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First, the Court notes that Congress has abrogated the states' sovereign immunity for claims arising under the Voting Rights Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Supreme Court has \"concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th Cir.1999); Reaves v. United States DOJ, 355 F.Supp.2d 510, 515 (D.D.C.2005) (“it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has “concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.”) (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308, 86 S.Ct. 803)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "355 F.Supp.2d 510, 515",
"parenthetical": "\"it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th Cir.1999); Reaves v. United States DOJ, 355 F.Supp.2d 510, 515 (D.D.C.2005) (“it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has “concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.”) (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308, 86 S.Ct. 803)."
} | 4,231,747 | b |
First, the Court notes that Congress has abrogated the states' sovereign immunity for claims arising under the Voting Rights Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the Supreme Court has \"concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th Cir.1999); Reaves v. United States DOJ, 355 F.Supp.2d 510, 515 (D.D.C.2005) (“it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has “concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.”) (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308, 86 S.Ct. 803)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "355 F.Supp.2d 510, 515",
"parenthetical": "\"it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th Cir.1999); Reaves v. United States DOJ, 355 F.Supp.2d 510, 515 (D.D.C.2005) (“it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has “concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.”) (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308, 86 S.Ct. 803)."
} | 4,231,747 | b |
It need only be shown that during the course of the planning or original construction it became evident that land so situated would probably be needed for the public use."). In order to allow a claim that the government's project influenced the market value of the subject property to go before a jury, the landowner must present sufficient evidence that the government's project had a market impact on the subject property. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "605 F.2d 808, 808",
"parenthetical": "\"What the trial judge decides, essentially, is whether ... the jury is to consider any alterations in value attributable to the Government project for which the condemned property is taken.\"",
"sentence": "See 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 808 (“What the trial judge decides, essentially, is whether ... the jury is to consider any alterations in value attributable to the Government project for which the condemned property is taken.”); cf. k9.01 Acres of Land, 669 F.2d at 1368 (imposing a “heavy burden” on landowner to show that property was within the scope of the project)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "669 F.2d 1368, 1368",
"parenthetical": "imposing a \"heavy burden\" on landowner to show that property was within the scope of the project",
"sentence": "See 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 808 (“What the trial judge decides, essentially, is whether ... the jury is to consider any alterations in value attributable to the Government project for which the condemned property is taken.”); cf. k9.01 Acres of Land, 669 F.2d at 1368 (imposing a “heavy burden” on landowner to show that property was within the scope of the project)."
} | 3,779,621 | a |
Defendant argues that sentencing him on the basis, in part, of an uncharged shooting is unconstitutional. He contends he is being punished for the shooting without a jury having determined beyond a reasonable doubt that he shot victim or the other procedural protections which would apply had defendant been indicted and tried for the shooting. We have rejected similar arguments and adhere to that position. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "873 F.2d 437, 441-42",
"parenthetical": "government need not prove facts used in sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441-42 (1st Cir.1989) (government need not prove facts used in sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sentencing by considering relevant, uncharged conduct under U.S.S.G. SS lB1.3(a",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.1992) (sentencing by considering relevant, uncharged conduct under U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(2) does not violate the constitutional rights to indictment, jury trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (factors used to raise a minimum sentence below the statutory maximum need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; preponderance standard satisfies due process and right to jury trial is not implicated)."
} | 36,412 | a |
See Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b). If the term "illegal sentence" included sentences that were the product of errors, constitutional or otherwise, committed in the process of sentencing, there would be no need for the "illegal manner" language in Rule 35(a). | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recounting that the \"illegal manner\" language was added to Rule 35 to \"change the result in [Hill, 368 U.S. at 430, 82 S.Ct. 468] where the then Rule 35 was held to be inapplicable to correct a sentence imposed without granting the defendant the right of allocution\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that courts should “avoid whenever possible statutory interpretations that result in superfluous language”); see also United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1977) (recounting that the “illegal manner” language was added to Rule 35 to “change the result in [Hill, 368 U.S. at 430, 82 S.Ct. 468] where the then Rule 35 was held to be inapplicable to correct a sentence imposed without granting the defendant the right of allocution”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 F.3d 1041, 1048",
"parenthetical": "stating that courts should \"avoid whenever possible statutory interpretations that result in superfluous language\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that courts should “avoid whenever possible statutory interpretations that result in superfluous language”); see also United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1977) (recounting that the “illegal manner” language was added to Rule 35 to “change the result in [Hill, 368 U.S. at 430, 82 S.Ct. 468] where the then Rule 35 was held to be inapplicable to correct a sentence imposed without granting the defendant the right of allocution”)."
} | 5,754,510 | b |
See Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b). If the term "illegal sentence" included sentences that were the product of errors, constitutional or otherwise, committed in the process of sentencing, there would be no need for the "illegal manner" language in Rule 35(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 F.3d 1041, 1048",
"parenthetical": "stating that courts should \"avoid whenever possible statutory interpretations that result in superfluous language\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that courts should “avoid whenever possible statutory interpretations that result in superfluous language”); see also United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1977) (recounting that the “illegal manner” language was added to Rule 35 to “change the result in [Hill, 368 U.S. at 430, 82 S.Ct. 468] where the then Rule 35 was held to be inapplicable to correct a sentence imposed without granting the defendant the right of allocution”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "368 U.S. 430, 430",
"parenthetical": "recounting that the \"illegal manner\" language was added to Rule 35 to \"change the result in [Hill, 368 U.S. at 430, 82 S.Ct. 468] where the then Rule 35 was held to be inapplicable to correct a sentence imposed without granting the defendant the right of allocution\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that courts should “avoid whenever possible statutory interpretations that result in superfluous language”); see also United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1977) (recounting that the “illegal manner” language was added to Rule 35 to “change the result in [Hill, 368 U.S. at 430, 82 S.Ct. 468] where the then Rule 35 was held to be inapplicable to correct a sentence imposed without granting the defendant the right of allocution”)."
} | 5,754,510 | a |
See Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b). If the term "illegal sentence" included sentences that were the product of errors, constitutional or otherwise, committed in the process of sentencing, there would be no need for the "illegal manner" language in Rule 35(a). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "476 F.3d 1041, 1048",
"parenthetical": "stating that courts should \"avoid whenever possible statutory interpretations that result in superfluous language\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that courts should “avoid whenever possible statutory interpretations that result in superfluous language”); see also United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1977) (recounting that the “illegal manner” language was added to Rule 35 to “change the result in [Hill, 368 U.S. at 430, 82 S.Ct. 468] where the then Rule 35 was held to be inapplicable to correct a sentence imposed without granting the defendant the right of allocution”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recounting that the \"illegal manner\" language was added to Rule 35 to \"change the result in [Hill, 368 U.S. at 430, 82 S.Ct. 468] where the then Rule 35 was held to be inapplicable to correct a sentence imposed without granting the defendant the right of allocution\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that courts should “avoid whenever possible statutory interpretations that result in superfluous language”); see also United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1977) (recounting that the “illegal manner” language was added to Rule 35 to “change the result in [Hill, 368 U.S. at 430, 82 S.Ct. 468] where the then Rule 35 was held to be inapplicable to correct a sentence imposed without granting the defendant the right of allocution”)."
} | 5,754,510 | a |
When considering sanctions, a district court may consider all the circumstances surrounding the alleged violations, including a party's misconduct in related cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "289 F.3d 452, 456-57",
"parenthetical": "holding that the tax court would be \"remiss not to consider\" the party's bad conduct in other cases",
"sentence": "Atkins v. Fischer, 232 F.R.D. 116, 129-31 (D.D.C.2005) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 635, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)); Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, La., Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (5th Cir.1994) (affirming award of sanctions when district court considered collateral bankruptcy proceedings in its sanctions order); see also Johnson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 289 F.3d 452, 456-57 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that the tax court would be “remiss not to consider” the party’s bad conduct in other cases)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "38 F.3d 1414, 1417-18",
"parenthetical": "affirming award of sanctions when district court considered collateral bankruptcy proceedings in its sanctions order",
"sentence": "Atkins v. Fischer, 232 F.R.D. 116, 129-31 (D.D.C.2005) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 635, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)); Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, La., Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (5th Cir.1994) (affirming award of sanctions when district court considered collateral bankruptcy proceedings in its sanctions order); see also Johnson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 289 F.3d 452, 456-57 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that the tax court would be “remiss not to consider” the party’s bad conduct in other cases)."
} | 3,836,661 | b |
Fingerprint identification has been admissible as reliable evidence in criminal trials in this country since at least 1911. While we have not definitively assessed the admissibility of expert fingerprint identifications in the post -Daubert era, every Circuit that has done so has found such evidence admissible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "188 F.Supp.2d 549, 572-73",
"parenthetical": "discussing long history of latent fingerprint evidence in criminal proceedings, and citing lack of proof of its unreliability, to hold such evidence admissible",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that fingerprint identification satisfies Dau-bert ); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir.1996) (noting defendant’s acknowledgment that “fingerprint comparison has been subjected to peer review and publication,” and holding that trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted fingerprint evidence without performing Daubert analysis); see also United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d 549, 572-73 (E.D.Pa.2002) (discussing long history of latent fingerprint evidence in criminal proceedings, and citing lack of proof of its unreliability, to hold such evidence admissible); United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213, *1 (E.D.La. May 14, 2001) (observing that “fingerprint analysis has been tested and proven to be a rehable science over decades of use for judicial purposes”); United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.P.R.2001) (noting that questions of reliability of fingerprint identifications can be addressed through vigorous cross-examination of expert witness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 F.3d 402, 408",
"parenthetical": "noting defendant's acknowledgment that \"fingerprint comparison has been subjected to peer review and publication,\" and holding that trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted fingerprint evidence without performing Daubert analysis",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that fingerprint identification satisfies Dau-bert ); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir.1996) (noting defendant’s acknowledgment that “fingerprint comparison has been subjected to peer review and publication,” and holding that trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted fingerprint evidence without performing Daubert analysis); see also United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d 549, 572-73 (E.D.Pa.2002) (discussing long history of latent fingerprint evidence in criminal proceedings, and citing lack of proof of its unreliability, to hold such evidence admissible); United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213, *1 (E.D.La. May 14, 2001) (observing that “fingerprint analysis has been tested and proven to be a rehable science over decades of use for judicial purposes”); United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.P.R.2001) (noting that questions of reliability of fingerprint identifications can be addressed through vigorous cross-examination of expert witness)."
} | 2,160,849 | b |
Fingerprint identification has been admissible as reliable evidence in criminal trials in this country since at least 1911. While we have not definitively assessed the admissibility of expert fingerprint identifications in the post -Daubert era, every Circuit that has done so has found such evidence admissible. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2001 WL 515213, *1",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"fingerprint analysis has been tested and proven to be a rehable science over decades of use for judicial purposes\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that fingerprint identification satisfies Dau-bert ); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir.1996) (noting defendant’s acknowledgment that “fingerprint comparison has been subjected to peer review and publication,” and holding that trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted fingerprint evidence without performing Daubert analysis); see also United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d 549, 572-73 (E.D.Pa.2002) (discussing long history of latent fingerprint evidence in criminal proceedings, and citing lack of proof of its unreliability, to hold such evidence admissible); United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213, *1 (E.D.La. May 14, 2001) (observing that “fingerprint analysis has been tested and proven to be a rehable science over decades of use for judicial purposes”); United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.P.R.2001) (noting that questions of reliability of fingerprint identifications can be addressed through vigorous cross-examination of expert witness)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 F.3d 402, 408",
"parenthetical": "noting defendant's acknowledgment that \"fingerprint comparison has been subjected to peer review and publication,\" and holding that trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted fingerprint evidence without performing Daubert analysis",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that fingerprint identification satisfies Dau-bert ); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir.1996) (noting defendant’s acknowledgment that “fingerprint comparison has been subjected to peer review and publication,” and holding that trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted fingerprint evidence without performing Daubert analysis); see also United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d 549, 572-73 (E.D.Pa.2002) (discussing long history of latent fingerprint evidence in criminal proceedings, and citing lack of proof of its unreliability, to hold such evidence admissible); United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213, *1 (E.D.La. May 14, 2001) (observing that “fingerprint analysis has been tested and proven to be a rehable science over decades of use for judicial purposes”); United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.P.R.2001) (noting that questions of reliability of fingerprint identifications can be addressed through vigorous cross-examination of expert witness)."
} | 2,160,849 | b |
Fingerprint identification has been admissible as reliable evidence in criminal trials in this country since at least 1911. While we have not definitively assessed the admissibility of expert fingerprint identifications in the post -Daubert era, every Circuit that has done so has found such evidence admissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 F.3d 402, 408",
"parenthetical": "noting defendant's acknowledgment that \"fingerprint comparison has been subjected to peer review and publication,\" and holding that trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted fingerprint evidence without performing Daubert analysis",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that fingerprint identification satisfies Dau-bert ); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir.1996) (noting defendant’s acknowledgment that “fingerprint comparison has been subjected to peer review and publication,” and holding that trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted fingerprint evidence without performing Daubert analysis); see also United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d 549, 572-73 (E.D.Pa.2002) (discussing long history of latent fingerprint evidence in criminal proceedings, and citing lack of proof of its unreliability, to hold such evidence admissible); United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213, *1 (E.D.La. May 14, 2001) (observing that “fingerprint analysis has been tested and proven to be a rehable science over decades of use for judicial purposes”); United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.P.R.2001) (noting that questions of reliability of fingerprint identifications can be addressed through vigorous cross-examination of expert witness)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "136 F.Supp.2d 17, 20",
"parenthetical": "noting that questions of reliability of fingerprint identifications can be addressed through vigorous cross-examination of expert witness",
"sentence": "See United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that fingerprint identification satisfies Dau-bert ); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir.1996) (noting defendant’s acknowledgment that “fingerprint comparison has been subjected to peer review and publication,” and holding that trial court did not commit clear error where it admitted fingerprint evidence without performing Daubert analysis); see also United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d 549, 572-73 (E.D.Pa.2002) (discussing long history of latent fingerprint evidence in criminal proceedings, and citing lack of proof of its unreliability, to hold such evidence admissible); United States v. Joseph, 2001 WL 515213, *1 (E.D.La. May 14, 2001) (observing that “fingerprint analysis has been tested and proven to be a rehable science over decades of use for judicial purposes”); United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.P.R.2001) (noting that questions of reliability of fingerprint identifications can be addressed through vigorous cross-examination of expert witness)."
} | 2,160,849 | a |
The Seventh Circuit has not directly addressed whether internal complaints are protected activity under the FLSA's retaliation provision, though we have reviewed two cases involving internal complaints without commenting on the matter. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "152 F.3d 729, 731, 734-36",
"parenthetical": "reversing a denial of punitive damages in a case where an employee had been discharged after complaining to the company president",
"sentence": "See Scott v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 195 F.3d 938, 940-41 (7th Cir.1999) (affirming dismissal of FLSA retaliation case because plaintiff had not shown a causal connection between her complaints and her later discharge); see also Shea v. Galaxie Lumber Constr. Co., 152 F.3d 729, 731, 734-36 (7th Cir.1998) (reversing a denial of punitive damages in a case where an employee had been discharged after complaining to the company president)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 F.3d 938, 940-41",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal of FLSA retaliation case because plaintiff had not shown a causal connection between her complaints and her later discharge",
"sentence": "See Scott v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 195 F.3d 938, 940-41 (7th Cir.1999) (affirming dismissal of FLSA retaliation case because plaintiff had not shown a causal connection between her complaints and her later discharge); see also Shea v. Galaxie Lumber Constr. Co., 152 F.3d 729, 731, 734-36 (7th Cir.1998) (reversing a denial of punitive damages in a case where an employee had been discharged after complaining to the company president)."
} | 3,664,689 | b |
. In particular, we note that the district court correctly declined to establish a constructive trust on Appellants' behalf both because Appellants have not met the elements required by New York law for a constructive trust and because SS 853(i) provides a legal remedy which obviates the need for application of an equitable remedy. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "968 F.2d 1583, 1583",
"parenthetical": "in forfeiture proceedings, trust beneficiaries must trace property to that held in trust",
"sentence": "See also Schwimmer, 968 F.2d at 1583 (in forfeiture proceedings, trust beneficiaries must trace property to that held in trust)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "51 F.3d 337, 340",
"parenthetical": "\"Generally, New York law requires that a person establish four elements before a court will impose a constructive trust: (1",
"sentence": "See Ribadeneira, 920 F.Supp. at 555-56, 21 U.S.C. § 853(i); United States v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2d Cir.1995) (\"Generally, New York law requires that a person establish four elements before a court will impose a constructive trust: (1) a confidential or fiduciaty relationship; (2) a promise, express or implied; (3) a transfer of the subject res made in reliance on that promise; and (4) unjust enrichment.”) (citing In re Koreag, Controle et Revision, S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 352 (2d Cir.1992); Bankers Sec. Life Ins. Soc’y v. Shakerdge, 49 N.Y.2d 939, 428 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624, 406 N.E.2d 440, 440-41 (1980); Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363-64, 380 N.E.2d 189, 193-95 (1978))."
} | 7,637,760 | b |
We therefore determine that Gentry did not suffer prejudice at either phase as a result of Hicks's false testimony. At the guilt phase, the DNA, eyewitness, and other circumstantial evidence were more than sufficient for a jury to convict Gentry without considering the testimony of the jailhouse witnesses. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "658 F.3d 898, 914",
"parenthetical": "finding no Napue violation at the guilt phase as a result of false testimony because \"[tjhere was simply too much evidence placing [the defendant] at the scene of the crime\"",
"sentence": "Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 914 (9th Cir.2011) (finding no Napue violation at the guilt phase as a result of false testimony because “[tjhere was simply too much evidence placing [the defendant] at the scene of the crime”); see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 292-93, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (finding no prejudice on a Brady claim because even ignoring the witness’s testimony, there was other evidence in the record to support the conviction on its own)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "527 U.S. 263, 292-93",
"parenthetical": "finding no prejudice on a Brady claim because even ignoring the witness's testimony, there was other evidence in the record to support the conviction on its own",
"sentence": "Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 914 (9th Cir.2011) (finding no Napue violation at the guilt phase as a result of false testimony because “[tjhere was simply too much evidence placing [the defendant] at the scene of the crime”); see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 292-93, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (finding no prejudice on a Brady claim because even ignoring the witness’s testimony, there was other evidence in the record to support the conviction on its own)."
} | 3,518,248 | a |
We therefore determine that Gentry did not suffer prejudice at either phase as a result of Hicks's false testimony. At the guilt phase, the DNA, eyewitness, and other circumstantial evidence were more than sufficient for a jury to convict Gentry without considering the testimony of the jailhouse witnesses. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "658 F.3d 898, 914",
"parenthetical": "finding no Napue violation at the guilt phase as a result of false testimony because \"[tjhere was simply too much evidence placing [the defendant] at the scene of the crime\"",
"sentence": "Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 914 (9th Cir.2011) (finding no Napue violation at the guilt phase as a result of false testimony because “[tjhere was simply too much evidence placing [the defendant] at the scene of the crime”); see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 292-93, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (finding no prejudice on a Brady claim because even ignoring the witness’s testimony, there was other evidence in the record to support the conviction on its own)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no prejudice on a Brady claim because even ignoring the witness's testimony, there was other evidence in the record to support the conviction on its own",
"sentence": "Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 914 (9th Cir.2011) (finding no Napue violation at the guilt phase as a result of false testimony because “[tjhere was simply too much evidence placing [the defendant] at the scene of the crime”); see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 292-93, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (finding no prejudice on a Brady claim because even ignoring the witness’s testimony, there was other evidence in the record to support the conviction on its own)."
} | 3,518,248 | a |
We therefore determine that Gentry did not suffer prejudice at either phase as a result of Hicks's false testimony. At the guilt phase, the DNA, eyewitness, and other circumstantial evidence were more than sufficient for a jury to convict Gentry without considering the testimony of the jailhouse witnesses. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "658 F.3d 898, 914",
"parenthetical": "finding no Napue violation at the guilt phase as a result of false testimony because \"[tjhere was simply too much evidence placing [the defendant] at the scene of the crime\"",
"sentence": "Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 914 (9th Cir.2011) (finding no Napue violation at the guilt phase as a result of false testimony because “[tjhere was simply too much evidence placing [the defendant] at the scene of the crime”); see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 292-93, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (finding no prejudice on a Brady claim because even ignoring the witness’s testimony, there was other evidence in the record to support the conviction on its own)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no prejudice on a Brady claim because even ignoring the witness's testimony, there was other evidence in the record to support the conviction on its own",
"sentence": "Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 914 (9th Cir.2011) (finding no Napue violation at the guilt phase as a result of false testimony because “[tjhere was simply too much evidence placing [the defendant] at the scene of the crime”); see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 292-93, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (finding no prejudice on a Brady claim because even ignoring the witness’s testimony, there was other evidence in the record to support the conviction on its own)."
} | 3,518,248 | a |
Although we have never addressed the precise issue of whether SS 406(b)(1)(A) authorizes an award of attorney's fees where the district court's judgment remanding the case to the Commissioner does not explicitly mention attorney's fees, we have noted that the congressional intent behind SS 406(b) is, in part, "to encourage effective legal representation of claimants by insuring lawyers that they will receive reasonable fees directly through certification by the Secretary." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "853 F.2d 860, 860-61",
"parenthetical": "holding that a district court may consider interim benefits received pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 423(g",
"sentence": "See Shoemaker, 853 F.2d at 860-61 (holding that a district court may consider interim benefits received pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423(g) in awarding attorney’s fees under § 406(b)). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a remand from the district court to the SSA under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as happened here, is a favorable judgment for the claimant."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "425 F.2d 1192, 1195",
"parenthetical": "holding that a district court may not authorize an attorney to charge fees for representation in Court when the Commissioner has already authorized that attorney to charge fees for representation in administrative proceedings, and declining to reach the Secretary's contention that SS 406(b",
"sentence": "Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir.1970) (holding that a district court may not authorize an attorney to charge fees for representation in Court when the Commissioner has already authorized that attorney to charge fees for representation in administrative proceedings, and declining to reach the Secretary’s contention that § 406(b) does not allow a Court to authorize attorney’s fees unless it renders a judgment on the merits favorable to the claimant)."
} | 5,322,801 | b |
. Even if Orozco had not waived this argument, the district court did not plainly err in sentencing him as an armed career criminal because his prior convictions for felony lascivious acts with a child constitute violent felonies under the ACCA and the sentencing guidelines. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "445 F.3d 1019, 1022",
"parenthetical": "noting that incestuous intercourse between an adult and a minor child is a violent felony under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that a conviction for a lascivious act with a child in violation of Iowa Code § 709.8 was a crime of violence); see also United States v. Eastin, 445 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir.2006) (noting that incestuous intercourse between an adult and a minor child is a violent felony under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 138, 141",
"parenthetical": "holding that a conviction for a lascivious act with a child in violation of Iowa Code SS 709.8 was a crime of violence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that a conviction for a lascivious act with a child in violation of Iowa Code § 709.8 was a crime of violence); see also United States v. Eastin, 445 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir.2006) (noting that incestuous intercourse between an adult and a minor child is a violent felony under the ACCA)."
} | 3,671,181 | b |
First, Hall had the opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine all of the eyewitnesses in order to cast doubt on their ability to identify him. As we have explained, any weaknesses in eyewitness identification testimony ordinarily can be exposed through careful cross-examination of the eyewitnesses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 616, 641",
"parenthetical": "concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is properly excludable because the question of accuracy of perception and memory \"can be adequately addressed in cross-examination and that the jury can adequately weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation\"",
"sentence": "See Larkin, 978 F.2d at 971 (excluding proffered expert testimony, in part, because defendant’s counsel had the opportunity at trial to discuss the potential hazards of eyewitness identification and cast doubt upon the witnesses’ eyewitness identifications); Curry, 977 F.2d at 1052 (concluding that “vigorous cross-examination by the defendants,” which revealed the weaknesses of the eyewitness identifications, made expert testimony on the identifications unnecessary); see also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982) (concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is properly excludable because the question of accuracy of perception and memory “can be adequately addressed in cross-examination and that the jury can adequately weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 971, 971",
"parenthetical": "excluding proffered expert testimony, in part, because defendant's counsel had the opportunity at trial to discuss the potential hazards of eyewitness identification and cast doubt upon the witnesses' eyewitness identifications",
"sentence": "See Larkin, 978 F.2d at 971 (excluding proffered expert testimony, in part, because defendant’s counsel had the opportunity at trial to discuss the potential hazards of eyewitness identification and cast doubt upon the witnesses’ eyewitness identifications); Curry, 977 F.2d at 1052 (concluding that “vigorous cross-examination by the defendants,” which revealed the weaknesses of the eyewitness identifications, made expert testimony on the identifications unnecessary); see also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982) (concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is properly excludable because the question of accuracy of perception and memory “can be adequately addressed in cross-examination and that the jury can adequately weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation”)."
} | 11,781,406 | b |
First, Hall had the opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine all of the eyewitnesses in order to cast doubt on their ability to identify him. As we have explained, any weaknesses in eyewitness identification testimony ordinarily can be exposed through careful cross-examination of the eyewitnesses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "665 F.2d 616, 641",
"parenthetical": "concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is properly excludable because the question of accuracy of perception and memory \"can be adequately addressed in cross-examination and that the jury can adequately weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation\"",
"sentence": "See Larkin, 978 F.2d at 971 (excluding proffered expert testimony, in part, because defendant’s counsel had the opportunity at trial to discuss the potential hazards of eyewitness identification and cast doubt upon the witnesses’ eyewitness identifications); Curry, 977 F.2d at 1052 (concluding that “vigorous cross-examination by the defendants,” which revealed the weaknesses of the eyewitness identifications, made expert testimony on the identifications unnecessary); see also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982) (concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is properly excludable because the question of accuracy of perception and memory “can be adequately addressed in cross-examination and that the jury can adequately weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 1052, 1052",
"parenthetical": "concluding that \"vigorous cross-examination by the defendants,\" which revealed the weaknesses of the eyewitness identifications, made expert testimony on the identifications unnecessary",
"sentence": "See Larkin, 978 F.2d at 971 (excluding proffered expert testimony, in part, because defendant’s counsel had the opportunity at trial to discuss the potential hazards of eyewitness identification and cast doubt upon the witnesses’ eyewitness identifications); Curry, 977 F.2d at 1052 (concluding that “vigorous cross-examination by the defendants,” which revealed the weaknesses of the eyewitness identifications, made expert testimony on the identifications unnecessary); see also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.1982) (concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is properly excludable because the question of accuracy of perception and memory “can be adequately addressed in cross-examination and that the jury can adequately weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation”)."
} | 11,781,406 | b |
We note in conclusion that our decision today aligns us with all but one of the several circuit courts to address this question. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "110 F.3d 210, 219-20",
"parenthetical": "finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability",
"sentence": "Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring “evidence of conduct more egregious than intentional discrimination to support an award of punitive damages in Title VII cases”); but see Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "83 F.3d 498, 508",
"parenthetical": "endorsing concept of a higher standard for punitive damages under SS 1981a, and noting that such damages \"are awarded as a matter of public policy to punish outrageous conduct by the defendant or to deter similar conduct in the future\"",
"sentence": "See McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir.1996) (endorsing concept of a higher standard for punitive damages under § 1981a, and noting that such damages “are awarded as a matter of public policy to punish outrageous conduct by the defendant or to deter similar conduct in the future”); Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that under § 1981a, “[pjunitive damages are an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for egregious eases,” and “are not an element of recovery in every case involving an intentional tort”) (citation omitted); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1216 (6th Cir.1996) (despite sufficiency of evidence for liability and “duplicitous” actions of defendant’s employees, evidence held insufficient for punitive damages); Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling, 95 F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir.1996) (characterizing standard for punitive damages as a “higher hurdle” than that for proving the underlying discrimination); Karcker v. Emerson Electric Co., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir.1996) (although jury could properly infer intentional sex discrimination from inconsistent nature of hiring process and failure to select and train women, it could not find malice or deliberate indifference); Ngo v. Reno Hilton."
} | 11,847,127 | b |
We note in conclusion that our decision today aligns us with all but one of the several circuit courts to address this question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "132 F.3d 978, 982",
"parenthetical": "holding that under SS 1981a, \"[pjunitive damages are an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for egregious eases,\" and \"are not an element of recovery in every case involving an intentional tort\"",
"sentence": "See McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir.1996) (endorsing concept of a higher standard for punitive damages under § 1981a, and noting that such damages “are awarded as a matter of public policy to punish outrageous conduct by the defendant or to deter similar conduct in the future”); Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that under § 1981a, “[pjunitive damages are an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for egregious eases,” and “are not an element of recovery in every case involving an intentional tort”) (citation omitted); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1216 (6th Cir.1996) (despite sufficiency of evidence for liability and “duplicitous” actions of defendant’s employees, evidence held insufficient for punitive damages); Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling, 95 F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir.1996) (characterizing standard for punitive damages as a “higher hurdle” than that for proving the underlying discrimination); Karcker v. Emerson Electric Co., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir.1996) (although jury could properly infer intentional sex discrimination from inconsistent nature of hiring process and failure to select and train women, it could not find malice or deliberate indifference); Ngo v. Reno Hilton."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "110 F.3d 210, 219-20",
"parenthetical": "finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability",
"sentence": "Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring “evidence of conduct more egregious than intentional discrimination to support an award of punitive damages in Title VII cases”); but see Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability)."
} | 11,847,127 | a |
We note in conclusion that our decision today aligns us with all but one of the several circuit courts to address this question. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "110 F.3d 210, 219-20",
"parenthetical": "finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability",
"sentence": "Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring “evidence of conduct more egregious than intentional discrimination to support an award of punitive damages in Title VII cases”); but see Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 F.3d 1211, 1216",
"parenthetical": "despite sufficiency of evidence for liability and \"duplicitous\" actions of defendant's employees, evidence held insufficient for punitive damages",
"sentence": "See McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir.1996) (endorsing concept of a higher standard for punitive damages under § 1981a, and noting that such damages “are awarded as a matter of public policy to punish outrageous conduct by the defendant or to deter similar conduct in the future”); Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that under § 1981a, “[pjunitive damages are an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for egregious eases,” and “are not an element of recovery in every case involving an intentional tort”) (citation omitted); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1216 (6th Cir.1996) (despite sufficiency of evidence for liability and “duplicitous” actions of defendant’s employees, evidence held insufficient for punitive damages); Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling, 95 F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir.1996) (characterizing standard for punitive damages as a “higher hurdle” than that for proving the underlying discrimination); Karcker v. Emerson Electric Co., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir.1996) (although jury could properly infer intentional sex discrimination from inconsistent nature of hiring process and failure to select and train women, it could not find malice or deliberate indifference); Ngo v. Reno Hilton."
} | 11,847,127 | b |
We note in conclusion that our decision today aligns us with all but one of the several circuit courts to address this question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 627, 636",
"parenthetical": "characterizing standard for punitive damages as a \"higher hurdle\" than that for proving the underlying discrimination",
"sentence": "See McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir.1996) (endorsing concept of a higher standard for punitive damages under § 1981a, and noting that such damages “are awarded as a matter of public policy to punish outrageous conduct by the defendant or to deter similar conduct in the future”); Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that under § 1981a, “[pjunitive damages are an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for egregious eases,” and “are not an element of recovery in every case involving an intentional tort”) (citation omitted); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1216 (6th Cir.1996) (despite sufficiency of evidence for liability and “duplicitous” actions of defendant’s employees, evidence held insufficient for punitive damages); Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling, 95 F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir.1996) (characterizing standard for punitive damages as a “higher hurdle” than that for proving the underlying discrimination); Karcker v. Emerson Electric Co., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir.1996) (although jury could properly infer intentional sex discrimination from inconsistent nature of hiring process and failure to select and train women, it could not find malice or deliberate indifference); Ngo v. Reno Hilton."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "110 F.3d 210, 219-20",
"parenthetical": "finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability",
"sentence": "Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring “evidence of conduct more egregious than intentional discrimination to support an award of punitive damages in Title VII cases”); but see Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability)."
} | 11,847,127 | a |
We note in conclusion that our decision today aligns us with all but one of the several circuit courts to address this question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 502, 509",
"parenthetical": "although jury could properly infer intentional sex discrimination from inconsistent nature of hiring process and failure to select and train women, it could not find malice or deliberate indifference",
"sentence": "See McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir.1996) (endorsing concept of a higher standard for punitive damages under § 1981a, and noting that such damages “are awarded as a matter of public policy to punish outrageous conduct by the defendant or to deter similar conduct in the future”); Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that under § 1981a, “[pjunitive damages are an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for egregious eases,” and “are not an element of recovery in every case involving an intentional tort”) (citation omitted); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1216 (6th Cir.1996) (despite sufficiency of evidence for liability and “duplicitous” actions of defendant’s employees, evidence held insufficient for punitive damages); Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling, 95 F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir.1996) (characterizing standard for punitive damages as a “higher hurdle” than that for proving the underlying discrimination); Karcker v. Emerson Electric Co., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir.1996) (although jury could properly infer intentional sex discrimination from inconsistent nature of hiring process and failure to select and train women, it could not find malice or deliberate indifference); Ngo v. Reno Hilton."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "110 F.3d 210, 219-20",
"parenthetical": "finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability",
"sentence": "Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring “evidence of conduct more egregious than intentional discrimination to support an award of punitive damages in Title VII cases”); but see Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability)."
} | 11,847,127 | a |
We note in conclusion that our decision today aligns us with all but one of the several circuit courts to address this question. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring \"evidence of conduct more egregious than intentional discrimination to support an award of punitive damages in Title VII cases\"",
"sentence": "Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring “evidence of conduct more egregious than intentional discrimination to support an award of punitive damages in Title VII cases”); but see Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "110 F.3d 210, 219-20",
"parenthetical": "finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability",
"sentence": "Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring “evidence of conduct more egregious than intentional discrimination to support an award of punitive damages in Title VII cases”); but see Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that no additional evidence is required for punitive liability)."
} | 11,847,127 | a |
No objections have been received. I therefore accept and adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to file timely objections constitutes waiver of objections, and district court review not required",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (failure to file timely objections constitutes waiver of objections, and district court review not required); cf. Small, 892 F.2d 15 (Am applies even to pro se litigants where Report contains proper cautionary language)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Am applies even to pro se litigants where Report contains proper cautionary language",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (failure to file timely objections constitutes waiver of objections, and district court review not required); cf. Small, 892 F.2d 15 (Am applies even to pro se litigants where Report contains proper cautionary language)."
} | 7,405,446 | a |
No objections have been received. I therefore accept and adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Am applies even to pro se litigants where Report contains proper cautionary language",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (failure to file timely objections constitutes waiver of objections, and district court review not required); cf. Small, 892 F.2d 15 (Am applies even to pro se litigants where Report contains proper cautionary language)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to file timely objections constitutes waiver of objections, and district court review not required",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (failure to file timely objections constitutes waiver of objections, and district court review not required); cf. Small, 892 F.2d 15 (Am applies even to pro se litigants where Report contains proper cautionary language)."
} | 7,405,446 | b |
No objections have been received. I therefore accept and adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to file timely objections constitutes waiver of objections, and district court review not required",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (failure to file timely objections constitutes waiver of objections, and district court review not required); cf. Small, 892 F.2d 15 (Am applies even to pro se litigants where Report contains proper cautionary language)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Am applies even to pro se litigants where Report contains proper cautionary language",
"sentence": "See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (failure to file timely objections constitutes waiver of objections, and district court review not required); cf. Small, 892 F.2d 15 (Am applies even to pro se litigants where Report contains proper cautionary language)."
} | 7,405,446 | a |
Requiring disqualification every time a litigant files suit against a judge would allow litigants to improperly "judge shop." Trader's vague and unsupported allegations against the judge do not require the judge's disqualification. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "224 F.3d 273, 278",
"parenthetical": "party's displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal",
"sentence": "In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 778 (3d Cir.1992) (mandamus relief concerning judge’s failure to recuse only warranted where statute “clearly and indisputably” required him to recuse); see also Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir.2000) (party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "977 F.2d 764, 778",
"parenthetical": "mandamus relief concerning judge's failure to recuse only warranted where statute \"clearly and indisputably\" required him to recuse",
"sentence": "In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 778 (3d Cir.1992) (mandamus relief concerning judge’s failure to recuse only warranted where statute “clearly and indisputably” required him to recuse); see also Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir.2000) (party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal)."
} | 5,891,877 | b |
See AR 9398 ("Because of the environmental dynamics and long-term use and strategic nature of fuelbreaks, a maintenance and reburn schedule is necessary to keep fuel loading and canopy closure at required standards. Indefinite maintenance of the fuel breaks to ensure low fuel conditions is essential.") As fuel break maintenance is necessary and foreseeable, the effects of such maintenance must be addressed within the EIS. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "840 F.2d 714, 720",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n EIS must cover subsequent phase of development when '[t]he dependency is such that it would be irrational, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase, if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.' \"",
"sentence": "See Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 720 (9th Cir.1988) (“[A]n EIS must cover subsequent phase of development when ‘[t]he dependency is such that it would be irrational, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase, if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.’ ”); Blue Mountains, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring EIS to consider five related timber sales where actions part of one recovery strategy and were reasonably foreseeable); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (requiring that EIS consider reasonably foreseeable future actions); Cf. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps, 222 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir.2000) (holding EIS did not need to consider subsequent phases of project where “impractical” to do so because subsequent phases had not received approval and many planning decisions had not been made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "222 F.3d 1105, 1119",
"parenthetical": "holding EIS did not need to consider subsequent phases of project where \"impractical\" to do so because subsequent phases had not received approval and many planning decisions had not been made",
"sentence": "See Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 720 (9th Cir.1988) (“[A]n EIS must cover subsequent phase of development when ‘[t]he dependency is such that it would be irrational, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase, if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.’ ”); Blue Mountains, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring EIS to consider five related timber sales where actions part of one recovery strategy and were reasonably foreseeable); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (requiring that EIS consider reasonably foreseeable future actions); Cf. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps, 222 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir.2000) (holding EIS did not need to consider subsequent phases of project where “impractical” to do so because subsequent phases had not received approval and many planning decisions had not been made)."
} | 9,435,165 | a |
See AR 9398 ("Because of the environmental dynamics and long-term use and strategic nature of fuelbreaks, a maintenance and reburn schedule is necessary to keep fuel loading and canopy closure at required standards. Indefinite maintenance of the fuel breaks to ensure low fuel conditions is essential.") As fuel break maintenance is necessary and foreseeable, the effects of such maintenance must be addressed within the EIS. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 1208, 1214-15",
"parenthetical": "requiring EIS to consider five related timber sales where actions part of one recovery strategy and were reasonably foreseeable",
"sentence": "See Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 720 (9th Cir.1988) (“[A]n EIS must cover subsequent phase of development when ‘[t]he dependency is such that it would be irrational, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase, if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.’ ”); Blue Mountains, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring EIS to consider five related timber sales where actions part of one recovery strategy and were reasonably foreseeable); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (requiring that EIS consider reasonably foreseeable future actions); Cf. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps, 222 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir.2000) (holding EIS did not need to consider subsequent phases of project where “impractical” to do so because subsequent phases had not received approval and many planning decisions had not been made)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "222 F.3d 1105, 1119",
"parenthetical": "holding EIS did not need to consider subsequent phases of project where \"impractical\" to do so because subsequent phases had not received approval and many planning decisions had not been made",
"sentence": "See Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 720 (9th Cir.1988) (“[A]n EIS must cover subsequent phase of development when ‘[t]he dependency is such that it would be irrational, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase, if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.’ ”); Blue Mountains, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring EIS to consider five related timber sales where actions part of one recovery strategy and were reasonably foreseeable); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (requiring that EIS consider reasonably foreseeable future actions); Cf. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps, 222 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir.2000) (holding EIS did not need to consider subsequent phases of project where “impractical” to do so because subsequent phases had not received approval and many planning decisions had not been made)."
} | 9,435,165 | a |
We conclude that those arguments are not reviewable as they attempt to raise issues of fact. Specifically, to determine the likelihood of governmental acquiescence to torture (Mr. Ruiz's second argument), and whether the evidence as a whole shows Mr. Ruiz's eligibility for CAT relief (his third argument), we would have to weigh the evidence in this case. The criminal-alien bar prevents that. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "742 F.3d 603, 613",
"parenthetical": "holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien \"established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed\"",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "stating that the criminal-alien bar \"does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,\" and that \"jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact\"",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | 4,178,601 | a |
We conclude that those arguments are not reviewable as they attempt to raise issues of fact. Specifically, to determine the likelihood of governmental acquiescence to torture (Mr. Ruiz's second argument), and whether the evidence as a whole shows Mr. Ruiz's eligibility for CAT relief (his third argument), we would have to weigh the evidence in this case. The criminal-alien bar prevents that. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "stating that the criminal-alien bar \"does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,\" and that \"jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact\"",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "715 F.3d 690, 690",
"parenthetical": "observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims \"are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar\"",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | 4,178,601 | b |
We conclude that those arguments are not reviewable as they attempt to raise issues of fact. Specifically, to determine the likelihood of governmental acquiescence to torture (Mr. Ruiz's second argument), and whether the evidence as a whole shows Mr. Ruiz's eligibility for CAT relief (his third argument), we would have to weigh the evidence in this case. The criminal-alien bar prevents that. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "stating that the criminal-alien bar \"does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,\" and that \"jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact\"",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "694 F.3d 503, 507-08",
"parenthetical": "concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | 4,178,601 | b |
We conclude that those arguments are not reviewable as they attempt to raise issues of fact. Specifically, to determine the likelihood of governmental acquiescence to torture (Mr. Ruiz's second argument), and whether the evidence as a whole shows Mr. Ruiz's eligibility for CAT relief (his third argument), we would have to weigh the evidence in this case. The criminal-alien bar prevents that. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "516 F.3d 243, 249-50",
"parenthetical": "stating that the \"likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government's consent or acquiescence\" presents a factual question beyond review",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "stating that the criminal-alien bar \"does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,\" and that \"jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact\"",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | 4,178,601 | a |
We conclude that those arguments are not reviewable as they attempt to raise issues of fact. Specifically, to determine the likelihood of governmental acquiescence to torture (Mr. Ruiz's second argument), and whether the evidence as a whole shows Mr. Ruiz's eligibility for CAT relief (his third argument), we would have to weigh the evidence in this case. The criminal-alien bar prevents that. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "stating that the criminal-alien bar \"does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,\" and that \"jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact\"",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "447 F.3d 1, 5",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien's \"argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim\"",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | 4,178,601 | b |
We conclude that those arguments are not reviewable as they attempt to raise issues of fact. Specifically, to determine the likelihood of governmental acquiescence to torture (Mr. Ruiz's second argument), and whether the evidence as a whole shows Mr. Ruiz's eligibility for CAT relief (his third argument), we would have to weigh the evidence in this case. The criminal-alien bar prevents that. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42",
"parenthetical": "stating that the criminal-alien bar \"does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,\" and that \"jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact\"",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "417 F.3d 642, 647",
"parenthetical": "holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien's CAT claim that the IJ failed to \"correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence\"",
"sentence": "See Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir.2014) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien “established that he will more likely than not be tortured if ... removed”); Gallimore, 715 F.3d at 690 (observing that factual disputes and determinations regarding CAT claims “are foreclosed by the criminal alien bar”); Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.2012) (concluding that factual determinations regarding government acquiescence and eligibility for CAT relief are subject to the criminal-alien bar); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-50 (4th Cir.2008) (stating that the “likelihood that the [criminal alien] would suffer torture at the government’s consent or acquiescence” presents a factual question beyond review); Boakai v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider criminal alien’s “argument that the BIA was wrong in rejecting the CAT claim”); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the criminal-alien bar applied to alien’s CAT claim that the IJ failed to “correctly consider[ ], interpret ], and weigh[] the evidence”); but see Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2010) (stating that the criminal-alien bar “does not deprive [a court] of jurisdiction over denials of deferral of removal under the CAT,” and that “jurisdiction extends to both issues of law and issues of fact”)."
} | 4,178,601 | b |
Only if the record, viewed in that manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment." However, summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to the material facts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 424, 433",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962)(summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles”); see also Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir. 2000)(finding that “determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "368 U.S. 464, 473",
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962)(summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles”); see also Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir. 2000)(finding that “determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 12,272,915 | b |
Only if the record, viewed in that manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment." However, summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to the material facts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962)(summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles”); see also Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir. 2000)(finding that “determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 424, 433",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962)(summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles”); see also Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir. 2000)(finding that “determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 12,272,915 | a |
Only if the record, viewed in that manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment." However, summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to the material facts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 424, 433",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962)(summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles”); see also Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir. 2000)(finding that “determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "summary judgment is to be issued \"sparingly\" in litigation \"where motive and intent play leading roles\"",
"sentence": "See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962)(summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles”); see also Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir. 2000)(finding that “determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury”)."
} | 12,272,915 | b |
Missouri law allows a hotel to eject a person if the hotel operator "reasonably believes that the individual is using the premises for an unlawful purpose." The officers' discovery of drug paraphernalia on Inmon's person was sufficient to justify Mr. Bastean's concern that there were illegal drugs in the room and allow him to eject Inmon when the officers arrested him and told Mr. Bastean they were taking Inmon to jail. Under our precedent, once an individual is lawfully ejected from a hotel, the rental period terminates and "control over the hotel room revert[s] to the management." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "789 F.2d 1289, 1295-96",
"parenthetical": "holding that a hotel occupant who was asked to leave by police officers acting on behalf of hotel management who complained of defendant's disorderly behavior was justifiably ejected under state law and no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room",
"sentence": "United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that a hotel occupant who was asked to leave by police officers acting on behalf of hotel management who complained of defendant’s disorderly behavior was justifiably ejected under state law and no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room); see also Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that defendant “was justifiably evicted from the hotel because his friends created a disturbance” despite absence of any state statute addressing evictions from a hotel, such that “the control over the hotel room reverted to the management and [the defendant] ‘[could] not assert an expectation of being free from police intrusion upon his solitude and privacy in a place from which he has been justifiably expelled’ ” (quoting Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1296)). Thus, at the time the officers forcibly entered the hotel room at Mr. Baste-an’s request, Inmon had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room, and the subsequent search of the room did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "284 F.3d 863, 869",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant \"was justifiably evicted from the hotel because his friends created a disturbance\" despite absence of any state statute addressing evictions from a hotel, such that \"the control over the hotel room reverted to the management and [the defendant] '[could] not assert an expectation of being free from police intrusion upon his solitude and privacy in a place from which he has been justifiably expelled' \" (quoting Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1296",
"sentence": "United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that a hotel occupant who was asked to leave by police officers acting on behalf of hotel management who complained of defendant’s disorderly behavior was justifiably ejected under state law and no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room); see also Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that defendant “was justifiably evicted from the hotel because his friends created a disturbance” despite absence of any state statute addressing evictions from a hotel, such that “the control over the hotel room reverted to the management and [the defendant] ‘[could] not assert an expectation of being free from police intrusion upon his solitude and privacy in a place from which he has been justifiably expelled’ ” (quoting Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1296)). Thus, at the time the officers forcibly entered the hotel room at Mr. Baste-an’s request, Inmon had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room, and the subsequent search of the room did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights."
} | 4,052,744 | a |
Missouri law allows a hotel to eject a person if the hotel operator "reasonably believes that the individual is using the premises for an unlawful purpose." The officers' discovery of drug paraphernalia on Inmon's person was sufficient to justify Mr. Bastean's concern that there were illegal drugs in the room and allow him to eject Inmon when the officers arrested him and told Mr. Bastean they were taking Inmon to jail. Under our precedent, once an individual is lawfully ejected from a hotel, the rental period terminates and "control over the hotel room revert[s] to the management." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "789 F.2d 1289, 1295-96",
"parenthetical": "holding that a hotel occupant who was asked to leave by police officers acting on behalf of hotel management who complained of defendant's disorderly behavior was justifiably ejected under state law and no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room",
"sentence": "United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that a hotel occupant who was asked to leave by police officers acting on behalf of hotel management who complained of defendant’s disorderly behavior was justifiably ejected under state law and no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room); see also Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that defendant “was justifiably evicted from the hotel because his friends created a disturbance” despite absence of any state statute addressing evictions from a hotel, such that “the control over the hotel room reverted to the management and [the defendant] ‘[could] not assert an expectation of being free from police intrusion upon his solitude and privacy in a place from which he has been justifiably expelled’ ” (quoting Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1296)). Thus, at the time the officers forcibly entered the hotel room at Mr. Baste-an’s request, Inmon had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room, and the subsequent search of the room did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "789 F.2d 1296, 1296",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant \"was justifiably evicted from the hotel because his friends created a disturbance\" despite absence of any state statute addressing evictions from a hotel, such that \"the control over the hotel room reverted to the management and [the defendant] '[could] not assert an expectation of being free from police intrusion upon his solitude and privacy in a place from which he has been justifiably expelled' \" (quoting Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1296",
"sentence": "United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that a hotel occupant who was asked to leave by police officers acting on behalf of hotel management who complained of defendant’s disorderly behavior was justifiably ejected under state law and no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room); see also Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that defendant “was justifiably evicted from the hotel because his friends created a disturbance” despite absence of any state statute addressing evictions from a hotel, such that “the control over the hotel room reverted to the management and [the defendant] ‘[could] not assert an expectation of being free from police intrusion upon his solitude and privacy in a place from which he has been justifiably expelled’ ” (quoting Rambo, 789 F.2d at 1296)). Thus, at the time the officers forcibly entered the hotel room at Mr. Baste-an’s request, Inmon had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room, and the subsequent search of the room did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights."
} | 4,052,744 | a |
The issue originally arose in TIGLP's involuntary bankruptcy case wherein TAR asserts it purchased all of TIGLP's assets from the Trustee, including all of the Moving Limited Partners' individual rights, interests, or claims under the EPA. In the two opinions discussed above, the B.A.P. indicated, inter alia, that Judge Campbell had not ruled on the Moving Limited Partners' third-party beneficiary status nor whether the Sale Order was free and clear of the Moving Limited Partners' alleged equitable hen. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "364 B.R. 394, 394-95",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he Sale Order does not address nor does it purport to convey to TAR the Limited Partners' personal action to foreclose their alleged equitable hen on the Ballard House project.\"",
"sentence": "See Telluride 1, 364 B.R. at 394-95 (“[t]he Sale Order does not address nor does it purport to convey to TAR the Limited Partners’ personal action to foreclose their alleged equitable hen on the Ballard House project.”); see also Telluride 2, 364 B.R. at 417-18 (“[t]he bankruptcy court clearly did not intend to rule on the viability of the Limited Partners’ asserted third party beneficiary status ... the bankruptcy court stated that it had no intention of ruling or approving the sale of any alleged third party beneficiary nonder-ivative claims.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "364 B.R. 417, 417-18",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he bankruptcy court clearly did not intend to rule on the viability of the Limited Partners' asserted third party beneficiary status ... the bankruptcy court stated that it had no intention of ruling or approving the sale of any alleged third party beneficiary nonder-ivative claims.\"",
"sentence": "See Telluride 1, 364 B.R. at 394-95 (“[t]he Sale Order does not address nor does it purport to convey to TAR the Limited Partners’ personal action to foreclose their alleged equitable hen on the Ballard House project.”); see also Telluride 2, 364 B.R. at 417-18 (“[t]he bankruptcy court clearly did not intend to rule on the viability of the Limited Partners’ asserted third party beneficiary status ... the bankruptcy court stated that it had no intention of ruling or approving the sale of any alleged third party beneficiary nonder-ivative claims.”)."
} | 5,547,515 | a |
Petties met with other medical personnel in the following weeks, including a meeting with Dr. Carter on February 14, but Dr. Carter failed to immobilize his ankle then and Petties did not receive any type of immobilization until March 15, nearly two months after his injury. Evidence that a medical provider failed to abide by an established treatment protocol is evidence from which a jury could infer deliberate indifference. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 F.3d 745, 757-58",
"parenthetical": "reversing summary judgment where nurse's violation of published health-care requirements was circumstantial evidence that she knew of substantial risk of harm",
"sentence": "See Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 757-58 (10th Cir.2005) (reversing summary judgment where nurse’s violation of published health-care requirements was circumstantial evidence that she knew of substantial risk of harm); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., Tenn., 534 F.3d 531, 542-43 (6th Cir.2008) (affirming denial of qualified immunity for paramedic whose failure to follow established treatment protocols could constitute deliberate indifference)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "534 F.3d 531, 542-43",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of qualified immunity for paramedic whose failure to follow established treatment protocols could constitute deliberate indifference",
"sentence": "See Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 757-58 (10th Cir.2005) (reversing summary judgment where nurse’s violation of published health-care requirements was circumstantial evidence that she knew of substantial risk of harm); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., Tenn., 534 F.3d 531, 542-43 (6th Cir.2008) (affirming denial of qualified immunity for paramedic whose failure to follow established treatment protocols could constitute deliberate indifference)."
} | 4,287,860 | a |
The only restrictive covenants in the Agreement are the non-disclosure and non-solicitation provisions of the Agreement, which are significantly less restrictive than a non-compete agreement, and this Court declines to treat them as the equivalent of the restraint on trade contemplated by section 16600 in the absence of Defendants being able to point to a case where a court has found that California has a fundamental policy, as defined by Massachusetts choice-of-law rules, against mere non-disclosure or non-solicitation clauses. Second, even if such clauses were included in the ambit of California's fundamental policy as a general matter, that fundamental policy does not extend to contractual clauses that are designed to protect an employer's trade secrets. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "62 Cal.2d 239, 242",
"parenthetical": "Section 16600 \"invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor ... unless the[provisions] are necessary to protect the employer's trade secrets\"",
"sentence": "Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal.2d 239, 242, 42 Cal.Rptr. 107, 398 P.2d 147 (1965) (Section 16600 “invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor ... unless the[provisions] are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets”)); see also Roll Sys., 1998 WL 1785455, at *2 n. 1 (dis cussing Shipley and the trade secret exception in California policy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dis cussing Shipley and the trade secret exception in California policy",
"sentence": "Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal.2d 239, 242, 42 Cal.Rptr. 107, 398 P.2d 147 (1965) (Section 16600 “invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor ... unless the[provisions] are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets”)); see also Roll Sys., 1998 WL 1785455, at *2 n. 1 (dis cussing Shipley and the trade secret exception in California policy)."
} | 3,835,433 | a |
The only restrictive covenants in the Agreement are the non-disclosure and non-solicitation provisions of the Agreement, which are significantly less restrictive than a non-compete agreement, and this Court declines to treat them as the equivalent of the restraint on trade contemplated by section 16600 in the absence of Defendants being able to point to a case where a court has found that California has a fundamental policy, as defined by Massachusetts choice-of-law rules, against mere non-disclosure or non-solicitation clauses. Second, even if such clauses were included in the ambit of California's fundamental policy as a general matter, that fundamental policy does not extend to contractual clauses that are designed to protect an employer's trade secrets. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dis cussing Shipley and the trade secret exception in California policy",
"sentence": "Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal.2d 239, 242, 42 Cal.Rptr. 107, 398 P.2d 147 (1965) (Section 16600 “invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor ... unless the[provisions] are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets”)); see also Roll Sys., 1998 WL 1785455, at *2 n. 1 (dis cussing Shipley and the trade secret exception in California policy)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Section 16600 \"invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor ... unless the[provisions] are necessary to protect the employer's trade secrets\"",
"sentence": "Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal.2d 239, 242, 42 Cal.Rptr. 107, 398 P.2d 147 (1965) (Section 16600 “invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor ... unless the[provisions] are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets”)); see also Roll Sys., 1998 WL 1785455, at *2 n. 1 (dis cussing Shipley and the trade secret exception in California policy)."
} | 3,835,433 | b |
The only restrictive covenants in the Agreement are the non-disclosure and non-solicitation provisions of the Agreement, which are significantly less restrictive than a non-compete agreement, and this Court declines to treat them as the equivalent of the restraint on trade contemplated by section 16600 in the absence of Defendants being able to point to a case where a court has found that California has a fundamental policy, as defined by Massachusetts choice-of-law rules, against mere non-disclosure or non-solicitation clauses. Second, even if such clauses were included in the ambit of California's fundamental policy as a general matter, that fundamental policy does not extend to contractual clauses that are designed to protect an employer's trade secrets. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Section 16600 \"invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor ... unless the[provisions] are necessary to protect the employer's trade secrets\"",
"sentence": "Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal.2d 239, 242, 42 Cal.Rptr. 107, 398 P.2d 147 (1965) (Section 16600 “invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor ... unless the[provisions] are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets”)); see also Roll Sys., 1998 WL 1785455, at *2 n. 1 (dis cussing Shipley and the trade secret exception in California policy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dis cussing Shipley and the trade secret exception in California policy",
"sentence": "Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal.2d 239, 242, 42 Cal.Rptr. 107, 398 P.2d 147 (1965) (Section 16600 “invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor ... unless the[provisions] are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets”)); see also Roll Sys., 1998 WL 1785455, at *2 n. 1 (dis cussing Shipley and the trade secret exception in California policy)."
} | 3,835,433 | a |
Although plaintiff is not required to include all measurable variables in her statistical analysis, Dr. Madden's analysis is only minimally probative of commonality without these important variables. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "839 F.2d 334, 334",
"parenthetical": "upholding district court's finding that the plaintiffs statistics were flawed because they were based on the false assumption that all plaintiffs were equally qualified and equally interested in the promotions at issue",
"sentence": "See Sears, 839 F.2d at 334 (upholding district court’s finding that the plaintiffs statistics were flawed because they were based on the false assumption that all plaintiffs were equally qualified and equally interested in the promotions at issue); see also Radue, 219 F.3d at 616-17 (“Statistical evidence which fails to properly take into account nondiscriminatory explanations does not permit an inference of discrimination”). For this reason, together with the ones we have already discussed, Dr. Madden’s reports do not show commonality in plaintiffs putative class."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "219 F.3d 616, 616-17",
"parenthetical": "\"Statistical evidence which fails to properly take into account nondiscriminatory explanations does not permit an inference of discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Sears, 839 F.2d at 334 (upholding district court’s finding that the plaintiffs statistics were flawed because they were based on the false assumption that all plaintiffs were equally qualified and equally interested in the promotions at issue); see also Radue, 219 F.3d at 616-17 (“Statistical evidence which fails to properly take into account nondiscriminatory explanations does not permit an inference of discrimination”). For this reason, together with the ones we have already discussed, Dr. Madden’s reports do not show commonality in plaintiffs putative class."
} | 3,393,857 | a |
We also find that no conflict arises from the Plan's grant of discretion to Blue Cross to determine whether a procedure is experimental or investigative. Although the SPD contains no such language, we find no conflict between the absence of discretionary language in the SPD and its presence in the Plan. Vesting the plan administrator with discretion in making coverage decisions simply does not conflict with the SPD's silence on the matter. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 1317, 1321",
"parenthetical": "holding that even though the summary plan description did not include discretionary language, the grant of discretionary authority in the plan controlled",
"sentence": "See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that even though the summary plan description did not include discretionary language, the grant of discretionary authority in the plan controlled); see also Jensen v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 945, 952 (8th Cir.1994) (explaining that the plan will control “when the plan document is specific and the SPD is silent on a particular matter”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "38 F.3d 945, 952",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the plan will control \"when the plan document is specific and the SPD is silent on a particular matter\"",
"sentence": "See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that even though the summary plan description did not include discretionary language, the grant of discretionary authority in the plan controlled); see also Jensen v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 945, 952 (8th Cir.1994) (explaining that the plan will control “when the plan document is specific and the SPD is silent on a particular matter”)."
} | 11,991,375 | a |
This decision not to pursue additional information from Dr. Riccardi was error in light of the ALJ's affirmative duty to develop the record and to give proper weight to the opinions of treating physicians. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "168 F.3d 79, 79",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"an ALJ cannot reject a treating physician's diagnosis without first attempting to fill any clear gaps in the administrative record.\"",
"sentence": "See Devora v. Barnhart, 205 F.Supp.2d 164, 172-73 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“The duty of the ALJ to develop the record is particularly important when it comes to obtaining information from a claimant’s treating physician.”); see also Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79 (noting that “an ALJ cannot reject a treating physician’s diagnosis without first attempting to fill any clear gaps in the administrative record.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "205 F.Supp.2d 164, 172-73",
"parenthetical": "\"The duty of the ALJ to develop the record is particularly important when it comes to obtaining information from a claimant's treating physician.\"",
"sentence": "See Devora v. Barnhart, 205 F.Supp.2d 164, 172-73 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“The duty of the ALJ to develop the record is particularly important when it comes to obtaining information from a claimant’s treating physician.”); see also Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79 (noting that “an ALJ cannot reject a treating physician’s diagnosis without first attempting to fill any clear gaps in the administrative record.”)."
} | 9,096,880 | b |
Mental impairment is a mitigating factor and may tend to negate the wilful or intentional nature of an attorney's misconduct. Attorney Griev. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a hearing judge's factual findings with regard to mitigating factors tended to negate any dishonest or fraudulent intent",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Hayes, 367 Md. 504, 789 A.2d 119 (2002) (stating that a hearing judge’s factual findings with regard to mitigating factors tended to negate any dishonest or fraudulent intent); Attorney Griev."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "15 P.3d 1, 7",
"parenthetical": "finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 29, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999) (noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation); see State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n. v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 7 (Oklahoma 2000) (finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression)."
} | 560,103 | a |
Mental impairment is a mitigating factor and may tend to negate the wilful or intentional nature of an attorney's misconduct. Attorney Griev. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "15 P.3d 1, 7",
"parenthetical": "finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 29, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999) (noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation); see State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n. v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 7 (Oklahoma 2000) (finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a hearing judge's factual findings with regard to mitigating factors tended to negate any dishonest or fraudulent intent",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Hayes, 367 Md. 504, 789 A.2d 119 (2002) (stating that a hearing judge’s factual findings with regard to mitigating factors tended to negate any dishonest or fraudulent intent); Attorney Griev."
} | 560,103 | b |
Mental impairment is a mitigating factor and may tend to negate the wilful or intentional nature of an attorney's misconduct. Attorney Griev. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "362 Md. 483, 498",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the state of mind of the attorney at the time of the violation [is] 'important in the context of mitigation' \"",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Tomaino, 362 Md. 483, 498, 765 A.2d 653, 661 (2001) (noting that “the state of mind of the attorney at the time of the violation [is] ‘important in the context of mitigation’ ”); Attorney Griev."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "15 P.3d 1, 7",
"parenthetical": "finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 29, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999) (noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation); see State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n. v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 7 (Oklahoma 2000) (finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression)."
} | 560,103 | a |
Mental impairment is a mitigating factor and may tend to negate the wilful or intentional nature of an attorney's misconduct. Attorney Griev. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "765 A.2d 653, 661",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the state of mind of the attorney at the time of the violation [is] 'important in the context of mitigation' \"",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Tomaino, 362 Md. 483, 498, 765 A.2d 653, 661 (2001) (noting that “the state of mind of the attorney at the time of the violation [is] ‘important in the context of mitigation’ ”); Attorney Griev."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "15 P.3d 1, 7",
"parenthetical": "finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 29, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999) (noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation); see State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n. v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 7 (Oklahoma 2000) (finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression)."
} | 560,103 | a |
Mental impairment is a mitigating factor and may tend to negate the wilful or intentional nature of an attorney's misconduct. Attorney Griev. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "357 Md. 1, 29",
"parenthetical": "noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 29, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999) (noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation); see State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n. v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 7 (Oklahoma 2000) (finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "15 P.3d 1, 7",
"parenthetical": "finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 29, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999) (noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation); see State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n. v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 7 (Oklahoma 2000) (finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression)."
} | 560,103 | a |
Mental impairment is a mitigating factor and may tend to negate the wilful or intentional nature of an attorney's misconduct. Attorney Griev. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "741 A.2d 1143, 1158",
"parenthetical": "noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 29, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999) (noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation); see State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n. v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 7 (Oklahoma 2000) (finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "15 P.3d 1, 7",
"parenthetical": "finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression",
"sentence": "Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 29, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999) (noting that the state of mind at the time the [attorney] violated the [disciplinary] rules is important in the context of mitigation); see State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n. v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 7 (Oklahoma 2000) (finding no willful or voluntary misconduct in behavior of an attorney with a severe, untreated vitamin B-12 deficiency which impaired his short-term memory and exasperated his depression)."
} | 560,103 | a |
Given the importance of protecting the interests of both parties, courts often have followed an in camera procedure for disclosing the identity of and requesting information from a confidential informant. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "223 Fed.Appx. 747, 751-52",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's rejection of magistrate judge's report and recommendation suggesting disclosure of confidential informant's identity when confidential informant was not involved in drug buy",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Harris, 223 Fed.Appx. 747, 751-52 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (affirming district court’s rejection of magistrate judge’s report and recommendation suggesting disclosure of confidential informant’s identity when confidential informant was not involved in drug buy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "908 F.2d 565, 569",
"parenthetical": "remanding case to the \"district court to hold in camera hearings to determine whether the informant's testimony is relevant and whether disclosure is warranted\"",
"sentence": "See 3 WeiNStein’s FedeRal Evidenoe § 510.07 (2d ed.2011); see also United States v. Moralez, 908 F.2d 565, 569 (10th Cir.1990) (remanding case to the “district court to hold in camera hearings to determine whether the informant’s testimony is relevant and whether disclosure is warranted”). This procedure preserves the anonymity of the confidential informant while ensuring that the opposing party has access to the testimony of the informant in order to properly vet his or her claims."
} | 4,132,221 | b |
Plaintiff unquestionably fails to sufficiently plead causation by "alleging] particular circumstances suggesting that gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937",
"parenthetical": "refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated",
"sentence": "Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715; Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F.Supp.3d 356, 368, 2015 WL 1840402, at * 9 (S.D.N.Y.2015). Sufficient factual allegations include “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making that ... tend to show the influence of gender.” Sahm, 110 F.Supp.3d at 778, 2015 WL 2406065, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s “factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.”); see, e.g., Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937 (E.D.Mich. 2015) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "101 F.Supp.3d 356, 368",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiff's \"factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.\"",
"sentence": "Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715; Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F.Supp.3d 356, 368, 2015 WL 1840402, at * 9 (S.D.N.Y.2015). Sufficient factual allegations include “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making that ... tend to show the influence of gender.” Sahm, 110 F.Supp.3d at 778, 2015 WL 2406065, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s “factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.”); see, e.g., Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937 (E.D.Mich. 2015) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated)."
} | 4,197,294 | b |
Plaintiff unquestionably fails to sufficiently plead causation by "alleging] particular circumstances suggesting that gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2015 WL 1840402, at * 9",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiff's \"factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.\"",
"sentence": "Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715; Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F.Supp.3d 356, 368, 2015 WL 1840402, at * 9 (S.D.N.Y.2015). Sufficient factual allegations include “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making that ... tend to show the influence of gender.” Sahm, 110 F.Supp.3d at 778, 2015 WL 2406065, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s “factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.”); see, e.g., Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937 (E.D.Mich. 2015) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937",
"parenthetical": "refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated",
"sentence": "Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715; Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F.Supp.3d 356, 368, 2015 WL 1840402, at * 9 (S.D.N.Y.2015). Sufficient factual allegations include “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making that ... tend to show the influence of gender.” Sahm, 110 F.Supp.3d at 778, 2015 WL 2406065, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s “factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.”); see, e.g., Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937 (E.D.Mich. 2015) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated)."
} | 4,197,294 | a |
Plaintiff unquestionably fails to sufficiently plead causation by "alleging] particular circumstances suggesting that gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937",
"parenthetical": "refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated",
"sentence": "Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715; Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F.Supp.3d 356, 368, 2015 WL 1840402, at * 9 (S.D.N.Y.2015). Sufficient factual allegations include “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making that ... tend to show the influence of gender.” Sahm, 110 F.Supp.3d at 778, 2015 WL 2406065, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s “factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.”); see, e.g., Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937 (E.D.Mich. 2015) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "110 F.Supp.3d 778, 778",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiff's \"factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.\"",
"sentence": "Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715; Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F.Supp.3d 356, 368, 2015 WL 1840402, at * 9 (S.D.N.Y.2015). Sufficient factual allegations include “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making that ... tend to show the influence of gender.” Sahm, 110 F.Supp.3d at 778, 2015 WL 2406065, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s “factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.”); see, e.g., Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937 (E.D.Mich. 2015) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated)."
} | 4,197,294 | b |
Plaintiff unquestionably fails to sufficiently plead causation by "alleging] particular circumstances suggesting that gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937",
"parenthetical": "refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated",
"sentence": "Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715; Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F.Supp.3d 356, 368, 2015 WL 1840402, at * 9 (S.D.N.Y.2015). Sufficient factual allegations include “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making that ... tend to show the influence of gender.” Sahm, 110 F.Supp.3d at 778, 2015 WL 2406065, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s “factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.”); see, e.g., Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937 (E.D.Mich. 2015) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2015 WL 2406065, at *4",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiff's \"factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.\"",
"sentence": "Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715; Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F.Supp.3d 356, 368, 2015 WL 1840402, at * 9 (S.D.N.Y.2015). Sufficient factual allegations include “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making that ... tend to show the influence of gender.” Sahm, 110 F.Supp.3d at 778, 2015 WL 2406065, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s “factual allegations in the Amended Complaint [did] not satisfy any of these traditional means of demonstrating gender bias.”); see, e.g., Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F.Supp.3d 916, 937 (E.D.Mich. 2015) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his Title IX claim where he failed to identify any female student, other than the complainant, who was treated more favorably than he was treated)."
} | 4,197,294 | b |
Therefore, it is not surprising that federal courts have regularly considered the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction as relating to "removal jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "498 F.3d 248, 248",
"parenthetical": "\"removal jurisdiction is derivative of state court jurisdiction prior to removal\"",
"sentence": "Palmer, 498 F.3d at 248 (“removal jurisdiction is derivative of state court jurisdiction prior to removal”); In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.2005) (considering derivative jurisdiction in removal-jurisdiction terms); Hollis v. Florida State Univ., 259 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir.2001) (same); North Dakota v. Fredericks, 940 F.2d 333, 337 (8th Cir.1991) (same); Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 714 n. 11 (9th Cir.1990) (same); Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782, 784 (6th Cir.1989) (same); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 859 F.2d 407, 409 n. 4 (6th Cir.1988) (same); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. Gen. Cinemas Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 210 (1st Cir.1987) (same); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 801 (9th Cir.1987) (same); Leach v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 741 F.2d 200, 201 (8th Cir.1984) (same); Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 167-68 (3d Cir.1976) (same); see also In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir.1991) (characterizing the doctrine as “a judicial gloss on the removal statutes”); Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 269 n. * (5th Cir.1988) (characterizing derivative jurisdiction as a bar to removal rather than a substantive limit on federal authority); Dep’t of Revenue of State of Iowa v. Inv. Fin. Mgt."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "935 F.2d 61, 63",
"parenthetical": "characterizing the doctrine as \"a judicial gloss on the removal statutes\"",
"sentence": "Palmer, 498 F.3d at 248 (“removal jurisdiction is derivative of state court jurisdiction prior to removal”); In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.2005) (considering derivative jurisdiction in removal-jurisdiction terms); Hollis v. Florida State Univ., 259 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir.2001) (same); North Dakota v. Fredericks, 940 F.2d 333, 337 (8th Cir.1991) (same); Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 714 n. 11 (9th Cir.1990) (same); Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782, 784 (6th Cir.1989) (same); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 859 F.2d 407, 409 n. 4 (6th Cir.1988) (same); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. Gen. Cinemas Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 210 (1st Cir.1987) (same); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 801 (9th Cir.1987) (same); Leach v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 741 F.2d 200, 201 (8th Cir.1984) (same); Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 167-68 (3d Cir.1976) (same); see also In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir.1991) (characterizing the doctrine as “a judicial gloss on the removal statutes”); Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 269 n. * (5th Cir.1988) (characterizing derivative jurisdiction as a bar to removal rather than a substantive limit on federal authority); Dep’t of Revenue of State of Iowa v. Inv. Fin. Mgt."
} | 3,831,886 | a |
Therefore, it is not surprising that federal courts have regularly considered the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction as relating to "removal jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "characterizing derivative jurisdiction as a bar to removal rather than a substantive limit on federal authority",
"sentence": "Palmer, 498 F.3d at 248 (“removal jurisdiction is derivative of state court jurisdiction prior to removal”); In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.2005) (considering derivative jurisdiction in removal-jurisdiction terms); Hollis v. Florida State Univ., 259 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir.2001) (same); North Dakota v. Fredericks, 940 F.2d 333, 337 (8th Cir.1991) (same); Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 714 n. 11 (9th Cir.1990) (same); Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782, 784 (6th Cir.1989) (same); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 859 F.2d 407, 409 n. 4 (6th Cir.1988) (same); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. Gen. Cinemas Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 210 (1st Cir.1987) (same); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 801 (9th Cir.1987) (same); Leach v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 741 F.2d 200, 201 (8th Cir.1984) (same); Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 167-68 (3d Cir.1976) (same); see also In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir.1991) (characterizing the doctrine as “a judicial gloss on the removal statutes”); Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 269 n. * (5th Cir.1988) (characterizing derivative jurisdiction as a bar to removal rather than a substantive limit on federal authority); Dep’t of Revenue of State of Iowa v. Inv. Fin. Mgt."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "498 F.3d 248, 248",
"parenthetical": "\"removal jurisdiction is derivative of state court jurisdiction prior to removal\"",
"sentence": "Palmer, 498 F.3d at 248 (“removal jurisdiction is derivative of state court jurisdiction prior to removal”); In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.2005) (considering derivative jurisdiction in removal-jurisdiction terms); Hollis v. Florida State Univ., 259 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir.2001) (same); North Dakota v. Fredericks, 940 F.2d 333, 337 (8th Cir.1991) (same); Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 714 n. 11 (9th Cir.1990) (same); Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782, 784 (6th Cir.1989) (same); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 859 F.2d 407, 409 n. 4 (6th Cir.1988) (same); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. Gen. Cinemas Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 210 (1st Cir.1987) (same); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 801 (9th Cir.1987) (same); Leach v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 741 F.2d 200, 201 (8th Cir.1984) (same); Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 167-68 (3d Cir.1976) (same); see also In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir.1991) (characterizing the doctrine as “a judicial gloss on the removal statutes”); Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 269 n. * (5th Cir.1988) (characterizing derivative jurisdiction as a bar to removal rather than a substantive limit on federal authority); Dep’t of Revenue of State of Iowa v. Inv. Fin. Mgt."
} | 3,831,886 | b |
Immunity from State Taxes. It is undisputed that MSU and other state colleges are immune from state taxes and from municipal and county ordinances. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Montclair [State University] is exempt from federal and state taxation.\"",
"sentence": "O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 795 A.2d 857, 863 (2002) (“Montclair [State University] is exempt from federal and state taxation.”); see also N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth., 592 A.2d at 563 (indicating that New Jersey City University, which is governed by the same statutory scheme as MSU, would be immune from local land-use regulations)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "592 A.2d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "indicating that New Jersey City University, which is governed by the same statutory scheme as MSU, would be immune from local land-use regulations",
"sentence": "O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 795 A.2d 857, 863 (2002) (“Montclair [State University] is exempt from federal and state taxation.”); see also N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth., 592 A.2d at 563 (indicating that New Jersey City University, which is governed by the same statutory scheme as MSU, would be immune from local land-use regulations)."
} | 12,175,542 | a |
Immunity from State Taxes. It is undisputed that MSU and other state colleges are immune from state taxes and from municipal and county ordinances. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "795 A.2d 857, 863",
"parenthetical": "\"Montclair [State University] is exempt from federal and state taxation.\"",
"sentence": "O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 795 A.2d 857, 863 (2002) (“Montclair [State University] is exempt from federal and state taxation.”); see also N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth., 592 A.2d at 563 (indicating that New Jersey City University, which is governed by the same statutory scheme as MSU, would be immune from local land-use regulations)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "592 A.2d 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "indicating that New Jersey City University, which is governed by the same statutory scheme as MSU, would be immune from local land-use regulations",
"sentence": "O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 795 A.2d 857, 863 (2002) (“Montclair [State University] is exempt from federal and state taxation.”); see also N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth., 592 A.2d at 563 (indicating that New Jersey City University, which is governed by the same statutory scheme as MSU, would be immune from local land-use regulations)."
} | 12,175,542 | a |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "937 So.2d 86, 93",
"parenthetical": "holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant's questions regarding a lawyer were asked \"before she signed the waiver-of-rights form\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | b |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "937 So.2d 86, 93",
"parenthetical": "holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant's questions regarding a lawyer were asked \"before she signed the waiver-of-rights form\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | b |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "937 So.2d 86, 93",
"parenthetical": "holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant's questions regarding a lawyer were asked \"before she signed the waiver-of-rights form\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | a |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 P.3d 856, 869",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect's wishes",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | a |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 P.3d 856, 869",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect's wishes",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | b |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 P.3d 856, 869",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect's wishes",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | b |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "760 A.2d 223, 228",
"parenthetical": "declining to extend Davis \"to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | a |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "760 A.2d 223, 228",
"parenthetical": "declining to extend Davis \"to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | a |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "760 A.2d 223, 228",
"parenthetical": "declining to extend Davis \"to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | b |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court's bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | a |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court's bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | b |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court's bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | b |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "857 A.2d 557, 573",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court's bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | a |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "857 A.2d 557, 573",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court's bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | b |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "857 A.2d 557, 573",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court's bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | b |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "650 N.W.2d 20, 28",
"parenthetical": "\"Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | b |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "650 N.W.2d 20, 28",
"parenthetical": "\"Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | a |
Since Leyva, every state appellate court to consider the pre-waiver and post-waiver distinction, with only one exception, has applied its reasoning or similar rationale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "650 N.W.2d 20, 28",
"parenthetical": "\"Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has \"left open the issue\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that Davis did not apply where the defendant’s questions regarding a lawyer were asked “before she signed the waiver-of-rights form”); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) (“[T]he Davis rule (that interrogating officers need not interrupt their questioning to clarify the suspect’s wishes) applies only to a post-Mmmda-waiver setting.”); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 745 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (“[A]n ambiguous waiver must be clarified before initial questioning.”); State v. Holloway, 760 A.2d 223, 228 (Me.2000) (declining to extend Davis “to require an unambiguous invocation of ... the right to an attorney in the absence of a prior waiver”); Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 402, 857 A.2d 557, 573 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2004) (“[A] careful reading of Davis reveals that the Supreme Court’s bright line rule, requiring an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel, pertains to a situation in which the defendant had previously waived his right and then, during the interrogation, arguably sought to exercise his rights.”); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 (S.D.2002) (“Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal postwaiver invocation of rights.”); but see In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 964-65 (2005) (acknowledging that the holding in Davis is limited to an alleged invocation of the right to counsel in the post-waiver context, but choosing to also apply it in the pre-waiver context where the Supreme Court has “left open the issue”)."
} | 7,298,256 | a |
Counsel next raises the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by denying defense counsel an opportunity to impeach a government witness through cross examination on the matter of the witness's use of aliases. Because the court properly determined that the witness's use of the alias was remote in time from the present offense, and because ample evidence was admitted to impeach the witness, we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "882 F.2d 1444, 1446",
"parenthetical": "holding that a district court's refusal to allow cross examination as to certain prior conduct was not reversible error where the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness",
"sentence": "United States v. Kallin, 50 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that a reviewing court can only reverse for abuse of discretion if it has a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in reaching its conclusion, or based its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law); Cf. United States v. Jackson, 882 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that a district court’s refusal to allow cross examination as to certain prior conduct was not reversible error where the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "50 F.3d 689, 693",
"parenthetical": "stating that a reviewing court can only reverse for abuse of discretion if it has a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in reaching its conclusion, or based its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law",
"sentence": "United States v. Kallin, 50 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that a reviewing court can only reverse for abuse of discretion if it has a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in reaching its conclusion, or based its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law); Cf. United States v. Jackson, 882 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that a district court’s refusal to allow cross examination as to certain prior conduct was not reversible error where the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness)."
} | 151,881 | b |
Nor is it significant that the family court proceeding was a custody proceeding instead of a support proceeding. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 B.R. 295, 295",
"parenthetical": "\"Courts are in general agreement that obligations in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support may include the duty to pay attorneys' fees incurred by the former spouse in connection with a divorce proceeding, the obtaining and enforcement of alimony and/or support awards, or for custody disputes.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Peters, 133 B.R. at 295 (“Courts are in general agreement that obligations in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support may include the duty to pay attorneys’ fees incurred by the former spouse in connection with a divorce proceeding, the obtaining and enforcement of alimony and/or support awards, or for custody disputes.” (emphasis added)); see also In re Akamine, 217 B.R. 104, 108 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“[T]he vast majority of courts have held that awards of fees inextricably intertwined with proceedings affecting the welfare of a child, such as custody or child support litigation, are deemed ‘support’ within the meaning of § 523(a)(5).” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "217 B.R. 104, 108",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he vast majority of courts have held that awards of fees inextricably intertwined with proceedings affecting the welfare of a child, such as custody or child support litigation, are deemed 'support' within the meaning of SS 523(a",
"sentence": "See Peters, 133 B.R. at 295 (“Courts are in general agreement that obligations in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support may include the duty to pay attorneys’ fees incurred by the former spouse in connection with a divorce proceeding, the obtaining and enforcement of alimony and/or support awards, or for custody disputes.” (emphasis added)); see also In re Akamine, 217 B.R. 104, 108 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“[T]he vast majority of courts have held that awards of fees inextricably intertwined with proceedings affecting the welfare of a child, such as custody or child support litigation, are deemed ‘support’ within the meaning of § 523(a)(5).” (emphasis added))."
} | 9,319,657 | a |
In reaching this conclusion we do not rely exclusively on the fact that the salary adjustments were paid from the Firm's general assets; the Seventh Circuit has made clear this factor is not determinative. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 1, 18",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f an employer has an administrative scheme for paying benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general assets.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Diak, 33 F.3d at 813 (“[P]ayment of benefits out of general funds satisfies the requirement of an ascertainable source of funding.”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 18, 107 5.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (“[I]f an employer has an administrative scheme for paying benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general assets.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 813, 813",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]ayment of benefits out of general funds satisfies the requirement of an ascertainable source of funding.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Diak, 33 F.3d at 813 (“[P]ayment of benefits out of general funds satisfies the requirement of an ascertainable source of funding.”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 18, 107 5.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (“[I]f an employer has an administrative scheme for paying benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general assets.”)."
} | 11,566,054 | b |
In reaching this conclusion we do not rely exclusively on the fact that the salary adjustments were paid from the Firm's general assets; the Seventh Circuit has made clear this factor is not determinative. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f an employer has an administrative scheme for paying benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general assets.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Diak, 33 F.3d at 813 (“[P]ayment of benefits out of general funds satisfies the requirement of an ascertainable source of funding.”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 18, 107 5.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (“[I]f an employer has an administrative scheme for paying benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general assets.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 813, 813",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]ayment of benefits out of general funds satisfies the requirement of an ascertainable source of funding.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Diak, 33 F.3d at 813 (“[P]ayment of benefits out of general funds satisfies the requirement of an ascertainable source of funding.”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 18, 107 5.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (“[I]f an employer has an administrative scheme for paying benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general assets.”)."
} | 11,566,054 | b |
The lesson of the predatory pricing case law is that, generally, above-cost prices are not anticompetitive, and although there may be rare cases where above-cost prices are anticompetitive in the long run, it is "beyond the practical ability" of courts to identify those rare cases without creating an impermissibly high risk of deterring legitimate procompetitive behavior (i.e., price-cutting). These principles extend to above-cost discounting or rebate programs, which condition the discounts or rebates on the customer's purchasing of a specified volume or a specified percentage of its requirements from the seller. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "614 F.3d 79, 79",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is no more an act of coercion, collusion, or [other anticompetitive conduct] for [a supplier] ... to offer more money to [a customer] than it is for such [a] supplierf] to offer the lowest ... prices.\"",
"sentence": "See NicSand, 507 F.3d at 451-52 (applying price-cost test to a challenge to up-front payments offered by a supplier to several large retailers on the basis that such payments were “nothing more than ‘price reductions offered to the buyers for the exclusive right to supply a set of stores under multi-year contracts’ ”); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1060-63 (applying price-cost test to volume discounts and market-share discounts offered by a manufacturer); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 232 (applying the price-cost test to uphold discounts linked to a requirements contract); see also Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 79 (“[I]t is no more an act of coercion, collusion, or [other anticompetitive conduct] for [a supplier] ... to offer more money to [a customer] than it is for such [a] supplierf] to offer the lowest ... prices.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "507 F.3d 451, 451-52",
"parenthetical": "applying price-cost test to a challenge to up-front payments offered by a supplier to several large retailers on the basis that such payments were \"nothing more than 'price reductions offered to the buyers for the exclusive right to supply a set of stores under multi-year contracts' \"",
"sentence": "See NicSand, 507 F.3d at 451-52 (applying price-cost test to a challenge to up-front payments offered by a supplier to several large retailers on the basis that such payments were “nothing more than ‘price reductions offered to the buyers for the exclusive right to supply a set of stores under multi-year contracts’ ”); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1060-63 (applying price-cost test to volume discounts and market-share discounts offered by a manufacturer); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 232 (applying the price-cost test to uphold discounts linked to a requirements contract); see also Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 79 (“[I]t is no more an act of coercion, collusion, or [other anticompetitive conduct] for [a supplier] ... to offer more money to [a customer] than it is for such [a] supplierf] to offer the lowest ... prices.”)."
} | 5,865,946 | b |
The lesson of the predatory pricing case law is that, generally, above-cost prices are not anticompetitive, and although there may be rare cases where above-cost prices are anticompetitive in the long run, it is "beyond the practical ability" of courts to identify those rare cases without creating an impermissibly high risk of deterring legitimate procompetitive behavior (i.e., price-cutting). These principles extend to above-cost discounting or rebate programs, which condition the discounts or rebates on the customer's purchasing of a specified volume or a specified percentage of its requirements from the seller. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "207 F.3d 1060, 1060-63",
"parenthetical": "applying price-cost test to volume discounts and market-share discounts offered by a manufacturer",
"sentence": "See NicSand, 507 F.3d at 451-52 (applying price-cost test to a challenge to up-front payments offered by a supplier to several large retailers on the basis that such payments were “nothing more than ‘price reductions offered to the buyers for the exclusive right to supply a set of stores under multi-year contracts’ ”); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1060-63 (applying price-cost test to volume discounts and market-share discounts offered by a manufacturer); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 232 (applying the price-cost test to uphold discounts linked to a requirements contract); see also Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 79 (“[I]t is no more an act of coercion, collusion, or [other anticompetitive conduct] for [a supplier] ... to offer more money to [a customer] than it is for such [a] supplierf] to offer the lowest ... prices.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "614 F.3d 79, 79",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is no more an act of coercion, collusion, or [other anticompetitive conduct] for [a supplier] ... to offer more money to [a customer] than it is for such [a] supplierf] to offer the lowest ... prices.\"",
"sentence": "See NicSand, 507 F.3d at 451-52 (applying price-cost test to a challenge to up-front payments offered by a supplier to several large retailers on the basis that such payments were “nothing more than ‘price reductions offered to the buyers for the exclusive right to supply a set of stores under multi-year contracts’ ”); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1060-63 (applying price-cost test to volume discounts and market-share discounts offered by a manufacturer); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 232 (applying the price-cost test to uphold discounts linked to a requirements contract); see also Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 79 (“[I]t is no more an act of coercion, collusion, or [other anticompetitive conduct] for [a supplier] ... to offer more money to [a customer] than it is for such [a] supplierf] to offer the lowest ... prices.”)."
} | 5,865,946 | a |
The lesson of the predatory pricing case law is that, generally, above-cost prices are not anticompetitive, and although there may be rare cases where above-cost prices are anticompetitive in the long run, it is "beyond the practical ability" of courts to identify those rare cases without creating an impermissibly high risk of deterring legitimate procompetitive behavior (i.e., price-cutting). These principles extend to above-cost discounting or rebate programs, which condition the discounts or rebates on the customer's purchasing of a specified volume or a specified percentage of its requirements from the seller. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "724 F.2d 232, 232",
"parenthetical": "applying the price-cost test to uphold discounts linked to a requirements contract",
"sentence": "See NicSand, 507 F.3d at 451-52 (applying price-cost test to a challenge to up-front payments offered by a supplier to several large retailers on the basis that such payments were “nothing more than ‘price reductions offered to the buyers for the exclusive right to supply a set of stores under multi-year contracts’ ”); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1060-63 (applying price-cost test to volume discounts and market-share discounts offered by a manufacturer); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 232 (applying the price-cost test to uphold discounts linked to a requirements contract); see also Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 79 (“[I]t is no more an act of coercion, collusion, or [other anticompetitive conduct] for [a supplier] ... to offer more money to [a customer] than it is for such [a] supplierf] to offer the lowest ... prices.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "614 F.3d 79, 79",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is no more an act of coercion, collusion, or [other anticompetitive conduct] for [a supplier] ... to offer more money to [a customer] than it is for such [a] supplierf] to offer the lowest ... prices.\"",
"sentence": "See NicSand, 507 F.3d at 451-52 (applying price-cost test to a challenge to up-front payments offered by a supplier to several large retailers on the basis that such payments were “nothing more than ‘price reductions offered to the buyers for the exclusive right to supply a set of stores under multi-year contracts’ ”); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1060-63 (applying price-cost test to volume discounts and market-share discounts offered by a manufacturer); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 232 (applying the price-cost test to uphold discounts linked to a requirements contract); see also Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 79 (“[I]t is no more an act of coercion, collusion, or [other anticompetitive conduct] for [a supplier] ... to offer more money to [a customer] than it is for such [a] supplierf] to offer the lowest ... prices.”)."
} | 5,865,946 | a |
As applicable here, that rule indicates that the individual defendants, as sureties, may raise defenses available to B&A in an action seeking to hold the individual defendants liable as sureties. See also Richard A. Lord, 23 Williston on Contracts 61:7 (4th ed 2002) ("The general rule is that the surety is not liable to the creditor unless the principal obligor is liable; thus, the surety may plead the defenses that are available to the principal."). That is so even though a default order was entered against B&A. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "176 Or App 635, 644",
"parenthetical": "noting circumstances where a judgment entered in favor of a nondefaulting codefendant would necessarily apply to a defaulting codefendant with the same force and effect",
"sentence": "See also Becker v. Pieper, 176 Or App 635, 644, 32 P3d 912 (2001) (noting circumstances where a judgment entered in favor of a nondefaulting codefendant would necessarily apply to a defaulting codefendant with the same force and effect); ORCP 67 E(2) (stating in part, that default against less than all parties in an action against parties jointly indebted does not preclude a judgment in the same action in favor of the remaining parties)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that where default is entered against the principal, the facts alleged to be the basis of the obligation have never been subject to real inquiry and judgment is only prima facie evidence against the surety of the principal's obligation",
"sentence": "Kliks v. McCaffrey, 221 Or 81, 350 P2d 417 (1960) (concluding that where default is entered against the principal, the facts alleged to be the basis of the obligation have never been subject to real inquiry and judgment is only prima facie evidence against the surety of the principal’s obligation)."
} | 4,217,550 | b |
In order to obtain permanent injunctive relief in an action under Section 6c of the Act, the Commission must not only establish that a violation of the Act has occurred, but also that there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations. To be sure, while past misconduct does not require the conclusion that there is a likelihood of future misconduct, it is "highly suggestive of the likelihood of future violations." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "650 F.2d 718, 720",
"parenthetical": "\"the [Securities and Exchange] Commission is entitled to prevail when the inferences flowing from the defendant's prior illegal conduct, viewed in light of the present circumstances, betoken a 'reasonable likelihood' of future transgressions\"",
"sentence": "Hunt, 591 F.2d at 1220; see also CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 693 F.Supp. 168, 191 (D.N.J.1988) (“The likelihood of future violations may be inferred from past infractions based upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances to determine if the past infraction was an isolated occurrence as opposed to an indication of a systematic and continuous pattern of wrongdoing.”) (Citation omitted); Cf. SEC v. Zale Corp., 650 F.2d 718, 720 (5th Cir.1981) (“the [Securities and Exchange] Commission is entitled to prevail when the inferences flowing from the defendant’s prior illegal conduct, viewed in light of the present circumstances, betoken a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of future transgressions”), cert. denied sub nom., 454 U.S. 1124, 102 S.Ct. 973, 71 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981) (citations omitted); Hunt, 591 F.2d, at 1219-20 (reversing the district court’s denial of injunctive relief, and stating that a court of appeals should not hesitate “to reverse an order denying [injunctive] relief when it is evident that the trial court’s discretion has not been exercised to effectuate the manifest objectives of the specific legislation involved”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "693 F.Supp. 168, 191",
"parenthetical": "\"The likelihood of future violations may be inferred from past infractions based upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances to determine if the past infraction was an isolated occurrence as opposed to an indication of a systematic and continuous pattern of wrongdoing.\"",
"sentence": "Hunt, 591 F.2d at 1220; see also CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 693 F.Supp. 168, 191 (D.N.J.1988) (“The likelihood of future violations may be inferred from past infractions based upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances to determine if the past infraction was an isolated occurrence as opposed to an indication of a systematic and continuous pattern of wrongdoing.”) (Citation omitted); Cf. SEC v. Zale Corp., 650 F.2d 718, 720 (5th Cir.1981) (“the [Securities and Exchange] Commission is entitled to prevail when the inferences flowing from the defendant’s prior illegal conduct, viewed in light of the present circumstances, betoken a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of future transgressions”), cert. denied sub nom., 454 U.S. 1124, 102 S.Ct. 973, 71 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981) (citations omitted); Hunt, 591 F.2d, at 1219-20 (reversing the district court’s denial of injunctive relief, and stating that a court of appeals should not hesitate “to reverse an order denying [injunctive] relief when it is evident that the trial court’s discretion has not been exercised to effectuate the manifest objectives of the specific legislation involved”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)."
} | 3,817,085 | b |
"Mere retention" of securities during a period of an alleged violation does not satisfy the requirement that the violation be in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Pollak v. Eastman Dillon, CCH Fed.See.L.Rep. P94,-987 at 97,412 (S.D.N.Y.1975); In re Hoe & Co., Inc., CCH Fed.See.L.Rep. P 94,553 at 95,923 (S.D.N.Y.1974). The Second Circuit has stated "[bjefore changes in the rights of a security holder can qualify as the 'purchase' of a new security under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, there must be such significant change in the nature of the investment or in the investment risks as to amount to a new investment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "568 F.2d 862, 868",
"parenthetical": "modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities",
"sentence": "Abrahamson v. Fles chner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 913, 98 S.Ct. 2236, 2253, 56 L.Ed.2d 403, 414 (1978) (modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities); see Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F.Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "410 F.Supp. 244, 247",
"parenthetical": "agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments",
"sentence": "Abrahamson v. Fles chner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 913, 98 S.Ct. 2236, 2253, 56 L.Ed.2d 403, 414 (1978) (modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities); see Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F.Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments)."
} | 3,509,552 | a |
"Mere retention" of securities during a period of an alleged violation does not satisfy the requirement that the violation be in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Pollak v. Eastman Dillon, CCH Fed.See.L.Rep. P94,-987 at 97,412 (S.D.N.Y.1975); In re Hoe & Co., Inc., CCH Fed.See.L.Rep. P 94,553 at 95,923 (S.D.N.Y.1974). The Second Circuit has stated "[bjefore changes in the rights of a security holder can qualify as the 'purchase' of a new security under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, there must be such significant change in the nature of the investment or in the investment risks as to amount to a new investment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "436 U.S. 905, 913",
"parenthetical": "modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities",
"sentence": "Abrahamson v. Fles chner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 913, 98 S.Ct. 2236, 2253, 56 L.Ed.2d 403, 414 (1978) (modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities); see Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F.Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "410 F.Supp. 244, 247",
"parenthetical": "agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments",
"sentence": "Abrahamson v. Fles chner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 913, 98 S.Ct. 2236, 2253, 56 L.Ed.2d 403, 414 (1978) (modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities); see Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F.Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments)."
} | 3,509,552 | a |
"Mere retention" of securities during a period of an alleged violation does not satisfy the requirement that the violation be in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Pollak v. Eastman Dillon, CCH Fed.See.L.Rep. P94,-987 at 97,412 (S.D.N.Y.1975); In re Hoe & Co., Inc., CCH Fed.See.L.Rep. P 94,553 at 95,923 (S.D.N.Y.1974). The Second Circuit has stated "[bjefore changes in the rights of a security holder can qualify as the 'purchase' of a new security under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, there must be such significant change in the nature of the investment or in the investment risks as to amount to a new investment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 2236, 2253",
"parenthetical": "modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities",
"sentence": "Abrahamson v. Fles chner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 913, 98 S.Ct. 2236, 2253, 56 L.Ed.2d 403, 414 (1978) (modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities); see Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F.Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "410 F.Supp. 244, 247",
"parenthetical": "agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments",
"sentence": "Abrahamson v. Fles chner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 913, 98 S.Ct. 2236, 2253, 56 L.Ed.2d 403, 414 (1978) (modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities); see Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F.Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments)."
} | 3,509,552 | a |
"Mere retention" of securities during a period of an alleged violation does not satisfy the requirement that the violation be in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Pollak v. Eastman Dillon, CCH Fed.See.L.Rep. P94,-987 at 97,412 (S.D.N.Y.1975); In re Hoe & Co., Inc., CCH Fed.See.L.Rep. P 94,553 at 95,923 (S.D.N.Y.1974). The Second Circuit has stated "[bjefore changes in the rights of a security holder can qualify as the 'purchase' of a new security under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, there must be such significant change in the nature of the investment or in the investment risks as to amount to a new investment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "56 L.Ed.2d 403, 414",
"parenthetical": "modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities",
"sentence": "Abrahamson v. Fles chner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 913, 98 S.Ct. 2236, 2253, 56 L.Ed.2d 403, 414 (1978) (modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities); see Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F.Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "410 F.Supp. 244, 247",
"parenthetical": "agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments",
"sentence": "Abrahamson v. Fles chner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, 913, 98 S.Ct. 2236, 2253, 56 L.Ed.2d 403, 414 (1978) (modifications affected by the adoption of a new partnership agreement did not constitute the purchase and sale of new securities); see Rothstein v. Seidman & Seidman, 410 F.Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (agreements permitting loans to remain outstanding did not constitute reinvestments)."
} | 3,509,552 | a |
The trial court credited the confession, because the defendant's tone, clarity, and detailed recall of the robberies as set forth in the confession supported a finding of lucidity. Because he had a record of sixteen prior arrests, the district court found that Palmer comprehended the significance of a Miranda waiver. The court's finding that Palmer intelligently and knowingly waived his rights had a solid evidentiary basis in his confession statements and Detective Sprankle's testimony and thus was not clearly erroneous.. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "691 F.2d 579, 588",
"parenthetical": "courts should consider the age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and conduct of the defendant",
"sentence": "See United States v. Crooks, 766 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir.1985) (determination that statement not coerced, given government denial of threats, has adequate evidentiary support); see also United States v. Melanson, 691 F.2d 579, 588 (1st Cir.1981) (courts should consider the age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and conduct of the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "766 F.2d 7, 11",
"parenthetical": "determination that statement not coerced, given government denial of threats, has adequate evidentiary support",
"sentence": "See United States v. Crooks, 766 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir.1985) (determination that statement not coerced, given government denial of threats, has adequate evidentiary support); see also United States v. Melanson, 691 F.2d 579, 588 (1st Cir.1981) (courts should consider the age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and conduct of the defendant)."
} | 11,480,879 | b |
However, the IJ did not err in declining to credit Hasan's explanation, particularly given that: (1) Hasan, who had volunteered the information that he paid his first wife, failed to mention that he gave his second wife a dowry; (2) the two thousand dollar payment, which included a payment upon divorce, more closely resembled a commercial transaction than did the unconditional gift of gold jewelry that Hasan provided his second wife; and (3) Hasan failed to provide a consistent account regarding where he and his first wife had lived during their relationship, thereby further calling into question its validity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "534 F.3d 167, 167",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the 'totality of the circumstances' established that an asylum applicant is not credible\"",
"sentence": "See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (explaining that, although an IJ must consider an applicant’s explanations, he need not credit them unless a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to do so); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (“[A]n IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ established that an asylum applicant is not credible”) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, based on Hasan’s admission that he paid his first wife to marry him in an attempt to procure a visa, the agency did not err in finding him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "430 F.3d 77, 80-81",
"parenthetical": "explaining that, although an IJ must consider an applicant's explanations, he need not credit them unless a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to do so",
"sentence": "See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (explaining that, although an IJ must consider an applicant’s explanations, he need not credit them unless a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to do so); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (“[A]n IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ established that an asylum applicant is not credible”) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, based on Hasan’s admission that he paid his first wife to marry him in an attempt to procure a visa, the agency did not err in finding him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)."
} | 4,155,984 | b |
These comments were objected to contemporaneously, and thus, the issue was properly preserved. A comment suggesting a witness gave "uncontra-dicted" or "uncontroverted" evidence is an impermissible comment on appellant's right .to remain silent in those cases where the defendant is the only individual who can contradict the evidence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the State's comment that the only witness gave \"uncontradicted and uncontro-verted\" testimony establishing appellant's guilt was an impermissible comment on appellant's right to remain silent where appellant was the only individual capable of refuting the witness's testimony",
"sentence": "Hill v. State, 980 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding the State’s comment that the only witness gave “uncontradicted and uncontro-verted” testimony establishing appellant’s guilt was an impermissible comment on appellant’s right to remain silent where appellant was the only individual capable of refuting the witness’s testimony); see also Watts v. State, 921 So.2d 722, 724 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (same); Smith v. State, 843 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding the State’s comment that “[n]o-body testified he wasn’t the guy” was an impermissible comment on appellant’s right to remain silent in a case in which the only individual who could have contradicted the State’s evidence was the appellant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the State's comment that \"[n]o-body testified he wasn't the guy\" was an impermissible comment on appellant's right to remain silent in a case in which the only individual who could have contradicted the State's evidence was the appellant",
"sentence": "Hill v. State, 980 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding the State’s comment that the only witness gave “uncontradicted and uncontro-verted” testimony establishing appellant’s guilt was an impermissible comment on appellant’s right to remain silent where appellant was the only individual capable of refuting the witness’s testimony); see also Watts v. State, 921 So.2d 722, 724 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (same); Smith v. State, 843 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding the State’s comment that “[n]o-body testified he wasn’t the guy” was an impermissible comment on appellant’s right to remain silent in a case in which the only individual who could have contradicted the State’s evidence was the appellant)."
} | 7,046,147 | a |
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