacks any such footing in reality”); see also Perry, 704 F.Supp.2d at 972 (“Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex marriages”); In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 932 (this governmental interest “is largely irrelevant to the rational basis analysis here because the same-sex couples who seek the benefits are already married."
} | 3,965,944 | b |
The proffered justification may derive from strongly-held religious or fundamentally traditional beliefs, but still does not provide a legally recognizable rational basis for sustaining a law that actively discriminates against legally married couples. The exclusion of same-sex couples from the federal definition of marriage does nothing to encourage or strengthen opposite-sex marriages. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "704 F.Supp.2d 972, 972",
"parenthetical": "\"Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex marriages\"",
"sentence": "See Perry II, 671 F.3d at 1089, 2012 WL 372713, at *23 (holding that “the argument that withdrawing the designation of ‘marriage’ from same-sex couples could on its own promote the strength or stability of opposite-sex marital relationships lacks any such footing in reality”); see also Perry, 704 F.Supp.2d at 972 (“Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex marriages”); In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 932 (this governmental interest “is largely irrelevant to the rational basis analysis here because the same-sex couples who seek the benefits are already married."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 372713, at *23",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the argument that withdrawing the designation of 'marriage' from same-sex couples could on its own promote the strength or stability of opposite-sex marital relationships lacks any such footing in reality\"",
"sentence": "See Perry II, 671 F.3d at 1089, 2012 WL 372713, at *23 (holding that “the argument that withdrawing the designation of ‘marriage’ from same-sex couples could on its own promote the strength or stability of opposite-sex marital relationships lacks any such footing in reality”); see also Perry, 704 F.Supp.2d at 972 (“Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex marriages”); In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 932 (this governmental interest “is largely irrelevant to the rational basis analysis here because the same-sex couples who seek the benefits are already married."
} | 3,965,944 | b |
By describing the location of the keys which would provide entry into the closet, Milian provided additional evidence of his consent to the search. Appellant argues that this case is distinguishable from cases such as Allison in which the keys are physically presented and more closely analogous to cases in which the defendant gives a qualified or equivocal response and fails to present officials with the keys. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "442 F.Supp. 736, 738",
"parenthetical": "defendant says nothing but permits law enforcement agent to retrieve key from defendant's pocket",
"sentence": "See United States v. Patacchia, 602 F.2d 218, 219 (9th Cir.1979) (defendant expresses willingness but inability to open trunk because of damage to rear of car and absence of trunk key); cf. United States v. Ester, 442 F.Supp. 736, 738 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (defendant says nothing but permits law enforcement agent to retrieve key from defendant’s pocket)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "602 F.2d 218, 219",
"parenthetical": "defendant expresses willingness but inability to open trunk because of damage to rear of car and absence of trunk key",
"sentence": "See United States v. Patacchia, 602 F.2d 218, 219 (9th Cir.1979) (defendant expresses willingness but inability to open trunk because of damage to rear of car and absence of trunk key); cf. United States v. Ester, 442 F.Supp. 736, 738 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (defendant says nothing but permits law enforcement agent to retrieve key from defendant’s pocket)."
} | 388,372 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Figueroa's due process claim and medical deliberate indifference claim against all defendants except defendants Grafton, Johnson, and Ryan because Figueroa failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "391 F.3d 1051, 1057",
"parenthetical": "setting forth requirements for a deliberate indifference claim and stating that negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Toguehi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth requirements for a deliberate indifference claim and stating that negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth the elements of a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a government function)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Toguehi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth requirements for a deliberate indifference claim and stating that negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth the elements of a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a government function)."
} | 12,405,311 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Figueroa's due process claim and medical deliberate indifference claim against all defendants except defendants Grafton, Johnson, and Ryan because Figueroa failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "698 F.3d 1128, 1139",
"parenthetical": "setting forth the elements of a SS 1983 claim against a private entity performing a government function",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Toguehi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth requirements for a deliberate indifference claim and stating that negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth the elements of a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a government function)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 338, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief",
"sentence": "See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Toguehi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth requirements for a deliberate indifference claim and stating that negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth the elements of a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a government function)."
} | 12,405,311 | b |
Plaintiff's EEOC charge alleged race and- gender discrimination and, in a separate section, specifically discussed her departmental trial under the heading "unfair and ungrounded discipline" as a ground for discriminatory treatment. (See Schowengerdt Decl. Ex. N.) Plaintiff's claims related to subsequent developments in the same disciplinaiy process, including the finding of guilt and the recommendation that Plaintiff be terminated, were therefore properly exhausted because she alleges they occurred "in the same manner and for substantially the same reasons." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "237 F.Supp.2d 493, 498",
"parenthetical": "finding claim related to termination following EEOC charge was properly exhausted",
"sentence": "Tullo v. City of Mount Vernon, 237 F.Supp.2d 493, 498 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (finding claim related to termination following EEOC charge was properly exhausted); see also Rommage v. MTA Long Island R.R., No. 08-CV-836, 2010 WL 4038754, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding claim related to termination following EEOC charge was properly exhausted because EEOC charge included allegations of unfounded discipline and termination claim alleged an equivalent \"method of discrimination”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 4038754, at *7",
"parenthetical": "finding claim related to termination following EEOC charge was properly exhausted because EEOC charge included allegations of unfounded discipline and termination claim alleged an equivalent \"method of discrimination\"",
"sentence": "Tullo v. City of Mount Vernon, 237 F.Supp.2d 493, 498 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (finding claim related to termination following EEOC charge was properly exhausted); see also Rommage v. MTA Long Island R.R., No. 08-CV-836, 2010 WL 4038754, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding claim related to termination following EEOC charge was properly exhausted because EEOC charge included allegations of unfounded discipline and termination claim alleged an equivalent \"method of discrimination”)."
} | 4,177,809 | a |
Applying this test, we conclude that suppression is not required for the district court's authorization of wiretaps beyond the court's territorial jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "788 F.2d 1493, 1500",
"parenthetical": "holding that authorization of a wiretap order beyond the territorial restrictions in 18 U.S.C. SS 2518(3) does not require suppression because the statutory violation would not implicate Congress's core concerns underlying Title III",
"sentence": "See Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that authorization of a wiretap order beyond the territorial restrictions in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) does not require suppression because the statutory violation would not implicate Congress’s core concerns underlying Title III)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "736 F.3d 509, 515",
"parenthetical": "concluding that territorial jurisdiction is a core concern of Title III",
"sentence": "But see United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (concluding that territorial jurisdiction is a core concern of Title III)."
} | 12,277,405 | a |
At the fee determination stage, the district judge must protect the class's interest by acting as a fiduciary for the class. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 255, 255",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n agent must be located to oversee the relationship between the class and its lawyers,\" and \"[traditionally, that agent has been the court.\"",
"sentence": "See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he District Court acts as a fiduciary guarding the rights of absent class members^]”); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280-81 (7th Cir.2002) (“We and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.”); Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 251 (1985) (The court “must monitor the disbursement of the' fund and act as a fiduciary for those who are supposed to benefit from it, since typically no one else is available to perform that function.”); cf. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 255 (“[A]n agent must be located to oversee the relationship between the class and its lawyers,” and “[traditionally, that agent has been the court.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 231, 231",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he District Court acts as a fiduciary guarding the rights of absent class members^]\"",
"sentence": "See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he District Court acts as a fiduciary guarding the rights of absent class members^]”); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280-81 (7th Cir.2002) (“We and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.”); Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 251 (1985) (The court “must monitor the disbursement of the' fund and act as a fiduciary for those who are supposed to benefit from it, since typically no one else is available to perform that function.”); cf. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 255 (“[A]n agent must be located to oversee the relationship between the class and its lawyers,” and “[traditionally, that agent has been the court.”)."
} | 9,034,218 | b |
At the fee determination stage, the district judge must protect the class's interest by acting as a fiduciary for the class. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "288 F.3d 277, 280-81",
"parenthetical": "\"We and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.\"",
"sentence": "See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he District Court acts as a fiduciary guarding the rights of absent class members^]”); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280-81 (7th Cir.2002) (“We and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.”); Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 251 (1985) (The court “must monitor the disbursement of the' fund and act as a fiduciary for those who are supposed to benefit from it, since typically no one else is available to perform that function.”); cf. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 255 (“[A]n agent must be located to oversee the relationship between the class and its lawyers,” and “[traditionally, that agent has been the court.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 255, 255",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n agent must be located to oversee the relationship between the class and its lawyers,\" and \"[traditionally, that agent has been the court.\"",
"sentence": "See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he District Court acts as a fiduciary guarding the rights of absent class members^]”); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280-81 (7th Cir.2002) (“We and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.”); Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 251 (1985) (The court “must monitor the disbursement of the' fund and act as a fiduciary for those who are supposed to benefit from it, since typically no one else is available to perform that function.”); cf. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 255 (“[A]n agent must be located to oversee the relationship between the class and its lawyers,” and “[traditionally, that agent has been the court.”)."
} | 9,034,218 | a |
At the fee determination stage, the district judge must protect the class's interest by acting as a fiduciary for the class. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 255, 255",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n agent must be located to oversee the relationship between the class and its lawyers,\" and \"[traditionally, that agent has been the court.\"",
"sentence": "See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he District Court acts as a fiduciary guarding the rights of absent class members^]”); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280-81 (7th Cir.2002) (“We and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.”); Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 251 (1985) (The court “must monitor the disbursement of the' fund and act as a fiduciary for those who are supposed to benefit from it, since typically no one else is available to perform that function.”); cf. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 255 (“[A]n agent must be located to oversee the relationship between the class and its lawyers,” and “[traditionally, that agent has been the court.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "108 F.R.D. 237, 251",
"parenthetical": "The court \"must monitor the disbursement of the' fund and act as a fiduciary for those who are supposed to benefit from it, since typically no one else is available to perform that function.\"",
"sentence": "See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he District Court acts as a fiduciary guarding the rights of absent class members^]”); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280-81 (7th Cir.2002) (“We and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.”); Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 251 (1985) (The court “must monitor the disbursement of the' fund and act as a fiduciary for those who are supposed to benefit from it, since typically no one else is available to perform that function.”); cf. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 255 (“[A]n agent must be located to oversee the relationship between the class and its lawyers,” and “[traditionally, that agent has been the court.”)."
} | 9,034,218 | b |
In fact, Elsen testified in his deposition that there were LMC documents- "under the control of Barry Carroll in a storage facility at his residence." (R. 256, Pl.'s Resp. to Carroll's Mot. to Strike, Elsen Dep. at 56.) "When a party has produced the document in question in response to a subpoena or discovery request, he has implicitly authenticated the document." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "117 F.3d 1044, 1049",
"parenthetical": "admitting evidence where that evidence was found in a criminal raid on a place under a defendant's control and the evidence otherwise appeared to have been belong to the defendant",
"sentence": "United States v. Lawrence, 934 F.2d 868, 871-72 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Harvey, 117 F.3d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir.1997) (admitting evidence where that evidence was found in a criminal raid on a place under a defendant’s control and the evidence otherwise appeared to have been belong to the defendant); see also United States v. Munoz, 16 F.3d 1116, 1121 (11th Cir.1994) (finding that documents may be found authentic where there are discovered in the defen dant’s possession); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 644 F.Supp. 1240, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1986)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "16 F.3d 1116, 1121",
"parenthetical": "finding that documents may be found authentic where there are discovered in the defen dant's possession",
"sentence": "United States v. Lawrence, 934 F.2d 868, 871-72 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Harvey, 117 F.3d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir.1997) (admitting evidence where that evidence was found in a criminal raid on a place under a defendant’s control and the evidence otherwise appeared to have been belong to the defendant); see also United States v. Munoz, 16 F.3d 1116, 1121 (11th Cir.1994) (finding that documents may be found authentic where there are discovered in the defen dant’s possession); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 644 F.Supp. 1240, 1253 (N.D.Ill.1986)."
} | 5,725,848 | a |
Further, .Dunaway's collateral counsel also did not elicit any testimony from any of the other jurors or the alternate juror called at the June 20.04 hearing showing that [W.H.] had disclosed to them any information about the crime scene. None of the individuals called to testify at the June 2004 proceeding indicated [W.H.] ever disclosed any information from visiting the crime scene. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "547 So.2d 596, 598",
"parenthetical": "holding that '[bjecause the defendant in this case has failed to show that the experiment [conducted by a juror] resulted in the introduction of facts that might have unlawfully -influenced the verdict rendered, we find that the juror's action does not warrant a new trial'",
"sentence": "See Reed v. State, 547 So.2d 596, 598 (Ala.1989) (holding that ‘[bjecause the defendant in this case has failed to show that the experiment [conducted by a juror] resulted in the introduction of facts that might have unlawfully -influenced the verdict rendered, we find that the juror’s action does not warrant a new trial’); see also Reynolds v. City of Birmingham, 723 So.2d 822, 826 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (finding that juror misconduct did not warrant a new trial because ‘[t]he jurors in the present case all stated that they were basing their decision on the officers’ testimony rather than any statements of allegations coming from the investigating juror’); Ex parte Dawson, 710 So.2d at 476 (holding ‘[bje-cause Dawson failed to show that the juror’s viewing of the crime scene resulted in the introduction of facts that might have unlawfully influenced the jury’s verdict, a new trial is not warranted’)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "723 So.2d 822, 826",
"parenthetical": "finding that juror misconduct did not warrant a new trial because '[t]he jurors in the present case all stated that they were basing their decision on the officers' testimony rather than any statements of allegations coming from the investigating juror'",
"sentence": "See Reed v. State, 547 So.2d 596, 598 (Ala.1989) (holding that ‘[bjecause the defendant in this case has failed to show that the experiment [conducted by a juror] resulted in the introduction of facts that might have unlawfully -influenced the verdict rendered, we find that the juror’s action does not warrant a new trial’); see also Reynolds v. City of Birmingham, 723 So.2d 822, 826 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (finding that juror misconduct did not warrant a new trial because ‘[t]he jurors in the present case all stated that they were basing their decision on the officers’ testimony rather than any statements of allegations coming from the investigating juror’); Ex parte Dawson, 710 So.2d at 476 (holding ‘[bje-cause Dawson failed to show that the juror’s viewing of the crime scene resulted in the introduction of facts that might have unlawfully influenced the jury’s verdict, a new trial is not warranted’)."
} | 6,774,388 | a |
Furthermore, this court has rejected the suggestion that IDEA administrative litigation is categorically less complex than other forms of litigation, and reaffirms that IDEA cases are sufficiently complex to allow application of the Laffey Matrix. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "754 F.Supp.2d 76, 76",
"parenthetical": "holding that counsel must have specialized knowledge of the bureaucracy and practices of DCPS to handle IDEA cases",
"sentence": "See Jackson, 696 F.Supp.2d at 102 (holding that IDEA administrative proceedings, which require expert testimony regarding whether a student has been denied a FAPE, are sufficiently complex to warrant application of the Laffey Matrix); Nesbit, Civ. No. 01-2429, at 1 (refusing to create an exception to the application of the Laffey Matrix for IDEA litigation); see also Cox, 754 F.Supp.2d at 76 (holding that counsel must have specialized knowledge of the bureaucracy and practices of DCPS to handle IDEA cases)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "696 F.Supp.2d 102, 102",
"parenthetical": "holding that IDEA administrative proceedings, which require expert testimony regarding whether a student has been denied a FAPE, are sufficiently complex to warrant application of the Laffey Matrix",
"sentence": "See Jackson, 696 F.Supp.2d at 102 (holding that IDEA administrative proceedings, which require expert testimony regarding whether a student has been denied a FAPE, are sufficiently complex to warrant application of the Laffey Matrix); Nesbit, Civ. No. 01-2429, at 1 (refusing to create an exception to the application of the Laffey Matrix for IDEA litigation); see also Cox, 754 F.Supp.2d at 76 (holding that counsel must have specialized knowledge of the bureaucracy and practices of DCPS to handle IDEA cases)."
} | 4,186,345 | b |
As an alternative, the continuing course of conduct doctrine has also been applied to toll the statute of limitations. In its modern formulation, we have held that in order "[t]o support a finding of a 'continuing course of conduct' that may toll the statute of limitations there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission of the original wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong. . . . Where we have upheld a finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the 'act or omission' relied upon, there has been evidence of either a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no continuing duty on defendant's part after completion of roof installation",
"sentence": "Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 209-10 (no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold); see, e.g., Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 242 (improper reliance on theory); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983) (no continuing duty on defendant’s part after completion of roof installation); Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., supra, 170 Conn. 289 (continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., supra, 144 Conn. 316 (applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer); Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 144 Conn. 174 (continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold",
"sentence": "Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 209-10 (no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold); see, e.g., Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 242 (improper reliance on theory); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983) (no continuing duty on defendant’s part after completion of roof installation); Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., supra, 170 Conn. 289 (continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., supra, 144 Conn. 316 (applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer); Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 144 Conn. 174 (continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle)."
} | 759,926 | b |
As an alternative, the continuing course of conduct doctrine has also been applied to toll the statute of limitations. In its modern formulation, we have held that in order "[t]o support a finding of a 'continuing course of conduct' that may toll the statute of limitations there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission of the original wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong. . . . Where we have upheld a finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the 'act or omission' relied upon, there has been evidence of either a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold",
"sentence": "Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 209-10 (no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold); see, e.g., Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 242 (improper reliance on theory); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983) (no continuing duty on defendant’s part after completion of roof installation); Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., supra, 170 Conn. 289 (continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., supra, 144 Conn. 316 (applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer); Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 144 Conn. 174 (continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no continuing duty on defendant's part after completion of roof installation",
"sentence": "Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 209-10 (no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold); see, e.g., Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 242 (improper reliance on theory); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983) (no continuing duty on defendant’s part after completion of roof installation); Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., supra, 170 Conn. 289 (continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., supra, 144 Conn. 316 (applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer); Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 144 Conn. 174 (continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle)."
} | 759,926 | a |
As an alternative, the continuing course of conduct doctrine has also been applied to toll the statute of limitations. In its modern formulation, we have held that in order "[t]o support a finding of a 'continuing course of conduct' that may toll the statute of limitations there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission of the original wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong. . . . Where we have upheld a finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the 'act or omission' relied upon, there has been evidence of either a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action",
"sentence": "Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 209-10 (no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold); see, e.g., Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 242 (improper reliance on theory); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983) (no continuing duty on defendant’s part after completion of roof installation); Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., supra, 170 Conn. 289 (continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., supra, 144 Conn. 316 (applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer); Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 144 Conn. 174 (continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold",
"sentence": "Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 209-10 (no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold); see, e.g., Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 242 (improper reliance on theory); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983) (no continuing duty on defendant’s part after completion of roof installation); Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., supra, 170 Conn. 289 (continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., supra, 144 Conn. 316 (applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer); Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 144 Conn. 174 (continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle)."
} | 759,926 | b |
As an alternative, the continuing course of conduct doctrine has also been applied to toll the statute of limitations. In its modern formulation, we have held that in order "[t]o support a finding of a 'continuing course of conduct' that may toll the statute of limitations there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission of the original wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong. . . . Where we have upheld a finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the 'act or omission' relied upon, there has been evidence of either a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer",
"sentence": "Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 209-10 (no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold); see, e.g., Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 242 (improper reliance on theory); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983) (no continuing duty on defendant’s part after completion of roof installation); Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., supra, 170 Conn. 289 (continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., supra, 144 Conn. 316 (applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer); Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 144 Conn. 174 (continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold",
"sentence": "Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 209-10 (no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold); see, e.g., Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 242 (improper reliance on theory); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983) (no continuing duty on defendant’s part after completion of roof installation); Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., supra, 170 Conn. 289 (continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., supra, 144 Conn. 316 (applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer); Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 144 Conn. 174 (continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle)."
} | 759,926 | b |
As an alternative, the continuing course of conduct doctrine has also been applied to toll the statute of limitations. In its modern formulation, we have held that in order "[t]o support a finding of a 'continuing course of conduct' that may toll the statute of limitations there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission of the original wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong. . . . Where we have upheld a finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the 'act or omission' relied upon, there has been evidence of either a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold",
"sentence": "Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 209-10 (no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold); see, e.g., Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 242 (improper reliance on theory); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983) (no continuing duty on defendant’s part after completion of roof installation); Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., supra, 170 Conn. 289 (continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., supra, 144 Conn. 316 (applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer); Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 144 Conn. 174 (continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle",
"sentence": "Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., supra, 207 Conn. 209-10 (no evidence to support continuing duty on part of defendant after property sold); see, e.g., Connell v. Colwell, supra, 214 Conn. 242 (improper reliance on theory); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983) (no continuing duty on defendant’s part after completion of roof installation); Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., supra, 170 Conn. 289 (continuing course of conduct theory inappropriate in strict product liability action); Handler v. Remington Arms Co., supra, 144 Conn. 316 (applying continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations on the basis of continuing duty to warn of defective cartridge by manufacturer); Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 144 Conn. 174 (continuing course of conduct inapplicable where act completed by sale of air rifle)."
} | 759,926 | a |
Thus, because the court's findings had not yet been made for purposes of Rule 52(b) when Marie filed her motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is understandable that the court regarded her motion as moot when it entered its written judgment and denied the motion. In these circumstances, however, the correct response would have been to dismiss the motion as premature and allow Marie to file a proper motion, if she wished to do so, after the judgment was entered. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "132 Me. 79, 81",
"parenthetical": "affirming the denial of a motion for a directed verdict that was prematurely raised before the close of all the trial evidence",
"sentence": "See Boynton v. Adams, 331 A.2d 370, 373 n. 2 (Me.1975) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from judgment as premature because it was filed before the judgment was entered); cf. Dyar Sales & Mach. Co. v. Mininni, 132 Me. 79, 81, 166 A. 620, 621 (1933) (affirming the denial of a motion for a directed verdict that was prematurely raised before the close of all the trial evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's denial of a motion for relief from judgment as premature because it was filed before the judgment was entered",
"sentence": "See Boynton v. Adams, 331 A.2d 370, 373 n. 2 (Me.1975) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from judgment as premature because it was filed before the judgment was entered); cf. Dyar Sales & Mach. Co. v. Mininni, 132 Me. 79, 81, 166 A. 620, 621 (1933) (affirming the denial of a motion for a directed verdict that was prematurely raised before the close of all the trial evidence)."
} | 8,357,085 | b |
Thus, because the court's findings had not yet been made for purposes of Rule 52(b) when Marie filed her motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is understandable that the court regarded her motion as moot when it entered its written judgment and denied the motion. In these circumstances, however, the correct response would have been to dismiss the motion as premature and allow Marie to file a proper motion, if she wished to do so, after the judgment was entered. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's denial of a motion for relief from judgment as premature because it was filed before the judgment was entered",
"sentence": "See Boynton v. Adams, 331 A.2d 370, 373 n. 2 (Me.1975) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from judgment as premature because it was filed before the judgment was entered); cf. Dyar Sales & Mach. Co. v. Mininni, 132 Me. 79, 81, 166 A. 620, 621 (1933) (affirming the denial of a motion for a directed verdict that was prematurely raised before the close of all the trial evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "166 A. 620, 621",
"parenthetical": "affirming the denial of a motion for a directed verdict that was prematurely raised before the close of all the trial evidence",
"sentence": "See Boynton v. Adams, 331 A.2d 370, 373 n. 2 (Me.1975) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from judgment as premature because it was filed before the judgment was entered); cf. Dyar Sales & Mach. Co. v. Mininni, 132 Me. 79, 81, 166 A. 620, 621 (1933) (affirming the denial of a motion for a directed verdict that was prematurely raised before the close of all the trial evidence)."
} | 8,357,085 | a |
The medical evidence is not disputed by the USPS on this appeal, although the USPS argues that Ms. Malloy's disrespectful statements and inadequate performance warrant her removal from service. However, when mental impairment or illness is reasonably substantiated, and is shown to be related to the ground of removal, this must be taken into account when taking an adverse action against the employee. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "42 M.S.P.R. 233, 241",
"parenthetical": "the employee's testimony that \"he was under severe emotional distress at the time he committed the acts in question\" must be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the penalty",
"sentence": "See Hanna v. Dep’t of Army, 42 M.S.P.R. 233, 241 (1989) (the employee’s testimony that “he was under severe emotional distress at the time he committed the acts in question” must be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the penalty); see also Robb v. Dep’t of Def, 77 M.S.P.R. 130, 133 (1997) (“An employee in an AWOL-based adverse action may rely upon medical evidence of illness not previously submitted to the agency as a defense to the action.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 M.S.P.R. 130, 133",
"parenthetical": "\"An employee in an AWOL-based adverse action may rely upon medical evidence of illness not previously submitted to the agency as a defense to the action.\"",
"sentence": "See Hanna v. Dep’t of Army, 42 M.S.P.R. 233, 241 (1989) (the employee’s testimony that “he was under severe emotional distress at the time he committed the acts in question” must be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the penalty); see also Robb v. Dep’t of Def, 77 M.S.P.R. 130, 133 (1997) (“An employee in an AWOL-based adverse action may rely upon medical evidence of illness not previously submitted to the agency as a defense to the action.”)."
} | 4,048,840 | a |
It also overlooked the reality that, in most actions involving child support, "the 'parties' to the enumerated actions will be the parents of the child," though it is the best interests of the child that is being litigated. Thus, in determining whether attorney fees are nondischargeable under SS 523(a)(5), the bankruptcy court should have focused on the character of the underlying proceedings, not who was to have been paid the attorney fees, since the putative beneficiary of the award is, in fact, the child. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "133 B.R. 145, 147",
"parenthetical": "disparity between financial condition of parties not dispositive of whether an obligation is support",
"sentence": "See In re Poe, 118 B.R. at 811 (attorney fees awarded in the course of divorce decrees or related litigation generally take on the character of the litigation involved); cf. Hayden v. Farrell (In re Farrell), 133 B.R. 145, 147 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1991) (disparity between financial condition of parties not dispositive of whether an obligation is support)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 B.R. 811, 811",
"parenthetical": "attorney fees awarded in the course of divorce decrees or related litigation generally take on the character of the litigation involved",
"sentence": "See In re Poe, 118 B.R. at 811 (attorney fees awarded in the course of divorce decrees or related litigation generally take on the character of the litigation involved); cf. Hayden v. Farrell (In re Farrell), 133 B.R. 145, 147 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1991) (disparity between financial condition of parties not dispositive of whether an obligation is support)."
} | 6,514,585 | b |
Under Pickering and its progeny, unless the employee's comments are actually disruptive, single out a specific person as a target, or materially interfere with the performance of an employee's duties, the right to unhampered expression on matters of public salience will prevail. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "616 F.2d 1165, 1166",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff's secret tape recording of office conversations caused actual disruption",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Van Coteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff improperly dismissed for addressing public body on subject of civil rights for homosexuals); Hickman v. Valley Local School District Board of Education, 619 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1980) (absent direct public criticism of superiors, personality conflict generated by protected union activities cannot justify discharge); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1979) (improper to silence employee who reveals misappropriation of public funds, despite resulting disharmony); cf. Serna v. Manzano, 616 F.2d 1165,1166 (10th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff’s secret tape recording of office conversations caused actual disruption); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (fireman properly dismissed for verbally attacking very persons with whom he functions in closest coordination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff improperly dismissed for addressing public body on subject of civil rights for homosexuals",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Van Coteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff improperly dismissed for addressing public body on subject of civil rights for homosexuals); Hickman v. Valley Local School District Board of Education, 619 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1980) (absent direct public criticism of superiors, personality conflict generated by protected union activities cannot justify discharge); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1979) (improper to silence employee who reveals misappropriation of public funds, despite resulting disharmony); cf. Serna v. Manzano, 616 F.2d 1165,1166 (10th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff’s secret tape recording of office conversations caused actual disruption); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (fireman properly dismissed for verbally attacking very persons with whom he functions in closest coordination)."
} | 4,187,631 | b |
Under Pickering and its progeny, unless the employee's comments are actually disruptive, single out a specific person as a target, or materially interfere with the performance of an employee's duties, the right to unhampered expression on matters of public salience will prevail. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "fireman properly dismissed for verbally attacking very persons with whom he functions in closest coordination",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Van Coteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff improperly dismissed for addressing public body on subject of civil rights for homosexuals); Hickman v. Valley Local School District Board of Education, 619 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1980) (absent direct public criticism of superiors, personality conflict generated by protected union activities cannot justify discharge); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1979) (improper to silence employee who reveals misappropriation of public funds, despite resulting disharmony); cf. Serna v. Manzano, 616 F.2d 1165,1166 (10th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff’s secret tape recording of office conversations caused actual disruption); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (fireman properly dismissed for verbally attacking very persons with whom he functions in closest coordination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff improperly dismissed for addressing public body on subject of civil rights for homosexuals",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Van Coteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff improperly dismissed for addressing public body on subject of civil rights for homosexuals); Hickman v. Valley Local School District Board of Education, 619 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1980) (absent direct public criticism of superiors, personality conflict generated by protected union activities cannot justify discharge); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1979) (improper to silence employee who reveals misappropriation of public funds, despite resulting disharmony); cf. Serna v. Manzano, 616 F.2d 1165,1166 (10th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff’s secret tape recording of office conversations caused actual disruption); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (fireman properly dismissed for verbally attacking very persons with whom he functions in closest coordination)."
} | 4,187,631 | b |
Under Pickering and its progeny, unless the employee's comments are actually disruptive, single out a specific person as a target, or materially interfere with the performance of an employee's duties, the right to unhampered expression on matters of public salience will prevail. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 606, 609",
"parenthetical": "absent direct public criticism of superiors, personality conflict generated by protected union activities cannot justify discharge",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Van Coteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff improperly dismissed for addressing public body on subject of civil rights for homosexuals); Hickman v. Valley Local School District Board of Education, 619 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1980) (absent direct public criticism of superiors, personality conflict generated by protected union activities cannot justify discharge); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1979) (improper to silence employee who reveals misappropriation of public funds, despite resulting disharmony); cf. Serna v. Manzano, 616 F.2d 1165,1166 (10th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff’s secret tape recording of office conversations caused actual disruption); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (fireman properly dismissed for verbally attacking very persons with whom he functions in closest coordination)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "616 F.2d 1165, 1166",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff's secret tape recording of office conversations caused actual disruption",
"sentence": "See, e. g., Van Coteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff improperly dismissed for addressing public body on subject of civil rights for homosexuals); Hickman v. Valley Local School District Board of Education, 619 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1980) (absent direct public criticism of superiors, personality conflict generated by protected union activities cannot justify discharge); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1979) (improper to silence employee who reveals misappropriation of public funds, despite resulting disharmony); cf. Serna v. Manzano, 616 F.2d 1165,1166 (10th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff’s secret tape recording of office conversations caused actual disruption); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (fireman properly dismissed for verbally attacking very persons with whom he functions in closest coordination)."
} | 4,187,631 | a |
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