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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. | [
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opinion at 499 Mich 284. | [
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The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154; 98 S Ct 2674; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978), limited the trial court's discretion to order a hearing on the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the search warrant. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 499 Mich 930. | [
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On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 24, 2015 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Berrien Circuit Court to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resen-tence the defendant. We leave intact the remand ordered by the Court of Appeals. With regard to the defendant’s challenge to costs, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court prior to the completion of the proceedings ordered by the Court of Appeals. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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reported below: 312 Mich App 309. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resentence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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reported below: 307 Mich App 667. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 498 Mich 884. | [
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PER CURIAM.
We consider in this case whether the common-law affirmative defense of self-defense is available to a defendant charged with carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227, when the concealed weapon is an “other dangerous weapon.” The defendant was convicted of CCW under MCL 750.227(1) for carrying an “other dangerous weapon” concealed on his person when he used a utility knife as a weapon. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ determination, we conclude that the common-law affirmative defense of self-defense is available to a defendant charged with CCW for concealing an instrument which is a dangerous weapon only because it is used as a weapon. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the defendant’s CCW conviction, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 28, 2012, the defendant and his wife attended a party together, but they disagreed about when to leave. The defendant’s wife was intoxicated and angry when the defendant insisted they leave before she was ready. Shortly after returning home over her objection, the defendant’s wife left their home on foot to return to the party. The defendant followed her in his truck, hoping to persuade her to return home. When his wife refused to get back into the defendant’s truck, they engaged in a shoving match on the side of the road.
Two men driving by observed the struggle and stopped to assess the situation. They offered the defendant’s wife a ride, and she got into the back seat of their vehicle. The defendant attempted to intervene and to remove his wife from the car, but one of the men stopped him. According to the defendant, the man choked him, and the defendant responded by pulling out a utility knife with a two-inch blade, which he held in the air and threatened to use if the man did not let go. When they broke free from each other, the two men left the scene with the defendant’s wife and called 911. The defendant, who also left the scene, was arrested at his home.
The defendant was charged with felonious assault, CCW, and domestic violence, and the case was tried to a jury. The trial court instructed the jury that self-defense was an available defense to the defendant’s felonious assault charge but that it was not an available defense to the CCW charge. The jury found the defendant not guilty of the felonious assault charge, but convicted him of CCW and domestic violence.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that self-defense was not an affirmative defense to a charge of CCW and that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that self-defense is not a defense to a CCW charge, reasoning that a defendant’s purpose for concealing a weapon is irrelevant, and therefore a self-defense purpose for using the weapon is not a defense to a CCW charge. The defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court.
II. ANALYSIS
The defendant was charged and convicted of CCW under MCL 750.227(1), which provides:
A person shall not carry a dagger, dirk, stiletto, a double-edged nonfolding stabbing instrument of any length, or any other dangerous weapon, except a hunting knife adapted and carried as such, concealed on or about his or her person, or whether concealed or otherwise in any vehicle operated or occupied by the person, except in his or her dwelling house, place of business or on other land possessed by the person. [MCL 750.227(1) (emphasis added).]
The defendant was not alleged to have possessed any of the weapons specifically identified in the statute; instead, the prosecution had to prove that the utility knife carried by defendant was an “other dangerous weapon.”
We first addressed the characteristics of an “other dangerous weapon” in People v Goolsby, 284 Mich 375; 279 NW 867 (1938), in the context of our felonious assault statute. We held that the statute penalized a felonious assault by use of dangerous weapons per se, which “carry their dangerous character because so designed and are, when employed, per se, deadly,” as well as “other instrumentalities [that] are not dangerous weapons unless turned to such purpose.” Id. at 378. We explained that the test to determine if an instrument is an “other dangerous weapon” is “whether the instrumentality was used as a weapon and, when so employed in an assault, [was] dangerous.” Id. We later extended this definition of “other dangerous weapon” to the CCW statute at issue in this case in People v Vaines, 310 Mich 500, 506; 17 NW2d 729 (1945), explaining:
We are convinced that the legislature intended the words “other dangerous weapon,” as used in section 227, to mean any concealed article or instrument which the carrier used, or carried for the purpose of using, as a weapon for bodily assault or defense. The legislature certainly did not intend to include as a dangerous weapon the ordinary type of jackknife commonly carried by many people, unless there was evidence establishing that it was used, or was carried for the purpose of use, as a weapon.[ ]
It follows from Vaines that to convict an individual for violating MCL 750.227(1) for carrying an instrument that is not a dangerous weapon per se, the evidence must show that a defendant used the instrument, or was carrying the instrument for the purpose of use, as a weapon. Id.
The parties do not dispute that the defendant was charged with CCW under MCL 750.227(1) for possessing an instrument that was an “other dangerous weapon” only because it was used as a weapon. Likewise, there is no dispute that, absent a viable affirmative defense, the evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for CCW; the defendant concedes that he used the utility knife as a weapon but insists that his use was justified. As a general matter, a defendant who asserts the affirmative defense of self-defense “admits the crime but seeks to excuse or justify its commission.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 704 n 11; 788 NW2d 399 (2010).
We have not explicitly addressed whether an individual charged with CCW can assert the common-law affirmative defense of self-defense to justify his or her carrying of an instrument that becomes a dangerous weapon when he or she uses it as such. And MCL 750.227 does not address whether the common-law affirmative defense of self-defense is available for the crime of CCW. But the absence of a clear statutory recognition of the defense does not necessarily bar a defendant from relying on the defense to justify his violation of the statute. See Dupree, 486 Mich at 705. To the contrary, in Dupree, we clearly held that self-defense was an available affirmative defense to a felon-in-possession charge under MCL 750.224f when the felon’s temporary possession of a firearm was the result of an attempt to repel an imminent threat. Id. at 706. We did not read that statute’s silence as to self-defense to indicate a legislative intent to make the defense unavailable; rather, we concluded that “[a]b-sent some clear indication” in the statute that the Legislature abrogated the firmly embedded common-law affirmative defense of self-defense, the defense remains available to a defendant “if supported by sufficient evidence.” Id. at 706.
In this case, there is no “clear indication” that the Legislature abrogated or modified the common-law affirmative defense of self-defense in the CCW statute such that defendant would be precluded from asserting it to justify his actions. Thus, we conclude that the defendant should have been allowed to present self-defense as an affirmative defense to his CCW charge. The actions that resulted in the defendant’s violation of the CCW statute were the same as those that resulted in his charge of assault, which he explained were justified because he acted in lawful self-defense. Unless the prosecution disproved beyond a reasonable doubt his claim of self-defense, the defendant was justified in violating the CCW statute as well as the assault statute.
The Court of Appeals erroneously reasoned that a defendant’s purpose for concealing a weapon is irrelevant to determining a defendant’s guilt for violating the statute. Concealing an instrument that is charged as an “other dangerous weapon” under MCL 750.227(1) violates the statute only when a defendant in fact uses it as a weapon. See e.g., Goolsby, 284 Mich at 378; Vaines, 310 Mich at 506. Thus, a defendant’s use or purpose for carrying an “other dangerous weapon” is always relevant to determining a defendant’s guilt under MCL 750.227(1).
We hold, therefore, that the affirmative defense of self-defense is available to a defendant charged with violating MCL 750.227(1) when a concealed instrument becomes a dangerous weapon when the defendant uses it as such. While the defendant’s utility knife became an “other dangerous weapon” under MCL 750.227(1) when he used it as a weapon, the defendant was entitled to present the affirmative defense of self-defense to justify his use of it. We conclude that the trial court’s instruction that self-defense was not available to the defendant with respect to his CCW charge amounted to plain error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the defendant’s CCW conviction, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Young, C.J., and Markman, Zahra, McCormack, Viviano, and Bernstein, JJ., concurred.
LARSEN, J., took no part in the decision of this case.
People v Triplett, 309 Mich App 252; 870 NW2d 333 (2015).
The statute at that time defined felonious assault as follows:
Any person who shall assault another with a gun, revolver, pistol, knife, iron bar, club, brass knuckles or other dangerous weapon, but without intending to commit the crime of murder, and without intending to inflict great bodily harm less than the crime of murder, shall he guilty of a felony.
We recognize that Vaines interpreted “other dangerous weapon” to mean “any concealed article or instrument which the carrier used, or carried for the purpose of using, as a weapon,” 310 Mich at 506 (emphasis added), while MCL 750.227(1) does not refer to “use” and refers only to whether the instrument was “carried].” Because defendant does not ask us to consider whether Vaines correctly interpreted that aspect of the statute, we decline to do so sua sponte.
The Court of Appeals misunderstood our holding in People v Hernandez-Garcia, 477 Mich 1039; 728 NW2d 406 (2007). In Hernandez-Garcia, we held that the affirmative defense of momentary innocent possession was not available for violating MCL 750.227(2), which prohibits the knowing possession of an unlicensed concealed firearm where the defendant disarmed a wrongful possessor of a firearm but failed to immediately turn the firearm over to the police. See id. at 1040. Hernandez-Garcia simply does not offer any guidance on whether the defense of self-defense is available to justify violating MCL 750.227(1) where the defendant’s violation is based on the use or purpose for carrying an “other dangerous weapon.”
Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ reliance on People v Townsel, 13 Mich App 600; 164 NW2d 776 (1968), which held that carrying a concealed weapon for “self-protection” is not a defense to a CCW charge, was misplaced. Townsel is distinguishable because it does not appear that it involved a claim of self-defense. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the sentence of the Wayne Circuit Court on the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction, and we remand this case to the trial court for resentencing on that conviction pursuant to MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a. See Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US _; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016); Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012). We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 499 Mich 857. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 499 Mich 880. | [
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On May 4, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the June 20, 2013 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand this case to the Court of Claims for issuance of an order granting summary disposition in favor of the defendants on Count I of the Complaint. The Civil Service Commission has “plenary and absolute” authority to set rates of compensation and to determine the procedures by which it makes those compensation decisions. See UAW v Green, 498 Mich 282, 288 (2015). The consensus agreement purports to hind the parties to jointly recommend certain wage increases for civil service employees, and was part of the process by which the Civil Service Commission fixed rates of compensation. The plaintiffs breach of contract claim arises out of the exclusive constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to “fix rates of compensation” for the classified service. Const 1963, art 11, § 5. Judicial incursion into that process is “unavailing.” Council No 11, AFSCME v Civil Serv Comm, 408 Mich 385, 408 (1980). The motion to supplement the record is considered, and it is denied. Evidence regarding the amount of damages is irrelevant because the controversy fell exclusively within the purview of the Civil Service Commission. | [
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The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing whether a reasonable jury could determine that the defendant’s conduct was “the proximate cause” of plaintiff Kersch Ray’s injuries where the defendant’s actions placed the plaintiff in the dangerous situation that resulted in the plaintiffs injuries. MCL 691.1407(2)(c); Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 462 (2000); Beals v Michigan, 497 Mich 363 (2015). The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 499 Mich 854.
Viviano, J., did not participate because he presided over this case in the circuit court. | [
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On May 4, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the March 10, 2015 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is denied, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resentence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to stay and the motion for guidance are denied. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Jackson Circuit Court to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resentence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 499 Mich 854. | [
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The parties shall include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether the State Boundary Commission (SBC) has the authority to determine the validity of an agreement made pursuant to the Intergovernmental Conditional Transfer of Property by Contract Act, 1984 PA 425, MCL 124.21 et seq. (Act 425); (2) if so, whether the SBC in this case properly determined that the appellant townships’ Act 425 Agreement was invalid; and (3) whether, despite the language of MCL 117.9(6) and MCL 123.1012(3) (providing a two-year waiting period before resubmission of a petition for annexation), the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to invalidate the SBC’s 2014 approval of the appellee property owner’s petition for annexation on the basis of the SBC’s denial of the same property owner’s petition in 2012.
We further order that this case be argued and submitted to the Court together with the case of TeriDee LLC v Haring Charter Twp (Docket No. 153008), at such future session of the Court as both cases are ready for submission. In light of the joint submission, the time allotted for oral argument shall be limited to fifteen minutes per side in each case. MCR 7.314(B)(1). Motions for permission to file briefs amicus curiae and briefs amicus curiae regarding these two cases should be filed in Clam Lake Twp v Dep’t of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs (Docket No. 151800) only and served on the parties in both cases. | [
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On March 10, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the December 23, 2014 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is denied, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 498 Mich 874. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 498 Mich 921. | [
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Markman, J.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court judgments granting the defendants’ motions for summary disposition and for sanctions. | [
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VIVIANO, J.
In this case, we are asked to address, among other things, the scope of the full credit bid rule. Plaintiff has asserted a variety of claims against certain entities and individuals involved in various allegedly fraudulent mortgage transactions. The Oakland Circuit Court granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendants as to all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, relying on the full credit bid rule as discussed in New Freedom Mtg Corp v Globe Mtg Corp to conclude that certain claims raised by plaintiff were barred by plaintiffs full credit bids at the foreclosure sales.
Por the reasons stated below, we conclude that the New Freedom panel erred to the extent it held that the full credit bid rule bars contract claims against non-borrower third parties, such as defendants in this case. Therefore, the Court of Appeals in the instant case erred by concluding that plaintiffs full credit bids barred its contract claims against the nonborrower third-party defendants. As to the other claims at issue in this appeal, we conclude that closing instructions constitute a contract upon which a breach of contract claim can be brought, and we remand to the trial court for reconsideration of whether summary disposition is appropriate on this claim. We also conclude that the lower courts erroneously interpreted the parties’ closing protection letters and therefore remand to the trial court to reconsider whether summary disposition is appropriate as to plaintiffs claim under the parameters set forth in this opinion. In sum, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Oakland Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2005 and 2006, an independent mortgage broker submitted four loan packages to plaintiff Bank of America, NA. Bank of America agreed to finance a percentage of the borrowers’ purchases of the properties. After issuing the loan commitments, Bank of America sent closing instructions to two closing agents, defendants Westminster Abstract Company (Westminster) and Patriot Title Agency (Patriot). Those closing agents agreed to close the four loans in exchange for a fee.
The closing instructions required that a closing protection letter (CPL) be issued in connection with each closing. Defendant First American Title Insurance Co (First American) was the title insurance company for all four sales and agreed to issue CPLs for all four closings. Under the CPLs, First American agreed to reimburse Bank of America for its actual losses incurred in connection with the closing if the losses arose out of, among other things, the fraud or dishonesty of the closing agents.
After First American issued the CPLs, the closings occurred. Westminster closed on loans for two of the properties: 13232 Enid Boulevard (Enid), for which Bank of America provided a $3,575,000 loan; and 1890 Heron Ridge Court (Heron Ridge), for which Bank of America provided a $2,800,000 loan. Patriot closed on loans for the other two properties: 1766 Golf Ridge Drive (Golf Ridge), for which Bank of America provided a $1,500,000 loan; and 1550 Kirkway Road (Kirkway), for which Bank of America provided a $1,500,000 loan. Unbeknownst to Bank of America, the values of the properties had been inflated by fraudulent appraisals and straw buyers who were paid for their participation. Shortly after closing, all four borrowers defaulted.
Bank of America foreclosed by advertisement on all four properties in accordance with Michigan’s foreclosure statutes. It subsequently purchased all four properties at sheriff sales with credit bids. It made full credit bids—i.e., credit bids in the full amount of the unpaid principal and interest plus foreclosure costs—on the Enid and Kirkway properties. Thereafter, Bank of America sold all the properties to bona fide purchasers. Bank of America claims it lost roughly $7 million on the deals.
During the foreclosure proceedings, Bank of America discovered the underlying fraud in each of the four loans. Bank of America brought the instant suit against First American, Westminster, and Patriot, as well as several individuals involved in the closings. Pertinent to this appeal, Bank of America asserted a claim against Westminster, alleging that it violated the specific terms of the closing instructions, and a claim against First American for recovery under the CPLs for the actual losses arising from Westminster’s and Patriot’s fraud and dishonesty during the closings.
Defendants moved for summary disposition. The circuit court granted First American and Westminster summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10) as to all claims and thereafter denied Bank of America’s motion for reconsideration.
In a split, unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The majority found New Freedom controlling. Quoting New Freedom, the panel defined the full credit bid rule as follows:
“When a lender bids at a foreclosure sale, it is not required to pay cash, but rather is permitted to make a credit bid because any cash tendered would be returned to it. If this credit bid is equal to the unpaid principal and interest on the mortgage plus the costs of foreclosure, this is known as a ‘full credit hid.’ When a mortgagee makes a full credit bid, the mortgage debt is satisfied, and the mortgage is extinguished.”[ ]
Although the majority appeared to question the validity of New Freedom, it concluded that New Freedom extended the full credit bid rule to indemnity claims under CPLs. The majority first considered First American’s liability under the CPLs for the closings done by Patriot. The majority concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether Patriot engaged in fraud or dishonesty at the Golf Ridge and Kirkway closings. Nonetheless, it affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of First American as to the claim based on the Kirkway closing. Recognizing that Bank of America made a full credit bid on the Kirkway property, the majority held that the full credit bid rule barred Bank of America’s claim against First American stemming from the closing on that property. The majority then turned to First American’s liability regarding the Westminster closings. The majority concluded that Bank of America failed to produce evidence to create a question of fact as to whether Westminster knew of or participated in the underlying fraud in the closings of the Enid and Heron Ridge properties. Thus, the majority held that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to First American and Westminster. Finally, the majority considered the validity of Bank of America’s contract claim against Westminster. The majority concluded that Bank of America did not establish a link between Westminster’s alleged violations of the closing instructions and the claimed damages. Even if the majority had concluded there was a link, it also rejected Bank of America’s claim against Westminster stemming from the closing on the Enid property because there were no damages due to Bank of America’s full credit bid at the foreclosure sale.
Bank of America sought leave to appeal in this Court. On November 19, 2014, we granted leave to appeal and asked the parties to include among the issues briefed:
(1) whether a separate contract between the lender and the closing agent existed outside of the closing protection letters; (2) whether there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the closing agent’s violation of the terms of the lender’s written closing instructions; and (3) whether the full credit bid rule of New Freedom Mortgage Corp v Globe Mortgage Corp, 281 Mich App 63 (2008), is a correct rule of law and, if so, whether it applies to this case.[ ]
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES
We review de novo a trial court’s decision regarding summary disposition. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants Westminster and First American under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Amotion brought under MCR 2.116(0(10) “tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.” In resolving such a motion, “a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties ... in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” If the evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation and contractual interpretation. To the extent this case requires the interpretation of a statute, our goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, focusing first on the statute’s plain language. When a statute’s language is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. No further judicial construction is required or permitted. To the extent this case requires the interpretation of a contract, our primary goal in interpreting any contract is to give effect to the parties’ intentions at the time they entered into the contract. We determine the parties’ intent by inter preting the language of the contract according to its plain and ordinary meaning. If the language of a contract is unambiguous, we must enforce the contract as written.
III. ANALYSIS
A. WHETHER THE PULL CREDIT BID RULE BARS CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST NONBORROWER THIRD PARTIES
We turn first to Bank of America’s contention that the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the full credit bid rule barred its claims against Westminster and First American. As discussed previously, in reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on New Freedom, which held that the full credit bid rule bars fraud and contract claims brought by the mortgagee against nonborrower third parties. Bank of America argues that New Freedom was incorrectly decided and should be overruled.
As noted earlier, Bank of America foreclosed by advertisement on all four properties at issue in accordance with Michigan’s foreclosure statutes. Under our foreclosure by advertisement scheme, a mortgagee may foreclose by advertisement “[e]very mortgage of real estate, which contains a power of sale, upon default being made in any condition of such mortgage.” The statutes prescribe, among other things, the circumstances that must exist before foreclosure by advertisement can occur, the procedure that the mortgagee must follow, and the mortgagor’s right of redemption.
As part of this statutory scheme, the Michigan Legislature enacted MCL 600.3280, Michigan’s anti-deficiency statute. If a mortgagee sues a debtor to recover a deficiency judgment, the anti-deficiency statute allows the debtor to defend the suit by showing “that the property sold was fairly worth the amount of the debt secured by it at the time and place of sale or that the amount bid was substantially less than its true value.” Such a showing will “defeat the deficiency judgment against [the debtor], either in whole or in part. . . .”
A mortgagee that elects to foreclose by advertisement may bid on the property at the sale, and a mortgagee who does so “stands in the position of an ordinary purchaser . . . .” However, unlike a third-party purchaser, a mortgagee is not required to make a cash bid. Instead, a mortgagee can make a bid on credit because any cash it tenders would be returned to it, and thus “[a'Jctual payment to the sheriff would [be] an idle gesture.”
A mortgagee who bids on the property at a foreclosure sale is not required to bid the full amount of the debt. If a mortgagee bids a lower amount, it may then pursue a deficiency judgment against the debtor, subject to the limitations set forth in the anti-deficiency statute. However, a mortgagee can make a full credit bid—i.e., a credit bid “in an amount equal to the unpaid principal and interest of the mortgage debt, together with costs, fees, and other expenses of the foreclosure.” If a mortgagee’s “full credit bid is suc cessful, i.e., results in the acquisition of the property, the lender pays the full outstanding balance of the debt and costs of the foreclosure to itself and takes title to the security property, releasing the borrower from further obligations under the defaulted note.”
Under the full credit bid rule, a lender who takes title following a full credit bid “is precluded for purposes of collecting its debt from later claiming that the property is actually worth less than the bid.” This is because the mortgagee who enters such a bid is deemed “to have irrevocably warranted that the value of the security foreclosed upon was equal to the outstanding indebtedness and not impaired.” Thus, the full credit bid rule “makes a properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale the dispositive device through which to resolve the question of value.” And, in its most direct application, the rule bars a mortgagee who takes title at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale following a full credit bid from pursuing a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor.
However, courts have recognized the applicability of the full credit bid rule in other contexts. For example, in Smith v Gen Mtg Corp, although not referring to the rule by its name, we considered the full credit bid rule in the context of the mortgagee’s right to recover insurance proceeds for a loss occurring before the foreclosure sale. There, the mortgagee submitted a bid on the property at a foreclosure sale for the full amount of the debt plus foreclosure costs. A fire had previously destroyed the house. Six months after the foreclosure, the mortgagee received the insurance proceeds. The mortgagors (i.e., the defaulting homeowners) sued to recover the insurance proceeds from the mortgagee. The mortgagors argued that they were entitled to the insurance proceeds because the mortgage debt was extinguished when the mortgagee bid in the amount of the debt at the foreclosure sale. The mortgagee argued that, because the property was nearly worthless, it was entitled to the proceeds.
The Smith Court recognized that the loss occurred before the mortgage sale and that “[a]lthough the mortgagee was entitled to the insurance proceeds to reduce the debt or repair the property, it instead purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.” It stated, “[W]hen the loss occurs before a foreclosure sale in which the mortgagee purchases the property for a bid which extinguishes the mortgage debt, the mort gagee is not entitled to the insurance proceeds.” It then concluded:
“No one disputes that the mortgagee is entitled to recover only his debt. Any surplus value belongs to others, namely, the mortgagor or subsequent lienors. Indeed, it is not conceivable that the mortgagee could recover a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor if it had bid in the full amount of the debt at foreclosure sale. To allow the mortgagee, after effectively cutting off or discouraging lower bidders, to take the property and then establish that it was worth less than the bid encourages fraud, creates uncertainty as to the mortgagor’s rights, and most unfairly deprives the sale of whatever leaven comes from other bidders.”[ ]
In this case, we must determine whether the full credit bid rule applies to bar contract claims against nonborrower third parties. This brings us to New Freedom, which was the first case in Michigan to address the full credit bid rule in this context.
In New Freedom, the plaintiff funded two mortgage loans. Similar to the instant case, CPLs were issued in conjunction with the loans. Eventually, the borrowers defaulted on the loans, and a subsequent assignor foreclosed on the properties, making full credit bids. The assignor was indemnified by the plaintiff through an indemnity agreement. The plaintiff filed suit against several of the entities involved in the loans and the closings, arguing, among other things, that the title insurer was liable under the parties’ CPLs for the fraudulent or dishonest acts or omissions of the closing agents. The trial court agreed that the title insurer, through the closing agents, had violated the CPLs, but found no liability because the plaintiff suffered no damages as a result of the assignor’s full credit bid, which satisfied the debt.
On appeal, much of the Court of Appeals’ focus was on determining whether the full credit bid rule applied to bar fraud claims. In considering this issue, the Court reviewed a litany of cases from within and without this state discussing the full credit bid rule. The panel concluded that the cases stood for multiple propositions, including that the full credit bid rule applied to actions brought by the mortgagee for fraud. And, after reviewing two California cases, the panel held that the full credit bid rule precluded fraud actions against nonborrower third parties. Later, the panel extended this conclusion by applying the full credit bid rule to bar the plaintiffs contract claims against non-borrower third parties as well. In sum, the panel concluded that, in light of the full credit bids at the foreclosure sale, the plaintiffs claims against the non-borrower third parties (i.e., the appraiser, the closing agents, and the title insurer that issued the CPLs) were barred by the full credit bid rule.
In determining that the full credit bid rule bars claims against nonborrower third parties, the New Freedom panel distinguished Alliance Mortgage v Rothwell and relied on Pacific Inland Bank v Ains-worth, We will discuss each of those cases in turn to determine whether they support this conclusion.
In Alliance Mortgage, the California Supreme Court considered the effect of a mortgagee’s full credit bid on a claim of fraud in the inducement of the underlying loan obligation against the nonborrower, third-party defendants. After a lengthy review of California’s anti-deficiency statute, the full credit bid rule, and the applicable caselaw, the court concluded that the mortgagee’s full credit bids did not, as a matter of law, bar its fraud claims against the defendants as long as the mortgagee could establish that “its full credit bids were a proximate result of defendants’ fraud, and that in the absence of such fraud it would not, in all reasonable probability, have made the bids.” In so doing, it recognized that “[t]he full credit bid rule was not intended to immunize wrongdoers from the consequences of their fraudulent acts.”
Although Alliance Mortgage militates against New Freedom's conclusion that the full credit bid rule bars claims against nonborrower third parties, the New Freedom panel found Alliance Mortgage distinguishable, stating as follows: “[Gjiven the lender’s alleged fiduciary relationship with the defendants and the fact that it did not discover the alleged fraud until after the foreclosure sale, [Alliance Mortgage] held that the full credit bid rule did not, as a matter of law, bar its claims.” The panel concluded that Alliance Mortgage did not control the case before it because there were no allegations of a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the nonborrower third parties in New Freedom. However, the Alliance Mortgage Court specifically stated that the existence of a fiduciary relationship, or lack thereof, had no effect on its conclusion that the full credit bid rule does not, as a matter of law, bar fraud claims against nonborrower third parties. Thus, we find New Freedom’s attempt to distinguish Alliance Mortgage unpersuasive.
In Pacific Inland Bank, the California Court of Appeals concluded that the full credit bid rule barred a negligence action against an appraiser and his company—i.e., nonborrower third parties. The panel concluded that Alliance Mortgage only created an exception to the full credit bid rule for fraud claims against nonborrower third parties and thus concluded that, “absent a fraud claim, a full credit bid estops a plaintiff from establishing damages.”
However, more than one court has called into question the holding of Pacific Inland Bank. For example, in In re King Street Investments, the Court concluded that Pacific Inland Bank's holding was not only inconsistent with Alliance Mortgage but also contrary to the purpose of the full credit bid rule and California’s anti-deficiency statute because “[n] either the rule nor the statutes are concerned about the relationship between a third-party nonborrower and a lender.”
Similarly, in Kolodge v Boyd, the California Court of Appeals declined to follow Pacific Inland Bank in determining whether the full credit bid rule barred claims of fraud and negligence against an appraiser (i.e., a nonborrower third party). In holding that the rule does not bar such claims, the court noted that, although Alliance Mortgage only considered the full credit bid rule in relation to fraud claims, “the rationale of Alliance, as well as the authorities the court relied upon, strongly suggest such bids also do not as a matter of law bar any other tort claims against third parties who are not borrowers . . . .” The panel recognized that the full credit bid rule was designed “to ensure the integrity of nonjudicial foreclosure sales insofar as such sales may relate to the debtor protection policies of the antideficiency statutes.” Further, “[l]ike the antideficiency statutes, the full credit bid rule is not concerned about the relationship between the lender and third parties but only the relationship between the lender and the borrower. . . ,” After reviewing Cornelison v Kornbluth, which established the full credit bid rule in California, the court ob served that it provided “no reason to think a full credit bid establishes the value of the property for any purpose other than a determination whether the borrower subject to the lien has satisfied the secured obligation.” Then, after analyzing Pacific Inland Bank, the court concluded that the case was “wrongly decided and decline [d] to follow it,” noting that the “[a]pplication of the rule to bar claims against tort-feasors not party to the note goes far beyond the purpose of the rule and is simply irrational.”
Unlike the Court in New Freedom, we decline to rely on Pacific Inland Bank to extend the full credit bid rule to bar claims against nonborrower third parties. Instead, we are persuaded by Alliance Mortgage and Kolodge. As those courts recognized, the full credit bid rule is related to the anti-deficiency statute, and its purpose is merely to resolve the question of the value of the property for purposes of determining whether the mortgage debt was satisfied. It is not concerned with the relationship between the lender and third parties and was simply not intended to cut off all remedies a mortgagee might have against nonborrower third parties.
This is confirmed when the full credit bid rule is considered within our jurisprudence, as well as in relation to the claims at issue in this case. In Michigan, although the right to foreclose by advertisement is statutory, “[statutory foreclosures are a matter of contract, authorized by the mortgagor[.]” As a result, the proceedings are limited to resolving the rights and remedies of the parties to the contract—i.e., the mortgagee and the mortgagor. Moreover, the Legislature’s intent in enacting the foreclosure by advertisement statutes was, in part, to protect the mortgagor by not allowing the mortgagee a double recovery.
Likewise, when enacting Michigan’s anti-deficiency statute, the Legislature clearly limited its effect to the rights of the parties to the mortgage debt. We have recognized that the Legislature enacted the anti-deficiency statute in an attempt “to safeguard the rights of the debtor and secure to the creditor that which is his due.” Indeed, only “the mortgagor, trustor or other maker of any such obligation, or any other person liable thereon” may defend against a mortgagee’s suit to recover a deficiency by showing “that the property sold was fairly worth the amount of the debt secured by it at the time and place of sale or that the amount bid was substantially less than its true value [.] ”
Further, holding that Bank of America’s full credit bids meant that it suffered no damages whatsoever and thus could not recover under any theory would impinge on the parties’ ability to contract as they see fit and would nullify the protections for which Bank of America contracted. Through the contracts at issue, Bank of America sought to protect itself from the very activity that allegedly occurred in this case—fraud by those individuals involved in closing the mortgage. Bank of America’s ability to recover under the contracts is not limited by its bids on the properties; instead, as discussed later in this opinion, the parties agreed that Bank of America could recover for any loss resulting from Westminster’s failure to follow the closing instructions and its actual losses arising out of the fraud or dishonesty of Westminster in connection with the closings. Bank of America has presented evidence that it suffered actual losses when it sold the properties for much less than the amounts of the loans provided. We see no justification for limiting or nullifying Bank of America’s contractual rights by application of a rule designed to determine Bank of America’s rights in relation to the mortgagors.
In sum, although the full credit bid rule is not a creature of statute, we are cognizant of its relationship to the foreclosure by advertisement and anti-deficiency statutes. Those statutes are carefully designed to govern the relationship between, and establish the rights and liabilities of, the mortgagee and mortgagor—not nonborrower third parties. Like the courts in Alliance Mortgage and Kolodge, we conclude that there is no justification for extending the protections of the rule to alter the contractual rights and liabilities between a mortgagee and nonborrower third parties. Therefore, we hold that the full credit bid rule does not bar contract claims by a mortgagee against nonborrower third parties, and we overrule New Freedom to the extent that it conflicts with our decision today.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals majority erred by concluding that the full credit bid rule barred Bank of America’s claims against Westminster and First American stemming from the Kirkway and Enid closings. Instead, we agree with the Court of Appeals dissent that, while it is undisputed that Bank of America made full credit bids on those properties, the full credit bid rule does not bar Bank of America’s contract claims against nonborrower third parties such as Westminster and First American.
B. LIABILITY UNDER THE CLOSING INSTRUCTIONS
Having determined that the full credit bid rule does not automatically preclude recovery for Bank of America, we now turn to the viability of Bank of America’s contract claims. We first consider Bank of America’s breach of contract claim against Westminster for not complying with the specific provisions of the closing instructions at the Enid and Heron Ridge closings.
The closing instructions for the two closings performed by Westminster contain similar language. Among other things, the instructions required Westminster to contact Bank of America immediately if it could not comply with the instructions. Importantly, the instructions read, “As a closing agent you are financially liable for any loss resulting from your failure to follow these Instructions.” The instructions could not be verbally altered; any alterations or amendments had to be in writing and faxed as necessary with a confirmation receipt. Any changes approved by Bank of America had to be initialed by all signatories. In addition, Bank of America had to approve the HUD-1 settlement statement before closing.
To prevail on its claim for breach of contract against Westminster for violation of these contracts, Bank of America must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there was a contract, (2) the other party breached the contract, and (3) the breach resulted in damages to the party claiming breach. The parties quarrel over the first element—whether the closing instructions constitute contracts upon which a claim may be brought.
“A valid contract requires five elements: (1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation.” The parties do not dispute that they were competent to contract or that loan closings are a proper subject matter for a contract. In addition, there is no question regarding the existence of legal consideration. In order for consideration to exist, there must be a bargained-for exchange—“a benefit on one side, or a detriment suffered, or service done on the other.” Here, Westminster received a fee in exchange for handling the Enid and Heron Ridge closings, thus satisfying the consideration requirement. Further, there was mutuality of agreement and mutuality of obligation. Bank of America submitted the closing instructions to Westminster, and Westminster agreed to the closing instructions by performing the closings for Bank of America. Further, Westminster acknowledged that it understood its obligations under the closing instructions and indeed agreed to perform those obligations—the closing agent signed in ac-knowledgement that “I have closed this loan in accordance with the foregoing Instructions. I CERTIFY COMPLIANCE WITH ALL OF THE CONDITIONS OUTLINED IN THESE INSTRUCTIONS.”
As a result, the closing instructions in the instant case satisfied all the elements of a valid contract. Therefore, we hold that closing instructions can constitute a contract and that the closing instructions between Bank of America and Westminster do, in fact, constitute contracts upon which a breach of contract action may lie.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals concluded that, to the extent the closing instructions constituted contracts, Westminster’s duties under the contracts were specifically modified and limited by the CPLs between Bank of America and First American. We disagree.
Parties to a contract are at liberty to modify or waive the rights and duties established by a contract. Further, “a modification or waiver can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the parties mutually agreed to a modification or waiver of the contract.” But a party cannot “unilaterally alter an existing bilateral agreement.” Instead, a party alleging a modification of a contract “must establish a mutual intention of the parties to waive or modify the original contract.” “This principle follows from the contract formation requirement that is elementary to the exercise of one’s freedom to contract: mutual assent.”
Under these well-recognized principles, the CPLs in the instant case could not have modified the closing instructions between Bank of America and Westminster. Nothing in the contract purports to limit and modify Westminster’s duties as the closing agent. Instead, the contract merely provides the limitations on First American’s agreement to indemnify Bank of America for any errors arising from the closing on behalf of the closing agent (Westminster). Most importantly, even if the CPLs did purport to modify Westminster’s duties under the closing instructions, the CPLs are contracts between First American and Bank of America only. As Westminster is not a party to the CPLs, it cannot be that the CPLs modified Westminster’s obligations under the closing instructions because Bank of America and Westminster did not mutually agree to modify the obligations under the closing instructions. Because mutuality is a necessary predicate to the modification of a contract, the Court of Appeals erred to the extent it concluded that the contracts between Bank of America and Westminster were modified by the CPLs between Bank of America and First American.
Having clarified the contractual relationship between Bank of America and Westminster, we decline to decide whether summary disposition is appropriate on this claim at this time. Instead, we vacate the entirety of the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the issue, because of its erroneous belief that the closing instructions were modified by the CPLs. Moreover, the trial court’s only mention of this claim in its opinion and order was that, under New Freedom, there was no breach of contract by defendant Westminster. However, New Freedom did not involve a breach of contract claim based on the closing instructions and thus does not control the instant issue. Therefore, we remand to the trial court for it to reconsider, under the parameters set forth in this opinion, whether summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10) is appropriate as to Bank of America’s claim for breach of contract against Westminster.
C. LIABILITY UNDER THE CLOSING PROTECTION LETTERS
We turn next to Bank of America’s claim against First American for liability under the CPLs.
A CPL “is a contract between the title company and the lender whereby the title insurance company agrees to indemnify the lender for any losses caused by the failure of the title agent to follow the lender’s closing instructions.” A CPL “is necessary because, while a title agent is the agent of the title insurance company for purposes of selling the title insurance policy (and binding the company to the insurance contract), that agency relationship does not extend to the title agent’s conduct at the closing.” As a result, “[a] lender who also wants the title insurer to be responsible for the agent’s acts in connection with escrow closing activities and services must separately contract with the title insurer for such additional protection by entering into an ‘insured closing letter’ or ‘closing protection letter.’ ”
Under the CPLs in the instant case, First American agreed to reimburse Bank of America for
actual loss incurred by [Bank of America] in connection with such closings when conducted by the Issuing Agent (an Agent authorized to issue title insurance for the Company), referenced herein and when such loss arises out of:
1. Failure of the Issuing Agent to comply with your written closing instructions to the extent that they relate to (a) the status of the title to said interest in land or the validity, enforceability and priority of the lien of said mortgage on said interest in land, including the obtaining of documents and the disbursement of funds necessary to establish such status of title or lien, or (b) the obtaining of any other document, specifically required by you, but not to the extent that said instructions require a determination of the validity, enforceability or effectiveness of such other document, or (c) the collection and payment of funds due you, or
2. Fraud or dishonesty of the Issuing Agent handling your funds or documents in connection with such closings.[ ]
Bank of America only asserts that First American is liable under § 2 for the fraud and dishonesty of Westminster and Patriot in connection with the four closings.
On this issue, the trial court concluded that First American was not liable under § 2 of the CPLs because Bank of America “failed to present any evidence of concealed disbursements, shortages or unpaid prior lien holders.” Further, the trial court stated, “The Court of Appeals in New Freedom specifically found that any misrepresentation on the HUD-1 settlement is not fraud in the handling of the lender’s document.” Because it appears that the trial court misinterpreted the parties’ contracts, we clarify the circumstances under which First American may be liable under the CPLs.
As mentioned previously, we enforce a contract as written. Section 2 can be broken down into two parts: (1) fraud or dishonesty (2) of the Issuing Agent handling your funds or documents in connection with such closings. Considering the latter clause first, it is clear that Westminster and Patriot are the Issuing Agents “handling your funds or documents in connection with such closings.” Therefore, in order for First American to be liable under the CPLs, Bank of America must establish that it suffered actual losses arising out of the fraud or dishonesty of Westminster and Patriot in connection with the closings.
The Court of Appeals in this case recognized that the terms “fraud or dishonesty” were quite broad. The Court stated:
The common meaning of “dishonesty” is the opposite of “honesty;” it is “a disposition to lie, cheat, or steal” or a “dishonest act; fraud.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1992), p 385. Our Supreme Court in General Electric Credit Corp v Wolverine Ins Co, 420 Mich 176, 179, 188; 362 NW2d 595 (1984), discussed the “natural, common, ordinary, and primarily understood meaning” of the word “fraud,” as used in MCL 257.248 requiring a surety bond of motor vehicle dealers providing indemnification of certain persons for loss “caused through fraud, cheating, or misrepresentation in the conduct of the vehicle business.” The Court noted that the “natural, common, and ordinarily understood definition of the word ‘fraud’ embraces both actual and constructive fraud.” General Electric Credit Corp, 420 Mich at 188. Thus, the plain meaning of “fraud” includes “both actual fraud-—an intentional perversion of the truth—and constructive fraud—an act of deception or a misrepresentation without an evil intent.” Amco Builders & Developers, Inc v Team Ace Joint Venture, 469 Mich 90, 101 n 2; 666 NW2d 623 (2003) (Young, J., concurring). Fraud may also be committed by suppressing facts—silent fraud—where circumstances establish a legal duty to make full disclosure. Id., citing Hord v Environmental Research Institute of Michigan (After Remand), 463 Mich 399, 412; 617 NW2d 543 (2000). Such a duty of full disclosure may arise when a party has expressed to another “some particularized concern or made a direct inquiry.” M & D, Inc v McConkey, 231 Mich App 22, 29; 585 NW2d 33 (1998).[ ]
Neither party quarrels with the Court of Appeals’ construction of these words. And because we believe it to be a proper interpretation of the words “fraud or dishonesty” as contained in the CPLs, we adopt the analysis in full.
Notwithstanding the unambiguous language of the parties’ CPLs, the trial court and the Court of Appeals majority imposed additional requirements on Bank of America not found in the plain language of the parties’ contracts, including (1) that Bank of America must present evidence of concealed disbursements, shortages, or unpaid prior lien holders and (2) that First American, as a matter of law, could not be liable based on the fraud or dishonesty of Westminster and Patriot in the handling of a HUD-1 settlement statement.
First, it is unclear why the trial court concluded that Bank of America must present evidence of concealed disbursements, shortages, or unpaid prior lien holders in order to recover for the fraud or dishonesty by Westminster or Patriot. Given that no such restrictions are found in § 2 of the parties’ CPLs, the trial court erred by reading them into the parties’ contract. Again, as discussed earlier, Bank of America must only establish that it suffered actual losses arising out of the fraud or dishonesty of Westminster or Patriot in connection with the closings.
Second, the lower courts’ conclusions regarding the HUD-1 settlement statements appear to stem from their reliance on New Freedom, which also considered a title insurer’s liability under a CPL. In New Freedom, the CPLs stated that the title insurer was liable for actual losses arising out of the “[fraud or dishonesty of the Issuing Agent in handling your funds or documents in connection with such closings.” The panel interpreted this phrase to mean that the title insurer was only liable for the fraud or dishonesty of the closing agent in handling the lender’s funds or documents in connection with the closings. The panel recognized that “[a]lthough there were discrepancies in the HUD-1 settlement statement and the attachment to the HUD-1 settlement statement was falsely attested, these documents did not belong to plaintiff’ and thus there was “no evidence that it committed any fraud or dishonesty in handling documents that belonged to plaintiff.”
We conclude that the trial court and Court of Appeals majority erred by relying on New Freedom to interpret the CPLs in the instant case. The title insurer in New Freedom was liable for the actual losses arising out of the “[f]raud or dishonesty of the Issuing Agent in handling your funds or documents in connection with such closings,” whereas in the instant case, First American is liable for actual losses arising out of “[fraud or dishonesty of the Issuing Agent handling your funds or documents in connection with such closings.” Although the distinction is slight—the only difference is the word “in”—the distinction is legally significant. As the Court of Appeals dissent properly recognized, “If the word ‘in’ is included, it defines, and effectively restricts, the types or categories of fraudulent or dishonest activities by a closing agent that can give rise to a right to indemnification, limiting them to conduct associated with handling the mortgage company’s funds or documents.” On the other hand, “[i]f the word ‘in’ is not included, as is the case here, the phrase ‘handling your funds or documents in connection with ... closings’ simply defines or identifies the closing agent, effectively broadening the indemnification coverage to any acts of fraud or dishonesty by the closing agent related to a closing.” In light of this distinction, the fraud or dishonesty by Westminster or Patriot need not be tied to their handling of Bank of America’s funds or documents. As a result, Bank of America is able to offer evidence that Westminster and Patriot engaged in fraud or dishonesty in the handling of the HUD-1 settlement statements at closing, regardless of whether those documents belong to Bank of America.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred to the extent they relied on New Freedom to resolve this issue. Having clarified the parameters of Bank of America’s claim against First American, we remand to the trial court for it to reconsider whether summary disposition in favor of First American regarding its liability under the CPLs was appropriate. On remand, the inquiry is whether genuine issues of material fact remain regarding Bank of America’s actual losses arising from the fraud or dishonesty of Westminster and Patriot in connection with the closings.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals in New Freedom erred by extending the protections of the full credit bid rule to bar contract claims brought by the mortgagee against nonborrower third parties. Therefore, we overrule New Freedom to the extent it conflicts with this opinion. Further, the Court of Appeals in the instant case erred by concluding that the full credit bid rule barred recovery for Bank of America as to its claims regarding the Kirkway and Enid closings. The full credit bid rule does not bar contract claims against nonborrower third parties. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of whether summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was appropriate on Bank of America’s contract claims against Westminster and First American. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Young, C.J., and Markman, Zahra, McCormack, Bernstein, and Laesen, JJ., concurred with Viviano, J.
New Freedom Mtg Corp v Globe Mtg Corp, 281 Mich App 63; 761 NW2d 832 (2008).
MCL 600.3201 et seq.
Bank of America sold Enid for $632,500, Heron Ridge for $1,150,000, Golf Ridge for $325,000, and Kirkway for $440,000.
Patriot and all other defendants except Westminster and First American have either been defaulted or dismissed from the action.
Bank of America also raised a negligent misrepresentation claim against Westminster, but subsequently voluntarily dismissed it.
Bank of America, NA v First American Title Ins Co, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 27, 2014 (Docket No. 307756).
Bank of America, unpub op at 12, quoting New Freedom, 281 Mich App at 68 (citations omitted).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 15.
Chief Judge Murphy concurred in part and dissented in part. He disagreed with the majority’s construction of the CPLs and its analysis regarding the two closings administered by Westminster. He further disagreed with the majority’s acceptance of New Freedom regarding the full credit bid rule. Chief Judge Murphy recognized that New Freedom required the panel to apply the full credit bid rule to the instant case, but he would have formally challenged the opinion by requesting that a conflict panel be convened. Finally, he disagreed with the majoritys evaluation of Bank of America’s contract claim against Westminster. Bank of America, unpub op at 1-5 (Murphy, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Bank of America, NA v First American Title Ins Co, 497 Mich 896 (2014).
Elba Twp v Gratiot Co Drain Comm’r, 493 Mich 265, 277-278; 831 NW2d 204 (2013).
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
Id.
Id.
Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637, 643; 753 NW2d 48 (2008).
Madugula v Taub, 496 Mich 685, 696; 853 NW2d 75 (2014).
Id.
Id.
Miller-Davis v Ahrens Constr, Inc, 495 Mich 161, 174; 848 NW2d 95 (2014).
Id.
See In re Smith Trust, 480 Mich 19, 24; 745 NW2d 754 (2008).
Because New Freedom was published, the Court of Appeals panel in the instant case was bound by it. See MCR 7.215(C)(2).
MCL 600.3201 et seq.
MCL 600.3201.
MCL 600.3204.
See, e.g., MCL 600.3212 and MCL 600.3216.
See, e.g., MCL 600.3240.
MCL 600.3280 reads in pertinent part:
When, in the foreclosure of a mortgage by advertisement, any sale of real property has been made after February 11, 1933, or shall be hereafter made by a mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized to make the same pursuant to the power of sale contained therein, at which the mortgagee, payee or other holder of the obligation thereby secured has become or becomes the purchaser, or takes or has taken title thereto at such sale either directly or indirectly, and thereafter such mortgagee, payee or other holder of the secured obligation, as aforesaid, shall sue for and undertake to recover a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor, trustor or other maker of any such obligation, or any other person liable thereon, it shall be competent and lawful for the defendant against whom such deficiency judgment is sought to allege and show as matter of defense and set-off to the extent only of the amount of the plaintiffs claim, that the property sold was fairly worth the amount of the debt secured by it at the time and place of sale or that the amount bid was substantially less than its true value, and such showing shall constitute a defense to such action and shall defeat the deficiency judgment against him, either in whole or in part to such extent.
MCL 600.3280. Anti-deficiency statutes like MCL 600.3280 were enacted in response to the Great Depression as an attempt “to address the ever-growing number of foreclosures and the effect they had on the grim residential real estate situation.” Wright, The Effect of New Deal Real Estate Residential Finance and Foreclosure Policies Made in Response to the Real Estate Conditions of the Great Depression, 57 Ala L Rev 231, 240-241 (2005). Michigan’s original anti-deficiency statute was enacted by 1937 PA 143 and made retroactive to February 11, 1933.
MCL 600.3280.
Pulleyblank v Cape, 179 Mich App 690, 693; 446 NW2d 345 (1989).
Senters v Ottawa Sav Bank, FSB, 443 Mich 45, 50; 503 NW2d 639 (1993).
Griffin v Union Guardian Trust Co, 261 Mich 67, 69; 245 NW 572 (1932); see also Feldman v Equitable Trust Co, 278 Mich 619; 270 NW 809 (1937).
Bankers Trust Co of Detroit v Rose, 322 Mich 256, 261; 33 NW2d 783 (1948) (stating that the anti-deficiency statute “nowhere required [the mortgagee] to bid the full amount of the debt as a condition of bidding at the foreclosure proceedings”).
See MCL 600.3280.
Alliance Mtg Co v Rothwell, 10 Cal 4th 1226, 1238; 44 Cal Rptr 2d 352; 900 P2d 601 (1995). See also 55 Am Jur 2d, Mortgages, § 524, pp 243-244.
Id. See also 55 Am Jur 2d, Mortgages, § 524, pp 243-244.
Alliance Mtg Co, 10 Cal 4th at 1238. See also Titan Loan Investment Fund, LP v Marion Hotel Partners, LLC, 891 NE2d 74, 77 (Ind App, 2008) (“[The mortgagee] cannot bid and pay its entire judgment, interest, and costs at a sheriffs sale and then repudiate its bid in subsequent proceedings any more than a disinterested third party could have bid the same amount in cash and subsequently asked for a refund.”).
55 Am Jur 2d, Mortgages, § 524, p 244.
Kolodge v Boyd, 88 Cal App 4th 349, 356-357; 105 Cal Rptr 2d 749 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
See Pulleyblank, 179 Mich App at 695 (concluding that the mortgagee’s full credit bid “constituted full satisfaction of all indebtedness” and that “[i]t would defy logic to allow [the mortgagee] to bid an inflated price on a piece of property to ensure that they would not be overbid and ... to then claim that the ‘true value’ was less than half of the value of the bid”).
Smith v Gen Mtg Corp, 402 Mich 125; 261 NW2d 710 (1978). The full credit bid rule has also been invoked in actions to recover for the waste of the mortgagor—see, e.g., Cornelison v Kornbluth, 15 Cal 3d 590; 125 Cal Rptr 557; 542 P2d 981 (1975); see also Janower v FM Sibley Lumber Co, 245 Mich 571, 573-574; 222 NW 736 (1929)—and actions claiming fraud by the mortgagor or other parties in inducing the mortgagee to make the loan; see Alliance Mtg Co, 10 Cal 4th 1226; but see Chrysler Capital Realty, Inc v Grella, 942 F2d 160 (CA 2, 1991).
Smith, 402 Mich at 128.
Id.
Id. at 128-129, quoting Whitestone Savings & Loan Ass’n v Allstate Ins Co, 28 NY2d 332, 336-337; 321 NYS2d 862; 270 NE2d 694 (1971) (emphasis omitted). Although it adopted the rule for future cases, the Court declined to apply the full credit bid rule to the case before it, concluding that “[e]nforcement of this previously unannounced rule would confer an unearned benefit on plaintiffs.” Id. at 130.
New Freedom, 281 Mich App at 66-67.
id.
Id. at 70-74.
Id. at 74. Whether the full credit bid rule bars fraud claims against the mortgagor or nonborrower third parties is not before us today. While Bank of America originally brought a fraud claim against Westminster for negligent misrepresentation, the claim has been dismissed. Only Bank of America’s contract claims under the closing instructions and the CPLs remain.
Id. at 73-74, citing Alliance Mtg Co, 10 Cal 4th 1226, and Pacific Inland Bank v Ainsworth, 41 Cal App 4th 277; 48 Cal Rptr 2d 489 (1995).
New Freedom, 281 Mich App at 76-77.
Id. at 74-75.
Alliance Mtg Co, 10 Cal 4th 1226.
Pacific Inland Bank, 41 Cal App 4th 277.
Alliance Mtg Co, 10 Cal 4th at 1231.
Id. at 1246-47.
Id. Two concurring justices would have held that the full credit bid rule does not apply in the context of fraud claims against nonborrower third parties because such claims are not an attempt to collect on the debt, which is the predicate for the application of the rule. See id. at 1251-1254.
New Freedom, 281 Mich App at 73.
Id.
Alliance Mortgage Co, 10 Cal 4th at 1246 n 8.
Pacific Inland Bank, 41 Cal App 4th at 279.
Id. at 283.
In re King Street Investments, 219 BR 848, 855 (Bankr CA 9, 1998).
Kolodge, 88 Cal App 4th at 370. California Courts of Appeals are not bound by Court of Appeals’ decisions from other districts or divisions. See Jessen v Mentor Corp, 158 Cal App 4th 1480, 1489 n 10; 71 Cal Rptr 3d 714 (2008).
Kolodge, 88 Cal App 4th at 364.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 365-366.
Id. at 368, citing Cornelison, 15 Cal 3d 590.
Id. at 370.
One could argue (although no party does) that the full credit bid rule/insurance proceeds cases require a different result. These cases, which often involve a claim by a mortgagee against the insurer (i.e., a nonborrower third party), hold that such claims are barred by the full credit bid rule. See, e.g., Heritage Fed Savings Bank v Cincinnati Ins Co, 180 Mich App 720; 448 NW2d 39 (1989). However, we do not find these cases controlling in this context because, in an action to recover insurance proceeds, the crux of the dispute is whether the mortgagee or mortgagor is entitled to the proceeds (regardless of whether the mortgagor is made a party to the action). By contrast, in the instant case, the rights of the mortgagor are not at issue.
Calaveras Timber Co v Mich Trust Co, 278 Mich 445, 450; 270 NW 743 (1936).
White v Burkhardt, 338 Mich 235, 239; 60 NW2d 925 (1953).
See 54AAm Jur 2d, Mortgages, § 19, p 610 (“An instrument cannot operate as a mortgage unless there exist, as parties thereto, both a mortgagor and a mortgagee.”).
Church & Church, Inc v A-1 Carpentry, 281 Mich App 330, 341; 766 NW2d 30 (2008), vacated in part on other grounds 483 Mich 885 (2009).
Guardian Depositors Corp v Powers, 296 Mich 553, 561; 296 NW 675 (1941) (emphasis added). See also Bankers Trust Co of Detroit v Rose, 322 Mich 256, 260; 33 NW2d 783 (1948) (stating that the purpose of the anti-deficiency statute is “to prevent a mortgagee from obtaining judgment for a deficiency where the mortgagee had obtained by way of foreclosure the actual title to premises which were of greater value than the amount of the debt secured by the mortgage”).
MCL 600.3280.
See Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass’n v Birmingham, 479 Mich 206, 212; 737 NW2d 670 (2007) (recognizing that the freedom of contract is deeply entrenched in the common law and the right to make and enforce contracts is among the fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom).
For these reasons, we agree with the dissenting judge’s conclusion that "the full credit bid rule and anti-deficiency statutes are not concerned about the relationship between a lender and a third-party nonborrower; rather, they are designed to protect debtors or borrowers by restricting the remedies available to secured creditors for defaulted debts secured by mortgages or deeds of trust.” Bank of America, unpub op at 4 (Murphy, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing In re King Street Investments, 219 BR 848.
Miller-Davis, 495 Mich at 178.
This is a matter of first impression, in Michigan. However, we note that many courts have recognized that closing instructions may constitute contracts. See, e.g., Plaza Home Mtg Inc v North American Title Co, Inc, 184 Cal App 4th 130, 139; 109 Cal Rptr 3d 9 (2010) (indicating that the lender and the closing agent “had a direct contractual relationship arising from the closing instructions”); FDIC v US Titles, Inc, 939 F Supp 2d 30, 38-40 (D DC, 2013) (recognizing that violation of closing instructions can lead to a viable breach of contract claim); FDIC v Floridian Title Grp, 972 F Supp 2d 1289, 1295 (SD Fla, 2013) (concluding that the FDIC presented evidence that the closing instructions constituted a contract).
AFT Mich v Michigan, 497 Mich 197, 235; 866 NW2d 782 (2015).
Gen Motors Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 466 Mich 231, 239; 644 NW2d 734 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
See Quality Prods & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 372; 666 NW2d 251 (2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
In re Lowenstein, 459 BR 227, 236 (ED Penn, 2011).
Id.
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Westminster and Patriot are the Issuing Agents mentioned in the language of the CPLs.
In its order granting summary disposition, the trial court held that First American was not liable under Subsection (1) of the CPLs. We need not consider this issue because, as Bank of America readily admits, it never argued before the trial court that First American was liable under Subsection (1), nor does it attempt to do so now.
In re Smith Trust, 480 Mich at 24.
Bank of America, unpub op at 8-9.
New Freedom, 281 Mich App at 81 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 83.
Id. at 81 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
Bank of America, unpub op at 2 (Murphy, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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On order of the Court, in conformity with the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, the application for leave to appeal the August 29, 2013 order of the Court of Appeals is again considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the order of the Court of Appeals, we vacate the defendant’s sentence for first-degree murder, and we remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for resentencing on that conviction pursuant to MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a. See Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US _; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016), and Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012). We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s March 8, 2016 order is considered, and it is granted. We vacate our order dated March 8, 2016. On reconsideration, the application for leave to appeal the April 8, 2015 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is denied, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). | [
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LARSEN, J.
This case requires us to decide what alleged conduct is sufficient to warrant a bindover on the peculiar charge of “conspiring to commit a legal act in an illegal manner,” MCL 750.157a(d). In an anomalous reversal of roles, defendant, Paul Seewald, argues that his aim was illicit through and through. He never agreed to commit any legal act. Rather he conspired to commit an illegal act illegally; and that double illegality should set him free. The prosecution, for its part, argues that while defendant’s agreed-to means were surely illegal, his conspiratorial ends were purely legal-, and that legality is sufficient to try him as a felon.
The irony is not lost on us. Yet, after examining the conspiracy statute, we hold that the conduct alleged provides probable cause for trial on the charge. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for reinstatement of the 16th District Court’s order to bind defendant over and for further proceedings.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant and alleged coconspirator Don Yowch-uang worked in the district office of former Congressman Thaddeus McCotter during McCotter’s 2012 reelection campaign. Michigan election law required McCotter to submit at least 1,000 valid voter signatures before the Secretary of State could certify his placement on the ballot. Defendant and Yowchuang bore some responsibility for collecting those signatures and submitting them to the Secretary of State. The day before the nominating petitions were due, defendant and Yowchuang realized that several of the petitions had not been signed by their circulator, as required by law. To solve this problem, they agreed to sign the petitions as circulators even though they had not circulated the petitions themselves. Defendant and Yowchuang explained that they signed as circulators so McCotter would qualify to appear on the ballot.
The Board of State Canvassers discovered the petitions’ irregularities and, pursuant to MCL 168.544c(10)(a), disqualified the voter signatures contained thereon. The remaining signatures were too few to secure McCotter’s place on the ballot. Shortly after the announcement that his name would not appear on the ballot, McCotter resigned his seat in the House of Representatives.
These events led to a criminal investigation. Defendant was charged with nine counts of falsely signing petitions, a misdemeanor under MCL 168.544c(9), and one count of felony conspiracy to commit a legal act in an illegal manner under MCL 750.157a. The conspiracy count charged defendant with agreeing “together with [Yowchuang] to submit nominating petitions with valid signatures to The Michigan Secretary of State by falsely signing the petitions as the circulator[.]”
Following a preliminary examination, the 16th District Court bound defendant over to the Wayne Circuit Court as charged; defendant then moved to quash the information on the felony charge. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the felony charge against him, concluding that there had been no conspiracy to commit a legal act. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the prosecution could not show an agreement to commit a legal act. We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal.
II. STANDARD OP REVIEW
In order to bind a defendant over for trial in the circuit court, the district court must find probable cause that the defendant committed a felony. This standard requires “evidence of each element of the crime charged or evidence from which the elements may be inferred.” Absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court should not disturb the district court’s bindover decision. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision “falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” Determining the scope of a criminal statute is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.
III. CONSPIRACY
The “gist” of conspiracy ‘lies in the illegal agreement”; once the agreement is formed, the “crime is complete.” Michigan law requires no proof of an overt act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. And, because the crime is complete upon the conspirators’ agreement, the prosecution need not prove that “the purpose contemplated by the unlawful agreement was accomplished.”
At common law, conspiracy consisted of “an understanding or agreement to accomplish an unlawful end, or a lawful end by unlawful means.” Most states have since abandoned this common-law formulation, jettisoning the “lawful end by unlawful means” alternative in favor of a requirement that the object of the conspiracy be itself criminal. Michigan’s conspiracy statute, by contrast, has retained the common-law form. MCL 750.157a provides:
Any person who conspires together with 1 or more persons to commit an offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty of the crime of conspiracy
As at common law, then, the statutory crime of conspiracy can be established in one of two ways: by proof that two or more persons have agreed to do an act that is in itself unlawful, or by proof that two or more persons have agreed to do a legal act using illegal means.
There can be little doubt that the Legislature intended to proscribe two forms of conspiracy. The plain language of the statute contemplates it, and distinct penalty provisions govern the commission of conspiracies to commit legal and illegal acts.
The statute provides penalties for conspiring to commit an illegal act that roughly track the penalties for the substantive offense. Conspiracies to commit a felony are subject to the same penalties as the corresponding substantive offense. Conspiracies to commit a misdemeanor may be punished by no more than one year in prison, a $1,000 fine, or both.
Conspiracies to commit a legal act in an illegal manner are treated differently. The statute makes such conspiracies categorically subject to penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both, regardless of whether the “illegal manner” would constitute a felony or a misdemeanor if charged as a substantive offense. On the facts of the present case, this sentencing scheme elevates conduct that could be charged as a misdemeanor—either as falsely signing petitions or as conspiracy to do the same—to conduct chargeable as a five-year felony. In a different case, the statute might allow a prosecutor to limit punishment by charging conduct punishable as a felony with a higher maximum penalty as a felony with a five-year maximum. The scheme thus places great discretion in the hands of prosecutors. Absent constitutional infirmity, however, we must give effect to the statute the Legislature has crafted.
IV. THE BINDOVER
We now consider whether defendant’s agreement with Yowchuang can provide the basis for a bindover on a charge of violating MCL 750.157a(d). The statute specifies three elements: (1) conspiring, (2) to commit a legal act, (3) in an illegal manner. Here, the prosecu tion charged that defendant conspired “together with [Yowchuang] to submit nominating petitions with valid signatures to The Michigan Secretary of State by falsely signing the petitions as the circulator [.] ” The parties agree that falsely signing a nominating petition as a circulator is an illegal act. What divides them is whether the agreement to falsely sign as circulators can be charged as an illegal means to commit a legal act.
The prosecution argues that submitting nominating petitions with valid signatures to the Secretary of State is, in the abstract, a legal act. Defendant and Yowchuang agreed to perform this legal act by falsely signing the petitions as circulators. In the prosecution’s view, falsely signing is the illegal means by which the conspirators agreed to perform the generally legal act of submitting nominating signatures.
Defendant, by contrast, argues that, on the facts of this case, there never was any agreement to commit a legal act. Although submitting nominating petitions containing valid voter signatures to the Secretary of State is generally legal, once defendant and Yowch-uang falsely signed the petitions, the voter signatures contained thereon would become invalid by operation of law, and their submission to the Secretary of State would therefore be illegal. Thus, as defendant characterizes the facts here, the only agreement between defendant and Yowchuang was to do an illegal act through illegal means.
At bottom, then, the dispute revolves around whether to read the conspiracy statute as requiring proof of an agreement to perform an act legal in generic terms or legal as it would be performed in the particu lar circumstances of the case. We conclude that it must be the former.
This Court has never opined on the scope of the “legal act” requirement under MCL 750.157a, and so we have no precedent on point. Yet, defendant’s suggestion that we should train our focus on the specific facts of the case when construing the statute’s requirement of an agreed-upon “legal act” points us in the direction of our impossibility jurisprudence. Another way to have presented defendant’s argument, after all, would have been to argue that it was impossible, on the facts of the case, to have done the legal act alleged (submitting nominating petitions) because the illegal means alleged (false signing) made the legal act illegal. Defendant has not squarely raised an impossibility defense. Still, our precedent discussing impossibility can guide us toward the proper reading of the statutory text.
In People v Thousand, this Court discussed the availability of an impossibility defense with respect to a charge of attempt under MCL 750.92, which criminalizes attempts to commit an “offense prohibited by law.” The offense at issue was distribution of obscene material to a minor, an act which is generally illegal. The defendant, however, claimed entitlement to an impossibility defense because the intended recipient of the obscene material was not, in fact, a minor, but instead an adult undercover law enforcement officer. In a scholarly opinion considering the state of the law with respect to impossibility as a defense to inchoate crimes generally, the Court concluded that impossibility was not a valid defense to the crime of attempt. It did not matter, therefore, that completion of the substantive offense was impossible on the facts of the case, the recipient being an adult, not a child. What mattered was that the defendant attempted to commit an offense generally prohibited by law. The Court thus reinstated the charge against the defendant.
As noted, defendant has not squarely raised the defense of impossibility, and the parties have not briefed the question of its availability. We do not, therefore, resolve that question here. What Thousand suggests, however, is that the term “legal act” in the conspiracy statute is most properly read in the same manner that we read the language “offense prohibited by law” in the related statute criminalizing attempt: as referring to the lawfulness of the act in general, rather than with respect to the specific facts of the case. If, in Thousand, the statutory term “offense prohibited by law” had been read not as referring to offenses generally prohibited, but had instead been read in light of the particular facts of the case, there would have been no need to have discussed the availability of a defense. As the partial dissent in that case hinted, the charges could not have been sustained.
We are buoyed in this conclusion by the realization that to read the term “legal act” to mean “an act that is legal in light of the specific facts of the case,” instead of “an act that is legal generally,” would threaten to drain all meaning from the legal-act prong of the conspiracy statute. This we are loath to do. When possible, we strive to avoid constructions that would render any part of the Legislature’s work nugatory. Here, the text and structure of MCL 750.157a make clear that the Legislature intended to criminalize both conspiring to commit an offense prohibited by law and conspiring to commit a legal act in an illegal manner. The Court of Appeals’ and defendant’s analyses, however, would effectively collapse the two into one.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the false signing (a concededly illegal act) made the later generally lawful act (submitting petitions) into an illegal act, since it involved “[defendant’s and Yowchuang’s] defrauding of the Secretary of State.” Thus, the Court reasoned, the illegality of the means (signing falsely) tainted the ends (submitting nominating petitions) and made those ends illegal too. Accordingly, the Court concluded there was no legal act at all, nor any agreement to commit one. But if any illegal means taints the legality of the ends, it is difficult to envision the scenario in which a person could commit a legal act in an illegal manner. The Court of Appeals thus erred by giving the statute a construction that threatened to combine two distinct forms of conspiracy into one.
Defendant argues that just the opposite is true—that the prosecution’s reasoning would eliminate the statutory distinction between conspiracies to commit an offense prohibited by law and conspiracies to commit a legal act in an illegal manner. We are not persuaded. It may be that the single agreement between defendant and Yowchuang satisfied the elements of both flavors of conspiracy: conspiracy to commit an offense prohibited by law, which in this case was a misdemeanor, and felony conspiracy to commit a legal act in an illegal manner. But this does not, as defendant contends, eliminate the misdemeanor offense from the statute. To the contrary, when a single act violates multiple statutes, the prosecution is given discretion in its charging decision as long as the offenses and penalties are sufficiently clear. That prosecutors might often elect to charge the felony in no way makes the misdemeanor charge surplusage as a matter of law.
Finally, defendant argues that, in circumstances not present in this case, a ruling for the prosecution would permit future prosecutors to broaden the goals of the conspiracy when charging under MCL 750.157a(d) such that any conspiracy could be charged as a felony under the statute. We think the risk exaggerated. Defendant forgets that the crime of conspiracy is the agreement. Therefore, the prosecutor does not define the scope of the conspiracy: the conspirators do. Because one of the elements of MCL 750.157a(d) is the conspiracy, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the conspirators agreed both to commit a legal act and to do it in an illegal manner. The prosecution may not obtain a conviction simply by asserting that some legal act was the aim of the conspiracy; it must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, an agreement to it. In this case, there is certainly probable cause to believe that the conspirators agreed to the legal act charged, given that defendant has testified under oath that they agreed to sign the petitions “for the purpose of having [the] signatures included in” the Secretary of State’s count for the nomination and that Yowchuang similarly testified that the purpose for agreeing to do so was “to make [the] signatures count towards the nomination].]”
V. CONCLUSION
The district court properly found that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that defendant committed the felony of conspiracy to commit a legal act in an illegal manner. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for it to reinstate the bindover decision of the 16th District Court and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Young, C.J., and Markman, Zahra, McCormack, Viviano, and Bernstein, JJ., concurred with Larsen, J.
We note at the outset that this case is only at the bindover stage. The facts presented in this opinion are gleaned mostly from testimony given by defendant and Yowchuang at pretrial interviews.
MCL 168.544Í.
MCL 168.544c(5), as amended by 2014 PA 94 and 2014 PA 418, requires each individual petition to he signed and dated by the person who circulated the petition—the circulator—after the signatures for that petition have been collected. The Secretary of State is forbidden to count signatures submitted on an unsigned petition. Id. At the time this case arose, the version of the statute as amended by 2002 PA 431 was in effect, and the applicable subsection was Subsection (4). For ease of reference, however, this opinion will use and quote the 2014 version of MCL 168.544c.
Pursuant to MCL 168.544c(10)(a), any “obviously fraudulent signatures on a petition form,” which include the false signature of one purporting to be a circulator, are disqualified and may not be counted toward the number of signatures a candidate needs to appear on the ballot.
Yowchuang was also charged with 10 counts of felony forgery, 6 counts of misdemeanor falsely signing petitions, and 1 count of felony conspiracy to commit a legal act in an illegal manner. Those charges are not directly at issue in this case.
People v Seewald, unpublished order of the Wayne Circuit Court, entered January 18, 2013 (Case No. 12-010198-02-FH).
People v Seewald, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 5, 2014 (Docket No. 314705).
People v Seewald, 497 Mich 909 (2014).
See MCL 766.13.
People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 469; 446 NW2d 140 (1989), citing People v Doss, 406 Mich 90; 276 NW2d 9 (1979).
People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 561; 621 NW2d 702 (2001). See also People v Hudson, 241 Mich App 268, 276; 615 NW2d 784 (2000) (commenting that appellate courts “review the district court’s original exercise of discretion” when reviewing a decision to bind a defendant over to the circuit court).
Epps v 4 Quarters Restoration LLC, 498 Mich 518, 528; 872 NW2d 412 (2015), citing Barnett v Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151, 158; 732 NW2d 472 (2007).
Stone, 463 Mich at 561, citing People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 698; 564 NW2d 13 (1997).
People v Asta, 337 Mich 590, 611; 60 NW2d 472 (1953).
People v Justice, 454 Mich 334, 345-346; 562 NW2d 652 (1997), quoting People v Carter, 415 Mich 558, 568; 330 NW2d 314 (1982).
Asta, 337 Mich at 611.
People v Tenerowicz, 266 Mich 276, 285; 253 NW 296 (1934). See also 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d ed), § 12.1(a), p 255 (“[I]n 1832 came Lord Denman’s famous epigram that a conspiracy indictment must ‘charge a conspiracy either to do an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means’.. ..”).
2 LaFave, § 12.3(a), p 287 (“[MIost states provide that the object of a criminal conspiracy must be some crime or some felony.”) (collecting statutes). See, e.g., La Stat Ann 14:26, Reporter’s Comment—1950 (“By limiting ‘criminal conspiracy to cases where a substantive crime is involved we escape the hazardous undertaking of trying to determine when a lawful act is being done with a fraudulent or corrupt purpose,-a problem which plagued the common law.”); Ala Code 13A-4-3, Commentary (noting the “vagueness and uncertainty of the common law definition of conspiracy’).
See Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999) (“If the language of the statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. No further judicial construction is required or permitted.”).
We note also that two separate committees examining the criminal code advocated a change to the conspiracy statute due to the indeterminate nature of the current law. First, the 1967 Joint Committee of the State Bar of Michigan suggested that the conspiracy statute be limited to conspiracies to commit a criminal act because of the “open-ended” nature of the conspiracy to commit a legal act in an illegal manner. Israel, The Process of Penal Law Reform—A Look at the Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 Wayne L Rev 772, 819-820 (1968), citing Michigan Revised Criminal Code (final draft, 1967), § 1015, comment, p 98. Second, in 1979, another State Bar committee recommended a change to the statute, arguing that the current formulation is “too vague and indefinite.” Michigan Second Revised Criminal Code (final draft, June 1979), § 1015, Committee Commentary, p 108. The committee further noted: “[R]eported cases indicate little practical need for such a broad definition of an illicit conspiratorial objective. With few exceptions, past reported cases all have involved conspiracies to commit acts that were in themselves criminal.” Id. at 109. However, the Legislature has not amended the statute following its initial codification in 1966 by 1966 PA 296.
MCL 750.157a(a).
MCL 750.157a(c).
MCL 750.157a(d).
We note that defendant has raised no constitutional objections to the statute.
See MCL 168.544e(8) and (9).
The parties have identified only one case in this Court arising out of a conviction under MCL 750.157a(d): People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1; 260 NW2d 58 (1977). But that case did not analyze what it meant to commit a legal act in an illegal manner. The defendants there did not contest the validity of the charge, either in this Court or in the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, neither Court ruled on the question or even commented on it in dictum. To argue, by working backwards from Duncan’s facts, that the charge in that case must have been valid, when the question was not raised and no legal ruling on it was rendered, is to build a syllogism upon a conjecture.
People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149; 631 NW2d 694 (2001).
See MCL 722.675 (currently denominating the offense as “disseminating sexually explicit matter to a minor”).
Thousand, 465 Mich at 155.
Id. at 162-166.
Id. at 165-166.
Id. at 175 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In People v Tinskey, 394 Mich 108; 228 NW2d 782 (1975), this Court also briefly discussed the doctrine of impossibility as a defense to a charge of attempt. The charge in Tinskey, however, was conspiracy, not attempt. Although the Court discharged the defendants, the order leaves some ambiguity as to the grounds for the discharge.
Hoste v Shanty Creek Mgt, Inc, 459 Mich 561, 574; 592 NW2d 360 (1999).
Seewald, unpub op at 4.
When asked at oral argument to describe a scenario in which a person might properly be charged with committing a legal act in an illegal manner, the defense referred us to the facts of Duncan, 402 Mich 1. Because the Court in Duncan did not consider the legal question before us, we consider Duncan’s facts only as a hypothetical. If we apply defendant’s taint theory to those facts, however, we are not sure that even the charge in Duncan could survive. That case involved returning property to its rightful owner, which, of course, is generally a legal act. But, on the facts of that case (on which defendant would have us focus) it was to be returned only after a bribe had been paid. The return, then, being tainted by the bribe, might be better described not as a lawful act, but as the final step in an extortion. That it would have been worse to have received the bribe and then to have kept the property does not remove the taint. We are left, therefore, skeptical that any “legal act” conspiracy charge could survive on defendant’s reading of the statute.
See People v Ford, 417 Mich 66, 100; 331 NW2d 878 (1982), citing United States v Batchelder, 442 US 114, 126; 99 S Ct 2198; 60 L Ed 2d 755 (1979).
In any event, it is by no means clear that prosecutors will always or often elect the felony charge. The scarcity of appellate cases arising under the ‘legal act” prong of the conspiracy statute suggests that it has not heretofore been a popular charge, despite being available since before the adoption of our criminal code. In the exercise of sound discretion, prosecutors might well elect to charge the misdemeanor offense alone or in combination with a felony.
Asia, 337 Mich at 611.
See People v Kanar, 314 Mich 242, 249-250; 22 NW2d 359 (1946). | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 498 Mich 871. | [
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By order of November 26, 2014, the application for leave to appeal the August 5, 2014 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in People v Seewald (Docket No. 150146). On order of the Court, the case having been decided on April 25, 2016, 499 Mich 111 (2016), the application is again considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court to reinstate the bindover decision of the 16th District Court and for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s opinion in People v Seewald. | [
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Summary disposition at 498 Mich 926. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the sentence of the Wayne Circuit Court on the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction, and we remand this case to the trial court for resentencing on that conviction pursuant to MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a. See Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012); and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US _; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016). We note that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal under MCE 6.502(G) because this was the defendant’s first motion for relief from judgment since August 1, 1995. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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Superintending control denied at 499 Mich 885. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. | [
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Markman, J.
(dissenting). Defendant pleaded guilty to charges of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor explained that “even though [the conspiracy charge] would be a conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, it would be [sentenced using] the second degree murder grid [of the sentencing guidelines].” The trial court informed defendant that the conspiracy charge “carr[ied] a penalty of up to life in prison” and stated at sentencing that “by virtue of the plea agreement, . . . conviction will enter on the less serious charge of conspiracy to commit second degree murder.” Similarly, the judgment of sentence lists the offense as conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. The sentence was to concur rent prison terms of 20 to 40 years. Defendant now has moved to withdraw his conspiracy plea on the basis that he pleaded guilty of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder, which is a nonexistent crime. The trial court denied this motion without significant analysis, suggesting that any error was not prejudicial, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.
There are two issues in this case, each implicating the trial court’s authority to impose a particular sentence for the conspiracy plea. The first is whether, as defendant contends, the sentence is invalid because he was formally sentenced to a nonexistent conspiracy crime. As the Court of Appeals has recognized, a “conspiracy to commit second-degree murder is not a criminal offense,” and therefore a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to grant a defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea of guilty to such a nonexistent offense. People v Hammond, 187 Mich App 105, 109-113 (1991). I find it compelling here that the formal judgment of sentence states that defendant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit second-degree murder, citing the second-degree murder statute, MCL 750.317; this also reflects the trial court’s express statements at sentencing. As such, I believe defendant has a valid argument that he was sentenced to a nonexistent crime.
The second issue is whether, even assuming the validity of the criminal offense, the trial court lacked the authority to impose the term-of-years sentence given that conspiracy to commit first-degree murder carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. MCL 750.157a(a) provides that a person convicted of conspiracy “shall be punished by a penalty equal to that which could be imposed if he had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Consequently, the punishment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is the same as the punishment for first-degree murder: “[A] person who commits any of the following [acts] is guilty of first-degree murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life . . . .” MCL 750.316(1). Thus, a sentence to a term-of-years for this crime would violate the statutorily prescribed penalty. We have held that “[a] sentence is invalid when it is beyond statutory limits . . . .” People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96 (1997). Because the instant sentence fell below the mandatory minimum, the trial court disregarded the legislatively prescribed limitation on its sentencing discretion and consequently lacked the authority to impose this sentence.
I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of both issues and would further reject for the following reasons the trial court’s suggestion that the asserted lack of prejudice to defendant renders remand unnecessary. First, each of the errors described implicates the inherent authority of the trial court to impose the sentence it did. We have opined that “[a] sentence may be invalid no matter whom the error benefits because sentencing must not only be tailored to each defendant, but [must] also satisfy ‘society's need for protection and its interest in maximizing the offender’s rehabilitative potential.’ ” Id. at 98 (citation omitted; emphasis added). Second, any lack of prejudice to defendant stands alongside prejudice to the legislative process and thus to the people of this state. The Legislature, and not the judiciary, possesses the power to set criminal penalties. People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 436 (2001). Therefore, when a trial court disregards these penalties, it imposes criminal punishments that the Legislature has rejected. Third, I would observe that defendant himself evidently feels aggrieved by his sentence, despite having been expressly informed at the withdrawal-motion hearing that the prosecutor would reinstate the first-degree murder charges with their accompanying mandatory sentences of life imprisonment and having fully acknowledged his understanding of this risk.
Finally, I believe that the issues raised here are of considerable jurisprudential significance because they concern the trial court’s encroachment on the Legislature’s prerogative to define criminal penalties. Such disregard of mandatory sentences results in the effective nullification of the Legislature’s sentencing scheme. This is because a mandatory minimum sentence is clearly designed by the Legislature to operate as a limitation on the trial court’s sentencing discretion. Once more, “the ultimate authority to provide for penalties for criminal offenses is constitutionally vested in the Legislature.” Id. Permitting trial courts to treat these mandates as mere suggestions can only undermine our penal code. I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of these issues and, by this dissent, call this case to the attention of the Legislature.
Viviano and Bernstein, JJ., joined the statement of Markman, J. | [
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On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we vacate our order of December 10, 2014. The application for leave to appeal the May 13, 2014 judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as cross-appellants are denied, because we are no longer persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 499 Mich 899. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Berrien Circuit Court to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridgey 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentences absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resen-tence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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The Judicial Tenure Commission has issued a Decision and Recommendation, to which the respondent, Hon. Elizabeth Biolette Church, Chippewa County Probate and District Court Judge, consents. It is accompanied by a settlement agreement, in which the respondent waived her rights and consented to a sanction no greater than a public censure and a 120-day suspension without pay.
In resolving this matter, we are mindful of the standards set forth in In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293 (2000):
Everything else being equal:
(1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or practice is more serious than an isolated instance of misconduct;
(2) misconduct on the bench is usually more serious than the same misconduct off the bench;
(3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the actual administration of justice is more serious than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the appearance of propriety;
(4) misconduct that does not implicate the actual administration of justice, or its appearance of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct that does;
(5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is less serious than misconduct that is premeditated or deliberated;
(6) misconduct that undermines the ability of the justice system to discover the truth of what occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the most just result in such a case, is more serious than misconduct that merely delays such discovery;
(7) misconduct that involves the unequal application of justice on the basis of such considerations as race, color, ethnic background, gender, or religion are more serious than breaches of justice that do not disparage the integrity of the system on the basis of a class of citizenship.
In the present case, those standards are being applied in the context of the following stipulated findings of fact of the Judicial Tenure Commission, which, following our de novo review, we adopt as our own:
1. The respondent is, and at all material times was, a judge of the Chippewa County Probate and District Court in Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan.
2. As a judge, she is subject to all the duties and responsibilities imposed on judges by this Court, and is subject to the standards for discipline set forth in MCR 9.104 and MCR 9.205.
3. Over the course of the last several years, respondent reduced charges, dismissed charges outright, or modified sentences in at least 20 criminal cases, without holding a hearing and where she had no explicit authority from the prosecutor to do so. Those 91st District Court cases are: People v Tenecyck (Case No. 13-55757-ST); People v Stebleton (Case No. 13-7804-SI); People v Debolt (Case No. 13-8954-ST); People v Reiswitz (Case No. 13-8812-SI); People v Hough (Case No. 13-56209-SM); People v Swiger (Case No. 13-7402-SI); People v Payment (Case No. 14-10642-01); People v Brand (Case No. 13-9214-SI); People v Parr (Case No. 13-6874-SI); People v Wiezbenski (Case No. 13-7024-SI); People v Captain (Case No. 12-6474-SI); People v Gagnon (Case No. 11-53224-SM); People v Gunckel (Case No. 14-57103-SM); People v Morningstar (Case No. 14-11943-SM); People v Keesler (Case No. 14-57118-ST); People v Mellea (Case No. 14-57254-SM); People v Manos (Case No. 14-11974-SI); People v Hatfield (Case No. 14-12032-SI); People v Dicks (Case No. 14-12080-SJ); and People v Homminga (Case No. 14-587515-SD).
4. Over the course of the last several years, respondent dismissed at least 32 ticket cases without holding a hearing and where she had no explicit authority from the prosecutor to do so. Those 91st District Court cases are: People v Smith Family Sanitation (Case No. 12-4859-SI); People v Beland (Case No. 12-4891-SI); People v Huyck (Case No. 12-4889-ST); People v Greene (Case No. 12-4978-SI); People v Heikkinen (Case Nos. 12-4916-OI, 12-4917-OI, and 12-4918-OI); People v Mitchell (Case No. 12-5089-OI); People v Karakas (Case No. 12-51 04-SI); People v Bagwan (Case No. 12-5452-SI); People v Eggart (Case Nos. 12-5651-SI & 12-5652-SI); People v Rogers (Case No. 12-5690-SI); People v Fox Excavating (Case No. 12-5714-SI); People v McLeod (Case No. 12-5786-SI); People v Reynoso (Case No. 12-5795-SI); People v Nietling (Case No. 12-5800-SI); People v Heather Goudge (Case No. 12-5855-SI); People v Bertram (Case No. 12-5914-SI); People v Schuster (Case No. 12-5919-SI); People v Hiatt (Case No. 12-5926-SI); People v Mongene (Case No. 12-6015-SI); People v Akers (Case No. 12-6090-SI); People v Parr (Case No. 12-6117-SI); People v Cardiff (Case No. 12-6221-01); People v McEwen (Case No. 12-6250-SI); People v Miller (Case No. 12-6349-SI); People v Johnston (Case No. 12-6411-SI); People v Bosley (Case No. 12-6439-SI); People v Saluja (Case No. 12-6443-OI); People v Morley (Case No. 12-6446-OI); People v Schwiderson (Case No. 12-6492-SI); People v Path (Case No. 12-6653-OI); People v Dumback (Case No. 12-6597-SI); and People v Shuman (Case No. 13-7084-SM).
5. In the matters referred to above, respondent engaged in ex parte communications by considering substantive matters relevant to the merits of the pending proceedings, without the knowledge or consent of the prosecuting attorney.
6. Respondent also engaged in ex parte contacts as follows:
(a) People v Betlam, (50th Circuit Case No. 13-001221-FC)
i. This matter was before respondent on January 16,2014 for a bench trial.
ii. Before the trial started, respondent, accompanied by defense counsel Jennifer France, went to the holding cell where Mr. Betlam was being held by the Chippewa County Sheriffs Department.
iii. Respondent met there with Mr. Betlam, in the presence of Ms. France, but without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney.
iv. Respondent never told the prosecutor of her ex parte meeting with the defendant, Mr. Betlam, nor did she ever make a record of the event.
(b) People v Ferraro
i. Respondent was assigned to preside over People v Ferraro, 91st District Case Nos.:
(1) 15-58203-SM (filed on or around April 27, 2015, charging the defendant with domestic violence, contrary to MCL 750.812) and
(2) 15-58285-SM (filed on or around May 28, 2015, charging defendant with domestic violence, 2nd offense, contrary to MCL 750.812, and 4th-degree child abuse, contrary to MCL 750.136b [7]).
ii. On April 28, 2015, respondent disqualified herself on her own motion in Case No. 15-58203-SM, and on June 3,2015 she did so in Case No. 15-58285-SM, indicating in both matters that she believed that her continued assignment would create an appearance of impropriety.
iii. Respondent added the following on the disqualification order in Case No. 15-58203-SM: “DEFENDANT IS THE SON OF BLDG MAINTENANCE MAN WHO IS PART OF ONGOING JTC INVESTIGATION.” [sic]
iv. The State Court Administrative Office (SCAO) assigned Judge Beth Gibson of the 92nd District Court to preside over Case No. 15-58203-SM on May 1, 2015 and over Case No. 15-58285-SM on June 8, 2015.
v. On June 12, 2015, Mr. Ferraro pleaded guilty to one charge of domestic violence (Case No. 15-58203-SM) and one charge of domestic violence-second offense (Case No. 15-58285-SM); the child abuse charge was dismissed without prejudice.
vi. In Case No. 15-58203-SM, Judge Gibson sentenced Mr. Ferraro to 93 days in jail, with 17 days credit and the remaining 76 days suspended. Judge Gibson also imposed $500 in fines and costs and placed Mr. Ferraro on 12 months of probation.
vii. In Case No. 15-58285-SM, Judge Gibson placed Mr. Ferraro on 24 months of probation and imposed $750 in fines and costs.
viii. In both cases, Judge Gibson continued a no-contact order against Mr. Ferraro regarding the victim.
ix. On July 8, 2015, charges were filed against the same Mr. Ferraro in Case No. 15-58414-FY, alleging that he had used a computer to commit a crime, contrary to MCL 752.796 and 752.797(3)(d), as well as aggravated stalking, contrary to MCL 750.411i, and malicious use of telecommunications services, contrary to MCL 750.540e.
x. The charges against Mr. Ferraro in Case No. 15-58414-FY were filed while he was still on probation in Case Nos. 15-58203-SM and 15-58285-SM.
xi. Respondent disqualified herself on her own motion from Case No. 15-58414-FY on July 8, 2015, indicating that she believed that her continued assignment would create an appearance of impropriety.
xii. Respondent added the following on the disqualification order in Case No. 15-58414-FY: “Defendant has had two very recent cases that Judge Church has recused on as well.” [sic] The two cases referred to were Case Nos. 15-58203-SM and 15-58285-SM.
xiii. SCAO assigned Judge Beth Gibson of the 92nd District Court to preside over Case No. 15-58414-FY on July 9, 2015.
xiv. Respondent sent two texts to Judge Gibson regarding Case No. 15-58414-FY.
xv. On July 7, 2015, at 5:15 p.m., respondent texted Judge Gibson:
“I am group texting both Judge Gibson in [sic] John Feroni I have been contacted by MSP regarding Carmen Ferraro they will be submitting report to the Circuit C [sic]ourt [sic] to the prosecutor and to you John for probation violation. Acid [sic] a report be sent all three and I told him that Judge Gibson will hear the matter
“It was trooper Bitnar”
xvi. On July 16, 2015, at 4:52 p.m., respondent texted Judge Gibson:
“I could really use that boy on community service so hurry and send the Ferraro kid”
7. In People v Martinez (91st District Case No. 14-57336-EX), respondent declined to appoint a translator for the defendant when she should have.
The standards set forth in Brown are also being applied to the Judicial Tenure Commission legal conclusions to which the respondent stipulated and which we adopt as our own. The Commission concludes, and we agree, that the respondent’s conduct constitutes:
(a) Misconduct in office, as defined by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, Article 6, Section 30 and MCR 9.205;
(b) Conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice, as defined by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, Article 6, Section 30, and MCR 9.205(B);
(c) Conduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2A;
(d) Failure to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it, contrary to Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(1);
(e) Participation in ex parte communications, and consideration of them outside the presence of all parties concerning pending or impending proceedings, in violation of Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(4); and
(f) A failure to adopt the usual and accepted methods of doing justice, in violation of Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(9).
After review of the Judicial Tenure Commission’s decision and recommendation, the settlement agreement, the standards set forth in Brown, and the above findings and conclusions, we order that the Honorable Elizabeth Biolette Church be publicly censured and suspended without pay for 120 days. Were we to apply the Brown factors in the first instance, we may have reached an alternate result. However, in light of respondent’s disclosed serious and debilitating medical condition, in addition to her acceptance of responsibility, the unique circumstances of this case warrant our deference to the Judicial Tenure Commission’s recommended sanction. During the period of suspension, Judge Church shall not enter any courthouse in Chippewa County or initiate communication with the staff of any courthouse in Chippewa County unless she has a personal matter pending in any of those courts and then only to the extent that any other member of the public would have access to the court or the court staff. This order stands as our public censure. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings. We do not disturb that part of the Court of Appeals judgment ordering the trial court, on remand, to resentence the defendant or find facts to support the scoring of OV 13, MCL 777.43. If the trial court does not resentence the defendant, but instead finds facts that support the scoring of OV 13, it shall then determine whether it would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015). The trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resentence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether, in the absence of an agreement for joint funding of a district court in districts of the third class where the court sits in only one political subdivision, all district funding units within the district have an independent obligation to fund the court; (2) whether the parties in this case agreed that the 45th District Court would be funded entirely by the City of Oak Park; and (3) whether revenue from fees collected for building operations and retiree benefits is subject to revenue sharing under MCL 600.8379(l)(c). The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. | [
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By order of January 29,2014, the application for leave to appeal the June 20, 2013 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decisions in UAW v Green (Docket No. 147700) and Mich Coalition of State Employee Unions v Michigan (Docket No. 147758). On order of the Court, the caseshaving been decided on July 29, 2015, 498 Mich 282 (2015), and 498 Mich 312 (2015), respectively, the application is again considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order and shall include among the issues to be briefed whether, given that the Civil Service Commission has constitutional authority to “fix rates of compensation” for the classified service, Const 1963, art 11, § 5, and given that the relief the plaintiff requests is not available unless the Civil Service Commission reconsiders its rate-setting decision, is the plaintiffs breach of contract claim cognizable in the Court of Claims? The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.
Larsen, J.
Although I intend to participate in the forthcoming oral argument on the application for leave to appeal, I did not participate in the entry of this order because the Court considered the application before I assumed office and my vote is not outcome-determinative. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 498 Mich 872. | [
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On March 9, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the August 7, 2014 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is denied, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. | [
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On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s March 8, 2016 order is considered, and it is granted. We vacate our order dated March 8, 2016. On reconsideration, the application for leave to appeal the June 24, 2015 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Kent Circuit Court to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional restraint on its discretion, it may affirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional restraint on its discretion, it shall resentence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should he reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Van Burén Circuit Court to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resentence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted of the defendant’s issue regarding the propriety of the Wayne Circuit Court’s restitution award in light of People v McKinley, 496 Mich 410 (2014). In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Iosco Circuit Court to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resentence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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On order of the Court, the request by the Governor for an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of Section 152b contained in 2016 PA 249 is considered. We invite the Governor and any member of the House or Senate to file briefs on the following questions: (1) whether the Court should exercise its discretion to grant the Governor’s request to issue an advisory opinion in this matter; and (2) whether the appropriation to nonpublic schools authorized by Section 152b of 2016 PA 249 would violate Const 1963, art 8, § 2.
We respectfully request the Attorney General to submit separate briefs arguing both sides of the above questions. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the questions presented in this matter may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae on either or both sides of the above questions.
All briefs shall be filed no later than August 26, 2016.
The request by the Governor for an advisory opinion remains pending. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate that part of the Court of Appeals opinion stating that the defendant was not entitled to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Because defendant’s motion for a new trial was filed during his appeal by right, he was entitled to counsel during the proceeding and entitled to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. Douglas v California, 372 US 353; 83 S Ct 814; 9 L Ed 2d 811 (1963). In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 499 Mich 869. | [
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Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Kent Circuit Court to determine whether it would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resen-tence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion for miscellaneous relief is denied. We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing whether, in order to bring a wrongful-death action under MCL 600.2922 for the death of a fetus or embryo, a plaintiff must meet the affirmative-act requirement of MCL 600.2922a. See Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417 (2012). The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.
The Michigan Association for Justice and the Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc. are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issue presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.
Bernstein, J., did not participate due to his prior relationship with The Sam Bernstein Law Firm. | [
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reported below: 310 Mich App 318. | [
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On April 6, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the January 20, 2015 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is denied, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. | [
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By order of November 24, 2015, the application for leave to appeal the December 11, 2014 order of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in Montgomery v Louisiana, cert gtd 575 US _; 135 S Ct 1546; 191 L Ed 2d 635 (2015). On order of the Court, the case having been decided on January 25, 2016, 577 US _; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016), the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate the sentence of the Wayne Circuit Court on the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction, and we remand this case to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a. See Montgomery, supra, and Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012). We do not retain jurisdiction. | [
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Leave to appeal denied at 499 Mich 915. | [
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The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing whether: (1) the Court of Appeals erred in applying Peña Ingham Co Rd Comm, 255 Mich App 299 (2003), a Michigan Civil Rights Act case, to the plaintiffs claim under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq.; (2) the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to establish that he suffered an adverse employment action under the WPA, see MCL 15.362; and (3) the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to establish that he engaged in a protected activity under the WPA, see MCL 15.362. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. | [
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] |
The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that a necessary-party defendant may be brought into a lawsuit after the expiration of the limitations period based on the relation-back doctrine. See Casserly v Wayne Circuit Judge, 124 Mich 157, 161 (1900), Prather Engineering Co v Detroit, F & S Ry Co, 152 Mich 582, 585 (1908); but see Miller v Chapman Contracting, 477 Mich 102, 105 (2007) (“the relation-back doctrine does not extend to the addition of new parties”). The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. | [
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The defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 285605. | [
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Summary Disposition June 3, 2009:
Pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals, which shall hold this case in abeyance pending its decision in Farley v Carp (Court of Appeals Docket Nos. 283405, 283418, and 284681). After Farley is decided, the Court of Appeals shall reconsider this case in light of that case. Court of Appeals No. 284972. | [
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The defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 285529. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 272945. | [
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Leave to Appeal Denied March 25, 2009:
Court of Appeals No. 275554.
Kelly, C.J., and Hathaway, J. We would grant leave to appeal. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 280508. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 288016. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 282793.
Hathaway, J., did not participate. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 276151. | [
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Leave to Appeal Denied July 9, 2009: | [
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Court of Appeals No. 280860.
Corrigan, J., did not participate for the reasons stated in People v Parsons, 728 NW2d 62 (2007). | [
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Court of Appeals No. 280233. | [
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Order Granting Oral Argument in Case Pending on Application for Leave to Appeal April 8, 2009:
We direct the clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action. MCR 7.302(G)(1). At oral argument, the parties shall address: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that innocent misrepresentation is not a viable theory of liability under the Seller Disclosure Act (SDA), MCL 565.951 et seq.; (2) if not, whether the plaintiffs could nevertheless proceed with their claim to the extent an issue presented to the jury was whether the defendants knew of the termite infestation and intentionally withheld the information from the plaintiffs; (3) whether the defendants failed to preserve the argument that a claim for innocent misrepresentation cannot legally be maintained under the SDA by failing to expressly present it at the Court of Appeals; and (4) if so, whether this failure to preserve the issue acted as a waiver of this defense or acted as a bar to the Court of Appeals consideration of the issue. The parties may file supplemental briefs within 28 days of the date of this order, but they should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. Reported below: 280 Mich App 397. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 286447. | [
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The defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 286764. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 277775. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 278497.
Kelly, C.J., and Cavanagh and Hathaway, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 287242. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 289422. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 286537. | [
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ADB: 07-87-RE
Corrigan, J. (not participating). I am not participating because I was an Assistant United States Attorney involved in petitioner’s original conviction. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 288084. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 260592.
Kelly, C.J., and Cavanagh, J. We would grant leave to appeal. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 280703. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 278795. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 273688. | [
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WEAVER, J.
In this case we must decide the proper date of accrual in a breach of contract action for the recovery of unpaid legal fees. Specifically, this Court has been asked to consider whether the parties’ obligations are governed by a contract or a mutual and open account current. We also consider whether a claim by an attorney against a client for unpaid legal fees accrues on the date that the attorney-client relationship is terminated.
We conclude that the relationship between plaintiff and defendant is governed by the explicit terms of their contract and is not a mutual and open account current. We also hold that plaintiffs breach of contract claim to recover the unpaid legal fees under the original contract accrued on September 30, 1993, which is the date that the Court of Appeals granted the motion to terminate the attorney-client relationship. In addition, we conclude that plaintiffs acts of reviewing, copying, and returning defendant’s file do not extend the accrual date beyond the date that the attorney-client relationship was terminated. Because plaintiff did not file this claim until October 8, 1999, we hold that, pursuant to MCL 600.5807(8), the breach of contract action to recover the unpaid legal fees under the original contract is barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Finally, we hold that the costs attributed to the file-review services effectively arose from a separate contract, and the claim for those costs was filed timely and is not outside the statute of limitations.
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $442, with no interest to be assessed under the contract.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts and procedural history of this case are quite extensive and were well set forth by the Court of Appeals as follows:
In 1989, [defendant] Bakshi retained [plaintiff] Seyburn to represent him and his two corporations in a legal action (underlying litigation) and other legal matters. Bakshi was unsuccessful in the underlying litigation: the trial court dismissed the action on October 17,1991, and [the Court of Appeals] affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Interface Electronics v Minicomp Private Ltd, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 10,1994 (Docket No. 146262). (Circuit court records indicate that Seyburn also represented Bakshi in at least one other lawsuit in the circuit court while the Interface Electronics appeal was pending.)
Bakshi ceased paying Seyburn’s legal bills in November 1992, while the appeal in the underlying litigation was pending. At that time, Bakshi had already paid $92,000, and his remaining balance was $50,603. Apparently, his refusal to pay initially arose from a dispute with Seyburn over an amount he believed should have been credited to the account. The parties continued to dispute this matter over the next several months. On March 3, 1993, Seyburn argued a motion in the trial court on Bakshi’s behalf. This was the last date on which Seyburn performed a service for Bakshi that was not related to the dissolution of the attorney-client relationship. On April 27, 1993, Seyburn drafted a motion to withdraw as Bakshi’s counsel and charged him for that task.
On June 8, 1993, Bakshi notified Seyburn that he believed that “our attorney client relationship must be terminated or substantially modified.” He gave Seyburn two “options”: Seyburn could refund the fees already paid and enable Bakshi to retain substitute counsel with the refunded money, or Seyburn could refund 75 percent of the fees paid, file an appeal, and withdraw. Bakshi also stated that he had no financial resources to pay for the litigation.
On July 30, 1993, Seyburn moved in [the Court of Appeals] to withdraw as Bakshi’s counsel. It stated that Bakshi was “indebted to counsel for fees and costs incurred at the trial court level as well as fees associated with the appeal,” and that he “has indicated that it [sic: he] is not willing to pay the outstanding fees or costs.” Seyburn also alleged in the withdrawal motion that the attorney-client relationship between itself and Bakshi was “subject to irreconcilable differences and has broken down to such an extent that counsel can not effectively represent [Bakshi’s] interest in this appeal.” [The Court of Appeals] granted the motion to withdraw on September 30, 1993.
In October 1993, Bakshi requested his file from Sey-burn. Seyburn’s paralegal reviewed the file to determine which materials would be provided to Bakshi. On November 12, 1993, Seyburn sent Bakshi a bill, which included charges for those activities, as follows:
10/10/93 Review file to determine what to keep and what to return to client; draft memorandum regarding same;
10/11/93 Complete review of file to determine what to send back to client; copy pleading indexes and correspondence;
10/12/93 Review and revise memorandum regarding file....
Seyburn charged Bakshi $182 [sic: $192][ ] for these activities, plus $250 for photocopying. Bakshi did not pay this bill, and the unpaid balance on Bakshi’s account was then $55,723.
In 1995, Bakshi brought a legal malpractice action against Seyburn, claiming, among other things, that he should be relieved of his obligation to pay Seyburn for negligently performed legal services in the prior unsuccessful litigation. In a motion for summary disposition, Sey-burn argued that Bakshi’s action was barred in part by the two-year statute of limitations for malpractice claims, MCL 600.5805(5) (now MCL 600.5805[6]). Contrary to the position that it takes in this litigation, Seyburn stated in an affidavit that it last performed legal services for Bakshi on March 3, 1993, and that it “discontinued” providing legal services to Bakshi on April 27, 1993 (the latter date refers to the date it drafted its motion to withdraw as counsel). The trial court commented in its opinion that “[Seyburn was] hired for the particular purpose of representing [Bakshi] and did not discontinue serving [Bakshi] with respect to those matters until October 1993 ....” The trial court dismissed the malpractice action in 1999, and [the Court of Appeals] affirmed the dismissal in Bakshi v Gold, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 10, 2001 (Docket No. 220867). Our Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Bakshi v Gold, 467 Mich 851 (2002).
Seyburn filed its complaint in the instant action for unpaid legal fees on October 9 [sic: 8], 1999, while Bakshi’s malpractice action was pending. Bakshi moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that the six-year statute of limitations, MCL 600.5807(7) (now MCL 600.5807[8]), had expired. He maintained that Seyhurn’s claim accrued in November 1992, when he last paid for legal services. In response, again contrary to the position it took in the malpractice case, Seyhurn argued that it last performed legal services on October 12, 1993, when it complied with Bakshi’s request to be provided with a copy of his file. It asserted that the trial court in the malpractice action had already determined that its services ended in October 1993.
In 2001, the trial court granted Bakshi’s motion for summary disposition based on the statute of limitations, and held that Seyburn’s action accrued in 1992, when Bakshi stopped paying Seyburn’s legal fees. Seyburn appealed that decision to [the Court of Appeals], which, in a split decision, reversed the trial court’s decision. The majority agreed with Seyburn that its action was timely filed because its claim accrued on October 12,1993, the last date it performed a properly billable service. Seyburn, Kahn, Ginn, Bess, Deitch and Serlin, PC v Bakshi, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 13, 2003 (Docket No. 238697). One judge, however, issued a separate partially dissenting opinion, which agreed with the majority’s conclusion that summary disposition was improperly granted to Bakshi. However, that judge wrote that the matter should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether “there was a proper action on an open account” and, if so, the date of the last proper billable entry. In this regard, the partially dissenting judge opined that the trial court should have considered whether Seyburn could ethically and legally charge Bakshi for the tasks it performed in October 1993 in relation to his request for a copy of his file. However, she also commented that the October dates were not necessarily dispositive of the question of when Seyburn’s claim accrued. Id., slip op at 1-2 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Bakshi thereafter filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court vacated [the Court of Appeals] judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings for the reasons stated in the partially dissenting opinion. Seyburn, Kahn, Ginn, Bess, Deitch and Serlin, PC v Bakshi, 469 Mich 958 (2003).
On remand, the trial court held a hearing on the statute of limitations issue. It determined that Seyburn performed the additional work in October 1993, at Bakshi’s request and for his benefit, and that Seyburn could ethically charge Bakshi for those services. From this, the court reasoned that the limitations period did not begin to run until October 12,1993, and thus held that Seyhurn’s action, filed on October 9 [sic: 8], 1999, was timely filed within the six-year period of limitations. MCL 600.5807(8) (formerly MCL 600.5807[7]). Thus, the trial court determined that Bakshi was liable for legal fees of $62,763, and that Seyburn was entitled to interest of $510,405.07, as of August 16, 2006. It issued judgment ordering Bakshi to pay Seyburn $573,168.07.
Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision. On April 1, 2008, the Court of Appeals majority, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of defendant. The majority held that plaintiffs claim accrued on September 30,1993, which is the date that the Court of Appeals terminated the underlying attorney-client relationship. The majority also held that plaintiffs October 1993 acts of copying and returning defendant’s file did not extend the accrual date under MCL 600.5807(8). In reversing the trial court, the majority articulated that in the context of litigation, where the attorney is no longer providing services to the client but a dispute exists over legal fees, a claim for unpaid legal fees accrues on the date that the attorney-client relationship is terminated. In reaching its decision, the majority reasoned that the law governing a mutual and open account, MCL 600.5831, does not apply in this case because the law specifically governing the termination of the attorney-client relationship has precedence over a statute of general applicability.
Judge JANSEN fully concurred in the result but would have decided the case more simply, specifically, by holding that the attorney-client relationship terminated on September 30, 1993, and that the subsequent acts of copying and returning defendant’s file did not extend the relationship beyond the date of the court-granted termination. Therefore, the breach of contract action for the recovery of unpaid legal fees also accrued on the termination date. This Court granted leave to appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The question whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is one of law, which this Court reviews de novo. This Court also reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a summary disposition motion.
III. ANALYSIS
At issue in this case is the proper accrual date for a claim by an attorney against his client for unpaid legal fees. In order to address this question, we must first discern whether this case is governed by contract theory or whether there was a mutual and open account between plaintiff and defendant.
A. BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
Under the rules governing claims alleging breach of contract, the statute of limitations for bringing a cause of action is six years. A claim accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, when the claim may be brought. For a breach of contract action, the limitations period generally begins to run on the date that the breach occurs.
Under a mutual and open account theory, the date of accrual is calculated differently than it is under a contract for services. The language of MCL 600.5831, which is the statutory provision governing a mutual and open account current, provides: “In actions brought to recover the balance due upon a mutual and open account current, the claim accrues at the time of the last item proved in the account.”
A “mutual account” is defined as “[a]n account showing mutual transactions between parties, as by showing debits and credits on both sides of the account.” The definition of an “open account” is: “1. An unpaid or unsettled account. 2. An account that is left open for ongoing debit and credit entries and that has a fluctuating balance until either party finds it convenient to settle and close, at which time there is a single liability.”
The definitions for a “mutual account” and an “open account” have been used together to classify certain accounts as mutual and open accounts current. This Court has held that for an account to be considered a mutual and open account current, it is necessary for the account to be “mutual as well as open.” This “means a course of dealing where each party furnishes credit to the other on the reliance that upon settlement the accounts will be allowed, so that one will reduce the balance due on the other.”
Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we conclude that the parties do not have a mutual and open account current because there was no longer a mutual relationship between the parties and also because plaintiff and defendant had an express contract with one another. For a mutual and open account current to exist, there must be a mutual relationship. We stated this exact principle in Fuerbringer v Herman: “It is essential to a mutual account that there be reciprocity of dealing; the items must not be all on one side; there must be mutuality.” In the present case, defendant made his last payment to plaintiff in November 1992 and informed plaintiff that he would not make any further payments. Where there is no longer a reciprocal relationship, as is the case here, it would be contrary to hold that a mutual and open account current exists between the parties.
Moreover, despite the lack of mutuality between the parties, there is additional authority to support our holding that a mutual and open account does not exist between the parties. This Court has previously recognized that the existence of a contract rules out the existence of a mutual and open account “where the dealings of the parties relate entirely to and are governed by a special contract for the payment of money . . . ,” Similarly, in A Krolik & Co v Ossowski, this Court acknowledged a comparable proposition when defining an open account:
“An open account is one which consists of a series of transactions and is continuous or current, and not closed or stated. However, all accounts which are not stated or reduced to writing are not necessarily open accounts. Thus, cases of bailment, or express contract defining the liabilities of the parties, whether evidenced by writings or not, are not as a general rule open accounts ....” 1 C.J. p. 601. [Emphasis added.][ ]
In the present case, it is undisputed that plaintiff and defendant entered into a signed contract containing specific terms. The contract stated that plaintiff agreed to provide legal services to defendant and, in turn, defendant would make payments of money to plaintiff. Specifically, the contract provided for plaintiff to send a billing statement by the 20th of each month, using hourly billing at an established rate, and also required defendant to pay within 10 days of the date of the statement. In addition, the contract defined the liabilities of both parties. Because it is clear that a contract existed between the parties, we do not conclude that there is a mutual and open account in the present situation.
Furthermore, when the trial court inquired whether there was an open account between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiffs counsel answered that there was not: “I’m going to answer the Court’s question no ... . [T]here’s one count in the complaint which is for breach of contract.” In addition, plaintiffs complaint contained one count, labeled “Breach of Contract.” The complaint neither cited the mutual and open account statute, MCL 600.5831, nor used the phrase “mutual and open account.”
Accordingly, because there was no longer a mutual relationship between the parties and because plaintiff and defendant had an express contract with one another, we hold that the parties’ obligations to one another are governed by the explicit terms of their contract and not a mutual and open account current.
B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Because we conclude that the parties’ obligations in the present case are governed by contract rather than a mutual and open account current, we must now consider the proper accrual date for purposes of the statute of limitations. As we stated earlier, in a breach of contract action, the statutory period generally begins to run on the date that the breach occurs. However, we conclude that a narrow exception exists in the litigation context where the client breaches the agreement during the course of the attorney’s representation.
A contract is breached when one party fails to perform its portion of the contract. Thus, under general contract principles, an attorney’s cause of action to recover attorney fees would accrue on the date the client breached the parties’ agreement by failing to pay in accordance with its terms. We conclude that, in the context of litigation, the special features of the attorney-client relationship necessitate an exception to the general rule where the client breaches the agreement during the representation. Once litigation has commenced, an attorney cannot discontinue serving his or her client without an order of the court because an attorney’s ability to terminate the representation may be limited by his or her responsibilities to the client. Although the client may have ceased making payments to the attorney, the attorney’s representation of the client continues until the court has permitted the termination.
In the present case, defendant had stopped making payments to plaintiff in late 1992, but defendant never terminated the attorney-client relationship. It was plaintiff that filed a motion in the Court of Appeals seeking to withdraw from the case. Withdrawal was finally granted on September 30, 1993, and the attorney-client relationship was then terminated. Because plaintiffs obligations to defendant continued until the Court of Appeals terminated the relationship, we hold that plaintiffs cause of action to recover attorney fees accrued on the date that the attorney-client relationship was terminated: September 30, 1993.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the accrual date can be extended beyond the termination of the attorney-client relationship if the attorney performs follow-up or ministerial services for the client, such as copying and returning the client’s file. We hold that the tasks of reviewing, copying, and returning a client’s file do not extend the date of accrual beyond the termination date of the attorney-client relationship.
The Court of Appeals has opined on this issue. In a case for legal malpractice, the Court of Appeals held: “In general, once an attorney has discontinued serving the plaintiff-client, additional acts by the attorney will not delay or postpone the accrual of a legal malpractice claim.” In another case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that to extend the date of accrual for follow-up activities to otherwise completed matters would give attorneys a powerful advantage over former clients. Although this Court is not bound by the decisions of the Court of Appeals, we find the Court of Appeals’ reasoning on this issue persuasive for our holding on this question. Thus, we hold that plaintiffs acts of reviewing, copying, and returning the file to defendant do not extend the accrual date in this matter past the termination date of the attorney-client relationship.
While the plaintiffs acts of reviewing, copying, and returning the file to defendant do not extend the accrual date of the claim regarding the earlier unpaid legal fees, we hold that the minimal costs associated with the file-review services are timely and must be paid. We reach this conclusion because the additional services rendered after the termination equate to a separate contract apart from the parties’ original contract. This separate contract is not governed by the terms included in the original contract because the original contract was dissolved when the Court of Appeals granted the motion to terminate the attorney-client relationship. After the termination was granted, defendant requested a copy of his file from plaintiff. Plaintiff acquiesced to the request and then billed defendant on November 12,1993, for the additional services performed in October 1993. According to plaintiffs invoice, payment for the October 1993 services was due on November 23, 1993. Plaintiff filed its claim on October 8,1999. Thus, plaintiffs claim to recover the fees associated with the file-review services is timely and is not outside the statute of limitations.
Although the file-review services effectively constituted a separate contract, there were no specific contractual terms governing the costs and fees to review the file. Under MRPC 1.5(a), an attorney must charge a reasonable fee for services rendered to a client. In the current case, plaintiff charged $442 to review and copy the defendant’s file. The reasonableness of the costs assessed for the file-review services were not contested. Therefore, we conclude that the fees charged for the file-review services are a reasonable charge, and defendant must pay $442 to plaintiff.
To summarize, because we hold that the proper date of accrual in this case is September 30,1993, the statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs claim for recovery of the earlier, unpaid legal fees. The plaintiff filed the present cause of action in the trial court on October 8, 1999, which is more than six years from the date that the claim accrued on the earlier fees. Moreover, plaintiffs acts of copying and returning defendant’s file do not extend the accrual date beyond the date that the attorney-client relationship was terminated. However, we conclude that the minimal costs associated with the file-review services is a separate contract, and the claim to recover those fees is timely and is not barred by the statute of limitations.
C. In re DEI’S ESTATE
Plaintiff asserts that if this Court holds that there is not a mutual and open account in the present case, then we will have to overrule In re Dei’s Estate. We disagree. In Dei’s Estate, an attorney performed legal services for his client from early 1925 to May 1933. The client made only two payments on the account in 1925. In 1935 the client died; however, the attorney was not made aware of the death until 1938, at which time he filed suit to collect the unpaid legal fees. This Court held that the attorney’s cause of action on the mutual and open account did not accrue until the date of the last item of services that the attorney had performed for the client.
The central issue in Dei’s Estate was whether the attorney’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations, which required this Court to first determine whether the account was a mutual and open account current. This Court determined that, pursuant to 1929 CL 13977 (now codified as MCL 600.5831), there was a mutual and open account. Therefore, the attorney’s claim for unpaid legal fees accrued on the last date that services were rendered.
Contrary to plaintiffs contentions, we conclude that both the facts and the issues in Dei’s Estate are distinguishable from those in the present case. In Dei’s Estate, there was no contract between the attorney and the client, and there apparently was no agreement regarding the rate that the attorney would charge or when payment was due. Rather, the attorney would simply make entries in his day book after deciding on the value of his services. Furthermore, it was clear that the end of the attorney’s services coincided with the termination of the attorney-client relationship. There was never a lack of mutuality between attorney and client, and the attorney-client relationship only terminated because the attorney’s services ceased. Therefore, in Dei’s Estate, this Court did not focus on the nature of the attorney-client relationship. Rather, it addressed the general issue whether the statute of limitations barred an attorney from recovering unpaid legal fees on what was clearly a mutual and open account. In contrast, it is apparent that the parties in the present case had a written agreement detailing rates and time for payment, and plaintiff brought this action to recover amounts it had charged defendant under the terms of that contract. Thus, it is apparent that Dei’s Estate is distinguishable from the present case, and our decision today does not overrule settled precedent.
IV CONCLUSION
We hold that the parties’ obligations to one another are governed by the explicit terms of their contract rather than by the laws governing mutual and open accounts current because the parties did not have a mutual relationship and because plaintiff and defendant had an express contract detailing the specific terms of their agreement. Moreover, we also hold that plaintiffs breach of contract claim to recover the unpaid legal fees under the original contract accrued on September 30, 1993, which is the date that the attorney-client relationship was terminated. Furthermore, we do not extend the accrual date beyond the date of the attorney-client termination for plaintiffs acts of reviewing, copying, and returning defendant’s file. Because plaintiff did not file this claim until October 8, 1999, we hold that, pursuant to MCL 600.5807(8), the breach of contract action to recover the unpaid legal fees under the original contract is barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Finally, we hold that the costs and fees attributed to the file-review services effectively constituted a separate contract, which presents a timely and actionable claim.
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $442, with no interest to be assessed under the contract.
Kelly, C.J., and Cavanagh, Corrigan, Young, Markman, and Hathaway, JJ., concurred with Weaver, J.
The term “mutual and open account current” comes directly from MCL 600.5831, which governs accrual for actions involving a mutual and open account.
The Court of Appeals opinion states that plaintiff filed this claim on October 9,1999; however, the complaint in the Oakland Circuit Court file is date-stamped October 8, 1999.
The Court of Appeals opinion states that plaintiff charged defendant $182 for the file-review services; however, the charges on the actual invoice for the October 10-12, 1993, activities total $192.
Seyburn charged 18 percent annual interest on unpaid balances; thus, Bakshi’s outstanding balance grew from $62,763 in 1993 to $573,168 in 2006.[ ]
Seyburn, Kahn, Ginn, Bess, Seitch and Serlin, PC v Bakshi, 278 Mich App 486, 489-493; 750 NW2d 633 (2008).
Id. at 501.
Id. at 500 n 10.
Seyburn, Kahn, Ginn, Bess, Seitch and Serlin, PC v Bakshi, 482 Mich 1077 (2008).
Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 26; 506 NW2d 816 (1993).
Mayberry v Gen Orthopedics, PC, 474 Mich 1, 5; 704 NW2d 69 (2005).
MCL 600.5807(8).
MCL 600.5827.
AFSCME v Highland Park Bd of Ed, 457 Mich 74, 90; 577 NW2d 79 (1998); Harris v City of Allen Park, 193 Mich App 103, 106; 483 NW2d 434 (1992).
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed).
Id.
See MCL 600.5831.
In re Hiscock’s Estate, 79 Mich 536, 538; 44 NW 947 (1890).
Id.
Fuerbringer v Herman, 225 Mich 76; 195 NW 693 (1923).
Id. at 78.
Goodsole v Jeffery, 202 Mich 201, 203; 168 NW 461 (1918).
A Krolik & Co v Ossowski, 213 Mich 1; 180 NW 499 (1920).
Id. at 7.
Although we conclude that the parties’ obligations are governed by contract rather than a mutual and open account, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals opinion suggesting that there is an attorney-litigation exception to the mutual and open account statute.
See Highland Park Bd of Ed, supra at 90; Harris, supra at 106.
HJ Tucker & Assoc, Inc v Allied Chucker & Engineering Co, 234 Mich App 550, 562; 595 NW2d 176 (1999).
MRPC 1.16(b) and (c); also see White v Sadler, 350 Mich 511, 526; 87 NW2d 192 (1957), which stated:
[W]hen an attorney once enters an appearance for a client and for any reason later finds he cannot or does not intend to continue to represent that client, he owes a clear duty to his client and opposing counsel and to the court to take timely affirmative steps in the pending case to be relieved of his retainer and have his appearance withdrawn. [Emphasis in the original.]
See also Mitchell v Dougherty, 249 Mich App 668, 683; 644 NW2d 391 (2002); Stroud v Ward, 169 Mich App 1, 6; 425 NW2d 490 (1988).
See Mitchell, supra at 683.
Maddox v Burlingame, 205 Mich App 446, 450; 517 NW2d 816 (1994); Stroud, supra at 6.
Where an attorney and a client have an agreement that requires the client to pay on a date after the termination of the attorney-client relationship, breach of contract rules apply and the cause of action for unpaid legal fees accrues on the date payment is due and the client fails to pay.
Kloian v Schwartz, 272 Mich App 232, 238 n 2; 725 NW2d 671 (2006).
See Bauer v Ferriby & Houston, PC, 235 Mich App 536, 539; 599 NW2d 493 (1999).
In re Dei’s Estate, 293 Mich 651; 292 NW 513 (1940).
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] |
Leave to Appeal Denied June 23, 2009:
Court of Appeals No. 269181. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 280563. | [
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] |
Court of Appeals No. 285649.
Hathaway, J.
(not participating). To avoid unnecessary delay to the parties in cases considered by this Court before I assumed office, I follow the practice of previous justices in transition and participate only in cases that need my vote to achieve a majority for a decision. | [
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] |
Court of Appeals No. 278751.
Kelly, C. J. I would grant leave to appeal. | [
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67,
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] |
Court of Appeals No. 282324. | [
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92,
75,
55,
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] |
Court of Appeals No. 284874.
Kelly, C.J., and Cavanagh and Hathaway, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal. | [
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] |
The defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Court of Appeals No. 286101. | [
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Court of Appeals No. 275939. | [
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] |
Court of Appeals No. 275462. | [
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18,
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94,
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67,
51,
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] |
Court of Appeals No. 279463. | [
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87,
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67,
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] |
Court of Appeals No. 286453.
Hathaway, J. I would grant leave to appeal. | [
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64,
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7,
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28,
67,
59,
23,
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] |
Court of Appeals No. 286605. | [
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-101,
-40,
80
] |
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