Daily Papers

Generating high-quality question-answer pairs for specialized technical domains remains challenging, with existing approaches facing a tradeoff between leveraging expert examples and achieving topical diversity. We present ExpertGenQA, a protocol that combines few-shot learning with structured topic and style categorization to generate comprehensive domain-specific QA pairs. Using U.S. Federal Railroad Administration documents as a test bed, we demonstrate that ExpertGenQA achieves twice the efficiency of baseline few-shot approaches while maintaining 94.4% topic coverage. Through systematic evaluation, we show that current LLM-based judges and reward models exhibit strong bias toward superficial writing styles rather than content quality. Our analysis using Bloom's Taxonomy reveals that ExpertGenQA better preserves the cognitive complexity distribution of expert-written questions compared to template-based approaches. When used to train retrieval models, our generated queries improve top-1 accuracy by 13.02% over baseline performance, demonstrating their effectiveness for downstream applications in technical domains.

We consider concept generalization at a large scale in the diverse and natural visual spectrum. Established computational modes (i.e., rule-based or similarity-based) are primarily studied isolated and focus on confined and abstract problem spaces. In this work, we study these two modes when the problem space scales up, and the complexity of concepts becomes diverse. Specifically, at the representational level, we seek to answer how the complexity varies when a visual concept is mapped to the representation space. Prior psychology literature has shown that two types of complexities (i.e., subjective complexity and visual complexity) (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2003) build an inverted-U relation (Donderi, 2006; Sun and Firestone, 2021). Leveraging Representativeness of Attribute (RoA), we computationally confirm the following observation: Models use attributes with high RoA to describe visual concepts, and the description length falls in an inverted-U relation with the increment in visual complexity. At the computational level, we aim to answer how the complexity of representation affects the shift between the rule- and similarity-based generalization. We hypothesize that category-conditioned visual modeling estimates the co-occurrence frequency between visual and categorical attributes, thus potentially serving as the prior for the natural visual world. Experimental results show that representations with relatively high subjective complexity outperform those with relatively low subjective complexity in the rule-based generalization, while the trend is the opposite in the similarity-based generalization.

We study the task of prompting large-scale language models to perform multi-step reasoning. Existing work shows that when prompted with a chain of thoughts (CoT), sequences of short sentences describing intermediate reasoning steps towards a final answer, large language models can generate new reasoning chains and predict answers for new inputs. A central question is which reasoning examples make the most effective prompts. In this work, we propose complexity-based prompting, a simple and effective example selection scheme for multi-step reasoning. We show that prompts with higher reasoning complexity, i.e., chains with more reasoning steps, achieve substantially better performance on multi-step reasoning tasks over strong baselines. We further extend our complexity-based criteria from prompting (selecting inputs) to decoding (selecting outputs), where we sample multiple reasoning chains from the model, then choose the majority of generated answers from complex reasoning chains (over simple chains). When used to prompt GPT-3 and Codex, our approach substantially improves multi-step reasoning accuracy and achieves new state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on three math benchmarks (GSM8K, MultiArith, and MathQA) and two BigBenchHard tasks (Date Understanding and Penguins), with an average +5.3 and up to +18 accuracy improvements. Compared with existing example selection schemes like manual tuning or retrieval-based selection, selection based on reasoning complexity is intuitive, easy to implement, and annotation-efficient. Further results demonstrate the robustness of performance gains from complex prompts under format perturbation and distribution shift.

Building upon our previous investigations of O1 replication (Part 1: Journey Learning [Qin et al., 2024] and Part 2: Distillation [Huang et al., 2024]), this work explores the potential of inference-time scaling in large language models (LLMs) for medical reasoning tasks, ranging from diagnostic decision-making to treatment planning. Through extensive experiments on medical benchmarks of varying complexity (MedQA, Medbullets, and JAMA Clinical Challenges), our investigation reveals several key insights: (1) Increasing inference time does lead to improved performance. With a modest training set of 500 samples, our model yields substantial performance improvements of 6%-11%. (2) Task complexity directly correlates with the required length of reasoning chains, confirming the necessity of extended thought processes for challenging problems. (3) The differential diagnoses generated by our model adhere to the principles of the hypothetico-deductive method, producing a list of potential conditions that may explain a patient's symptoms and systematically narrowing these possibilities by evaluating the evidence. These findings demonstrate the promising synergy between inference-time scaling and journey learning in advancing LLMs' real-world clinical reasoning capabilities.

While large language models (LLMs) have shown exceptional capabilities in understanding complex queries and performing sophisticated tasks, their generalization abilities are often deeply entangled with memorization, necessitating more precise evaluation. To address this challenge, we introduce Scylla, a dynamic evaluation framework that quantitatively measures the generalization abilities of LLMs. Scylla disentangles generalization from memorization via assessing model performance on both in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) data through 20 tasks across 5 levels of complexity. Through extensive experiments, we uncover a non-monotonic relationship between task complexity and the performance gap between ID and OOD data, which we term the generalization valley. Specifically, this phenomenon reveals a critical threshold - referred to as critical complexity - where reliance on non-generalizable behavior peaks, indicating the upper bound of LLMs' generalization capabilities. As model size increases, the critical complexity shifts toward higher levels of task complexity, suggesting that larger models can handle more complex reasoning tasks before over-relying on memorization. Leveraging Scylla and the concept of critical complexity, we benchmark 28LLMs including both open-sourced models such as LLaMA and Qwen families, and close-sourced models like Claude and GPT, providing a more robust evaluation and establishing a clearer understanding of LLMs' generalization capabilities.

In the realm of embodied artificial intelligence, the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) play a pivotal role. Although there are effective methods like program-of-thought prompting for LLMs which uses programming language to tackle complex reasoning tasks, the specific impact of code data on the improvement of reasoning capabilities remains under-explored. To address this gap, we propose complexity-impacted reasoning score (CIRS), which combines structural and logical attributes, to measure the correlation between code and reasoning abilities. Specifically, we use the abstract syntax tree to encode the structural information and calculate logical complexity by considering the difficulty and the cyclomatic complexity. Through an empirical analysis, we find not all code data of complexity can be learned or understood by LLMs. Optimal level of complexity is critical to the improvement of reasoning abilities by program-aided prompting. Then we design an auto-synthesizing and stratifying algorithm, and apply it to instruction generation for mathematical reasoning and code data filtering for code generation tasks. Extensive results demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed approach. Code will be integrated into the EasyInstruct framework at https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyInstruct.

We explore the emergence of intelligent behavior in artificial systems by investigating how the complexity of rule-based systems influences the capabilities of models trained to predict these rules. Our study focuses on elementary cellular automata (ECA), simple yet powerful one-dimensional systems that generate behaviors ranging from trivial to highly complex. By training distinct Large Language Models (LLMs) on different ECAs, we evaluated the relationship between the complexity of the rules' behavior and the intelligence exhibited by the LLMs, as reflected in their performance on downstream tasks. Our findings reveal that rules with higher complexity lead to models exhibiting greater intelligence, as demonstrated by their performance on reasoning and chess move prediction tasks. Both uniform and periodic systems, and often also highly chaotic systems, resulted in poorer downstream performance, highlighting a sweet spot of complexity conducive to intelligence. We conjecture that intelligence arises from the ability to predict complexity and that creating intelligence may require only exposure to complexity.

Recent studies have shown that making a model spend more time thinking through longer Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) enables it to gain significant improvements in complex reasoning tasks. While current researches continue to explore the benefits of increasing test-time compute by extending the CoT lengths of Large Language Models (LLMs), we are concerned about a potential issue hidden behind the current pursuit of test-time scaling: Would excessively scaling the CoT length actually bring adverse effects to a model's reasoning performance? Our explorations on mathematical reasoning tasks reveal an unexpected finding that scaling with longer CoTs can indeed impair the reasoning performance of LLMs in certain domains. Moreover, we discover that there exists an optimal scaled length distribution that differs across different domains. Based on these insights, we propose a Thinking-Optimal Scaling strategy. Our method first uses a small set of seed data with varying response length distributions to teach the model to adopt different reasoning efforts for deep thinking. Then, the model selects its shortest correct response under different reasoning efforts on additional problems for self-improvement. Our self-improved models built upon Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct outperform other distillation-based 32B o1-like models across various math benchmarks, and achieve performance on par with QwQ-32B-Preview.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising results in a wide array of generative NLP tasks, such as summarization and machine translation. In the context of narrative generation, however, existing models still do not capture factors that contribute to producing consistent text. For instance, it is logical that a piece of text or a story should be uniformly readable throughout and that this form of complexity should be controllable. As such, if the complexity of an input text prompt is rated first-grade reading level in the Flesch Reading Ease test, then the generated text continuing the plot should also be within this range of complexity. With this in mind, we introduce Uniform Complexity for Text Generation (UCTG), a new benchmark test which raises the challenge of making generative models observe uniform linguistic properties with respect to prompts. We experiment with over 150+ linguistically and cognitively motivated features for evaluating text complexity in humans and generative models. From our results, we find that models such as GPT-2 struggle to preserve the complexity of input prompts used in its generations, even if finetuned with professionally written texts.

Language exhibits a fractal structure in its information-theoretic complexity (i.e. bits per token), with self-similarity across scales and long-range dependence (LRD). In this work, we investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can replicate such fractal characteristics and identify conditions-such as temperature setting and prompting method-under which they may fail. Moreover, we find that the fractal parameters observed in natural language are contained within a narrow range, whereas those of LLMs' output vary widely, suggesting that fractal parameters might prove helpful in detecting a non-trivial portion of LLM-generated texts. Notably, these findings, and many others reported in this work, are robust to the choice of the architecture; e.g. Gemini 1.0 Pro, Mistral-7B and Gemma-2B. We also release a dataset comprising of over 240,000 articles generated by various LLMs (both pretrained and instruction-tuned) with different decoding temperatures and prompting methods, along with their corresponding human-generated texts. We hope that this work highlights the complex interplay between fractal properties, prompting, and statistical mimicry in LLMs, offering insights for generating, evaluating and detecting synthetic texts.

We study the fractal structure of language, aiming to provide a precise formalism for quantifying properties that may have been previously suspected but not formally shown. We establish that language is: (1) self-similar, exhibiting complexities at all levels of granularity, with no particular characteristic context length, and (2) long-range dependent (LRD), with a Hurst parameter of approximately H=0.70. Based on these findings, we argue that short-term patterns/dependencies in language, such as in paragraphs, mirror the patterns/dependencies over larger scopes, like entire documents. This may shed some light on how next-token prediction can lead to a comprehension of the structure of text at multiple levels of granularity, from words and clauses to broader contexts and intents. We also demonstrate that fractal parameters improve upon perplexity-based bits-per-byte (BPB) in predicting downstream performance. We hope these findings offer a fresh perspective on language and the mechanisms underlying the success of LLMs.

We present a fundamental discovery that challenges our understanding of how complex reasoning emerges in large language models. While conventional wisdom suggests that sophisticated reasoning tasks demand extensive training data (>100,000 examples), we demonstrate that complex mathematical reasoning abilities can be effectively elicited with surprisingly few examples. Through comprehensive experiments, our proposed model LIMO demonstrates unprecedented performance in mathematical reasoning. With merely 817 curated training samples, LIMO achieves 57.1% accuracy on AIME and 94.8% on MATH, improving from previous SFT-based models' 6.5% and 59.2% respectively, while only using 1% of the training data required by previous approaches. LIMO demonstrates exceptional out-of-distribution generalization, achieving 40.5% absolute improvement across 10 diverse benchmarks, outperforming models trained on 100x more data, challenging the notion that SFT leads to memorization rather than generalization. Based on these results, we propose the Less-Is-More Reasoning Hypothesis (LIMO Hypothesis): In foundation models where domain knowledge has been comprehensively encoded during pre-training, sophisticated reasoning capabilities can emerge through minimal but precisely orchestrated demonstrations of cognitive processes. This hypothesis posits that the elicitation threshold for complex reasoning is determined by two key factors: (1) the completeness of the model's encoded knowledge foundation during pre-training, and (2) the effectiveness of post-training examples as "cognitive templates" that show the model how to utilize its knowledge base to solve complex reasoning tasks. To facilitate reproducibility and future research in data-efficient reasoning, we release LIMO as a comprehensive open-source suite at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/LIMO.

In-context Learning (ICL) enables large language models (LLMs) to tackle downstream tasks through sophisticated prompting and high-quality demonstrations. However, this traditional ICL paradigm shows limitations when facing complex mathematical reasoning tasks, primarily due to its heavy dependence on example quality and the necessity for human intervention in challenging scenarios. To address these limitations, this paper presents HiAR-ICL, a High-level Automated Reasoning paradigm in ICL that shifts focus from specific examples to abstract thinking patterns, extending the conventional concept of context in ICL. HiAR-ICL introduces five atomic reasoning actions as fundamental components for constructing chain-structured patterns. Using Monte Carlo Tree Search, we explore reasoning paths and construct thought cards to guide subsequent inference. We then develop a cognitive complexity framework that dynamically matches problems with appropriate thought cards. Experimental results demonstrate HiAR-ICL's effectiveness, achieving state-of-the-art accuracy (79.6%) on the MATH benchmark with Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, surpassing GPT-4o (76.6%) and Claude 3.5 (71.1%).

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

As the field progresses toward Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), there is a pressing need for more comprehensive and insightful evaluation frameworks that go beyond aggregate performance metrics. This paper introduces a unified rating system that jointly models the difficulty of individual test cases and the competency of AI models (or humans) across vision, language, and action domains. Unlike existing metrics that focus solely on models, our approach allows for fine-grained, difficulty-aware evaluations through competitive interactions between models and tasks, capturing both the long-tail distribution of real-world challenges and the competency gap between current models and full task mastery. We validate the generalizability and robustness of our system through extensive experiments on multiple established datasets and models across distinct AGI domains. The resulting rating distributions offer novel perspectives and interpretable insights into task difficulty, model progression, and the outstanding challenges that remain on the path to achieving full AGI task mastery.

This study investigates the reasoning robustness of large language models (LLMs) on mathematical problem-solving tasks under systematically introduced input perturbations. Using the GSM8K dataset as a controlled testbed, we evaluate how well state-of-the-art models maintain logical consistency and correctness when confronted with four categories of prompt perturbations: irrelevant context, pathological instructions, factually relevant but non-essential context, and a combination of the latter two. Our experiments, conducted on thirteen open-source and closed-source LLMs, reveal that introducing irrelevant context within the model's context window significantly degrades performance, suggesting that distinguishing essential from extraneous details remains a pressing challenge. Surprisingly, performance regressions are relatively insensitive to the complexity of the reasoning task, as measured by the number of steps required, and are not strictly correlated with model size. Moreover, we observe that certain perturbations inadvertently trigger chain-of-thought-like reasoning behaviors, even without explicit prompting. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in current LLMs and underscore the need for improved robustness against noisy, misleading, and contextually dense inputs, paving the way for more resilient and reliable reasoning in real-world applications.

Recent advancements in the field of large language models, particularly through the Chain of Thought (CoT) approach, have demonstrated significant improvements in solving complex problems. However, existing models either tend to sacrifice detailed reasoning for brevity due to user preferences, or require extensive and expensive training data to learn complicated reasoning ability, limiting their potential in solving complex tasks. To bridge this gap, following the concept of scaling test-time, we propose a simple method by encouraging models to adopt a more patient reasoning style without the need of introducing new knowledge or skills. To employ a preference optimization approach, we generate detailed reasoning processes as positive examples and simple answers as negative examples, thereby training the model to favor thoroughness in its responses. Our results demonstrate a performance increase of up to 6.7% on GSM8k with training just on a lightweight dataset.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable problem-solving and basic mathematics abilities. However, their efficacy is highly contingent on the formulation of the prompt. This study endeavors to quantify the influence of incorporating "positive thinking" into the system message of the prompt, then compare that to systematic prompt optimization. We assess the performance of 60 combinations of system message snippets, tested with and without Chain of Thought prompting, across three models with parameters ranging from 7 to 70 billion on the GSM8K dataset. Our findings reveal that results do not universally generalize across models. In most instances, the inclusion of "positive thinking" prompts positively affected model performance. Notably, however, Llama2-70B exhibited an exception when not utilizing Chain of Thought, as the optimal system message was found to be none at all. Given the combinatorial complexity, and thus computation time, of experimenting with hand-tuning prompts for large black-box models, we then compared the performance of the best "positive thinking" prompt against the output of systematic prompt optimization. We show that employing an automated prompt optimizer emerges as the most effective method for enhancing performance, even when working with smaller open-source models. Additionally, our findings reveal that the highest-scoring, automatically-optimized prompt exhibits a degree of peculiarity far beyond expectations.

Mathematical reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs) is often evaluated using benchmarks with limited numerical ranges, failing to reflect real-world problem-solving across diverse scales. Furthermore, most existing evaluation methods only compare model outputs to ground-truth answers, obscuring insights into reasoning processes. To address these limitations, we introduce GSM-Ranges, a dataset generator derived from GSM8K that systematically perturbs numerical values in math problems to assess model robustness across varying numerical scales. Additionally, we propose a novel grading methodology that distinguishes between logical and non-logical errors, offering a more precise evaluation of reasoning processes beyond computational accuracy. Our experiments with various models reveal a significant increase in logical error rates-up to 14 percentage points-as numerical complexity rises, demonstrating a general weakness in reasoning with out-of-distribution numerical values. Moreover, while models demonstrate high accuracy on standalone arithmetic tasks, their performance deteriorates substantially when computations are embedded within word problems. These findings provide a comprehensive evaluation of LLMs' mathematical reasoning capabilities and inform future research directions for improving numerical generalization in language models.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Transformer large language models (LLMs) have sparked admiration for their exceptional performance on tasks that demand intricate multi-step reasoning. Yet, these models simultaneously show failures on surprisingly trivial problems. This begs the question: Are these errors incidental, or do they signal more substantial limitations? In an attempt to demystify Transformers, we investigate the limits of these models across three representative compositional tasks -- multi-digit multiplication, logic grid puzzles, and a classic dynamic programming problem. These tasks require breaking problems down into sub-steps and synthesizing these steps into a precise answer. We formulate compositional tasks as computation graphs to systematically quantify the level of complexity, and break down reasoning steps into intermediate sub-procedures. Our empirical findings suggest that Transformers solve compositional tasks by reducing multi-step compositional reasoning into linearized subgraph matching, without necessarily developing systematic problem-solving skills. To round off our empirical study, we provide theoretical arguments on abstract multi-step reasoning problems that highlight how Transformers' performance will rapidly decay with increased task complexity.

Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr's three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the Moral Tractability Thesis (MTT).

Large language models display remarkable capabilities in logical and mathematical reasoning, allowing them to solve complex tasks. Interestingly, these abilities emerge in networks trained on the simple task of next-token prediction. In this work, we present a theoretical framework for studying auto-regressive next-token predictors. We demonstrate that even simple models such as linear next-token predictors, trained on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data, can approximate any function efficiently computed by a Turing machine. We introduce a new complexity measure -- length complexity -- which measures the number of intermediate tokens in a CoT sequence required to approximate some target function, and analyze the interplay between length complexity and other notions of complexity. Finally, we show experimentally that simple next-token predictors, such as linear networks and shallow Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs), display non-trivial performance on text generation and arithmetic tasks. Our results demonstrate that the power of language models can be attributed, to a great extent, to the auto-regressive next-token training scheme, and not necessarily to a particular choice of architecture.

Mathematical capabilities were previously believed to emerge in common language models only at a very large scale or require extensive math-related pre-training. This paper shows that the LLaMA-2 7B model with common pre-training already exhibits strong mathematical abilities, as evidenced by its impressive accuracy of 97.7% and 72.0% on the GSM8K and MATH benchmarks, respectively, when selecting the best response from 256 random generations. The primary issue with the current base model is the difficulty in consistently eliciting its inherent mathematical capabilities. Notably, the accuracy for the first answer drops to 49.5% and 7.9% on the GSM8K and MATH benchmarks, respectively. We find that simply scaling up the SFT data can significantly enhance the reliability of generating correct answers. However, the potential for extensive scaling is constrained by the scarcity of publicly available math questions. To overcome this limitation, we employ synthetic data, which proves to be nearly as effective as real data and shows no clear saturation when scaled up to approximately one million samples. This straightforward approach achieves an accuracy of 82.6% on GSM8K and 40.6% on MATH using LLaMA-2 7B models, surpassing previous models by 14.2% and 20.8%, respectively. We also provide insights into scaling behaviors across different reasoning complexities and error types.

In most current research, large language models (LLMs) are able to perform reasoning tasks by generating chains of thought through the guidance of specific prompts. However, there still exists a significant discrepancy between their capability in solving complex reasoning problems and that of humans. At present, most approaches focus on chains of thought (COT) and tool use, without considering the adoption and application of human cognitive frameworks. It is well-known that when confronting complex reasoning challenges, humans typically employ various cognitive abilities, and necessitate interaction with all aspects of tools, knowledge, and the external environment information to accomplish intricate tasks. This paper introduces a novel intelligent framework, referred to as OlaGPT. OlaGPT carefully studied a cognitive architecture framework, and propose to simulate certain aspects of human cognition. The framework involves approximating different cognitive modules, including attention, memory, reasoning, learning, and corresponding scheduling and decision-making mechanisms. Inspired by the active learning mechanism of human beings, it proposes a learning unit to record previous mistakes and expert opinions, and dynamically refer to them to strengthen their ability to solve similar problems. The paper also outlines common effective reasoning frameworks for human problem-solving and designs Chain-of-Thought (COT) templates accordingly. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism is also proposed to maximize model accuracy. The efficacy of OlaGPT has been stringently evaluated on multiple reasoning datasets, and the experimental outcomes reveal that OlaGPT surpasses state-of-the-art benchmarks, demonstrating its superior performance. Our implementation of OlaGPT is available on GitHub: https://github.com/oladata-team/OlaGPT.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

The recent proliferation of research into transformer based natural language processing has led to a number of studies which attempt to detect the presence of human-like cognitive behavior in the models. We contend that, as is true of human psychology, the investigation of cognitive behavior in language models must be conducted in an appropriate population of an appropriate size for the results to be meaningful. We leverage work in uncertainty estimation in a novel approach to efficiently construct experimental populations. The resultant tool, PopulationLM, has been made open source. We provide theoretical grounding in the uncertainty estimation literature and motivation from current cognitive work regarding language models. We discuss the methodological lessons from other scientific communities and attempt to demonstrate their application to two artificial population studies. Through population based experimentation we find that language models exhibit behavior consistent with typicality effects among categories highly represented in training. However, we find that language models don't tend to exhibit structural priming effects. Generally, our results show that single models tend to over estimate the presence of cognitive behaviors in neural models.

What are the root causes of hallucinations in large language models (LLMs)? We use Communication Complexity to prove that the Transformer layer is incapable of composing functions (e.g., identify a grandparent of a person in a genealogy) if the domains of the functions are large enough; we show through examples that this inability is already empirically present when the domains are quite small. We also point out that several mathematical tasks that are at the core of the so-called compositional tasks thought to be hard for LLMs are unlikely to be solvable by Transformers, for large enough instances and assuming that certain well accepted conjectures in the field of Computational Complexity are true.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in solving complex reasoning tasks through mechanisms like Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, which emphasizes verbose, step-by-step reasoning. However, humans typically employ a more efficient strategy: drafting concise intermediate thoughts that capture only essential information. In this work, we propose Chain of Draft (CoD), a novel paradigm inspired by human cognitive processes, where LLMs generate minimalistic yet informative intermediate reasoning outputs while solving tasks. By reducing verbosity and focusing on critical insights, CoD matches or surpasses CoT in accuracy while using as little as only 7.6% of the tokens, significantly reducing cost and latency across various reasoning tasks.

Difficult problems, which often result in long reasoning traces, are widely recognized as key factors for enhancing the performance of reasoning models. However, such high-challenge problems are scarce, limiting the size of available datasets. In this paper, we propose a simple method to decouple the reliance on problem difficulty. First, we empirically demonstrate that reasoning length, rather than problem difficulty, primarily influences the performance of trained models. Second, we identify a scaling law on reasoning length, showing that model performance increases in a log-linear fashion as the reasoning data length grows. Finally, we introduce a straightforward technique to generate reasoning data of arbitrary length, and show that synthesized data is effective for training reasoning models. After fine-tuning the Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct language model on our Long1K dataset, we present our model, Long1K-32B, which achieves remarkable performance with only 1,000 training samples, achieving 95.6\% accuracy on MATH, and 71.1\% on GPQA outperforming DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B. The model, code, and dataset are all open-sourced, available at https://huggingface.co/ZTss/LONG1.

In this work, we introduce a novel evaluation paradigm for Large Language Models, one that challenges them to engage in meta-reasoning. This approach addresses critical shortcomings in existing math problem-solving benchmarks, traditionally used to evaluate the cognitive capabilities of agents. Our paradigm shifts the focus from result-oriented assessments, which often overlook the reasoning process, to a more holistic evaluation that effectively differentiates the cognitive capabilities among models. For example, in our benchmark, GPT-4 demonstrates a performance ten times more accurate than GPT3-5. The significance of this new paradigm lies in its ability to reveal potential cognitive deficiencies in LLMs that current benchmarks, such as GSM8K, fail to uncover due to their saturation and lack of effective differentiation among varying reasoning abilities. Our comprehensive analysis includes several state-of-the-art math models from both open-source and closed-source communities, uncovering fundamental deficiencies in their training and evaluation approaches. This paper not only advocates for a paradigm shift in the assessment of LLMs but also contributes to the ongoing discourse on the trajectory towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). By promoting the adoption of meta-reasoning evaluation methods similar to ours, we aim to facilitate a more accurate assessment of the true cognitive abilities of LLMs.

Mathematical reasoning serves as a cornerstone for assessing the fundamental cognitive capabilities of human intelligence. In recent times, there has been a notable surge in the development of Large Language Models (LLMs) geared towards the automated resolution of mathematical problems. However, the landscape of mathematical problem types is vast and varied, with LLM-oriented techniques undergoing evaluation across diverse datasets and settings. This diversity makes it challenging to discern the true advancements and obstacles within this burgeoning field. This survey endeavors to address four pivotal dimensions: i) a comprehensive exploration of the various mathematical problems and their corresponding datasets that have been investigated; ii) an examination of the spectrum of LLM-oriented techniques that have been proposed for mathematical problem-solving; iii) an overview of factors and concerns affecting LLMs in solving math; and iv) an elucidation of the persisting challenges within this domain. To the best of our knowledge, this survey stands as one of the first extensive examinations of the landscape of LLMs in the realm of mathematics, providing a holistic perspective on the current state, accomplishments, and future challenges in this rapidly evolving field.

We introduce S1-Bench, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate Large Reasoning Models' (LRMs) performance on simple tasks that favor intuitive system 1 thinking rather than deliberative system 2 reasoning. While LRMs have achieved significant breakthroughs in complex reasoning tasks through explicit chains of thought, their reliance on deep analytical thinking may limit their system 1 thinking capabilities. Moreover, a lack of benchmark currently exists to evaluate LRMs' performance in tasks that require such capabilities. To fill this gap, S1-Bench presents a set of simple, diverse, and naturally clear questions across multiple domains and languages, specifically designed to assess LRMs' performance in such tasks. Our comprehensive evaluation of 22 LRMs reveals significant lower efficiency tendencies, with outputs averaging 15.5 times longer than those of traditional small LLMs. Additionally, LRMs often identify correct answers early but continue unnecessary deliberation, with some models even producing numerous errors. These findings highlight the rigid reasoning patterns of current LRMs and underscore the substantial development needed to achieve balanced dual-system thinking capabilities that can adapt appropriately to task complexity.

Reasoning models have demonstrated impressive performance on difficult tasks that traditional language models struggle at. However, many are plagued with the problem of overthinking--generating large amounts of unnecessary tokens which don't improve accuracy on a question. We introduce approximate measures of problem-level difficulty and demonstrate that a clear relationship between problem difficulty and optimal token spend exists, and evaluate how well calibrated a variety of reasoning models are in terms of efficiently allocating the optimal token count. We find that in general, reasoning models are poorly calibrated, particularly on easy problems. To evaluate calibration on easy questions we introduce DUMB500, a dataset of extremely easy math, reasoning, code, and task problems, and jointly evaluate reasoning model on these simple examples and extremely difficult examples from existing frontier benchmarks on the same task domain. Finally, we introduce THOUGHTTERMINATOR, a training-free black box decoding technique that significantly improves reasoning model calibration.

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to longer and compositional proofs. However, they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

Recent work claims that large language models display emergent abilities, abilities not present in smaller-scale models that are present in larger-scale models. What makes emergent abilities intriguing is two-fold: their sharpness, transitioning seemingly instantaneously from not present to present, and their unpredictability, appearing at seemingly unforeseeable model scales. Here, we present an alternative explanation for emergent abilities: that for a particular task and model family, when analyzing fixed model outputs, emergent abilities appear due to the researcher's choice of metric rather than due to fundamental changes in model behavior with scale. Specifically, nonlinear or discontinuous metrics produce apparent emergent abilities, whereas linear or continuous metrics produce smooth, continuous predictable changes in model performance. We present our alternative explanation in a simple mathematical model, then test it in three complementary ways: we (1) make, test and confirm three predictions on the effect of metric choice using the InstructGPT/GPT-3 family on tasks with claimed emergent abilities; (2) make, test and confirm two predictions about metric choices in a meta-analysis of emergent abilities on BIG-Bench; and (3) show to choose metrics to produce never-before-seen seemingly emergent abilities in multiple vision tasks across diverse deep networks. Via all three analyses, we provide evidence that alleged emergent abilities evaporate with different metrics or with better statistics, and may not be a fundamental property of scaling AI models.

This paper presents an advanced mathematical problem-solving framework, LLaMA-Berry, for enhancing the mathematical reasoning ability of Large Language Models (LLMs). The framework combines Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) with iterative Self-Refine to optimize the reasoning path and utilizes a pairwise reward model to evaluate different paths globally. By leveraging the self-critic and rewriting capabilities of LLMs, Self-Refine applied to MCTS (SR-MCTS) overcomes the inefficiencies and limitations of conventional step-wise and greedy search algorithms by fostering a more efficient exploration of solution spaces. Pairwise Preference Reward Model~(PPRM), inspired by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), is then used to model pairwise preferences between solutions, utilizing an Enhanced Borda Count (EBC) method to synthesize these preferences into a global ranking score to find better answers. This approach addresses the challenges of scoring variability and non-independent distributions in mathematical reasoning tasks. The framework has been tested on general and advanced benchmarks, showing superior performance in terms of search efficiency and problem-solving capability compared to existing methods like ToT and rStar, particularly in complex Olympiad-level benchmarks, including GPQA, AIME24 and AMC23.

Unsupervised pretraining, which learns a useful representation using a large amount of unlabeled data to facilitate the learning of downstream tasks, is a critical component of modern large-scale machine learning systems. Despite its tremendous empirical success, the rigorous theoretical understanding of why unsupervised pretraining generally helps remains rather limited -- most existing results are restricted to particular methods or approaches for unsupervised pretraining with specialized structural assumptions. This paper studies a generic framework, where the unsupervised representation learning task is specified by an abstract class of latent variable models Phi and the downstream task is specified by a class of prediction functions Psi. We consider a natural approach of using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for unsupervised pretraining and Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) for learning downstream tasks. We prove that, under a mild ''informative'' condition, our algorithm achieves an excess risk of mathcal{O}(mathcal{C_Phi/m} + mathcal{C_Psi/n}) for downstream tasks, where C_Phi, C_Psi are complexity measures of function classes Phi, Psi, and m, n are the number of unlabeled and labeled data respectively. Comparing to the baseline of mathcal{O}(mathcal{C_{Phi circ Psi}/n}) achieved by performing supervised learning using only the labeled data, our result rigorously shows the benefit of unsupervised pretraining when m gg n and C_{Phicirc Psi} > C_Psi. This paper further shows that our generic framework covers a wide range of approaches for unsupervised pretraining, including factor models, Gaussian mixture models, and contrastive learning.

Recent advancements in reasoning with large language models (RLLMs), such as OpenAI-O1 and DeepSeek-R1, have demonstrated their impressive capabilities in complex domains like mathematics and coding. A central factor in their success lies in the application of long chain-of-thought (Long CoT) characteristics, which enhance reasoning abilities and enable the solution of intricate problems. However, despite these developments, a comprehensive survey on Long CoT is still lacking, limiting our understanding of its distinctions from traditional short chain-of-thought (Short CoT) and complicating ongoing debates on issues like "overthinking" and "test-time scaling." This survey seeks to fill this gap by offering a unified perspective on Long CoT. (1) We first distinguish Long CoT from Short CoT and introduce a novel taxonomy to categorize current reasoning paradigms. (2) Next, we explore the key characteristics of Long CoT: deep reasoning, extensive exploration, and feasible reflection, which enable models to handle more complex tasks and produce more efficient, coherent outcomes compared to the shallower Short CoT. (3) We then investigate key phenomena such as the emergence of Long CoT with these characteristics, including overthinking, and test-time scaling, offering insights into how these processes manifest in practice. (4) Finally, we identify significant research gaps and highlight promising future directions, including the integration of multi-modal reasoning, efficiency improvements, and enhanced knowledge frameworks. By providing a structured overview, this survey aims to inspire future research and further the development of logical reasoning in artificial intelligence.

While language models are powerful and versatile, they often fail to address highly complex problems. This is because solving complex problems requires deliberate thinking, which has been only minimally guided during training. In this paper, we propose a new method called Cumulative Reasoning (CR), which employs language models in a cumulative and iterative manner to emulate human thought processes. By decomposing tasks into smaller components, CR streamlines the problem-solving process, rendering it both more manageable and effective. For logical inference tasks, CR consistently outperforms existing methods with an improvement up to 9.3%, and achieves the astonishing accuracy of 98.04% on the curated FOLIO wiki dataset. In the context of the Game of 24, CR achieves an accuracy of 98%, which signifies a substantial enhancement of 24% over the previous state-of-the-art method. Finally, on the MATH dataset, we establish new state-of-the-art results with 58.0% overall accuracy, surpassing the previous best approach by a margin of 4.2%, and achieving 43% relative improvement on the hardest level 5 problems (22.4% to 32.1%). Code is available at https://github.com/iiis-ai/cumulative-reasoning.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Step-level reward models (SRMs) can significantly enhance mathematical reasoning performance through process supervision or step-level preference alignment based on reinforcement learning. The performance of SRMs is pivotal, as they serve as critical guidelines, ensuring that each step in the reasoning process is aligned with desired outcomes. Recently, AlphaZero-like methods, where Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) is employed for automatic step-level preference annotation, have proven particularly effective. However, the precise mechanisms behind the success of SRMs remain largely unexplored. To address this gap, this study delves into the counterintuitive aspects of SRMs, particularly focusing on MCTS-based approaches. Our findings reveal that the removal of natural language descriptions of thought processes has minimal impact on the efficacy of SRMs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that SRMs are adept at assessing the complex logical coherence present in mathematical language while having difficulty in natural language. These insights provide a nuanced understanding of the core elements that drive effective step-level reward modeling in mathematical reasoning. By shedding light on these mechanisms, this study offers valuable guidance for developing more efficient and streamlined SRMs, which can be achieved by focusing on the crucial parts of mathematical reasoning.

The scientific scale-up of large language models (LLMs) necessitates a comprehensive understanding of their scaling properties. However, the existing literature on the scaling properties only yields an incomplete answer: optimization loss decreases predictably as the model size increases, in line with established scaling law; yet no scaling law for task has been established and the task performances are far from predictable during scaling. Task performances typically show minor gains on small models until they improve dramatically once models exceed a size threshold, exemplifying the ``emergent abilities''. In this study, we discover that small models, although they exhibit minor performance, demonstrate critical and consistent task performance improvements that are not captured by conventional evaluation strategies due to insufficient measurement resolution. To measure such improvements, we introduce PassUntil, an evaluation strategy through massive sampling in the decoding phase. We conduct quantitative investigations into the scaling law of task performance. Firstly, a strict task scaling law is identified, enhancing the predictability of task performances. Remarkably, we are able to predict the performance of the 2.4B model on code generation with merely 0.05\% deviation before training starts. Secondly, underpinned by PassUntil, we observe concrete evidence of emergent abilities and ascertain that they are not in conflict with the continuity of performance improvement. Their semblance to break-through is that their scaling curve cannot be fitted by standard scaling law function. We then introduce a mathematical definition for the emergent abilities. Through the definition, we refute a prevalent ``multi-step reasoning hypothesis'' regarding the genesis of emergent abilities and propose a new hypothesis with a satisfying fit to the observed scaling curve.

In a systematic way, we investigate a widely asked question: Do LLMs really understand what they say?, which relates to the more familiar term Stochastic Parrot. To this end, we propose a summative assessment over a carefully designed physical concept understanding task, PhysiCo. Our task alleviates the memorization issue via the usage of grid-format inputs that abstractly describe physical phenomena. The grids represents varying levels of understanding, from the core phenomenon, application examples to analogies to other abstract patterns in the grid world. A comprehensive study on our task demonstrates: (1) state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-4o, o1 and Gemini 2.0 flash thinking, lag behind humans by ~40%; (2) the stochastic parrot phenomenon is present in LLMs, as they fail on our grid task but can describe and recognize the same concepts well in natural language; (3) our task challenges the LLMs due to intrinsic difficulties rather than the unfamiliar grid format, as in-context learning and fine-tuning on same formatted data added little to their performance.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their ability to perform complex reasoning tasks, transitioning from fast and intuitive thinking (System 1) to slow and deep reasoning (System 2). While System 2 reasoning improves task accuracy, it often incurs substantial computational costs due to its slow thinking nature and inefficient or unnecessary reasoning behaviors. In contrast, System 1 reasoning is computationally efficient but leads to suboptimal performance. Consequently, it is critical to balance the trade-off between performance (benefits) and computational costs (budgets), giving rise to the concept of reasoning economy. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive analysis of reasoning economy in both the post-training and test-time inference stages of LLMs, encompassing i) the cause of reasoning inefficiency, ii) behavior analysis of different reasoning patterns, and iii) potential solutions to achieve reasoning economy. By offering actionable insights and highlighting open challenges, we aim to shed light on strategies for improving the reasoning economy of LLMs, thereby serving as a valuable resource for advancing research in this evolving area. We also provide a public repository to continually track developments in this fast-evolving field.

Investigating the reasoning abilities of transformer models, and discovering new challenging tasks for them, has been a topic of much interest. Recent studies have found these models to be surprisingly strong at performing deductive reasoning over formal logical theories expressed in natural language. A shortcoming of these studies, however, is that they do not take into account that logical theories, when sampled uniformly at random, do not necessarily lead to hard instances. We propose a new methodology for creating challenging algorithmic reasoning datasets that focus on natural language satisfiability (NLSat) problems. The key idea is to draw insights from empirical sampling of hard propositional SAT problems and from complexity-theoretic studies of language. This methodology allows us to distinguish easy from hard instances, and to systematically increase the complexity of existing reasoning benchmarks such as RuleTaker. We find that current transformers, given sufficient training data, are surprisingly robust at solving the resulting NLSat problems of substantially increased difficulty. They also exhibit some degree of scale-invariance - the ability to generalize to problems of larger size and scope. Our results, however, reveal important limitations too: a careful sampling of training data is crucial for building models that generalize to larger problems, and transformer models' limited scale-invariance suggests they are far from learning robust deductive reasoning algorithms.

The surprising ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform well on complex reasoning with only few-shot chain-of-thought prompts is believed to emerge only in very large-scale models (100+ billion parameters). We show that such abilities can, in fact, be distilled down from GPT-3.5 (ge 175B) to T5 variants (le 11B). We propose model specialization, to specialize the model's ability towards a target task. The hypothesis is that large models (commonly viewed as larger than 100B) have strong modeling power, but are spread on a large spectrum of tasks. Small models (commonly viewed as smaller than 10B) have limited model capacity, but if we concentrate their capacity on a specific target task, the model can achieve a decent improved performance. We use multi-step math reasoning as our testbed because it is a very typical emergent ability. We show two important aspects of model abilities: (1). there exists a very complex balance/ tradeoff between language models' multi-dimensional abilities; (2). by paying the price of decreased generic ability, we can clearly lift up the scaling curve of models smaller than 10B towards a specialized multi-step math reasoning ability. We further give comprehensive discussions about important design choices for better generalization, including the tuning data format, the start model checkpoint, and a new model selection method. We hope our practice and discoveries can serve as an important attempt towards specialized smaller models in the new research paradigm set by LLMs.

Language models have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various natural language processing tasks, yet they struggle with planning tasks requiring multi-step simulations. Inspired by human cognitive processes, this paper investigates the optimal planning power of language models that can construct a cognitive map of a given environment. Our experiments demonstrate that cognitive map significantly enhances the performance of both optimal and reachable planning generation ability in the Gridworld path planning task. We observe that our method showcases two key characteristics similar to human cognition: generalization of its planning ability to extrapolated environments and rapid adaptation with limited training data. We hope our findings in the Gridworld task provide insights into modeling human cognitive processes in language models, potentially leading to the development of more advanced and robust systems that better resemble human cognition.

Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) tends to produce substantially longer token generation sequences than simpler language modeling tasks. This extended generation length reflects the multi-step, compositional nature of reasoning and is often correlated with higher solution accuracy. From an efficiency perspective, longer token generation exacerbates the inherently sequential and memory-bound decoding phase of LLMs. However, not all parts of this expensive reasoning process are equally difficult to generate. We leverage this observation by offloading only the most challenging parts of the reasoning process to a larger, more capable model, while performing most of the generation with a smaller, more efficient model; furthermore, we teach the smaller model to identify these difficult segments and independently trigger offloading when needed. To enable this behavior, we annotate difficult segments across 18k reasoning traces from the OpenR1-Math-220k chain-of-thought (CoT) dataset. We then apply supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning fine-tuning (RLFT) to a 1.5B-parameter reasoning model, training it to learn to offload the most challenging parts of its own reasoning process to a larger model. This approach improves AIME24 reasoning accuracy by 24% and 28.3% while offloading 1.35% and 5% of the generated tokens respectively. We open-source our SplitReason model, data, code and logs.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performances across a wide range of tasks. However, the mechanisms by which these models encode tasks of varying complexities remain poorly understood. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that LLMs process concepts of varying complexities in different layers, introducing the idea of "Concept Depth" to suggest that more complex concepts are typically acquired in deeper layers. Specifically, we categorize concepts based on their level of abstraction, defining them in the order of increasing complexity within factual, emotional, and inferential tasks. We conduct extensive probing experiments using layer-wise representations across various LLM families (Gemma, LLaMA, QWen) on various datasets spanning the three domains of tasks. Our findings reveal that models could efficiently conduct probing for simpler tasks in shallow layers, and more complex tasks typically necessitate deeper layers for accurate understanding. Additionally, we examine how external factors, such as adding noise to the input and quantizing the model weights, might affect layer-wise representations. Our findings suggest that these factors can impede the development of a conceptual understanding of LLMs until deeper layers are explored. We hope that our proposed concept and experimental insights will enhance the understanding of the mechanisms underlying LLMs. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Luckfort/CD.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance in various reasoning benchmarks with the emergence of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and its derivative methods, particularly in tasks involving multi-choice questions (MCQs). However, current works all process data uniformly without considering the problem-solving difficulty, which means an excessive focus on simple questions while insufficient to intricate ones. To address this challenge, we inspired by humans using heuristic strategies to categorize tasks and handle them individually, propose to apply the Divide and Conquer to LLMs reasoning. First, we divide questions into different subsets based on the statistical confidence score (CS), then fix nearly resolved sets and conquer demanding nuanced process ones with elaborately designed methods, including Prior Knowledge based Reasoning (PKR) and Filter Choices based Reasoning (FCR), as well as their integration variants. Our experiments demonstrate that this proposed strategy significantly boosts the models' reasoning abilities across nine datasets involving arithmetic, commonsense, and logic tasks. For instance, compared to baseline, we make a striking improvement on low confidence subsets of 8.72\% for AQuA, 15.07\% for ARC Challenge and 7.71\% for RiddleSense. In addition, through extensive analysis on length of rationale and number of options, we verify that longer reasoning paths in PKR could prevent models from referring infer-harmful shortcuts, and also find that removing irrelevant choices in FCR would substantially avoid models' confusion. The code is at https://github.com/AiMijie/Divide-and-Conquer

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Language models have made significant progress in generating coherent text and predicting next tokens based on input prompts. This study compares the next-token prediction performance of two well-known models: OpenAI's GPT-2 and Meta's Llama-2-7b-chat-hf on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. To evaluate their capabilities, we built a dataset from 10 short stories sourced from the Explore ToM Dataset. We enhanced these stories by programmatically inserting additional sentences (infills) using GPT-4, creating variations that introduce different levels of contextual complexity. This setup enables analysis of how increasing context affects model performance. We tested both models under four temperature settings (0.01, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0) and evaluated their ability to predict the next token across three reasoning levels. Zero-order reasoning involves tracking the state, either current (ground truth) or past (memory). First-order reasoning concerns understanding another's mental state (e.g., "Does Anne know the apple is salted?"). Second-order reasoning adds recursion (e.g., "Does Anne think that Charles knows the apple is salted?"). Our results show that adding more infill sentences slightly reduces prediction accuracy, as added context increases complexity and ambiguity. Llama-2 consistently outperforms GPT-2 in prediction accuracy, especially at lower temperatures, demonstrating greater confidence in selecting the most probable token. As reasoning complexity rises, model responses diverge more. Notably, GPT-2 and Llama-2 display greater variability in predictions during first- and second-order reasoning tasks. These findings illustrate how model architecture, temperature, and contextual complexity influence next-token prediction, contributing to a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of current language models.

No free lunch theorems for supervised learning state that no learner can solve all problems or that all learners achieve exactly the same accuracy on average over a uniform distribution on learning problems. Accordingly, these theorems are often referenced in support of the notion that individual problems require specially tailored inductive biases. While virtually all uniformly sampled datasets have high complexity, real-world problems disproportionately generate low-complexity data, and we argue that neural network models share this same preference, formalized using Kolmogorov complexity. Notably, we show that architectures designed for a particular domain, such as computer vision, can compress datasets on a variety of seemingly unrelated domains. Our experiments show that pre-trained and even randomly initialized language models prefer to generate low-complexity sequences. Whereas no free lunch theorems seemingly indicate that individual problems require specialized learners, we explain how tasks that often require human intervention such as picking an appropriately sized model when labeled data is scarce or plentiful can be automated into a single learning algorithm. These observations justify the trend in deep learning of unifying seemingly disparate problems with an increasingly small set of machine learning models.

The measure of a machine learning algorithm is the difficulty of the tasks it can perform, and sufficiently difficult tasks are critical drivers of strong machine learning models. However, quantifying the generalization difficulty of machine learning benchmarks has remained challenging. We propose what is to our knowledge the first model-agnostic measure of the inherent generalization difficulty of tasks. Our inductive bias complexity measure quantifies the total information required to generalize well on a task minus the information provided by the data. It does so by measuring the fractional volume occupied by hypotheses that generalize on a task given that they fit the training data. It scales exponentially with the intrinsic dimensionality of the space over which the model must generalize but only polynomially in resolution per dimension, showing that tasks which require generalizing over many dimensions are drastically more difficult than tasks involving more detail in fewer dimensions. Our measure can be applied to compute and compare supervised learning, reinforcement learning and meta-learning generalization difficulties against each other. We show that applied empirically, it formally quantifies intuitively expected trends, e.g. that in terms of required inductive bias, MNIST < CIFAR10 < Imagenet and fully observable Markov decision processes (MDPs) < partially observable MDPs. Further, we show that classification of complex images < few-shot meta-learning with simple images. Our measure provides a quantitative metric to guide the construction of more complex tasks requiring greater inductive bias, and thereby encourages the development of more sophisticated architectures and learning algorithms with more powerful generalization capabilities.

We explore how generating a chain of thought -- a series of intermediate reasoning steps -- significantly improves the ability of large language models to perform complex reasoning. In particular, we show how such reasoning abilities emerge naturally in sufficiently large language models via a simple method called chain of thought prompting, where a few chain of thought demonstrations are provided as exemplars in prompting. Experiments on three large language models show that chain of thought prompting improves performance on a range of arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning tasks. The empirical gains can be striking. For instance, prompting a 540B-parameter language model with just eight chain of thought exemplars achieves state of the art accuracy on the GSM8K benchmark of math word problems, surpassing even finetuned GPT-3 with a verifier.

Like humans, Large Language Models (LLMs) struggle to generate high-quality long-form text that adheres to strict requirements in a single pass. This challenge is unsurprising, as successful human writing, according to the Cognitive Writing Theory, is a complex cognitive process involving iterative planning, translating, reviewing, and monitoring. Motivated by these cognitive principles, we aim to equip LLMs with human-like cognitive writing capabilities through CogWriter, a novel training-free framework that transforms LLM constrained long-form text generation into a systematic cognitive writing paradigm. Our framework consists of two key modules: (1) a Planning Agent that performs hierarchical planning to decompose the task, and (2) multiple Generation Agents that execute these plans in parallel. The system maintains quality via continuous monitoring and reviewing mechanisms, which evaluate outputs against specified requirements and trigger necessary revisions. CogWriter demonstrates exceptional performance on LongGenBench, a benchmark for complex constrained long-form text generation. Even when using Qwen-2.5-14B as its backbone, CogWriter surpasses GPT-4o by 22% in complex instruction completion accuracy while reliably generating texts exceeding 10,000 words. We hope this cognitive science-inspired approach provides a paradigm for LLM writing advancements: https://github.com/KaiyangWan/CogWriter{CogWriter}.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI o1, have demonstrated strong performance gains by scaling up the length of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning during inference. However, a growing concern lies in their tendency to produce excessively long reasoning traces, which are often filled with redundant content (e.g., repeated definitions), over-analysis of simple problems, and superficial exploration of multiple reasoning paths for harder tasks. This inefficiency introduces significant challenges for training, inference, and real-world deployment (e.g., in agent-based systems), where token economy is critical. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of recent efforts aimed at improving reasoning efficiency in LRMs, with a particular focus on the unique challenges that arise in this new paradigm. We identify common patterns of inefficiency, examine methods proposed across the LRM lifecycle, i.e., from pretraining to inference, and discuss promising future directions for research. To support ongoing development, we also maintain a real-time GitHub repository tracking recent progress in the field. We hope this survey serves as a foundation for further exploration and inspires innovation in this rapidly evolving area.

While large language models demonstrate impressive performance on static benchmarks, the true potential of large language models as self-learning and reasoning agents in dynamic environments remains unclear. This study systematically evaluates the efficacy of self-reflection, heuristic mutation, and planning as prompting techniques to test the adaptive capabilities of agents. We conduct experiments with various open-source language models in dynamic environments and find that larger models generally outperform smaller ones, but that strategic prompting can close this performance gap. Second, a too-long prompt can negatively impact smaller models on basic reactive tasks, while larger models show more robust behaviour. Third, advanced prompting techniques primarily benefit smaller models on complex games, but offer less improvement for already high-performing large language models. Yet, we find that advanced reasoning methods yield highly variable outcomes: while capable of significantly improving performance when reasoning and decision-making align, they also introduce instability and can lead to big performance drops. Compared to human performance, our findings reveal little evidence of true emergent reasoning. Instead, large language model performance exhibits persistent limitations in crucial areas such as planning, reasoning, and spatial coordination, suggesting that current-generation large language models still suffer fundamental shortcomings that may not be fully overcome through self-reflective prompting alone. Reasoning is a multi-faceted task, and while reasoning methods like Chain of thought improves multi-step reasoning on math word problems, our findings using dynamic benchmarks highlight important shortcomings in general reasoning capabilities, indicating a need to move beyond static benchmarks to capture the complexity of reasoning.

In this paper we look at the ability of recent large language models (LLMs) at solving mathematical problems in combinatorics. We compare models LLaMA-2, LLaMA-3.1, GPT-4, and Mixtral against each other and against human pupils and undergraduates with prior experience in mathematical olympiads. To facilitate these comparisons we introduce the Combi-Puzzles dataset, which contains 125 problem variants based on 25 combinatorial reasoning problems. Each problem is presented in one of five distinct forms, created by systematically manipulating the problem statements through adversarial additions, numeric parameter changes, and linguistic obfuscation. Our variations preserve the mathematical core and are designed to measure the generalisability of LLM problem-solving abilities, while also increasing confidence that problems are submitted to LLMs in forms that have not been seen as training instances. We found that a model based on GPT-4 outperformed all other models in producing correct responses, and performed significantly better in the mathematical variation of the problems than humans. We also found that modifications to problem statements significantly impact the LLM's performance, while human performance remains unaffected.

Understanding how language model performance varies with scale is critical to benchmark and algorithm development. Scaling laws are one approach to building this understanding, but the requirement of training models across many different scales has limited their use. We propose an alternative, observational approach that bypasses model training and instead builds scaling laws from ~80 publically available models. Building a single scaling law from multiple model families is challenging due to large variations in their training compute efficiencies and capabilities. However, we show that these variations are consistent with a simple, generalized scaling law where language model performance is a function of a low-dimensional capability space, and model families only vary in their efficiency in converting training compute to capabilities. Using this approach, we show the surprising predictability of complex scaling phenomena: we show that several emergent phenomena follow a smooth, sigmoidal behavior and are predictable from small models; we show that the agent performance of models such as GPT-4 can be precisely predicted from simpler non-agentic benchmarks; and we show how to predict the impact of post-training interventions like Chain-of-Thought and Self-Consistency as language model capabilities continue to improve.

Best-of-N selection is a key technique for improving the reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) through increased test-time computation. Current state-of-the-art methods often employ computationally intensive reward models for response evaluation and selection. Reward-free alternatives, like self-consistency and universal self-consistency, are limited in their ability to handle open-ended generation tasks or scale effectively. To address these limitations, we propose self-certainty, a novel and efficient metric that leverages the inherent probability distribution of LLM outputs to estimate response quality without requiring external reward models. We hypothesize that higher distributional self-certainty, aggregated across multiple samples, correlates with improved response accuracy, as it reflects greater confidence in the generated output. Through extensive experiments on various reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that self-certainty (1) scales effectively with increasing sample size N, akin to reward models but without the computational overhead; (2) complements chain-of-thought, improving reasoning performance beyond greedy decoding; and (3) generalizes to open-ended tasks where traditional self-consistency methods fall short. Our findings establish self-certainty as a practical and efficient way for improving LLM reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/backprop07/Self-Certainty

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning demonstrate impressive problem-solving abilities. However, in this work, we identify a recurring issue where these models occasionally generate overly short reasoning, leading to degraded performance on even simple mathematical problems. Specifically, we investigate how reasoning length is embedded in the hidden representations of reasoning models and its impact on accuracy. Our analysis reveals that reasoning length is governed by a linear direction in the representation space, allowing us to induce overly short reasoning by steering the model along this direction. Building on this insight, we introduce ThinkEdit, a simple yet effective weight-editing approach to mitigate the issue of overly short reasoning. We first identify a small subset of attention heads (approximately 2%) that predominantly drive short reasoning behavior. We then edit the output projection weights of these heads to suppress the short reasoning direction. With changes to only 0.1% of the model's parameters, ThinkEdit effectively reduces overly short reasoning and yields notable accuracy gains for short reasoning outputs (+5.44%), along with an overall improvement across multiple math benchmarks (+2.43%). Our findings provide new mechanistic insights into how reasoning length is controlled within LLMs and highlight the potential of fine-grained model interventions to improve reasoning quality. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/ThinkEdit

Estimating the difficulty of multiple-choice questions would be great help for educators who must spend substantial time creating and piloting stimuli for their tests, and for learners who want to practice. Supervised approaches to difficulty estimation have yielded to date mixed results. In this contribution we leverage an aspect of generative large models which might be seen as a weakness when answering questions, namely their uncertainty, and exploit it towards exploring correlations between two different metrics of uncertainty, and the actual student response distribution. While we observe some present but weak correlations, we also discover that the models' behaviour is different in the case of correct vs wrong answers, and that correlations differ substantially according to the different question types which are included in our fine-grained, previously unused dataset of 451 questions from a Biopsychology course. In discussing our findings, we also suggest potential avenues to further leverage model uncertainty as an additional proxy for item difficulty.

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

Recently, diffusion models have garnered significant interest in the field of text processing due to their many potential advantages compared to conventional autoregressive models. In this work, we propose Diffusion-of-Thought (DoT), a novel approach that integrates diffusion models with Chain-of-Thought, a well-established technique for improving the reasoning ability of autoregressive language models. In contrast to autoregressive language models that make decisions in a left-to-right, token-by-token manner, DoT allows reasoning steps to diffuse over time through a diffusion language model and offers greater flexibility in trading-off computation for reasoning performance. Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of DoT in multi-digit multiplication, boolean logic, and grade school math problems, with a small diffusion model outperforming a much larger autoregressive model in both efficiency and accuracy. In addition to that, DoT showcases promising self-correction abilities and benefits from existing reasoning-enhancing techniques like self-consistency decoding. Our findings contribute to the understanding and development of reasoning with diffusion language models.

Ensuring safe and effective use of AI requires understanding and anticipating its performance on novel tasks, from advanced scientific challenges to transformed workplace activities. So far, benchmarking has guided progress in AI, but it has offered limited explanatory and predictive power for general-purpose AI systems, given the low transferability across diverse tasks. In this paper, we introduce general scales for AI evaluation that can explain what common AI benchmarks really measure, extract ability profiles of AI systems, and predict their performance for new task instances, in- and out-of-distribution. Our fully-automated methodology builds on 18 newly-crafted rubrics that place instance demands on general scales that do not saturate. Illustrated for 15 large language models and 63 tasks, high explanatory power is unleashed from inspecting the demand and ability profiles, bringing insights on the sensitivity and specificity exhibited by different benchmarks, and how knowledge, metacognition and reasoning are affected by model size, chain-of-thought and distillation. Surprisingly, high predictive power at the instance level becomes possible using these demand levels, providing superior estimates over black-box baseline predictors based on embeddings or finetuning, especially in out-of-distribution settings (new tasks and new benchmarks). The scales, rubrics, battery, techniques and results presented here represent a major step for AI evaluation, underpinning the reliable deployment of AI in the years ahead. (Collaborative platform: https://kinds-of-intelligence-cfi.github.io/ADELE.)

This research introduces a novel evaluation framework designed to assess large language models' (LLMs) ability to acknowledge uncertainty on 675 fundamentally unsolvable problems. Using a curated dataset of graduate-level grand challenge questions with intentionally unknowable answers, we evaluated twelve state-of-the-art LLMs, including both open and closed-source models, on their propensity to admit ignorance rather than generate plausible but incorrect responses. The best models scored in 62-68% accuracy ranges for admitting the problem solution was unknown in fields ranging from biology to philosophy and mathematics. We observed an inverse relationship between problem difficulty and model accuracy, with GPT-4 demonstrating higher rates of uncertainty acknowledgment on more challenging problems (35.8%) compared to simpler ones (20.0%). This pattern indicates that models may be more prone to generate speculative answers when problems appear more tractable. The study also revealed significant variations across problem categories, with models showing difficulty in acknowledging uncertainty in invention and NP-hard problems while performing relatively better on philosophical and psychological challenges. These results contribute to the growing body of research on artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment by highlighting the importance of uncertainty recognition as a critical component of future machine intelligence evaluation. This impossibility test thus extends previous theoretical frameworks for universal intelligence testing by providing empirical evidence of current limitations in LLMs' ability to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, suggesting new directions for improving model training architectures and evaluation approaches.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

We study the relationship between vocabulary size and text length in a corpus of 75 literary works in English, authored by six writers, distinguishing between the contributions of three grammatical classes (or ``tags,'' namely, {\it nouns}, {\it verbs}, and {\it others}), and analyze the progressive appearance of new words of each tag along each individual text. While the power-law relation prescribed by Heaps' law is satisfactorily fulfilled by total vocabulary sizes and text lengths, the appearance of new words in each text is on the whole well described by the average of random shufflings of the text, which does not obey a power law. Deviations from this average, however, are statistically significant and show a systematic trend across the corpus. Specifically, they reveal that the appearance of new words along each text is predominantly retarded with respect to the average of random shufflings. Moreover, different tags are shown to add systematically distinct contributions to this tendency, with {\it verbs} and {\it others} being respectively more and less retarded than the mean trend, and {\it nouns} following instead this overall mean. These statistical systematicities are likely to point to the existence of linguistically relevant information stored in the different variants of Heaps' law, a feature that is still in need of extensive assessment.

To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action, two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier's accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9% given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up, and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.

Recent reasoning models through test-time scaling have demonstrated that long chain-of-thoughts can unlock substantial performance boosts in hard reasoning tasks such as math and code. However, the benefit of such long thoughts for system-2 reasoning is relatively less explored in other domains such as perceptual tasks where shallower, system-1 reasoning seems sufficient. In this paper, we introduce LongPerceptualThoughts, a new synthetic dataset with 30K long-thought traces for perceptual tasks. The key challenges in synthesizing elaborate reasoning thoughts for perceptual tasks are that off-the-shelf models are not yet equipped with such thinking behavior and that it is not straightforward to build a reliable process verifier for perceptual tasks. Thus, we propose a novel three-stage data synthesis framework that first synthesizes verifiable multiple-choice questions from dense image descriptions, then extracts simple CoTs from VLMs for those verifiable problems, and finally expands those simple thoughts to elaborate long thoughts via frontier reasoning models. In controlled experiments with a strong instruction-tuned 7B model, we demonstrate notable improvements over existing visual reasoning data-generation methods. Our model, trained on the generated dataset, achieves an average +3.4 points improvement over 5 vision-centric benchmarks, including +11.8 points on V^* Bench. Notably, despite being tuned for vision tasks, it also improves performance on the text reasoning benchmark, MMLU-Pro, by +2 points.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Large language model (LLM) performance on reasoning problems typically does not generalize out of distribution. Previous work has claimed that this can be mitigated by modifying prompts to include examples with chains of thought--demonstrations of solution procedures--with the intuition that it is possible to in-context teach an LLM an algorithm for solving the problem. This paper presents a case study of chain of thought on problems from Blocksworld, a classical planning domain, and examine the performance of two state-of-the-art LLMs across two axes: generality of examples given in prompt, and complexity of problems queried with each prompt. While our problems are very simple, we only find meaningful performance improvements from chain of thought prompts when those prompts are exceedingly specific to their problem class, and that those improvements quickly deteriorate as the size n of the query-specified stack grows past the size of stacks shown in the examples. Our results hint that, contrary to previous claims in the literature, CoT's performance improvements do not stem from the model learning general algorithmic procedures via demonstrations and depend on carefully engineering highly problem specific prompts. This spotlights drawbacks of chain of thought, especially because of the sharp tradeoff between possible performance gains and the amount of human labor necessary to generate examples with correct reasoning traces.

Language models (LMs) are increasingly used as simulacra for people, yet their ability to match the distribution of views of a specific demographic group and be distributionally aligned remains uncertain. This notion of distributional alignment is complex, as there is significant variation in the types of attributes that are simulated. Prior works have underexplored the role of three critical variables -- the question domain, steering method, and distribution expression method -- which motivates our contribution of a benchmark explicitly addressing these dimensions. We construct a dataset expanding beyond political values, create human baselines for this task, and evaluate the extent to which an LM can align with a particular group's opinion distribution to inform design choices of such simulation systems. Our analysis reveals open problems regarding if, and how, LMs can be used to simulate humans, and that LLMs can more accurately describe the opinion distribution than simulate such distributions.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

IQ testing has served as a foundational methodology for evaluating human cognitive capabilities, deliberately decoupling assessment from linguistic background, language proficiency, or domain-specific knowledge to isolate core competencies in abstraction and reasoning. Yet, artificial intelligence research currently lacks systematic benchmarks to quantify these critical cognitive dimensions in multimodal systems. To address this critical gap, we propose MM-IQ, a comprehensive evaluation framework comprising 2,710 meticulously curated test items spanning 8 distinct reasoning paradigms. Through systematic evaluation of leading open-source and proprietary multimodal models, our benchmark reveals striking limitations: even state-of-the-art architectures achieve only marginally superior performance to random chance (27.49% vs. 25% baseline accuracy). This substantial performance chasm highlights the inadequacy of current multimodal systems in approximating fundamental human reasoning capacities, underscoring the need for paradigm-shifting advancements to bridge this cognitive divide.

In this paper, we present an investigative study on how Mental Sets influence the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. LLMs have excelled in diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks, driven by advancements in parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) and emergent capabilities like in-context learning (ICL). For complex reasoning tasks, selecting the right model for PEFT or ICL is critical, often relying on scores on benchmarks such as MMLU, MATH, and GSM8K. However, current evaluation methods, based on metrics like F1 Score or reasoning chain assessments by larger models, overlook a key dimension: adaptability to unfamiliar situations and overcoming entrenched thinking patterns. In cognitive psychology, Mental Set refers to the tendency to persist with previously successful strategies, even when they become inefficient - a challenge for problem solving and reasoning. We compare the performance of LLM models like Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct and GPT-4o in the presence of mental sets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to integrate cognitive psychology concepts into the evaluation of LLMs for complex reasoning tasks, providing deeper insights into their adaptability and problem-solving efficacy.

The uniform information density (UID) hypothesis states that humans tend to distribute information roughly evenly across an utterance or discourse. Early evidence in support of the UID hypothesis came from Genzel & Charniak (2002), which proposed an entropy rate constancy principle based on the probability of English text under n-gram language models. We re-evaluate the claims of Genzel & Charniak (2002) with neural language models, failing to find clear evidence in support of entropy rate constancy. We conduct a range of experiments across datasets, model sizes, and languages and discuss implications for the uniform information density hypothesis and linguistic theories of efficient communication more broadly.

Probabilistic models of language understanding are valuable tools for investigating human language use. However, they need to be hand-designed for a particular domain. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) are trained on text that spans a wide array of domains, but they lack the structure and interpretability of probabilistic models. In this paper, we use chain-of-thought prompts to introduce structures from probabilistic models into LLMs. We explore this approach in the case of metaphor understanding. Our chain-of-thought prompts lead language models to infer latent variables and reason about their relationships in order to choose appropriate paraphrases for metaphors. The latent variables and relationships chosen are informed by theories of metaphor understanding from cognitive psychology. We apply these prompts to the two largest versions of GPT-3 and show that they can improve performance in a paraphrase selection task.

Chain-of-thought prompting has demonstrated remarkable performance on various natural language reasoning tasks. However, it tends to perform poorly on tasks which requires solving problems harder than the exemplars shown in the prompts. To overcome this challenge of easy-to-hard generalization, we propose a novel prompting strategy, least-to-most prompting. The key idea in this strategy is to break down a complex problem into a series of simpler subproblems and then solve them in sequence. Solving each subproblem is facilitated by the answers to previously solved subproblems. Our experimental results on tasks related to symbolic manipulation, compositional generalization, and math reasoning reveal that least-to-most prompting is capable of generalizing to more difficult problems than those seen in the prompts. A notable finding is that when the GPT-3 code-davinci-002 model is used with least-to-most prompting, it can solve the compositional generalization benchmark SCAN in any split (including length split) with an accuracy of at least 99% using just 14 exemplars, compared to only 16% accuracy with chain-of-thought prompting. This is particularly noteworthy because neural-symbolic models in the literature that specialize in solving SCAN are trained on the entire training set containing over 15,000 examples. We have included prompts for all the tasks in the Appendix.

Chain of Thought (CoT) is significant in improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the correlation between the effectiveness of CoT and the length of reasoning steps in prompts remains largely unknown. To shed light on this, we have conducted several empirical experiments to explore the relations. Specifically, we design experiments that expand and compress the rationale reasoning steps within CoT demonstrations, while keeping all other factors constant. We have the following key findings. First, the results indicate that lengthening the reasoning steps in prompts, even without adding new information into the prompt, considerably enhances LLMs' reasoning abilities across multiple datasets. Alternatively, shortening the reasoning steps, even while preserving the key information, significantly diminishes the reasoning abilities of models. This finding highlights the importance of the number of steps in CoT prompts and provides practical guidance to make better use of LLMs' potential in complex problem-solving scenarios. Second, we also investigated the relationship between the performance of CoT and the rationales used in demonstrations. Surprisingly, the result shows that even incorrect rationales can yield favorable outcomes if they maintain the requisite length of inference. Third, we observed that the advantages of increasing reasoning steps are task-dependent: simpler tasks require fewer steps, whereas complex tasks gain significantly from longer inference sequences.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in problem-solving. However, their proficiency in solving mathematical problems remains inadequate. We propose MathScale, a simple and scalable method to create high-quality mathematical reasoning data using frontier LLMs (e.g., {\tt GPT-3.5}). Inspired by the cognitive mechanism in human mathematical learning, it first extracts topics and knowledge points from seed math questions and then build a concept graph, which is subsequently used to generate new math questions. MathScale exhibits effective scalability along the size axis of the math dataset that we generate. As a result, we create a mathematical reasoning dataset (MathScaleQA) containing two million math question-answer pairs. To evaluate mathematical reasoning abilities of LLMs comprehensively, we construct {\sc MwpBench}, a benchmark of Math Word Problems, which is a collection of ten datasets (including GSM8K and MATH) covering K-12, college, and competition level math problems. We apply MathScaleQA to fine-tune open-source LLMs (e.g., LLaMA-2 and Mistral), resulting in significantly improved capabilities in mathematical reasoning. Evaluated on {\sc MwpBench}, MathScale-7B achieves state-of-the-art performance across all datasets, surpassing its best peers of equivalent size by 42.9\% in micro average accuracy and 43.7\% in macro average accuracy, respectively.

We have recently witnessed a number of impressive results on hard mathematical reasoning problems with language models. At the same time, the robustness of these models has also been called into question; recent works have shown that models can rely on shallow patterns in the problem description when generating a solution. Building on the idea of behavioral testing, we propose a novel framework, which pins down the causal effect of various factors in the input, e.g., the surface form of the problem text, the operands, and math operators on the output solution. By grounding the behavioral analysis in a causal graph describing an intuitive reasoning process, we study the behavior of language models in terms of robustness and sensitivity to direct interventions in the input space. We apply our framework on a test bed of math word problems. Our analysis shows that robustness does not appear to continuously improve as a function of size, but the GPT-3 Davinci models (175B) achieve a dramatic improvement in both robustness and sensitivity compared to all other GPT variants.

Modelling compositional meaning for sentences using empirical distributional methods has been a challenge for computational linguists. We implement the abstract categorical model of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) using data from the BNC and evaluate it. The implementation is based on unsupervised learning of matrices for relational words and applying them to the vectors of their arguments. The evaluation is based on the word disambiguation task developed by Mitchell and Lapata (2008) for intransitive sentences, and on a similar new experiment designed for transitive sentences. Our model matches the results of its competitors in the first experiment, and betters them in the second. The general improvement in results with increase in syntactic complexity showcases the compositional power of our model.

In this position paper, we argue that human evaluation of generative large language models (LLMs) should be a multidisciplinary undertaking that draws upon insights from disciplines such as user experience research and human behavioral psychology to ensure that the experimental design and results are reliable. The conclusions from these evaluations, thus, must consider factors such as usability, aesthetics, and cognitive biases. We highlight how cognitive biases can conflate fluent information and truthfulness, and how cognitive uncertainty affects the reliability of rating scores such as Likert. Furthermore, the evaluation should differentiate the capabilities and weaknesses of increasingly powerful large language models -- which requires effective test sets. The scalability of human evaluation is also crucial to wider adoption. Hence, to design an effective human evaluation system in the age of generative NLP, we propose the ConSiDERS-The-Human evaluation framework consisting of 6 pillars -- Consistency, Scoring Criteria, Differentiating, User Experience, Responsible, and Scalability.

Writing is a cognitively demanding task involving continuous decision-making, heavy use of working memory, and frequent switching between multiple activities. Scholarly writing is particularly complex as it requires authors to coordinate many pieces of multiform knowledge. To fully understand writers' cognitive thought process, one should fully decode the end-to-end writing data (from individual ideas to final manuscript) and understand their complex cognitive mechanisms in scholarly writing. We introduce ScholaWrite dataset, the first-of-its-kind keystroke logs of an end-to-end scholarly writing process for complete manuscripts, with thorough annotations of cognitive writing intentions behind each keystroke. Our dataset includes LaTeX-based keystroke data from five preprints with nearly 62K total text changes and annotations across 4 months of paper writing. ScholaWrite shows promising usability and applications (e.g., iterative self-writing) for the future development of AI writing assistants for academic research, which necessitate complex methods beyond LLM prompting. Our experiments clearly demonstrated the importance of collection of end-to-end writing data, rather than the final manuscript, for the development of future writing assistants to support the cognitive thinking process of scientists. Our de-identified dataset, demo, and code repository are available on our project page.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable progress in mathematical reasoning, leveraging chain-of-thought and test-time compute scaling. However, many open questions remain regarding the interplay between reasoning token usage and accuracy gains. In particular, when comparing models across generations, it is unclear whether improved performance results from longer reasoning chains or more efficient reasoning. We systematically analyze chain-of-thought length across o1-mini and o3-mini variants on the Omni-MATH benchmark, finding that o3-mini (m) achieves superior accuracy without requiring longer reasoning chains than o1-mini. Moreover, we show that accuracy generally declines as reasoning chains grow across all models and compute settings, even when controlling for difficulty of the questions. This accuracy drop is significantly smaller in more proficient models, suggesting that new generations of reasoning models use test-time compute more effectively. Finally, we highlight that while o3-mini (h) achieves a marginal accuracy gain over o3-mini (m), it does so by allocating substantially more reasoning tokens across all problems, even the ones that o3-mini (m) can already solve. These findings provide new insights into the relationship between model capability and reasoning length, with implications for efficiency, scaling, and evaluation methodologies.

Recent studies have discovered that Chain-of-Thought prompting (CoT) can dramatically improve the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly when dealing with complex tasks involving mathematics or reasoning. Despite the enormous empirical success, the underlying mechanisms behind CoT and how it unlocks the potential of LLMs remain elusive. In this paper, we take a first step towards theoretically answering these questions. Specifically, we examine the expressivity of LLMs with CoT in solving fundamental mathematical and decision-making problems. By using circuit complexity theory, we first give impossibility results showing that bounded-depth Transformers are unable to directly produce correct answers for basic arithmetic/equation tasks unless the model size grows super-polynomially with respect to the input length. In contrast, we then prove by construction that autoregressive Transformers of constant size suffice to solve both tasks by generating CoT derivations using a commonly used math language format. Moreover, we show LLMs with CoT can handle a general class of decision-making problems known as Dynamic Programming, thus justifying its power in tackling complex real-world tasks. Finally, an extensive set of experiments show that, while Transformers always fail to directly predict the answers, they can consistently learn to generate correct solutions step-by-step given sufficient CoT demonstrations.

We introduce Graph of Thoughts (GoT): a framework that advances prompting capabilities in large language models (LLMs) beyond those offered by paradigms such as Chain-of-Thought or Tree of Thoughts (ToT). The key idea and primary advantage of GoT is the ability to model the information generated by an LLM as an arbitrary graph, where units of information ("LLM thoughts") are vertices, and edges correspond to dependencies between these vertices. This approach enables combining arbitrary LLM thoughts into synergistic outcomes, distilling the essence of whole networks of thoughts, or enhancing thoughts using feedback loops. We illustrate that GoT offers advantages over state of the art on different tasks, for example increasing the quality of sorting by 62% over ToT, while simultaneously reducing costs by >31%. We ensure that GoT is extensible with new thought transformations and thus can be used to spearhead new prompting schemes. This work brings the LLM reasoning closer to human thinking or brain mechanisms such as recurrence, both of which form complex networks.

The dominant paradigm for instruction tuning is the random-shuffled training of maximally diverse instruction-response pairs. This paper explores the potential benefits of applying a structured cognitive learning approach to instruction tuning in contemporary large language models like ChatGPT and GPT-4. Unlike the previous conventional randomized instruction dataset, we propose a highly structured synthetic dataset that mimics the progressive and organized nature of human education. We curate our dataset by aligning it with educational frameworks, incorporating meta information including its topic and cognitive rigor level for each sample. Our dataset covers comprehensive fine-grained topics spanning diverse educational stages (from middle school to graduate school) with various questions for each topic to enhance conceptual depth using Bloom's taxonomy-a classification framework distinguishing various levels of human cognition for each concept. The results demonstrate that this cognitive rigorous training approach yields significant performance enhancements - +3.06 on the MMLU benchmark and an additional +1.28 on AI2 Reasoning Challenge (hard set) - compared to conventional randomized training, all while avoiding additional computational costs. This research highlights the potential of leveraging human learning principles to enhance the capabilities of language models in comprehending and responding to complex instructions and tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) have accomplished remarkable reasoning performance in various domains. However, in the domain of reasoning tasks, we discover a frailty: LLMs are surprisingly brittle to the ordering of the premises, despite the fact that such ordering does not alter the underlying task. In particular, we observe that LLMs achieve the best performance when the premise order aligns with the context required in intermediate reasoning steps. For example, in deductive reasoning tasks, presenting the premises in the same order as the ground truth proof in the prompt (as opposed to random ordering) drastically increases the model's accuracy. We first examine the effect of premise ordering on deductive reasoning on a variety of LLMs, and our evaluation shows that permuting the premise order can cause a performance drop of over 30%. In addition, we release the benchmark R-GSM, based on GSM8K, to examine the ordering effect for mathematical problem-solving, and we again observe a significant drop in accuracy, relative to the original GSM8K benchmark.

Procedural planning, which entails decomposing a high-level goal into a sequence of temporally ordered steps, is an important yet intricate task for machines. It involves integrating common-sense knowledge to reason about complex contextualized situations that are often counterfactual, e.g. "scheduling a doctor's appointment without a phone". While current approaches show encouraging results using large language models (LLMs), they are hindered by drawbacks such as costly API calls and reproducibility issues. In this paper, we advocate planning using smaller language models. We present PlaSma, a novel two-pronged approach to endow small language models with procedural knowledge and (counterfactual) planning capabilities. More concretely, we develop symbolic procedural knowledge distillation to enhance the implicit knowledge in small language models and an inference-time algorithm to facilitate more structured and accurate reasoning. In addition, we introduce a novel task, Counterfactual Planning, that requires a revision of a plan to cope with a counterfactual situation. In both the original and counterfactual setting, we show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (770M-11B parameters) can compete and often surpass their larger teacher models' capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) do not differentially represent numbers, which are pervasive in text. In contrast, neuroscience research has identified distinct neural representations for numbers and words. In this work, we investigate how well popular LLMs capture the magnitudes of numbers (e.g., that 4 < 5) from a behavioral lens. Prior research on the representational capabilities of LLMs evaluates whether they show human-level performance, for instance, high overall accuracy on standard benchmarks. Here, we ask a different question, one inspired by cognitive science: How closely do the number representations of LLMscorrespond to those of human language users, who typically demonstrate the distance, size, and ratio effects? We depend on a linking hypothesis to map the similarities among the model embeddings of number words and digits to human response times. The results reveal surprisingly human-like representations across language models of different architectures, despite the absence of the neural circuitry that directly supports these representations in the human brain. This research shows the utility of understanding LLMs using behavioral benchmarks and points the way to future work on the number representations of LLMs and their cognitive plausibility.

Scaling inference compute enhances reasoning in large language models (LLMs), with long chains-of-thought (CoTs) enabling strategies like backtracking and error correction. Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a crucial method for developing these capabilities, yet the conditions under which long CoTs emerge remain unclear, and RL training requires careful design choices. In this study, we systematically investigate the mechanics of long CoT reasoning, identifying the key factors that enable models to generate long CoT trajectories. Through extensive supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and RL experiments, we present four main findings: (1) While SFT is not strictly necessary, it simplifies training and improves efficiency; (2) Reasoning capabilities tend to emerge with increased training compute, but their development is not guaranteed, making reward shaping crucial for stabilizing CoT length growth; (3) Scaling verifiable reward signals is critical for RL. We find that leveraging noisy, web-extracted solutions with filtering mechanisms shows strong potential, particularly for out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks such as STEM reasoning; and (4) Core abilities like error correction are inherently present in base models, but incentivizing these skills effectively for complex tasks via RL demands significant compute, and measuring their emergence requires a nuanced approach. These insights provide practical guidance for optimizing training strategies to enhance long CoT reasoning in LLMs. Our code is available at: https://github.com/eddycmu/demystify-long-cot.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate promising capabilities in solving simple scientific problems but often produce hallucinations for complex ones. While integrating LLMs with tools can increase reliability, this approach typically results in over-reliance on tools, diminishing the model's ability to solve simple problems through basic reasoning. In contrast, human experts first assess problem complexity using domain knowledge before choosing an appropriate solution approach. Inspired by this human problem-solving process, we propose a novel two-component fine-tuning method. In the first component World Knowledge Distillation (WKD), LLMs learn directly from solutions generated using tool's information to internalize domain knowledge. In the second component Tool Usage Adaptation (TUA), we partition problems into easy and hard categories based on the model's direct answering accuracy. While maintaining the same alignment target for easy problems as in WKD, we train the model to intelligently switch to tool usage for more challenging problems. We validate our method on six scientific benchmark datasets, spanning mathematics, climate science and epidemiology. On average, our models demonstrate a 28.18% improvement in answer accuracy and a 13.89% increase in tool usage precision across all datasets, surpassing state-of-the-art models including GPT-4o and Claude-3.5.

The evolution of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been significantly accelerated by advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Multimodal Models (LMMs), gradually showcasing potential cognitive reasoning abilities in problem-solving and scientific discovery (i.e., AI4Science) once exclusive to human intellect. To comprehensively evaluate current models' performance in cognitive reasoning abilities, we introduce OlympicArena, which includes 11,163 bilingual problems across both text-only and interleaved text-image modalities. These challenges encompass a wide range of disciplines spanning seven fields and 62 international Olympic competitions, rigorously examined for data leakage. We argue that the challenges in Olympic competition problems are ideal for evaluating AI's cognitive reasoning due to their complexity and interdisciplinary nature, which are essential for tackling complex scientific challenges and facilitating discoveries. Beyond evaluating performance across various disciplines using answer-only criteria, we conduct detailed experiments and analyses from multiple perspectives. We delve into the models' cognitive reasoning abilities, their performance across different modalities, and their outcomes in process-level evaluations, which are vital for tasks requiring complex reasoning with lengthy solutions. Our extensive evaluations reveal that even advanced models like GPT-4o only achieve a 39.97% overall accuracy, illustrating current AI limitations in complex reasoning and multimodal integration. Through the OlympicArena, we aim to advance AI towards superintelligence, equipping it to address more complex challenges in science and beyond. We also provide a comprehensive set of resources to support AI research, including a benchmark dataset, an open-source annotation platform, a detailed evaluation tool, and a leaderboard with automatic submission features.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

Mathematical understanding and reasoning are crucial tasks for assessing the capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI). However, existing benchmarks either require just a few steps of reasoning, or only contain a small amount of data in one specific topic, making it hard to analyse AI's behaviour with reference to different problems within a specific topic in detail. In this work, we propose Conic10K, a challenging math problem dataset on conic sections in Chinese senior high school education. Our dataset contains various problems with different reasoning depths, while only the knowledge from conic sections is required. Since the dataset only involves a narrow range of knowledge, it is easy to separately analyse the knowledge a model possesses and the reasoning ability it has. For each problem, we provide a high-quality formal representation, the reasoning steps, and the final solution. Experiments show that existing large language models, including GPT-4, exhibit weak performance on complex reasoning. We hope that our findings could inspire more advanced techniques for precise natural language understanding and reasoning. Our dataset and codes are available at https://github.com/whyNLP/Conic10K.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

Recent diagnostic datasets on compositional generalization, such as SCAN (Lake and Baroni, 2018) and COGS (Kim and Linzen, 2020), expose severe problems in models trained from scratch on these datasets. However, in contrast to this poor performance, state-of-the-art models trained on larger and more general datasets show better generalization ability. In this work, to reconcile this inconsistency, we conduct an empirical analysis by training Transformer models on a variety of training sets with different data factors, including dataset scale, pattern complexity, example difficulty, etc. First, we show that increased dataset complexity can lead to better generalization behavior on multiple different generalization challenges. To further understand this improvement, we show two axes of the benefit from more complex datasets: they provide more diverse examples so compositional understanding becomes more effective, and they also prevent ungeneralizable memorization of the examples due to reduced example repetition frequency. Finally, we explore how training examples of different difficulty levels influence generalization differently. On synthetic datasets, simple examples invoke stronger compositionality than hard examples do. On larger-scale real language datasets, while hard examples become more important potentially to ensure decent data coverage, a balanced mixture of simple and hard examples manages to induce the strongest generalizability. The code and data for this work are available at https://github.com/owenzx/data4comp

Recurrent large language models that compete with Transformers in language modeling perplexity are emerging at a rapid rate (e.g., Mamba, RWKV). Excitingly, these architectures use a constant amount of memory during inference. However, due to the limited memory, recurrent LMs cannot recall and use all the information in long contexts leading to brittle in-context learning (ICL) quality. A key challenge for efficient LMs is selecting what information to store versus discard. In this work, we observe the order in which information is shown to the LM impacts the selection difficulty. To formalize this, we show that the hardness of information recall reduces to the hardness of a problem called set disjointness (SD), a quintessential problem in communication complexity that requires a streaming algorithm (e.g., recurrent model) to decide whether inputted sets are disjoint. We empirically and theoretically show that the recurrent memory required to solve SD changes with set order, i.e., whether the smaller set appears first in-context. Our analysis suggests, to mitigate the reliance on data order, we can put information in the right order in-context or process prompts non-causally. Towards that end, we propose: (1) JRT-Prompt, where context gets repeated multiple times in the prompt, effectively showing the model all data orders. This gives 11.0 pm 1.3 points of improvement, averaged across 16 recurrent LMs and the 6 ICL tasks, with 11.9times higher throughput than FlashAttention-2 for generation prefill (length 32k, batch size 16, NVidia H100). We then propose (2) JRT-RNN, which uses non-causal prefix-linear-attention to process prompts and provides 99% of Transformer quality at 360M params., 30B tokens and 96% at 1.3B params., 50B tokens on average across the tasks, with 19.2times higher throughput for prefill than FA2.

Recent works have shown that chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting can elicit language models to solve complex reasoning tasks, step-by-step. However, prompt-based CoT methods are dependent on very large models such as GPT-3 175B which are prohibitive to deploy at scale. In this paper, we use these large models as reasoning teachers to enable complex reasoning in smaller models and reduce model size requirements by several orders of magnitude. We propose Fine-tune-CoT, a method that generates reasoning samples from very large teacher models to fine-tune smaller models. We evaluate our method on a wide range of public models and complex tasks. We find that Fine-tune-CoT enables substantial reasoning capability in small models, far outperforming prompt-based baselines and even the teacher model in many tasks. Additionally, we extend our method by leveraging the teacher model's ability to generate multiple distinct rationales for each original sample. Enriching the fine-tuning data with such diverse reasoning results in a substantial performance boost across datasets, even for very small models. We conduct ablations and sample studies to understand the emergence of reasoning capabilities of student models. Our code implementation and data are available at https://github.com/itsnamgyu/reasoning-teacher.

How do humans learn language, and can the first language be learned at all? These fundamental questions are still hotly debated. In contemporary linguistics, there are two major schools of thought that give completely opposite answers. According to Chomsky's theory of universal grammar, language cannot be learned because children are not exposed to sufficient data in their linguistic environment. In contrast, usage-based models of language assume a profound relationship between language structure and language use. In particular, contextual mental processing and mental representations are assumed to have the cognitive capacity to capture the complexity of actual language use at all levels. The prime example is syntax, i.e., the rules by which words are assembled into larger units such as sentences. Typically, syntactic rules are expressed as sequences of word classes. However, it remains unclear whether word classes are innate, as implied by universal grammar, or whether they emerge during language acquisition, as suggested by usage-based approaches. Here, we address this issue from a machine learning and natural language processing perspective. In particular, we trained an artificial deep neural network on predicting the next word, provided sequences of consecutive words as input. Subsequently, we analyzed the emerging activation patterns in the hidden layers of the neural network. Strikingly, we find that the internal representations of nine-word input sequences cluster according to the word class of the tenth word to be predicted as output, even though the neural network did not receive any explicit information about syntactic rules or word classes during training. This surprising result suggests, that also in the human brain, abstract representational categories such as word classes may naturally emerge as a consequence of predictive coding and processing during language acquisition.

Inference-time scaling can enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) on complex problems that benefit from step-by-step problem solving. Although lengthening generated scratchpads has proven effective for mathematical tasks, the broader impact of this approach on other tasks remains less clear. In this work, we investigate the benefits and limitations of scaling methods across nine state-of-the-art models and eight challenging tasks, including math and STEM reasoning, calendar planning, NP-hard problems, navigation, and spatial reasoning. We compare conventional models (e.g., GPT-4o) with models fine-tuned for inference-time scaling (e.g., o1) through evaluation protocols that involve repeated model calls, either independently or sequentially with feedback. These evaluations approximate lower and upper performance bounds and potential for future performance improvements for each model, whether through enhanced training or multi-model inference systems. Our extensive empirical analysis reveals that the advantages of inference-time scaling vary across tasks and diminish as problem complexity increases. In addition, simply using more tokens does not necessarily translate to higher accuracy in these challenging regimes. Results from multiple independent runs with conventional models using perfect verifiers show that, for some tasks, these models can achieve performance close to the average performance of today's most advanced reasoning models. However, for other tasks, a significant performance gap remains, even in very high scaling regimes. Encouragingly, all models demonstrate significant gains when inference is further scaled with perfect verifiers or strong feedback, suggesting ample potential for future improvements.

Language models (LMs), like other neural networks, often favor shortcut heuristics based on surface-level patterns. Although LMs behave like n-gram models early in training, they must eventually learn hierarchical syntactic representations to correctly apply grammatical rules out-of-distribution (OOD). In this work, we use case studies of English grammar to explore how complex, diverse training data drives models to generalize OOD. We construct a framework that unifies our understanding of random variation with training dynamics, rule selection with memorization, and data diversity with complexity. We show that these factors are nuanced, and that intermediate levels of diversity and complexity lead to inconsistent behavior across random seeds and to unstable training dynamics. Our findings emphasize the critical role of training data in shaping generalization patterns and illuminate how competing model strategies lead to inconsistent generalization outcomes across random seeds. Code is available at https://github.com/sunnytqin/concept_comp.git.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

We propose cognitive prompting as a novel approach to guide problem-solving in large language models (LLMs) through structured, human-like cognitive operations such as goal clarification, decomposition, filtering, abstraction, and pattern recognition. By employing systematic, step-by-step reasoning, cognitive prompting enables LLMs to efficiently tackle complex, multi-step tasks. We evaluate the effectiveness of cognitive prompting on Meta's LLaMA models, comparing performance on arithmetic reasoning tasks using the GSM8K dataset and on commonsense reasoning benchmarks. Our analysis includes comparisons between models without cognitive prompting, models with a static sequence of cognitive operations, and models using reflective cognitive prompting, where the LLM dynamically self-selects the sequence of cognitive operations. The results show that cognitive prompting, particularly when dynamically adapted, significantly improves the performance of larger models, such as LLaMA3.1 70B, and enhances their ability to handle multi-step reasoning tasks. This approach also improves interpretability and flexibility, highlighting cognitive prompting as a promising strategy for general-purpose AI reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated solid zero-shot reasoning capabilities, which is reflected in their performance on the current test tasks. This calls for a more challenging benchmark requiring highly advanced reasoning ability to be solved. In this paper, we introduce such a benchmark, consisting of 191 long-form (1200 words on average) mystery narratives constructed as detective puzzles. Puzzles are sourced from the "5 Minute Mystery" platform and include a multiple-choice question for evaluation. Only 47% of humans solve a puzzle successfully on average, while the best human solvers achieve over 80% success rate. We show that GPT-3 models barely outperform random on this benchmark (with 28% accuracy) while state-of-the-art GPT-4 solves only 38% of puzzles. This indicates that there is still a significant gap in the deep reasoning abilities of LLMs and humans and highlights the need for further research in this area. Our work introduces a challenging benchmark for future studies on reasoning in language models and contributes to a better understanding of the limits of LLMs' abilities.

Multi-agent interactions, such as communication, teaching, and bluffing, often rely on higher-order social inference, i.e., understanding how others infer oneself. Such intricate reasoning can be effectively modeled through nested multi-agent reasoning. Nonetheless, the computational complexity escalates exponentially with each level of reasoning, posing a significant challenge. However, humans effortlessly perform complex social inferences as part of their daily lives. To bridge the gap between human-like inference capabilities and computational limitations, we propose a novel approach: leveraging neural networks to amortize high-order social inference, thereby expediting nested multi-agent reasoning. We evaluate our method in two challenging multi-agent interaction domains. The experimental results demonstrate that our method is computationally efficient while exhibiting minimal degradation in accuracy.

Predictable behavior from scaling advanced AI systems is an extremely desirable property. Although a well-established literature exists on how pretraining performance scales, the literature on how particular downstream capabilities scale is significantly muddier. In this work, we take a step back and ask: why has predicting specific downstream capabilities with scale remained elusive? While many factors are certainly responsible, we identify a new factor that makes modeling scaling behavior on widely used multiple-choice question-answering benchmarks challenging. Using five model families and twelve well-established multiple-choice benchmarks, we show that downstream performance is computed from negative log likelihoods via a sequence of transformations that progressively degrade the statistical relationship between performance and scale. We then reveal the mechanism causing this degradation: downstream metrics require comparing the correct choice against a small number of specific incorrect choices, meaning accurately predicting downstream capabilities requires predicting not just how probability mass concentrates on the correct choice with scale, but also how probability mass fluctuates on specific incorrect choices with scale. We empirically study how probability mass on the correct choice co-varies with probability mass on incorrect choices with increasing compute, suggesting that scaling laws for incorrect choices might be achievable. Our work also explains why pretraining scaling laws are commonly regarded as more predictable than downstream capabilities and contributes towards establishing scaling-predictable evaluations of frontier AI models.

Compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression is constructed from the meaning of its parts and syntactic rules, permits the infinite productivity of human language. For the first time, artificial language models (LMs) are able to match human performance in a number of compositional generalization tasks. However, much remains to be understood about the representational mechanisms underlying these abilities. We take a high-level geometric approach to this problem by relating the degree of compositionality in a dataset to the intrinsic dimensionality of its representations under an LM, a measure of feature complexity. We find not only that the degree of dataset compositionality is reflected in representations' intrinsic dimensionality, but that the relationship between compositionality and geometric complexity arises due to learned linguistic features over training. Finally, our analyses reveal a striking contrast between linear and nonlinear dimensionality, showing that they respectively encode formal and semantic aspects of linguistic composition.

Recent supervised fine-tuning (SFT) approaches have significantly improved language models' performance on mathematical reasoning tasks, even when models are trained at a small scale. However, the specific capabilities enhanced through such fine-tuning remain poorly understood. In this paper, we conduct a detailed analysis of model performance on the AIME24 dataset to understand how reasoning capabilities evolve. We discover a ladder-like structure in problem difficulty, categorize questions into four tiers (Easy, Medium, Hard, and Extremely Hard (Exh)), and identify the specific requirements for advancing between tiers. We find that progression from Easy to Medium tier requires adopting an R1 reasoning style with minimal SFT (500-1K instances), while Hard-level questions suffer from frequent model's errors at each step of the reasoning chain, with accuracy plateauing at around 65% despite logarithmic scaling. Exh-level questions present a fundamentally different challenge; they require unconventional problem-solving skills that current models uniformly struggle with. Additional findings reveal that carefully curated small-scale datasets offer limited advantage-scaling dataset size proves far more effective. Our analysis provides a clearer roadmap for advancing language model capabilities in mathematical reasoning.

Reasoning models have demonstrated remarkable progress in solving complex and logic-intensive tasks by generating extended Chain-of-Thoughts (CoTs) prior to arriving at a final answer. Yet, the emergence of this "slow-thinking" paradigm, with numerous tokens generated in sequence, inevitably introduces substantial computational overhead. To this end, it highlights an urgent need for effective acceleration. This survey aims to provide a comprehensive overview of recent advances in efficient reasoning. It categorizes existing works into three key directions: (1) shorter - compressing lengthy CoTs into concise yet effective reasoning chains; (2) smaller - developing compact language models with strong reasoning capabilities through techniques such as knowledge distillation, other model compression techniques, and reinforcement learning; and (3) faster - designing efficient decoding strategies to accelerate inference. A curated collection of papers discussed in this survey is available in our GitHub repository.

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

Scaling model size and training data has led to great advances in the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, the diminishing returns of this approach necessitate alternative methods to improve model capabilities, particularly in tasks requiring advanced reasoning. Large reasoning models, which leverage long chain-of-thoughts, bring unprecedented breakthroughs in problem-solving capabilities but at a substantial deployment cost associated to longer generations. Reducing inference costs is crucial for the economic feasibility, user experience, and environmental sustainability of these models. In this work, we propose to train large reasoning models to reason efficiently. More precisely, we use reinforcement learning (RL) to train reasoning models to dynamically allocate inference-time compute based on task complexity. Our method incentivizes models to minimize unnecessary computational overhead while maintaining accuracy, thereby achieving substantial efficiency gains. It enables the derivation of a family of reasoning models with varying efficiency levels, controlled via a single hyperparameter. Experiments on two open-weight large reasoning models demonstrate significant reductions in inference cost while preserving most of the accuracy.

Solving math word problems depends on how to articulate the problems, the lens through which models view human linguistic expressions. Real-world settings count on such a method even more due to the diverse practices of the same mathematical operations. Earlier works constrain available thinking processes by limited prediction strategies without considering their significance in acquiring mathematical knowledge. We introduce Attention-based THought Expansion Network Architecture (ATHENA) to tackle the challenges of real-world practices by mimicking human thought expansion mechanisms in the form of neural network propagation. A thought expansion recurrently generates the candidates carrying the thoughts of possible math expressions driven from the previous step and yields reasonable thoughts by selecting the valid pathways to the goal. Our experiments show that ATHENA achieves a new state-of-the-art stage toward the ideal model that is compelling in variant questions even when the informativeness in training examples is restricted.

Do large language models (LLMs) solve reasoning tasks by learning robust generalizable algorithms, or do they memorize training data? To investigate this question, we use arithmetic reasoning as a representative task. Using causal analysis, we identify a subset of the model (a circuit) that explains most of the model's behavior for basic arithmetic logic and examine its functionality. By zooming in on the level of individual circuit neurons, we discover a sparse set of important neurons that implement simple heuristics. Each heuristic identifies a numerical input pattern and outputs corresponding answers. We hypothesize that the combination of these heuristic neurons is the mechanism used to produce correct arithmetic answers. To test this, we categorize each neuron into several heuristic types-such as neurons that activate when an operand falls within a certain range-and find that the unordered combination of these heuristic types is the mechanism that explains most of the model's accuracy on arithmetic prompts. Finally, we demonstrate that this mechanism appears as the main source of arithmetic accuracy early in training. Overall, our experimental results across several LLMs show that LLMs perform arithmetic using neither robust algorithms nor memorization; rather, they rely on a "bag of heuristics".

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Although large language models demonstrate emergent abilities in solving math word problems, there is a challenging task in complex multi-step mathematical reasoning tasks. To improve model performance on mathematical reasoning tasks, previous work has conducted supervised fine-tuning on open-source models by improving the quality and quantity of data. In this paper, we propose a novel approach, named Brain, to imitate human thought processes to enhance mathematical reasoning abilities, using the Frontal Lobe Model to generate plans, and then employing the Parietal Lobe Model to generate code and execute to obtain answers. First, we achieve SOTA performance in comparison with Code LLaMA 7B based models through this method. Secondly, we find that plans can be explicitly extracted from natural language, code, or formal language. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/cyzhh/Brain.

Large language models (LLMs) excel in both closed tasks (including problem-solving, and code generation) and open tasks (including creative writing), yet existing explanations for their capabilities lack connections to real-world human intelligence. To fill this gap, this paper systematically investigates LLM intelligence through the lens of ``human simulation'', addressing three core questions: (1) How do personality traits affect problem-solving in closed tasks? (2) How do traits shape creativity in open tasks? (3) How does single-agent performance influence multi-agent collaboration? By assigning Big Five personality traits to LLM agents and evaluating their performance in single- and multi-agent settings, we reveal that specific traits significantly influence reasoning accuracy (closed tasks) and creative output (open tasks). Furthermore, multi-agent systems exhibit collective intelligence distinct from individual capabilities, driven by distinguishing combinations of personalities. We demonstrate that LLMs inherently simulate human behavior through next-token prediction, mirroring human language, decision-making, and collaborative dynamics.

Language models (LM) are capable of remarkably complex linguistic tasks; however, numerical reasoning is an area in which they frequently struggle. An important but rarely evaluated form of reasoning is understanding probability distributions. In this paper, we focus on evaluating the probabilistic reasoning capabilities of LMs using idealized and real-world statistical distributions. We perform a systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art LMs on three tasks: estimating percentiles, drawing samples, and calculating probabilities. We evaluate three ways to provide context to LMs 1) anchoring examples from within a distribution or family of distributions, 2) real-world context, 3) summary statistics on which to base a Normal approximation. Models can make inferences about distributions, and can be further aided by the incorporation of real-world context, example shots and simplified assumptions, even if these assumptions are incorrect or misspecified. To conduct this work, we developed a comprehensive benchmark distribution dataset with associated question-answer pairs that we will release publicly.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across multiple tasks through in-context learning. For complex reasoning tasks that require step-by-step thinking, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has given impressive results, especially when combined with self-consistency. Nonetheless, some tasks remain particularly difficult for LLMs to solve. Tree of Thoughts (ToT) and Graph of Thoughts (GoT) emerged as alternatives, dividing the complex problem into paths of subproblems. In this paper, we propose Tree of Problems (ToP), a simpler version of ToT, which we hypothesise can work better for complex tasks that can be divided into identical subtasks. Our empirical results show that our approach outperforms ToT and GoT, and in addition performs better than CoT on complex reasoning tasks. All code for this paper is publicly available here: https://github.com/ArmelRandy/tree-of-problems.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate impressive abilities over high level perception and reasoning, their robustness in the wild still lags behind humans and exhibits diminished efficacy on simple tasks that are intuitive for humans. We examine the hypothesis that these deficiencies stem from the absence of core knowledge, rudimentary cognitive abilities innate to humans from early childhood. To probe core knowledge representation in MLLMs, we draw from developmental cognitive sciences and develop a large-scale benchmark, CoreCognition dataset, encompassing 12 core cognitive concepts. We evaluate 219 models with 10 different prompts, leading to a total of 2409 data points for analysis. Our findings reveal core knowledge deficits in early developed core abilities while models demonstrate human comparable performance in high level cognition. Moreover, we find that low level abilities show little to no scaling, in stark contrast to high level abilities. Finally, we introduce an evaluation technique, Concept Hacking, through which we demonstrate that MLLMs do not genuinely advance toward core knowledge but instead rely on illusory understanding and shortcut learning as they scale. Website with this https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{link}.

Existing Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown the potential of reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance the complex reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models~(LLMs). While they achieve remarkable performance on challenging tasks such as mathematics and coding, they often rely on their internal knowledge to solve problems, which can be inadequate for time-sensitive or knowledge-intensive questions, leading to inaccuracies and hallucinations. To address this, we propose R1-Searcher, a novel two-stage outcome-based RL approach designed to enhance the search capabilities of LLMs. This method allows LLMs to autonomously invoke external search systems to access additional knowledge during the reasoning process. Our framework relies exclusively on RL, without requiring process rewards or distillation for a cold start. % effectively generalizing to out-of-domain datasets and supporting both Base and Instruct models. Our experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms previous strong RAG methods, even when compared to the closed-source GPT-4o-mini.

Chain of Thought (CoT) of multi-step benefits from the logical structure of the reasoning steps and task-specific actions, significantly enhancing the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models. As the prevalence of long CoT, the number of reasoning steps exceeds manageable token limits and leads to higher computational demands. Inspired by the fundamental logic of human cognition, ``derive, then reduce'', we conceptualize the standard multi-step CoT as a novel Markov Chain of Thought (MCoT). In this study, we consider the mathematical reasoning task, defining each reasoning step as text accompanied by a Python code snippet. To facilitate a longer reasoning path, self-correction is enabled through interactions with the code interpreter. Our MCoT aims to compress previous reasoning steps into a simplified question, enabling efficient next-step inference without relying on a lengthy KV cache. In our experiments, we curate the MCoTInstruct dataset, and the empirical results indicate that MCoT not only significantly enhances efficiency but also maintains comparable accuracy. While much remains to be explored, this work paves the way for exploring the long CoT reasoning abilities of LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are thought to struggle with arithmetic learning due to the inherent differences between language modeling and numerical computation, but concrete evidence has been lacking. This work responds to this claim through a two-side experiment. We first investigate whether LLMs leverage partial products during arithmetic learning. We find that although LLMs can identify some partial products after learning, they fail to leverage them for arithmetic tasks, conversely. We then explore how LLMs approach arithmetic symbolically by breaking tasks into subgroups, hypothesizing that difficulties arise from subgroup complexity and selection. Our results show that when subgroup complexity is fixed, LLMs treat a collection of different arithmetic operations similarly. By analyzing position-level accuracy across different training sizes, we further observe that it follows a U-shaped pattern: LLMs quickly learn the easiest patterns at the first and last positions, while progressively learning the more difficult patterns in the middle positions. This suggests that LLMs select subgroup following an easy-to-hard paradigm during learning. Our work confirms that LLMs are pure symbolic learners in arithmetic tasks and underscores the importance of understanding them deeply through subgroup-level quantification.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant performance gains via scaling up model sizes and/or data. However, recent evidence suggests diminishing returns from such approaches, motivating scaling the computation spent at inference time. Existing inference-time scaling methods, usually with reward models, cast the task as a search problem, which tends to be vulnerable to reward hacking as a consequence of approximation errors in reward models. In this paper, we instead cast inference-time scaling as a probabilistic inference task and leverage sampling-based techniques to explore the typical set of the state distribution of a state-space model with an approximate likelihood, rather than optimize for its mode directly. We propose a novel inference-time scaling approach by adapting particle-based Monte Carlo methods to this task. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that our methods have a 4-16x better scaling rate over our deterministic search counterparts on various challenging mathematical reasoning tasks. Using our approach, we show that Qwen2.5-Math-1.5B-Instruct can surpass GPT-4o accuracy in only 4 rollouts, while Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct scales to o1 level accuracy in only 32 rollouts. Our work not only presents an effective method to inference-time scaling, but also connects the rich literature in probabilistic inference with inference-time scaling of LLMs to develop more robust algorithms in future work. Code and further information is available at https://probabilistic-inference-scaling.github.io.

Recently, long-thought reasoning models achieve strong performance on complex reasoning tasks, but often incur substantial inference overhead, making efficiency a critical concern. Our empirical analysis reveals that the benefit of using Long-CoT varies across problems: while some problems require elaborate reasoning, others show no improvement, or even degraded accuracy. This motivates adaptive reasoning strategies that tailor reasoning depth to the input. However, prior work primarily reduces redundancy within long reasoning paths, limiting exploration of more efficient strategies beyond the Long-CoT paradigm. To address this, we propose a novel two-stage framework for adaptive and efficient reasoning. First, we construct a hybrid reasoning model by merging long and short CoT models to enable diverse reasoning styles. Second, we apply bi-level preference training to guide the model to select suitable reasoning styles (group-level), and prefer concise and correct reasoning within each style group (instance-level). Experiments demonstrate that our method significantly reduces inference costs compared to other baseline approaches, while maintaining performance. Notably, on five mathematical datasets, the average length of reasoning is reduced by more than 50%, highlighting the potential of adaptive strategies to optimize reasoning efficiency in large language models. Our code is coming soon at https://github.com/StarDewXXX/AdaR1

Recently, long-thought reasoning LLMs, such as OpenAI's O1, adopt extended reasoning processes similar to how humans ponder over complex problems. This reasoning paradigm significantly enhances the model's problem-solving abilities and has achieved promising results. However, long-thought reasoning process leads to a substantial increase in inference time. A pressing challenge is reducing the inference overhead of long-thought LLMs while ensuring accuracy. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate that long-thought reasoning models struggle to effectively allocate token budgets based on problem difficulty and reasoning redundancies. To address this, we propose Length-Harmonizing Fine-Tuning (O1-Pruner), aiming at minimizing reasoning overhead while maintaining accuracy. This effective fine-tuning method first estimates the LLM's baseline performance through pre-sampling and then uses RL-style fine-tuning to encourage the model to generate shorter reasoning processes under accuracy constraints. This allows the model to achieve efficient reasoning with lower redundancy while maintaining accuracy. Experiments on various mathematical reasoning benchmarks show that O1-Pruner not only significantly reduces inference overhead but also achieves higher accuracy, providing a novel and promising solution to this challenge. Our code is coming soon at https://github.com/StarDewXXX/O1-Pruner

Chain-of-thought prompting combined with pre-trained large language models has achieved encouraging results on complex reasoning tasks. In this paper, we propose a new decoding strategy, self-consistency, to replace the naive greedy decoding used in chain-of-thought prompting. It first samples a diverse set of reasoning paths instead of only taking the greedy one, and then selects the most consistent answer by marginalizing out the sampled reasoning paths. Self-consistency leverages the intuition that a complex reasoning problem typically admits multiple different ways of thinking leading to its unique correct answer. Our extensive empirical evaluation shows that self-consistency boosts the performance of chain-of-thought prompting with a striking margin on a range of popular arithmetic and commonsense reasoning benchmarks, including GSM8K (+17.9%), SVAMP (+11.0%), AQuA (+12.2%), StrategyQA (+6.4%) and ARC-challenge (+3.9%).

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

The reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) on a wide range of problems critically relies on chain-of-thought prompting, which involves providing a few chain of thought demonstrations as exemplars in prompts. Recent work, e.g., Tree of Thoughts, has pointed out the importance of exploration and self-evaluation in reasoning step selection for complex problem solving. In this paper, we present Boosting of Thoughts (BoT), an automated prompting framework for problem solving with LLMs by iteratively exploring and self-evaluating many trees of thoughts in order to acquire an ensemble of trial-and-error reasoning experiences, which will serve as a new form of prompting to solve the complex problem. Starting from a simple prompt without requiring examples, BoT iteratively explores and evaluates a large collection of reasoning steps, and more importantly, uses error analysis obtained from the LLM on them to explicitly revise prompting, which in turn enhances reasoning step generation, until a final answer is attained. Our experiments with GPT-4 and Llama2 across extensive complex mathematical problems demonstrate that BoT consistently achieves higher or comparable problem-solving rates than other advanced prompting approaches.

During the evolution of large models, performance evaluation is necessarily performed to assess their capabilities and ensure safety before practical application. However, current model evaluations mainly rely on specific tasks and datasets, lacking a united framework for assessing the multidimensional intelligence of large models. In this perspective, we advocate for a comprehensive framework of cognitive science-inspired artificial general intelligence (AGI) tests, aimed at fulfilling the testing needs of large models with enhanced capabilities. The cognitive science-inspired AGI tests encompass the full spectrum of intelligence facets, including crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence, social intelligence, and embodied intelligence. To assess the multidimensional intelligence of large models, the AGI tests consist of a battery of well-designed cognitive tests adopted from human intelligence tests, and then naturally encapsulates into an immersive virtual community. We propose increasing the complexity of AGI testing tasks commensurate with advancements in large models and emphasizing the necessity for the interpretation of test results to avoid false negatives and false positives. We believe that cognitive science-inspired AGI tests will effectively guide the targeted improvement of large models in specific dimensions of intelligence and accelerate the integration of large models into human society.

We introduce Phi-4-reasoning, a 14-billion parameter reasoning model that achieves strong performance on complex reasoning tasks. Trained via supervised fine-tuning of Phi-4 on carefully curated set of "teachable" prompts-selected for the right level of complexity and diversity-and reasoning demonstrations generated using o3-mini, Phi-4-reasoning generates detailed reasoning chains that effectively leverage inference-time compute. We further develop Phi-4-reasoning-plus, a variant enhanced through a short phase of outcome-based reinforcement learning that offers higher performance by generating longer reasoning traces. Across a wide range of reasoning tasks, both models outperform significantly larger open-weight models such as DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-70B model and approach the performance levels of full DeepSeek-R1 model. Our comprehensive evaluations span benchmarks in math and scientific reasoning, coding, algorithmic problem solving, planning, and spatial understanding. Interestingly, we observe a non-trivial transfer of improvements to general-purpose benchmarks as well. In this report, we provide insights into our training data, our training methodologies, and our evaluations. We show that the benefit of careful data curation for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) extends to reasoning language models, and can be further amplified by reinforcement learning (RL). Finally, our evaluation points to opportunities for improving how we assess the performance and robustness of reasoning models.

State-of-the-art language generation models can degenerate when applied to open-ended generation problems such as text completion, story generation, or dialog modeling. This degeneration usually shows up in the form of incoherence, lack of vocabulary diversity, and self-repetition or copying from the context. In this paper, we postulate that ``human-like'' generations usually lie in a narrow and nearly flat entropy band, and violation of these entropy bounds correlates with degenerate behavior. Our experiments show that this stable narrow entropy zone exists across models, tasks, and domains and confirm the hypothesis that violations of this zone correlate with degeneration. We then use this insight to propose an entropy-aware decoding algorithm that respects these entropy bounds resulting in less degenerate, more contextual, and "human-like" language generation in open-ended text generation settings.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve good performance on challenging reasoning benchmarks, yet could also make basic reasoning mistakes. This contrasting behavior is puzzling when it comes to understanding the mechanisms behind LLMs' reasoning capabilities. One hypothesis is that the increasingly high and nearly saturated performance on common reasoning benchmarks could be due to the memorization of similar problems. In this paper, we systematically investigate this hypothesis with a quantitative measurement of memorization in reasoning tasks, using a dynamically generated logical reasoning benchmark based on Knights and Knaves (K&K) puzzles. We found that LLMs could interpolate the training puzzles (achieving near-perfect accuracy) after fine-tuning, yet fail when those puzzles are slightly perturbed, suggesting that the models heavily rely on memorization to solve those training puzzles. On the other hand, we show that while fine-tuning leads to heavy memorization, it also consistently improves generalization performance. In-depth analyses with perturbation tests, cross difficulty-level transferability, probing model internals, and fine-tuning with wrong answers suggest that the LLMs learn to reason on K&K puzzles despite training data memorization. This phenomenon indicates that LLMs exhibit a complex interplay between memorization and genuine reasoning abilities. Finally, our analysis with per-sample memorization score sheds light on how LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization in solving logical puzzles. Our code and data are available at https://memkklogic.github.io.

Diffusion models are a class of generative models that learn to synthesize samples by inverting a diffusion process that gradually maps data into noise. While these models have enjoyed great success recently, a full theoretical understanding of their observed properties is still lacking, in particular, their weak sensitivity to the choice of noise family and the role of adequate scheduling of noise levels for good synthesis. By identifying a correspondence between diffusion models and a well-known paradigm in cognitive science known as serial reproduction, whereby human agents iteratively observe and reproduce stimuli from memory, we show how the aforementioned properties of diffusion models can be explained as a natural consequence of this correspondence. We then complement our theoretical analysis with simulations that exhibit these key features. Our work highlights how classic paradigms in cognitive science can shed light on state-of-the-art machine learning problems.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Free-text rationales justify model decisions in natural language and thus become likable and accessible among approaches to explanation across many tasks. However, their effectiveness can be hindered by misinterpretation and hallucination. As a perturbation test, we investigate how large language models (LLMs) perform rationale generation under the effects of readability level control, i.e., being prompted for an explanation targeting a specific expertise level, such as sixth grade or college. We find that explanations are adaptable to such instruction, though the requested readability is often misaligned with the measured text complexity according to traditional readability metrics. Furthermore, the generated rationales tend to feature medium level complexity, which correlates with the measured quality using automatic metrics. Finally, our human annotators confirm a generally satisfactory impression on rationales at all readability levels, with high-school-level readability being most commonly perceived and favored.

Solving complex mathematical problems via system-2 reasoning is a natural human skill, yet it remains a significant challenge for current large language models (LLMs). We identify the scarcity of deliberate multi-step reasoning data as a primary limiting factor. To this end, we introduce Enriched Instruction Tuning (EIT), a method that enriches existing human-annotated mathematical datasets by synergizing human and AI feedback to create fine-grained reasoning trajectories. These datasets are then used to fine-tune open-source LLMs, enhancing their mathematical reasoning abilities without reliance on any symbolic verification program. Concretely, EIT is composed of two critical steps: Enriching with Reasoning Plan (ERP) and Enriching with Reasoning Step (ERS). The former generates a high-level plan that breaks down complex instructions into a sequence of simpler objectives, while ERS fills in reasoning contexts often overlooked by human annotators, creating a smoother reasoning trajectory for LLM fine-tuning. Unlike existing CoT prompting methods that generate reasoning chains only depending on LLM's internal knowledge, our method leverages human-annotated initial answers as ``meta-knowledge'' to help LLMs generate more detailed and precise reasoning processes, leading to a more trustworthy LLM expert for complex mathematical problems. In experiments, EIT achieves an accuracy of 84.1% on GSM8K and 32.5% on MATH, surpassing state-of-the-art fine-tuning and prompting methods, and even matching the performance of tool-augmented methods.

Solving mathematical problems requires advanced reasoning abilities and presents notable challenges for large language models. Previous works usually synthesize data from proprietary models to augment existing datasets, followed by instruction tuning to achieve top-tier results. However, our analysis of these datasets reveals severe biases towards easy queries, with frequent failures to generate any correct response for the most challenging queries. Hypothesizing that difficult queries are crucial to learn complex reasoning, we propose Difficulty-Aware Rejection Tuning (DART), a method that allocates difficult queries more trials during the synthesis phase, enabling more extensive training on difficult samples. Utilizing DART, we have created new datasets for mathematical problem-solving that focus more on difficult queries and are substantially smaller than previous ones. Remarkably, our synthesis process solely relies on a 7B-sized open-weight model, without reliance on the commonly used proprietary GPT-4. We fine-tune various base models on our datasets ranging from 7B to 70B in size, resulting in a series of strong models called DART-MATH. In comprehensive in-domain and out-of-domain evaluation on 6 mathematical benchmarks, DART-MATH outperforms vanilla rejection tuning significantly, being superior or comparable to previous arts, despite using much smaller datasets and no proprietary models. Furthermore, our results position our synthetic datasets as the most effective and cost-efficient publicly available resources for advancing mathematical problem-solving.

Mathematical reasoning---a core ability within human intelligence---presents some unique challenges as a domain: we do not come to understand and solve mathematical problems primarily on the back of experience and evidence, but on the basis of inferring, learning, and exploiting laws, axioms, and symbol manipulation rules. In this paper, we present a new challenge for the evaluation (and eventually the design) of neural architectures and similar system, developing a task suite of mathematics problems involving sequential questions and answers in a free-form textual input/output format. The structured nature of the mathematics domain, covering arithmetic, algebra, probability and calculus, enables the construction of training and test splits designed to clearly illuminate the capabilities and failure-modes of different architectures, as well as evaluate their ability to compose and relate knowledge and learned processes. Having described the data generation process and its potential future expansions, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of models from two broad classes of the most powerful sequence-to-sequence architectures and find notable differences in their ability to resolve mathematical problems and generalize their knowledge.

Recent methods have demonstrated that Large Language Models (LLMs) can solve reasoning tasks better when they are encouraged to solve subtasks of the main task first. In this paper we devise a similar strategy that breaks down reasoning tasks into a problem decomposition phase and a problem solving phase and show that the strategy is able to outperform a single stage solution. Further, we hypothesize that the decomposition should be easier to distill into a smaller model compared to the problem solving because the latter requires large amounts of domain knowledge while the former only requires learning general problem solving strategies. We propose methods to distill these two capabilities and evaluate their impact on reasoning outcomes and inference cost. We find that we can distill the problem decomposition phase and at the same time achieve good generalization across tasks, datasets, and models. However, it is harder to distill the problem solving capability without losing performance and the resulting distilled model struggles with generalization. These results indicate that by using smaller, distilled problem decomposition models in combination with problem solving LLMs we can achieve reasoning with cost-efficient inference and local adaptation.

We design a suite of minimal algorithmic tasks that are a loose abstraction of open-ended real-world tasks. This allows us to cleanly and controllably quantify the creative limits of the present-day language model. Much like real-world tasks that require a creative, far-sighted leap of thought, our tasks require an implicit, open-ended stochastic planning step that either (a) discovers new connections in an abstract knowledge graph (like in wordplay, drawing analogies, or research) or (b) constructs new patterns (like in designing math problems or new proteins). In these tasks, we empirically and conceptually argue how next-token learning is myopic and memorizes excessively; comparatively, multi-token approaches, namely teacherless training and diffusion models, excel in producing diverse and original output. Secondly, in our tasks, we find that to elicit randomness from the Transformer without hurting coherence, it is better to inject noise right at the input layer (via a method we dub hash-conditioning) rather than defer to temperature sampling from the output layer. Thus, our work offers a principled, minimal test-bed for analyzing open-ended creative skills, and offers new arguments for going beyond next-token learning and softmax-based sampling. We make part of the code available under https://github.com/chenwu98/algorithmic-creativity

We introduce MAmmoTH, a series of open-source large language models (LLMs) specifically tailored for general math problem-solving. The MAmmoTH models are trained on MathInstruct, our meticulously curated instruction tuning dataset. MathInstruct is compiled from 13 math datasets with intermediate rationales, six of which have rationales newly curated by us. It presents a unique hybrid of chain-of-thought (CoT) and program-of-thought (PoT) rationales, and also ensures extensive coverage of diverse fields in math. The hybrid of CoT and PoT not only unleashes the potential of tool use but also allows different thought processes for different math problems. As a result, the MAmmoTH series substantially outperform existing open-source models on nine mathematical reasoning datasets across all scales with an average accuracy gain between 13% and 29%. Remarkably, our MAmmoTH-7B model reaches 35% on MATH (a competition-level dataset), which exceeds the best open-source 7B model (WizardMath) by 25%, and the MAmmoTH-34B model achieves 46% accuracy on MATH, even surpassing GPT-4's CoT result. Our work underscores the importance of diverse problem coverage and the use of hybrid rationales in developing superior math generalist models.

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

Understanding knowledge mechanisms in Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for advancing towards trustworthy AGI. This paper reviews knowledge mechanism analysis from a novel taxonomy including knowledge utilization and evolution. Knowledge utilization delves into the mechanism of memorization, comprehension and application, and creation. Knowledge evolution focuses on the dynamic progression of knowledge within individual and group LLMs. Moreover, we discuss what knowledge LLMs have learned, the reasons for the fragility of parametric knowledge, and the potential dark knowledge (hypothesis) that will be challenging to address. We hope this work can help understand knowledge in LLMs and provide insights for future research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized natural language processing and hold immense potential for advancing Artificial Intelligence. However, the core architecture of most mainstream LLMs -- the Transformer -- has inherent limitations in computational depth, rendering them theoretically incapable of solving many reasoning tasks that demand increasingly deep computations. Chain of Thought (CoT) prompting has emerged as a technique to address these architectural limitations, as evidenced by several theoretical studies. It offers a promising approach to solving complex reasoning tasks that were previously beyond the capabilities of these models. Despite its successes, CoT and its variants (such as Tree of Thought, Graph of Thought, etc.) rely on a "one-prompt-for-all" approach, using a single prompt structure (e.g., "think step by step") for a wide range of tasks -- from counting and sorting to solving mathematical and algorithmic problems. This approach poses significant challenges for models to generate the correct reasoning steps, as the model must navigate through a vast prompt template space to find the appropriate template for each task. In this work, we build upon previous theoretical analyses of CoT to demonstrate how the one-prompt-for-all approach can negatively affect the computability of LLMs. We partition the solution search space into two: the prompt space and the answer space. Our findings show that task-specific supervision is essential for navigating the prompt space accurately and achieving optimal performance. Through experiments with state-of-the-art LLMs, we reveal a gap in reasoning performance when supervision is applied versus when it is not.

With the advancement of large language models (LLMs), solving complex reasoning tasks has gained increasing attention. Inference-time computation methods (e.g., Best-of-N, beam search, et al.) are particularly valuable as they can enhance reasoning performance without modifying model parameters or requiring additional training. However, these techniques come with implementation challenges, and most existing methods remain at the proof-of-concept stage with limited practical adoption due to their computational complexity and varying effectiveness across different tasks. In this paper, we investigate and benchmark diverse inference-time computation strategies across reasoning tasks of varying complexity. Since most current methods rely on a proposer-verifier pipeline that first generates candidate solutions (e.g., reasoning solutions) and then selects the best one based on reward signals (e.g., RLHF rewards, process rewards), our research focuses on optimizing both candidate solution generation (e.g., instructing prompts, hyperparameters such as temperature and top-p) and reward mechanisms (e.g., self-evaluation, reward types). Through extensive experiments (more than 20,000 A100-80G GPU hours with over 1,000 experiments) across a variety of models (e.g., Llama, Qwen, and Mistral families) of various sizes, our ablation studies reveal that previously overlooked strategies can significantly enhance performance (e.g., tuning temperature can improve reasoning task performance by up to 5%). Furthermore, we establish a standardized benchmark for inference-time computation by systematically evaluating six representative methods across eight reasoning tasks. These findings provide a stronger foundation for future research. The code is available at https://github.com/usail-hkust/benchmark_inference_time_computation_LLM

Being prompted to engage in reasoning has emerged as a core technique for using large language models (LLMs), deploying additional inference-time compute to improve task performance. However, as LLMs increase in both size and adoption, inference costs are correspondingly becoming increasingly burdensome. How, then, might we optimize reasoning's cost-performance tradeoff? This work introduces a novel approach based on computational models of metareasoning used in cognitive science, training LLMs to selectively use intermediate reasoning steps only when necessary. We first develop a reward function that incorporates the Value of Computation by penalizing unnecessary reasoning, then use this reward function with Expert Iteration to train the LLM. Compared to few-shot chain-of-thought prompting and STaR, our method significantly reduces inference costs (20-37\% fewer tokens generated across three models) while maintaining task performance across diverse datasets.

As AI systems become more intelligent and their behavior becomes more challenging to assess, they may learn to game the flaws of human feedback instead of genuinely striving to follow instructions; however, this risk can be mitigated by controlling how LLMs generalize human feedback to situations where it is unreliable. To better understand how reward models generalize, we craft 69 distribution shifts spanning 8 categories. We find that reward models do not learn to evaluate `instruction-following' by default and instead favor personas that resemble internet text. Techniques for interpreting reward models' internal representations achieve better generalization than standard fine-tuning, but still frequently fail to distinguish instruction-following from conflated behaviors. We consolidate the 15 most challenging distribution shifts into the GENeralization analogIES (GENIES) benchmark, which we hope will enable progress toward controlling reward model generalization.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

Despite significant advancements, there is a limited understanding of how large language models (LLMs) utilize knowledge for reasoning. To address this, we propose a method that deconstructs complex real-world questions into a graph, representing each question as a node with parent nodes of background knowledge needed to solve the question. We develop the DepthQA dataset, deconstructing questions into three depths: (i) recalling conceptual knowledge, (ii) applying procedural knowledge, and (iii) analyzing strategic knowledge. Based on a hierarchical graph, we quantify forward discrepancy, discrepancies in LLMs' performance on simpler sub-problems versus complex questions. We also measure backward discrepancy, where LLMs answer complex questions but struggle with simpler ones. Our analysis shows that smaller models have more discrepancies than larger models. Additionally, guiding models from simpler to complex questions through multi-turn interactions improves performance across model sizes, highlighting the importance of structured intermediate steps in knowledge reasoning. This work enhances our understanding of LLM reasoning and suggests ways to improve their problem-solving abilities.

Establishing a unified theory of cognition has been a major goal of psychology. While there have been previous attempts to instantiate such theories by building computational models, we currently do not have one model that captures the human mind in its entirety. Here we introduce Centaur, a computational model that can predict and simulate human behavior in any experiment expressible in natural language. We derived Centaur by finetuning a state-of-the-art language model on a novel, large-scale data set called Psych-101. Psych-101 reaches an unprecedented scale, covering trial-by-trial data from over 60,000 participants performing over 10,000,000 choices in 160 experiments. Centaur not only captures the behavior of held-out participants better than existing cognitive models, but also generalizes to new cover stories, structural task modifications, and entirely new domains. Furthermore, we find that the model's internal representations become more aligned with human neural activity after finetuning. Taken together, Centaur is the first real candidate for a unified model of human cognition. We anticipate that it will have a disruptive impact on the cognitive sciences, challenging the existing paradigm for developing computational models.

Recent developments, particularly OpenAI's O1 model, have demonstrated the remarkable potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) for complex reasoning tasks. Through analysis of O1's outputs and provided sample Chain-of-Thought (CoT) demonstrations, we observe that it approaches problem-solving in a distinctly human-like manner, systematically brainstorming ideas, testing hypotheses, verifying results, and planning comprehensive solutions. These sophisticated reasoning capabilities remain notably absent in other state-of-the-art language models. In this paper, we hypothesize that this performance gap stems from the limited availability of high-quality reasoning process data in current training sets. We demonstrate that by constructing a specialized dataset focused on explicit problem-solving workflows ("worked solutions"), we can elicit substantially improved planning capabilities from existing models. Additionally, we propose the Reasoning Enhancement Loop (REL), a method for generating synthetic worked solutions.

Visual mathematical reasoning, as a fundamental visual reasoning ability, has received widespread attention from the Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) community. Existing benchmarks, such as MathVista and MathVerse, focus more on the result-oriented performance but neglect the underlying principles in knowledge acquisition and generalization. Inspired by human-like mathematical reasoning, we introduce WE-MATH, the first benchmark specifically designed to explore the problem-solving principles beyond end-to-end performance. We meticulously collect and categorize 6.5K visual math problems, spanning 67 hierarchical knowledge concepts and five layers of knowledge granularity. We decompose composite problems into sub-problems according to the required knowledge concepts and introduce a novel four-dimensional metric, namely Insufficient Knowledge (IK), Inadequate Generalization (IG), Complete Mastery (CM), and Rote Memorization (RM), to hierarchically assess inherent issues in LMMs' reasoning process. With WE-MATH, we conduct a thorough evaluation of existing LMMs in visual mathematical reasoning and reveal a negative correlation between solving steps and problem-specific performance. We confirm the IK issue of LMMs can be effectively improved via knowledge augmentation strategies. More notably, the primary challenge of GPT-4o has significantly transitioned from IK to IG, establishing it as the first LMM advancing towards the knowledge generalization stage. In contrast, other LMMs exhibit a marked inclination towards Rote Memorization - they correctly solve composite problems involving multiple knowledge concepts yet fail to answer sub-problems. We anticipate that WE-MATH will open new pathways for advancements in visual mathematical reasoning for LMMs. The WE-MATH data and evaluation code are available at https://github.com/We-Math/We-Math.

Cognitive dynamics are pivotal to advance human understanding of the world. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) reveal their potential for cognitive simulation. However, these LLM-based cognitive studies primarily focus on static modeling, overlooking the dynamic nature of cognition. To bridge this gap, we propose the concept of the cognitive dynamics of LLMs and present a corresponding task with the inspiration of longitudinal studies. Towards the task, we develop CogBench, a novel benchmark to assess the cognitive dynamics of LLMs and validate it through participant surveys. We also design two evaluation metrics for CogBench, including Authenticity and Rationality. Recognizing the inherent static nature of LLMs, we introduce CogGPT for the task, which features an innovative iterative cognitive mechanism aimed at enhancing lifelong cognitive dynamics. Empirical results demonstrate the superiority of CogGPT over existing methods, particularly in its ability to facilitate role-specific cognitive dynamics under continuous information flows.

Human intelligence thrives on the concept of cognitive synergy, where collaboration and information integration among different cognitive processes yield superior outcomes compared to individual cognitive processes in isolation. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising performance as general task-solving agents, they still struggle with tasks that require intensive domain knowledge and complex reasoning. In this work, we propose Solo Performance Prompting (SPP), which transforms a single LLM into a cognitive synergist by engaging in multi-turn self-collaboration with multiple personas. A cognitive synergist refers to an intelligent agent that collaborates with multiple minds, combining their individual strengths and knowledge, to enhance problem-solving and overall performance in complex tasks. By dynamically identifying and simulating different personas based on task inputs, SPP unleashes the potential of cognitive synergy in LLMs. We have discovered that assigning multiple, fine-grained personas in LLMs elicits better problem-solving abilities compared to using a single or fixed number of personas. We evaluate SPP on three challenging tasks: Trivia Creative Writing, Codenames Collaborative, and Logic Grid Puzzle, encompassing both knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive types. Unlike previous works, such as Chain-of-Thought, that solely enhance the reasoning abilities in LLMs, SPP effectively elicits internal knowledge acquisition abilities, reduces hallucination, and maintains strong reasoning capabilities. Code, data, and prompts can be found at: https://github.com/MikeWangWZHL/Solo-Performance-Prompting.git.

Large language models (LLMs) trained on huge corpora of text datasets demonstrate intriguing capabilities, achieving state-of-the-art performance on tasks they were not explicitly trained for. The precise nature of LLM capabilities is often mysterious, and different prompts can elicit different capabilities through in-context learning. We propose a framework that enables us to analyze in-context learning dynamics to understand latent concepts underlying LLMs' behavioral patterns. This provides a more nuanced understanding than success-or-failure evaluation benchmarks, but does not require observing internal activations as a mechanistic interpretation of circuits would. Inspired by the cognitive science of human randomness perception, we use random binary sequences as context and study dynamics of in-context learning by manipulating properties of context data, such as sequence length. In the latest GPT-3.5+ models, we find emergent abilities to generate seemingly random numbers and learn basic formal languages, with striking in-context learning dynamics where model outputs transition sharply from seemingly random behaviors to deterministic repetition.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.

Large language models can solve tasks that were not present in the training set. This capability is believed to be due to in-context learning and skill composition. In this work, we study the emergence of in-context learning and skill composition in a collection of modular arithmetic tasks. Specifically, we consider a finite collection of linear modular functions z = a , x + b , y ;mod; p labeled by the vector (a, b) in Z_p^2. We use some of these tasks for pre-training and the rest for out-of-distribution testing. We empirically show that a GPT-style transformer exhibits a transition from in-distribution to out-of-distribution generalization as the number of pre-training tasks increases. We find that the smallest model capable of out-of-distribution generalization requires two transformer blocks, while for deeper models, the out-of-distribution generalization phase is transient, necessitating early stopping. Finally, we perform an interpretability study of the pre-trained models, revealing the highly structured representations in both phases; and discuss the learnt algorithm.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

We introduce KiloGram, a resource for studying abstract visual reasoning in humans and machines. Drawing on the history of tangram puzzles as stimuli in cognitive science, we build a richly annotated dataset that, with >1k distinct stimuli, is orders of magnitude larger and more diverse than prior resources. It is both visually and linguistically richer, moving beyond whole shape descriptions to include segmentation maps and part labels. We use this resource to evaluate the abstract visual reasoning capacities of recent multi-modal models. We observe that pre-trained weights demonstrate limited abstract reasoning, which dramatically improves with fine-tuning. We also observe that explicitly describing parts aids abstract reasoning for both humans and models, especially when jointly encoding the linguistic and visual inputs. KiloGram is available at https://lil.nlp.cornell.edu/kilogram .

Large language models (LLMs) are applied to all sorts of creative tasks, and their outputs vary from beautiful, to peculiar, to pastiche, into plain plagiarism. The temperature parameter of an LLM regulates the amount of randomness, leading to more diverse outputs; therefore, it is often claimed to be the creativity parameter. Here, we investigate this claim using a narrative generation task with a predetermined fixed context, model and prompt. Specifically, we present an empirical analysis of the LLM output for different temperature values using four necessary conditions for creativity in narrative generation: novelty, typicality, cohesion, and coherence. We find that temperature is weakly correlated with novelty, and unsurprisingly, moderately correlated with incoherence, but there is no relationship with either cohesion or typicality. However, the influence of temperature on creativity is far more nuanced and weak than suggested by the "creativity parameter" claim; overall results suggest that the LLM generates slightly more novel outputs as temperatures get higher. Finally, we discuss ideas to allow more controlled LLM creativity, rather than relying on chance via changing the temperature parameter.

Chomsky and others have very directly claimed that large language models (LLMs) are equally capable of learning languages that are possible and impossible for humans to learn. However, there is very little published experimental evidence to support such a claim. Here, we develop a set of synthetic impossible languages of differing complexity, each designed by systematically altering English data with unnatural word orders and grammar rules. These languages lie on an impossibility continuum: at one end are languages that are inherently impossible, such as random and irreversible shuffles of English words, and on the other, languages that may not be intuitively impossible but are often considered so in linguistics, particularly those with rules based on counting word positions. We report on a wide range of evaluations to assess the capacity of GPT-2 small models to learn these uncontroversially impossible languages, and crucially, we perform these assessments at various stages throughout training to compare the learning process for each language. Our core finding is that GPT-2 struggles to learn impossible languages when compared to English as a control, challenging the core claim. More importantly, we hope our approach opens up a productive line of inquiry in which different LLM architectures are tested on a variety of impossible languages in an effort to learn more about how LLMs can be used as tools for these cognitive and typological investigations.

Mathematical reasoning skills are essential for general-purpose intelligent systems to perform tasks from grocery shopping to climate modeling. Towards evaluating and improving AI systems in this domain, we propose LILA, a unified mathematical reasoning benchmark consisting of 23 diverse tasks along four dimensions: (i) mathematical abilities e.g., arithmetic, calculus (ii) language format e.g., question-answering, fill-in-the-blanks (iii) language diversity e.g., no language, simple language (iv) external knowledge e.g., commonsense, physics. We construct our benchmark by extending 20 datasets benchmark by collecting task instructions and solutions in the form of Python programs, thereby obtaining explainable solutions in addition to the correct answer. We additionally introduce two evaluation datasets to measure out-of-distribution performance and robustness to language perturbation. Finally, we introduce BHASKARA, a general-purpose mathematical reasoning model trained on LILA. Importantly, we find that multi-tasking leads to significant improvements (average relative improvement of 21.83% F1 score vs. single-task models), while the best performing model only obtains 60.40%, indicating the room for improvement in general mathematical reasoning and understanding.

The ability (and inability) of large language models (LLMs) to perform arithmetic tasks has been the subject of much theoretical and practical debate. We show that LLMs are frequently able to correctly and confidently predict the first digit of n-digit by m-digit multiplication tasks without using chain of thought reasoning, despite these tasks require compounding operations to solve. Simultaneously, LLMs in practice often fail to correctly or confidently predict the last digit of an n-digit by m-digit multiplication, a task equivalent to 1-digit by 1-digit multiplication which can be easily learned or memorized. We show that the latter task can be solved more robustly when the LLM is conditioned on all of the correct higher-order digits, which on average increases the confidence of the correct last digit on 5-digit by 5-digit multiplication tasks using Llama 2-13B by over 230% (0.13 to 0.43) and Mistral-7B by 150% (0.22 to 0.55).

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence, particularly with the development of Large Language Models (LLMs) built on the transformer architecture, has redefined the capabilities of natural language processing. These models now exhibit remarkable performance across various language-related tasks, such as text generation, question answering, translation, and summarization, often rivaling human-like comprehension. More intriguingly, LLMs have demonstrated emergent abilities extending beyond their core functions, showing proficiency in tasks like commonsense reasoning, code generation, and arithmetic. This survey paper explores the foundational components, scaling mechanisms, and architectural strategies that drive these capabilities. Emphasizing models like GPT and LLaMA, we analyze the impact of exponential data and computational growth on LLM performance, while also addressing the trade-offs associated with scaling. We also examine LLM applications across sectors, such as healthcare, finance, education, and law, highlighting their adaptability and potential to solve domain-specific challenges. Central to this work are the questions of how LLMs generalize across diverse tasks, exhibit planning, and reasoning abilities, and whether these emergent abilities can be systematically elicited or enhanced. In particular, we provide some insights into the CoT (Chain of Thought) and PoT (Plan of Thought) abilities within LLMs, focusing on how pre-training data influences their emergence. Additionally, we investigate LLM-modulo frameworks that integrate external systems, allowing LLMs to handle complex, dynamic tasks. By analyzing these factors, this paper aims to foster the ongoing discussion on the capabilities and limits of LLMs, promoting their responsible development and application in novel and increasingly complex environments.

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.

In human cognition theory, human thinking is governed by two systems: the fast and intuitive System 1 and the slower but more deliberative System 2. Recent studies have shown that incorporating System 2 process into Transformers including large language models (LLMs), significantly enhances their reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, models that purely resemble System 2 thinking require substantially higher computational costs and are much slower to respond. To address this challenge, we present Dualformer, a single Transformer model that seamlessly integrates both the fast and slow reasoning modes. Dualformer is obtained by training on data with randomized reasoning traces, where different parts of the traces are dropped during training. The dropping strategies are specifically tailored according to the trace structure, analogous to analyzing our thinking process and creating shortcuts with patterns. At inference time, our model can be configured to output only the solutions (fast mode) or both the reasoning chain and the final solution (slow mode), or automatically decide which mode to engage (auto mode). In all cases, Dualformer outperforms the corresponding baseline models in both performance and computational efficiency: (1) in slow mode, Dualformer optimally solves unseen 30 x 30 maze navigation tasks 97.6% of the time, surpassing the Searchformer (trained on data with complete reasoning traces) baseline performance of 93.3%, while only using 45.5% fewer reasoning steps; (2) in fast mode, Dualformer completes those tasks with an 80% optimal rate, significantly outperforming the Solution-Only model (trained on solution-only data), which has an optimal rate of only 30%. For math problems, our techniques have also achieved improved performance with LLM fine-tuning, showing its generalization beyond task-specific models.

Neural networks often suffer from catastrophic interference (CI): performance on previously learned tasks drops off significantly when learning a new task. This contrasts strongly with humans, who can sequentially learn new tasks without appreciably forgetting previous tasks. Prior work has explored various techniques for mitigating CI such as regularization, rehearsal, generative replay, and distillation methods. The current work takes a different approach, one guided by cognitive science research showing that in naturalistic environments, the probability of encountering a task decreases as a power-law of the time since it was last performed. We argue that a realistic evaluation of techniques for the mitigation of CI should be performed in simulated naturalistic learning environments. Thus, we evaluate the extent of mitigation of CI when training simple rehearsal-based methods in power-law environments similar to the ones humans face. Our work explores this novel rehearsal-based approach for a domain-incremental task: learning permutations in the MNIST task. We compare our rehearsal environment with other baselines to show its efficacy in promoting continual learning. Additionally, we investigate whether this environment shows forward facilitation, i.e., faster learning of later tasks. Next, we explore the robustness of our learning environment to the number of tasks, model size, and amount of data rehearsed after each task. Notably, our results show that the performance is comparable or superior to that of models trained using popular regularization methods and also to rehearsals in non-power-law environments. The benefits of this training paradigm include simplicity and the lack of a need for extra neural circuitry. In addition, because our method is orthogonal to other methods, future research can combine training in power-law environments with other continual learning mechanisms.

Large multimodal models extend the impressive capabilities of large language models by integrating multimodal understanding abilities. However, it is not clear how they can emulate the general intelligence and reasoning ability of humans. As recognizing patterns and abstracting concepts are key to general intelligence, we introduce PuzzleVQA, a collection of puzzles based on abstract patterns. With this dataset, we evaluate large multimodal models with abstract patterns based on fundamental concepts, including colors, numbers, sizes, and shapes. Through our experiments on state-of-the-art large multimodal models, we find that they are not able to generalize well to simple abstract patterns. Notably, even GPT-4V cannot solve more than half of the puzzles. To diagnose the reasoning challenges in large multimodal models, we progressively guide the models with our ground truth reasoning explanations for visual perception, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning. Our systematic analysis finds that the main bottlenecks of GPT-4V are weaker visual perception and inductive reasoning abilities. Through this work, we hope to shed light on the limitations of large multimodal models and how they can better emulate human cognitive processes in the future (Our data and code will be released publicly at https://github.com/declare-lab/LLM-PuzzleTest).

While recent works (e.g. o1, DeepSeek R1) have demonstrated great promise of using long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) to improve reasoning capabilities of language models, scaling it up during test-time is challenging due to inefficient memory usage -- intermediate computations accumulate indefinitely in context even no longer needed for future thoughts. We propose PENCIL, which incorporates a reduction mechanism into the autoregressive generation process, allowing the model to recursively clean up intermediate thoughts based on patterns learned from training. With this reduction mechanism, PENCIL significantly reduces the maximal context length required during generation, and thus can generate longer thoughts with limited memory, solving larger-scale problems given more thinking time. For example, we demonstrate PENCIL achieves 97\% accuracy on the challenging Einstein's puzzle -- a task even large models like GPT-4 struggle with -- using only a small 25M-parameter transformer with 2048 context length. Theoretically, we prove PENCIL can perform universal space-efficient computation by simulating Turing machines with optimal time and space complexity, and thus can solve arbitrary computational tasks that would otherwise be intractable given context window constraints.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve remarkable performance across various tasks, they often struggle with complex reasoning tasks, such as answering mathematical questions. Recent efforts to address this issue have primarily focused on leveraging mathematical datasets through supervised fine-tuning or self-improvement techniques. However, these methods often depend on high-quality datasets that are difficult to prepare, or they require substantial computational resources for fine-tuning. Inspired by findings that LLMs know how to produce the right answer but struggle to select the correct reasoning path, we propose a purely inference-based searching method -- MindStar (M*). This method formulates reasoning tasks as searching problems and proposes two search ideas to identify the optimal reasoning paths. We evaluate the M* framework on both the GSM8K and MATH datasets, comparing its performance with existing open and closed-source LLMs. Our results demonstrate that M* significantly enhances the reasoning abilities of open-source models, such as Llama-2-13B and Mistral-7B, and achieves comparable performance to GPT-3.5 and Grok-1, but with substantially reduced model size and computational costs.

This paper presents an in-depth analysis of Large Language Models (LLMs), focusing on LLaMA, a prominent open-source foundational model in natural language processing. Instead of assessing LLaMA through its generative output, we design multiple-choice tasks to probe its intrinsic understanding in high-order tasks such as reasoning and computation. We examine the model horizontally, comparing different sizes, and vertically, assessing different layers. We unveil several key and uncommon findings based on the designed probing tasks: (1) Horizontally, enlarging model sizes almost could not automatically impart additional knowledge or computational prowess. Instead, it can enhance reasoning abilities, especially in math problem solving, and helps reduce hallucinations, but only beyond certain size thresholds; (2) In vertical analysis, the lower layers of LLaMA lack substantial arithmetic and factual knowledge, showcasing logical thinking, multilingual and recognitive abilities, with top layers housing most computational power and real-world knowledge.

Today's probabilistic language generators fall short when it comes to producing coherent and fluent text despite the fact that the underlying models perform well under standard metrics, e.g., perplexity. This discrepancy has puzzled the language generation community for the last few years. In this work, we posit that the abstraction of natural language generation as a discrete stochastic process--which allows for an information-theoretic analysis--can provide new insights into the behavior of probabilistic language generators, e.g., why high-probability texts can be dull or repetitive. Humans use language as a means of communicating information, aiming to do so in a simultaneously efficient and error-minimizing manner; in fact, psycholinguistics research suggests humans choose each word in a string with this subconscious goal in mind. We formally define the set of strings that meet this criterion: those for which each word has an information content close to the expected information content, i.e., the conditional entropy of our model. We then propose a simple and efficient procedure for enforcing this criterion when generating from probabilistic models, which we call locally typical sampling. Automatic and human evaluations show that, in comparison to nucleus and top-k sampling, locally typical sampling offers competitive performance (in both abstractive summarization and story generation) in terms of quality while consistently reducing degenerate repetitions.

In this paper, we present a novel framework for the analysis of Riemann Hypothesis [27], which is composed of three key components: a) probabilistic modeling with cross entropy optimization and reasoning; b) the application of the law of large numbers; c) the application of mathematical inductions. The analysis is mainly conducted by virtue of probabilistic modeling of cross entropy optimization and reasoning with rare event simulation techniques. The application of the law of large numbers [2, 3, 6] and the application of mathematical inductions make the analysis of Riemann Hypothesis self-contained and complete to make sure that the whole complex plane is covered as conjectured in Riemann Hypothesis. We also discuss the method of enhanced top-p sampling with large language models (LLMs) for reasoning, where next token prediction is not just based on the estimated probabilities of each possible token in the current round but also based on accumulated path probabilities among multiple top-k chain of thoughts (CoTs) paths. The probabilistic modeling of cross entropy optimization and reasoning may suit well with the analysis of Riemann Hypothesis as Riemann Zeta functions are inherently dealing with the sums of infinite components of a complex number series. We hope that our analysis in this paper could shed some light on some of the insights of Riemann Hypothesis. The framework and techniques presented in this paper, coupled with recent developments with chain of thought (CoT) or diagram of thought (DoT) reasoning in large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL) [1, 7, 18, 21, 24, 34, 39-41], could pave the way for eventual proof of Riemann Hypothesis [27].

We study whether Large Language Models (LLMs) latently perform multi-hop reasoning with complex prompts such as "The mother of the singer of 'Superstition' is". We look for evidence of a latent reasoning pathway where an LLM (1) latently identifies "the singer of 'Superstition'" as Stevie Wonder, the bridge entity, and (2) uses its knowledge of Stevie Wonder's mother to complete the prompt. We analyze these two hops individually and consider their co-occurrence as indicative of latent multi-hop reasoning. For the first hop, we test if changing the prompt to indirectly mention the bridge entity instead of any other entity increases the LLM's internal recall of the bridge entity. For the second hop, we test if increasing this recall causes the LLM to better utilize what it knows about the bridge entity. We find strong evidence of latent multi-hop reasoning for the prompts of certain relation types, with the reasoning pathway used in more than 80% of the prompts. However, the utilization is highly contextual, varying across different types of prompts. Also, on average, the evidence for the second hop and the full multi-hop traversal is rather moderate and only substantial for the first hop. Moreover, we find a clear scaling trend with increasing model size for the first hop of reasoning but not for the second hop. Our experimental findings suggest potential challenges and opportunities for future development and applications of LLMs.

Human reasoning relies on constructing and manipulating mental models-simplified internal representations of situations that we use to understand and solve problems. Conceptual diagrams (for example, sketches drawn by humans to aid reasoning) externalize these mental models, abstracting irrelevant details to efficiently capture relational and spatial information. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) predominantly reason through textual representations, limiting their effectiveness in complex multi-step combinatorial and planning tasks. In this paper, we propose a zero-shot fully automatic framework that enables LMMs to reason through multiple chains of self-generated intermediate conceptual diagrams, significantly enhancing their combinatorial planning capabilities. Our approach does not require any human initialization beyond a natural language description of the task. It integrates both textual and diagrammatic reasoning within an optimized graph-of-thought inference framework, enhanced by beam search and depth-wise backtracking. Evaluated on multiple challenging PDDL planning domains, our method substantially improves GPT-4o's performance (for example, from 35.5% to 90.2% in Blocksworld). On more difficult planning domains with solution depths up to 40, our approach outperforms even the o1-preview reasoning model (for example, over 13% improvement in Parking). These results highlight the value of conceptual diagrams as a complementary reasoning medium in LMMs.

Many recent works have discussed the propensity, or lack thereof, for emergent languages to exhibit properties of natural languages. A favorite in the literature is learning compositionality. We note that most of those works have focused on communicative bandwidth as being of primary importance. While important, it is not the only contributing factor. In this paper, we investigate the learning biases that affect the efficacy and compositionality of emergent languages. Our foremost contribution is to explore how capacity of a neural network impacts its ability to learn a compositional language. We additionally introduce a set of evaluation metrics with which we analyze the learned languages. Our hypothesis is that there should be a specific range of model capacity and channel bandwidth that induces compositional structure in the resulting language and consequently encourages systematic generalization. While we empirically see evidence for the bottom of this range, we curiously do not find evidence for the top part of the range and believe that this is an open question for the community.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

We introduce "Method Actors" as a mental model for guiding LLM prompt engineering and prompt architecture. Under this mental model, LLMs should be thought of as actors; prompts as scripts and cues; and LLM responses as performances. We apply this mental model to the task of improving LLM performance at playing Connections, a New York Times word puzzle game that prior research identified as a challenging benchmark for evaluating LLM reasoning. Our experiments with GPT-4o show that a "Method Actors" approach can significantly improve LLM performance over both a vanilla and "Chain of Thoughts" approach. A vanilla approach solves 27% of Connections puzzles in our dataset and a "Chain of Thoughts" approach solves 41% of puzzles, whereas our strongest "Method Actor" approach solves 86% of puzzles. We also test OpenAI's newest model designed specifically for complex reasoning tasks, o1-preview. When asked to solve a puzzle all at once, o1-preview solves 79% of Connections puzzles in our dataset, and when allowed to build puzzle solutions one guess at a time over multiple API calls, o1-preview solves 100% of the puzzles. Incorporating a "Method Actor" prompt architecture increases the percentage of puzzles that o1-preview solves perfectly from 76% to 87%.

Recent studies have put into question the belief that emergent abilities in language models are exclusive to large models. This skepticism arises from two observations: 1) smaller models can also exhibit high performance on emergent abilities and 2) there is doubt on the discontinuous metrics used to measure these abilities. In this paper, we propose to study emergent abilities in the lens of pre-training loss, instead of model size or training compute. We demonstrate that the models with the same pre-training loss, but different model and data sizes, generate the same performance on various downstream tasks. We also discover that a model exhibits emergent abilities on certain tasks -- regardless of the continuity of metrics -- when its pre-training loss falls below a specific threshold. Before reaching this threshold, its performance remains at the level of random guessing. This inspires us to redefine emergent abilities as those that manifest in models with lower pre-training losses, highlighting that these abilities cannot be predicted by merely extrapolating the performance trends of models with higher pre-training losses.