Daily Papers

Open-Source Software (OSS) vulnerabilities bring great challenges to the software security and pose potential risks to our society. Enormous efforts have been devoted into automated vulnerability detection, among which deep learning (DL)-based approaches have proven to be the most effective. However, the current labeled data present the following limitations: (1) Tangled Patches: Developers may submit code changes unrelated to vulnerability fixes within patches, leading to tangled patches. (2) Lacking Inter-procedural Vulnerabilities: The existing vulnerability datasets typically contain function-level and file-level vulnerabilities, ignoring the relations between functions, thus rendering the approaches unable to detect the inter-procedural vulnerabilities. (3) Outdated Patches: The existing datasets usually contain outdated patches, which may bias the model during training. To address the above limitations, in this paper, we propose an automated data collection framework and construct the first repository-level high-quality vulnerability dataset named ReposVul. The proposed framework mainly contains three modules: (1) A vulnerability untangling module, aiming at distinguishing vulnerability-fixing related code changes from tangled patches, in which the Large Language Models (LLMs) and static analysis tools are jointly employed. (2) A multi-granularity dependency extraction module, aiming at capturing the inter-procedural call relationships of vulnerabilities, in which we construct multiple-granularity information for each vulnerability patch, including repository-level, file-level, function-level, and line-level. (3) A trace-based filtering module, aiming at filtering the outdated patches, which leverages the file path trace-based filter and commit time trace-based filter to construct an up-to-date dataset.

Many ML-based approaches have been proposed to automatically detect, localize, and repair software vulnerabilities. While ML-based methods are more effective than program analysis-based vulnerability analysis tools, few have been integrated into modern IDEs, hindering practical adoption. To bridge this critical gap, we propose AIBugHunter, a novel ML-based software vulnerability analysis tool for C/C++ languages that is integrated into Visual Studio Code. AIBugHunter helps software developers to achieve real-time vulnerability detection, explanation, and repairs during programming. In particular, AIBugHunter scans through developers' source code to (1) locate vulnerabilities, (2) identify vulnerability types, (3) estimate vulnerability severity, and (4) suggest vulnerability repairs. In this article, we propose a novel multi-objective optimization (MOO)-based vulnerability classification approach and a transformer-based estimation approach to help AIBugHunter accurately identify vulnerability types and estimate severity. Our empirical experiments on a large dataset consisting of 188K+ C/C++ functions confirm that our proposed approaches are more accurate than other state-of-the-art baseline methods for vulnerability classification and estimation. Furthermore, we conduct qualitative evaluations including a survey study and a user study to obtain software practitioners' perceptions of our AIBugHunter tool and assess the impact that AIBugHunter may have on developers' productivity in security aspects. Our survey study shows that our AIBugHunter is perceived as useful where 90% of the participants consider adopting our AIBugHunter. Last but not least, our user study shows that our AIBugHunter could possibly enhance developers' productivity in combating cybersecurity issues during software development.

Knowledge graphs have shown promise for several cybersecurity tasks, such as vulnerability assessment and threat analysis. In this work, we present a new method for constructing a vulnerability knowledge graph from information in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Our approach combines named entity recognition (NER), relation extraction (RE), and entity prediction using a combination of neural models, heuristic rules, and knowledge graph embeddings. We demonstrate how our method helps to fix missing entities in knowledge graphs used for cybersecurity and evaluate the performance.

In today's digital landscape, the importance of timely and accurate vulnerability detection has significantly increased. This paper presents a novel approach that leverages transformer-based models and machine learning techniques to automate the identification of software vulnerabilities by analyzing GitHub issues. We introduce a new dataset specifically designed for classifying GitHub issues relevant to vulnerability detection. We then examine various classification techniques to determine their effectiveness. The results demonstrate the potential of this approach for real-world application in early vulnerability detection, which could substantially reduce the window of exploitation for software vulnerabilities. This research makes a key contribution to the field by providing a scalable and computationally efficient framework for automated detection, enabling the prevention of compromised software usage before official notifications. This work has the potential to enhance the security of open-source software ecosystems.

Background: The C and C++ languages hold significant importance in Software Engineering research because of their widespread use in practice. Numerous studies have utilized Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) techniques to detect software vulnerabilities (SVs) in the source code written in these languages. However, the application of these techniques in function-level SV assessment has been largely unexplored. SV assessment is increasingly crucial as it provides detailed information on the exploitability, impacts, and severity of security defects, thereby aiding in their prioritization and remediation. Aims: We conduct the first empirical study to investigate and compare the performance of ML and DL models, many of which have been used for SV detection, for function-level SV assessment in C/C++. Method: Using 9,993 vulnerable C/C++ functions, we evaluated the performance of six multi-class ML models and five multi-class DL models for the SV assessment at the function level based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). We further explore multi-task learning, which can leverage common vulnerable code to predict all SV assessment outputs simultaneously in a single model, and compare the effectiveness and efficiency of this model type with those of the original multi-class models. Results: We show that ML has matching or even better performance compared to the multi-class DL models for function-level SV assessment with significantly less training time. Employing multi-task learning allows the DL models to perform significantly better, with an average of 8-22% increase in Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC). Conclusions: We distill the practices of using data-driven techniques for function-level SV assessment in C/C++, including the use of multi-task DL to balance efficiency and effectiveness. This can establish a strong foundation for future work in this area.

In this paper we present a novel solution that combines the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with Formal Verification strategies to verify and automatically repair software vulnerabilities. Initially, we employ Bounded Model Checking (BMC) to locate the software vulnerability and derive a counterexample. The counterexample provides evidence that the system behaves incorrectly or contains a vulnerability. The counterexample that has been detected, along with the source code, are provided to the LLM engine. Our approach involves establishing a specialized prompt language for conducting code debugging and generation to understand the vulnerability's root cause and repair the code. Finally, we use BMC to verify the corrected version of the code generated by the LLM. As a proof of concept, we create ESBMC-AI based on the Efficient SMT-based Context-Bounded Model Checker (ESBMC) and a pre-trained Transformer model, specifically gpt-3.5-turbo, to detect and fix errors in C programs. Our experimentation involved generating a dataset comprising 1000 C code samples, each consisting of 20 to 50 lines of code. Notably, our proposed method achieved an impressive success rate of up to 80% in repairing vulnerable code encompassing buffer overflow and pointer dereference failures. We assert that this automated approach can effectively incorporate into the software development lifecycle's continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) process.

Deep learning (DL) models have become increasingly popular in identifying software vulnerabilities. Prior studies found that vulnerabilities across different vulnerable programs may exhibit similar vulnerable scopes, implicitly forming discernible vulnerability patterns that can be learned by DL models through supervised training. However, vulnerable scopes still manifest in various spatial locations and formats within a program, posing challenges for models to accurately identify vulnerable statements. Despite this challenge, state-of-the-art vulnerability detection approaches fail to exploit the vulnerability patterns that arise in vulnerable programs. To take full advantage of vulnerability patterns and unleash the ability of DL models, we propose a novel vulnerability-matching approach in this paper, drawing inspiration from program analysis tools that locate vulnerabilities based on pre-defined patterns. Specifically, a vulnerability codebook is learned, which consists of quantized vectors representing various vulnerability patterns. During inference, the codebook is iterated to match all learned patterns and predict the presence of potential vulnerabilities within a given program. Our approach was extensively evaluated on a real-world dataset comprising more than 188,000 C/C++ functions. The evaluation results show that our approach achieves an F1-score of 94% (6% higher than the previous best) and 82% (19% higher than the previous best) for function and statement-level vulnerability identification, respectively. These substantial enhancements highlight the effectiveness of our approach to identifying vulnerabilities. The training code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/optimatch/optimatch.

In this study, we evaluated the capability of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly OpenAI's GPT-4, in detecting software vulnerabilities, comparing their performance against traditional static code analyzers like Snyk and Fortify. Our analysis covered numerous repositories, including those from NASA and the Department of Defense. GPT-4 identified approximately four times the vulnerabilities than its counterparts. Furthermore, it provided viable fixes for each vulnerability, demonstrating a low rate of false positives. Our tests encompassed 129 code samples across eight programming languages, revealing the highest vulnerabilities in PHP and JavaScript. GPT-4's code corrections led to a 90% reduction in vulnerabilities, requiring only an 11% increase in code lines. A critical insight was LLMs' ability to self-audit, suggesting fixes for their identified vulnerabilities and underscoring their precision. Future research should explore system-level vulnerabilities and integrate multiple static code analyzers for a holistic perspective on LLMs' potential.

Software vulnerabilities bear enterprises significant costs. Despite extensive efforts in research and development of software vulnerability detection methods, uncaught vulnerabilities continue to put software owners and users at risk. Many current vulnerability detection methods require that code snippets can compile and build before attempting detection. This, unfortunately, introduces a long latency between the time a vulnerability is injected to the time it is removed, which can substantially increases the cost of fixing a vulnerability. We recognize that the current advances in machine learning can be used to detect vulnerable code patterns on syntactically incomplete code snippets as the developer is writing the code at EditTime. In this paper we present a practical system that leverages deep learning on a large-scale data set of vulnerable code patterns to learn complex manifestations of more than 250 vulnerability types and detect vulnerable code patterns at EditTime. We discuss zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuning approaches on state of the art pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs). We show that in comparison with state of the art vulnerability detection models our approach improves the state of the art by 10%. We also evaluate our approach to detect vulnerability in auto-generated code by code LLMs. Evaluation on a benchmark of high-risk code scenarios shows a reduction of up to 90% vulnerability reduction.

The impact of software vulnerabilities on everyday software systems is significant. Despite deep learning models being proposed for vulnerability detection, their reliability is questionable. Prior evaluations show high recall/F1 scores of up to 99%, but these models underperform in practical scenarios, particularly when assessed on entire codebases rather than just the fixing commit. This paper introduces Real-Vul, a comprehensive dataset representing real-world scenarios for evaluating vulnerability detection models. Evaluating DeepWukong, LineVul, ReVeal, and IVDetect shows a significant drop in performance, with precision decreasing by up to 95 percentage points and F1 scores by up to 91 points. Furthermore, Model performance fluctuates based on vulnerability characteristics, with better F1 scores for information leaks or code injection than for path resolution or predictable return values. The results highlight a significant performance gap that needs addressing before deploying deep learning-based vulnerability detection in practical settings. Overfitting is identified as a key issue, and an augmentation technique is proposed, potentially improving performance by up to 30%. Contributions include a dataset creation approach for better model evaluation, Real-Vul dataset, and empirical evidence of deep learning models struggling in real-world settings.

Automated detection of software vulnerabilities is a fundamental problem in software security. Existing program analysis techniques either suffer from high false positives or false negatives. Recent progress in Deep Learning (DL) has resulted in a surge of interest in applying DL for automated vulnerability detection. Several recent studies have demonstrated promising results achieving an accuracy of up to 95% at detecting vulnerabilities. In this paper, we ask, "how well do the state-of-the-art DL-based techniques perform in a real-world vulnerability prediction scenario?". To our surprise, we find that their performance drops by more than 50%. A systematic investigation of what causes such precipitous performance drop reveals that existing DL-based vulnerability prediction approaches suffer from challenges with the training data (e.g., data duplication, unrealistic distribution of vulnerable classes, etc.) and with the model choices (e.g., simple token-based models). As a result, these approaches often do not learn features related to the actual cause of the vulnerabilities. Instead, they learn unrelated artifacts from the dataset (e.g., specific variable/function names, etc.). Leveraging these empirical findings, we demonstrate how a more principled approach to data collection and model design, based on realistic settings of vulnerability prediction, can lead to better solutions. The resulting tools perform significantly better than the studied baseline: up to 33.57% boost in precision and 128.38% boost in recall compared to the best performing model in the literature. Overall, this paper elucidates existing DL-based vulnerability prediction systems' potential issues and draws a roadmap for future DL-based vulnerability prediction research. In that spirit, we make available all the artifacts supporting our results: https://git.io/Jf6IA.

Increasing numbers of software vulnerabilities are discovered every year whether they are reported publicly or discovered internally in proprietary code. These vulnerabilities can pose serious risk of exploit and result in system compromise, information leaks, or denial of service. We leveraged the wealth of C and C++ open-source code available to develop a large-scale function-level vulnerability detection system using machine learning. To supplement existing labeled vulnerability datasets, we compiled a vast dataset of millions of open-source functions and labeled it with carefully-selected findings from three different static analyzers that indicate potential exploits. The labeled dataset is available at: https://osf.io/d45bw/. Using these datasets, we developed a fast and scalable vulnerability detection tool based on deep feature representation learning that directly interprets lexed source code. We evaluated our tool on code from both real software packages and the NIST SATE IV benchmark dataset. Our results demonstrate that deep feature representation learning on source code is a promising approach for automated software vulnerability detection.

The automatic detection of software vulnerabilities is an important research problem. However, existing solutions to this problem rely on human experts to define features and often miss many vulnerabilities (i.e., incurring high false negative rate). In this paper, we initiate the study of using deep learning-based vulnerability detection to relieve human experts from the tedious and subjective task of manually defining features. Since deep learning is motivated to deal with problems that are very different from the problem of vulnerability detection, we need some guiding principles for applying deep learning to vulnerability detection. In particular, we need to find representations of software programs that are suitable for deep learning. For this purpose, we propose using code gadgets to represent programs and then transform them into vectors, where a code gadget is a number of (not necessarily consecutive) lines of code that are semantically related to each other. This leads to the design and implementation of a deep learning-based vulnerability detection system, called Vulnerability Deep Pecker (VulDeePecker). In order to evaluate VulDeePecker, we present the first vulnerability dataset for deep learning approaches. Experimental results show that VulDeePecker can achieve much fewer false negatives (with reasonable false positives) than other approaches. We further apply VulDeePecker to 3 software products (namely Xen, Seamonkey, and Libav) and detect 4 vulnerabilities, which are not reported in the National Vulnerability Database but were "silently" patched by the vendors when releasing later versions of these products; in contrast, these vulnerabilities are almost entirely missed by the other vulnerability detection systems we experimented with.

We propose and release a new vulnerable source code dataset. We curate the dataset by crawling security issue websites, extracting vulnerability-fixing commits and source codes from the corresponding projects. Our new dataset contains 18,945 vulnerable functions spanning 150 CWEs and 330,492 non-vulnerable functions extracted from 7,514 commits. Our dataset covers 295 more projects than all previous datasets combined. Combining our new dataset with previous datasets, we present an analysis of the challenges and promising research directions of using deep learning for detecting software vulnerabilities. We study 11 model architectures belonging to 4 families. Our results show that deep learning is still not ready for vulnerability detection, due to high false positive rate, low F1 score, and difficulty of detecting hard CWEs. In particular, we demonstrate an important generalization challenge for the deployment of deep learning-based models. We show that increasing the volume of training data may not further improve the performance of deep learning models for vulnerability detection, but might be useful to improve the generalization ability to unseen projects. We also identify hopeful future research directions. We demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) are a promising research direction for ML-based vulnerability detection, outperforming Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) with code-structure features in our experiments. Moreover, developing source code specific pre-training objectives is a promising research direction to improve the vulnerability detection performance.

Multi-task learning is a paradigm that leverages information from related tasks to improve the performance of machine learning. Self-Admitted Technical Debt (SATD) are comments in the code that indicate not-quite-right code introduced for short-term needs, i.e., technical debt (TD). Previous research has provided evidence of a possible relationship between SATD and the existence of vulnerabilities in the code. In this work, we investigate if multi-task learning could leverage the information shared between SATD and vulnerabilities to improve the automatic detection of these issues. To this aim, we implemented VulSATD, a deep learner that detects vulnerable and SATD code based on CodeBERT, a pre-trained transformers model. We evaluated VulSATD on MADE-WIC, a fused dataset of functions annotated for TD (through SATD) and vulnerability. We compared the results using single and multi-task approaches, obtaining no significant differences even after employing a weighted loss. Our findings indicate the need for further investigation into the relationship between these two aspects of low-quality code. Specifically, it is possible that only a subset of technical debt is directly associated with security concerns. Therefore, the relationship between different types of technical debt and software vulnerabilities deserves future exploration and a deeper understanding.

The rapid advancement of bug-finding techniques has led to the discovery of more vulnerabilities than developers can reasonably fix, creating an urgent need for effective Automated Program Repair (APR) methods. However, the complexity of modern bugs often makes precise root cause analysis difficult and unreliable. To address this challenge, we propose crash-site repair to simplify the repair task while still mitigating the risk of exploitation. In addition, we introduce a template-guided patch generation approach that significantly reduces the token cost of Large Language Models (LLMs) while maintaining both efficiency and effectiveness. We implement our prototype system, WILLIAMT, and evaluate it against state-of-the-art APR tools. Our results show that, when combined with the top-performing agent CodeRover-S, WILLIAMT reduces token cost by 45.9% and increases the bug-fixing rate to 73.5% (+29.6%) on ARVO, a ground-truth open source software vulnerabilities benchmark. Furthermore, we demonstrate that WILLIAMT can function effectively even without access to frontier LLMs: even a local model running on a Mac M4 Mini achieves a reasonable repair rate. These findings highlight the broad applicability and scalability of WILLIAMT.

Fuzzing is an important dynamic program analysis technique designed for finding vulnerabilities in complex software. Fuzzing involves presenting a target program with crafted malicious input to cause crashes, buffer overflows, memory errors, and exceptions. Crafting malicious inputs in an efficient manner is a difficult open problem and the best approaches often apply uniform random mutations to pre-existing valid inputs. In this work, we propose to adopt fine-tuned large language models (FuzzCoder) to learn patterns in the input files from successful attacks to guide future fuzzing explorations. Specifically, we develop a framework to leverage the code LLMs to guide the mutation process of inputs in fuzzing. The mutation process is formulated as the sequence-to-sequence modeling, where LLM receives a sequence of bytes and then outputs the mutated byte sequence. FuzzCoder is fine-tuned on the created instruction dataset (Fuzz-Instruct), where the successful fuzzing history is collected from the heuristic fuzzing tool. FuzzCoder can predict mutation locations and strategies locations in input files to trigger abnormal behaviors of the program. Experimental results show that FuzzCoder based on AFL (American Fuzzy Lop) gain significant improvements in terms of effective proportion of mutation (EPM) and number of crashes (NC) for various input formats including ELF, JPG, MP3, and XML.

Memory safety violations in low-level code, written in languages like C, continues to remain one of the major sources of software vulnerabilities. One method of removing such violations by construction is to port C code to a safe C dialect. Such dialects rely on programmer-supplied annotations to guarantee safety with minimal runtime overhead. This porting, however, is a manual process that imposes significant burden on the programmer and, hence, there has been limited adoption of this technique. The task of porting not only requires inferring annotations, but may also need refactoring/rewriting of the code to make it amenable to such annotations. In this paper, we use Large Language Models (LLMs) towards addressing both these concerns. We show how to harness LLM capabilities to do complex code reasoning as well as rewriting of large codebases. We also present a novel framework for whole-program transformations that leverages lightweight static analysis to break the transformation into smaller steps that can be carried out effectively by an LLM. We implement our ideas in a tool called MSA that targets the CheckedC dialect. We evaluate MSA on several micro-benchmarks, as well as real-world code ranging up to 20K lines of code. We showcase superior performance compared to a vanilla LLM baseline, as well as demonstrate improvement over a state-of-the-art symbolic (non-LLM) technique.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

Most existing pre-trained language models for source code focus on learning the static code text, typically augmented with static code structures (abstract syntax tree, dependency graphs, etc.). However, program semantics will not be fully exposed before the real execution. Without an understanding of the program execution, statically pre-trained models fail to comprehensively capture the dynamic code properties, such as the branch coverage and the runtime variable values, and they are consequently less effective at code understanding tasks, such as retrieving semantic clones and detecting software vulnerabilities. To close the gap between the static nature of language models and the dynamic characteristics of programs, we introduce TRACED, an execution-aware pre-training strategy for source code. Specifically, we pre-train code language models with a combination of source code, executable inputs, and corresponding execution traces. Our goal is to teach code models the complicated execution logic during the pre-training, enabling the model to statically estimate the dynamic code properties without repeatedly executing code during task-specific fine-tuning. To illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, we fine-tune and evaluate TRACED on three downstream tasks: static execution estimation, clone retrieval, and vulnerability detection. The empirical results show that TRACED relatively improves the statically pre-trained code models by 12.4% for complete execution path prediction and by 25.2% for runtime variable value predictions. TRACED also significantly outperforms statically pre-trained models in clone retrieval and vulnerability detection across four public benchmarks.

Fuzz testing is a fundamental technique employed to identify vulnerabilities within software systems. However, the process can be protracted and resource-intensive, especially when confronted with extensive codebases. In this work, I present FuzzDistill, an approach that harnesses compile-time data and machine learning to refine fuzzing targets. By analyzing compile-time information, such as function call graphs' features, loop information, and memory operations, FuzzDistill identifies high-priority areas of the codebase that are more probable to contain vulnerabilities. I demonstrate the efficacy of my approach through experiments conducted on real-world software, demonstrating substantial reductions in testing time.

Training machine learning approaches for vulnerability identification and producing reliable tools to assist developers in implementing quality software -- free of vulnerabilities -- is challenging due to the lack of large datasets and real data. Researchers have been looking at these issues and building datasets. However, these datasets usually miss natural language artifacts and programming language diversity. We scraped the entire CVE details database for GitHub references and augmented the data with 3 security-related datasets. We used the data to create a ground-truth dataset of natural language artifacts (such as commit messages, commits comments, and summaries), meta-data and code changes. Our dataset integrates a total of 8057 security-relevant commits -- the equivalent to 5942 security patches -- from 1339 different projects spanning 146 different types of vulnerabilities and 20 languages. A dataset of 110k non-security-related commits is also provided. Data and scripts are all available on GitHub. Data is stored in a .CSV file. Codebases can be downloaded using our scripts. Our dataset is a valuable asset to answer research questions on different topics such as the identification of security-relevant information using NLP models; software engineering and security best practices; and, vulnerability detection and patching; and, security program analysis.

Data-driven research on the automated discovery and repair of security vulnerabilities in source code requires comprehensive datasets of real-life vulnerable code and their fixes. To assist in such research, we propose a method to automatically collect and curate a comprehensive vulnerability dataset from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) records in the public National Vulnerability Database (NVD). We implement our approach in a fully automated dataset collection tool and share an initial release of the resulting vulnerability dataset named CVEfixes. The CVEfixes collection tool automatically fetches all available CVE records from the NVD, gathers the vulnerable code and corresponding fixes from associated open-source repositories, and organizes the collected information in a relational database. Moreover, the dataset is enriched with meta-data such as programming language, and detailed code and security metrics at five levels of abstraction. The collection can easily be repeated to keep up-to-date with newly discovered or patched vulnerabilities. The initial release of CVEfixes spans all published CVEs up to 9 June 2021, covering 5365 CVE records for 1754 open-source projects that were addressed in a total of 5495 vulnerability fixing commits. CVEfixes supports various types of data-driven software security research, such as vulnerability prediction, vulnerability classification, vulnerability severity prediction, analysis of vulnerability-related code changes, and automated vulnerability repair.

Security vulnerabilities in modern software are prevalent and harmful. While automated vulnerability detection tools have made promising progress, their scalability and applicability remain challenging. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs), such as GPT-4 and CodeLlama, have demonstrated remarkable performance on code-related tasks. However, it is unknown whether such LLMs can do complex reasoning over code. In this work, we explore whether pre-trained LLMs can detect security vulnerabilities and address the limitations of existing tools. We evaluate the effectiveness of pre-trained LLMs on a set of five diverse security benchmarks spanning two languages, Java and C/C++, and including code samples from synthetic and real-world projects. We evaluate the effectiveness of LLMs in terms of their performance, explainability, and robustness. By designing a series of effective prompting strategies, we obtain the best results on the synthetic datasets with GPT-4: F1 scores of 0.79 on OWASP, 0.86 on Juliet Java, and 0.89 on Juliet C/C++. Expectedly, the performance of LLMs drops on the more challenging real-world datasets: CVEFixes Java and CVEFixes C/C++, with GPT-4 reporting F1 scores of 0.48 and 0.62, respectively. We show that LLMs can often perform better than existing static analysis and deep learning-based vulnerability detection tools, especially for certain classes of vulnerabilities. Moreover, LLMs also often provide reliable explanations, identifying the vulnerable data flows in code. We find that fine-tuning smaller LLMs can outperform the larger LLMs on synthetic datasets but provide limited gains on real-world datasets. When subjected to adversarial attacks on code, LLMs show mild degradation, with average accuracy reduction of up to 12.67%. Finally, we share our insights and recommendations for future work on leveraging LLMs for vulnerability detection.

Software is prone to security vulnerabilities. Program analysis tools to detect them have limited effectiveness in practice due to their reliance on human labeled specifications. Large language models (or LLMs) have shown impressive code generation capabilities but they cannot do complex reasoning over code to detect such vulnerabilities especially since this task requires whole-repository analysis. We propose IRIS, a neuro-symbolic approach that systematically combines LLMs with static analysis to perform whole-repository reasoning for security vulnerability detection. Specifically, IRIS leverages LLMs to infer taint specifications and perform contextual analysis, alleviating needs for human specifications and inspection. For evaluation, we curate a new dataset, CWE-Bench-Java, comprising 120 manually validated security vulnerabilities in real-world Java projects. A state-of-the-art static analysis tool CodeQL detects only 27 of these vulnerabilities whereas IRIS with GPT-4 detects 55 (+28) and improves upon CodeQL's average false discovery rate by 5% points. Furthermore, IRIS identifies 4 previously unknown vulnerabilities which cannot be found by existing tools. IRIS is available publicly at https://github.com/iris-sast/iris.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

Software engineering is a domain characterized by intricate decision-making processes, often relying on nuanced intuition and consultation. Recent advancements in deep learning have started to revolutionize software engineering practices through elaborate designs implemented at various stages of software development. In this paper, we present an innovative paradigm that leverages large language models (LLMs) throughout the entire software development process, streamlining and unifying key processes through natural language communication, thereby eliminating the need for specialized models at each phase. At the core of this paradigm lies ChatDev, a virtual chat-powered software development company that mirrors the established waterfall model, meticulously dividing the development process into four distinct chronological stages: designing, coding, testing, and documenting. Each stage engages a team of agents, such as programmers, code reviewers, and test engineers, fostering collaborative dialogue and facilitating a seamless workflow. The chat chain acts as a facilitator, breaking down each stage into atomic subtasks. This enables dual roles, allowing for proposing and validating solutions through context-aware communication, leading to efficient resolution of specific subtasks. The instrumental analysis of ChatDev highlights its remarkable efficacy in software generation, enabling the completion of the entire software development process in under seven minutes at a cost of less than one dollar. It not only identifies and alleviates potential vulnerabilities but also rectifies potential hallucinations while maintaining commendable efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The potential of ChatDev unveils fresh possibilities for integrating LLMs into the realm of software development.

A critical part of creating code suggestion systems is the pre-training of Large Language Models on vast amounts of source code and natural language text, often of questionable origin or quality. This may contribute to the presence of bugs and vulnerabilities in code generated by LLMs. While efforts to identify bugs at or after code generation exist, it is preferable to pre-train or fine-tune LLMs on curated, high-quality, and compliant datasets. The need for vast amounts of training data necessitates that such curation be automated, minimizing human intervention. We propose an automated source code autocuration technique that leverages the complete version history of open-source software projects to improve the quality of training data. This approach leverages the version history of all OSS projects to identify training data samples that have been modified or have undergone changes in at least one OSS project, and pinpoint a subset of samples that include fixes for bugs or vulnerabilities. We evaluate this method using The Stack v2 dataset, and find that 17% of the code versions in the dataset have newer versions, with 17% of those representing bug fixes, including 2.36% addressing known CVEs. The deduplicated version of Stack v2 still includes blobs vulnerable to 6,947 known CVEs. Furthermore, 58% of the blobs in the dataset were never modified after creation, suggesting they likely represent software with minimal or no use. Misidentified blob origins present an additional challenge, as they lead to the inclusion of non-permissively licensed code, raising serious compliance concerns. By addressing these issues, the training of new models can avoid perpetuating buggy code patterns or license violations. We expect our results to inspire process improvements for automated data curation, with the potential to enhance the reliability of outputs generated by AI tools.

The effectiveness and efficiency of 5G software stack vulnerability and unintended behavior detection are essential for 5G assurance, especially for its applications in critical infrastructures. Scalability and automation are the main challenges in testing approaches and cybersecurity research. In this paper, we propose an innovative approach for automatically detecting vulnerabilities, unintended emergent behaviors, and performance degradation in 5G stacks via run-time profiling documents corresponding to fuzz testing in code repositories. Piloting on srsRAN, we map the run-time profiling via Logging Information (LogInfo) generated by fuzzing test to a high dimensional metric space first and then construct feature spaces based on their timestamp information. Lastly, we further leverage machine learning-based classification algorithms, including Logistic Regression, K-Nearest Neighbors, and Random Forest to categorize the impacts on performance and security attributes. The performance of the proposed approach has high accuracy, ranging from 93.4 % to 95.9 % , in detecting the fuzzing impacts. In addition, the proof of concept could identify and prioritize real-time vulnerabilities on 5G infrastructures and critical applications in various verticals.

Recent advancements in generative AI have led to the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) in software engineering, addressing numerous long-standing challenges. However, a comprehensive study examining the capabilities of LLMs in software vulnerability detection (SVD), a crucial aspect of software security, is currently lacking. Existing research primarily focuses on evaluating LLMs using C/C++ datasets. It typically explores only one or two strategies among prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning for open-source LLMs. Consequently, there is a significant knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of diverse LLMs in detecting vulnerabilities across various programming languages. To address this knowledge gap, we present a comprehensive empirical study evaluating the performance of LLMs on the SVD task. We have compiled a comprehensive dataset comprising 8,260 vulnerable functions in Python, 7,505 in Java, and 28,983 in JavaScript. We assess five open-source LLMs using multiple approaches, including prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning. These LLMs are benchmarked against five fine-tuned small language models and two open-source static application security testing tools. Furthermore, we explore two avenues to improve LLM performance on SVD: a) Data perspective: Retraining models using downsampled balanced datasets. b) Model perspective: Investigating ensemble learning methods that combine predictions from multiple LLMs. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate that SVD remains a challenging task for LLMs. This study provides a thorough understanding of the role of LLMs in SVD and offers practical insights for future advancements in leveraging generative AI to enhance software security practices.

Security vulnerability repair is a difficult task that is in dire need of automation. Two groups of techniques have shown promise: (1) large code language models (LLMs) that have been pre-trained on source code for tasks such as code completion, and (2) automated program repair (APR) techniques that use deep learning (DL) models to automatically fix software bugs. This paper is the first to study and compare Java vulnerability repair capabilities of LLMs and DL-based APR models. The contributions include that we (1) apply and evaluate five LLMs (Codex, CodeGen, CodeT5, PLBART and InCoder), four fine-tuned LLMs, and four DL-based APR techniques on two real-world Java vulnerability benchmarks (Vul4J and VJBench), (2) design code transformations to address the training and test data overlapping threat to Codex, (3) create a new Java vulnerability repair benchmark VJBench, and its transformed version VJBench-trans and (4) evaluate LLMs and APR techniques on the transformed vulnerabilities in VJBench-trans. Our findings include that (1) existing LLMs and APR models fix very few Java vulnerabilities. Codex fixes 10.2 (20.4%), the most number of vulnerabilities. (2) Fine-tuning with general APR data improves LLMs' vulnerability-fixing capabilities. (3) Our new VJBench reveals that LLMs and APR models fail to fix many Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) types, such as CWE-325 Missing cryptographic step and CWE-444 HTTP request smuggling. (4) Codex still fixes 8.3 transformed vulnerabilities, outperforming all the other LLMs and APR models on transformed vulnerabilities. The results call for innovations to enhance automated Java vulnerability repair such as creating larger vulnerability repair training data, tuning LLMs with such data, and applying code simplification transformation to facilitate vulnerability repair.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed code completion tasks, providing context-based suggestions to boost developer productivity in software engineering. As users often fine-tune these models for specific applications, poisoning and backdoor attacks can covertly alter the model outputs. To address this critical security challenge, we introduce CodeBreaker, a pioneering LLM-assisted backdoor attack framework on code completion models. Unlike recent attacks that embed malicious payloads in detectable or irrelevant sections of the code (e.g., comments), CodeBreaker leverages LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for sophisticated payload transformation (without affecting functionalities), ensuring that both the poisoned data for fine-tuning and generated code can evade strong vulnerability detection. CodeBreaker stands out with its comprehensive coverage of vulnerabilities, making it the first to provide such an extensive set for evaluation. Our extensive experimental evaluations and user studies underline the strong attack performance of CodeBreaker across various settings, validating its superiority over existing approaches. By integrating malicious payloads directly into the source code with minimal transformation, CodeBreaker challenges current security measures, underscoring the critical need for more robust defenses for code completion.

In this study, we tackle a growing concern around the safety and ethical use of large language models (LLMs). Despite their potential, these models can be tricked into producing harmful or unethical content through various sophisticated methods, including 'jailbreaking' techniques and targeted manipulation. Our work zeroes in on a specific issue: to what extent LLMs can be led astray by asking them to generate responses that are instruction-centric such as a pseudocode, a program or a software snippet as opposed to vanilla text. To investigate this question, we introduce TechHazardQA, a dataset containing complex queries which should be answered in both text and instruction-centric formats (e.g., pseudocodes), aimed at identifying triggers for unethical responses. We query a series of LLMs -- Llama-2-13b, Llama-2-7b, Mistral-V2 and Mistral 8X7B -- and ask them to generate both text and instruction-centric responses. For evaluation we report the harmfulness score metric as well as judgements from GPT-4 and humans. Overall, we observe that asking LLMs to produce instruction-centric responses enhances the unethical response generation by ~2-38% across the models. As an additional objective, we investigate the impact of model editing using the ROME technique, which further increases the propensity for generating undesirable content. In particular, asking edited LLMs to generate instruction-centric responses further increases the unethical response generation by ~3-16% across the different models.

Vulnerabilities related to option combinations pose a significant challenge in software security testing due to their vast search space. Previous research primarily addressed this challenge through mutation or filtering techniques, which inefficiently treated all option combinations as having equal potential for vulnerabilities, thus wasting considerable time on non-vulnerable targets and resulting in low testing efficiency. In this paper, we utilize carefully designed prompt engineering to drive the large language model (LLM) to predict high-risk option combinations (i.e., more likely to contain vulnerabilities) and perform fuzz testing automatically without human intervention. We developed a tool called ProphetFuzz and evaluated it on a dataset comprising 52 programs collected from three related studies. The entire experiment consumed 10.44 CPU years. ProphetFuzz successfully predicted 1748 high-risk option combinations at an average cost of only \$8.69 per program. Results show that after 72 hours of fuzzing, ProphetFuzz discovered 364 unique vulnerabilities associated with 12.30\% of the predicted high-risk option combinations, which was 32.85\% higher than that found by state-of-the-art in the same timeframe. Additionally, using ProphetFuzz, we conducted persistent fuzzing on the latest versions of these programs, uncovering 140 vulnerabilities, with 93 confirmed by developers and 21 awarded CVE numbers.

In the current cybersecurity landscape, protecting military devices such as communication and battlefield management systems against sophisticated cyber attacks is crucial. Malware exploits vulnerabilities through stealth methods, often evading traditional detection mechanisms such as software signatures. The application of ML/DL in vulnerability detection has been extensively explored in the literature. However, current ML/DL vulnerability detection methods struggle with understanding the context and intent behind complex attacks. Integrating large language models (LLMs) with system call analysis offers a promising approach to enhance malware detection. This work presents a novel framework leveraging LLMs to classify malware based on system call data. The framework uses transfer learning to adapt pre-trained LLMs for malware detection. By retraining LLMs on a dataset of benign and malicious system calls, the models are refined to detect signs of malware activity. Experiments with a dataset of over 1TB of system calls demonstrate that models with larger context sizes, such as BigBird and Longformer, achieve superior accuracy and F1-Score of approximately 0.86. The results highlight the importance of context size in improving detection rates and underscore the trade-offs between computational complexity and performance. This approach shows significant potential for real-time detection in high-stakes environments, offering a robust solution to evolving cyber threats.

Hardware security vulnerabilities in computing systems compromise the security defenses of not only the hardware but also the software running on it. Recent research has shown that hardware fuzzing is a promising technique to efficiently detect such vulnerabilities in large-scale designs such as modern processors. However, the current fuzzing techniques do not adjust their strategies dynamically toward faster and higher design space exploration, resulting in slow vulnerability detection, evident through their low design coverage. To address this problem, we propose PSOFuzz, which uses particle swarm optimization (PSO) to schedule the mutation operators and to generate initial input programs dynamically with the objective of detecting vulnerabilities quickly. Unlike traditional PSO, which finds a single optimal solution, we use a modified PSO that dynamically computes the optimal solution for selecting mutation operators required to explore new design regions in hardware. We also address the challenge of inefficient initial seed generation by employing PSO-based seed generation. Including these optimizations, our final formulation outperforms fuzzers without PSO. Experiments show that PSOFuzz achieves up to 15.25times speedup for vulnerability detection and up to 2.22times speedup for coverage compared to the state-of-the-art simulation-based hardware fuzzer.

The modern surge in camera usage alongside widespread computer vision technology applications poses significant privacy and security concerns. Current artificial intelligence (AI) technologies aid in recognizing relevant events and assisting in daily tasks in homes, offices, hospitals, etc. The need to access or process personal information for these purposes raises privacy concerns. While software-level solutions like face de-identification provide a good privacy/utility trade-off, they present vulnerabilities to sniffing attacks. In this paper, we propose a hardware-level face de-identification method to solve this vulnerability. Specifically, our approach first learns an optical encoder along with a regression model to obtain a face heatmap while hiding the face identity from the source image. We also propose an anonymization framework that generates a new face using the privacy-preserving image, face heatmap, and a reference face image from a public dataset as input. We validate our approach with extensive simulations and hardware experiments.

Fuzzing has achieved tremendous success in discovering bugs and vulnerabilities in various software systems. Systems under test (SUTs) that take in programming or formal language as inputs, e.g., compilers, runtime engines, constraint solvers, and software libraries with accessible APIs, are especially important as they are fundamental building blocks of software development. However, existing fuzzers for such systems often target a specific language, and thus cannot be easily applied to other languages or even other versions of the same language. Moreover, the inputs generated by existing fuzzers are often limited to specific features of the input language, and thus can hardly reveal bugs related to other or new features. This paper presents Fuzz4All, the first fuzzer that is universal in the sense that it can target many different input languages and many different features of these languages. The key idea behind Fuzz4All is to leverage large language models (LLMs) as an input generation and mutation engine, which enables the approach to produce diverse and realistic inputs for any practically relevant language. To realize this potential, we present a novel autoprompting technique, which creates LLM prompts that are wellsuited for fuzzing, and a novel LLM-powered fuzzing loop, which iteratively updates the prompt to create new fuzzing inputs. We evaluate Fuzz4All on nine systems under test that take in six different languages (C, C++, Go, SMT2, Java and Python) as inputs. The evaluation shows, across all six languages, that universal fuzzing achieves higher coverage than existing, language-specific fuzzers. Furthermore, Fuzz4All has identified 76 bugs in widely used systems, such as GCC, Clang, Z3, CVC5, OpenJDK, and the Qiskit quantum computing platform, with 47 bugs already confirmed by developers as previously unknown.

API misuses often lead to software bugs, crashes, and vulnerabilities. While several API misuse detectors have been proposed, there are no automatic repair tools specifically designed for this purpose. In a recent study, test-suite-based automatic program repair (APR) tools were found to be ineffective in repairing API misuses. Still, since the study focused on non-learning-aided APR tools, it remains unknown whether learning-aided APR tools are capable of fixing API misuses. In recent years, pre-trained language models (PLMs) have succeeded greatly in many natural language processing tasks. There is a rising interest in applying PLMs to APR. However, there has not been any study that investigates the effectiveness of PLMs in repairing API misuse. To fill this gap, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study on 11 learning-aided APR tools, which include 9 of the state-of-the-art general-purpose PLMs and two APR tools. We evaluate these models with an API-misuse repair dataset, consisting of two variants. Our results show that PLMs perform better than the studied APR tools in repairing API misuses. Among the 9 pre-trained models tested, CodeT5 is the best performer in the exact match. We also offer insights and potential exploration directions for future research.

Testing plays a crucial role in the software development cycle, enabling the detection of bugs, vulnerabilities, and other undesirable behaviors. To perform software testing, testers need to write code snippets that execute the program under test. Recently, researchers have recognized the potential of large language models (LLMs) in software testing. However, there remains a lack of fair comparisons between different LLMs in terms of test case generation capabilities. In this paper, we propose TESTEVAL, a novel benchmark for test case generation with LLMs. We collect 210 Python programs from an online programming platform, LeetCode, and design three different tasks: overall coverage, targeted line/branch coverage, and targeted path coverage. We further evaluate sixteen popular LLMs, including both commercial and open-source ones, on TESTEVAL. We find that generating test cases to cover specific program lines/branches/paths is still challenging for current LLMs, indicating a lack of ability to comprehend program logic and execution paths. We have open-sourced our dataset and benchmark pipelines at https://llm4softwaretesting.github.io to contribute and accelerate future research on LLMs for software testing.

Penetration testing, an essential component of software security testing, allows organizations to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in their systems, thus bolstering their defense mechanisms against cyberattacks. One recent advancement in the realm of penetration testing is the utilization of Language Models (LLMs). We explore the intersection of LLMs and penetration testing to gain insight into their capabilities and challenges in the context of privilege escalation. We introduce a fully automated privilege-escalation tool designed for evaluating the efficacy of LLMs for (ethical) hacking, executing benchmarks using multiple LLMs, and investigating their respective results. Our results show that GPT-4-turbo is well suited to exploit vulnerabilities (33-83% of vulnerabilities). GPT-3.5-turbo can abuse 16-50% of vulnerabilities, while local models, such as Llama3, can only exploit between 0 and 33% of the vulnerabilities. We analyze the impact of different context sizes, in-context learning, optional high-level guidance mechanisms, and memory management techniques. We discuss challenging areas for LLMs, including maintaining focus during testing, coping with errors, and finally comparing LLMs with human hackers. The current version of the LLM-guided privilege-escalation prototype can be found at https://github.com/ipa-labs/hackingBuddyGPT.

In recent years, more vulnerabilities have been discovered every day, while manual vulnerability repair requires specialized knowledge and is time-consuming. As a result, many detected or even published vulnerabilities remain unpatched, thereby increasing the exposure of software systems to attacks. Recent advancements in agents based on Large Language Models have demonstrated their increasing capabilities in code understanding and generation, which can be promising to achieve automated vulnerability repair. However, the effectiveness of agents based on static information retrieval is still not sufficient for patch generation. To address the challenge, we propose a program repair agent called VulDebugger that fully utilizes both static and dynamic context, and it debugs programs in a manner akin to humans. The agent inspects the actual state of the program via the debugger and infers expected states via constraints that need to be satisfied. By continuously comparing the actual state with the expected state, it deeply understands the root causes of the vulnerabilities and ultimately accomplishes repairs. We experimentally evaluated VulDebugger on 50 real-life projects. With 60.00% successfully fixed, VulDebugger significantly outperforms state-of-the-art approaches for vulnerability repair.

With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (e.g. GitHub Copilot, ChatGPT, etc.) in software engineers' daily practices, it is important to ensure that the code generated by these tools is not only functionally correct but also free of vulnerabilities. Although LLMs can help developers to be more productive, prior empirical studies have shown that LLMs can generate insecure code. There are two contributing factors to the insecure code generation. First, existing datasets used to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) do not adequately represent genuine software engineering tasks sensitive to security. Instead, they are often based on competitive programming challenges or classroom-type coding tasks. In real-world applications, the code produced is integrated into larger codebases, introducing potential security risks. There's a clear absence of benchmarks that focus on evaluating the security of the generated code. Second, existing evaluation metrics primarily focus on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security considerations. Metrics such as pass@k gauge the probability of obtaining the correct code in the top k suggestions. Other popular metrics like BLEU, CodeBLEU, ROUGE, and METEOR similarly emphasize functional accuracy, neglecting security implications. In light of these research gaps, in this paper, we described SALLM, a framework to benchmark LLMs' abilities to generate secure code systematically. This framework has three major components: a novel dataset of security-centric Python prompts, an evaluation environment to test the generated code, and novel metrics to evaluate the models' performance from the perspective of secure code generation.

The increasing use of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) in modern software engineering, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation, has transformed professional software development by boosting productivity and automating development processes. This adoption, however, has highlighted a significant issue: the introduction of security vulnerabilities into the code. These vulnerabilities result, e.g., from flaws in the training data that propagate into the generated code, creating challenges in disclosing them. Traditional vulnerability handling processes often involve extensive manual review. Applying such traditional processes to AI-generated code is challenging. AI-generated code may include several vulnerabilities, possibly in slightly different forms as developers might not build on already implemented code but prompt similar tasks. In this work, we explore the current state of LLM-based approaches for vulnerability handling, focusing on approaches for vulnerability detection, localization, and repair. We provide an overview of recent progress in this area and highlight open challenges that must be addressed in order to establish a reliable and scalable vulnerability handling process of AI-generated code.

AI-powered coding assistants such as GitHub Copilot and OpenAI ChatGPT have achieved notable success in automating code generation. However, these tools rely on pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) that are typically trained on human-written code sourced from open-source project hosting sites like GitHub, which often contains inherent security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may then be mirrored in the code generated by these LLMs, a critical risk revealed and highlighted by recent empirical studies. In this work, we present an exploratory study on whether fine-tuning pre-trained LLMs on datasets of vulnerability-fixing commits can promote secure code generation. We explored two parameter-efficient fine-tuning techniques (LoRa and IA3) on two pre-trained LLMs for code generation. We crawled a fine-tuning dataset (14,622 C and C++ files) for secure code generation by collecting code fixes of confirmed vulnerabilities from open-source repositories. Our evaluation dataset comprises 52 vulnerability scenarios designed to cover the top most dangerous C and C++ Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). Each scenario is a prompt that may induce LLMs to generate vulnerable code. Our exploration reveals that fine-tuning LLMs can improve secure code generation by 6.4% in C language and 5.4% in C++ language. We further experimented with fine-tuning LLMs using different versions of the collected secure code dataset (block, function, and line). We found that fine-tuning with function-level and block-level datasets achieves the best secure code generation performance, compared to the alternatives (file-level and line-level).

Static analysis is a cornerstone for software vulnerability detection, yet it often struggles with the classic precision-scalability trade-off. In practice, such tools often produce high false positive rates, particularly in large codebases like the Linux kernel. This imprecision can arise from simplified vulnerability modeling and over-approximation of path and data constraints. While large language models (LLMs) show promise in code understanding, their naive application to program analysis yields unreliable results due to inherent reasoning limitations. We introduce BugLens, a post-refinement framework that significantly improves static analysis precision. BugLens guides an LLM to follow traditional analysis steps by assessing buggy code patterns for security impact and validating the constraints associated with static warnings. Evaluated on real-world Linux kernel bugs, BugLens raises precision from 0.10 (raw) and 0.50 (semi-automated refinement) to 0.72, substantially reducing false positives and revealing four previously unreported vulnerabilities. Our results suggest that a structured LLM-based workflow can meaningfully enhance the effectiveness of static analysis tools.

In software development, the predominant emphasis on functionality often supersedes security concerns, a trend gaining momentum with AI-driven automation tools like GitHub Copilot. These tools significantly improve developers' efficiency in functional code development. Nevertheless, it remains a notable concern that such tools are also responsible for creating insecure code, predominantly because of pre-training on publicly available repositories with vulnerable code. Moreover, developers are called the "weakest link in the chain" since they have very minimal knowledge of code security. Although existing solutions provide a reasonable solution to vulnerable code, they must adequately describe and educate the developers on code security to ensure that the security issues are not repeated. Therefore we introduce a multipurpose code vulnerability analysis system SecRepair, powered by a large language model, CodeGen2 assisting the developer in identifying and generating fixed code along with a complete description of the vulnerability with a code comment. Our innovative methodology uses a reinforcement learning paradigm to generate code comments augmented by a semantic reward mechanism. Inspired by how humans fix code issues, we propose an instruction-based dataset suitable for vulnerability analysis with LLMs. We further identify zero-day and N-day vulnerabilities in 6 Open Source IoT Operating Systems on GitHub. Our findings underscore that incorporating reinforcement learning coupled with semantic reward augments our model's performance, thereby fortifying its capacity to address code vulnerabilities with improved efficacy.

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

Large language models (LLMs) have brought significant advancements to code generation, benefiting both novice and experienced developers. However, their training using unsanitized data from open-source repositories, like GitHub, introduces the risk of inadvertently propagating security vulnerabilities. To effectively mitigate this concern, this paper presents a comprehensive study focused on evaluating and enhancing code LLMs from a software security perspective. We introduce SecuCoGenSecuCoGen has been uploaded as supplemental material and will be made publicly available after publication., a meticulously curated dataset targeting 21 critical vulnerability types. SecuCoGen comprises 180 samples and serves as the foundation for conducting experiments on three crucial code-related tasks: code generation, code repair and vulnerability classification, with a strong emphasis on security. Our experimental results reveal that existing models often overlook security concerns during code generation, leading to the generation of vulnerable code. To address this, we propose effective approaches to mitigate the security vulnerabilities and enhance the overall robustness of code generated by LLMs. Moreover, our study identifies weaknesses in existing models' ability to repair vulnerable code, even when provided with vulnerability information. Additionally, certain vulnerability types pose challenges for the models, hindering their performance in vulnerability classification. Based on these findings, we believe our study will have a positive impact on the software engineering community, inspiring the development of improved methods for training and utilizing LLMs, thereby leading to safer and more trustworthy model deployment.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose ``gray-box'' access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

The advent of instruction-tuned Large Language Models designed for coding tasks (Code LLMs) has transformed software engineering practices. However, their robustness against various input challenges remains a critical concern. This study introduces DegradePrompter, a novel method designed to systematically evaluate the robustness of instruction-tuned Code LLMs. We assess the impact of diverse input challenges on the functionality and correctness of generated code using rigorous metrics and established benchmarks. Our comprehensive evaluation includes five state-of-the-art open-source models and three production-grade closed-source models, revealing varying degrees of robustness. Open-source models demonstrate an increased susceptibility to input perturbations, resulting in declines in functional correctness ranging from 12% to 34%. In contrast, commercial models demonstrate relatively greater resilience, with performance degradation ranging from 3% to 24%. To enhance the robustness of the models against these vulnerabilities, we investigate a straightforward yet effective mitigation strategy. Our findings highlight the need for robust defense mechanisms and comprehensive evaluations during both the development and deployment phases to ensure the resilience and reliability of automated code generation systems.

In the context of the rising interest in code language models (code LMs) and vulnerability detection, we study the effectiveness of code LMs for detecting vulnerabilities. Our analysis reveals significant shortcomings in existing vulnerability datasets, including poor data quality, low label accuracy, and high duplication rates, leading to unreliable model performance in realistic vulnerability detection scenarios. Additionally, the evaluation methods used with these datasets are not representative of real-world vulnerability detection. To address these challenges, we introduce PrimeVul, a new dataset for training and evaluating code LMs for vulnerability detection. PrimeVul incorporates a novel set of data labeling techniques that achieve comparable label accuracy to human-verified benchmarks while significantly expanding the dataset. It also implements a rigorous data de-duplication and chronological data splitting strategy to mitigate data leakage issues, alongside introducing more realistic evaluation metrics and settings. This comprehensive approach aims to provide a more accurate assessment of code LMs' performance in real-world conditions. Evaluating code LMs on PrimeVul reveals that existing benchmarks significantly overestimate the performance of these models. For instance, a state-of-the-art 7B model scored 68.26% F1 on BigVul but only 3.09% F1 on PrimeVul. Attempts to improve performance through advanced training techniques and larger models like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 were unsuccessful, with results akin to random guessing in the most stringent settings. These findings underscore the considerable gap between current capabilities and the practical requirements for deploying code LMs in security roles, highlighting the need for more innovative research in this domain.

Static analysis tools are widely used for vulnerability detection as they understand programs with complex behavior and millions of lines of code. Despite their popularity, static analysis tools are known to generate an excess of false positives. The recent ability of Machine Learning models to understand programming languages opens new possibilities when applied to static analysis. However, existing datasets to train models for vulnerability identification suffer from multiple limitations such as limited bug context, limited size, and synthetic and unrealistic source code. We propose D2A, a differential analysis based approach to label issues reported by static analysis tools. The D2A dataset is built by analyzing version pairs from multiple open source projects. From each project, we select bug fixing commits and we run static analysis on the versions before and after such commits. If some issues detected in a before-commit version disappear in the corresponding after-commit version, they are very likely to be real bugs that got fixed by the commit. We use D2A to generate a large labeled dataset to train models for vulnerability identification. We show that the dataset can be used to build a classifier to identify possible false alarms among the issues reported by static analysis, hence helping developers prioritize and investigate potential true positives first.

Different from the flow semantics of natural languages, programming languages are inherently rigid in structure and grammar. Existing fine-tuning methodologies for code vulnerability detection generally treat code as long text sequences, stripping away structural elements such as newlines ('/n') and whitespace. However, this approach inadvertently results in the loss of crucial structural information, diminishing the distinct characteristics of code and impairing the accuracy of vulnerability detection. To address these challenges, we propose a novel network architecture method based on pre-trained code models, which incorporates structural information awareness. We propose an enhanced code text processing workflow that retains structural elements prior to modeling. This refinement allows the model to retain and exploit line-level structural information and semantic information during the modeling process. Furthermore, we introduce a new network architecture, the Code Structure-Aware Network through Line-level Semantic Learning (CSLS), which integrates three key components: global vulnerability awareness, line-structural awareness, and sensitive-line awareness. We have conducted comprehensive experiments using vulnerability detection datasets from real-world projects. Extensive experiments were conducted on vulnerability detection datasets derived from real-world projects. The results demonstrate that our new code pre-processing flow significantly improves existing baselines (e.g., a 3\% accuracy improvement on the Devign dataset when applied to popular models such as CoderBert and UniXcoder). The proposed network architecture also demonstrates superior accuracy in detecting vulnerabilities, surpassing newly established benchmarks. These findings underscore the importance of structural information in enhancing the efficacy of code vulnerability detection models.

This paper presents VulBERTa, a deep learning approach to detect security vulnerabilities in source code. Our approach pre-trains a RoBERTa model with a custom tokenisation pipeline on real-world code from open-source C/C++ projects. The model learns a deep knowledge representation of the code syntax and semantics, which we leverage to train vulnerability detection classifiers. We evaluate our approach on binary and multi-class vulnerability detection tasks across several datasets (Vuldeepecker, Draper, REVEAL and muVuldeepecker) and benchmarks (CodeXGLUE and D2A). The evaluation results show that VulBERTa achieves state-of-the-art performance and outperforms existing approaches across different datasets, despite its conceptual simplicity, and limited cost in terms of size of training data and number of model parameters.

Vulnerability prediction is valuable in identifying security issues more efficiently, even though it requires the source code of the target software system, which is a restrictive hypothesis. This paper presents an experimental study to predict vulnerabilities in binary code without source code or complex representations of the binary, leveraging the pivotal idea of decompiling the binary file through neural decompilation and predicting vulnerabilities through deep learning on the decompiled source code. The results outperform the state-of-the-art in both neural decompilation and vulnerability prediction, showing that it is possible to identify vulnerable programs with this approach concerning bi-class (vulnerable/non-vulnerable) and multi-class (type of vulnerability) analysis.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly aided developers by generating or assisting in code writing, enhancing productivity across various tasks. While identifying incorrect code is often straightforward, detecting vulnerabilities in functionally correct code is more challenging, especially for developers with limited security knowledge, which poses considerable security risks of using LLM-generated code and underscores the need for robust evaluation benchmarks that assess both functional correctness and security. Current benchmarks like CyberSecEval and SecurityEval attempt to solve it but are hindered by unclear and impractical specifications, failing to assess both functionality and security accurately. To tackle these deficiencies, we introduce CWEval, a novel outcome-driven evaluation framework designed to enhance the evaluation of secure code generation by LLMs. This framework not only assesses code functionality but also its security simultaneously with high-quality task specifications and outcome-driven test oracles which provides high accuracy. Coupled with CWEval-bench, a multilingual, security-critical coding benchmark, CWEval provides a rigorous empirical security evaluation on LLM-generated code, overcoming previous benchmarks' shortcomings. Through our evaluations, CWEval reveals a notable portion of functional but insecure code produced by LLMs, and shows a serious inaccuracy of previous evaluations, ultimately contributing significantly to the field of secure code generation. We open-source our artifact at: https://github.com/Co1lin/CWEval .

Large Language Models (LLMs) are one of the most promising developments in the field of artificial intelligence, and the software engineering community has readily noticed their potential role in the software development life-cycle. Developers routinely ask LLMs to generate code snippets, increasing productivity but also potentially introducing ownership, privacy, correctness, and security issues. Previous work highlighted how code generated by mainstream commercial LLMs is often not safe, containing vulnerabilities, bugs, and code smells. In this paper, we present a framework that leverages testing and static analysis to assess the quality, and guide the self-improvement, of code generated by general-purpose, open-source LLMs. First, we ask LLMs to generate C code to solve a number of programming tasks. Then we employ ground-truth tests to assess the (in)correctness of the generated code, and a static analysis tool to detect potential safety vulnerabilities. Next, we assess the models ability to evaluate the generated code, by asking them to detect errors and vulnerabilities. Finally, we test the models ability to fix the generated code, providing the reports produced during the static analysis and incorrectness evaluation phases as feedback. Our results show that models often produce incorrect code, and that the generated code can include safety issues. Moreover, they perform very poorly at detecting either issue. On the positive side, we observe a substantial ability to fix flawed code when provided with information about failed tests or potential vulnerabilities, indicating a promising avenue for improving the safety of LLM-based code generation tools.

Memory-safety bugs introduce critical software-security issues. Rust provides memory-safe mechanisms to avoid memory-safety bugs in programming, while still allowing unsafe escape hatches via unsafe code. However, the unsafe code that enhances the usability of Rust provides clear spots for finding memory-safety bugs in Rust source code. In this paper, we claim that these unsafe spots can still be identifiable in Rust binary code via machine learning and be leveraged for finding memory-safety bugs. To support our claim, we propose the tool textttrustspot, that enables reverse engineering to learn an unsafe classifier that proposes a list of functions in Rust binaries for downstream analysis. We empirically show that the function proposals by textttrustspot can recall 92.92% of memory-safety bugs, while it covers only 16.79% of the entire binary code. As an application, we demonstrate that the function proposals are used in targeted fuzzing on Rust packages, which contribute to reducing the fuzzing time compared to non-targeted fuzzing.

With the rapidly increasing capabilities and adoption of code agents for AI-assisted coding, safety concerns, such as generating or executing risky code, have become significant barriers to the real-world deployment of these agents. To provide comprehensive and practical evaluations on the safety of code agents, we propose RedCode, a benchmark for risky code execution and generation: (1) RedCode-Exec provides challenging prompts that could lead to risky code execution, aiming to evaluate code agents' ability to recognize and handle unsafe code. We provide a total of 4,050 risky test cases in Python and Bash tasks with diverse input formats including code snippets and natural text. They covers 25 types of critical vulnerabilities spanning 8 domains (e.g., websites, file systems). We provide Docker environments and design corresponding evaluation metrics to assess their execution results. (2) RedCode-Gen provides 160 prompts with function signatures and docstrings as input to assess whether code agents will follow instructions to generate harmful code or software. Our empirical findings, derived from evaluating three agent frameworks based on 19 LLMs, provide insights into code agents' vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations on RedCode-Exec show that agents are more likely to reject executing risky operations on the operating system, but are less likely to reject executing technically buggy code, indicating high risks. Risky operations described in natural text lead to a lower rejection rate than those in code format. Additionally, evaluations on RedCode-Gen show that more capable base models and agents with stronger overall coding abilities, such as GPT4, tend to produce more sophisticated and effective harmful software. Our findings highlight the need for stringent safety evaluations for diverse code agents. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/AI-secure/RedCode.

Long contexts of recent LLMs have enabled a new use case: asking models to find security vulnerabilities in entire codebases. To evaluate model performance on this task, we introduce eyeballvul: a benchmark designed to test the vulnerability detection capabilities of language models at scale, that is sourced and updated weekly from the stream of published vulnerabilities in open-source repositories. The benchmark consists of a list of revisions in different repositories, each associated with the list of known vulnerabilities present at that revision. An LLM-based scorer is used to compare the list of possible vulnerabilities returned by a model to the list of known vulnerabilities for each revision. As of July 2024, eyeballvul contains 24,000+ vulnerabilities across 6,000+ revisions and 5,000+ repositories, and is around 55GB in size.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to security and safety threats, such as prompt injection, prompt extraction, and harmful requests. One major cause of these vulnerabilities is the lack of an instruction hierarchy. Modern LLM architectures treat all inputs equally, failing to distinguish between and prioritize various types of instructions, such as system messages, user prompts, and data. As a result, lower-priority user prompts may override more critical system instructions, including safety protocols. Existing approaches to achieving instruction hierarchy, such as delimiters and instruction-based training, do not address this issue at the architectural level. We introduce the Instructional Segment Embedding (ISE) technique, inspired by BERT, to modern large language models, which embeds instruction priority information directly into the model. This approach enables models to explicitly differentiate and prioritize various instruction types, significantly improving safety against malicious prompts that attempt to override priority rules. Our experiments on the Structured Query and Instruction Hierarchy benchmarks demonstrate an average robust accuracy increase of up to 15.75% and 18.68%, respectively. Furthermore, we observe an improvement in instruction-following capability of up to 4.1% evaluated on AlpacaEval. Overall, our approach offers a promising direction for enhancing the safety and effectiveness of LLM architectures.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools, but their inherent safety risks - ranging from harmful content generation to broader societal harms - pose significant challenges. These risks can be amplified by the recent adversarial attacks, fine-tuning vulnerabilities, and the increasing deployment of LLMs in high-stakes environments. Existing safety-enhancing techniques, such as fine-tuning with human feedback or adversarial training, are still vulnerable as they address specific threats and often fail to generalize across unseen attacks, or require manual system-level defenses. This paper introduces RepBend, a novel approach that fundamentally disrupts the representations underlying harmful behaviors in LLMs, offering a scalable solution to enhance (potentially inherent) safety. RepBend brings the idea of activation steering - simple vector arithmetic for steering model's behavior during inference - to loss-based fine-tuning. Through extensive evaluation, RepBend achieves state-of-the-art performance, outperforming prior methods such as Circuit Breaker, RMU, and NPO, with up to 95% reduction in attack success rates across diverse jailbreak benchmarks, all with negligible reduction in model usability and general capabilities.

In real world software development, improper or missing exception handling can severely impact the robustness and reliability of code. Exception handling mechanisms require developers to detect, capture, and manage exceptions according to high standards, but many developers struggle with these tasks, leading to fragile code. This problem is particularly evident in open source projects and impacts the overall quality of the software ecosystem. To address this challenge, we explore the use of large language models (LLMs) to improve exception handling in code. Through extensive analysis, we identify three key issues: Insensitive Detection of Fragile Code, Inaccurate Capture of Exception Types, and Distorted Handling Solutions. These problems are widespread across real world repositories, suggesting that robust exception handling practices are often overlooked or mishandled. In response, we propose Seeker, a multi agent framework inspired by expert developer strategies for exception handling. Seeker uses agents: Scanner, Detector, Predator, Ranker, and Handler to assist LLMs in detecting, capturing, and resolving exceptions more effectively. Our work is the first systematic study on leveraging LLMs to enhance exception handling practices, providing valuable insights for future improvements in code reliability.

In real world software development, improper or missing exception handling can severely impact the robustness and reliability of code. Exception handling mechanisms require developers to detect, capture, and manage exceptions according to high standards, but many developers struggle with these tasks, leading to fragile code. This problem is particularly evident in open-source projects and impacts the overall quality of the software ecosystem. To address this challenge, we explore the use of large language models (LLMs) to improve exception handling in code. Through extensive analysis, we identify three key issues: Insensitive Detection of Fragile Code, Inaccurate Capture of Exception Block, and Distorted Handling Solution. These problems are widespread across real world repositories, suggesting that robust exception handling practices are often overlooked or mishandled. In response, we propose Seeker, a multi-agent framework inspired by expert developer strategies for exception handling. Seeker uses agents: Scanner, Detector, Predator, Ranker, and Handler to assist LLMs in detecting, capturing, and resolving exceptions more effectively. Our work is the first systematic study on leveraging LLMs to enhance exception handling practices in real development scenarios, providing valuable insights for future improvements in code reliability.

Package confusion attacks such as typosquatting threaten software supply chains. Attackers make packages with names that syntactically or semantically resemble legitimate ones, tricking engineers into installing malware. While prior work has developed defenses against package confusions in some software package registries, notably NPM, PyPI, and RubyGems, gaps remain: high false-positive rates; generalization to more software package ecosystems; and insights from real-world deployment. In this work, we introduce ConfuGuard, a solution designed to address the challenges posed by package confusion threats. We begin by presenting the first empirical analysis of benign signals derived from prior package confusion data, uncovering their threat patterns, engineering practices, and measurable attributes. We observed that 13.3% of real package confusion attacks are initially stealthy, so we take that into consideration and refined the definitions. Building on state-of-the-art approaches, we extend support from three to six software package registries, and leverage package metadata to distinguish benign packages. Our approach significantly reduces 64% false-positive (from 77% to 13%), with acceptable additional overhead to filter out benign packages by analyzing the package metadata. ConfuGuard is in production at our industry partner, whose analysts have already confirmed 301 packages detected by ConfuGuard as real attacks. We share lessons learned from production and provide insights to researchers.

The open-source software (OSS) ecosystem suffers from security threats caused by malware.However, OSS malware research has three limitations: a lack of high-quality datasets, a lack of malware diversity, and a lack of attack campaign contexts. In this paper, we first build the largest dataset of 24,356 malicious packages from online sources, then propose a knowledge graph to represent the OSS malware corpus and conduct malware analysis in the wild.Our main findings include (1) it is essential to collect malicious packages from various online sources because their data overlapping degrees are small;(2) despite the sheer volume of malicious packages, many reuse similar code, leading to a low diversity of malware;(3) only 28 malicious packages were repeatedly hidden via dependency libraries of 1,354 malicious packages, and dependency-hidden malware has a shorter active time;(4) security reports are the only reliable source for disclosing the malware-based context. Index Terms: Malicious Packages, Software Analysis

Nowadays, developers increasingly rely on solutions powered by Large Language Models (LLM) to assist them with their coding tasks. This makes it crucial to align these tools with human values to prevent malicious misuse. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework for assessing the potential harmfulness of LLMs within the software engineering domain. We begin by developing a taxonomy of potentially harmful software engineering scenarios and subsequently, create a dataset of prompts based on this taxonomy. To systematically assess the responses, we design and validate an automatic evaluator that classifies the outputs of a variety of LLMs both open-source and closed-source models, as well as general-purpose and code-specific LLMs. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of models size, architecture family, and alignment strategies on their tendency to generate harmful content. The results show significant disparities in the alignment of various LLMs for harmlessness. We find that some models and model families, such as Openhermes, are more harmful than others and that code-specific models do not perform better than their general-purpose counterparts. Notably, some fine-tuned models perform significantly worse than their base-models due to their design choices. On the other side, we find that larger models tend to be more helpful and are less likely to respond with harmful information. These results highlight the importance of targeted alignment strategies tailored to the unique challenges of software engineering tasks and provide a foundation for future work in this critical area.

LLMs have becoming increasingly powerful, both in their benign and malicious uses. With the increase in capabilities, researchers have been increasingly interested in their ability to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities. In particular, recent work has conducted preliminary studies on the ability of LLM agents to autonomously hack websites. However, these studies are limited to simple vulnerabilities. In this work, we show that LLM agents can autonomously exploit one-day vulnerabilities in real-world systems. To show this, we collected a dataset of 15 one-day vulnerabilities that include ones categorized as critical severity in the CVE description. When given the CVE description, GPT-4 is capable of exploiting 87% of these vulnerabilities compared to 0% for every other model we test (GPT-3.5, open-source LLMs) and open-source vulnerability scanners (ZAP and Metasploit). Fortunately, our GPT-4 agent requires the CVE description for high performance: without the description, GPT-4 can exploit only 7% of the vulnerabilities. Our findings raise questions around the widespread deployment of highly capable LLM agents.

Modern code generation tools, utilizing AI models like Large Language Models (LLMs), have gained popularity for producing functional code. However, their usage presents security challenges, often resulting in insecure code merging into the code base. Evaluating the quality of generated code, especially its security, is crucial. While prior research explored various aspects of code generation, the focus on security has been limited, mostly examining code produced in controlled environments rather than real-world scenarios. To address this gap, we conducted an empirical study, analyzing code snippets generated by GitHub Copilot from GitHub projects. Our analysis identified 452 snippets generated by Copilot, revealing a high likelihood of security issues, with 32.8% of Python and 24.5% of JavaScript snippets affected. These issues span 38 different Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories, including significant ones like CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values, CWE-78: OS Command Injection, and CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code. Notably, eight CWEs are among the 2023 CWE Top-25, highlighting their severity. Our findings confirm that developers should be careful when adding code generated by Copilot and should also run appropriate security checks as they accept the suggested code. It also shows that practitioners should cultivate corresponding security awareness and skills.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the opportunities, challenges, and potential solutions of harnessing Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 to dig out vulnerabilities within smart contracts based on our ongoing research. For the task of smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving practical usability hinges on identifying as many true vulnerabilities as possible while minimizing the number of false positives. Nonetheless, our empirical study reveals contradictory yet interesting findings: generating more answers with higher randomness largely boosts the likelihood of producing a correct answer but inevitably leads to a higher number of false positives. To mitigate this tension, we propose an adversarial framework dubbed GPTLens that breaks the conventional one-stage detection into two synergistic stages - generation and discrimination, for progressive detection and refinement, wherein the LLM plays dual roles, i.e., auditor and critic, respectively. The goal of auditor is to yield a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities with the hope of encompassing the correct answer, whereas the goal of critic that evaluates the validity of identified vulnerabilities is to minimize the number of false positives. Experimental results and illustrative examples demonstrate that auditor and critic work together harmoniously to yield pronounced improvements over the conventional one-stage detection. GPTLens is intuitive, strategic, and entirely LLM-driven without relying on specialist expertise in smart contracts, showcasing its methodical generality and potential to detect a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/git-disl/GPTLens.

AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. To help us understand this change, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a specific vulnerability), and Patch (patching a specific vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \10 to 30,485, and cover 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a specific vulnerability. We evaluate 5 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI, and custom agents with GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Claude Code (5% on Detect, mapping to \1,350), Custom Agent with Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (5% on Detect, mapping to 1,025; 67.5% on Exploit), and OpenAI Codex CLI (5% on Detect, mapping to \2,400; 90% on Patch, mapping to 14,422). OpenAI Codex CLI and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90% and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 32.5% and 57.5% respectively; in contrast, the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 40-67.5% and Patch scores of 45-60%.

Pre-trained programming language (PL) models (such as CodeT5, CodeBERT, GraphCodeBERT, etc.,) have the potential to automate software engineering tasks involving code understanding and code generation. However, these models operate in the natural channel of code, i.e., they are primarily concerned with the human understanding of the code. They are not robust to changes in the input and thus, are potentially susceptible to adversarial attacks in the natural channel. We propose, CodeAttack, a simple yet effective black-box attack model that uses code structure to generate effective, efficient, and imperceptible adversarial code samples and demonstrates the vulnerabilities of the state-of-the-art PL models to code-specific adversarial attacks. We evaluate the transferability of CodeAttack on several code-code (translation and repair) and code-NL (summarization) tasks across different programming languages. CodeAttack outperforms state-of-the-art adversarial NLP attack models to achieve the best overall drop in performance while being more efficient, imperceptible, consistent, and fluent. The code can be found at https://github.com/reddy-lab-code-research/CodeAttack.

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly influenced various aspects of software development activities. Despite their benefits, LLMs also pose notable risks, including the potential to generate harmful content and being abused by malicious developers to create malicious code. Several previous studies have focused on the ability of LLMs to resist the generation of harmful content that violates human ethical standards, such as biased or offensive content. However, there is no research evaluating the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. To fill this gap, we propose RMCBench, the first benchmark comprising 473 prompts designed to assess the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. This benchmark employs two scenarios: a text-to-code scenario, where LLMs are prompted with descriptions to generate code, and a code-to-code scenario, where LLMs translate or complete existing malicious code. Based on RMCBench, we conduct an empirical study on 11 representative LLMs to assess their ability to resist malicious code generation. Our findings indicate that current LLMs have a limited ability to resist malicious code generation with an average refusal rate of 40.36% in text-to-code scenario and 11.52% in code-to-code scenario. The average refusal rate of all LLMs in RMCBench is only 28.71%; ChatGPT-4 has a refusal rate of only 35.73%. We also analyze the factors that affect LLMs' ability to resist malicious code generation and provide implications for developers to enhance model robustness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant improvements in many tasks across various domains, such as code interpretation, response generation, and ambiguity handling. These LLMs, however, when upgrading, primarily prioritize enhancing user experience while neglecting security, privacy, and safety implications. Consequently, unintended vulnerabilities or biases can be introduced. Previous studies have predominantly focused on specific versions of the models and disregard the potential emergence of new attack vectors targeting the updated versions. Through the lens of adversarial examples within the in-context learning framework, this longitudinal study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the robustness of successive versions of LLMs, vis-\`a-vis GPT-3.5. We conduct extensive experiments to analyze and understand the impact of the robustness in two distinct learning categories: zero-shot learning and few-shot learning. Our findings indicate that, in comparison to earlier versions of LLMs, the updated versions do not exhibit the anticipated level of robustness against adversarial attacks. In addition, our study emphasizes the increased effectiveness of synergized adversarial queries in most zero-shot learning and few-shot learning cases. We hope that our study can lead to a more refined assessment of the robustness of LLMs over time and provide valuable insights of these models for both developers and users.

Remote Code Execution (RCE) exploits pose a significant threat to AI and ML systems, particularly in GPU-accelerated environments where the computational power of GPUs can be misused for malicious purposes. This paper focuses on RCE attacks leveraging deserialization vulnerabilities and custom layers, such as TensorFlow Lambda layers, which are often overlooked due to the complexity of monitoring GPU workloads. These vulnerabilities enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, blending malicious activity seamlessly into expected model behavior and exploiting GPUs for unauthorized tasks such as cryptocurrency mining. Unlike traditional CPU-based attacks, the parallel processing nature of GPUs and their high resource utilization make runtime detection exceptionally challenging. In this work, we provide a comprehensive examination of RCE exploits targeting GPUs, demonstrating an attack that utilizes these vulnerabilities to deploy a crypto miner on a GPU. We highlight the technical intricacies of such attacks, emphasize their potential for significant financial and computational costs, and propose strategies for mitigation. By shedding light on this underexplored attack vector, we aim to raise awareness and encourage the adoption of robust security measures in GPU-driven AI and ML systems, with an emphasis on static and model scanning as an easier way to detect exploits.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

Much is promised in relation to AI-supported software development. However, there has been limited evaluation effort in the research domain aimed at validating the true utility of such techniques, especially when compared to human coding outputs. We bridge this gap, where a benchmark dataset comprising 72 distinct software engineering tasks is used to compare the effectiveness of large language models (LLMs) and human programmers in producing Python software code. GPT-4 is used as a representative LLM, where for the code generated by humans and this LLM, we evaluate code quality and adherence to Python coding standards, code security and vulnerabilities, code complexity and functional correctness. We use various static analysis benchmarks, including Pylint, Radon, Bandit and test cases. Among the notable outcomes, results show that human-generated code recorded higher ratings for adhering to coding standards than GPT-4. We observe security flaws in code generated by both humans and GPT-4, however, code generated by humans shows a greater variety of problems, but GPT-4 code included more severe outliers. Our results show that although GPT-4 is capable of producing coding solutions, it frequently produces more complex code that may need more reworking to ensure maintainability. On the contrary however, our outcomes show that a higher number of test cases passed for code generated by GPT-4 across a range of tasks than code that was generated by humans. That said, GPT-4 frequently struggles with complex problem-solving that involve in-depth domain knowledge. This study highlights the potential utility of LLMs for supporting software development, however, tasks requiring comprehensive, innovative or unconventional solutions, and careful debugging and error correction seem to be better developed by human programmers. We plot an agenda for the software engineering community.

Existing works have established multiple benchmarks to highlight the security risks associated with Code GenAI. These risks are primarily reflected in two areas: a model potential to generate insecure code (insecure coding) and its utility in cyberattacks (cyberattack helpfulness). While these benchmarks have made significant strides, there remain opportunities for further improvement. For instance, many current benchmarks tend to focus more on a model ability to provide attack suggestions rather than its capacity to generate executable attacks. Additionally, most benchmarks rely heavily on static evaluation metrics, which may not be as precise as dynamic metrics such as passing test cases. Conversely, expert-verified benchmarks, while offering high-quality data, often operate at a smaller scale. To address these gaps, we develop SecCodePLT, a unified and comprehensive evaluation platform for code GenAIs' risks. For insecure code, we introduce a new methodology for data creation that combines experts with automatic generation. Our methodology ensures the data quality while enabling large-scale generation. We also associate samples with test cases to conduct code-related dynamic evaluation. For cyberattack helpfulness, we set up a real environment and construct samples to prompt a model to generate actual attacks, along with dynamic metrics in our environment. We conduct extensive experiments and show that SecCodePLT outperforms the state-of-the-art (SOTA) benchmark CyberSecEval in security relevance. Furthermore, it better identifies the security risks of SOTA models in insecure coding and cyberattack helpfulness. Finally, we apply SecCodePLT to the SOTA code agent, Cursor, and, for the first time, identify non-trivial security risks in this advanced coding agent.

Intelligent agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated substantial promise in autonomously conducting experiments and facilitating scientific discoveries across various disciplines. While their capabilities are promising, they also introduce novel vulnerabilities that demand careful consideration for safety. However, there exists a notable gap in the literature, as there has been no comprehensive exploration of these vulnerabilities. This position paper fills this gap by conducting a thorough examination of vulnerabilities in LLM-based agents within scientific domains, shedding light on potential risks associated with their misuse and emphasizing the need for safety measures. We begin by providing a comprehensive overview of the potential risks inherent to scientific LLM agents, taking into account user intent, the specific scientific domain, and their potential impact on the external environment. Then, we delve into the origins of these vulnerabilities and provide a scoping review of the limited existing works. Based on our analysis, we propose a triadic framework involving human regulation, agent alignment, and an understanding of environmental feedback (agent regulation) to mitigate these identified risks. Furthermore, we highlight the limitations and challenges associated with safeguarding scientific agents and advocate for the development of improved models, robust benchmarks, and comprehensive regulations to address these issues effectively.

Language model deployments in consumer-facing applications introduce numerous risks. While existing research on harms and hazards of such applications follows top-down approaches derived from regulatory frameworks and theoretical analyses, empirical evidence of real-world failure modes remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce RealHarm, a dataset of annotated problematic interactions with AI agents built from a systematic review of publicly reported incidents. Analyzing harms, causes, and hazards specifically from the deployer's perspective, we find that reputational damage constitutes the predominant organizational harm, while misinformation emerges as the most common hazard category. We empirically evaluate state-of-the-art guardrails and content moderation systems to probe whether such systems would have prevented the incidents, revealing a significant gap in the protection of AI applications.

Open source code is considered a common practice in modern software development. However, reusing other code allows bad actors to access a wide developers' community, hence the products that rely on it. Those attacks are categorized as supply chain attacks. Recent years saw a growing number of supply chain attacks that leverage open source during software development, relaying the download and installation procedures, whether automatic or manual. Over the years, many approaches have been invented for detecting vulnerable packages. However, it is uncommon to detect malicious code within packages. Those detection approaches can be broadly categorized as analyzes that use (dynamic) and do not use (static) code execution. Here, we introduce Malicious Source code Detection using Transformers (MSDT) algorithm. MSDT is a novel static analysis based on a deep learning method that detects real-world code injection cases to source code packages. In this study, we used MSDT and a dataset with over 600,000 different functions to embed various functions and applied a clustering algorithm to the resulting vectors, detecting the malicious functions by detecting the outliers. We evaluated MSDT's performance by conducting extensive experiments and demonstrated that our algorithm is capable of detecting functions that were injected with malicious code with precision@k values of up to 0.909.

In the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), the code summarization technique boosts a lot, along with the emergence of many new significant works. However, the potential of code summarization in the Computer Security Area still remains explored. Can we generate a code summary of a code snippet for its security intention? Thus, this work proposes an innovative large-scale multi-perspective Code Intent Summary Dataset named BADS , aiming to increase the understanding of a given code snippet and reduce the risk in the code developing process. The procedure of establishing a dataset can be divided into four steps: First, we collect samples of codes with known vulnerabilities as well as code generated by AI from multiple sources. Second, we do the data clean and format unification, then do the data combination. Third, we utilize the LLM to automatically Annotate the code snippet. Last, We do the human evaluation to double-check. The dataset contains X code examples which cover Y categories of vulnerability. Our data are from Z open-source projects and CVE entries, and compared to existing work, our dataset not only contains original code but also code function summary and security intent summary, providing context information for research in code security analysis. All information is in CSV format. The contributions of this paper are four-fold: the establishment of a high-quality, multi-perspective Code Intent Summary Dataset; an innovative method in data collection and processing; A new multi-perspective code analysis framework that promotes cross-disciplinary research in the fields of software engineering and cybersecurity; improving the practicality and scalability of the research outcomes by considering the code length limitations in real-world applications. Our dataset and related tools have been publicly released on GitHub.

Auto-completing code enables developers to speed up coding significantly. Recent advances in transformer-based large language model (LLM) technologies have been applied to code synthesis. However, studies show that many of such synthesized codes contain vulnerabilities. We propose a novel vulnerability-constrained decoding approach to reduce the amount of vulnerable code generated by such models. Using a small dataset of labeled vulnerable lines of code, we fine-tune an LLM to include vulnerability labels when generating code, acting as an embedded classifier. Then, during decoding, we deny the model to generate these labels to avoid generating vulnerable code. To evaluate the method, we chose to automatically complete Ethereum Blockchain smart contracts (SCs) as the case study due to the strict requirements of SC security. We first fine-tuned the 6-billion-parameter GPT-J model using 186,397 Ethereum SCs after removing the duplication from 2,217,692 SCs. The fine-tuning took more than one week using ten GPUs. The results showed that our fine-tuned model could synthesize SCs with an average BLEU (BiLingual Evaluation Understudy) score of 0.557. However, many codes in the auto-completed SCs were vulnerable. Using the code before the vulnerable line of 176 SCs containing different types of vulnerabilities to auto-complete the code, we found that more than 70% of the auto-completed codes were insecure. Thus, we further fine-tuned the model on other 941 vulnerable SCs containing the same types of vulnerabilities and applied vulnerability-constrained decoding. The fine-tuning took only one hour with four GPUs. We then auto-completed the 176 SCs again and found that our approach could identify 62% of the code to be generated as vulnerable and avoid generating 67% of them, indicating the approach could efficiently and effectively avoid vulnerabilities in the auto-completed code.

Large Language Models (LLMs) in Software Engineering (SE) can offer assistance for coding. To facilitate a rigorous evaluation of LLMs in practical coding contexts, Carlos et al. introduced the SWE-bench dataset, which comprises 2,294 real-world GitHub issues and their corresponding pull requests, collected from 12 widely used Python repositories. Several impressive LLM-based toolkits recently are developed and evaluated on this dataset. However, a systematic evaluation of the quality of SWE-bench remains missing. In this paper, we addressed this gap by presenting an empirical analysis of the SWE-bench dataset. We conducted a manual screening of instances where SWEAgent + GPT-4 successfully resolved issues by comparing the model-generated patches with the actual pull requests. SWE-Agent+GPT-4 was at the top of SWE-bench leaderboard during the time of our study. Our analysis reveals some critical issues with the SWE-bench dataset: 1) 32.67% of the successful patches involve cheating as the solutions were directly provided in the issue report or the comments. We refer to as solution leakage problem. 2) 31.08% of the passed patches are suspicious patches due to weak test cases, i.e., the tests were not adequate to verify the correctness of a patch. When we filtered out these problematic issues, the resolution rate of SWE-Agent+GPT-4 dropped from 12.47% to 3.97%. We also observed that the same data quality issues also exist in the two variants of SWE-bench, i.e., SWE-bench Lite and SWE-Bench Verified. In addition, over 94% of the issues were created before LLM's knowledge cutoff dates, posing potential data leakage issues.

Vulnerability identification is crucial to protect the software systems from attacks for cyber security. It is especially important to localize the vulnerable functions among the source code to facilitate the fix. However, it is a challenging and tedious process, and also requires specialized security expertise. Inspired by the work on manually-defined patterns of vulnerabilities from various code representation graphs and the recent advance on graph neural networks, we propose Devign, a general graph neural network based model for graph-level classification through learning on a rich set of code semantic representations. It includes a novel Conv module to efficiently extract useful features in the learned rich node representations for graph-level classification. The model is trained over manually labeled datasets built on 4 diversified large-scale open-source C projects that incorporate high complexity and variety of real source code instead of synthesis code used in previous works. The results of the extensive evaluation on the datasets demonstrate that Devign outperforms the state of the arts significantly with an average of 10.51% higher accuracy and 8.68\% F1 score, increases averagely 4.66% accuracy and 6.37% F1 by the Conv module.

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

Rapid advances in the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have raised widespread concerns regarding their potential for malicious use. Open-weight LLMs present unique challenges, as existing safeguards lack robustness to tampering attacks that modify model weights. For example, recent works have demonstrated that refusal and unlearning safeguards can be trivially removed with a few steps of fine-tuning. These vulnerabilities necessitate new approaches for enabling the safe release of open-weight LLMs. We develop a method, called TAR, for building tamper-resistant safeguards into open-weight LLMs such that adversaries cannot remove the safeguards even after thousands of steps of fine-tuning. In extensive evaluations and red teaming analyses, we find that our method greatly improves tamper-resistance while preserving benign capabilities. Our results demonstrate that tamper-resistance is a tractable problem, opening up a promising new avenue to improve the safety and security of open-weight LLMs.

We present HaPy-Bug, a curated dataset of 793 Python source code commits associated with bug fixes, with each line of code annotated by three domain experts. The annotations offer insights into the purpose of modified files, changes at the line level, and reviewers' confidence levels. We analyze HaPy-Bug to examine the distribution of file purposes, types of modifications, and tangled changes. Additionally, we explore its potential applications in bug tracking, the analysis of bug-fixing practices, and the development of repository analysis tools. HaPy-Bug serves as a valuable resource for advancing research in software maintenance and security.

Smart contracts are essential to decentralized finance (DeFi) and blockchain ecosystems but are increasingly vulnerable to exploits due to coding errors and complex attack vectors. Traditional static analysis tools and existing vulnerability detection methods often fail to address these challenges comprehensively, leading to high false-positive rates and an inability to detect dynamic vulnerabilities. This paper introduces SmartLLM, a novel approach leveraging fine-tuned LLaMA 3.1 models with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of smart contract auditing. By integrating domain-specific knowledge from ERC standards and employing advanced techniques such as QLoRA for efficient fine-tuning, SmartLLM achieves superior performance compared to static analysis tools like Mythril and Slither, as well as zero-shot large language model (LLM) prompting methods such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Experimental results demonstrate a perfect recall of 100% and an accuracy score of 70%, highlighting the model's robustness in identifying vulnerabilities, including reentrancy and access control issues. This research advances smart contract security by offering a scalable and effective auditing solution, supporting the secure adoption of decentralized applications.

With the recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), generating functionally correct code has become less complicated for a wide array of developers. While using LLMs has sped up the functional development process, it poses a heavy risk to code security. Code generation with proper security measures using LLM is a significantly more challenging task than functional code generation. Security measures may include adding a pair of lines of code with the original code, consisting of null pointer checking or prepared statements for SQL injection prevention. Currently, available code repair LLMs generate code repair by supervised fine-tuning, where the model looks at cross-entropy loss. However, the original and repaired codes are mostly similar in functionality and syntactically, except for a few (1-2) lines, which act as security measures. This imbalance between the lines needed for security measures and the functional code enforces the supervised fine-tuned model to prioritize generating functional code without adding proper security measures, which also benefits the model by resulting in minimal loss. Therefore, in this work, for security hardening and strengthening of generated code from LLMs, we propose a reinforcement learning-based method for program-specific repair with the combination of semantic and syntactic reward mechanisms that focus heavily on adding security and functional measures in the code, respectively.

Pre-trained Code Language Models (Code-PLMs) have shown many advancements and achieved state-of-the-art results for many software engineering tasks in the past few years. These models are mainly targeted for popular programming languages such as Java and Python, leaving out many other ones like R. Though R has a wide community of developers and users, there is little known about the applicability of Code-PLMs for R. In this preliminary study, we aim to investigate the vulnerability of Code-PLMs for code entities in R. For this purpose, we use an R dataset of code and comment pairs and then apply CodeAttack, a black-box attack model that uses the structure of code to generate adversarial code samples. We investigate how the model can attack different entities in R. This is the first step towards understanding the importance of R token types, compared to popular programming languages (e.g., Java). We limit our study to code summarization. Our results show that the most vulnerable code entity is the identifier, followed by some syntax tokens specific to R. The results can shed light on the importance of token types and help in developing models for code summarization and method name prediction for the R language.

Recently, the large language models (LLMs) have shown extraordinary ability in understanding natural language and generating programming code. It has been a common practice of software engineers to consult LLMs when encountering coding questions. Although efforts have been made to avoid syntax errors and align the code with the intended semantics, the reliability and robustness of the code generationfrom LLMs have not yet been thoroughly studied. The executable code is not equivalent to the reliable and robust code, especially in the context of real-world software development. The misuse of APIs in the generated code could lead to severe problem, such as resource leaks, program crashes. To make things worse, the users of LLM code generation services are actually the developers that are most vulnerable to these code that seems right -- They are always novice developers that are not familiar with the APIs that LLMs generate code for them. Therefore, they could hardly tell the misuse in the code generated by LLMs, which further facilitates the incorrect code applied in real-world software. Existing code evaluation benchmark and datasets focus on crafting small tasks such as programming questions in coding interviews, which however deviates from the problem that developers would ask LLM for real-world coding help. To fill the missing piece, in this work, we propose a dataset RobustAPI for evaluating the reliability and robustness of code generated by LLMs. We collect 1208 coding questions from StackOverflow on 24 representative Java APIs. We summarize thecommon misuse patterns of these APIs and evaluate them oncurrent popular LLMs. The evaluation results show that evenfor GPT-4, 62% of the generated code contains API misuses,which would cause unexpected consequences if the code isintroduced into real-world software.

The new paradigm of finetuning-as-a-service introduces a new attack surface for Large Language Models (LLMs): a few harmful data uploaded by users can easily trick the finetuning to produce an alignment-broken model. We conduct an empirical analysis and uncover a harmful embedding drift phenomenon, showing a probable cause of the alignment-broken effect. Inspired by our findings, we propose Vaccine, a perturbation-aware alignment technique to mitigate the security risk of users finetuning. The core idea of Vaccine is to produce invariant hidden embeddings by progressively adding crafted perturbation to them in the alignment phase. This enables the embeddings to withstand harmful perturbation from un-sanitized user data in the finetuning phase. Our results on open source mainstream LLMs (e.g., Llama2, Opt, Vicuna) demonstrate that Vaccine can boost the robustness of alignment against harmful prompts induced embedding drift while reserving reasoning ability towards benign prompts. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Vaccine.

Deep learning has transformed AI applications but faces critical security challenges, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, model theft, and privacy leakage. This survey examines these vulnerabilities, detailing their mechanisms and impact on model integrity and confidentiality. Practical implementations, including adversarial examples, label flipping, and backdoor attacks, are explored alongside defenses such as adversarial training, differential privacy, and federated learning, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Advanced methods like contrastive and self-supervised learning are presented for enhancing robustness. The survey concludes with future directions, emphasizing automated defenses, zero-trust architectures, and the security challenges of large AI models. A balanced approach to performance and security is essential for developing reliable deep learning systems.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Tests that cause spurious failures without any code changes, i.e., flaky tests, hamper regression testing, increase maintenance costs, may shadow real bugs, and decrease trust in tests. While the prevalence and importance of flakiness is well established, prior research focused on Java projects, thus raising the question of how the findings generalize. In order to provide a better understanding of the role of flakiness in software development beyond Java, we empirically study the prevalence, causes, and degree of flakiness within software written in Python, one of the currently most popular programming languages. For this, we sampled 22352 open source projects from the popular PyPI package index, and analyzed their 876186 test cases for flakiness. Our investigation suggests that flakiness is equally prevalent in Python as it is in Java. The reasons, however, are different: Order dependency is a much more dominant problem in Python, causing 59% of the 7571 flaky tests in our dataset. Another 28% were caused by test infrastructure problems, which represent a previously undocumented cause of flakiness. The remaining 13% can mostly be attributed to the use of network and randomness APIs by the projects, which is indicative of the type of software commonly written in Python. Our data also suggests that finding flaky tests requires more runs than are often done in the literature: A 95% confidence that a passing test case is not flaky on average would require 170 reruns.

The widespread deployment of general-purpose AI (GPAI) systems introduces significant new risks. Yet the infrastructure, practices, and norms for reporting flaws in GPAI systems remain seriously underdeveloped, lagging far behind more established fields like software security. Based on a collaboration between experts from the fields of software security, machine learning, law, social science, and policy, we identify key gaps in the evaluation and reporting of flaws in GPAI systems. We call for three interventions to advance system safety. First, we propose using standardized AI flaw reports and rules of engagement for researchers in order to ease the process of submitting, reproducing, and triaging flaws in GPAI systems. Second, we propose GPAI system providers adopt broadly-scoped flaw disclosure programs, borrowing from bug bounties, with legal safe harbors to protect researchers. Third, we advocate for the development of improved infrastructure to coordinate distribution of flaw reports across the many stakeholders who may be impacted. These interventions are increasingly urgent, as evidenced by the prevalence of jailbreaks and other flaws that can transfer across different providers' GPAI systems. By promoting robust reporting and coordination in the AI ecosystem, these proposals could significantly improve the safety, security, and accountability of GPAI systems.

The proliferation of pre-trained models (PTMs) and datasets has led to the emergence of centralized model hubs like Hugging Face, which facilitate collaborative development and reuse. However, recent security reports have uncovered vulnerabilities and instances of malicious attacks within these platforms, highlighting growing security concerns. This paper presents the first systematic study of malicious code poisoning attacks on pre-trained model hubs, focusing on the Hugging Face platform. We conduct a comprehensive threat analysis, develop a taxonomy of model formats, and perform root cause analysis of vulnerable formats. While existing tools like Fickling and ModelScan offer some protection, they face limitations in semantic-level analysis and comprehensive threat detection. To address these challenges, we propose MalHug, an end-to-end pipeline tailored for Hugging Face that combines dataset loading script extraction, model deserialization, in-depth taint analysis, and heuristic pattern matching to detect and classify malicious code poisoning attacks in datasets and models. In collaboration with Ant Group, a leading financial technology company, we have implemented and deployed MalHug on a mirrored Hugging Face instance within their infrastructure, where it has been operational for over three months. During this period, MalHug has monitored more than 705K models and 176K datasets, uncovering 91 malicious models and 9 malicious dataset loading scripts. These findings reveal a range of security threats, including reverse shell, browser credential theft, and system reconnaissance. This work not only bridges a critical gap in understanding the security of the PTM supply chain but also provides a practical, industry-tested solution for enhancing the security of pre-trained model hubs.

Despite the effort in vulnerability detection over the last two decades, memory safety vulnerabilities continue to be a critical problem. Recent reports suggest that the key solution is to migrate to memory-safe languages. To this end, C-to-Rust transpilation becomes popular to resolve memory-safety issues in C programs. Recent works propose C-to-Rust transpilation frameworks; however, a comprehensive evaluation dataset is missing. Although one solution is to put together a large enough dataset, this increases the analysis time in automated frameworks as well as in manual efforts for some cases. In this work, we build a method to select functions from a large set to construct a minimized yet representative dataset to evaluate the C-to-Rust transpilation. We propose C2RUST-BENCH that contains 2,905 functions, which are representative of C-to-Rust transpilation, selected from 15,503 functions of real-world programs.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

Ensuring the security and reliability of machine learning frameworks is crucial for building trustworthy AI-based systems. Fuzzing, a popular technique in secure software development lifecycle (SSDLC), can be used to develop secure and robust software. Popular machine learning frameworks such as PyTorch and TensorFlow are complex and written in multiple programming languages including C/C++ and Python. We propose a dynamic analysis pipeline for Python projects using the Sydr-Fuzz toolset. Our pipeline includes fuzzing, corpus minimization, crash triaging, and coverage collection. Crash triaging and severity estimation are important steps to ensure that the most critical vulnerabilities are addressed promptly. Furthermore, the proposed pipeline is integrated in GitLab CI. To identify the most vulnerable parts of the machine learning frameworks, we analyze their potential attack surfaces and develop fuzz targets for PyTorch, TensorFlow, and related projects such as h5py. Applying our dynamic analysis pipeline to these targets, we were able to discover 3 new bugs and propose fixes for them.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

Software maintenance faces a persistent challenge with crash bugs, especially across diverse release channels catering to distinct user bases. Nightly builds, favoured by enthusiasts, often reveal crashes that are cheaper to fix but may differ significantly from those in stable releases. In this paper, we emphasize the need for a data-driven solution to predict the impact of crashes happening on nightly channels once they are released to stable channels. We also list the challenges that need to be considered when approaching this problem.

Software testing and verification are critical for ensuring the reliability and security of modern software systems. Traditionally, formal verification techniques, such as model checking and theorem proving, have provided rigorous frameworks for detecting bugs and vulnerabilities. However, these methods often face scalability challenges when applied to complex, real-world programs. Recently, the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has introduced a new paradigm for software analysis, leveraging their ability to understand insecure coding practices. Although LLMs demonstrate promising capabilities in tasks such as bug prediction and invariant generation, they lack the formal guarantees of classical methods. This paper presents a comprehensive study of state-of-the-art software testing and verification, focusing on three key approaches: classical formal methods, LLM-based analysis, and emerging hybrid techniques, which combine their strengths. We explore each approach's strengths, limitations, and practical applications, highlighting the potential of hybrid systems to address the weaknesses of standalone methods. We analyze whether integrating formal rigor with LLM-driven insights can enhance the effectiveness and scalability of software verification, exploring their viability as a pathway toward more robust and adaptive testing frameworks.

The field of software security testing, more specifically penetration testing, is an activity that requires high levels of expertise and involves many manual testing and analysis steps. This paper explores the potential usage of large-language models, such as GPT3.5, to augment penetration testers with AI sparring partners. We explore the feasibility of supplementing penetration testers with AI models for two distinct use cases: high-level task planning for security testing assignments and low-level vulnerability hunting within a vulnerable virtual machine. For the latter, we implemented a closed-feedback loop between LLM-generated low-level actions with a vulnerable virtual machine (connected through SSH) and allowed the LLM to analyze the machine state for vulnerabilities and suggest concrete attack vectors which were automatically executed within the virtual machine. We discuss promising initial results, detail avenues for improvement, and close deliberating on the ethics of providing AI-based sparring partners.

Releasing open-source large language models (LLMs) presents a dual-use risk since bad actors can easily fine-tune these models for harmful purposes. Even without the open release of weights, weight stealing and fine-tuning APIs make closed models vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks (HFAs). While safety measures like preventing jailbreaks and improving safety guardrails are important, such measures can easily be reversed through fine-tuning. In this work, we propose Representation Noising (RepNoise), a defence mechanism that is effective even when attackers have access to the weights and the defender no longer has any control. RepNoise works by removing information about harmful representations such that it is difficult to recover them during fine-tuning. Importantly, our defence is also able to generalize across different subsets of harm that have not been seen during the defence process. Our method does not degrade the general capability of LLMs and retains the ability to train the model on harmless tasks. We provide empirical evidence that the effectiveness of our defence lies in its "depth": the degree to which information about harmful representations is removed across all layers of the LLM.

Black-box finetuning is an emerging interface for adapting state-of-the-art language models to user needs. However, such access may also let malicious actors undermine model safety. To demonstrate the challenge of defending finetuning interfaces, we introduce covert malicious finetuning, a method to compromise model safety via finetuning while evading detection. Our method constructs a malicious dataset where every individual datapoint appears innocuous, but finetuning on the dataset teaches the model to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. Applied to GPT-4, our method produces a finetuned model that acts on harmful instructions 99% of the time and avoids detection by defense mechanisms such as dataset inspection, safety evaluations, and input/output classifiers. Our findings question whether black-box finetuning access can be secured against sophisticated adversaries.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been gaining increasing attention and demonstrated promising performance across a variety of Software Engineering (SE) tasks, such as Automated Program Repair (APR), code summarization, and code completion. For example, ChatGPT, the latest black-box LLM, has been investigated by numerous recent research studies and has shown impressive performance in various tasks. However, there exists a potential risk of data leakage since these LLMs are usually close-sourced with unknown specific training details, e.g., pre-training datasets. In this paper, we seek to review the bug-fixing capabilities of ChatGPT on a clean APR benchmark with different research objectives. We first introduce {\benchmark}, a new benchmark with buggy and the corresponding fixed programs from competitive programming problems starting from 2023, after the training cutoff point of ChatGPT. The results on {\benchmark} show that ChatGPT is able to fix 109 out of 151 buggy programs using the basic prompt within 35 independent rounds, outperforming state-of-the-art LLMs CodeT5 and PLBART by 27.5\% and 62.4\% prediction accuracy. We also investigate the impact of three types of prompts, i.e., problem description, error feedback, and bug localization, leading to additional 34 fixed bugs. Besides, we provide additional discussion from the interactive nature of ChatGPT to illustrate the capacity of a dialog-based repair workflow with 9 additional fixed bugs. Inspired by the findings, we further pinpoint various challenges and opportunities for advanced SE study equipped with such LLMs (e.g.,~ChatGPT) in the near future. More importantly, our work calls for more research on the reevaluation of the achievements obtained by existing black-box LLMs across various SE tasks, not limited to ChatGPT on APR.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced code completion capabilities, giving rise to a new generation of LLM-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs). Unlike general-purpose LLMs, these tools possess unique workflows, integrating multiple information sources as input and prioritizing code suggestions over natural language interaction, which introduces distinct security challenges. Additionally, LCCTs often rely on proprietary code datasets for training, raising concerns about the potential exposure of sensitive data. This paper exploits these distinct characteristics of LCCTs to develop targeted attack methodologies on two critical security risks: jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks. Our experimental results expose significant vulnerabilities within LCCTs, including a 99.4% success rate in jailbreaking attacks on GitHub Copilot and a 46.3% success rate on Amazon Q. Furthermore, We successfully extracted sensitive user data from GitHub Copilot, including 54 real email addresses and 314 physical addresses associated with GitHub usernames. Our study also demonstrates that these code-based attack methods are effective against general-purpose LLMs, such as the GPT series, highlighting a broader security misalignment in the handling of code by modern LLMs. These findings underscore critical security challenges associated with LCCTs and suggest essential directions for strengthening their security frameworks. The example code and attack samples from our research are provided at https://github.com/Sensente/Security-Attacks-on-LCCTs.

Code generation models have achieved impressive performance. However, they tend to be brittle as slight edits to a prompt could lead to very different generations; these robustness properties, critical for user experience when deployed in real-life applications, are not well understood. Most existing works on robustness in text or code tasks have focused on classification, while robustness in generation tasks is an uncharted area and to date there is no comprehensive benchmark for robustness in code generation. In this paper, we propose ReCode, a comprehensive robustness evaluation benchmark for code generation models. We customize over 30 transformations specifically for code on docstrings, function and variable names, code syntax, and code format. They are carefully designed to be natural in real-life coding practice, preserve the original semantic meaning, and thus provide multifaceted assessments of a model's robustness performance. With human annotators, we verified that over 90% of the perturbed prompts do not alter the semantic meaning of the original prompt. In addition, we define robustness metrics for code generation models considering the worst-case behavior under each type of perturbation, taking advantage of the fact that executing the generated code can serve as objective evaluation. We demonstrate ReCode on SOTA models using HumanEval, MBPP, as well as function completion tasks derived from them. Interesting observations include: better robustness for CodeGen over InCoder and GPT-J; models are most sensitive to syntax perturbations; more challenging robustness evaluation on MBPP over HumanEval.