Daily Papers

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to universal jailbreaks-prompting strategies that systematically bypass model safeguards and enable users to carry out harmful processes that require many model interactions, like manufacturing illegal substances at scale. To defend against these attacks, we introduce Constitutional Classifiers: safeguards trained on synthetic data, generated by prompting LLMs with natural language rules (i.e., a constitution) specifying permitted and restricted content. In over 3,000 estimated hours of red teaming, no red teamer found a universal jailbreak that could extract information from an early classifier-guarded LLM at a similar level of detail to an unguarded model across most target queries. On automated evaluations, enhanced classifiers demonstrated robust defense against held-out domain-specific jailbreaks. These classifiers also maintain deployment viability, with an absolute 0.38% increase in production-traffic refusals and a 23.7% inference overhead. Our work demonstrates that defending against universal jailbreaks while maintaining practical deployment viability is tractable.

The process of annotating data within the legal sector is filled with distinct challenges that differ from other fields, primarily due to the inherent complexities of legal language and documentation. The initial task usually involves selecting an appropriate raw dataset that captures the intricate aspects of legal texts. Following this, extracting text becomes a complicated task, as legal documents often have complex structures, footnotes, references, and unique terminology. The importance of data cleaning is magnified in this context, ensuring that redundant information is eliminated while maintaining crucial legal details and context. Creating comprehensive yet straightforward annotation guidelines is imperative, as these guidelines serve as the road map for maintaining uniformity and addressing the subtle nuances of legal terminology. Another critical aspect is the involvement of legal professionals in the annotation process. Their expertise is valuable in ensuring that the data not only remains contextually accurate but also adheres to prevailing legal standards and interpretations. This paper provides an expanded view of these challenges and aims to offer a foundational understanding and guidance for researchers and professionals engaged in legal data annotation projects. In addition, we provide links to our created and fine-tuned datasets and language models. These resources are outcomes of our discussed projects and solutions to challenges faced while working on them.

Legal practice has witnessed a sharp rise in products incorporating artificial intelligence (AI). Such tools are designed to assist with a wide range of core legal tasks, from search and summarization of caselaw to document drafting. But the large language models used in these tools are prone to "hallucinate," or make up false information, making their use risky in high-stakes domains. Recently, certain legal research providers have touted methods such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) as "eliminating" (Casetext, 2023) or "avoid[ing]" hallucinations (Thomson Reuters, 2023), or guaranteeing "hallucination-free" legal citations (LexisNexis, 2023). Because of the closed nature of these systems, systematically assessing these claims is challenging. In this article, we design and report on the first preregistered empirical evaluation of AI-driven legal research tools. We demonstrate that the providers' claims are overstated. While hallucinations are reduced relative to general-purpose chatbots (GPT-4), we find that the AI research tools made by LexisNexis (Lexis+ AI) and Thomson Reuters (Westlaw AI-Assisted Research and Ask Practical Law AI) each hallucinate between 17% and 33% of the time. We also document substantial differences between systems in responsiveness and accuracy. Our article makes four key contributions. It is the first to assess and report the performance of RAG-based proprietary legal AI tools. Second, it introduces a comprehensive, preregistered dataset for identifying and understanding vulnerabilities in these systems. Third, it proposes a clear typology for differentiating between hallucinations and accurate legal responses. Last, it provides evidence to inform the responsibilities of legal professionals in supervising and verifying AI outputs, which remains a central open question for the responsible integration of AI into law.

Does GPT know you? The answer depends on your level of public recognition; however, if your information was available on a website, the answer is probably yes. All Large Language Models (LLMs) memorize training data to some extent. If an LLM training corpus includes personal data, it also memorizes personal data. Developing an LLM typically involves processing personal data, which falls directly within the scope of data protection laws. If a person is identified or identifiable, the implications are far-reaching: the AI system is subject to EU General Data Protection Regulation requirements even after the training phase is concluded. To back our arguments: (1.) We reiterate that LLMs output training data at inference time, be it verbatim or in generalized form. (2.) We show that some LLMs can thus be considered personal data on their own. This triggers a cascade of data protection implications such as data subject rights, including rights to access, rectification, or erasure. These rights extend to the information embedded with-in the AI model. (3.) This paper argues that machine learning researchers must acknowledge the legal implications of LLMs as personal data throughout the full ML development lifecycle, from data collection and curation to model provision on, e.g., GitHub or Hugging Face. (4.) We propose different ways for the ML research community to deal with these legal implications. Our paper serves as a starting point for improving the alignment between data protection law and the technical capabilities of LLMs. Our findings underscore the need for more interaction between the legal domain and the ML community.

Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to transform the practice of law, but this potential is threatened by the presence of legal hallucinations -- responses from these models that are not consistent with legal facts. We investigate the extent of these hallucinations using an original suite of legal queries, comparing LLMs' responses to structured legal metadata and examining their consistency. Our work makes four key contributions: (1) We develop a typology of legal hallucinations, providing a conceptual framework for future research in this area. (2) We find that legal hallucinations are alarmingly prevalent, occurring between 69% of the time with ChatGPT 3.5 and 88% with Llama 2, when these models are asked specific, verifiable questions about random federal court cases. (3) We illustrate that LLMs often fail to correct a user's incorrect legal assumptions in a contra-factual question setup. (4) We provide evidence that LLMs cannot always predict, or do not always know, when they are producing legal hallucinations. Taken together, these findings caution against the rapid and unsupervised integration of popular LLMs into legal tasks. Even experienced lawyers must remain wary of legal hallucinations, and the risks are highest for those who stand to benefit from LLMs the most -- pro se litigants or those without access to traditional legal resources.

The rapid development in large language models (LLMs) has transformed the landscape of natural language processing and understanding (NLP/NLU), offering significant benefits across various domains. However, when applied to scientific research, these powerful models exhibit critical failure modes related to scientific integrity and trustworthiness. Existing general-purpose LLM guardrails are insufficient to address these unique challenges in the scientific domain. We provide comprehensive guidelines for deploying LLM guardrails in the scientific domain. We identify specific challenges -- including time sensitivity, knowledge contextualization, conflict resolution, and intellectual property concerns -- and propose a guideline framework for the guardrails that can align with scientific needs. These guardrail dimensions include trustworthiness, ethics & bias, safety, and legal aspects. We also outline in detail the implementation strategies that employ white-box, black-box, and gray-box methodologies that can be enforced within scientific contexts.